[G.R. Nos. 148939-40.

February 13, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSEPH ORILLA, appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision[1] dated 7 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Alaminos City, Province of Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla, the 15-year old sister of appellant Joseph Orilla (appellant),
accused appellant of raping her twice. The criminal cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A. The trial court
found appellant guilty of only one crime of qualified rape and imposed on him the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. Instead
of dismissing the second case, Criminal Case No. 3220-A, the trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of
imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.

The Charge

The Amended Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A are identical. The allegations read:

That on or about the dawn of September 12, 1996 at Brgy. Masidem, municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused, by means of force or intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Arraignment and Plea

On 3 January 1997, appellant assisted by his counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the two charges.[3]

The Trial

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) Remilyn, the complainant and sister of the appellant, (2) SPO1 Clarence de Vera,
a member of the Philippine National Police of Bani, Pangasinan, who entered in the police blotter the complaint of Remilyn, and (3)
Dr. Lynette Valencerina-Caburnay (Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay), a resident physician of the Western Pangasinan District Hospital, who
conducted the medico-legal examination of Remilyn.
The prosecutions version of the rapes as summarized by the Solicitor General is as follows:

On September 12, 1996, around 3:00 oclock in the morning, fifteen-year old Remilyn Orilla was sound asleep inside one of the rooms
of their house located at Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing on her body and
found appellant Joseph Orilla on top of her. (p. 18, TSN, April 15, 1997)

Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked from waist down (pp. 17-18, ibid). Appellant continuously pinned down Remilyn Orillas
body with his own. She struggled to free herself from appellant but her efforts proved futile. (p. 7, TSN, April 15, 1997)
Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced Remilyn Orillas legs
apart and inserted his penis into her vagina. Remilyn Orilla felt pain. She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina (p. 8, ibid.).
Appellant remained on top of Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter her vagina (ibid.). With
a knife pointed at her, Remilyn Orilla was powerless. Appellant warned her not to make a noise. Frightened, Remilyn Orilla just kept
silent. (pp. 8-9, 18-19, ibid.)

Around 9:00 oclock in the morning of that same day, Remilyn Orilla reported to her sister, Evelyn Catabay, what appellant did to her.
Immediately, they went to the Municipal Hall of Bani to report the incident. Unfortunately, the investigator assigned that day was
absent. (p. 22, ibid.)

On September 19, 1996, around 2:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla arrived at the Bani Police Station, Bani, Pangasinan and
executed her sworn statement relative to the incident in question. She recounted the incident to SPO1 Clarence P. de Vera who entered
the same in the Police Blotter (p. 2, TSN, June 11, 1997).

Later, or around 3:30 in the afternoon, Remilyn Orilla and her sister went to the Western Pangasinan District Hospital in Alaminos,
Pangasinan. Remilyn Orilla was examined by Dr. Lynette D. Valencerina whose findings are contained in the Medico-Legal
Certificate dated September 20, 1996 (Exhibit A) which she issued:

MENSTRUAL HISTORY: Menarche at age 13 years old, occurring monthly, of 3-7 days duration, consuming around 2 napkins per
day not accompanied by hypoglycemia.

LMP August 9-14, 1996

INTERNAL EXAMINATION: With old hymenal laceration at 3, 6 and 9 oclock position vaginal introitous admits 2 fingers with
ease, Cervix close, uterus small;

(-) adnexeal mass/tenderness

Pregnancy Test negative

(p. 8, Record)

Accordingly, appellant was arrested. However, he escaped while detained at the provincial jail. After a month of hiding, appellant was
re-arrested. (pp. 12-13, TSN, September 28, 1999).

On the other hand, Remilyn Orilla is now under the care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development. (p. 12, TSN, April 15,
1997).[4]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented three witnesses: (1) appellant, (2) Crispin Orilla (Crispin), brother of appellant and Remilyn, and (3)
Beverly Cabuburac (Beverly), sister of appellant and Remilyn.
Appellant and Remilyn are siblings. Remilyn is the youngest in a brood of nine. The parents of appellant and Remilyn are
already dead. Remilyn was then staying in a house commonly owned by the siblings in Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan.
Adjacent to Remilyns house is the house of appellant where he and his own family lived.
Appellant claimed that from 2 August 1996 to 14 September 1996, he was in Sitio Olo, Barangay Masidem, Bani, Pangasinan
rushing the work on the dikes of a fishpond. He was not able to go home to his house in Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996,
the date the crimes charged allegedly occurred.
Appellants house in Barangay Masidem is five to six meters away from the house of Remilyn. However, the place where
appellant was staying in Sitio Olo is two kilometers away from Barangay Masidem. One can negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo
and Barangay Masidem by walking. However, one must cross a river before reaching Barangay Masidem. A motorboat service is
available to cross the river and the ride can last for an hour. Crossing the river on foot will take about three hours.
Appellant worked in the fishpond of Lindel Onofre who is married to another sister of appellant. At the time appellant was
working in the fishpond, his companion was his brother, Reneboy Orilla (Reneboy). The persons left in appellants house while he was
in Sitio Olo were his wife, five children and his wifes grandmother. When appellant left Barangay Masidem on 2 August 1996 for
Sitio Olo, the persons who were with Remilyn in her house were Crispin, Beverly and her three children.
 Appellant described Remilyn as matampuhin or emotional. Remilyn was always frowning and sometimes she would be happy.
When Remilyn would get irritable she would just leave the house for weeks without telling appellant or their other siblings where she
was going. Appellant claimed that he had a good relationship with Remilyn although he would sometimes scold her because she
would leave the house without permission. Appellant does not know why Remilyn accused him of rape. Appellant assumed that it was
because he often scolded Remilyn.
Crispin testified that on 11 September 1996, he and his sister Beverly and her husband slept in the living room of their house
while Remilyn slept in the small room with Beverlys daughter. The next day, 12 September 1996, Crispin woke up around 5:00 a.m.
and noticed that Remilyn was still asleep. During that time, his brother Joseph was working in Barangay Ulo, Bani, Pangasinan.
Beverly testified that on 11 September 1996, she was in Masidem with her children and her siblings, Crispin, Reneboy, and
Remilyn. At 6:00 a.m. of the next day, she, together with her husband and children, left for Manila. She denied having any knowledge
that her brother Joseph raped their sister Remilyn.

