Labor Cases

G.R. No.
170830 August 11, 2010
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

- versus -
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), and ERLINDA VAZQUEZ, RICARDO SACRISTAN,
LEONIDA CATALAN, MAXIMO PEDRO, NATHANIELA DIMACULANGAN,* RODOLFO MOJICO, ROMEO
CARAMANZA, REYNALDO GANITANO, ALBERTOBASCONCILLO,** and RAMON FALCIS, in their capacity
as officers of PILA, and ANGELITA BALOSA,***DANILO BANAAG, ABRAHAM CADAY, ALFONSO CLAUDIO, Pa
FRANCISCO DALISAY,**** ANGELITO DEJAN,***** PHILIP GARCES, NICANOR ILAGAN, FLORENCIO
ge
LIBONGCOGON,****** NEMESIO MAMONONG, TEOFILO MANALILI, ALFREDO PEARSON, ******* MARIO
PEREA,******** RENATO RAMOS, MARIANO ROSALES, PABLO SARMIENTO, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, FELIPE |
VILLAREAL, ARSENIO ZAMORA, DANILO BALTAZAR, ROGER CABER, ********* REYNALDO CAMARIN, 1
BERNARDO CUADRA,********** ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, GERARDO FELICIANO, *********** ALEX IBAEZ,
BENJAMIN JUAN, SR., RAMON MACAALAY, GONZALO MANALILI, RAUL MICIANO, HILARIO PEA, TERESA
PERMOCILLO,************ ERNESTO RIO, RODOLFO SANIDAD, RAFAEL STA. ANA, JULIAN TUGUIN and
AMELIA ZAMORA, as members of PILA,Respondents.
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Phimco Industries, Inc. (PHIMCO),
seeking to reverse and set aside the decision,[2] dated February 10, 2004, and the resolution,[3] dated December
12, 2005, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70336. The assailed CA decision dismissed PHIMCOs
petition for certiorari that challenged the resolution, dated December 29, 1998, and the decision, dated February
20, 2002, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); the assailed CA resolution denied PHIMCOs
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal address at Phimco
Compound, Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA) is the duly
authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCOs daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named respondents are
PILA officers and members.
When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994, PHIMCO and
PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic issues, mainly due to
disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike
on the ground of the bargaining deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the union conducted a
strike vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as its response to the bargaining impasse. On
March 17, 1995, PILA filed the strike vote results with the NCMB. Thirty-five (35) days later, or on April 21, 1995,
PILA staged a strike.
On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing through force, intimidation and coercion the ingress and egress
of non-striking employees into and from the company premises. On May 15, 1995, the NLRC issued an ex-
parte TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20) days, or until June 5, 1995.
On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to explain within
twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they committed during the strike.
Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal.
On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal dismissal case)
with the NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04705-95, and raffled to Labor Arbiter (LA)
Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute,
and ordered all the striking employees (except those who were handed termination papers on June 26, 1995) to
return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the order. The Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept
the striking employees, under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike. [4] On the same day,
PILA ended its strike.
On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with the NLRC,
with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing
1|LABOR LAW II
PHIMCOs operations. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06031-95, and raffled to LA Jovencio
Ll. Mayor.
On March 14, 1996, the respondents filed their Position Paper in the illegal strike case. They countered that
they complied with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put up no barricade, and conducted
their strike peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without incident.
LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998,[5] and found the strike illegal; the respondents committed Pa
prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises and preventing the
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non-striking employees from reporting for work. He observed that it was not enough that the picket of the strikers
was a moving picket, since the strikers should allow the free passage to the entrance and exit points of the |
company premises. Thus, LA Mayor declared that the respondent employees, PILA officers and members, have lost 2
their employment status.
On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members appealed LA Mayors decision to the NLRC.
THE NLRC RULING
The NLRC decided the appeal on December 29, 1998, and set aside LA Mayors decision. [6] The NLRC did not
give weight to PHIMCOs evidence, and relied instead on the respondents evidence showing that the union
conducted a peaceful moving picket.
On January 28, 1999, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case. [7]
In a parallel development, LA Espiritu decided the unions illegal dismissal case on March 2, 1999. He ruled
the respondents dismissal as illegal, and ordered their reinstatement with payment of backwages. PHIMCO
appealed LA Espiritus decision to the NLRC.
Pending the resolution of PHIMCOs motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case and the appeal of the
illegal dismissal case, PHIMCO moved for the consolidation of the two (2) cases. The NLRC acted favorably on the
motion and consolidated the two (2) cases in its Order dated August 5, 1999.
On February 20, 2002, the NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in the unions
favor.[8] It dismissed the appeal of the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCOs motion for reconsideration in the
illegal strike case. The NLRC found that the picket conducted by the striking employees was not an illegal blockade
and did not obstruct the points of entry to and exit from the companys premises; the pictures submitted by the
respondents revealed that the picket was moving, not stationary. With respect to the illegal dismissal charge, the
NLRC observed that the striking employees were not given ample opportunity to explain their side after receipt of
the June 23, 1995 letter. Thus, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of LA Espiritu with respect to the payment of
backwages until the promulgation of the decision, plus separation pay at one (1) month salary per year of service
in lieu of reinstatement, and 10% of the monetary award as attorneys fees. It ruled out reinstatement because of
the damages sustained by the company brought about by the strike.
On March 14, 2002, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision.
On April 26, 2002, without waiting for the result of its motion for reconsideration, PHIMCO elevated its case
to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[9]
THE CA RULING
In a Decision[10] promulgated on February 10, 2004, the CA dismissed PHIMCOs petition for certiorari. The
CA noted that the NLRC findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCOs evidence failed to show that the
picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the points of entry to and exit from the company
premises, were supported by substantial evidence.
PHIMCO came to us through the present petition after the CA denied [11] PHIMCOs motion for
reconsideration.[12]
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the strike was illegal because the respondents committed the prohibited acts
under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as blocking the ingress and egress of the company premises, threat,
coercion, and intimidation, as established by the evidence on record.
2|LABOR LAW II
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the issues raised in this case are factual in nature that we
cannot generally touch in a petition for review, unless compelling reasons exist; the company has not shown any
such compelling reason as the picket was peaceful and uneventful, and no human barricade blocked the company
premises.
THE ISSUE Pa
ge
In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,[13] we laid down the basic approach that should be followed in the
review of CA decisions in labor cases, thus: |
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the 3
review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the
review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we
have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly
determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not
on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we
have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the
NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a
CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine
whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
In this light, the core issue in the present case is whether the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the unions strike was legal.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Requisites of a valid strike
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of setting
their terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of economic war between labor
and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members, and one that
must also necessarily affect management and its members.[14]
In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must always rest
on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of hot heads; it must focus
on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be antithetical to public welfare, and must be
pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or
destroy anyone, least of all, the employer.[15]
Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general peace
and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike. Procedurally, for a strike to
be valid, it must comply with Article 263[16] of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given
to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory, and the unions failure to comply renders the strike illegal. [17] The 15
to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute with
the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an
opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union
members.[18]
In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike notice was
filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the strike vote was filed with
the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on April 25, 1995.
Strike may be illegal for commission of prohibited acts
Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike
may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.[19] The means become illegal when they come
within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:
3|LABOR LAW II
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares.
Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC and
the CA, we find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and factual issues of this
case as both the NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading them to inordinately incorrect Pa
conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably had not been marred by actual violence and
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patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA officers and members undertook as part of their strike
activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs premises, thus preventing non-striking |
employees and company vehicles from entering the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated 4
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
The Evidence
We gather from the case record the following pieces of relevant evidence adduced in the compulsory arbitration
proceedings.[20]
For the Company
1. Pictures taken during the strike, showing that the respondents prevented free
ingress to and egress from the company premises;[21]
2. Affidavit of PHIMCO Human Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco, stating that he was one
of the employees prevented by the strikers from entering the PHIMCO premises; [22]
3. Affidavit of Cinco, identifying Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan,
Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela R. Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto
Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis as PILA officers;[23]
4. Affidavit of Cinco identifying other members of PILA;[24]
5. Folder 1, containing pictures taken during the strike identifying and showing Leonida Catalan,
Renato Ramos, Arsenio Zamora, Reynaldo Ganitano, Amelia Zamora, Angelito Dejan, Teresa Permocillo, and
Francisco Dalisay as the persons preventing Cinco and his group from entering the company premises; [25]
6. Folder 2, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing Cinco, together with non-striking
PHIMCO employees, reporting for work but being refused entry by strikers Teofilo Manalili, Nathaniela
Dimaculangan, Bernando Cuadra, Maximo Pedro, Nicanor Ilagan, Julian Tuguin, Nemesio Mamonong, Abraham
Caday, Ernesto Rio, Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gerardo Feliciano, Alberto Basconcillo, Rodolfo Sanidad,
Mariano Rosales, Roger Caber, Angelito de Guzman, Angelito Balosa and Philip Garces who blocked the company
gate;[26]
7. Folder 3, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing the respondents denying free ingress
to and egress from the company premises;[27]
8. Folder 4, with pictures taken during the strike, showing that non-striking employees failed to
enter the company premises as a result of the respondents refusal to let them in; [28]
9. Affidavit of Joaquin Aguilar stating that the pictures presented by Cinco were taken during the
strike;[29]
10. Pictures taken by Aguilar during the strike, showing non-striking employees being refused entry
by the respondents;[30]
11. Joint affidavit of Orlando Marfil and Rodolfo Digo, identifying the pictures they took
during the strike, showing that the respondents blocked ingress to and egress from the company premises; [31] and,
12. Testimonies of PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva, Aguilar and Cinco, as well as those of PILA
officers Maximo Pedro and Leonida Catalan.
For the Respondents
1. Affidavit of Leonida Catalan, stating that the PILA strike complied with all the legal requirements, and
the strike/picket was conducted peacefully with no incident of any illegality;[32]
2. Affidavit of Maximo Pedro, stating that the strike/picket was conducted peacefully; the picket
was always moving with no acts of illegality having been committed during the strike; [33]
3. Certification of Police Station Commander Bienvenido de los Reyes that during the strike there
was no report of any untoward incident;[34]
4. Certification of Rev. Father Erick Adeviso of Dambanang Bayan Parish Church that the strike
was peaceful and without any untoward incident;[35]
5. Certification of Priest-In-Charge Angelito Fausto of the Philippine Independent Church in
Punta, Santa Ana, that the strike complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike, and the strikers conducted
themselves in a peaceful manner;[36]
6. Clearance issued by Punong Barangay Mario O. dela Rosa and Barangay Secretary Pascual
Gesmundo, Jr. that the strike from April 21 to July 7, 1995 was conducted in an orderly manner with no complaints
filed;[37] and,
4|LABOR LAW II
7. Testimonies at the compulsory arbitration proceedings.
In its resolution of December 29, 1998,[38] the NLRC declared that the string of proofs the company
presented was overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the numerous pieces of evidence adduced by
respondents x x x all depicting a common story that respondents put up a peaceful moving picket, and did not
commit any illegal acts x x x specifically obstructing the ingress to and egress from the company premises[.] [39]
We disagree with this finding as the purported peaceful moving picket upon which the NLRC resolution Pa
was anchored was not an innocuous picket, contrary to what the NLRC said it was; the picket, under the evidence
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presented, did effectively obstruct the entry and exit points of the company premises on various occasions.
|
To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or 5
labor dispute.[40] The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking employees outside of the
company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute
and its incidents to inform the public of what is happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to
march to and from the employers premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs
making known the facts involved in a labor dispute.[41] It is a strike activity separate and different from the actual
stoppage of work.
While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the protection of freedom of
expression[42] and the right to peaceably assemble to air grievances, [43] these rights are by no means
absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises.[44] That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it
from taints of illegality if the picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
In this regard, PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva and Joaquin Aguilar, and the companys Human Resources
Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco testified during the compulsory arbitration hearings:
ATTY. REYES: this incident on May 22, 1995, when a coaster or bus attempted to enter PHIMCO
compound, you mentioned that it was refused entry. Why was this (sic) it refused entry?
WITNESS: Because at that time, there was a moving picket at the gate that is why the bus was not
able to enter.[45]
xxxx
Q: Despite this TRO, which was issued by the NLRC, were you allowed entry by the strikers?
A: We made several attempts to enter the compound, I remember on May 7, 1995, we tried to enter
the PHIMCO compound but we were not allowed entry.
Q: Aside from May 27, 1995, were there any other instances wherein you were not allowed entry at
PHIMCO compound?
A: On May 29, I recall I was riding with our Production Manager with the Pick-up. We tried to enter
but we were not allowed by the strikers.[46]
xxxx
ARBITER MAYOR: How did the strikers block the ingress of the company?
A: They hold around, joining hands, moving picket.[47]
xxxx
ARBITER MAYOR: Reform the question, and because of that moving picket conducted by the strikers,
no employees or vehicles can come in or go out of the premises?
A: None, sir.[48]
These accounts were confirmed by the admissions of respondent PILA officers Maximo Pedro and Leonida
Catalan that the strikers prevented non-striking employees from entering the company premises. According to
these union officers:
ATTY. CHUA: Mr. witness, do you recall an incident when a group of managers of PHIMCO, with
several of the monthly paid employees who tried to enter the PHIMCO compound during the
strike?
5|LABOR LAW II
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA: Can you tell us if these (sic) group of managers headed by Francis Cinco entered the
compound of PHIMCO on that day, when they tried to enter?
MR. PEDRO: No, sir. They were not able to enter.[49]

