Network Rail Asset Protection Handbook High Speed Rail PDF

Revision Record:
Issue No. Date Comments

1 First Issue
2 Nov 2009 Second issue
3 Feb 2010 General revision
4 Feb 2011 General revision
5 Apr 2012 General revision
5.1 May 2012 Name change to Network Rail (High Speed)
6 April 2013 General revision
7 Dec 2015 General revision
7.1 July 2016 Name change from Outside Parties to Asset
Protection; updates to 6.13, 6.15, 6.27
This procedure will be reviewed at least annually and be revised as required.

Printed copies of this document are uncontrolled. For the latest version click
here: Development Handbook
or contact:
Asset Protection Technical Clerk
Network Rail (High Speed)
Singlewell Infrastructure Maintenance Depot
Henhurst Road
Cobham
Gravesend
Kent
DA12 3AN
Tel: 01474 563 554
Email: [email protected]
Note that hyperlinks to internal Network Rail documents will not work for external
users. In this case contact your Asset Protection Engineer.
Cover photo: Manhattan Loft Gardens development beside High Speed 1 at
Stratford.
Issue 7.1 Page 2 of 58

Contents
1. Introduction 6
1.1 Purpose 6
1.2 Scope 6
1.3 Responsibilities 7
1.4 Outside Parties team charter 7
1.5 Disclaimer 8
1.6 Legal requirements 8
1.7 Level playing field in tender situations 8
1.8 Definitions 9
2. Risk management 12
2.1 General 12
2.2 Risk tools 12
2.3 Programme development 12
2.4 Safe working practices 12
2.5 Buried services 13
2.6 Windblown debris 13
2.7 Protection to railway equipment 14
2.8 Emergency plans 14
2.9 Standards 14
2.10 CDM Regulations 2015 14
2.11 Request for information (RFI) 15
2.12 As-built information 15
3. Formal approvals 16
3.1 Principle 16
3.2 Planning consent 16
3.3 Initial consultation 16
3.4 Formal approvals 16
3.5 Timescales 19
3.6 System Review Panel (SRP) 19
3.7 Approval in Principle (F001/Form A) 19
3.8 Design intent (F002) and Certificate of design and checking
(F003) 20
3.9 Temporary works (F003/Form C) 23
3.10 Architectural and layout acceptance (F004) 23
3.11 Certificate of fitness to be taken into use (F005) 23
3.12 Method statement/work package plan or lifting plan 24
3.13 Approval of CRE and CEM 24
4. Access 25
4.1 General 25
4.2 Access competency 25
4.3 Dispensation 26
4.4 Work on High Speed 1 land 26
4.5 Disruptive possessions 27
4.6 Possessions 27
4.7 Between trains working 28
4.8 Isolations 28
4.9 Possessions across rail interfaces 28
4.10 Rail traffic during a possession 28
4.11 Possession overrun contingency planning 28
4.12 Possession costs 29

5. Design 30
5.1 General 30
5.2 Clearances 30
5.3 For High Speed 1 maintenance 32
5.4 Gauging 32
5.5 Track and structure stability 32
5.6 Overbridges and underbridges 33
5.7 Accidental loading 33
5.8 Glare 33
5.9 Unexploded ordnance 34
5.10 Electromagnetic compatibility 34
5.11 Public mobile operators 35
5.12 Health and safety file 35
5.13 Other requirements 35
6. Construction 37
6.1 Work methodology 37
6.2 Supervision 37
6.3 Induction and training 37
6.4 Communications 37
6.5 Alcohol and drugs 38
6.6 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 38
6.7 Removal of developers’ employees 38
6.8 Safety inspections 38
6.9 Notification of accidents and incidents 38
6.10 Marking of hazards 39
6.11 Storage of plant, equipment and materials 39
6.12 Use of plant and equipment near to the railway. 39
6.13 Mast climbers 40
6.14 Vehicle containment 40
6.15 Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) 40
6.16 Vibration 41
6.17 Confined spaces 41
6.18 Windblown debris 41
6.19 Dust, smoke and vapour 41
6.20 Water 42
6.21 Vegetation clearance 42
6.22 Overhead line equipment 42
6.23 Third rail electrification 43
6.24 Earthing and temporary earthing 43
6.25 Excavations, foundations, embankments – support zones43
6.26 Retaining walls – imposed loads 44
6.27 Under track crossing (UTX) 45
7. Developments over High Speed 1 tunnels 47
7.1 Construction 47
7.2 High Speed 1 subsoil acquisition 47
7.3 Safeguarded zone 47
7.4 Surcharge loadings 47
7.5 Exceeding surcharge loadings 48
7.6 Foundation options 48
7.7 Boreholes 48
7.8 CTRL project grid 49
7.9 Settlement above tunnels 49
7.10 Monitoring 49
8. Lifting 50
8.1 Types of plant 50
8.2 Risk control 50
8.3 Crane mat 50
8.4 Tower cranes 50
8.5 Aerial lifting 50
8.6 Concrete pumps 51
8.7 360 degree slew excavators and telehandlers 51
9. Piling operations 52
9.1 General 52
9.2 Selection of the piling method 52
9.3 Proximity to the line 52
9.4 Lineside protection 53
9.5 Operational considerations 53
9.6 Piling platform 53
10. Cost recovery 55
Figures
Figure 1 – Approvals process flowchart 18
Figure 2 – Table of design check categories 22
Figure 3 – Arrangements for accessing the railway 25
Figure 4 – Measurement of vertical clearances 31
Figure 5 – Measurement of horizontal clearances 32
Figure 6 – EMC activities 35
Figure 7 – Track support zone 44
Figure 8 – Structure support zone 44
Figure 9 – Loading and excavation close to retaining walls 45
Appendices
Appendix A – Scheme checklist 56
Appendix B – Method statement checksheet 57

1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This document provides guidance to developers carrying out work on, under,
over or adjacent to High Speed 1. This guidance aims to eliminate or reduce
risks to the safety and performance of High Speed 1. It also aims to minimise,
so far as is reasonably practicable, the impact of developers’ works on future
operation and maintenance costs and liabilities.
1.2 Scope
This document applies to the High Speed 1 line from the Channel Tunnel at
Cheriton to St Pancras station including the links to Temple Mills depot from
Stratford station and Fawkham junction from Southfleet junction, as well as
other links at St Pancras, Ebbsfleet, Ashford and Dollonds Moor freight yard.
The guidance covers all work by developers that can influence the railway,
including stations and other lands. For example general construction,
excavations, demolition, installation of public utilities and other services
including underground and overhead pipes and cables, surveys, ground
investigation works and general access.
The Asset Protection Engineer will be concerned with:
• safety of passengers, railway staff and the public when using HS1
premises or designated land
• safety and stability of the track, running tunnels, overhead electrified lines,
embankments, cuttings and structures
• maintenance of dimensional clearances
• protection of railway equipment
• risks from plant such as cranes and piling rigs within a collapse radius of
the High Speed 1 infrastructure
• lines of sight to signals and avoidance of glare affecting train drivers
• risks from flood, windblown debris and unexploded ordnance
• avoiding additional maintenance or other liabilities/obligations
• any covenants or safeguarded zones in favour of HS1
• heritage considerations at St Pancras station.
This document does not cover in-house Network Rail (High Speed)
maintenance work but it does cover some construction work instructed by HS1
or Network Rail (High Speed) of an outside party nature.
A companion document (C/05/OP/32/3001) gives guidance to the Asset
Protection Engineer at planning application stage. Other requirements can be
found in statutory instruments, codes of practice, Railway Group Standards
and Network Rail (High Speed) standards and guidance.
Further information can be obtained by contacting Network Rail (High Speed)
Asset Protection – we are here to help. In the first instance
email: [email protected]
1.3 Responsibilities
The High Speed 1 railway, formerly known as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link
(CTRL), is owned by the Secretary of State for Transport who has signed a
long term concession with HS1. HS1 has contracted with Network Rail (High
Speed) to operate and maintain the railway, which includes management of
work by developers. Where a PPA exists between HS1 and the developer,
Network Rail (High Speed) acts as the Engineer under that agreement.
This document is prepared by the Asset Protection Project Manager.
1.4 Asset Protection team charter

We are committed to managing the impact on High Speed 1 from the works of
developers. We are concerned that this work goes ahead to the satisfaction of
both parties and of our client, HS1. This involves a pact between you – the
developer – and us:
What you have a right to expect from us:

act in a professional, knowledgeable and competent way
try to understand your needs
communicate effectively with you by being approachable, responsive and giving straight
answers
deliver to deadlines
exhibit safe behaviour
What we need from you:
to be professional and straightforward
understand our imperatives
comprehend our guidance notes and other communications, and act on them
plan your submissions and submit them in good time
consult with us on any possessions and isolations at a very early stage
know who to communicate with in our team and to use the OP number in any
correspondence
What are our imperatives?
safeguard the railway against accidents, incidents or near misses caused by developers
recognise any changes in long term costs and risks to High Speed 1 resulting from
developers’ schemes
comply with statute law, and standards where appropriate.
Feedback
we have a feedback process which we ask developers of significant schemes to be
involved in. Please take the time to do this
we like to feedback to you, the developer, on how your work and attitude is affecting the
risk to the railway, whether positively or negatively. If negatively, we need you to take note
of this and put corrective actions in place.
Complaints
if you have any complaints about Asset Protection you can raise them with the Asset
Protection Project Manager

1.5 Disclaimer
We have taken care to ensure that the content of this document is accurate,
complete and suitable for its stated purpose. We make no warranties, express
or implied, that compliance with the contents of this document shall be
sufficient to ensure safe systems of work or operation. Network Rail (High
Speed) will not be liable to pay compensation in respect of the content or
subsequent use of this document for any purpose other than its stated
purpose or for any purpose other than that for which it was prepared except
where Network Rail (High Speed) can be shown to have acted in bad faith or
where there has been wilful default.
Participation, opinion, permission or approval by Network Rail (High Speed) does
not extend to or imply any warranty or representation concerning the suitability or
adequacy of the works. Nor does it displace the responsibility of the developer in
relation to such matters.
1.6 Legal requirements

Responsibilities under the CDM Regulations 2015 are to be defined at the
outset. Where the scheme is notifiable the developer is to forward a copy of
the F10 to the Asset Protection Engineer.
Working on the railway is subject to an alcohol and drugs policy as described
in Level 1 Standard: NR/L1/OHS/051.
The High Speed 1 route has been safeguarded, protecting the route from
conflicting development.
1.7 Level playing field in tender situations

We are aware that in many cases our advice at tender stage can have a
significant effect on the risk perceived by the tenderer and therefore on the
construction methodology and price. Where the employer advises that work is
being put out to tender we will therefore take care to ensure that the
employer’s wishes are met with regard to providing consistent information and
a level playing field for all tenderers. This is normally best achieved by
channelling the tender clarification questions and our responses through the
employer. Although we are prepared to meet with individual tenderers the
employer will be asked to approve this in advance. In our experience the
answers to many of the questions are already covered in this handbook.
We would expect the employer to:
• advise us that tendering is about to start
• include this handbook in the tender documents as it will answer many of
the tenderers’ questions
• advise whether tenderers’ questions for us, and our responses, are to be
channelled through the employer
• if not channelled through the employer, state whether he is happy for
individual meetings to go ahead.