The Trial Courts Judgment

The trial court ruled that Remilyn positively identified appellant as the one who raped her. True, no electric light or kerosene
lamp lit the room where the rape took place. However, since it was already 3:00 a.m., a ray of light from the eastern horizon enabled
Remilyn to recognize appellant. When appellant threatened and ordered Remilyn not to shout, or else he would kill her, Remilyn was
able to recognize appellants voice. The trial court concluded that even if appellant attacked Remilyn during the darkest portion of the
night,[5] appellants voice alone could have made it known to Remilyn that her attacker was appellant, her own brother.
The trial court rejected appellants defense of alibi. One can negotiate the distance between Sitio Olo and Barangay Masidem by
riding passenger jeepneys and tricycles and by riding a motorboat to cross the river. Appellant failed to demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have access to the place where the crime happened.
The trial court gave credence to Remilyns testimony because her testimony was very natural and convincing.[6] In contrast, the
testimony of the defense witnesses failed to convince the trial court. Defense witness Crispins demeanor in court prompted the trial
court to remark that he appeared crafty, cunning, unfair and unreliable.[7] Beverlys testimony failed to support appellants alibi because
she testified that she left Barangay Masidem on 12 September 1996 and she learned of the rape only on her return sometime in
January of 1997.
The trial court held that the presence of old lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 oclock vaginal positions indicates that Remilyn had previous
sexual experience contrary to Remilyns claim that the rape was her first sexual experience. The trial court nonetheless ruled that a
woman who is unchaste or impure could still be raped.
Thus, the trial court held appellant guilty of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. The trial court ruled that since Remilyn
was only 15 years old at the time appellant raped her, the death penalty must be imposed on appellant, the victims brother. Appellant
committed only one count of rape because while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyns vagina, the first and second ejaculations
occurred during one single body connection.[8] The trial court considered Criminal Case No. 3220-A involving the second count of
rape as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A.
The judgment of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE in Criminal Case No. 3219-A and considering that the offended party is under 18 years of age,
and the offender is the brother of the victim (relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree) the accused is therefore sentenced
to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH by lethal injection but in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable
Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death is not imposed but that of Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that
accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30) years and that he is further condemned to pay in favor of the
offended party in the sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as civil indemnity.

That Criminal Case No. 3220-A is considered merely as a qualifying circumstance in the imposition of the death penalty, as the Court
submits the view that there is only one crime of rape committed although there were two ejaculations done on the person of the
offended party.

The Provincial Warden of the Province of Pangasinan at Lingayen is ordered to commit the living body of the accused to the National
Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City within a period of three (3) days from receipt of this Decision considering that in the past the accused
have (sic) tendency to escape his Jailer.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[9]

The Issues

Appellant submits for our review the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
COMPLAINANTS DUBIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI DESPITE
COMPLAINANTS DOUBTFUL IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT AS THE AUTHOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3220-A AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
AGAINST THE APPELLANT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3219-A, SINCE THE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE IS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON HIM
THE DEATH PENALTY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE INFROMATION NEVER ALLEGED THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF COMPLAINANTS AGE, AND THE EXACT DEGREE OF CONSANGUINITY ANENT THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP.[10]