Pa
xxxx
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ATTY. CHUA: Despite having been escorted by police Delos Reyes, you still did not give way, and |
instead proceeded with your moving picket? 6
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA: In short, these people were not able to enter the premises of PHIMCO, Yes or No.
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir. [50]
xxxx
ATTY. CHUA: Madam witness, even if Major Delos Reyes instructed you to give way so as to allow
the employees and managers to enter the premises, you and your co-employees did not give
way?
MS. CATALAN: No sir.
ATTY. CHUA: the managers and the employees were not able to enter the premises?
MS. CATALAN: Yes, sir.[51]
The NLRC resolution itself noted the above testimonial evidence, all building up a scenario that the moving
picket put up by [the] respondents obstructed the ingress to and egress from the company premises[,] [52] yet it
ignored the clear import of the testimonies as to the true nature of the picket. Contrary to the NLRC
characterization that it was a peaceful moving picket, it stood, in fact, as an obstruction to the companys points of
ingress and egress.
Significantly, the testimonies adduced were validated by the photographs taken of the strike area, capturing
the strike in its various stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the picket. While the picket was
moving, it was maintained so close to the company gates that it virtually constituted an obstruction, especially
when the strikers joined hands, as described by Aguilar, or were moving in circles, hand-to-shoulder, as shown by
the photographs, that, for all intents and purposes, blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company
premises. In fact, on closer examination, it could be seen that the respondents were conducting the picket right at
the company gates.[53]
The obstructive nature of the picket was aggravated by the placement of benches, with strikers standing on
top, directly in front of the open wing of the company gates, clearly obstructing the entry and exit points of the
company compound.[54]
With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions (benches and makeshift structures both
outside and inside the gates),[55]it was pure conjecture on the part of the NLRC to say that [t]he non-strikers and
their vehicles were x x x free to get in and out of the company compound undisturbed by the picket
line.[56] Notably, aside from non-strikers who wished to report for work, company vehicles likewise could not enter
and get out of the factory because of the picket and the physical obstructions the respondents installed. The
blockade went to the point of causing the build up of traffic in the immediate vicinity of the strike area, as shown
by photographs.[57] This, by itself, renders the picket a prohibited activity. Pickets may not aggressively interfere
with the right of peaceful ingress to and egress from the employers shop or obstruct public thoroughfares;
picketing is not peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by picketers parading
around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.[58]
What the records reveal belies the NLRC observation that the evidence x x x tends to show that what
respondents actually did was walking or patrolling to and fro within the company vicinity and by word of mouth,
banner or placard, informing the public concerning the dispute.[59]
The peaceful moving picket that the NLRC noted, influenced apparently by the certifications (Mayor delos
Reyes, Fr. Adeviso, Fr. Fausto and Barangay Secretary Gesmundo presented in evidence by the respondents, was
peaceful only because of the absence of violence during the strike, but the obstruction of the entry and exit points
6|LABOR LAW II
of the company premises caused by the respondents picket was by no means a petty blocking act or an
insignificant obstructive act.[60]
As we have stated, while the picket was moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the gates, with
the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers
and vehicles from coming in and getting out.Supported by actual blocking benches and obstructions, what the
union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the
operations of the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the participating workers, but by excluding the Pa
company officials and non-striking employees from access to and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the
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strike caused the company operations considerable damage, as the NLRC itself recognized when it ruled out the
reinstatement of the dismissed strikers.[61] |
7
Intimidation
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or intimidation is
unlawful.[62] According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on the totality of
the circumstances.[63] Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There may be unlawful intimidation
without direct threats or overt acts of violence. Words or acts which are calculated and intended to cause an
ordinary person to fear an injury to his person, business or property are equivalent to threats. [64]
The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the picket in the present case had
created such an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company vehicles did not dare
cross the picket line, even with police intervention. Those who dared cross the picket line were stopped. The
compulsory arbitration hearings bear this out.
Maximo Pedro, a PILA officer, testified, on July 30, 1997, that a group of PHIMCO managers led by Cinco,
together with several monthly-paid employees, tried to enter the company premises on May 27, 1995 with police
escort; even then, the picketers did not allow them to enter. [65]Leonida Catalan, another union officer, testified
that she and the other picketers did not give way despite the instruction of Police Major de los Reyes to the
picketers to allow the group to enter the company premises. [66] (To be sure, police intervention and participation
are, as a rule, prohibited acts in a strike, but we note this intervention solely as indicators of how far the union and
its members have gone to block ingress to and egress from the company premises.)
Further, PHIMCO employee Rodolfo Eva testified that on May 22, 1995, a company coaster or bus attempted to
enter the PHIMCO compound but it was refused entry by the moving picket. [67] Cinco, the company personnel
manager, also testified that on May 27, 1995, when the NLRC TRO was in force, he and other employees tried to
enter the PHIMCO compound, but they were not allowed entry; on May 29, 1995, Cinco was with the PHIMCO
production manager in a pick-up and they tried to enter the company compound but, again, they were not allowed
by the strikers.[68] Another employee, Joaquin Aguilar, when asked how the strikers blocked the ingress of the
company, replied that the strikers hold around, joining hands, moving picket and, because of the moving picket,
no employee or vehicle could come in and go out of the premises.[69]
The evidence adduced in the present case cannot be ignored. On balance, it supports the companys
submission that the respondent PILA officers and members committed acts during the strike prohibited under
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The testimonies of non-striking employees, who were prevented from gaining
entry into the company premises, and confirmed no less by two officers of the union, are on record.
The photographs of the strike scene, also on record, depict the true character of the picket; while moving,
it, in fact, constituted a human blockade, obstructing free ingress to and egress from the company premises,
reinforced by benches planted directly in front of the company gates. The photographs do not lie these
photographs clearly show that the picketers were going in circles, without any break in their ranks or closely
bunched together, right in front of the gates. Thus, company vehicles were unable to enter the company
compound, and were backed up several meters into the street leading to the company gates.
Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction, the NLRC looked the other way and chose
not to see the unmistakable violations of the law on strikes by the union and its respondent officers and
members. Needless to say, while the law protects the rights of the laborer, it authorizes neither the oppression nor
the destruction of the employer.[70] For grossly ignoring the evidence before it, the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion; for supporting these gross NLRC errors, the CA committed its own reversible error.
Liabilities of union
officers and members
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article 264(a)
of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x
7|LABOR LAW II
xxxx
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
by the employer during such lawful strike. Pa
ge
We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.[71] that the |
effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction between participating workers 8
and union officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The services
of a participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not only when he actually commits an
illegal act during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike. [72]
In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required; substantial
evidence, available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal
on participating workers and union officers as above described.[73]
In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo Pedro,
Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon
Falcis stand to be dismissed as participating union officers, pursuant to Article 264(a), paragraph 3, of the
Labor Code. This provision imposes the penalty of dismissal on any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment.[74]
PHIMCO was able to individually identify the participating union members thru the affidavits of PHIMCO
employees Martimer Panis[75] and Rodrigo A. Ortiz,[76] and Personnel Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco,[77] and the
photographs[78] of Joaquin Aguilar.Identified were respondents Angelita Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday,
Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio
Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento,
Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora, Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo
Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez, Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo
Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin
and Amelia Zamora as the union members who actively participated in the strike by blocking the ingress to and
egress from the company premises and preventing the passage of non-striking employees. For participating in
illegally blocking ingress to and egress from company premises, these union members stand to be dismissed for
their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike.
PHIMCO failed to observe due process
We find, however, that PHIMCO violated the requirements of due process of the Labor Code when it
dismissed the respondents.
Under Article 277(b)[79] of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to be
terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.
We explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission,[80] that Article 277(b), in relation to Article
264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the
cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement in strike-related violence prohibited
under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code.
To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish him or
her with two (2) written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving the
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due
consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the
employee.[81]
In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-six (36) union members, generally
directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they
committed during the strike; three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union members were
informed of their dismissal from employment.
8|LABOR LAW II
We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance with the due process requirements that
the law guards zealously. It does not appear from the evidence that the union officers were specifically informed of
the charges against them and given the chance to explain and present their side. Without the specifications they
had to respond to, they were arbitrarily separated from work in total disregard of their rights to due process and
security of tenure.
As to the union members, only thirty-six (36) of the thirty-seven (37) union members included in this case
were notified of the charges against them thru the letters dated June 23, 1995, but they were not given an ample Pa
opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves; the notice of termination came on June 26, 1995, only three
ge
(3) days from the first notice - a perfunctory and superficial attempt to comply with the notice requirement under
the Labor Code. The short interval of time between the first and second notice speaks for itself under the |
circumstances of this case; mere token recognition of the due process requirements was made, indicating the 9
companys intent to dismiss the union members involved, without any meaningful resort to the guarantees
accorded them by law.
Under the circumstances, where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal has been adduced but
the workers concerned were not accorded their essential due process rights, our ruling in Agabon v. NLRC[82] finds
full application; the employer, despite the just cause for dismissal, must pay the dismissed workers nominal
damages as indemnity for the violation of the workers right to statutory due process. Prevailing jurisprudence sets
the amount of nominal damages at P30,000.00, which same amount we find sufficient and appropriate in the present
case.[83]
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated
February 10, 2004 and the resolution dated December 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70336,
upholding the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Decision, dated February 4, 1998, of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor should prevail and is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo Pedro,
Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, Ramon
Falcis, Angelita Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip
Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea,
Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora, Danilo
Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez,
Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio,
Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin, and Amelia Zamora are each awarded nominal damages in the
amount of P30,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
9|LABOR LAW II
[G.R. No. 99266. March 2, 1999]
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND
DIVISION, AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION (SMCEU) - PTGWO, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution [1] of the
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CASE NO. 00094-90, which dismissed the complaint of San
Miguel Corporation (SMC), seeking to dismiss the notice of strike given by the private respondent union and to Pa
compel the latter to comply with the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)[2] on grievance ge
machinery, arbitration, and the no-strike clause, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. |
The antecedent facts are as follows: 10
In July 1990, San Miguel Corporation, alleging the need to streamline its operations due to financial losses, shut
down some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant, listed as follows: seventeen (17) employees in
the Business Logistics Division (BLD), seventeen (17) in the Ayala Operations Center (AOC), and eighteen (18) in
the Magnolia-Manila Buying Station (Magnolia-MBS).[3] Consequently, the private respondent union filed several
grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying for the redeployment of the said employees to the
other divisions of the company.
The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties 1990
Collective Bargaining Agreement providing for the following procedures, to wit:
Sec.5. Processing of Grievance. - Should a grievance arise, an earnest effort shall be made to settle the
grievance expeditiously in accordance with the following procedures:
Step 1. - The individual employee concerned and the Union Directors, or the Union Steward shall, first take up the
employees grievance orally with his immediate superior. If no satisfactory agreement or adjustment of the
grievance is reached, the grievance shall, within twenty (20) working days from the occurrence of the cause or
event which gave rise to the grievance, be filed in writing with the Department Manager or the next level superior
who shall render his decision within ten (10) working days from the receipt of the written grievance. A copy of the
decision shall be furnished the Plant Personnel Officer.
Step 2. - If the decision in Step 1 is rejected, the employee concerned may elevate or appeal this in writing to the
Plant Manager/Director or his duly authorized representative within twenty (20) working days from the receipt of
the Decision of the Department Manager. Otherwise, the decision in Step 1 shall be deemed accepted by the
employee.
The Plant Manager/Director assisted by the Plant Personnel Officer shall determine the necessity of conducting
grievance meetings. If necessary, the Plant Manager/Director and the Plant Personnel Officer shall meet the
employee concerned and the Union Director/Steward on such date(s) as may be designated by the Plant
Manager. In every plant/office, Grievance Meetings shall be scheduled at least twice a month.
The Plant Manager shall give his written comments and decision within ten (10) working days after his receipt of
such grievance or the date of submission of the grievance for resolution, as the case may be. A copy of his
Decision shall be furnished the Employee Relations Directorate.
Step 3. - If no satisfactory adjustment is arrived at Step 2, the employee may appeal the Decision to the
Conciliation Board as provided under Section 6 hereof, within fifteen (15) working days from the date of receipt of
the decision of the Plant Manager/Director or his designate. Otherwise, the decision in Step 2 shall be deemed
accepted by the employee.
The Conciliation Board shall meet on the grievance in such dates as shall be designated by the Division/Business
Unit Manager or his representative. In every Division/Business Unit, Grievance Meetings of the Conciliation Board
shall be scheduled at least once a month.
The Conciliation Board shall have fifteen (15) working days from the date of submission of the grievance for
resolution within which to decide on the grievance.
SEC. 6. Conciliation Board. - There shall be a conciliation Board per Business Unit or Division. Every Conciliation
Board shall be composed of not more than five (5) representatives each from the Company and the
Union. Management and the Union may be assisted by their respective legal counsels.
In every Division/Business Unit, the names of the Company and Union representatives to the Conciliation Board
shall be submitted to the Division/Business Unit Manager not later than January of every year. The Conciliation
10 | L A B O R L A W I I
Board members shall act as such for one (1) year until removed by the Company or the Union, as the case may
be.
xxx
Sec. 8. Submission to Arbitration. - If the employee or Union is not satisfied with the Decision of the
Conciliation Board and desires to submit the grievance to arbitration, the employee or the Union shall serve notice
of such intention to the Company within fifteen (15) working days after receipt of the Boards decision. If no such Pa
written notice is received by the Company within fifteen (15) working days, the grievance shall be considered ge
settled on the basis of the companys position and shall no longer be available for arbitration.[4]
|
During the grievance proceedings, however, most of the employees were redeployed, while others accepted
11
early retirement. As a result only 17 employees remained when the parties proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of
the grievance procedure. In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner informed private respondent union that if
by October 30, 1990, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be redeployed, their services would be terminated
on November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjourned when Mr. Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union,
declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of the deadlock.[5]
On November 7, 1990, the private respondent filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike on the following
grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b) union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide private respondent
with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA;
and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike
but the NCMB failed to act on the motion.
On December 21, 1990, petitioner SMC filed a complaint [6] with the respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the
dismissal the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent union to submit to grievance and arbitration
the issue listed in the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of litigation.
On April 16, 1991, respondent NLRC came out with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint; holding,
thus:
NLRC NCR IC NO. 000094-90, entitled San Miguel Corporation, Complainant -versus- San Miguel Corporation
Employees Union-PTWO (SMCEU), Respondent. - Considering the allegations in the complaint to restrain
Respondent Union from declaring a strike and to enforce mutual compliance with the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement on grievance machinery, and the no-strike clause, with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order, and the evidence adduced therein, the Answer filed by the respondent and the memorandum
filed by the complainant in support of its application for the issuance of an injunction, the Second Division, after
due deliberation, Resolved to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit. [7]
Aggrieved by the said resolution, petitioner found its way to this court via the present petition, contending
that:
IT IS THE POSITIVE LEGAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT NLRC TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO ENJOIN A STRIKE
IN VIOLATION OF A NO STRIKE CLAUSE.
II
INJUNCTION IS THE ONLY IMMEDIATE, EFFECTIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC WARFARE
THAT ARBITRATION IS DESIGNED TO AVOID.[8]
On June 3, 1991, to preserve the status quo, the Court issued a Resolution[9] granting petitioners prayer for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Rule XXII, Section I, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V the Labor Code [10], reads:
Section 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. -- A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks
and unfair labor practices. Violations of the collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious
refusal to comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be
strikeable. No strike or lockout may be declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes or on
issues brought to voluntary or compulsory arbitration.
In the case under consideration, the grounds relied upon by the private respondent union are non-
strikeable. The issues which may lend substance to the notice of strike filed by the private respondent union are:
collective bargaining deadlock and petitioners alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These
grounds, however, appear more illusory than real.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as the situation between the labor and the management of the
company where there is failure in the collective bargaining negotiations resulting in a stalemate[11] This situation, is
non-existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
machinery to resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of asking the Conciliation Board composed of five Pa
representatives each from the company and the union, to decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and ge
thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration |
proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed by
12
the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. In the
case of Liberal Labor Union vs. Phil. Can Co.,[12] the court declared as illegal the strike staged by the union for not
complying with the grievance procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement, ruling that:
x x x the main purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to prevent
a strike. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is to achieve its objective. x x x strikes held in
violation of the terms contained in the collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they provide
for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends
have to be achieved. x x x[13]
As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that such a violation is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under
the CBA, private respondent violated the mandatory provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
Abolition of departments or positions in the company is one of the recognized management
prerogatives.[14] Noteworthy is the fact that the private respondent does not question the validity of the business
move of petitioner. In the absence of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is presumed that
petitioner San Miguel Corporation acted in good faith. In fact, petitioner acceded to the demands of the private
respondent union by redeploying most of the employees involved; such that from an original 17 excess employees
in BLD, 15 were successfully redeployed. In AOC, out of the 17 original excess, 15 were redeployed. In the
Magnolia - Manila Buying Station, out of 18 employees, 6 were redeployed and only 12 were terminated. [15]
So also, in filing complaint with the NLRC, petitioner prayed that the private respondent union be compelled to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings. Petitioner having evinced its willingness to negotiate the
fate of the remaining employees affected, there is no ground to sustain the notice of strike of the private
respondent union.
All things studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and so hold, that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint of petitioner SMC for the dismissal of the notice of strike, issuance
of a temporary restraining order, and an order compelling the respondent union to settle the dispute under the
grievance machinery of their CBA.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner San Miguel Corporation and private
respondent San Miguel Corporation Employees Union - PTGWO are hereby directed to complete the third
level (Step 3) of the Grievance Procedure and proceed with the Arbitration proceedings if necessary. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 158158. January 17, 2005]
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER) AND RAYMOND TOMAROY, ROEL
SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR,
FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP
AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Fifteenth Division), NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), and CLOTHMAN KNITTING
CORPORATION, respondents. Pa
ge
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
|
This is a petition for review of the Resolutions [1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73353 filed by
13
the Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting Corporation Solidarity of Unions in the Philippines for
Empowerment and Reforms (the petitioner union) and Raymond Tomaroy, Roel Sardonidos, Joseph Sederio,
Maritchu Javellana, Enrique Omadto, Efren Mogar, Francisco Bertulfo, Judy Roquero, Paterno Silvestre, Cayetano
Palmon, Teodoro Ocop and Joseph Estifano.
Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation engaged in knitting/textiles. [2] It
has approximately one hundred forty-four (144) rank-and-file employees. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor
organization of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file employees of the respondent
and were also members and officers of the petitioner union.
In the year 2001, the rank-and-file employees at the CKC banded together and formed the petitioner union. It
was registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on February 23, 2001. In reaction thereto,
the respondent, headed by its President, Paul U. Lee, gathered the employees and advised them not to listen to
outsiders.[3]
Meanwhile, another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng
Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of
registration on April 23, 2001 by the DOLE.[4] A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner
union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR).
Pending the resolution of the petition for certification election, the respondent issued a Memorandum [5] dated
March 2, 2001, informing the employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the
orders from the customers.
On March 10, 2001, another Memorandum[6] was issued by the respondent informing its employees at the
Dyeing and Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would be effected for one week,
from March 12 to 17, 2001. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave, and were asked to verify any
changes in the schedule from the Human Resources Division on March 17, 2001.
Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily shutdown its operations at the
Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. It notified the DOLE
of the said shutdown on May 26, 2001.[7] The operations of the other divisions of the CKC remained normal.
For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles to Crayons, Inc., a sister
company. On June 11, 2001, while the respondents service truck with plate number TBK-158 was to deliver fabrics
in Bulacan, the group of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions approached the truck as it made its
way towards Don Pedro Street and blocked its way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to
the respondents compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16) members of the petitioner union,
staged a picket in front of the respondents compound, carrying placards with slogans that read:
1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER.
2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-
SUPER.
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department.
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng
manggagawa ay di mo maibigay. BMC-SUPER.
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon. BMC-SUPER.[8]
On June 14, 2001, twenty-three (23) members of the petitioner union gathered in front of the respondents
compound carrying the same placards. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy agreed to talk to the management with
the following priority demands: (a) resumption of work; and (b) 13 th month pay.[9] The next day, members of the
petitioner union and their supporters gathered in front of the respondents compound. [10] From June 16, 2001 up to
June 18, 2001, the members, as well as supporters of the union, gathered again in front of the companys
compound.[11]
On June 25, 2001, the respondent filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the arbitration branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC-NCR 06-03332-2001.[12] The respondent
alleged that the picket of the members of the union from June 11, 2001 to June 18, 2001 in front of the companys
compound constituted an illegal strike. It cited the following reasons:
a) The strikers/picketers did not conduct a strike vote and no cooling-off period was observed;
b) The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;
c) The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue; Pa