1.8 Definitions
AIP Approval in Principle: confirmation that a professionally competent person or
body is satisfied that the design concept meets the principles for safety and
performance of High Speed 1, and minimises – so far as is reasonably
practicable – the impact of developer’s works on future operation and
maintenance, costs and liabilities
ancillary plant Any plant involved in the piling process except for the piling rig itself
Asset The department within Network Rail (High Speed) tasked with managing the
Protection risk from the work of any developer
Asset A person appointed by Network Rail (High Speed) to liaise with a developer
Protection concerning asset protection of High Speed 1 infrastructure
Engineer
CAC Contractor Assurance Case – formal certification by Network Rail (High
Speed) that a contractor has an acceptable safety management system to
allow working on High Speed 1 infrastructure
CBR California Bearing Ratio
CDM Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015
Regulations
collapse radius In a lifting operation, the maximum extent of collapse of a crane plus load.
In the case of a mobile crane collapse the point of rotation can be either the
boom about its pivot or else the whole crane about its most heavily loaded
outriggers. In some cases, for example with the full counterweights in place
and a light load combined with high jib angle, the most heavily loaded
outriggers can be those furthest from the boom
Contractor's The person within a design and/or construction organisation with overall
Engineering responsibility for engineering activities in a contract, including
Manager interdisciplinary checks
Contractor's The person in a construction organisation responsible for the day-to-day
Responsible management and coordination of the technical and engineering activities in
Engineer a contract
CRA Cost Reimbursement Agreement
CTRL Channel Tunnel Rail Link, the former name of High Speed 1
Danger Zone The area within 2.75m of any running rail (1,25m for platform edges and
where linespeed is less than 160km/h)
developer An individual or organisation, not being HS1 or Network Rail (High Speed),
promoting or carrying out work in the vicinity of High Speed 1
DfT Department for Transport
DZEP Danger Zone Entry Permit
E&P Electrification and plant
EMC Electromagnetic compatibility
employer In tendering situations, the body issuing tenders
F10 Notification to the Health and Safety Executive of a construction project,
required for notifiable schemes under the CDM Regulations
FPS Federation of Piling Specialists
goniophoto- The angular distribution of light scattered from a surface
metric
hazid A formal hazard identification process
High Speed 1 The High Speed 1 railway (formerly CTRL)
HS1 In the context of this document, the company with the concession from
government to operate, manage and maintain High Speed 1
isolation Planned arrangements for a predetermined period for the interruption of
traction electricity between defined locations
Line Standard A Network Rail standard applicable to Network Rail (High Speed)
LOLER Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998

method A document detailing a comprehensive step-by-step account for activities,
statement which identifies responsibilities, resources, method of working and controls
for risk from the work activity to the persons, property and operations.
Equivalent to a work package plan (WPP)
monitoring Checking of construction work by observation, measurement, testing or
audit to verify that the execution is compliant with the specified technical
requirements
Network Rail A wholly-owned subsidiary of Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd contracted to
(High Speed) operate and maintain the High Speed 1 line
Network Rail That part of Network Rail responsible for ownership, operation and
Infrastructure maintenance of the mainline railway excluding the High Speed 1 line.
Ltd Sometimes known as the ‘classic railway’ or ‘Network Rail classic’ or NRIL
NoNO Notice of No Objection
NPOS Nominated Person on Site: the person charged with implementing OCS
isolations
OCS Overhead catenary system, known elsewhere as OHLE (overhead line
equipment)
operational The area between the innermost boundary fences of High Speed 1 covering
railway both the Danger Zone and Safe Zone
ORR Office of Road and Rail: the independent economic and safety regulator for
Britain’s railways
piling The installation of bearing or lateral-restraint piles (continuous flight auger,
rotary bored, driven cast-in-situ, driven pre-cast concrete, driven steel
sections, auger displacement), retaining wall techniques (diaphragm walling,
secant and contiguous pile walling, sheet piling), mini-piling or soil
nailing/soil anchors
piling platform The designed surface on which the piling rig and ancillary plant is operated
possession Planned safety arrangements which control or prevent the normal
movement of rail traffic between defined locations for a predetermined
period
possession An assessment of the risks to possession overrun and their mitigations, and
overrun risk the break points and times at which the work will be curtailed
assessment
PPA Protective Provisions Agreement: a legal agreement between HS1 and the
developer covering safeguards, processes, responsibilities and cost
recovery
Railway Group A standard applicable to the whole UK railway industry
Standard
RFI Request for information
risk hierarchy Five ways of controlling risk. These are, from most to least favoured: avoid
> transfer > reduce > insure > accept
RISQS Railway Industry Supplier Qualification Scheme
RPOS Responsible Person on Site: the person charged with taking and handing
back High Speed 1 possessions
RSL Rail Safety Leader
S&T Signalling and telecoms
Safe Zone The area between the innermost boundary fence and the Danger Zone
slew restricted The working orbit of a crane (not the no-go area)
zone
SOED Submission of Engineering Documents: a form used to provide a remit to an
external engineering advisor
specular Reflection from shiny surfaces
sprag To steer a crawler machine by applying the brake to one track whilst driving
with the other
SRP System Review Panel: a Network Rail (High Speed) body typically meeting
once per four week period charged with reviewing and approving significant
changes to the High Speed 1 infrastructure to ensure any risk to the safety,
operation or maintenance is managed
SZEP Safety Zone Entry Permit
T-26 1. Deadline for submission of the Draft Period Possession Plan to the
TOCs, 26 weeks in advance of the possession
2. The four-weekly possession planning meeting to discuss the Draft Period
Possession Plan which typically takes place at Singlewell between 31 and
35 weeks in advance of the possession
T-14 Possession planning meeting held at Singlewell about 14 weeks in advance
of the possession
T-7 Possession planning meeting held at Singlewell about 7 weeks in advance
of the possession
T-2 Possession planning meeting held at Singlewell 2 weeks in advance of the
possession
TOC Train operating company
UAS Unmanned aerial system: entire UAV operating equipment including aircraft,
the control station and the wireless data link
UAV Small unmanned aircraft other than a balloons or kite up to 20kg in weight
including any attachments
veiling Decreased visibility caused by bright lights in the visual field
luminance
work package See method statement
plan
work site An area on, above or below the operational railway where work is planned
or taking place

2. Risk management
2.1 General
Risks are to be controlled using the risk hierarchy:
• > eliminate
• > transfer
• > reduce
• > insure
• > accept.
CDM Regulations 2015 refer to Principles of Prevention (see appendix A of
the HSE guidance http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l153.htm ) which duty
holders should use in their approach to identifying the measures they should
take to control the risks to health and safety in a particular project. In
summary, these are:
• avoid risks where possible
• evaluate those risks that cannot be avoided
• put in place proportionate measures that control them at source.
The effort involved in managing a risk should be commensurate with the
magnitude of that risk.
The developer is expected to demonstrate to Network Rail (High Speed) that
the risks associated with the scheme have been identified and controlled.
2.2 Risk tools

Nearly all schemes will have a risk register. In addition, risk assessments are
expected at the task level, normally as part of the method statement/work
package plan. The Asset Protection Engineer will always require sight of this,
and will often wish to comment.
If the work is subject to changing circumstances such as the weather, a
dynamic risk assessment may be appropriate.
2.3 Programme development

Risks arise where there is inadequate time to properly plan and execute the
works. Network Rail (High Speed) will expect an initial programme to be
developed at an early stage taking account of comments from the Asset
Protection Engineer and this must be further reviewed as the development
progresses. Section 3.5 gives typical timescales to allow in the programme for
approvals and section 4.6 indicates notice required for booking possessions.
2.4 Safe working practices

Systems, procedures and working practices that identify and minimise risk to
the safety, operation or maintenance of the railway, and that protect persons

involved, must be developed and implemented. This is a key risk control
measure and the Asset Protection Engineer will pay particular attention to it.
For some works affecting the safety or operation of the railway (or on High
Speed 1 land) a contractor accredited by Network Rail (High Speed) through
our contractor assurance process may be required. The Asset Protection
Engineer can advise whether this is likely to be the case and which contractors
hold a Contractor Assurance Case (CAC).
2.5 Buried services

Historically, buried services strikes are a common incident type caused by
developers. Accordingly, particular attention must be focussed on avoidance
for example by following the HSE guidance note 47 “Avoiding Danger from
Underground Services”. Developers can greatly reduce the risk using vacuum
excavation.
Information on some High Speed 1 services is available from Network Rail
(High Speed) upon request (see section 2.11) but developers will also need to
contact the statutory undertakers. The Asset Protection Engineer will not
issue a notice of no objection to the method statement allowing excavation
work to go ahead until he is confident that the developer is controlling the risk
of a buried service strike.
A full survey must be undertaken to ascertain the existence, location and
nature of services. A permit to dig must be issued before excavating or driving
objects into the ground. Note that such a survey may also be required before
surcharging the ground.
Should any unknown or unexpected service be discovered or uncovered, work
in the vicinity of the service must stop, ownership established, and both
Network Rail (High Speed) and the owner of the service informed.
Appropriate precautions for protection must be taken prior to restarting work.
The degree of existing protection provided to services can vary. Therefore
High Speed 1 services must not be interfered with or moved unless authorised
by the Asset Protection Engineer.
Services shall not be interrupted unless otherwise agreed. Any service not
diverted must be supported, maintained, protected as necessary and kept in
working order in its existing location. Where temporary or permanent service
diversions are necessary a method statement and specification must be
agreed with the Asset Protection Engineer.
2.6 Windblown debris

Windblown debris causes more lineside neighbour incidents than anything
else. All could and should be avoided with good housekeeping.
More guidance – aimed at lineside neighbours – on the risks from windblown
debris (as well as buried services, fires and fences) can be found
at http://www.networkrail.co.uk/HS1TracksideSafety. See also section 6.18.

2.7 Protection to railway equipment
The need for special protection to prevent damage to the tracks, OCS,
signalling, telecommunications, structures and other railway equipment shall
be considered at an early stage. Where required any protection shall be
designed, constructed, maintained and removed on completion as directed by
the Asset Protection Engineer.
2.8 Emergency plans

The developer will have in place emergency plans where appropriate, for
example where identified in the hazid or possession overrun risk assessment.
Where there might be a need to stop trains in an emergency and/or arrange
an isolation this will be done by the RPOS or Task Supervisor for that work. If
neither of these persons is continuously present during the work an
emergency contact notice must be displayed on the worksite. The Asset
Protection Engineer can provide the latest version of this notice. Site staff
shall be made fully conversant with this procedure as part of site induction.
2.9 Standards
Safe operation of the railway is governed by Group and Company standards
that it is incumbent upon any developer to abide by. The developer is
expected to appoint designers and project managers who know and
understand what is required to comply with these.
Network Rail (High Speed) has its own line standards based on, but distinct
from, those of Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd.
When working on the operational railway or High Speed 1 land the developer
shall comply with the Network Rail (High Speed) alcohol and drugs policy.
Developers and others involved in work on the Railway should be familiar with
the Network Rail (High Speed) Environmental Policy Statement.
2.10 CDM Regulations 2015

The developer is subject to many legislative requirements of which the duties
of the client and principal designer under CDM 2015 are new and worth
highlighting:
• the client has a major influence over the way a project is procured and
managed through contractual control, appointing designers and
contractors, and determining the money, time and other resources
available. The client is required to assemble the project team and make
suitable arrangements for managing the project safely
• the principal designer should address health and safety issues from the
very start. The designer is also responsible for coordinating design efforts
to foresee and manage risks throughout the design process.
See http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/l153.htm for further info.

2.11 Request for information (RFI)
Any request for High Speed 1 asset information such as health and safety
files, buried services or structural information should be made to the Asset
Protection Technical Clerk (and copied to the Asset Protection Engineer), who
will interrogate the records database and supply an index of the data found,
together with the terms for acquiring it. Once there is a signed agreement and
payment in place, the requested data will be released by email or file sharing
software.
Note that information is:
• confidential
• not for disclosure
• solely for the purposes of the scheme
• not warranted to be fit for this, or any, purpose
• subject to limited liability
• provided without a premium charge.
2.12 As-built information

Where the scheme makes changes to High Speed 1 infrastructure, health and
safety file information may be required. This will normally be in conjunction
with a formal handover. Where works are carried out on or near High Speed 1
land, as-built information to allow update of High Speed 1 records will be
required. In both cases the Asset Protection Engineer will advise what is
needed.