The Courts Ruling

Appellant is guilty of rape as charged in Criminal Case No. 3219-A but the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death. Since
appellant committed only one count of rape, Criminal Case No. 3220-A must be dismissed.
Appellant insists that it was impossible for Remilyn to have identified the person who raped her because the room where the
crime took place was pitch black, as it had no window and no source of light. Appellant asks the Court to take judicial notice of the
fact that on 12 September 1996, a Thursday, the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines was at 5:45 a.m., or a good two hours
and forty-five minutes from 3:00 a.m. Appellant argues that if the rape took place at 3:00 a.m., then there could have been no early
morning sunlight to aid Remilyn in identifying appellant.
We are not persuaded. Crispin, the brother of Remilyn and appellant and a witness for the defense, testified that the wall of the
house where the rape happened was made of buri[11]and the flooring of the house was made of splitted (sic) bamboo.[12] Buri is a leaf
that is dried and woven together to form panels used as walls in the construction of houses. A panel of buriis not compact as it has
small holes in it allowing light to filter through the woven material. The slats on the floor and the elevation of the floor from the
ground by two feet[13] also make it possible for light to pass through the floor.
While the approximate time of sunrise in the Philippines on 12 September 1996 was at 5:45 a.m. and not at 3:00 a.m., what is
controlling is Remilyns declaration that the horizon coming from the east enabled her to identify appellant. Remilyn categorically
declared that there was a little light, sir, that is why I recognized him.[14] Remilyns declaration that there was a little light is consistent
with her statement that the room was not fully illuminated but the amount of light that sneaked through her room was sufficient to
enable her to recognize her own brother.
The time mentioned by Remilyn, that is 3:00 a.m., is at most an estimate. We must bear in mind that appellant roused Remilyn
from sleep when he forced himself on her. Remilyn could not have known the exact time as appellants act abruptly and rudely
awakened her. Remilyns estimate of the time while not precise tends to strengthen the impression that her testimony is unrehearsed.
Moreover, no one expects rape victims to remember with precision every detail of the crime. A mis-estimation of time is too
immaterial to discredit the testimony of a witness especially where time is not an essential element or has no substantial bearing on the
fact of the commission of the offense.[15] What is decisive in a rape charge is the complainants positive identification of the accused as
the malefactor.[16]
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in declaring that Remilyn identified him through his voice. Appellant maintains that
Remilyn was not able to identify him at all. Appellants contention is without basis. Remilyns testimony is as follows:
Q: And during the time that the accused was on top of you, what did you do, if any?
A: I cannot move and fight because he threatened me not to shout, sir.
Q: And what was the word of the accused when he threatened you?
A: He told me not to shout and move and according to him he will kill me, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
 Q: And because of those threatened words of the accused you mean to inform the Honorable Court that you did not shout
for help?
A: No, sir, because I was afraid.[17]
Based on the foregoing testimony, there was nothing to prevent the trial court from properly concluding that Remilyn identified
appellant through voice recognition. A persons voice is an acceptable means of identification where there is proof that the witness and
the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.[18] Appellant is no stranger to Remilyn for she had known
him with much familiarity. Appellant is Remilyns own brother. Thus, when appellant threatened Remilyn not to shout and move, or
else he would kill her, the trial court logically inferred that Remilyn recognized appellant through his voice.
We have thoroughly examined the transcript of the testimonies of the witnesses and we agree with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court was meticulous in judging the witnesses credibility. The trial court even took note of
the witnesses demeanor in court. Unless appellant can show that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, the Court will not disturb the trial courts
findings on appeal.[19] None of the grounds to overturn the trial courts ruling on the witnesses credibility is present in this case.
Remilyns narration of how appellant ravished her meets the test of credibility. When a woman says that the accused raped her, in
effect, she says all that is necessary to show that the accused raped her, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the court may
convict the accused on that basis.[20]
Remilyn had no reason to fabricate the serious charges against her own brother whose life could hang in the balance in case he is
found guilty of qualified rape. With the filing of the criminal cases, Remilyn had to face the ire of her other siblings, two of whom
have even testified against her. Remilyn is now under the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in Lingayen,
Pangasinan. An incestuous sexual assault is a psycho-social deviance that inflicts a stigma, not only on the victim but also on their
whole family.[21] Even in ordinary rape cases, the sole testimony of a credible victim may seal the fate of the rapist.[22]
Appellant failed to establish convincingly his alibi. The distance between Sitio Olo, where appellant claimed he was, and
Barangay Masidem, where the rape happened, is only two kilometers. Appellant himself admitted that public vehicles were available
to transport passengers from Sitio Olo to Barangay Masidem, including a motorboat that could ferry the passengers to Barrio Masidem
in just about an hour. It was not physically impossible for appellant to have gone to Barangay Masidem on the day he committed the
rape. None of his witnesses could even corroborate his alibi.
Appellants alibi and denial cannot prevail over Remilyns positive and categorical testimony. Alibi is an inherently weak defense
and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.[23] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the
accused show he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime.[24] The accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[25] Appellant failed to
do this. Moreover, appellants escape from detention does not help his cause since escape is evidence of guilt.[26]
We must correct the trial courts opinion that prior to the rape, Remilyn already had past sexual experience because her hymen
had healed lacerations. The trial court reached this conclusion despite Remilyns assertion that she had no sexual experience at all
before the rape and despite the absence of such a finding by Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay, the medico- legal who examined Remilyn.
Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay conducted Remilyns physical examination on 19 September 1996 or seven days after the rape. Dr.
Valencerina-Caburnay was not certain what exactly caused the healed lacerations. Dr. Valencerina-Caburnay testified that an object,
probably a penis, could have caused the lacerations, or even a fall could have caused them.[27]Dr.Valencerina-Caburnay did not
attribute the healed lacerations to a sexual experience prior to the rape.
The presence of old lacerations per se does not imply that the lacerations were the result of previous sexual experience and not
by the rape.[28] Thus, the trial court had no basis in ruling that Remilyn was no longer a virgin when appellant raped her. The trial court
must be careful not to cast aspersions on the reputation of a woman, especially so when she is still a minor.
The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyns hymen does not prove that appellant did not rape her. A freshly broken hymen is
not an essential element of rape and healed lacerations do not negate rape.[29] In addition, a medical examination and a medical
certificate are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case.[30] The credible disclosure of a minor
that the accused raped her is the most important proof of the sexual abuse.[31]
The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will.[32] Remilyns straightforward narration on
how appellant forcibly ravished her proves beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of rape as charged in
Criminal Case No. 3219-A. However, appellant committed only one count of rape. Remilyns own account of the rape proves this,
thus:
Q: And after accused pointed you (sic) knife, can you tell the Court what else did he do after that?
A: He had sexual intercourse with me to (sic) times at the same time, sir.
COURT:
Q: Two times at the same time?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
PROS. RABINA:
 Q: And when he had sexual intercourse with you for two times as you said on that same day, what was your feeling when
he inserted his penis into your vagina?
A: It is painful, sir, and I felt some warm matter to my vagina.
Q: And can you tell the Honorable Court how long was the accused stayed (sic) on top of you before he ejaculated into
your vagina?
A: About thirty (30) minutes, sir.
xxx
Q: Now, you said that the accused was on top of you for at least a period of thirty minutes, do you mean to inform the
Honorable Court that the two sexual intercourse that he allegedly committed on your person, he stayed on top of you
for a period of thirty minutes, is that what you mean?
Q: And for the first time that he ejaculated a warm substance inside your vagina, did accused get out on top of you?
A: No, sir.
COURT:
Q: You mean to tell the Court that it is a case of double shoot in the sense that after ejaculating he is still on top of
you but then after that he did it again while he was still on top of your body?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, sir.[33]
Remilyn testified that appellants penis penetrated her genitalia. At that point, appellant had already consummated the rape. The
mere introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victims genitalia engenders the crime of rape.[34] Hence, it is the touching or
entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victims genitalia that consummates rape.[35]
Appellant ejaculated twice during the time that he consummated the rape. Appellant did not withdraw his penis to insert it again
into the vagina or to touch the labia majora or the labia minora when he ejaculated the second time. It is not the number of times that
appellant ejaculated but the penetration or touching that determines the consummation of the sexual act.[36]Thus, appellant committed
only one count of rape.
The trial court erred when it did not dismiss outright Criminal Case No. 3220-A and instead considered it as a qualifying
circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 3219-A. In short, the trial court considered the
second ejaculation by the accused as a qualifying circumstance to raise the penalty to death. This has no basis in law.
Article 335[37] of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659[38] (RA 7659) was the law then
applicable at the time of the rape. RA 7659 provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the carnal knowledge of a woman
procured through force or intimidation and without any other attendant circumstance. The death penalty is imposed if the victim is
under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. When the information specifically alleges the twin
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority of the victim, and the prosecution proves the same in court, the imposable
penalty is no longer reclusion perpetua but death.[39]
The trial court convicted appellant of qualified rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A because appellant is Remilyns brother and she
was a minor being only 15 years old at the time that appellant raped her. A reading of the Amended Information, however, does not
justify the elevation of the crime of simple rape to qualified rape.
The prosecution went through the trouble of amending the Information to allege that Remilyn is the younger sister of appellant to
emphasize the qualified nature of the rape. However, the Amended Information did not allege Remilyns minor age. The prosecutions
failure to allege specifically Remilyns minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its qualified form.
The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he must
be tried.[40] The information must allege every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his defense.[41] The
law assumes that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[42] Since the Amended Information
failed to inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape
and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death.
The Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty based on the twin circumstances of
relationship and minority considering that the Amended Information failed to allege specifically Remilyns age. What justifies the
imposition of the death penalty, the Solicitor General argues, is the fact that appellant used a knife in committing the rape and
appellant perpetrated the rape against his own sister. According to the Solicitor General, Article 335 as amended by RA 7659 provides
that the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of rape results in the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the presence of an aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of the higher
penalty of death. The Solicitor General points out that relationship in this case is an aggravating circumstance based on Article
15[43] of the Revised Penal Code as applied in People v. Baldino.[44]
Appellant on the other hand argues that the allegation in the Amended Information that he was armed with a knife does not
comply with Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The allegation in the Amended
Information that the accused was armed with a knife is not in any way equivalent to use of a deadly weapon. The knife could simply
be a butter knife, a harmless knife. Appellant opines that the Amended Information should have stated that accused was armed with a
deadly knife, which is a deadly weapon.
We have held in several cases that the allegation armed with a knife is sufficient to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him.[45] The prosecution also proved during the trial appellants use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she
was not able to shout because appellant pointed an eight-inch kitchen knife at her throat.[46]
We, however, do not agree with the Solicitor Generals opinion that relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. People v. Baldino, the case invoked by the Solicitor General, appreciated
relationship as an aggravating circumstance but only for the purpose of assessing exemplary damages against the accused and not for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty. Two recent cases, People v. Sagarino[47] and People v. Umbaa,[48] squarely address the
issue raised by the Solicitor General.
In People v. Sagarino[49] and People v. Umbaa,[50] the information specifically alleged the use of a deadly weapon and the
prosecution proved the same. The information also specifically alleged relationship between the accused and the victim, and the
prosecution proved the same: son and mother in People v. Sagarino, and father and daughter in People v. Umbaa. However, these two
cases did not impose the death penalty. People v. Umbaa repeated our explanation in People v. Sagarino. We quote this pertinent
portion in People v. Umbaa:

We agree with appellant that People vs. Sagarino finds application in the case at bar. We there stated:

We now come to the propriety of the penalties imposed on appellant. Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, which amended article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua when the rape was committed with force and intimidation. But the
imposable penalty becomes reclusion perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Such is the
situation in Criminal Case Nos. 98-551 and 98-552 because the use of a knife or a bladed weapon by appellant in the consummation of
the two rapes has been alleged and proved.

However, we are unable to sustain the death penalty imposed on appellant in both cases. As provided in Section 8 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, but applicable to these cases now, the complaint or information must not
only state the designation of the offense given by statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, but also specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. But here the informations against appellant in both cases show no specification of
circumstances that aggravate the offenses charged. Note that the close relationship between the victim and the offender (mother and
son) is alleged, but nothing is stated in the informations concerning pertinent circumstances (such as disregard of the filial respect
due the victim by reason of her age, sex and rank) that could aggravate the crimes and justify imposing the death sentence. Thus,
absent any aggravating circumstance specifically alleged and proved in the two rape cases, the penalty imposable on appellant for
each offense is not death but only the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code states the specific aggravating/qualifying circumstances. Other than the use of a deadly
weapon, which is already taken into account to raise the penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, not one of these circumstances was
alleged or proved in the case at bar. Hence, the penalty imposable is only reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis ours)

The circumstances pertinent to the relationship mentioned in People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaa must be alleged in the
information and duly proven in the trial. In the present case, the Amended Information did not allege the circumstances pertinent to
the relationship of appellant and Remilyn and the prosecution did not prove these circumstances during the trial.
The circumstances pertinent to the relationship cited in People v. Sagarino and People v. Umbaa are aggravating circumstances
listed in paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the aggravating
circumstances. Unlike mitigating circumstances under Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, Article 14 does not include
circumstances similar in nature or analogous to those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 21 of Article 14. The term aggravating
circumstances is strictly construed, not only because what is involved is a criminal statute, but also because its application could result
in the imposition of the death penalty. The list of aggravating circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus
exclusive[51] for the purpose of raising a crime to its qualified form.
Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under Article
15 of the Revised Penal Code:

Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating
according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and
degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.

Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature
and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative circumstances are
thus not aggravating circumstances per se.
The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating.[52] Jurisprudence considers
relationship as an aggravating circumstance in crimes against chastity.[53] However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is
now classified as a crime against persons.[54] The determination of whether an alternative circumstance is aggravating or not to warrant
the death penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare unequivocally an attendant circumstance as qualifying
to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for
crimes defined as heinous by Congress.[55] Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so
prescribed by Congress.
When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is not death but the range of two indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. It provides
that:

ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.

xxx

Article 63 states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is present one
aggravating circumstance. We hold that the aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty
of death must be that specifically enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and
proven in this case, and it is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Even for the purpose of awarding exemplary damages, there was lingering doubt whether the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be considered an aggravating circumstance to justify such an award. People v. Catubig[56] settled the lingering
doubt in this manner:

The attendance of aggravating circumstances in the perpetration of the crime serves to increase the penalty (the criminal liability
aspect), as well as to justify an award of exemplary or corrective damages (the civil liability aspect), moored on the greater perversity
of the offender manifested in the commission of the felony such as may be shown by (1) the motivating power itself, (2) the place of
commission, (3) the means and ways employed, (4) the time, or (5) the personal circumstances of the offender or the offended party or
both. There are various types of aggravating circumstances, among them, the ordinary and the qualifying. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Art. 15. Their concept. --Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating
according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its commission. They are relationship, intoxication, and
degree of instruction and education of the offender.