ge
d) The work slowdown/picket caused damages to the petitioner in the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS |
(P5,000,000.00);
14
e) The illegal acts of respondents constrained petitioner to seek the services of undersigned counsel for an
attorneys fee of P50,000.00 and P2,000.00 per appearance.[13]
In a Decision dated October 18, 2001, the Labor Arbiter granted the petition, declared the strike illegal and the
employment status of the union officers who participated therein as terminated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioner is hereby GRANTED.
The strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.
Consequently, due to their illegal activities, the respondents namely: RAYMOND TOMAROY, President, ROEL
SARDONIDOS, Vice-President, JOSEPH SEDERIO, Secretary, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, Treasurer, ENRIQUE
OMADTO, Auditor, EFREN MOGAR, P.R.O., and FRANCISCO BERTULFO, P.R.O. and Board of Directors: JUDY
ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP and JOSEPH ESTIFANO are hereby
declared to have lost their employment status with the petitioner.[14]
The Labor Arbiter found that the continued decline in job prompted the respondent to implement a reduced
working day from the original six (6) days to three (3) days per week because of the continued decrease of job
orders, which further led to its decision to temporarily stop the operation in its Dyeing and Finishing Division for
one (1) week March 12 to 17, 2001. The affected employees were then requested to utilize their vacation leaves
and were, thereafter, admitted back to work. However, Tomaroy and members of the union staged a strike, and
the labor unrest resulted in the cancellation of job orders amounting to P6,380,817.50. The aforestated losses
prompted the petitioner to close and stop the business operations of its Dyeing and Finishing Division.
It is worthy to note that the whole company did not cease to operate and that it was only the workers in the
Dyeing and Finishing Division who were affected by the temporary lay-off. Thus, when the respondents conducted
a picket in front of the companys premises, the whole business operations of the respondent was affected. As
borne out by the records, the Labor Arbiter found that the petitioners therein failed to comply with the
requirements for a valid strike, to wit:
1. It was not based on a valid factual ground, either based on Collective Bargaining Deadlock and/or
Unfair Labor Practice;
2. No notice of strike was filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the DOLE;
3. There was no strike-vote taken by the majority members of the union;
4. There was no strike-vote report submitted to the DOLE at least seven (7) days before the intended date
of the strike;
5. The cooling-off period prescribed by law was not observed; and
6. The 7-day visiting period after submission of the strike vote report was not fully observed. [15]
Thus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal; hence, the union
officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike, already lost their employment status. [16]
Aggrieved, the petitioner union interposed an appeal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC-CA-030216-01. In a
Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2002, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the Labor Arbiter a
quo, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. [17]
The NLRC reasoned that it found no instances and/or situation befitting grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Labor Arbiter.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner union filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution [18] dated
July 24, 2002.
The petitioner union filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73353, raising the
following error:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENTS, THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSED (SIC) OF
Pa
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY FAILED TO
APPRECIATE FACTS AND EVIDENCES, APPLICABLE LAWS AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND, IF ge
NOT CORRECTED, WOULD CAUSE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS.[19] |
15
In a Resolution[20] dated October 25, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that, contrary to
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner union did
not contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, as the petition merely
mentioned BMC-SUPER, et al. as the petitioners. Further, the petition and the certification on non-forum shopping
were signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, who claimed to be the union president/authorized representative of
petitioners without, however, any such authorization from the labor union and the other petitioners covered by the
abbreviation et al. Moreover, the petition was not verified as required by Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure; hence, did not produce legal effect as provided for in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In addition, the petition was signed by petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy in his capacity as union
president/authorized representative, assisted by Enrique T. Belarmino, Legal Head of Solidarity of Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms, neither of whom was a duly authorized member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. Hence, according to the appellate court, neither of them had authority to conduct litigation
before the CA.[21] A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner union which was similarly denied in a
Resolution[22] dated April 21, 2003. The CA reasoned that, contrary to the petitioners insistence that the
verification was signed by Raymond P. Tomaroy, page 16 of the petition filed before it did not bear such signature.
Moreover, the special power of attorney attached to the motion for reconsideration was subscribed and sworn to by
the signatories therein before Notary Public Orlando C. Dy only on November 20, 2002, i.e., more than one (1)
month after the filing of the petition on October 15, 2002. Consequently, the special power of attorney did not cure
the defect in the certification against forum shopping signed by Raymond Tomaroy, which was, likewise, not
accompanied by proof that he was authorized to file the petition on behalf of the petitioner union.
The CA clarified that the authority of non-lawyers to represent the labor organization or members thereof
applies only to proceedings before the NLRC or Labor Arbiters, as provided for in Article 222 of the Labor Code. On
the other hand, a non-lawyer may appear before it only if he is a party-litigant. However, Raymond P. Tomaroy did
not appear to be a party in the case before the CA as his name was not mentioned in the caption nor in the body
of the petition.[23]
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant petition contending that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL ON
GROUNDS OF TECHNICALITIES.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ERRED [WHEN] IT AFFIRMED THE
FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED ILLEGAL STRIKE.[24]
On the first ground, the petitioners allege that they complied with Section 3, Rule 46 and Section 7, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. They contend that the petition filed before the CA by the petitioner unions president was
sanctioned by Article 242 of the Labor Code, and the cases of Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union v. CFI of
Bulacan,[25] Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR, [26] and La Carlota Sugar Central v. CIR.[27] The petitioner union
insists that it would be illogical for the union, as an entity, to require all its members to sign the said petition and
the certificate of non-forum shopping. It avers that a labor union is a judicial entity which functions thru its
officers. Thus, the president, as an officer of the union, needed no special power of attorney to sign for the union.
It stresses that it did not violate Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner union further invokes the policy that the rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest
of substantial justice; when the rules strictly applied resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, this Court is empowered to support the rules.
The petitioners argue that they did not stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike
means work stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was shutdown, it
could not have caused a work stoppage. The union members merely picketed in front of the respondents factory to
urge the respondent to open and order the resumption of the operations in its Dyeing and Finishing Division. There
was, thus, no need to comply with the requirements laid down by Article 263 of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules.
For its part, the respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the petition filed before
the CA failed to comply with Section 1 of Rule 65, Section 3 of Rule 46, and Section 7 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, and that the requirement as to the signatories in the petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. The respondent reiterates that the petitioners staged an illegal strike, and that as officers of the
union who participated therein, the petitioners are deemed to have lost their employment status.
Pa
The contention of the petitioners is erroneous. They are of the erroneous impression that the only respondent ge
in the NLRC was the petitioner union and that it was sued in its representative capacity. The fact of the matter is
that the respondent sued not only the petitioner union as respondent, but also its officers and members of its
|
Board of Directors as principal respondents, and sought the termination of the employment of the said officers. The 16
Labor Arbiter rendered judgment against all the respondents therein and declared the officers to have lost their
employment status. The NLRC affirmed the decision on appeal. It was not only the union that assailed the decision
of the NLRC in the CA, but also the dismissed officers. The petitioners (respondents therein) prayed for the
reversal thereof and that another judgment be rendered as prayed for by them in their position paper in the NLRC,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed to this Honorable Labor Arbiter that, after submission
of this Position Paper, the above entitled case be considered submitted for resolution, and the decision be rendered
in favor of the respondents employees:
1. Declaring Petitioners guilty of illegal reduction of working days, shutdown and UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES against individual respondents;
2. Ordering petitioners be, jointly and severally, liable to pay respondents actual damages, payment
of MORAL and EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00 each individual
employees and 10% of the total monetary award for the Office of BMC-SUPER plus P10,000.00
litigation expenses;
3. Ordering that Petitioner Paul Lee be in contempt of court and be fined to pay individual respondents
in the amount of P50,000.00 each or imprisonment of Two (2) to Four (4) Years or both.
Other relief and remedies equitable in the premises are, likewise, prayed for. [28]
Under Section 3 of Rule 46 in relation to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petition for certiorari
shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents, and that the failure of
the petitioners to comply with the said requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition:
Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the
full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the
original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such
material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The
certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the
proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other
requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents
attached to the original.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore
commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different
divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the
status of the same; and if he should, thereafter, learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5)
days therefrom.
The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the
amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the title of the action indicates the names of the
parties who shall be named in the original petition:
Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number, if
assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or
petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with Pa
an appropriate indication when there are other parties. ge
|
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated.
17
In this case, the title of the petition for certiorari filed in the CA does not contain the names of the petitioners
officers of the petitioner BMC-SUPER and of the members of the Board of Directors; even the petition itself does
not contain the full names and addresses of the said officers and members of the Board of Directors of the
petitioner union. We quote the title of the petition and the averments thereof having reference to the parties-
petitioners:
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ET AL.,
Petitioner,
-vs-
CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION,