3. Formal approvals
3.1 Principle
Where it may affect the railway, construction will not be allowed to proceed
without the prior approval of Network Rail (High Speed). To enable this, the
developer shall demonstrate acceptability of their proposals using the means
set out below.
3.2 Planning consent

Planning authorities are required to consult with us for any developments
within the Safeguarded Zone (see section 7.3) and we would normally propose
conditions and informatives if within the zone of influence (see section 7.4 for
tunnels and 6.25/6.26 where above ground).
Only the planning authority can discharge conditions. However, where the
condition is one that we have proposed, we suggest that developers submit
the proposed wording of the discharge application to us for review prior to
sending to the planning authority. Once we are happy that the railway risks
have been addressed we can provide a confirmation email which the
developer may find useful in his discharge application.
3.3 Initial consultation

Although this section deals mainly with formal approvals there is informal,
initial consultation which precedes this and which is equally important in
making sure the developer’s scheme proceeds smoothly. The principal stages
are:
• planning application
• initial fact finding
• statement of programme
• description of the design concept
• discussion of construction methodology
• identification of risks
• agreement of a schedule of submissions.
The scheme checklist in Appendix A can be used as a guide on the main
issues of concern. If in doubt consult the Asset Protection Engineer – we are
here to help.
3.4 Formal approvals

The formal approvals regime in Figure 1 is similar to that used elsewhere on
the national railway network as detailed in NR/L2/CIV/003 Technical Approval
of Design, Construction and Maintenance of Civil Engineering Infrastructure.
Note that this standard is aimed at changes to railway infrastructure and some
adjustments to the submissions may be needed where developments are
outside the railway boundary. Although this standard mandates the use of
standard sign off forms F001 to F005, Network Rail (High Speed) will still

accept Forms A, B and C where the developer is more familiar with these.
Components of this approvals regime are:
• approval in principle (with sign off form F001 – was Form A)
• statement of design intent (F002 – part of Form B)
• certificate of design and check (F003 – part of Form B)
• temporary works design (Form C)
• architectural and layout acceptance (F004)
• certificate of fitness to be taken into use (F005)
• monitoring proposal (if applicable)
• method statement/work package plan/lifting plan
• approval of CRE and CEM.
Formal approvals are required for works, permanent or temporary, whose
failure or presence could possibly affect or otherwise transfer risk to a High
Speed 1 asset. If there is a later substantive change to the scheme the Asset
Protection Engineer may require a further submission, or parts of a
submission.
With agreement of the Asset Protection Engineer, approval may be given in
stages – for example separate submissions for substructure and
superstructure – though this is not preferred as it can blur boundaries and
responsibilities.
At scheme inception the developer will present the scheme and, following
discussion, the Asset Protection Engineer will agree what submissions are
necessary and this will enable the developer to forward a schedule of
submissions.
If the works affect both Network Rail (High Speed) and Network Rail
Infrastructure Ltd each party will have their own requirements and carry out
their own review and approvals. However, we would normally advise the
developer to discuss with both parties at the outset and to prepare a single
submission covering both interfaces.
The process set out in Highways Agency Standard BD2, Technical Approval of
Highway Structures, is considered to be equivalent. F006 relates to highways
authority agreement to bridgeworks. For gas installations a compliance check
against the Institution of Gas Engineers and Managers (IGEM) standards may
be acceptable.
This section does not apply to consents or approvals from outside bodies:
• regulatory and statutory authorities
• Environment Agency
• planning, listed building and conservation area authorities
• land and property owners or leaseholders
• statutory undertakers and other public services and utilities owners
• approvals under the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991.

Figure 1 – Approvals process flowchart

Submissions are to be made to the Network Rail (High Speed) Technical Clerk
at Singlewell (see page 2) in electronic format for logging and tracking. Note
that any submissions are not considered to have been received until this is
done. For files above 10Mb use of a file sharing facility such as Box is
strongly encouraged – make contact if you wish us to send a link.
3.5 Timescales
Developers are advised to allow in their programme 40 working days for
acceptance of each of F001/Form A and F002/F003/Form B. For other
acceptances the duration will depend upon the size and scope of the
document being approved, and whether the Asset Protection Engineer will
need to submit for outside engineering review. We would normally expect the
developer to allow 20 working days for a temporary works/Form C acceptance,
and 15 working days for method statements/work package plans and lifting
plans.
We aim to complete our review in half the programmed approval times stated
above. A poor quality submission, significant rework or multiple iterations are
likely to lengthen the approval timescale.
3.6 System Review Panel (SRP)

In particular for schemes modifying High Speed 1 assets or having a
significant multi-disciplinary impact on the railway, it may be necessary to
submit the scheme to SRP. In this case SRP may deal with scheme approval
or they may delegate some parts of the approval to the Asset Protection team.
Whichever is the case, Asset Protection will have the role of overseeing the
construction.
3.7 Approval in Principle (F001/Form A)

3.7.1 General Requirements
Approval in Principle (AIP) shall be obtained once the design concepts have
been established but well before the start of detailed design, to allow Network
Rail (High Speed) to sign it off before start of detailed design.
To avoid delays, misunderstandings and abortive work, early communication
should be established between the various parties involved in the AIP process
as discussed in section 3.3.
AIP is granted when Network Rail (High Speed) lead discipline head (track,
civils, S&T E&P, Stations) has signed it and lapses three years after being
granted.
3.7.2 Information to be submitted
The submission for AIP shall demonstrate that:
• adequate geotechnical and other relevant investigations and surveys have
been or will be undertaken
• the proposed design loadings (including accidental loadings) are
acceptable

• the proposed design standards and methods of design are suitable
• the requirements/recommendations of ORR, Railway Group standards and
Network Rail (High Speed) company standards are adequately addressed,
with any proposed departures justified
• any significant design matters not covered by standards are adequately
addressed
• the scheme will not result in unsatisfactory clearances, platform stepping
distances or other constraints on the operational railway
• arrangements for the interface between the civil engineering elements of
the scheme and any signalling, telecommunications, electrification, lighting
or other operational electrical or mechanical equipment are satisfactory
• the effects of the scheme on existing infrastructure have been adequately
considered
• the likely effects of the scheme on the environment and on organisations
external to Network Rail (High Speed) have been adequately considered
• arrangements for liaison and consultation with bodies external to Network
Rail (High Speed) (e.g. local authorities, statutory undertakers,
Environment Agency, adjacent landowners) are satisfactory
• provisions for examination, maintenance and eventual renewal/removal are
satisfactory
• risks to health and safety during construction, maintenance, operation and
demolition are controlled so far as is reasonably practicable
• any Network Rail (High Speed) or other stakeholder comments from the
initial meeting (or an earlier AIP submission) have been taken into account
• potential liabilities for HS1 have been recognised and mitigated
• potential synergies with HS1 have been recognised and, if appropriate,
taken advantage of.
3.8 Design intent (F002) and Certificate of design and checking (F003)
3.8.1 General
Design submissions should cover detailed design to the extent needed to
understand elements of the scheme affecting the safety, operation,
maintenance or liabilities of HS1. Developers will have established this extent
with Network Rail (High Speed) at AIP stage. For example:
• for a development above tunnels the design submission would normally
include: architectural details for the superstructure, design loads,
foundation layout, and calculated load and deformation of the tunnels
• where High Speed 1 is above ground but outside the influence zone we will
want to see selected superstructure details such as window opening and
cleaning arrangements, and maintenance proposals on the railway façade.
The Asset Protection Engineer will advise what is required when agreeing the
schedule of submissions (see section 3.3).

Non-objection to the design is granted when the Designated Project Engineer
has signed the Form B and lapses three years after being granted.
In addition to demonstrating that the development is compatible with – and
presents acceptable risk to – the railway, the submission of detailed design
shall demonstrate that:
• any issues not fully resolved at AIP stage are addressed
• Network Rail (High Speed) or other stakeholder comments from earlier
stages have been taken into account
• the design check category is not lower than specified in the F001/Form A.
3.8.2 Schemes with multiple designers
In cases where different designers are responsible for different parts of a
single structure, a lead designer shall be identified and agreed by the
Designated Project Engineer and one of the following arrangements shall
apply:
• a single design submission shall be prepared and signed by the lead
designer taking design responsibility for the whole
• a single design submission shall be submitted with a signature for each
design contribution and signed by the lead designer as taking responsibility
for the interfaces
• each of the designers shall submit and sign a separate design submission,
one of which shall be signed by the lead designer as taking responsibility
for the interfaces. This is not preferred and should be avoided unless
previously justified and agreed with Network Rail (High Speed).
3.8.3 Design check
The designer is responsible for arranging a check of his design. To
demonstrate this has been done a certificate of design and checking shall
accompany F001 and F002 submissions. In the case of a straightforward
temporary works design an F001 or F002 is not required.
3.8.4 Design check category
The level of independence of this design check shall reflect the risk to the
safety, operation and maintenance of High Speed 1. The Designated Project
Engineer will decide and state on the Form A what design check category is
applicable in accordance with the principles in Figure 2. Note that he may
decide that a higher check level is appropriate if:
• the design is carried out in-house by the construction organisation or
in-house by a sub-contractor to the construction organisation
• the design is novel or complex.
The design check shall be carried out without reference to the design
calculations or assumptions.

Cat. Type of scheme Method of checking
0 Designs which can be adequately No formal design check is required
checked by inspection, and where
failure could not conceivably affect
safety or operation of the railway
and would also be financially small
I Designs where failure could not The design may be checked in the same
conceivably affect safety or group or team as that which prepared
operation of the railway but which the design, but by people other than the
could have an adverse impact on designers. Those carrying out the
short or long term liabilities such as design check may refer to the design
additional maintenance calculations and the assumptions on
which the calculations are based, but
shall critically consider the assumptions
in order to be satisfied that the
assumptions are valid
II Designs where failure could not The design shall be checked by the
conceivably affect safety or same organisation as that which
operation of the railway but could prepared the design, but in a separate
adversely affect the safety or group of team which has not been
operation of other High Speed 1 concerned with the development of the
assets design
III Designs where failure could The design shall be checked by an
prejudice the safety or operation oforganisation independent of the design
the railway organisation. Normally this means an
organisation which is a separate legal
entity
Figure 2 – Table of design check categories
3.8.5 Scope and method of design check

A design check shall include:
• compliance with the signed AIP submission
• structural adequacy of the design
• any effects on surrounding infrastructure
• non-structural safety-related aspects of the design
• site conditions to the extent that could affect the safety and practicability of
construction or operation
• clearances.
When the Designated Project Engineer identifies that the method of design
employed by the designer is novel, the method of checking shall not use the
same method as for the design. In such cases, where practicable, recognised
methods shall be used for the design check.

The computerised method used for a category III design check shall not be the
same computerised method as used for the design or else a reasonable
sample check of the output shall be carried out.
For more complex designs the Designated Project Engineer may then require
a design check statement to show the design check methodology to be used.
This statement shall:
• specify the method of analysis to be used, including any computerised
methods
• detail the programme for the design check
• state interfaces with the designer
• state how compliance with the requirements of this section 3.8.3 will be
achieved.
3.8.6 Liaison between designers and checkers
A design check may start before the design is complete provided the
independence specified in Figure 2 is maintained. Those carrying out the
design shall liaise with those carrying out the design check as necessary to
ensure that their results are comparable and to resolve any points of
disagreement that may arise. Design and design check calculations and
assumptions may be exchanged if necessary to reach agreement.
Differences which cannot be resolved shall be referred to the Asset Protection
Engineer for resolution by the Designated Project Engineer.
3.8.7 Sign off
The signature of the Designated Project Engineer indicates acceptance that
the procedures followed for the design are in accordance with this
Development Handbook and that any comments raised by the Asset
Protection Engineer on the Submission of Engineering Documents form have
been satisfactorily addressed.
3.8.8 Changes to the design
Changes to the scheme may require redesign and checking. Developers are
advised to consult the Asset Protection Engineer in the first instance.
3.9 Temporary works (F003/Form C)

A F003/Form C is required for temporary works where failure could adversely
affect a High Speed 1 asset, such as excavations and crane bases or piling
mats.
3.10 Architectural and layout acceptance (F004)

This is rarely required for schemes affecting High Speed 1 except at St
Pancras.
3.11 Certificate of fitness to be taken into use (F005)

A F005 will be required by the Asset Protection Engineer or the Designated
Project Engineer when either determines that it is necessary to verify that

construction work is compliant with the design. This may include material
certificates and results of commissioning tests.
The F005 shall be completed by the construction organisation and signed by
the Contractor’s Responsible Engineer, or other person nominated in advance,
and shall be provided before the works are taken into use.
3.12 Method statement/work package plan or lifting plan

These will be required to be submitted to the Technical Clerk and Asset
Protection Engineer for work which could affect the safety, operation or
maintenance of the railway even if of a minor nature. They are expected to
include a task risk assessment or, if the work is subject to changing
circumstances such as the weather, a dynamic risk assessment. For
guidance a method statement checklist is included in Appendix B.
A lifting plan is to submitted where the collapse radius is within 4m of a High
Speed 1 asset.
The Asset Protection Engineer will respond with a notice of no objection once
he is satisfied with the content.
3.13 Approval of CRE and CEM

Appointment of the Contractor’s Responsible Engineer and Contractor’s
Engineering Manager are subject to approval by Network Rail (High Speed).
An application for approval should be made on the relevant form.