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.

As a rule, relationship is held to be aggravating in crimes against chastity, such as rape and acts of lasciviousness, whether the
offender is a higher or a lower degree relative of the offended party.

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is to be imposed in
rape cases when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court has since
held that the circumstances enumerated by the amendatory law are to be regarded as special qualifying (aggravating) circumstances.
Somehow doubts linger on whether relationship may then be considered to warrant an award for exemplary damages where it is used
to qualify rape as a heinous crime, thereby becoming an element thereof, as would subject the offender to the penalty of death.
Heretofore, the Court has not categorically laid down a specific rule, preferring instead to treat the issue on a case to case basis.

In People vs. Fundano, People vs. Ramos, People vs. Medina, People vs. Dimapilis, People vs. Calayca, People vs. Tabion, People vs.
Bayona, People vs. Bayya, and People vs. Nuez, along with still other cases, the Court has almost invariably appreciated relationship
as an ordinary aggravating circumstance in simple rape and thereby imposed exemplary damages upon the offender whether or not the
offense has been committed prior to or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659. Exceptionally, as in People vs. Decena, People
vs. Perez, and People vs. Ambray, the Court has denied the award of exemplary damages following the effectivity of that law. In
qualified rape cases, such as in People vs. Magdato, People vs. Arizapa, and People vs. Alicante, the Court decreed the payment of
exemplary damages to the offended party but it did not so do as in People vs. Alba, People vs. Mengote, and People vs. Maglente.

It may be time for the Court to abandon its pro hac vice stance and provide, for the guidance of the bar and the bench, a kind of
standard on the matter.
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong
doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of
outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for
the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant - associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness,
malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud- that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
similar conduct in the future.

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other
upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver
felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not
primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be
due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)

In People v. Catubig, we held that the alternative circumstance of relationship serves as basis for an award of exemplary
damages because the term aggravating circumstances must be understood in its broad or generic sense. However, this interpretation
is only applicable to the civil aspect, not the criminal aspect of rape, which involves the imposition of the proper penalty. When
the penalty to be imposed on the accused is teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term aggravating circumstance in
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be understood in the strictest sense. The aggravating circumstance that would spell the
difference between life and death for the accused must be that specifically listed in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Death is an irrevocable penalty. Thus, the rule on strict interpretation of criminal statutes applies with greater force when the law
defines the offense as a heinous crime punishable by death.
However, we resort to the strict interpretation of the term aggravating circumstance only for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty. When the penalty to be imposed is a range of penalties where the maximum penalty is death and the appreciation of an
aggravating circumstance would call for the imposition of the maximum penalty, which is death, the term aggravating circumstance
must be strictly construed. The aggravating circumstance sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty must not only be duly
alleged and proven it must be one of those enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code or that specified by law. In all other
cases where the maximum penalty is not death, the term aggravating circumstance must be interpreted in its broad or generic sense so
as to include the alternative circumstances under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.
We cannot consider dwelling as a generic aggravating circumstance because the Amended Information did not allege dwelling.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which applies retroactively in this case, now explicitly mandates that the information
must state in ordinary and concise language the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.[57] When the law or rules specify certain
circumstances that can aggravate an offense or qualify an offense to warrant a greater penalty, the information must allege such
circumstances and the prosecution must prove the same to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.[58]
Relationship in this case serves to justify the award of exemplary damages to Remilyn of P25,000.[59] Remilyn is also entitled
to P50,000 moral damages and P50,000 civil indemnity. Case law requires the automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim
without need of proof because from the nature of the crime it can be assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.[60] Such award is separate and distinct from civil indemnity, which case law also automatically awards upon proof of the
commission of the crime by the offender.[61]
The trial court was so revolted by the perversity of appellants crime that it was moved to include this proposal in the dispositive
portion of its decision:

xxx in the event that upon automatic review by the Honorable Supreme Court, that the penalty of Death is not imposed but that of
Reclusion Perpetua, this Honorable Court recommends that accused should not be granted pardon within the period of thirty (30)
years.

Incestuous rape is indeed reprehensible. It deserves our full condemnation. However, the recommendation by the trial court is
improper.[62] It is the Presidents prerogative whether or not to grant a pardon subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution.[63]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 54, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, is
AFFIRMED insofar as it finds appellant Joseph Orilla GUILTY of one count of rape in Criminal Case No. 3219-A with the
MODIFICATION that the death sentence imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the amount of civil indemnity is reduced
toP50,000. In addition, appellant is further ordered to pay Remilyn Orilla P50,000 moral damages and P25,000 exemplary damages.
Criminal Case No. 3220-A is dismissed. The provision recommending the disqualification of appellant from executive clemency is
deleted. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano by the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano Buenaflor.

The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:

On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur, between the hours of four and five
o'clock in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called
in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a sharp bladed and pointed instrument about two feet long including the black handle, tapering
to the end, about one and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit "C") while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street almost
infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal wounds for which he died
instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer, of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy Report
(Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches below left axilla, a little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin,
subcutaneous tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of left lung, pericardium, penetrating the ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the
right lung and exit to the right chest. One inch opening.

2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm

CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage.

After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the seashore of the barrio, and on finding Mariano
Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head
stooping down hacked the latter with the same bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow,
he continued hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the bolo at the left
side of the chest above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of
one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which were
specifically described by Dr. Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated February 17, 1970, as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the nipple, running to the right side a little posteriorly and
superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues, pericardium the auricles of the
heart, the left lung towards the right side of back.

2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep three-fourth (3/4) inch long penetrating the skin and the sternum.