Respondents.[29]
Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), et al., is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, can be served
with summons and other processes at 4th Floor Perlas Building, 646 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City.
Private Respondent, CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION, is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of Philippine Laws engaged in textile industry with principal place of business at No. 57 Don Pedro
Street, Don Pedro Village, Marulas, Valenzuela City.
Public Respondents, National Labor Relations Commission, Second Division, herein impleaded as the tribunal
exercising judicial functions who issued the assailed decision in NLRC Case No. 05-03332-2001.[30]
The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[31] is misplaced. In the
said case, the Court held that the failure to specify the details regarding the number and names of the striking
members of a labor union in the decision or in the complaint was of no consequence. This is due to the fact that it
was established that all the union members went on strike as a result of the unfair labor practice of the employer,
in consonance with the rule that it is precisely the function of a labor union to carry the representation of its
members, particularly against the employers unfair labor practices against it and its members, and to file an action
for their benefit and behalf without joining each and every member as a separate party.
Significantly, the full names and addresses of the officers and members of the Board of Directors of the
petitioner union are set forth in their petition at bench; proof that, indeed, there is a need for the full names and
addresses of all the petitioners to be stated in the title of the petition and in the petition itself. We quote the title of
the petition and the allegation therein having reference to the parties-petitioners:
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), AND RAYMOND TOMAROY,
ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO, EFREN MOGAR,
FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO OCOP
AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO,
Petitioners.[32]
1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

REFORMS (BMC-SUPER), ROEL SARDONIDOS, JOSEPH SEDERIO, MARITCHU JAVELLANA, ENRIQUE OMADTO,
EFREN MOGAR, FRANCISCO BERTULFO, JUDY ROQUERO, PATERNO SILVESTRE, CAYETANO PALMON, TEODORO
OCOP AND JOSEPH ESTIFANO, the former is a legitimate labor organization with Charter Certificate No. S-102, and
the latter are members of the former; they can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable
Court at c/o H.O. VICTORIA AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Unit 305 Web-Jet Building, 64 Quezon Avenue cor.
BMA Avenue, Quezon City.[33]
On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not, therefore, commenced any action or filed any claim involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should, thereafter, learn that the same or similar action or claim has been
filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Pa
ge
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise |
provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the 18
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate
forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
As gleaned from the petition for certiorari in the CA, only the petitioner Raymond P. Tomaroy signed the
certification of non-forum shopping in his capacity as the president of the petitioner union. The officers and
members of the Board of Directors, who were, likewise, principal petitioners, did not execute any certification of
non-forum shopping as mandated by the said Rule. The rule is that the certification of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the petitioners and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient.[34] Although petitioner
Tomaroy was authorized by virtue of his position as president of the petitioner union to execute the certification for
and in its behalf, he had no authority to do so for and in behalf of its petitioners-officers, as well as the members
of the Board of Directors thereof. The execution by the individual petitioners of a special power of attorney
subsequent to the dismissal of the petition by the CA authorizing petitioner Tomaroy to execute the requisite
certification does not cure the fatal defect in their petition.[35]
The respondent alleges that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA was correctly dismissed as it was not
signed by counsel. The respondent noted that petitioner Tomaroy was not a lawyer and that petitioner Enrique
Belarmino did not manifest in the petition that he was the lawyer. The respondent, thus, contends that Tomaroy
and Belarmino engaged in the illegal practice of law, in violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel
representing him.[36] Considering that the union is one of the petitioners, Tomaroy, as its president, may sign the
pleading. For this reason alone, the CA cannot dismiss the petition.
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the petitioners and resolved the petition on its merits, we find
that the petitioner union, along with its supporters, staged a strike without complying with the requirements laid
down in Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
The petitioner union alleges that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division were temporarily stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified closing of the
respondents Dyeing and Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the respondents compound to urge the
re-opening thereof.
We do not agree.
A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute.[37] A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment
or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms
and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.[38]
The members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy, thru concerted action,
caused a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial dispute. This is evidenced in the June 13, 2001
spot report of the Atlantic Security & Investigation Agency:
On or about 1445H of June 11, 2001, Mr. Jojo Flores and Mr. Rene Fabian were about to deliver fabrics in Bulacan
with service truck TBK-158. Upon reaching the corner of Don Pedro St. and McArthur Highway, they gave way to a
big truck turning to Don Pedro St. and at the same time the group of Mr. Raymond Tomaroy, the leader of
BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT
AND REFORMS BMC SUPER were on their way to CKC compound. Seeing the group, Mr. Fabian greeted them by
giving a quick forward motion of his head. But instead, according to Mr. Fabian, Mr. Tomaroy with finger pointing
on to Mr. Fabian accusing him as the one responsible for the delay of their 13 th month pay. Mr. Fabian just told the
group BMC-SUPER to read the Memorandum of the HRD dated June 8, 2001. Mr. Flores and Mr. Fabian returned to
CKC, Don Pedro St., Marulas, Valenzuela, to report the matter.
At about 1517H of same date, Mr. Tomaroy with 16 members of BMC SUPER staged a rally and/or gathered in
front of Clothman Knitting Corporation gate carrying placards with slogan read as follows:
1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;

2. Mr. Paul Lee Huwag mong ipitin ang mid-year, 13th month pay ng mga manggagawa sa CKC. BMC-
SUPER;
3. Ibalik ang pasok sa Finishing Department; Pa
4. Mr. Paul Lee Magagara ang sasakyan mo, Montero, BMW, Pajero pero kaunting benepisyo ng
ge
manggagawa ay di mo maibigay BMC-SUPER; |
19
5. Kilalanin ang karapatan ng manggagawa na magtatag ng unyon BMC-SUPER.
On or about 1640H at the same date, a PNP-Valenzuela Mobil car had SPO1 Palma, PO2 Manresa and PO1 Isip on
board. The police with the BMC-SUPER.
The Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.
At about 1810H of the same date, the group of BMC-SUPER abandoned the area.[39]
The subsequent Reports dated June 14, 15, 16 and 18, 2001 of the same agency further stated that members
of the petitioner union, along with other employees particularly from the knitting department, joined in the
picket.[40] It is, thus, apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its supporters
caused a temporary work stoppage. The allegation that there can be no work stoppage because the operation in
the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of no consequence. It bears stressing that the other
divisions were fully operational. There is nothing on record showing that the union members and the supporters
who formed a picket line in front of the respondents compound were assigned to the finishing department. As can
be clearly inferred from the spot reports, employees from the knitting department also joined in picket. The
blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from the other departments of the respondent
meant work stoppage. The placards that the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms
or conditions of employment as well as the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment.
Clearly, the petitioner union, its officers, members and supporters staged a strike. In order for a strike to be
valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be
complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed; (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the
strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE.[41] It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning,
non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice
and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.[42]
Considering that the petitioner union failed to comply with the aforesaid requirements, the strike staged on
June 11 to 18, 2001 is illegal. Consequently, the officers of the union who participated therein are deemed to have
lost their employment status.[43]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 73353 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SUKHOTHAI CUISINE and G.R. No. 150437
RESTAURANT,
Petitioner,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS,
NATIONAL LABOR Pa
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ge
PHILIPPINE LABOR
ALLIANCE COUNCIL |
(PLAC) Local 460 Sukhothai Promulgated: 20
Restaurant Chapter, EMMANUEL
CAYNO, ALEX MARTINEZ, BILLY July 17, 2006
BACUS, HERMIE RAZ, JOSE
LANORIAS, LITO ARCE, LINO
SALUBRE, CESAR SANGREO,
ROLANDO FABREGAS, JIMMY BALAN,
JOVEN LUALHATI, ANTONIO
ENEBRAD, JOSE NEIL ARCILLA, REY
ARSENAL, ROEL ESANCHA, EDGAR
EUGENIO, ALBERT AGBUYA,
ROLANDO PUGONG, ARNEL
SALVADOR, RICKY DEL PRADO,
CLAUDIO PANALIGAN, BERNIE DEL
MUNDO, JOHN BATHAN, ROBERTO
ECO, JOVEN TALIDONG, LENY
LUCENTE, ANALIZA CABLAY,
RIGOBERTO TUBAON and MERLY
NAZ,
Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Be f o r e th i s Co u r t is a pe ti ti on f or c e rti o ra ri u n d e r Ru l e 45 qu e sti on i n g th e
D eci si on [ 1 ] da t ed Au gu st 8 , 20 01 p r omu l gated by th e C ou rt o f A pp eal s (C A) i n CA - G .R . S P N o .
6386 4 wh i ch af fi rm ed in t ot o th e D eci si on dat e d N ov e mb e r 29 , 2 000 of th e N ati on al Lab o r
Rel ati on s C ommi s si on ( N LRC ); an d th e CA R e s ol u ti on [ 2 ] d at ed O ct ob e r 1 8, 2 001 wh i ch d en i e d
th e p eti ti on e rs M oti on f o r R e c on si d e rati on .
Th i s ca s e o ri gi n ated f r o m a c om pl ai n t f o r i l l egal st ri k e fi l ed wi th th e N LR C by th e
peti ti on e r [ 3 ] agai n st p ri vat e r e sp on d en t s du e t o an al l eg ed wi l dcat st ri k e an d oth e r co n c e rt e d
acti o n sta g ed i n th e c o mpan y p r emi s e s on Ju n e 24 , 25 an d 26, 1 999 .
Th e u n di spu t ed fa ct s a r e as f ol l ows:
So m et i me i n M ar ch 1 998 , th e m aj o ri ty of th e e mpl o y e e s of th e p eti ti on e r o rga n i z ed

th e ms el v e s i n to a u n i on wh i ch a ffi l i ated wi th th e Ph i l i ppi n e L ab o r Al li an c e C ou n ci l (P LA C),
an d wa s d e si gn at ed as P LA C L o cal 4 60 S u kh oth ai R e st au ran t Ch apt e r (Un i on ). [ 4 ]
On D e c em b er 3 , 1 998 , p ri v at e r e sp o n den t Un i on fi l ed a N oti c e of St ri k e wi th th e Na ti on al