4. Access
4.1 General
High Speed 1 is unique in Britain with its line speed of 300km/h. This
introduces particular risks to those around the railway and for this reason the
access regime is different from, and more onerous than, that on other parts of
the railway network. For example it is a people-less railway: no persons are
allowed in the Danger Zone while trains are running.
Network Rail (High Speed) has a separate rule book from Network Rail
Infrastructure Ltd and the access requirements are different.
Booking possessions and isolations has a long lead time (see sections 4.6 and
4.8). Booking on-track access plant, if needed, is even longer. This is often a
significant risk in a development and should be considered at an early stage.
Before booking possessions, isolations or on-track plant this work will need to
be planned in detail: we will support your request for track access but only
when we are convinced you are clear what access is needed.
4.2 Access competency

Access to the operational railway (comprising Danger Zone and Safe Zone) or
non-operational railway land must be arranged through your Asset Protection
Engineer.
Persons accessing the High Speed 1 operational railway must hold either a
Network Rail (High Speed) competency or else a dispensation. In either case
there must be a competent person in charge, depending upon zone:
Zone Description Competency
Individual Person in
Charge
within 2.75m of any Danger Zone Task Supervisor
running rail (1,25m for Entry Permit (TS)
Danger Zone platform edges and (DZEP) or
where linespeed is less dispensation
than 160km/h)
between the Danger Safe Zone Rail Safety
Zone and the innermost Entry Permit Leader (RSL) or
Safe Zone
boundary fence (SZEP) or Task Supervisor
dispensation (TS)
on HS1 land outside the None Asset Protection
Non- operational railway will advise
operational (outside Safe Zone and
Danger Zone)
Figure 3 – Arrangements for accessing the operational
and non-operational railway

DZEP and SZEP training will be sponsored by your OP Engineer if he is
convinced of the necessity. A form will need to be filled in to get a login for the
relevant online test. You must also have passed a drugs and alcohol screen
and be certified to be medically fit as defined in Network Rail
standard NR/L2/OHS/00124. If you hold a current Sentinel card for the
Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd or London Underground the medical is
normally acceptable (this will be checked by Network Rail (High Speed)
online). Otherwise the developer will need to arrange this screen and medical,
and provide a certificate.
Network Rail (High Speed) or their framework contractor will normally provide
the RSL or TS, at the cost of the developer.
4.3 Dispensation
Dispensations can be issued in certain circumstances:
• for 3 days or less per calendar year
• survey or specialist inspection
• specialist short term work.
• a visitor not carrying out work.
A dispensation is similar to the Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd visitor permit
but can only be issued by certain Network Rail (High Speed) managers
covering defined activities with defined supervision on defined dates. The
manager will need to satisfy himself that the person covered by the
dispensation is:
• physically fit
• adequately supervised
• satisfactorily briefed
• unable to take the DZEP or SZEP training.
Where track access is required developers should not underestimate the
advance notice required (see section 4.6). For many schemes this is on the
critical path. Developers should submit plans in sufficient detail to allow
discussion with the Network Rail (High Speed) Planning Department to identify
possible track access conflicts or issues.
4.4 Work on High Speed 1 land

Written authority is required before working on High Speed 1 land. This can
be obtained through the Asset Protection Engineer and may include
conditions.
The developer must establish and maintain robust procedures and actions to
prevent unauthorised access.
Except for small schemes of low risk to the railway, HS1 will normally require a
protective provisions agreement (PPA) to be in place. This is a legal
agreement between HS1 and the developer covering safeguards, processes,
responsibilities and cost recovery. Where there is a need to access railway

land not under our control, terms will need to be agreed with the landowner.
Adequate time should be allowed for access in programming the works.
4.5 Disruptive possessions

The current possessions regime agreed through to the end of 2017 does not
provide any disruptive possessions.
Any interruptions to rail services that the railway industry is prepared to accept
will have to be arranged well in advance via the industry Engineering Access
Statement (formally Rules of the Route), typically by August for the calendar
year commencing 17 months later.
4.6 Possessions
Track possessions are available at night only and will allow a working period of
about 3 to 4 hours (longer on Saturday nights). Possessions will be necessary
for work:
• within the operational railway
• above the railway
• where, in the opinion of the Asset Protection Engineer, work would actually
or potentially interfere with the normal running of the railway.
Possessions must be planned well in advance (at the latest 36 weeks in
advance to ensure visibility in the Draft Period Possession Plan which has to
be shared with the Train Operating Companies. The agreed plan is then
submitted at T-26.
Only in exceptional circumstances will it be possible to vary the possession, or
provide additional possessions or isolations. The developer may need to send
a representative (who is intimately aware of the work planned) to accompany
the Asset Protection possession coordinator to the T14/T-7/T-2 possession
planning meeting.
Operational constraints mean that possessions are sometimes cancelled or
curtailed at short notice. Network Rail (High Speed) cannot guarantee that
possessions will take place or that they will be of the expected duration. Nor
will Network Rail (High Speed) be responsible for any of the developer’s costs
in this event.
There will be a Responsible Person on Site (RPOS) for each possession who
will be the only person that may say that it is safe for work to commence.
Whether or not the developer provides the RPOS, the developer must ensure
that the person in charge of the works knows the identity of the RPOS and
enforces compliance with his instructions. The RPOS will give up a
possession when satisfied that:
• the works requiring the possession are complete
• personnel are clear of the line
• the railway is safe and clear for traffic.
The developer must allow adequate time for taking and giving up a
possession/isolation when planning the possession work scope.
4.7 Between trains working
Section 7 of Module T7 of the rule book allows the line to be temporarily
blocked for certain purposes provided that normal passage of trains is not
affected. These purposes are typically short duration lifting operations or
piling rig works where the collapse radius would otherwise require a
possession. Danger Zone access is prohibited.
On the main High Speed 1 route the frequency of trains is such that between
trains working is generally only available at night or late and early in the day.
A Network Rail (High Speed) local manager will need to be arranged and be
present on site to communicate with the signaller.
Between trains working must be planned, agreed and resourced in sufficient
time to allow publication in the weekly notice.
4.8 Isolations
Where the work is near to or over the OCS an isolation will be required. This
must be booked well in advance and will curtail the duration of working time in
the possession. It can involve several persons setting up and removing the
isolation in complex areas like the Ebbsfleet station throat. These resources
are only available through Network Rail (High Speed) and are scarce. The
further in advance they are booked the more likely it is that they will be
available. However, Network Rail (High Speed) cannot guarantee their
availability and will not be held responsible for the consequences of any non-
availability.
There are some areas of High Speed 1 which have third rail: Ebbsfleet High
Level including the junction with North Kent Line, Ripple Lane, Fawkham
Junction, Ashford and Dollands Moor to Eurotunnel.
4.9 Possessions across rail interfaces

On some parts of High Speed 1, interfaces exist with the rest of the railway
network. If works are required which span the interface areas, there are
additional factors to be considered. High Speed 1 operates under a different
rule book to those other routes and the Sectional Appendix outlines how work
is carried out there. Access planning in these areas is more complex and the
early advice of the Network Rail (High Speed) possessions planning team
should be sought.
4.10 Rail traffic during a possession

During a possession it may be necessary for engineering trains or on-track
plant to pass through the work site by prior arrangement. This will need
temporary clearance of the track and cessation of those activities that could
affect their passage or the safety of personnel.
4.11 Possession overrun contingency planning

The costs of train delay in the event of a possession overrun are punitive. The
developer must therefore assure himself and the Asset Protection Engineer
that the work can be completed within the possession. For more complex
works or those where early curtailment is not possible the Asset Protection
Engineer may require the developer to undertake a possession overrun risk
assessment. This will detail the risks of overrun and their mitigations, as well
as the break points and times at which the work will be curtailed. It is
conducted jointly between the developer and Network Rail (High Speed), and
will involve any parties who can impact possession handback.
4.12 Possession costs

The developer will be responsible for the costs of a possession and isolation
including:
• possession staff such as RPOS and TS where not provided by the
developer
• isolation staff such as the NPOS
• support from Asset Protection Engineers
• use of rail plant if needed
• use of specialist Network Rail (High Speed) contractors, such as those
used for pre-works and post-works inspections
Costs may still be incurred where the booked possession or isolation is
cancelled, or is not available on the night.

5. Design
5.1 General
It is advised that the developer consults the Asset Protection Engineer at the
inception of the design to review relevant information.
As part of the scheme planning process, the developer shall agree with
Network Rail (High Speed) a schedule of submissions.
Working on the railway involves onerous and often expensive protective
measures which the developer will wish to minimise through smart design and
planning. This can be done by:
• avoiding any work within the boundaries of the operational railway except
as a last resort. This will require a possession, special supervision,
possibly an isolation, and a notice of no objection from Network Rail (High
Speed) Asset Protection
• avoiding any intrusion in to the zone of subsoil acquisition (see section 7.2)
• eliminating any need to modify any High Speed 1 asset, including services
• avoiding any work outside the operational railway but nevertheless on High
Speed 1 land
• adopting a construction methodology which avoids the need for an isolation
• designing so that construction will not impart risks to the railway
• avoiding the need for diversion of High Speed 1 services
• designing the structure or building with long term maintenance in mind:
remember that access to the exterior of a building close to the railway for
maintenance of the fabric or cleaning the glass may require a method
statement and approval by Network Rail (High Speed) each time it is
carried out
• making sure that protective zones adjacent to the railway are preserved:
this is the typically 5m wide safety zone providing protection against vehicle
ingress. There is also often a 1m maintenance zone adjacent to fences
and other boundaries
• for a possession, carrying out an assessment of the risks of possession
overrun (or other operational delay) and implementing the appropriate
mitigation measures.
The minimisation of interruption to railway services during construction is a
prime consideration in design.
5.2 Clearances
Clearances are crucial to safe operation of the railway. The minimum
clearances, outside which the whole development must be kept, are quoted
here for convenience to avoid the need to extract this information from other
documents. The dimensions quoted in the following may need to be increased
where required by the railway infrastructure.