3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep.

4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.

5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and bone of anterior side.

6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.

7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back near spinal column.
8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin and bone.

CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage from the heart." Out of the eight (8)
wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20,
Session November 22, 1971). The two victims Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the accused are neighbors,
residing at the same street of Barrio Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident was not
preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60, Nov. 22, 1971).

Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two victims had a misunderstanding with the accused while
fishing along Sagnay River. During this occasion it appears that the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat with
the motor boat owned by Mariano Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended and embittered the
accused against the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal resentment against them. And
although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude
towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He
consistently refused to associate since then with the two victim especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten attempts were
made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims but were refused. Instead, defendant
when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a fight and announce his evil intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp.
50-53, session November 22, 1971.)

Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the accused. That after killing the two victims, he returned to
his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila, Juan Chavez, Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by laid peace
officers for him to surrender. When brought to the Police headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used
in the killing was hidden by him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched, and
recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he Chief of Police was still stained with human blood from the
base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to who was he owner of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He
also admitted the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. however, when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. 1

For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under two (2) separate informations,
with the crime of murder attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried
jointly.

The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo Pascua. He
also denied holding a grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he had with Mariano
Buenaflor. He said that while they were drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were drunk, it resulted in a fist fight,
which they had soon forgotten. 2

His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was fishing in the open sea. He went ashore at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a percentage. for
the fishery commission. When he refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that he was hard-headed. He went home, taking
his things along with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 3 He ate his
dinner 4 and prepared to go out to sea again. While he was standing in the yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua,
Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store
of Socorro Buates, went to him and Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened
next: "I defend myself but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm. Then after that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I
was hit on my lower jaw. (Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that bolo from him."

"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to take hold of his hands and I was able to grab the
bolo. After I have taken the bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of the group except
Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano Buenaflor approached me having
also a bolo then immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and when he has wounded he run away and when he was running
away I run after him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away so I run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he
reach home he will get that gun and he might shoot me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.

The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:

Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot give credence to the testimony and story of the accused,
and his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The claim of self-defense does not find support in the evidence
presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8) men headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing
him one after another while others were throwing stones at him; that he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo which he
succeeded in wresting from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he killed said Mariano Buenaflor after a bolo
duel, are mere fictions of a desperate man without evidentiary support. His testimony on these points, and that of his cousin Nemesio
Camano are simply incredible not only because they are inherently improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear
inconsistencies on contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia argumenti that he was really ganged up by eight (8)
persons, some boxing him while others throwing stones at him, and two of whom were armed with a bolo, and that he was all
alone fighting them and yet he did not suffer any physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8) persons to
contend with, two armed with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he should come out of the melee unscathed.
The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every piece of evidence presented by the defense and has
relaxed all technical rules of evidence in favor of the accused in search for evidentiary support of his claim of self-defense in vain.
Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court has earnestly searched in vain
for facts upon which to lay the basis at least of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the ugly and
unpleasant task of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their concocted story is so apparent and self-evident to need
further elucidation. This is demonstrated by the record. They simply cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court feels very
much intrigued by the fact that notwithstanding that many people witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that
the accused had more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in the barrio, during the long
period that this case has been pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could not get any witness to testify in his favor, other than
his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, whose testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is naturally very vulnerable to grave
doubt and suspicion for coming from a biased source. Could this mean lack of public sympathy because the horrible act was in truth
committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public condemnation? Be it as it may, this unpleasant circumstance has no bearing or
influence in the painful decision of this case. What impelled and compelled this Court in making this painful decision, much to his
dislike, are the bare and incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence presented indicating beyond per adventure of doubt
the stark reality which shows that there exist that moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who
are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 22 SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on
the compelling and irresistible facts born out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,
abuse of superior strength, and intoxication with no mitigating circumstance. The accused and his only witness, Nemesio Camano
changed their declarations not only once, twice, or thrice, but many times, placing the Court in quandary and confused what theory or
testimony is to be believed and considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and diametrically opposed statements.
Considering the manner and tenor they were given, - the accused and his only witness changing stand in every turn, leaves no room
for doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted and fabricated as a desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6

In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the cause of their deaths are not disputed. Counsel de
oficio merely claims that the accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as charged; and prays for the
modification of the judgment and the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano.

(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the accused, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses,
are all indicative of E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.

The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully Planned by the offender, when he
prepared beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had sufficient time
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It has also been held that evident
premeditation requires proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution
of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof
as to how and when the plan to kill Pascua and Buenaflor was hatched or what time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The
trial court merely concluded that the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been nursing the evil
design to kill both the victims since three years prior to the occurrence of the incident on February 18, 1970, when both of them
refused the request of the accused to have his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to Mariano Buenaflor while fishing along
Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal killings, said accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their drinking
spree where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;" "in fact, no less than ten attempts made by witness Amado
Payago inviting the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that "on the contrary, it has been established that
whenever the accused was drunk, he announces his intention to kill the victims, and as a matter of fact he challenged several times
Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."

The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the
aforementioned incident merely established the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9

The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever he was drunk and announces his intention to kill the
latter does not reveal a persistence of a criminal design since there is no showing that in between the utterances of the threats and the
consummation of the crime, the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to accomplish the killing.

As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked persistence to
accomplish that plan, the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.

(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the commission of the crime.

The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua from
behind, a method which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the perpetrator arising from the
defense that his victim may put up. His testimony reads, as follows:

Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice whether there is anything unusual incident that
happened?
A Yes, sir.

Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please relate it?

A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run after Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.

Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano?

A More or less 12 to 15 meters.

Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno Camano?

A He was walking to his house.

Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the time that Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?

A From behind sir.

Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what happened to Godofredo Pascua?

A He fell down and keep on turning.

Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua fell down?

A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10

His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua. The autopsy
report, 11 showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3) inches long and three (3) inches below
the left armpit, a little bit posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit was the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral
to the right nipple with a one (1) inch opening. If the deceased was stabbed while he was facing his assailant, as claimed by counsel
for the accused, the entrance wound would have been in the front part of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the back.
The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding that the deceased Godofredo Pascua was assaulted from behind.