Co n ci l i ati on an d M edi ati on B o a rd (N CM B) on th e g r o u n d o f u n fai r l ab o r p ra cti c e , an d
pa rti cu l arl y , a ct s o f h a ra s sm en t , fa u l t - fi n di n g, an d u n i on bu sti n g th r ou gh c o e r ci on an d
i n ter f e r en c e wi th u n i on af fai rs . On D e c emb e r 10 , 19 98 , i n a c on ci l i ati on c on f e r en c e , th e
r ep r e s en ta ti ve s o f t h e p e ti ti on e r a g r e ed a n d gu ar an t e ed th a t th e r e wi l l be n o t e rmi n ati on o f th e
s e rvi c e s of p ri vat e r e sp on d en t s du ri n g th e p en d en c y o f t h e c a s e, wi th th e r e s e rv ati on of th e
man ag e m en t p r e r og ati ve t o i ssu e m em o s t o e r ri n g e mpl o y e e s f o r th e i n fr a cti o n , o r vi ol ati on o f
c omp an y p ol i ci es . O n th e f ol l owi n g da y , o r on D e c em b e r 11 , 19 98 , a St ri k e V ot e wa s c on du ct ed
an d su p e r vi s ed by NC MB p e r so n n el , a n d th e r e su l ts of t h e v ot e w e r e su bm i tted t o th e N CM B
on D e c em b er 2 1, 1 9 98.
On J an u a r y 2 1, 1 999 , th e p eti ti on e r an d t h e Un i on en te r ed i n to a Su b mi s si on A gr e e m en t ,
th e r eb y ag r e ei n g t o su bmi t th e i s su e of u n fai r l ab or p r a cti c e th e s u bj e ct mat t e r of th e fo r e g oi n g
N oti c e o f St ri k e an d th e St ri k e V ot e f o r v ol u n tar y a rbi tr ati o n wi th a vi e w to p r e v en t th e st ri k e .
On Ma r ch 24 , 19 99 , du ri n g th e p en d e n cy o f th e v ol u n ta r y a rbi tr ati on p r o c e edi n g s, th e
peti ti on e r , th r ou gh i ts pr e si d en t, E r n es to G ar ci a, di smi s s e d Eu g en e Lu c e n t e, a u n i on m e mb e r ,
du e t o an al l eg ed p ett y qu a r r el wi th a c o - empl o y e e i n F eb ru a ry 1 999 . In vi e w o f th i s
te rmi n ati on , p ri vat e r es po n d en t Un i on fi l ed wi th th e N LR C a c o mpl ai n t f o r i ll ega l di smi ss al .
In th e m o rn i n g of J u n e 24 , 199 9, p ri va te r es po n d en t J os e Lan o ri as , a u n i on m em b e r, w as
r el i ev ed fr o m h i s p o st , an d h i s empl o ym en t a s c oo k , t e rmi n at ed. Su bs e qu en tl y , r es p on d en t Bi l l y
Ba cu s , t h e u n i on vi c e- p r e si den t , c on f e rr e d wi th E rn e st o Ga r ci a an d p r ot e st ed La n o ri a ss Pa
di smi ss al . Sh o r tl y t h e r ea ft e r , r e sp on d e n ts s tag ed a wi l dcat s tri k e .
ge
On J u n e 25 , 199 9, a N o ti c e of St ri k e wa s r e - fi l ed b y th e p ri v at e r e sp on d e n ts an d th e |
pr ot e st , ac c o rdi n g t o th e r e sp on d en t s , wa s c on v e r t ed i n t o a si t - do wn st ri k e . O n th e n e xt da y, o r 21
on Ju n e 26 , 199 9, t h e s am e w a s t r an s f o rm ed i n to a n act u a l st ri k e.
On J u n e 29 , 199 9, th e p eti ti on e r fi l ed a c om pl ai n t f o r i ll egal st ri k e wi th th e N LR C agai n s t

pri va t e r es p on d en t s , s e eki n g t o d ec l a r e th e s t ri ke i ll egal , an d t o d e cl a r e r e sp on d en t s , wh o
pa rti ci pat ed i n th e co mmi s si on of i l l egal a ct s, t o h a v e l o st th ei r empl o ym e n t stat u s . Ha vi n g
ar ri v ed at n o ami c abl e s e ttl em en t, th e p ar ti e s su bmi tte d th ei r p o si ti on pap e r s, t o g eth e r wi th
su pp o rti n g d ocu m en ts , a f fi davi ts of wi t n e s s es , an d ph ot og ra ph s , i n c om pl i an ce wi th th e or d e rs
o f th e La bo r A rbi te r . On O ct ob e r 1 2, 19 99, th e Lab o r A rbi te r r en d e r ed a D e ci si o n th e di sp o si ti ve
po rti on o f wh i ch r e a ds:
W H E R EF OR E , p r emi s es c on si de r ed , r es pon de n ts ar e h e r e b y d ecl a r ed t o h a v e s tag e d an

il l egal st ri k e, an d t h e e mpl o ym en t o f u n i on of fi c e r s an d al l i n di vi du al re sp o n den ts a r e d e em ed
val i dl y te r mi n ate d i n a c c or dan c e wi th l aw .
Fi n all y, al l i n di vi dual r e sp on d en t s a r e h e r eb y di r ec t ed t o i mm edi at el y r em o v e

th ei r pi c k et l i n e s a n d al l ph y si cal ob st ru cti on s th at i mp ed e i n gr e ss an d e gr e s s t o
peti ti on e r s pr e mi s es .
SO OR D ER E D. [ 5 ]
Th e p ri n ci pal qu es t i on b ef o r e th e La bo r Ar bi te r wa s w h et he r t he pr i v at e r e sp o nd e nt s
st a ge d a n i ll e g al st r ik e . R u l i n g i n t h e a ff i rm at i ve , th e Lab o r A rbi t e r h el d th at th e
N oti c e o f S tri k e da t ed D e c em b er 3 , 199 8 a s w el l as th e St ri k e V ot e of D e c e mb e r 11 , 1 998
r e fe r r e d t o a p ri o r di spu t e su b mi tted f o r v ol u n ta ry a rbi tr a ti on an d , h e n c e , th e y can n ot
appl y t o th e st ri k e s tag ed ab ou t si x m on th s l at e r, wh i ch c om men c ed on Ju n e 2 4, 1 999 an d
en d e d on Ju n e 26 , 19 99; th at , f o r th e s e r e a so n s , th e U n i on fai l ed t o c o mp l y wi th th e
man da t or y r equ i si te s f o r a l aw fu l st ri k e ; th a t th e i s su an c e o f m em o s b y th e p e ti ti on e r t o
i n sti l l di sci pl i n e on e r ri n g e mpl o y e e s i s a l awfu l ex e r ci s e o f m an ag e m en t p r e r og ati v e an d
do n ot am ou n t t o act s o f u n f ai r l ab o r p ra cti c e; th at , i n st ea d o f r e s or ti n g to a st ri k e ,
pri va t e r e sp on d en t s s h ou l d h av e a v ai l ed o f th e p r op e r l eg a l r em e di e s su ch a s t h e fi li n g o f
c ompl ai n ts f o r i l l egal su sp en si on o r i l l egal di smi s sal wi th t h e N LR C; t h at , th e r o ot ca u s e s
o f th e c on t r o v e r sy a r e th e p eti ti on f o r c e rti fi cati on el ec ti on an d p eti ti on f o r can c el l ati on o f
u n i on re gi st rati o n w h i ch w e r e th en p en d i n g be f or e th e D epa rtm e n t o f L ab o r as w el l as th e
i ssu e on u n f ai r l ab o r p r ac ti c e th en p e n di n g be f o r e th e v o l u n tary a rbi t rat o r , an d, h en c e,
th e pa rti e s sh ou l d h av e aw ai ted t h e r e s ol u ti on o f th e c as e s i n th e p r op e r f o r a; an d th at
e v en i f p ri vat e r e sp on d en t s c o mpl i ed w i th al l th e r equ i si te s o f a val i d st ri k e , t h e st ri k e i s
sti l l i l l egal du e t o th e co mmi s si on of pr oh i bi ted a ct s , i n c l u di n g th e o bs tru cti on o f f r e e
i n gre s s an d eg r e s s o f t h e p r e mi s es , i n ti mi dati on , an d th r ea t i n fl i cte d u p on n on - st ri ki n g
em pl oy e e s .
Pri v at e r e sp on d en t s app eal ed t o t h e N L RC w h i ch , on N ov e mb e r 29 , 2 000 , p r o mu l gate d

i ts D e ci si on th e di sp o si ti ve p o rti on of w h i ch s tat e s:
W H ER EF OR E , th e app eal i s h e r eb y gr an t ed . A cc o rdi n gl y, th e D e ci si on

dat ed Oc to b e r 12 , 1999 i n th e ab o v e en ti tl ed ca s e i s h e r eb y v a cat ed an d s et -
asi d e. C on s equ en tl y , th e c ompl ai n t o f i ll egal st ri k e i s h e r e by di s mi ss e d f o r l a ck o f
me ri t.
Al l st ri ki n g wo r k e r s a r e h e r e by o rd e r e d t o r e tu r n t o w o r k i mm edi at el y an d
Su kh oth ai Re st au ra n t t o a c c ept th em b ac k t o th ei r f o rm e r o r equ i v al en t p osi ti on s. If
th e s am e i s n o l o n ge r p os si bl e, Su k h oth ai Re st au ran t i s o rd e r ed t o p ay th e m
s epa r ati on pa y equ i val en t t o on e m on t h sal ar y f o r ev e r y y ea r of s er vi c e r ec k on ed
f ro m th ei r i n i ti al date of empl oy m e n t u p t o th e p r e s en t .
SO OR D ER E D. [ 6 ]
In o v e r ru l i n g th e La bo r A rbi t e r, th e NL R C h el d th at th e p eti t i on e r i s gu i l ty of u n i on bu sti n g; th at
th e p e ti ti on e r vi ol at ed th e Su b mi s si on Ag r e e m en t da t ed D ec e mb e r 10 , 1998 i n th at n o
te rmi n ati on sh al l be ef f e ct ed du ri n g th e v ol u n ta r y a rbi t rati o n p r o c e edi n gs a n d, h en c e , th e st ri k e
wa s j u sti fi ed; th at t h e N oti c e o f S tri k e an d St ri k e V ot e d at ed D e c emb e r 3 , 19 98 an d D e c e mb e r
11, 19 98, r es p ec ti vel y, a r e appl i cabl e t o th e s t ri ke of Ju n e 24, 25 , an d 2 6, 19 9 9 si n c e th e sa m e
i ssu e s of u n f ai r l a bo r pr a cti c e w e r e i n v ol ve d an d th at u n fai r l ab o r pr a cti c e s a r e c on ti n u i n g
o ff en s e s; th at e v en i f t h e f o r eg oi n g N oti c e of St ri k e an d Stri k e V ot e w er e n ot ap pl i cabl e, th e
Un i on ma y t ak e a cti on i mm edi at el y si n c e th e p eti ti on e r i s g u il ty o f u n i on bu s ti n g; an d th at th e Pa
r e- fi l i n g o f a N oti c e of St ri k e on Ju n e 25 , 19 99 cu r ed th e d e fe ct o f n on - c o mpl i an ce wi th th e
ge
man da t or y r equ i r em en t s .
|
Aft e r th e N LRC d en i ed t h e M oti on f o r R e c on si d e rati o n , th e peti ti on e r a pp eal e d t o th e CA 22
an d r ai s ed th e f ol l owi n g i ssu e s:
I. W H E T H E R OR N O T T H E S TR I K E S TA G E D BY T H E
PR IVA T E R ESP O N D E NT S IS L E G AL ; an d
II. W H E TH E R OR N O T T H E PR IVA T E RE SP O ND E N TS W H O P AR T IC IPA T ED IN T H E