The Asset Protection Engineer must approve dimensioned plans, elevations
and cross sections showing the exact relationship of the construction to the
railway. Each dimensional ground point must be capable of identification on
site.
Structures must meet the following clearances:
• 1.00m clear of OCS (this means any OCS asset, live or earthed) unless
agreed otherwise by the Network Rail (High Speed) E&P team. See Figure
4 dimension “b”
• at least 5.88m vertically above the highest rail. See Figure 4 dimension “a”
• preferably 7m horizontally from the nearest rail. See Figure 5
dimension “c”
• within 7m of the nearest rail permanent supports to structures spanning
over the railway must be designed to withstand derailment collision loads.
See Figure 5 dimension “c” and section 5.7.
• for equipment or personnel at least 2.75 metres from any part of the live
OCS or the airspace at all heights above live OCS. This criterion can be
temporarily removed with an isolation or permanently managed with
shielding
• for vehicles or plant, the clearances and barrier specification shall be risk
assessed such that the Asset Protection Engineer agrees that the risk of
vehicle incursion is as low as reasonably practicable
• plant or temporary works that encroach, or are able to fall, within 4m of the
operational boundary (even by accident, mishandling or as a result of
system failure) should be avoided if it is reasonably practicable to do so.
For cranes and piling rigs see sections 8 and 9.
• allowable proximity of tunnelling/thrust boring to the High Speed 1
infrastructure is governed by the risk to deformation affecting structures,
track and OCS.
Figure 4 – Measurement of vertical clearances

Figure 5 – Measurement of horizontal clearances
Screens and barriers can sometimes be used where clearances would

otherwise be compromised.
Any encroachments on the agreed clearances must be corrected immediately.
5.3 For High Speed 1 maintenance

In many places the High Speed 1 has been designed to have a maintenance
zone between 1m and 5m wide outside the railway fenceline. This is provided
to permit maintenance of the fence, access alongside the line, provision of
future services or protection against errant vehicles. Developments in this
zone are discouraged and, if permitted at all, will require the developer to
provide additional safeguards.
5.4 Gauging
Gauging is the process by which the various swept envelopes of a vehicle
(principally Class 373 and 374 (Eurostar) and Class 395 (Hitachi) for High
Speed 1) are assessed to ensure they can maintain a safe clearance to
lineside structures or vehicles on adjacent tracks. Lineside structures could
also include temporary works.
5.5 Track and structure stability

Railway track and equipment is sensitive to ground disturbance. Foundations
and changes in ground or water table level near the railway track or structure
may affect the support to the track and drainage or the stability of the
structure. Where this possibility exists, Network Rail (High Speed) will require

a soil survey, foundation loads and a design assessment. Often, monitoring of
the track, OCS and structures will also be required.
5.6 Overbridges and underbridges

High Speed 1-owned bridges may not be used for construction purposes
without the approval of Network Rail (High Speed) except in conformity with
the rights afforded to the public, if any.
Vehicle parapets over the railway have an inner face which is smooth, non-
perforate over their full height, and without hand or footholds. Steeple
copings, or similar anti-climbing feature are to be used and the height of
parapets including coping is at least 1800mm. In some areas additional
protective screening may be needed against direct contact with live OCS.
Parapets are designed to resist vehicle impact to minimum H4 standard.
5.7 Accidental loading

To avoid the risk of accidental loading arising from collisions from railway
traffic, supports carrying any structure over or alongside railway tracks must
be placed, where practicable, outside the hazard zone. The hazard zone
extends for a width of 7m from the edge of the outside rails. All supports
located between railway tracks are considered to be inside the hazard zone.
Where the railway is on embankment and there is a risk of derailed vehicles
rolling down the embankment, columns and piers beside the line may require
an extended hazard zone.
In the event that the risk cannot be avoided it shall be reduced by a design
which:
• defines the hazard zone where there is the greatest risk of impact
• addresses the need for columns and piers to withstand the effect of light
impacts that might occur from rail vehicles without sustaining irreparable
damage
• prevents a progressive collapse of the superstructure in the event of a
major accident that results in the loss of a support.
The structure and supports of any buildings over railway lines shall be so
designed and protected that they will withstand the effects of a fire on the track
for such time as specified by the appropriate building control authority and the
Asset Protection Engineer.
5.8 Glare
Where the development includes a highly reflective facade the designer is to
consider the extent to which specular surfaces, such as glass or polished
metal, could adversely affect the vision of train drivers. Developments which
give rise to spectral reflection will require a study of reflected sunlight as
experienced by the train driver’s perspective, even where they are some
distance from the railway. The assessment should:
• identify the relevant parts of the proposed facades which may reflect light

• define the occurrence of such reflections throughout the year and the day
• quantify the equivalent veiling luminance generated by the reflection at the
driver’s eye, undertaking goniophotometric studies if needed to accurately
characterise materials which exhibit combined specular and diffuse
reflection properties
• illustrate the above for a relevant stretch of the train tracks in both
directions of travel
• consider the location and type of signals on the same stretch
• measure the angular distance of the reflection from the driver’s line of sight
Animations are best suited to illustrate the assessment.
Note that lineside signalling is present on the approach to and exit from St
Pancras station but is in-cab signalling elsewhere. Network Rail (High Speed)
may require the screening of any light (including vehicle, street lights, aviation
warning beacons and external advertising screens) that may interfere with
sighting of signalling apparatus or affect the train driver’s vision. Flicker or
moving images should be avoided.
5.9 Unexploded ordnance

High Speed 1 passes through areas, particularly the marshes to the north and
south of the Thames, where unexploded second World War ordnance
remains. This risk is to be assessed and, where medium or high, measures
are to be proposed and agreed with Network Rail (High Speed) to control that
risk.
5.10 Electromagnetic compatibility

Compatibility of electromagnetic emissions from developers’ schemes with
High Speed 1 systems is to be dealt with by risk assessment of potential
coupling mechanisms. The rigour of the assessment will need to be
proportionate to the level of risk: more rigour where there is a higher likelihood
or where safety critical systems may be affected.
Where EMC effects cannot be ruled out developers may be required to submit
an EMC strategy defining the process and any further design or acceptance
requirements. Figure 6 indicates typical requirements for a project with a
significant EMC interface. In some cases the developer may need to validate
assumptions by testing.
High Speed 1 has been designed and built to be compliant with BS EN 50121.
Nevertheless, developers are responsible for ensuring that their equipment
can operate as intended in or around the railway environment.

Engineering Standard design Novel design Project record
enhancement/renewals (according to ref installation)
Requirements
PM remit EMC strategy Project risk log
Project specific
EMC requirements
Safety case
development
Design
Final installation
design for EMC
EMC test plan and

testing
Implementation/
EMC verification
acceptance
scope
Health and safety

EMC project file
file
Figure 6 – EMC activities
5.11 Public mobile operators

Any intention to install a radio host site for a public operator near to the railway
line must be advised so that consequences for the railway can be considered.
5.12 Health and safety file

Where High Speed 1 assets are created or changed the developer is required
to prepare a health and safety file to a format and standard agreed with the
Asset Protection Engineer, in liaison with the Network Rail (High Speed) asset
head.
5.13 Other requirements

• High Speed 1 buried service locations and depths must be known before
detailed design and, unless unavoidable, the new infrastructure sited to avoid
both the risk of a buried service strike during construction and a limitation on
access to the service post-construction. Where such siting cannot be
arranged Network Rail (High Speed) will advise whether the developer is to
divert the service before the start of construction. Diversion will be subject to
Network Rail (High Speed) approval
• drainage must be directed away from the railway and positively into an
existing drainage system unless this is impractical, in which case soakaways
may be considered in suitable locations and where slope stability is

maintained. Connection to High Speed 1 drainage will not normally be
permitted. The developer will be responsible for obtaining drainage consent
• Stratford Box is subject to de-watering at its ends. Neither the operation of
the de-watering boreholes nor the outflow pipework should be prejudiced.
Contamination of the lower aquifer must be avoided
• security of High Speed 1 is paramount: railway fences shall be maintained
throughout the work and permanently reinstated to the satisfaction of the
Asset Protection Engineer on completion. The level of security provided by
the railway fence shall not be diminished, even temporarily
• where a development introduces a change of use or increased risk of
trespass or vandalism on the railway, the developer may be asked to provide
mitigation measures such as higher specification fencing. Where palisade
fencing is used the rivetless type is preferred
• the international stations are enclosed in a security zone, generally provided
by high containment bollards tested to resist impact of a 7.5 tonne vehicle at
80 km/h. The containment level must be maintained
• provision of barriers against vehicle incursion from overbridges onto the
railway is the subject of risk assessment and guidance, normally using the
DfT Requirement for Road Restraint Systems, TD 19/06.
• where there are changes to road layout near overbridges (or elsewhere
adjacent to the line), or changes to the road traffic nature, speed or density
these vehicle incursion measures will need to be checked and agreed. As
vehicle incursion could cause a catastrophic fatal accident on a high speed
railway, Network Rail (High Speed) always require an appropriately high level
of containment
• where a development will shade any solar-powered railway equipment such
as track lubricators, this risk will be assessed in advance and alternative
measures – such as a permanent power supply – may be needed
• wind turbines present particular risks of constructability, structural integrity
and maintainability that will require a hazard identification exercise and risk
assessment to be carried out
• the design must take account of the effects of works on existing trees and
their roots, whether on the development site or High Speed 1 land adjoining
the site
• choice of tree species is subject to guidance produced in consultation with the
Tree Council
• in some cases a developer will be expected to provide mitigation for effects
on the development arising from High Speed 1, such as noise barriers for a
new residential development or containment for a nearby oil-filled
transformer. The developer is reminded of his obligation to ensure
appropriate mitigations are adopted to protect their development from noise
from High Speed 1. The developer is responsible for ensuring that the
development meets statutory requirements in accordance with Planning
and Noise PPG 24 September 1994 - Annex 4 and provisions of the
Safeguarding Direction.

6. Construction
6.1 Work methodology
The developer should present his methodology to the Asset Protection
Engineer for input at an early stage as described in section 3.2. In most cases
this will have happened during the feasibility or design stage and have been
accompanied by an assessment of risks. The construction risks to the railway,
both safety and operational, must be recognised and mitigated so far as is
reasonably practicable.
Any later changes in location, design or programme will normally need
discussion with the Asset Protection Engineer and may require further
acceptance.
6.2 Supervision
Although the developer retains responsibility for safe execution of his works
and for providing adequate supervision, where the safety or operation of the
railway could be prejudiced Network Rail (High Speed) may require an extra
level of supervision. This could include:
• for any works: site inspections of general safety, scaffolding, lifting
operations, excavations near buried services
• for works with a high risk to the safety of train operations: a Network Rail
(High Speed) safety representative full time
• where possessions are provided: the provision of an RPOS and Task
Supervisor
• where isolations are provided: the provision of an NPOS
• during between trains working: a local manager to liaise with the signaller
• for work on Network Rail (High Speed) property, especially near to railway
services: full time or part time site representation on behalf of Network Rail
(High Speed).
6.3 Induction and training

The developer shall include applicable railway risks in his site inductions and
site briefings. The Asset Protection Engineer can help with identifying these.
Records of training and briefings shall be retained at the developer’s site
offices for inspection.
6.4 Communications
Communications between Network Rail (High Speed) and the developer
should be through established channels. However, the developer agrees that
in an emergency during construction the Asset Protection Engineer (or other
Network Rail (High Speed) person) may give instructions directly to the
contractor in the interests of railway safety.
Where appropriate the developer is expected to have emergency plans in
place prior to the work. These will include emergency Network Rail (High
Speed) contact details. The Asset Protection Engineer will often require a
notice showing contact details in the event of a railway emergency to be part
of the work briefing and to be posted on site. Where the Asset Protection
Engineer requires this it will be included in his method statement comments.
Before start of work on the site the Asset Protection Engineer shall be
provided with a list of names and telephone numbers for personnel
responsible for organising remedial action in the event of an emergency on the
work site when it is unattended.
6.5 Alcohol and drugs

All personnel engaged in work which could affect the safety or operation of the
railway must comply with the Network Rail (High Speed) policy on alcohol and
drugs.
6.6 Personal protective equipment (PPE)

Persons on the operational railway must wear protective clothing of an
approved colour, type and design. Note that yellow is not permitted on the
railway. PPE includes hi-vis jacket and trousers, hard hat, safety boots and –
in tunnels and for some specific tasks – eye protection. The jacket and hard
hat should be branded with the contractor’s name so that an individual’s
employer can be identified. The PPE must be worn correctly and kept in a
clean condition.
6.7 Removal of developers’ employees

Network Rail (High Speed) reserves the right to require the immediate removal
from the operational railway of any person who in the opinion of Network Rail
(High Speed) is not in a fit condition to carry out their duties, or is liable to
endanger their own health and safety or that of others. Such persons will not
be permitted further access to the work site without the agreement of Network
Rail (High Speed).
6.8 Safety inspections

Network Rail (High Speed) will carry out pre-arranged or unannounced safety
inspections from time to time. These may cover lifting operations, piling,
excavation, scaffolding or general site issues. Where appropriate, registers
and certificates relevant to the works are to be made available for inspection
by Network Rail (High Speed).
6.9 Notification of accidents and incidents

Any accident or incident causing:
• injury to a railway worker, passenger or anyone on the operational railway
• damage to railway property
• a hazard to the railway (including any RIDDOR-reportable event)
must be reported at the earliest opportunity to the Asset Protection Engineer
and should be followed up with the incident report without delay.