With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked while in a kneeling position, with his arms on top of the
gate of the fence surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was hacked on the head, causing him to fall to the
ground, and then successively hacked and stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until he died. The attack was also sudden,
unexpected, and lethal, such as to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting up any defense.

(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the lower court appreciated
in fixing the penalty, is absorbed in treachery.

This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery. 13

(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. Counsel argues thusly:

As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted that there was no proof that the accused was intoxicated
at the time of the killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from his house he allegedly saw the accused drinking in his
house which is about 30 meters away. The prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's certification that accused was
found to be intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was not shown by competent evidence that accused purposedly became
drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.

If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it affected accused's mental facilities such
that it diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to comprehend fully the consequences of his acts. 14

There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is, not
subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be mitigating, it must be indubitably
proved. 16 A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and
confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to evil thought and undermines
will-power making its victim a potential evildoer. 17

The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he used to get
drunk every now and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:

Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are already in good terms because they even go on drinking spree,
is it not?

A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against Godofredo Pascua.

Q And how did you come to know about this plan?

A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.

Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not towed, could you remember how many times more or less did
you hear him speak about his plan before the stabbing incident?

A Whenever he is drunk.

Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard him?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q About five times?

FISCAL CLEDERA:

Already answered.

A Whenever he is drunk.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?

A I cannot estimate, sir.

Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been an altercation between him and Filomeno Camano prior to
the incident, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was this altercation about?

A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was refused by Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by
Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano Buenaflor.

Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this Buenaflor?

A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor immediately prior to the incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A In his house.
Q When you saw him where were you?

A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our window.

Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that you can see from your house?

A More or less 30 meters.

Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?

A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are arriving far from our house.

Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the accused was drunk when this incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident immediately prior that has precipitated this stabbing
incident between the accused and the victim

A None, sir.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

No, sir. 18

The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was in a state of intoxication at the time of
the commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."

The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of
Prisons, 19 the Court said:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution." It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."

The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two cases. The offense
being attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty
is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant, as above indicated, the judgment appealed from
should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against the said appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not when
demanded by the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

MAKASIAR, J., concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not when
demanded by the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.
G.R. No. 34917 September 7, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting them of the
illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its judgment to wit:

The lower court erred:

1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the record of the
administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret
service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from service.

2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the customhouse without the knowledge of
the customs secret service."

3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a desire to protect himself
and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the
service.

4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above reproach and utterly
irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.

5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other prosecution witnesses were testifying,
despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the court room, and in refusing to allow the defense
to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret
service agent of Cebu.

6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.

8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Uy Se
Tieng.

9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the appellant Lua Chu.

10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium, and in sentencing
each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the presumption of innocence which has not
been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution,
emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.

The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:

About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to send him a
shipment of opium.

About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a vacation in Europe,
he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and the latter, after a short
conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said
collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for
you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money,
left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad
called Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner
would go to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of
Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that
he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.

At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which the Naviera
Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About
the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed
between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain
employees in the customhouse.

Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed the latter that
the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until December 7th. In view of
this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for
ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.

The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests, Samson detailed one
of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything possible to have the cargo
unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy
Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it
would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was
told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading
and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson
informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander,
Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's
house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a
stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As
the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the
recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant
Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which
hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived,
Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu,
was afraid of him. Samson then hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing
out to Uy Se Tieng a back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in
the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night accompanied by his
codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila, named Tan, and another in
Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng
would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the
opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua
Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered:
"Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the
opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good business,
because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then
agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy
Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo,
who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading
(Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B. After having
taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua
Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five
letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to
the Constabulary headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11
to 18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.

In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to who was the
owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am not going to answer to
them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without
the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to order the
opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20, and that he could make
a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no
danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no
objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had
ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng
then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the
captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the P6,000;
that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed that he participate;
that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had
passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to
deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount.

The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of the trial
judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness for the
Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in
shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt.

With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of
Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the service, the trial court did
not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it
is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure to that end.

With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the Government, from the court
room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he has abused his discretion
(16 Corpus Juris, 842).

Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants' statements, since
they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at the trial that they were faithfully
taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard the statements.

As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the testimony given by the
witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of the customs secret service,
who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium,
though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of
customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is
contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the
opium that had been unlawfully imported.

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan Samson denies
this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears him out. A public official
who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime
and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the
introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving
only its introduction into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan
to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the United States,
are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense
to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at
the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was
formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It
is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective,
or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in question, as the
latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad — who had promised them
that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the customhouse was concerned — not to gain the
P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government
from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to
prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to agree a plan for
smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of
its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-5728 August 11, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.

TRENT, J.:

The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated the
provisions of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P250, Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of P2.50 a day,
and to pay the costs. He appealed.

The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This witness
testified that the first time he ever saw the accused was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the month of April, 1909; that at the time,
while two or three men were sitting together in the said salon, he heard the accused say that he on some occasions like to smoke opium;
that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the accused if he smoked opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked
sometimes; that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the accused, that he then asked the accused what opportunities he had for
smoking opium, and the accused replied, "good opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium." On the invitation
of the accused he looked him up that night and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the
Chinamen were afraid, and asked the witness to see him the following night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again
said that he could not find a suitable place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that time they went together to a certain
house in the barrio of Tulay, where a certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said court) had
prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave him P1 in payment for
the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took the pipe and the pan containing the opium and went directly to the
justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the accused and the said Chinaman.

The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going under the name of Lockwood, came to his
house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the accused) if he knew of any Chinaman
in the town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if
the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was the accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him
(Smith) with a pipe until he became acquainted in town; that on the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and
after being there about twenty minutes became very nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some opium; that he told
him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and received the reply that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a
position as clerk, and that they probably would not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again
asked to have the Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick,
told the Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the
Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left, without the
accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty minutes later, and that he called for the
doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's house.

The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands made by
Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.