STR IK E A N D C O M M ITT E D IL L E GA L AC TS W ER E PR O P ER L Y A ND VA L ID L Y
D EC LAR E D T O HAV E L O ST T H E IR E MP L O YM E N T ST AT US. [ 7 ]
As st at ed ab ov e , t h e CA d en i ed th e peti ti on an d af fi rm ed th e NL RC . P eti ti on e r i s n o w
be f o r e t h i s C ou rt, r ai si n g th e f ol l owi n g gr ou n d s:
I. T H E C OUR T OF A PP E AL S G RAV E L Y E RR ED A ND D EC ID E D T H E ISSU E S IN T H E INS TA N T

CAS E IN A MA NN E R C O N TRA RY T O E ST ABL IS H E D L AW AN D JUR IS PRU D EN C E BY R UL IN G
T HA T T H E W IL DCA T S TR IK E OF JU N E 2 4, 1 999 IS VA L ID A ND L E GA L D E SP IT E CL E AR A ND
IN C ON TR OV E RT IB L E EV ID E NC E TH AT :
A. PR IVA T E R ESP O N D EN TS FA IL E D T O CO M PL Y W IT H T H E RE Q U IS IT E S F OR A
VAL ID ST R IK E AS P RE SCR IB E D B Y T H E P ER T IN E NT PR OV IS IO NS O F T H E
LAB O R C OD E ;
B. T H ER E W ER E N O STR IK EA B L E IS SU ES ; A N D
C. PR IVA T E R ES PO N D EN TS C O MM IT T ED IL L E GA L AND PR O H IB IT E D
AC TS DU R IN G T H E S TR IK E .
II. T H E C O UR T OF APP E A LS G RAV E L Y E RR ED B Y F A IL IN G T O AD DR ES S T H E O T H ER IS SU ES

RA IS E D BY T H E P ET IT IO N E R IN IT S P E T IT IO N F OR C ER T IORA R I W H IC H F A ILUR E
AM OU N T ED T O A D E N IA L OF ITS R IG H T T O DU E P R OC ES S O F LA W. [ 8 ]
Th e p eti ti on i s m e ri to ri ou s.
Th e qu e sti on s b ef o r e th i s C ou rt a r e wh et h er th e st r i ke st ag ed b y th e p ri vat e
r e sp on d en t s i s i l l egal ; an d wh eth e r pri va t e r e sp on d en t s a r e d e em ed t o h av e l o st th ei r
em pl oy m en t s tatu s by pa rti ci pati n g i n t h e c o mmi s si on of i lleg al a ct s du ri n g th e s tri k e .
Re sp on de n ts i n si st th at th e fi l i n g of t h e N oti c e of St ri k e on D ec e mb e r 3 , 1 998 , th e
Stri k e V ot e of D e c e mb e r 11 , 1 998 , th e su b mi ssi o n of t h e r e su l ts o f th e v ot e to th e N CM B on
D ec e mb e r 2 1, 199 8 , an d th ei r ob s e rv a ti on o f th e 15 - d ay c o ol i n g - of f p e ri od i n ca s e o f u n fair
l abo r p r acti c e a s w el l as th e s e v en - d a y r ep o rti n g p e ri od o f th e r e su l ts o f t h e st ri k e v ot e , all
sati s f y th e m an d at o r y r equ i r e m en t s u n de r A rti cl e 2 63 [ 9 ] o f th e L ab o r C od e an d a r e ap pl i cabl e
to th e Ju n e 199 9 st ri k e. In su pp o rt o f th i s th e o r y, r es p on den t s i n v ok e A rti cl e 26 3(f ) i n th at
th e d eci si on t o s tri k e i s val i d f o r t h e du rati on of t h e di spu t e b as e d on su b stan t i all y th e sa m e
gr ou n d s c on si de r ed wh en th e st ri k e v ot e wa s ta k en , th u s, th e r e i s n o n e ed t o r ep e at th e
pr o c e ss . Fu rth e rm o r e , ac c o rdi n g t o th e r e sp on d en t s , e v en a s su mi n g f o r th e sa k e o f a rgu m en t
th at th e N oti c e o f Stri k e an d S tri k e V ot e i n D e c emb e r 19 98 c an n ot b e ma d e t o appl y t o t h e
c on c e r t ed a cti on s i n Ju n e 1 999 , th e s e r equ i r e m en t s ma y n o n eth el e s s b e di sp en s ed wi th si n c e
th e p eti ti on e r i s gu i l ty of u n i on bu sti n g an d, h en c e , th e Un i on c an ta k e ac ti on i mm edi at el y.
Th e u n di spu t ed fa ct , h ow e v e r, i s th at a t th e ti me th e s tri k e wa s stag e d i n Ju n e 1 999 , v ol u n tar y

ar bi trati on b etw e e n th e p a rti e s w as o n goi n g b y vi r tu e o f th e Jan u ar y 2 1, 1999 Su bmi s si on
Agr e e m en t . Th e i ss u e t o b e r e s ol v ed u n de r th o s e p ro c e edi n gs p e rtai n ed t o t h e v e r y s am e i ssu e s
stat e d i n th e N oti c e of St ri k e of D e c e mb e r 3, 19 98: th e c ommi s si on o f u n fai r l abo r p ra cti c e s ,
su ch as act s of h a r as sm en t, f au l t - fi n di n g, an d u n i on bu sti n g th r ou gh c o e rci on an d i n t er f e r en c e
wi th u n i on a ff ai rs .
Arti cl e 2 64 of th e L ab or C od e p ro vi d es :
Art . 26 4. P r oh ibit ed a cti viti e s .
x x x x
N o st ri k e o r l o ck ou t sh al l be d e cl ar ed a ft e r as su mpti on of j u ri sdi cti o n b y th e

Pa
Pr e si d en t o r th e S e c r eta r y o r a ft e r c e rti fi cati on or su b mi ssi on o f th e di s p u te t o ge
c ompu l s o r y o r v olu n ta ry a rb it rati on o r du rin g th e p en d en cy o f c as e s in v olv i n g th e |
sa m e g r ou n ds fo r th e s tr ik e o r l o ck ou t. 23
x x x x ( e mph a si s s u ppl i ed)
Th i s C ou rt h a s h el d th at st ri k e s s tag ed i n vi ol ati on o f ag r e e men ts p r o vi di n g f o r ar bi trati on

ar e i l l egal , si n c e th e s e ag r e em en ts mu st b e s t ri ctl y adh e r ed t o an d r e sp e ct ed i f th ei r en d s a r e
to b e ac h i ev e d. [ 1 0 ] Th e r ati on al e of th e p r oh i bi ti on u n d er A rti cl e 264 i s th at on c e j u ri sdi cti on
o v er th e l ab o r di sp u te h a s b e e n p r op e rl y ac qu i r ed by c om p et en t au th o ri ty , th at j u ri sd i cti on
sh ou l d n ot b e i n te r f e r ed wi th b y t h e a p pl i cati on of th e c o e r ci ve p r o c es s e s o f a st ri k e . [ 1 1 ] In d e ed
i t i s am on g th e ch i ef p ol i ci es o f th e Stat e t o p r o m ot e an d emph a si z e th e p ri ma c y of f r e e
c ol l ecti v e ba rgai n i n g an d n eg oti ati o n s, i n cl u di n g v ol u n ta ry a rbi tr ati on , m edi ati on , an d
c on ci l i ati on , a s m o de s o f s e ttl i n g l abo r, o r i n du st ri al di spu t e s . [ 1 2 ] In All ian c e o f G o v e rn m en t
W o rk e r s v. Min i st e r of Lab o r , [ 1 3 ] Ch i ef Ju sti c e F e rn an d o d e cl ar ed th a t th e p ri n ci pl e b eh i n d l abo r
u n i on i sm i n p ri v at e i n du s t ry i s t h at i n du st ri al p e ac e c an n ot b e s e cu r ed t h r ou gh c om pu l si on b y
l aw. R el ati on s b et w e en p ri vat e empl oy e r s an d th ei r e mpl o y e es r e st on an e s s en ti al l y v ol u n ta r y
basi s , su bj e ct t o th e mi n i mu m r e qu i rem e n ts of wa g e l aws an d oth e r l a bo r an d w el fa r e
l egi sl ati on . [ 1 4 ]
Th e al l eged di smi s s al s of L u c en te an d r e sp on d en t Lan o ri as, b oth u n i on m em be r s , w h i ch

al l egedl y t ri gge r ed th e wi l dcat st ri k e , ar e n ot su ffi ci en t g r ou n d s to j u sti fy th e r adi cal r ec ou r s e
on th e p a rt of t h e pri va t e r e sp on d en t s . Th e qu e sti on s th a t su r r ou n d th ei r di s mi ssal , as p ri vate
r e sp on d en t s s o a f fi r m, ar e c on n e ct e d t o th e al l ege d b r ea c h o f th e g u a ran t e e by th e p eti ti on e r
n ot t o di s mi ss i t s e mpl oy e e s du ri n g th e p en d e n c y of th e ar bi trati on c as e , th e v er y qu e sti on s
wh i ch th ey al so l i n k t o th e oth e r i n ci de n ts of u n fai r l ab o r pr acti c e s al l eg edl y c ommi tt ed b y th e
peti ti on e rth e s e m at te r s s h o u l d h a v e be en r ai se d an d r e s ol ve d i n th e v ol u n ta ry ar bi tra ti on
pr o c e edi n gs th a t w e r e c om m en c ed p r e ci s el y t o add r e s s t h em . On th e oth e r h an d , i f p ri vat e
r e sp on d en t s b el i ev e d th at th e di sci pl i nar y m e as u r e s h ad n oth i n g t o d o wi th th e i s su e s u n d e r
ar bi trati on , th en th e y sh ou l d h a v e a va il ed of th e app r op ri at e r em edi es u n d e r th e Lab o r C od e ,
su ch a s th e i n sti tu ti on o f ca s es o f i l l eg al di smi s sal [ 1 5 ] o r , b y ag r e em en t o f th e p a rti e s, th e
su bmi s si on o f th e c as e s t o th e g ri e van c e ma ch i n e r y of t h e C BA , i f on e i s a vai l abl e, s o th a t th ey
may b e su bj ect e d t o s epa ra t e v ol u n ta r y a rbi tr ati on p r o c e e di n gs, [ 1 6 ] o r si mpl y s e ek t o t e r mi n at e
th e p en di n g v ol u n tar y a rbi t rati on ca s e an d c o mpl et e th e m an da to r y p r o c e du r e f o r a l aw fu l
st ri k e. Pri v at e r e sp o n den ts sh ou l d h a v e avai l ed t h em s el ve s o f an y o f th e s e al t e rn a ti ve r e m edi e s
i n ste a d o f r e so rti n g t o a d ra sti c an d u n l awfu l m ea su r e , sp e ci fi cal l y, th e h ol di n g a wi l dcat
st ri k e. [ 1 7 ] An d b ec a u s e o f th e fa ct th at t h e U n i on wa s fu l l y a w a r e th at th e ar bi tra ti on
pr o c e edi n gs we r e p en di n g, g o od fai th c an n o t be i n v o k ed a s a d e f en s e . [ 1 8 ]
Fo r fai l i n g to e xh a u st al l st ep s i n th e a r bi trati on p r oc e edi n g s by vi rt u e o f th e Su bmi s si o n

Agr e e m en t , i n vi ew o f th e p r o s cri pti on u n d e r A rti cl e 2 64 o f th e L ab o r C od e, an d th e p r e vai l i n g
stat e p ol i cy a s w el l as i ts u n d erl yi n g r a ti on al e , th i s C ou rt d e cl ar e s th at th e st ri k e sta g ed by th e
pri va t e r e sp on d en ts i s i l l egal . [ 1 9 ]
Wi th r e sp e ct t o r e s pon de n ts av e r m en t th a t a ssu mi n g a rg u en d o th at th e N oti c e o f St ri k e an d