The location where the accident book is kept should be included in the method
statement or work package plan.
6.10 Marking of hazards

Known hazards are to be indicated by the developer on site such as:
• OCS
• third rail
• buried services
• Japanese Knotweed
• the presence of protected species.
6.11 Storage of plant, equipment and materials

All plant, equipment and materials shall be kept safe and secure when not in
use and shall be located so as to avoid opportunity for trespass or vandalism
on, or directed against, the railway or High Speed 1 land.
The developer shall minimise the risk of debris being blown onto the OCS or
the track by making sure materials are properly stored and secured. Failure to
do this could cause a very serious incident such as a flashover or train
pantograph damage. Hoardings and similar temporary structures shall be
designed and built to withstand the effects of wind, and may require a
temporary works design.
Storage of flammable gasses within 200m of High Speed 1 presents a risk of
closure of the railway by the emergency services in the event of fire and
should be avoided if practical. Acetylene can explode up to 24 hours after the
fire has been extinguished and its use within 200m is to be avoided unless
agreed with Network Rail (High Speed) following a risk assessment by the
developer. Where agreed it must only be on site when needed for that specific
activity. Follow the published guidance on liquid petroleum gas (LPG)
and acetylene.
HS1 and Network Rail (High Speed) do not accept responsibility for theft of or
damage to developers’ materials.
6.12 Use of plant and equipment near to the railway.

Use of construction plant, equipment or materials that, in the event of
mishandling or failure, could come within 4m of the railway boundary should
be avoided. Where this could come within 4m of the nearest rail or 2.75m of
any live OCS equipment this presents a safety risk and is only permitted with a
possession and isolation.
Such work, or any work involving plant, equipment or materials on railway
land, may only be undertaken with the prior written agreement of Network Rail
(High Speed). This is normally granted as a letter of no objection to a method
statement.
Specific guidance for cranes and piling rigs is given in sections 8 and 9.

6.13 Mast climbers
Mast climbers will require a temporary works design for the base and ties. In
addition we would expect:
• data sheet, certificate of thorough examination and periodic inspection
records for the mast climber
• a temporary works design which considers all failure modes including
asymmetric and unstable loads
• temporary works design to include ground conditions, assumptions, loads
from masts and proposed temporary mat if required
• an explanation of the level of redundancy in ties (if one tie fails can the
others resist the loads)
• temporary loading conditions when raising and removing the masts
• where the collapse radius is within 4m of the railway fenceline, the mast
climber to be rated to work within 75% of the SWL
• RAMS to prescribe an exclusion zone for vehicles and plant with physical
barriers to prevent collision with masts.
6.14 Vehicle containment

The risk of vehicle incursion during the temporary construction phase must be
recognised by the developer and mitigated. Normally this means keeping
construction traffic away from the railway boundary or, if this cannot be
arranged, erecting concrete interlocked vehicle containment barriers (VCBs).
The approaches to permanent structures must comply with, as a minimum, the
Network Rail standard NR/GN/CIV/00012 and the RLE document titled Risk to
the CTRL from Errant Vehicles/Vessels 000-GDG-LC-EEG-00002-06. Any
development which changes the risk assessment score will require
reassessment by the developer and may require additional measures. Over
and above this the developer will need to ensure this is adequate.
The high containment bollards around the three international stations are
designed to PAS68. Particular importance is attached to achieving a bollard
layout which maximises the distance between containment and target.
6.15 Unmanned aerial systems (UAS)

Prior to use of UASs close to High Speed1 we will want to see evidence that
risks to the railway are addressed. For small unmanned aircraft (UAVs up to
20kg) Civil Aviation Authority articles 166 and 167 are to be adhered to. A
submission for small unmanned aircraft will include:
• purpose of the flight and data to be acquired
• flight boundaries in plan and height (with CAA permission if above 400 feet)
• location of operator and a demonstration that the visual line of sight can be
maintained
• arrangements for take-off and landing including automatic return to base
• weight of UAV and CAA permission if over 7kg (if greater than 7kg the

operator is to remain at least 75 metres away from nearest rail)
• how the UAV is to be kept at least 50 metres from the nearest rail unless a
possession is in place (section 4.6) and the operator has an Operational
Safety Case which exempts the operator from relevant aspects of CAP 722
50m rule. Note that Network Rail has framework contractors that can come
within this 50m boundary. UAV operators can seek accreditation through
RISQS
• evidence of competency acceptable to CAA in theoretical knowledge,
airmanship and recent flying experience/assessment (known as Permission
for Aerial Work if on a commercial basis)
• any restrictions placed by CAA, the hiring company or other landowners
• demonstration of adequate insurance, normally £5m minimum.
6.16 Vibration
Vibration can present a risk to operation through disruption of equipment or
through movement of ground or structures (ground displacement, settlement
or heave).
Excessive vibration near to High Speed 1 structures, particularly tunnels, is
unlikely to be acceptable, normally ruling out driven piling as well as
vibro-compaction and stone columns. If these methods are used and the
developer cannot demonstrate that the vibration does not exceed a peak
particle velocity of 5mm/s at any structure then a settlement and vibration
monitoring regime will be required.
If Network Rail (High Speed) believes that continuing piling will or is
reasonably likely to have an adverse impact on HS1 property and/or on High
Speed 1 then we must have the right to suspend the piling works.
6.17 Confined spaces

A significant number of confined spaces exist on or about the High Speed 1
infrastructure, not all of which are shown on the CTRL hazard log. In carrying
out the scheme, developers must demonstrate that they comply fully with the
requirements of the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997 and the associated
Approved Code of Practice.
6.18 Windblown debris

Windblown debris causes more lineside neighbours incidents than anything
else, by far. All could and should be avoided with good housekeeping. Plastic
wrapping and aggregate sacks are too commonly blown onto the OCS,
affecting the train service and incurring train delay costs which are punitive.
6.19 Dust, smoke and vapour

Excessive dust, smoke and vapour from works may adversely affect safe
operation of the railway and create a nuisance, and must be avoided.

6.20 Water
Full details of any proposed drainage systems will be required. Drainage
channelling is to be directed away from High Speed 1 into local authority
sewers and should be installed a minimum distance of two metres from the
High Speed 1 boundary. Surface water discharge into a High Speed 1 drain
or culvert, if permitted, requires prior written consent.
The use of soakaway drainage is not favoured as it could have a detrimental
effect on High Speed 1 land. The drainage system should be designed to take
this into account.
The construction and maintenance of ponds or swimming pools may pose
risks to the railway and leakage or failure could lead to severe financial cost
and possible prosecution. Prior consultation on any proposals is strongly
urged.
Where altered drainage, flooding risk or significant discharges of water may be
anticipated as a result of proposed development, due regard should be given
to the potentially adverse impacts on foundations and ground structures
including existing High Speed 1 structures.
Parts of the High Speed 1 route are provided with permanent, continuous,
groundwater pumping to modulate ground water and water table levels. In the
Stratford area such a scheme is in operation to mitigate the floatation
pressures on the Stratford Box from the otherwise high groundwater levels.
22 wells penetrate into the chalk strata down as deep as 30m and under-drain
the Thanet Sands. Dewatering maintains the lower aquifer at not less than
10m below the underside of the base slab of the Stratford Box. In this locality
those considering development, interventions below the surface or
abstractions should have regard for of the dewatering regime and
infrastructure.
6.21 Vegetation clearance

Clearance of lineside vegetation is often contentious with the public, and
developers are advised to consult with neighbours where appropriate.
Vegetation clearance is not to take place on High Speed 1 land without the
approval of Network Rail (High Speed).
6.22 Overhead line equipment

This shall be assumed to be live and dangerous at all times except when in
possession of a valid OCS permit.
Work shall not be carried out, cranes or other plant erected, operated and/or
dismantled or materials stored within the prohibited space which is that space
within a radius of 2.75 metres of the live overhead equipment together with
anywhere vertically above this space.
The figure of 2.75 metres used in determining the prohibited space shall be
increased by the length of any tool, equipment and/or material being handled.
However, work on the track, platforms, walkways and the like below the
overhead equipment is permitted without special precautions provided that

tools, equipment and/or materials are not at any time raised above waist
height.
Long objects, such as pipes, scaffold poles, ladders, long handled tools or any
object of such length that if carried vertically could infringe on the prohibited
space, shall be carried horizontally by two persons below head height.
Electrically conductive tools or surveying equipment shall not be used within
(nor when used in a foreseeable way, capable of coming within) 2.75 metres
of any overhead line equipment or third rail.
In certain cases it may be permissible to use protective screens adjacent to
overhead line equipment or third rail electrification to enable certain work to
continue without isolations being required. Similarly, it may be permissible to
use crash decks to enable certain work to continue without possessions or
isolations being required.
Given the fatal nature of contact with live overhead equipment the 2.75 metres
should be treated as a prohibited zone not as a safe working limit. The
developer is responsible for providing a safe system of work which would
normally provide greater clearance.
6.23 Third rail electrification

Work in the vicinity of third or fourth rail electrification will involve the provision
of special protection or isolations to the equipment.
6.24 Earthing and temporary earthing

Where a metal structure such as scaffolding is erected there may be a
requirement for temporary earthing due to induction or touch potential.
Network Rail (High Speed) Asset Protection Engineer can advise. No
structure should be earthed to the track, OCS, fencing or other High Speed 1
equipment without consulting Network Rail (High Speed).
6.25 Excavations, foundations and embankments – support zones

Any proposal to excavate or construct foundations near High Speed 1 track or
structure must ensure:
• stability of the track and structures
• stability of cables and cable trough, walkways and fences
• safety of passing rail traffic.
Note that structure includes earthworks and, in this context, any foundations
including fencepost footings.
Excavations or piling near High Speed 1 infrastructure are subject to
agreement of design and method statements. They shall not commence until
measures required to monitor and maintain the stability of the track and/or
structure have been implemented, and the Asset Protection Engineer has
confirmed there is no objection. To do this he will need to assess:
• location, extent and depth of excavation
• temporary support within the excavation, its installation and removal
• method of excavation
• specification of backfilling.
Foundations (including piles) near to track or structures will be reviewed for:
• imposed load affecting the stability of the line or adjacent land
• penetration of the support zone of an existing structure (see Figure 8)
• increased loading on an existing foundation.
The track and structure support zones are defined in Figure 7 and Figure 8:
Figure 7 – Track support zone
Figure 8 – Structure support zone
6.26 Retaining walls – imposed loads

For retaining walls there are requirements, as shown in Figure 9, for both:
• excavation in front of the wall
• imposed loads behind the wall.
In addition the Asset Protection Engineer is to be advised of schemes that
could cause instability or settlement by other means:
• excavation below the toe of an embankment
• proposals for a foundation to intersect a watercourse or drain, even if the
latter can be diverted or protected
• ground improvement schemes of any kind
• dewatering schemes.
Figure 9 – Loading and excavation close to retaining walls
6.27 Under track crossing (UTX)

UTXs shallower than 4.8m are not permitted so they are normally undertaken
using horizontal directional drilling or other micro tunnelling techniques,
Network Rail (High Speed) will need assurance that their use beneath the
railway will not adversely affect the railway infrastructure or safe running of
trains.
The designer will need to demonstrate that the choice of tunnelling technique
is appropriate. The design is then to be undertaken and checked by
competent persons, and installation is by a competent and experienced
contractor. Recognising that the safe and efficient delivery of UTX schemes is
highly dependant upon a close and effective interface between designer and
installer, Network Rail (High Speed) requires evidence of this working
relationship.
The key to confidence that the track support zone has not been compromised
is comparing the observed and anticipated volume of arisings. Although this is
not always straightforward it should always be attempted. The following
records are also valuable:
• monitoring of the nature of material forming the arisings and comparison
with expected
• observations of any lost ground or other ground movement
• any unusual conditions or events
• checks on line and grade
• pipe jacking forces
• pressure readings
• groundwater control operations and groundwater levels
• reasons for operational shutdown in the event a drive is halted.
Track and infrastructure settlement monitoring regimes are to be prepared,
agreed and implemented prior to works commencing, along with appropriate
mitigation measures which can be seamlessly employed during UTX
installation should unforeseen events occur or unexpected conditions be
encountered.
Discussion on easements, wayleaves and clearances may be needed.