The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman, testified that when he
made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together before they went to the justice of the
peace where the preliminary investigation was held.

Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an examination of the accused about an hour
and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused was strong, robust man, and a man
presenting no appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court whether or not he could state positively if the accused had
used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that he did not use any opium on that day."

The court below in its decision said:

I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of opium. The accused is a
strong, robust man, in good physical condition, and from a casual examination of his person no one would accuse him of being a
habitual user of opium.

The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend that he had in his
possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having smoked opium this one time
in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of the witness Smith, who was an employee
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.
On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for the same
purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose of making
arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make arrangements so they
both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said Chinaman, according to his own
statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his
possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of
the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of the law within itself.

But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the statements made
by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states that he desired to commit the
same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a
man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the
offense and which would tend to the elevation and improvement of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his
debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are
placed beside the positive testimony of the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness
sinks into insignificance and certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to
his own testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most reprehensible.
We desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the incredibility of his testimony
on his own acts according to his own testimony.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court is reversed
and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.
 [G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y
CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth" were charged
with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The information reads:

"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and without
having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to
another eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District,
Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one
"Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E.
Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to
prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and
PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as
the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara,
Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3
Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation.
The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their serial
numbers in the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of
marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the
corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the
agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in
plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They
frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate.[7] SPO1
Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused,
PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10)
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."[8] The policemen arrested
"Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta
Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from
"Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana
fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a 33-year old
carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two
men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him
were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of
being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to
point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to
"Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3 Manlangit, pushed
open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was
left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked
Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding
them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one
of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had
something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police
headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He
said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta,
Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her house at Daang
Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins
Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal
for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and
bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and
accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained
standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the
artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed
her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was
the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and that her
husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that
marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence
of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @
"Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both CONVICTED of the present charge against them.

According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No.
6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the
provisions of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one
another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, NBI for destruction in
accordance with law.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons,
Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.

SO ORDERED."[13]

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE
CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
 II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE
THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME
WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE."[14]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE
VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.

II

THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ONE
ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO DEATH DESPITE THE
MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM
THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE
EVIDENCE, OF RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH LEADING TO THE
SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of
accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house,
and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed
by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has
received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the
increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment
sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement
of criminal law.[19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but
ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement
of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21] The
classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to
acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its
commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer."[23] It consists of two
(2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to
commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent
defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to
violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law,
the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment
and no conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for
commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to
catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and
avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced
him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as
a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v.
United States[31] to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to
commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.[32] All relevant facts
such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc.,
are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit
the offense rather than the officer's misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and
the trap for the unwary criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable
opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.[36] Some states, however,
have adopted the "objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State[38] rendered by the
Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the
court considers the nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.[39] The inquiry is focused on the
inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the
goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.[40]The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent
was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;[41] for purposes of
this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing
conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,[43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of
desperate illness, are not.[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his
conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the
government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not
become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction
between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and
the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a
normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the "subjective" test
creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of
police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and
predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the
possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular
crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need
for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an important
bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was proper.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused
was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is
relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United States now combine both the
"subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct
must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit
the crime.[53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal
defendant may successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he
is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation.[55] The hybrid approaches combine and apply the
"objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in flagrante
delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that the government
employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that
Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's
testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince
him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony of
the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one"
causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer
and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se
Tieng,[61] we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated
that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the
seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng[63] we first laid down the distinction between entrapment
vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we held:

"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of
instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been
condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense
to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the
'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield
defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an
owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was
formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public
authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is
generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or
hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary."[65]

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,[66] the appellate court
declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused
into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace
officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.[67] In People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the
Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment,
we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in
Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and
is considered an absolutory cause.[72] To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the
conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied
in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.[73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of
the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded
Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past
and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did
not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his
defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it
has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment
procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala
prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with
crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not
against particular individuals, but against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally
unattended with any particular harm to a definite person.[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many
devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala
prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing
violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This
means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants,
spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system breeds abominable
abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept
payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty
criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses
underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with
unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion--
harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial
notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases[84] where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to
prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as
informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug
cases.[86]Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as
objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search.As well put by the Supreme Court of California
in People v. Barraza,[87]

"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and
the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and
scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal
classes,' justifies the employment of illegal means."[88]

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents
raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own
temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an
instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase,
the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.[92] The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must
be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring
the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain
criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to
commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At
the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit
handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was
apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not crumpled on
cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua,
his back-up security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police.[93] It is well-settled that
except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers,[94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,[95] or
that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present
the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are minor and do
not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a
critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually identified
by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of
marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the
carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant
Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick we
confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items when the
question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box showed to him and brought in
front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to him by the
accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite reconsideration.
 COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the PCCL, your
Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the PCCL, your
Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc. etc.,
that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of paper inside
which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I gave him was
in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and
Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and
described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant
Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the
circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no
rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the
prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana
from the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three
instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended
in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and
marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[105] The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest;[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view;[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of
marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not
necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer,
however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I gave him was in
the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house, she was not
committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you were just in the side
lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you your role in this buy-bust
operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
 Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the amount of P1,600.00 was
recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money from Aling
Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section
5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores
when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in
arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion."[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.[116] A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making
the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit,
however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as
to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as
the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao
conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,[119] with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to
believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his
own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question
of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.[121] The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which
he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[122] The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.[123] In the course of
such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye
and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is
inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.[127] In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article
is deemed in plain view.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito,
nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust
money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a small one, for
record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw that. Not even a man
with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
 Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom
agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by
the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the
dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be
marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic
wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in
the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.[133] PO3
Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not
know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure
without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should
have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana[137] was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does
not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.[138]Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:

"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as
demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of
every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is
too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself."[140]

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659
punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug,
or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between
the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The
prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and
delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to
prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.[142]
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal
Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.