Stri k e V ot e i n D e c emb e r 1 998 c an n ot b e ma d e to app l y t o th e st ri k e i n Ju n e 19 99 , t h e
r equ i r e m en t s f o r a val i d st ri k e ma y n on eth el e s s b e di sp en s ed
wi th i n ca se of u n i on b u sti n g , [ 2 0 ] th e Co u r t fi n d s i t u n n e c es s a ry to di s cu s s th e qu es ti on a t
l en gth , e sp e ci al l y i n vi e w o f th e f o r eg oi n g d e cl ar ati on th a t th e st ri k e i s i l l egal , a s w el l as th e
c on si d e rati on s o f e sta bl i sh ed d o ct ri n e : th e l an gu ag e o f th e l aw l e a ve s n o r o o m f o r d ou bt th a t
th e c o ol i n g - of f p e ri od an d th e s ev en - d ay st ri k e ban aft e r th e st ri k e - v ot e r ep o rt w er e i n t en d ed
to b e m an da t or y , [ 2 1 ] an d i n ca s e of u n i on bu sti n g wh e r e t h e exi st e n c e o f th e u n i on i s
th r e at en ed , i t i s on l y t h e 1 5 - d ay c ool i n g - o f f pe ri od th at m a y b e di s p en s e d wi th .
Arti cl e 263( f) i n p a rt stat e s: In e v e ry ca s e , th e u n i o n o r th e em pl oy e r sh al l fu rn i sh th e

D epa rt m en t th e r e s u l ts o f th e v oti n g a t l ea st s ev en da y s be f o r e th e i n t en d ed st ri k e o r l o ck ou t,
su bj e ct t o th e c o ol i n g - o f f p e ri od h e r ei n p r o vi ded . Th i s p r o vi si on sh ou l d b e r e ad wi th S e cti on 3,
Ru l e XX II, B o o k V o f th e Ru l e s Impl em e n ti n g th e L ab o r C od e , th en ap pl i cabl e a t th e ti m e of th e
di spu t e, th e r el e van t p r o vi si on s o f wh i c h s tat e:
H ow e v e r , i n ca s e o f u n f ai r l ab o r p ra cti c e i n v ol vi n g th e di s mi ssal f r om empl o y men t

o f an y u n i o n of fi c e r du l y el e ct ed i n a c c o rda n c e wi th th e u n i on c on sti tu ti on an d by -
l aws wh i ch m ay c on sti tu t e u n i o n - bu s ti n g wh e r e th e e x i sten c e of th e u n i on i s
th r e at en ed , th e fi ft e en - d a y c o ol i n g - of f p e ri od sh al l n ot a ppl y a n d th e u n i on ma y
tak e a cti on i mm e di at el y a ft e r th e st rik e v ot e is co n du ct ed an d th e r e su lt s th e r e of Pa
su b mitt ed t o th e ap pr op ri at e re g i on al b ran ch of th e B o a rd. (e mph a si s su ppl i ed)
ge
Th e N CM B P ri me r on St ri k e , Pi ck e ti n g, an d L oc k ou t (J a n u ar y 31 , 19 92) p r ovi d e th e s am e |
wo r di n g. Th e f or e g oi n g p r o vi si on of t h e i mpl em en ti n g ru l es s h o u l d al s o b e co mpa r e d t o t h e 24
pr o vi si on s o f th e La bo r C od e u n d e r A rti cl e 26 3(c ):
(c) x x x H o w ev e r , i n ca s e o f di s mi ss al f r om em pl oy m en t of u n i on o ffi c e r s du l y
el e ct ed i n a c c o rdan c e wi th th e u n i on c o n sti tu ti on an d b y - l a ws , wh i ch m ay c on s ti tu te
u n i on bu sti n g wh e r e th e e xi st en c e o f th e u n i on i s th r ea t en e d, th e 1 5 - d ay co ol i n g - o f f
pe ri o d sh al l n o t app l y an d th e u n i on ma y t a ke acti on i mm ed i atel y.
Th e i mpl e m en ti n g r u l es cl a ri fy A rti cl e 263( c) i n th at th e u n i on m ay st ri k e i mm edi at el y

pr o vi ded th at th e st ri k e v ot e i s c on du ct ed , th e r e su l ts th e r e o f su bmi tt ed i n ev e r y ca s e at l ea st
s ev en da y s b e f o r e t h e i n t en d ed s tri k e o r l o c k ou t. In su m , i n cas e of al l eg ed u n i on bu sti n g, t h e
th r e e r emai n i n g r e qu i re m en t s n o ti ce , s tri k e v o t e, an d s ev en - da y r e p or t p e ri od can n ot b e
di spe n s e d wi th . [ 2 2 ]
Wh at i s m or e , th e st ri k e h ad b ee n att en d e d by th e wi de s pr e ad c o mmi s si on o f p r oh i bi ted

act s . W el l - se ttl ed i s th e ru l e th at e v en i f th e st ri k e w e r e t o b e d e cl ar ed val i d b e cau s e i ts
obj e cti v e o r pu rp o s e i s l aw fu l , th e st ri k e m ay sti l l be d e cl a r ed i n val i d wh er e th e m e an s
em pl oy e d a r e i l l egal . [ 2 3 ] Am on g su ch l i mi ts ar e th e p r oh i bi te d ac ti vi ti es u n d e r A rti cl e 264 o f th e
Lab o r C o de , pa r ti cu l arl y pa r ag ra ph ( e ), wh i ch st at es th at n o p e r so n en g ag ed i n pi ck eti n g sh al l :
a) c om mi t an y ac t of vi ol en c e, c o er ci o n , o r i n ti mi dati on o r
b) ob st ru c t th e f r e e i n g r es s to o r eg r e ss f r o m th e empl o y e r' s pr e mi s e s f o r l aw fu l
pu rp o s e s , o r
c) o bs t r u ct pu bl i c th o r ou gh fa r e s.
Th e f ol l owi n g a ct s h a v e b e en h el d t o b e p r oh i bi ted a c ti vi ti es: wh er e th e st ri k e r s

sh ou t ed sl an d e r ou s an d s cu r ri l ou s w o rd s agai n st th e o w n e r s o f th e v e ss el s ; [ 2 4 ] wh e r e th e
st ri k e rs u s ed u n n e c e ss a ry an d o bs c en e l an gu ag e [ 2 5 ] o r epi th et s t o p r ev en t ot h e r l abo r e r s t o
go t o w o rk , [ 2 6 ] an d ci r cu l at ed l i bel ou s st at em en ts ag ai n s t th e e mpl o y e r wh i ch sh o w a ctu al
mal i ce; [ 2 7 ] wh e r e th e p r ot e st o r s u s ed a bu si v e an d th r eat en i n g l an gu ag e t o wa r ds th e pat r on s
o f a pl ac e o f bu si n e s s o r a gai n st c o - em pl oy e e s, goi n g b e y o n d th e m e r e att e mp t t o p e r su a d e
cu st om e r s t o wi th d ra w th ei r p at r on ag e; [ 2 8 ] wh e r e th e s tr i ke rs f o rm ed a h u man c o r do n an d
bl oc k ed al l th e wa ys an d app r o ac h e s t o th e l au n ch e s a n d v es s el s of th e vi ci n i ty of th e
wo r kpl a c e [ 2 9 ] an d p e rp et r at ed ac ts of vi ol en c e an d c o e r ci on t o p r ev e n t w o rk f r o m b ei n g
pe r f o rm ed; [ 3 0 ] an d wh er e th e st ri k e r s s h o o k th ei r fi st s an d th r e at en ed n on - s tri ki n g empl o y e e s
wi th b odi l y h a rm if th e y p e rsi s t ed to p r oc e e d to th e w o rk pl ac e . [ 3 1 ] P e rmi s si bl e
acti vi ti es o f t h e pi c k eti n g wo r k e r s do
n ot i n cl u de ob st ru ct i on of a c c e ss o f cu s tom e r s . [ 3 2 ]
Th e evi d en c e i n th e r ec o rd cl e a rl y a n d e xt en si v el y sh o ws th at th e i n di vidu al r es p on d en t s
en g ag ed i n i ll egal a ct s du ri n g th e st ri k e, su ch as th e i n ti mi dati on an d h a ra s sm en t o f a
c on si d e rabl e n u m b e r o f cu s to m e r s t o tu rn th e m a wa y an d d i sc ou rag e th em f r o m pat r on i z i n g th e
bu si n e s s of t h e p eti ti on e r; [ 3 3 ] wa vi n g t h ei r a r m s an d sh ou ti n g at th e pa ss e r s by , Hu wag k ay on g
pu ma s ok sa Su kh ot h ai! [ 3 4 ] an d Nila g y a n n a n a min n g l as on an g p agk ain d y an ! [ 3 5 ] a s w el l as
n u m er ou s oth e r s tat em e n ts mad e to di sc r edi t th e r epu t ati on of th e
e sta bl i sh men t ; [ 3 6 ] p r e v en ti n g th e en tr y o f cu st om e r s; [ 3 7 ] a n gr y an d u n r u l y b e h avi o r c al cu l ate d
to cau s e c o mm oti o n [ 3 8 ] wh i ch a ff e ct ed n ei gh b ori n g e stabl i sh men ts wi th i n th e m al l ; [ 3 9 ] o p en l y
cu rsi n g an d sh ou ti n g at th e p r esi d en t i n f r on t o f cu st o me r s [ 4 0 ] a n d u si n g l ou d an d a bu si ve
l an gu ag e, su ch a s P u tan g in a n iy on g l a h at!, t o wa rd th e r e st o f th e man ag em en t [ 4 1 ] as wel l a s
th ei r c o- w o rk e r s w h o r e fu s e d t o g o on st ri k e; [ 4 2 ] ph y si cal l y pr e v en t i n g n on - st ri k e r s f r o m
en t e ri n g th e p r e m i se s, [ 4 3 ] a s w el l a s d el i be rat el y bl o cki n g th ei r m ov e men ts i n si d e th e
r e stau r an t, [ 4 4 ] at ti me s b y sh a rpl y bu mpi n g i n t o th e m [ 4 5 ] o r th r ou gh i n de c en t p h y s i cal
c on ta ct; [ 4 6 ] o p en l y t h r ea te n i n g n on - st ri k e rs wi th b o di l y h a rm , su c h a s Pag h i n di si la pu ma yag ,
u pakan m o! ; [ 4 7 ] a n d sh ou ti n g at th e s ec u ri ty gu a rd G ran ada! wh i ch c au s e d pan i c am on g th e
cu st om e r s an d p r o mpt ed s ec u ri ty to r ep o rt a po s si bl e d ea th th r eat t o m an ag em en t an d th e
s ec u ri ty ag en cy . [ 4 8 ]
In th e d et e rmi n ati o n of th e l i abi l i ti es o f th e i n di vi du al r e s pon de n ts , th e appl i cabl e p r o vi si on i s

Arti cl e 2 64( a) o f th e L ab o r C od e:
A rt . 264 . P r oh ib it e d A cti viti e s (a ) x x x

Pa
x x x x ge
|
x x x x An y u n i on o ffi c e r wh o kn owi n gl y pa rti ci pat e s i n an il l egal st ri k e an d an y w o rk e r o r
u n i on o f fi c er wh o k n o wi n gl y pa rti ci pat e s i n th e c o mmi s si on o f i ll egal a cts du ri n g a st ri k e 25
may b e d e cl ar e d t o h av e l o st h i s e m pl o ym en t st atu s: P r o vi ded , Th a t m e r e p ar t i ci pati on o f
a w o r k e r i n a l awf u l st ri ke sh al l n ot c on s ti tu te s u f fi ci en t g r ou n d f o r t e r mi n ati on o f h i s
em pl oy m en t , e v en i f a r epl a c em en t h a d b e en h i r ed b y th e empl o y e r du ri n g su ch l aw fu l
st ri k e.
x x x x
In S am ah an g M an g g ag a wa s a Su l pi ci o Lin e s , In c . - NAF LU v . Su lpi ci o Lin e s , In c. [ 4 9 ] th i s

Co u r t e xpl ai n ed t h at th e e f f ec ts of su ch i l l egal st ri ke s , ou tl i n ed i n A rti c l e 264 , ma k e a
di sti n cti on b etw e en w o r k er s an d u n i o n of fi c e rs wh o p a rt i ci pate th e r ei n : an o r di n ar y st ri ki n g
wo r k e r can n ot b e t e rmi n at ed f o r m e r e p arti ci pati on i n a n i lleg al st ri k e. Th er e m u st b e p ro o f th at
h e o r sh e c o mmi tt e d i l l egal a ct s du ri n g a st ri k e . A u n i on of fi c e r , o n th e oth e r h an d, ma y b e
te rmi n at e d f r om w o rk wh en h e kn ow i n gl y pa rti ci pat e s i n a n i ll egal st ri k e, an d l i ke oth e r
wo r k e r s, wh en h e c om mi ts an i l l egal a ct du ri n g a st ri k e . [ 5 0 ] In al l ca s es , th e st ri k e r mu st b e
i den ti fi ed . Bu t p r o o f b ey on d r ea s on abl e d ou b t i s n o t re q u i red . Su b st an ti al e vi den c e a vai l abl e
u n de r th e a tt en dan t ci r cu m st an c e s , wh i ch m ay j u sti fy th e i mp osi ti on o f th e p e n al ty of di smi s sal ,
may su ffi c e . [ 5 1 ] Li abi l i ty f o r p r oh i bi ted a ct s i s t o b e d et e rmi n ed on an i n di vi du al ba si s:
Private
Respondent Illegal Acts