7. Developments over High Speed 1 tunnels
7.1 Construction
High Speed 1 includes 42 km of running tunnel. This is mostly under London
in two sections to the west and east of Stratford, known as London Tunnel 1
and London Tunnel 2 respectively. They are twin tunnels generally between
20 and 35 metres below ground level lined with 350mm thick fibre-reinforced
precast concrete segments. Access is possible at the portals and at five other
locations where there are headhouses. The twin tunnels are parallel and,
including linings, each have an outside diameter of 7.85 metres.
The Thames Tunnel is of similar construction though the North Downs tunnel
under Blue Bell Hill is a single bore with in-situ lining.
Tunnels in Kent are cut and cover.
7.2 High Speed 1 subsoil acquisition

Where the line is in tunnel, developers should be aware of the extent of High
Speed 1 subsoil acquisition. This is a rectangle in cross section covering both
tunnel bores and the space between them. The rectangle extends to 3m
above, below and to the side of the tunnel linings. Intrusion into this zone is
considered trespass and is to be avoided except as a last resort. If the Asset
Protection Engineer agrees that it cannot be avoided a licence from High
Speed 1 will be required.
7.3 Safeguarded zone

A strip of land wider than the railway (including above tunnels) is designated a
safeguarded zone. This prevents developments without consultation and
requires planning authorities to heed certain conditions HS1 may seek to
impose. The safeguarding boundaries are to be modified in 2016 to shrink the
safeguarded zone.
7.4 Surcharge loadings

Network Rail (High Speed) will want to discuss loading or unloading from any
development that could potentially load or deform the tunnel linings. This is a
strip within d+6 metres of either tunnel centreline where d is the depth of the
tunnel centreline in metres. Alternatively t+3 metres can be used where t is
the depth of track in metres.
The design of the London Tunnels allows for surcharge loadings from existing
buildings or, where there were no existing buildings, assumes a uniformly
distributed load of 50kN/m² at ground level, based on the ground level at the
time the design was undertaken. For the Thames Tunnel and Temple Mills
Chord Tunnel the allowable surcharge is 20kN/m² (maximum 10kN/m² for live
loads above TMC Tunnel). For Stratford Box this surcharge is 20 kN/m² within
40m of the Box walls based on a ground level of +6.5m above Ordnance
Datum.
High Speed 1 tunnels have not been designed to take point loads.

7.5 Exceeding surcharge loadings
The surcharge allowances in section 7.4 can only be exceeded if an
engineering assessment of the tunnel load and deformation is produced and is
acceptable to Network Rail (High Speed).
As part of this the developer shall:
• calculate predicted soil movements and therefore tunnel lining movement
at stages of construction, loading and consolidation, including unloading for
example during demolition or basement construction
• tunnel lining hoop stress, joint stress and bending moment changes,
allowing for any segment joint lips in that location
• combination of hoop stress and bending moment with respect to the M-N
interaction diagram
• verification where appropriate using semi-empirical methods
• longitudinal deformation at track level both vertical and horizontal, and
comparing with serviceability limits of 4mm over 35m and 9mm over 70m
• movement of OCS contact wire with respect to the track as a result of both
tunnel squat and rotation of the segment that the OCS support bracket is
fixed to, and comparing with a limit of 10mm
• if cross passages are nearby the load and deformation of the linings, collar
(where the cross passage joins the running tunnel) and potential for
leakage
The developer shall also consider issues with construction:
• stress relief and deformation of HS1 tunnels from the boring process
• potential for outflow of soil into pile bore, reducing support to tunnel lining
• potential for concrete or support fluid flow from pile bore to HS1 tunnels.
7.6 Foundation options

Above tunnels strip and raft foundations will, subject sufficient clearance to the
tunnel soffit, normally be acceptable forms of building foundation and are
preferable to piled foundations.
Where piled foundations are required, bored piles are preferred (see
section 6.16).
The precise location, depth and loading of piled foundations should be
carefully specified. As part of the consultation process Network Rail (High
Speed) may request advance notification of scheduled piling, and that the pile
logs and test pile results be made available.
7.7 Boreholes
Those proposing boreholes should have regard to the extent of subsoil
acquisition (see section 7.2). As a minimum the drilling method, diameter,
proposed depth, inclination and OS coordinates of the borehole will be
required before approval is given. The Asset Protection Engineer may wish to
attend site to verify site controls on location and depth.

Where drilling support fluid is proposed, the fluid shall be selected to avoid any
potential ingress of fluid into the nearby HS1 tunnels, for instance from
transmission of the fluid through fissures in the ground
7.8 CTRL project grid

High Speed 1 documents use the CTRL project grid though national datum is
used for levels. Defined as a plane true to scale grid which is related to
Ordnance Survey coordinates, the essence of the grid is that measured
distances on the ground are the same as distances calculated from grid
coordinates within a specific area. Any projection from the surface of the earth
on to a plane will be a compromise in retaining true geometrical properties
and, therefore, any grid system will have limitations in terms of accuracy over
large areas. The CTRL project grid has been developed specifically for the
project to minimise any inaccuracies within the High Speed 1 trace.
On application to Network Rail (High Speed) we can provide a conversion tool
to convert between OS and CTRL project grid coordinates and vice versa.
7.9 Settlement above tunnels

Minor settlement occurred during the tunnelling operation of High Speed 1 but
this has long since ceased. HS1 has detailed monitoring records of settlement
throughout the route and can prove that settlement is no longer happening.
HS1 will not accept any claim with regard to settlement.
HS1 does not offer the right of support nor does it accept liability for any
settlement, damage, noise or vibration emanating from the normal operation or
maintenance of the railway.
7.10 Monitoring
For developments above, below or near to tunnels the developer will agree
with the Asset Protection Engineer whether tunnel monitoring is required and,
if so, to agree a monitoring regime. Measures will depend upon the predicted
load and deformation at the tunnel extrados and are likely to be:
• pre-works and post-works tunnel condition survey
• a review of the track recording coach measurements of track vertical and
horizontal alignment
• pre-works and post-works three dimensional survey using laser or fixed
targets (also during the works if for an extended period) to identify the
radial and longitudinal deformation profile changes of the HS1 tunnels
during the works
• monitoring equipment recording movement of tunnel lining and trackbed in
real time. This will need to be in place well before loading (to allow a stable
set of readings to be taken) and continue until soil movement is largely
complete or until it is clear that the settlement has matched the predictions
• monitoring of adjacent structures such as retaining walls forming
basements close to the High Speed 1 tunnels so that displacements of the
wall are monitored at source and may be able to be correlated with
displacements of the nearby High Speed 1 tunnels.
8. Lifting
8.1 Types of plant
This section deals in particular with:
• tower cranes (fixed or luffing jib)
• mobile cranes
• hoists, lifts and mobile elevated work platforms (MEWPs)
• 360 degree excavators used as cranes
• telehandlers
• helicopter lifts.
It provides some general guidance appropriate to other types of cranes such
as rail-mounted cranes and gantry cranes. Concrete pumps are also
considered.
Piling rigs are dealt with in section 9.
8.2 Risk control

Use of lifting plant near to the railway presents a risk of catastrophic accident.
The developer is expected to demonstrate that the craneage regime reduces
the risk to the railway to as low as reasonably practicable. Guidance on the
main controls can be found in Requirements for Tower Cranes Alongside
Railways Controlled by Network Rail (see section 8.4). Although this is
concerned with tower cranes, the same principles apply to other cranes.
Complimentary guidance covering mobile cranes will be published in 2016.
8.3 Crane mat

The criteria for piling platforms also apply. See section 9.6.
8.4 Tower cranes

Accidents involving tower cranes are becoming less frequent in the UK but still
account for several accidents each year on average.
Tower cranes are to comply with BS EN 14439:2006. Many accidents arise
from oversights in erection, dismantling or inspection all of which are covered
by BS7121. Requirements for Tower Cranes Alongside Railways Controlled
by Network Rail was developed by Network Rail (High Speed), the HSE and
the Construction Plant Association. Published June 2014, this is considered to
constitute best practice: http://www.cpa.uk.net/tower-crane-interest-group-
tcig-publications/.
8.5 Aerial lifting

Aerial lifting by helicopter must comply with the Lifting Operations and Lifting
Equipment Regulations. This requires that lifting operations are risk assessed.
LOLER regulation 8 (organising lifting operations) and regulation 9 (thorough
examination and inspection) are key and the developer must demonstrate that
the requirements are met.
In addition to the normal requirements from ground-based lift, an aerial lifting
plan will need:
• downdraft control strategy detailing clearance between load and height of
helicopter when lifting and placing loads
• exclusion zones to be managed so there is no risk of loose material or
debris blowing onto High Speed 1
• flight plan
• CAA certificate of airworthiness.
A comprehensive submission comprising method statement together with lift
plan, operating procedures, test certification and CAA certificate of
airworthiness risk, assessment/risk control measures and emergency plan is
to be submitted. When working adjacent to High Speed 1 downrating to 75%
of allowable load is to be imposed.
Generally no part of the helicopter is to fly above an exclusion zone extending
10 metres from the railway boundary fence in the event of any conceivable
failure modes. Working is to be restricted in the 180 degree arc away from the
operational railway.
8.6 Concrete pumps

The pump siting is to be planned and executed so that its boom will not need
to slew to a position towards the track. No part of the pump or its boom should
be capable of being within 4m of the operational railway boundary even in
collapse conditions.
If there is no form of physical restraint, locking or zoning device to ensure this,
the Asset Protection Engineer may require that a banksman be in attendance
during pump operation.
Cleaning of concrete pumps or equipment should be well away from the
railway and always away from any watercourses or High Speed 1 drainage
assets.
8.7 360 degree slew excavators and telehandlers

In normal operation at maximum boom outreach, allowing for power slide if
fitted, no part of the machine or load should be capable of falling within 4m of
the operational railway boundary. Additional errant vehicle protection may be
required where mobile plant is to be used or a haul road is to be constructed
adjacent to any railway boundary fence. This will be assessed on an
individual basis at the initial planning consultation stage.

9. Piling operations
9.1 General
This section provides advice on systems of work for piling that ensure the
safety of High Speed 1.
Piling work shall be planned to be without risk to the railway so far as is
reasonably practicable. To demonstrate this, piling methodology is to be
carefully considered and is subject to Network Rail (High Speed) acceptance.
Piling platforms shall be designed, certificated, constructed and maintained.
Piling shall not introduce an unacceptable level of vibration at High Speed 1
structures, particularly tunnels.
The developer shall consider where piling works may prejudice the safety of
the railway as a consequence of:
• plant operator or workforce error
• failure of the ground supporting the piling equipment
• piling outside the line of the piling rig tracks
• equipment or accessory failure
• the piling system and its interaction with the existing ground (such as
vibration, displacement and loosening affects)
• collapse radius of the piling rig or attendant crane.
9.2 Selection of the piling method

To identify the most practicable piling solution prior to finalising the structure
design it is recommended that the developer seeks advice from a piling
specialist. The method selected must not only be safe but also be appropriate
for the geotechnical/soil conditions at the site and the existing High Speed 1
infrastructure in the vicinity. Hence the developer must consider:
• working space and access to the site
• proximity of High Speed 1 infrastructure, particularly if it may be sensitive to
the works to be undertaken
• limitations to ground or structure movement (lateral, heave or settlement
whether caused by vibration or not)
• noise and/or vibration limits (see also section 6.16)
• effects of ground displacement and/or soil loosening
• frequency and speed of trains.
9.3 Proximity to the line

Piling should be planned so that, in the event of mishandling or failure of piling
equipment, no part of the equipment can fall within 4m of the operational
railway boundary.
Where this cannot be achieved and a fall could be within 4m of the nearest
line open to traffic or 2.75m of the live overhead catenary system the
movement of the piling rig to, from or between pile positions will only be
permitted during a blockade of the lines in question or, exceptionally, under a
special operating procedure for between-trains working.
A similar condition applies for crane movements or slinging loads: where the
jib length/height of the crane plus half of the length of the longest load being
lifted, in any orientation, could be within 4m of the nearest line open to traffic
(or 2.75m of the live overhead catenary system), the crane should be
downrated by 25%. That is, the heaviest load lifted should not exceed 75% of
the safe working load.
9.4 Lineside protection

In some cases protection between the piling and the railway tracks will be
required. This may take the form of:
• interlocked vehicle containment barriers (VCBs) to prevent vehicles
approaching the railway
• a screen to provide a physical barrier to prevent personnel, materials, lifting
tackle or ancillary equipment accidentally falling or straying
• a visible marker delineating plant movement boundary for example at the
edge of the piling mat.
9.5 Operational considerations

The site area shall be planned and managed to avoid risks to the railway as
far as reasonably practicable, including off-loading of materials, rebar
fabrication areas, pile storage areas, mud plant and accommodation units.
The general position of the piling rig and movement of the piling rig when
undertaking pile installation and the sequencing of the works must be planned
to reduce the need for repeated significant changes in the orientation of the
tracks of the piling rig and crane (in particular, the elimination of frequent
spragging).
Any lifting operations such as for pile rebar frequently present a significant risk
and are to be reviewed in detail. Control measures could include:
• a secondary restraint e.g. back-up sling
• pile cages being spliced to reduce the lifted length
• tag lines shall be used to control loads.
See also section 8 which deals with lifting operations.
Where movement, noise or vibration monitoring is required before, during or
after the piling works, the monitoring regime will be agreed with Network Rail
(High Speed) in advance.
At the end of each shift, plant is to be left in a safe and secure manner.
9.6 Piling platform

In analysing accidents reported by its members to the Federation of Piling
Specialists, it has been noted that the most serious accidents involving the
failure of a piling rig, or a crane whilst on piling duties, have been caused by a

failure of the platform supporting that rig/crane or by a failure in the
maintenance of that platform rather than by mechanical failure of the machine
itself.
In recognition of this the FPS, with the support of the HSE, has introduced a
procedure outlining the responsibilities for the design, construction and
maintenance of piling platforms. This procedure, which is detailed in Building
Research Establishment document Working Platforms for Tracked Plant and
has become a standard construction industry requirement.
Installation of the platform shall be in accordance with the design and shall be
undertaken by a competent contractor. The performance of the piling platform
shall be verified by CBR tests or equivalent before use.
Once the installation of the piling platform has been completed, the Piling
Platform Certificate will be completed and a copy shall be held on site. Further
ongoing inspection of the piling platform will be required.
The piling company shall provide all relevant rig and equipment loadings and
bearing pressure calculations in advance of the piling platform being designed
if the rig and equipment which is delivered to site is not the same as that for
which the loadings have been supplied, then the piling platform shall be
redesigned for the loads appropriate to that rig and equipment.
The design of the piling platform shall be subject to a category 3 design check
and a F003/Form C.
Good practice dictates that:
• piling platforms shall exceed the working area by 2m all round
• physical demarcation (timber baulks or similar) shall be placed to effectively
demarcate the edge of the working area
• platforms are to be designed for the full capacity of piling rigs, cranes and
other equipment proposed
• consideration may be given to the use of lean mix/reinforced concrete
platforms as these may provide additional safety margins
• the capacity of installed piling platforms shall be proven by CBR tests or
similar prior to first use, and on any subsequent changes to the platform
• consideration shall be given to the drainage of the piling platform
• a regular piling platform inspection, testing and maintenance regime shall
be proposed by the piling platform designer and approved by the piling
contractor and principal contractor. The results of each inspection shall be
recorded
• access to the piling site, in particular if sloping, is to be planned to allow
safe passage of the rig onto the designated piling platform
• the project shall be planned to avoid excavation of the piling platform until
piling operations have been completed
• any unsupported pile shafts or trenches must be correctly backfilled to
ensure that there is no localised reduction in the bearing capacity of the
piling platform.

10. Cost recovery
The developer is responsible for costs incurred by Network Rail (High Speed) and
HS1 in connection with their development. Costs are recorded each four-week
period by Network Rail (High Speed) and invoiced by HS1.
Developers will normally be expected to sign up to a Cost Reimbursement
Agreement (CRA). This allows HS1 to reclaim the costs incurred by themselves
and Network Rail (High Speed). It also defines conditions on use of any records
supplied. Network Rail (High Speed) will provide an estimate of these costs on an
emerging cost basis.
For schemes of significant size, complexity or risk to the railway a Protective
Provisions Agreement (PPA) may also be required to safeguard HS1 interests.
This is a legal agreement between HS1 and the developer covering
safeguards, processes, responsibilities, indemnity and cost recovery. The
ORR sets a standard of £155m for the indemnity.
It is in the interests of Network Rail (High Speed) to know about developments
either proposed or taking place near to the railway. Accordingly, initial fact
finding should take place at the appropriate time whether or not there is an
agreement in place.
Costs include:
• requests for information, including borehole information
• manpower costs for Network Rail (High Speed) personnel
• necessary engineering advice commissioned by Network Rail (High Speed)
to review submissions and sign off as DPE
• provision of staff for possessions, isolations (see sections 4.6 to 4.8) or
security where applicable
• additional equipment provided by Network Rail (High Speed) and required
for the development such as spark gap equipment for a new overbridge
• relocation of equipment, fencing, or HS1-owned materials, to facilitate the
scheme
• HS1 costs, such as legal fees and management fee
• for borehole logs a sum reflecting use of intellectual property
• additional future operation or maintenance costs (which we would normally
seek to avoid but, if accepted, could be allowed for with a negotiated
commuted sum)
• emergency works carried out by Network Rail (High Speed) or HS1 to
safeguard the infrastructure as a result of an act or omission of the
developer
• train delay or train cancellation costs resulting from the developer’s work.
Note that these are punitive, and higher than on the rest of the railway
network.

Appendix A – Scheme checklist
Legal • at what depth?

• are High Speed 1 assets to be changed? Development above tunnels.
• will HS1 liabilities be affected? • what is the position in relation to the
• is a drainage or other consent affected? tunnels?
• is a PPA required? • how is the location and depth controlled on
• I planning consent required and if so has it site?
been obtained? • at what depth are they above the tunnel?
Documentation and drawings • what is the displacement of the loading?
• are method statements in place? • is there evidence that the have been
designed and the design checked?
• have they been accepted by Network Rail
(High Speed)? • has this been accepted?
• is the emergency procedure available and Plant
understood? • is there any piling involved?
Access to site • what controls have been put in place?
• will access to HS1 land be needed? • is there any craneage involved?
• what access routes are being used during • what controls have been put in place?
construction? • what other plant will be used?
• is maintenance or emergency access being • will there be any vibration caused by the
impaired? plant?
• what security is in place during works? • what controls have been put in place?
Activity • what consideration has been given to errant
• what is being built? vehicles?
• what type of foundations will be used? Cranes
• what depth are the foundations? • what site position are the cranes?
• will there be any changes to railway or • what is the slew radius?
public utilities • what is the load exclusion area?
• will there be any change to public access? • are slew locks in place?
• will there be any impact on existing Storage of materials
structures?
• proposed site location of stored materials
• are there any temporary works involved?
• risk of windblown debris removed?
• is evidence available of design and
checking? • will any flammable products be stored?
• what distance from High Speed 1?
Excavation
• any fire precautions to be put in place?
• is there excavation adjacent to the railway?
• will any additional loading be placed on
• how far is it from the rail? High Speed 1 structures?
• does it impinge on the track support zone? • could materials fall on High Speed 1
• what depth is the excavation? assets?
• what methods of earth retention are used? Possessions
• is there evidence of design and checking of • will rail possessions be required?
the earth retention?
• planned timescale of works?
• any High Speed 1 buried services?
• will any OCS isolations be required?
• any risk of unexploded ordnance?
• will third rail isolations be needed?
Crossing High Speed 1 infrastructure.
Residual risks
• is the construction going over the railway?
• any additional residual risks?
• at what height?
• is the construction going under the railway?

Appendix B – Method statement checksheet
Administration Protection of and from railway

• cover page completed and signed off infrastructure
• pages numbered • housekeeping to avoid windblown debris
• document number and revision correct • buried and other services considered and
checked
• review sign off by manager
• use of approved cable locating tools
• referenced documentation
provided/available • identify infrastructure susceptible to
damage
• conformance to H&S legislation
demonstrated • sketch showing location of services
Scope of work • protection of track
• plant movement
• work to be undertaken
• demolition
• location of work
• hot work
• work limits, site boundaries, time limits,
access to site • additional fire precautions required
• completion criteria • failsafe reconnection of fire precaution
systems
Risks and hazards
• disturbance of track support, structures,
• risks identified cuttings etc
• controls and safeguards to be effected • disconnection and reconnection of services
• buried and other services checked Environmental protection arrangements
• any risk of unexploded ordnance?
• waste and pollution
• planning permission
• noise, dust, smoke, vapour
• traffic management
• dewatering arrangements and disposal of
Railway and public interface arrangements water
• DZEP/SZEP/non-operational zone • fuels, oils etc. storage and containment
• possession arrangements • hazardous substances, spill procedure
• protected/safe areas/worksite/RPOS Plant and equipment
• movement of engineering trains • plant and equipment specified
• OHLE permit/isolation arrangements/NPOS • inspection and examination certificates
• disconnection/alteration of High Speed 1 • temporary lighting
operational services
• detail cranes, lifting machines etc including
• restricted clearances especially at stations access
• passenger interfaces at stations • plant collapse within 4m of boundary?
• temporary speed restrictions • arrangements for standby plant
• signal sighting implications • loading and marshalling of rail mounted
• temporary fencing adjacent to railway equipment
• work adjacent to control rooms Personnel
• temporary lighting blinding train drivers • number of contractors and subcontractors
• road traffic management • supervision arrangements, names of
• road/rail machines near operational lines person in charge
• handover/handback arrangements • competence and training requirements
• security of material from vandalism outlined and met
• site access arrangements e.g. permits
• working hours
• shift handover arrangements
• welfare and first aid provision
• health hazards assessed and controlled

• track and other access requirements • local authorities
• dispensations required • occupiers of adjacent properties
Safety of contractor's personnel Handback Arrangements
• control measures for specific health • arrangements additional to handback
hazards strategy
• COSHH • liaison with maintenance contractor
• manual handling • handback contingency arrangements
• permit to work systems • sign off for taking back into use
• PPE requirements Possession Overrun Contingency Plan
• site emergency plan • Required and completed
Methodology
• state order of work
• hold points
• bar chart showing sequence of separate
tasks
• standards & procedures (Network Rail and
contractor's)
• drawings and sketches
• access and egress arrangements, including
ladders/scaffolds
• delivery and disposal of materials
• temporary structures
• method of authorising start of work
• method of confirming each stage has been
complied with
Briefing arrangements
• who briefs the method statement?
• who is briefed?
• how is briefing recorded?
• how is understanding confirmed?
• emergency numbers
Emergency plans
• contact phone numbers outside normal
working hours
• contractor including contact hours for
project manager
• Network Rail Operations
• accident reporting and investigation
• contingency plans
• sub-standard conditions reporting
Contractor monitoring arrangements
• how is compliance with the method
monitored?
Communication and liaison
• specific persons who must be contacted
• effects on HS1 property, Eurostar, LSER
• other contractors working nearby
• highway authorities

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What is the purpose and scope of this document?

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What are the formal approval processes outlined in this document?

What are the formal approval processes outlined in this document?

Revision Record:

Issue No. Date Comments

This procedure will be reviewed at least annually and be revised as required.

Issue 7.1 Page 2 of 58

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1.4 Asset Protection team charter

What you have a right to expect from us:

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1.6 Legal requirements

1.7 Level playing field in tender situations

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2.2 Risk tools

2.3 Programme development

2.4 Safe working practices

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2.5 Buried services

2.6 Windblown debris

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2.8 Emergency plans

2.10 CDM Regulations 2015

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2.12 As-built information

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3.2 Planning consent

3.3 Initial consultation

3.4 Formal approvals

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3.6 System Review Panel (SRP)

3.7 Approval in Principle (F001/Form A)

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3.8.5 Scope and method of design check

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3.9 Temporary works (F003/Form C)

3.10 Architectural and layout acceptance (F004)

3.11 Certificate of fitness to be taken into use (F005)

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3.12 Method statement/work package plan or lifting plan

3.13 Approval of CRE and CEM

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4.2 Access competency

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4.4 Work on High Speed 1 land

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4.5 Disruptive possessions

4.9 Possessions across rail interfaces

4.10 Rail traffic during a possession

4.11 Possession overrun contingency planning

4.12 Possession costs