Rank in
Respondent Union
Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;

shouting at the security
Emmanuel
guard Granada! which caused panic among
Cayno President
the customers;[52] Intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging customers
from entering the restaurant;[53]publicly
denouncing the reputation of the
establishment;[54]openly threatening non-
strikers with bodily harm;[55]

Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and
Vice President
discouraging customers from entering the
Billy Bacus restaurant;[56] use of abusive language
towards management or non-
strikers;[57] deliberately blocking the
movements of management or non-
strikers inside the restaurant;[58]
Secretary
Analiza
Cablay Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;
restaurant;[59]
Pa
Jose Neil Knowingly participating in an illegal strike; ge
Arcilla Treasurer Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and |
26
restaurant;[60] publicly denouncing the
reputation of the
establishment;[61]coercing non-strikers to
strike;[62] Cursing and use of abusive
language towards management, non-
strikers, or customers;[63]

Roel Esancha Auditor intimidating, harassing, preventing, and
restaurant;[64]

use of abusive language towards
Claudio
management, non-strikers, or
Panaligan
customers;[65] intimidating, harassing,
Board Member preventing, and discouraging customers
from entering the
restaurant;[66] deliberately blocking the
strikers inside the restaurant;[67]
Rey Arsenal Member Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and

restaurant;[68]
Alex
Martinez Member Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and
restaurant;[69]
Cursing and use of abusive language

towards management,non-strikers, or
Hermie Raz Member
customers;[70] deliberately blocking the
strikers inside the
restaurant;[71] intimidating, harassing,
preventing, and discouraging customers
from entering the restaurant;[72]
Jose
Lanorias Member Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and
restaurant;[73]
Pa
ge
|
Lito Arce Member Id.[74] 27
Cesar
Sangreo Member Id.[75]
Rolando
Fabregas Member Id.[76]
Id.;[77] deliberately blocking movements of

Jimmy Balan Member
non-strikers inside the restaurant by
sharply bumping into them[78] or through
indecent physical contact; [79] cursing and
use of abusive language towards
management, non-strikers, or
customers;[80]

Joven discouraging customers from entering the
Lualhati Member restaurant;[81]
Antonio
Enebrad Member Id.[82]
Edgar
Eugenio Member Id.;[83] cursing and use of abusive

Albert discouraging customers from entering the
Agbuya Member restaurant;[85]
Arnel
Salvador Member
Id.[86]
Ricky Del
Prado Member Id.[87]
Pa
ge
|
Bernie Del 28
Mundo Member Id.[88]
Roberto Eco Member Id.[89]
Joven
Talidong Member Id.[90]
Id.;[91] threatening non-strikers with bodily

Leny Lucente Member harm;[92]

Rigoberto discouraging customers from entering the
Tubaon Member restaurant;[93] cursing and use of abusive

Merly Naz Member restaurant;[95] cursing and use of abusive
Lino Salubre Member

Preventing and discouraging customers
Rolando
Pugong Member
Preventing and discouraging customers
John Bathan Member
restaurant;[99]
Th u s, th e Lab o r A rbi t er i s c or r e ct i n ru l i n g th at th e e mpl oy m en t of al l i n di vi du al pri va t e Pa

r e sp on d en t s a r e d e e me d val i dl y t e rmi n a ted . ge
|
W H ER EFO RE , th e peti ti on i s g ra n t ed . Th e D eci si on an d R es ol u ti on of th e C ou r t o f
App eal s t og eth e r wi th th e D e ci si on dat ed N o v em b e r 2 9, 2 000 o f th e Na ti on al L ab o r Rel ati on s 29
Co mmi s si on a r e R E VE RS ED an d SET A SI DE . Th e D eci si o n of th e L ab o r A rbi t e r da t ed O ct o b er
12, 199 9 i s R E IN ST AT E D. Th e C ou rt fi n ds th e s tri k e i l l egal an d , a s a c on s equ e n c e th e r et o , th e
u n i on o f fi c er s wh o p a rti ci pat ed i n th e i l l egal st ri k e an d i n th e c ommi s si on o f i ll egal act s ,
n am el y, Em man u el Ca yn o , Bi l l y Ba cu s, An al i z a Cabl ay , Jo s e N ei l Ar ci ll a, R o el Es an ch a , an d
Cl au di o Pan al i gan , as w el l as th e u n i o n m e mb e r s wh o pa r ti ci pated i n th e c o mmi s si on o f i l l egal
act s du ri n g th e st r i ke, n a m el y, R e y A r s en al , Al e x Ma rti n ez , H e rmi e R az , J o s e Lan o ri a s, Li t o
Ar c e , C e sa r San g r e o , R ol an d o Fa b r ega s, Ji mmy Bal an , J o v en Lu al h ati , An t on i o En e br ad , Edg a r
Eu g en i o, Al be rt A gb u ya , A rn el Sal va d or , Ri c ky D el P rad o , B e rn i e D el Mu n d o , R o be rt o E c o , J o v en
Tal i don g , L en y Lu c e n te , Ri g ob e rt o Tu b a on , M e rl y N az , Li n o Sal u br e , R ol an do P u gon g, an d J oh n
Bath a n , al l pri v at e r e sp on d en t s , a r e h e r eb y d e cl ar ed t o h a v e l os t t h ei r e mpl o y men t st atu s.
N o p r on ou n c e m en t as t o c o st s.
SO OR D ER E D.
G.R. No. L-24224 July 30, 1965
MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA ESSO (PFPW) and PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM

WORKERS,petitioners, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., and HON. CARMELINO G. ALVENDIA, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Pa
The respondent, hereinafter to be referred to as ESSO, is a foreign corporation registered in the Philippines and ge
engaged in the marketing and distribution of petroleum, oil, gas and other allied products. There are two labor |
organizations to either of which its employees are affiliated: the Citizens Labor Union (CLU) and the Malayang
Manggagwa sa ESSO (MME). ESSO, however, has its collective bargaining agreement only with CLU, entered into
30
on April 8, 1963, to expire on July 8, 1966.
On January 7, 1965, MME filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No.
1459-MC), claiming to represent a majority of ESSO'S employees at the latter's terminal plant in Pandacan, Manila,
and praying that after due hearing it be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all said employees. Hearings
on the petition were conducted on several dates in February 1965. They had been scheduled for continuation on
the 20th and 22nd of the same month when on February 19 MME declared a strike at the Pandacan Terminal.
On February 22 ESSO filed a petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 59942)
against MME and the Philippine Federation of Petroleum strikers PFPW of which MME is an affiliate. ESSO asked for
a writ of preliminary injunction, which the Court issued ex parte on the same day on a bond of P1,000.00. The writ
commanded the respondents to "refrain from continuing to strike, picket and engage in other concerted activities,
causing stoppage or slowdown of work at the petitioner's Pandacan Terminal and other related stations ... as long
as or while the certification election filed by the (MME) ... is pending determination by the proper court."
On February 24, 1965 MME came to us in this original action for certiorari to have the injunctive order set aside
and upon proper application we issued a writ of preliminary injunction on February 26, to restrain its enforcement.
The validity of the order of respondent court is assailed by petitioner MME on three grounds:
(a) The order of injunction is directed not against the commission of illegal acts but against the very right to
strike and the right to picket both of which are protected by law (Sec. 9 (a) (1) (5), R.A. 875) and the
exercise of which cannot be enjoined;
(b) The injunction order did not comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. 875 and is, therefore, null
and void, and
(c) The respondent court did not have jurisdiction to issue the injunction as this belongs, under the facts of
the case, to the Court of Industrial Relations exclusively.
The third ground is, in the opinion of this Court, decisive of this case. At the time ESSO applied for injunction
below there was already pending before the Industrial Court the petition for certification election initiated by MME.
While the controversy as to who should be the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees was primarily
between the two contending unions, ESSO became a party when it submitted to that Court, under date of January
30, 1965, a motion to dismiss MME'S petition for certification election on the ground that the bargaining
agreement between ESSO and CLU was still effective and would not expire until July 8, 1966. On March 6, 1965
the Industrial Court, over the signature of Associate Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, issued an order denying the
motion and requesting the Department of Labor to conduct the certification election prayed for by MME.
Concerning the strike declared by MME on February 19, 1965, the following statement of the Industrial Court
appears in the said order:
In the course of the hearings, petitioner union called the attention of this Court to the alleged threatened
dismissals or change in the working conditions of the employees which it feared had the effect of influencing the
election. This Court succeeded in getting the parties to agree to maintain the status quo during the pendency of
the case. Unfortunately, before the hearings were terminated, petitioner union declared a strike allegedly on the
ground of unfair labor practices and the alleged violation by the Company of the agreement in open court that
status quo will be maintained ... . (emphasis ours)
A similar allegation has been made by MME in its petition and memoranda filed in and during the hearing of
this certiorari case, to the effect that it declared the strike because of certain unfair labor practices committed by
ESSO. This, if true, would mean that the authority to issue an injunction in connection with that strike pertained
exclusively to the Industrial Court in accordance with Republic Act No. 875 and that respondent Court of First
Instance had no such authority, acting under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
ESSO maintains, however, that the question of jurisdiction must be determined in the light of the allegations in the
petition invoking it, and that there is nothing in its petition for injunction below to indicate the existence of a labor
dispute or the commission by it of any unfair labor practice, which in fact is expressly denied. What is alleged,
among other things, is that the concerted activities of MME sought to be enjoined, namely, strike and picketing
(and blocking entrance and exit of ESSO'S Pandacan Terminal) are illegal and unjustified because of the still
pending election certification case and the existing collective bargaining agreement with CLU, and that said
activities were "resorted to in order to compel the petitioner ESSO to commit an unlawful act which is to
discriminate against the Citizens Labor Union ... even before MME is certified by the Court of Industrial Relations." Pa
ge
The controversy between the two rival unions as to which of them should be the recognized bargaining agent for
the employees constitutes a labor dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Peace Act (Balaquezon |
Transportation Labor Union vs. Hon. Muñoz-Palma, G.R. No. L-12587, Nov. 27, 1959). Section 2 (j) of said Act 31
defines a labor dispute as including "any controversy concerning, terms, tenure, or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee."
ESSO says the dispute is between the two unions, and suggests that the result of the certification election between
them is to it a matter of indifference. But the fact is ESSO became virtually a disputant when it intervened in the
certification case before the Industrial Court and made common cause with CLU by asking for the dismissal of
MME'S petition. The strike which MME declared after it filed said petition may be considered as merely an incident
in said case, interwoven as it was, according to the allegations of ESSO itself, with the contest for bargaining
supremacy between the two labor organizations. From the standpoint of both law and expediency the remedy lay
the Industrial Court in the certification case, and not with the respondent Court of First Instance.
ESSO cites the case of Goodwins, Inc. v. Frank Hagedorn, et al., 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. 2d. 697, where the New
York Court of Appeals held that the picketing there in question was unlawful and could be enjoined by the courts
because its purpose was to coerce plaintiff employers "to yield to a demand that they recognize the defendant
union instead of some rival organization as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for the employees ... in
advance of a certification by the National Labor Relations Board in the pending representation proceeding."
We do not see that the decision relied upon is here applicable. In the present case no coercion to accomplish the
same particular objective as that found by the New York Court is alleged in ESSO'S petition below. It would be
unjustified to derive gratuitously a similar conclusion from the vague assertion that MME struck to compel ESSO to
discriminate against CLU, the rival union, especially considering the fact that it was MME that went to the Court of
Industrial Relations precisely to ask for a certification election. Having resorted to such judicial process, as
provided by law, MME could hardly be expected to employ coercive measures to attain the same result. If
anything, the allegation that MME declared a strike to compel ESSO to discriminate against CLU is an allegation of
unfair labor practice on the part of MME under Section 4, b (2) of Republic Act No. 875, which would put the case
within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court.
The harshness of the remedy resorted to by ESSO may be readily appreciated. The right of employees to strike
and picket is recognized and protected by law. This is part of the right "to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection" set forth in section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act. The issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
where it is authorized by said Act, is restricted by indispensable procedural requisites, among which is a previous
hearing wherein certain facts must be established, namely, that substantial and irreparable injury will be caused to
the property of the complainant unless the injunction is issued; that the injury thus averted is greater than that
caused by the injunction to the defendant; that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and that the
public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish
adequate protection (Section 9[d], R.A. 875). And yet, notwithstanding such safeguards ESSO was able to obtain a
preliminary injunction ex parte not against specific unlawful acts but against the strike and picketing conducted by
the employees affiliated with MME, by the simple expediency of going to a regular court, alleging in its petition that
no labor dispute existed, and invoking the Rules of Court on injunctions instead of the provisions of the Industrial
Peace Act.
Petitioner, in challenging the jurisdiction of respondent Court to issue the injunction, maintains that the strike it
declared was caused by unfair labor practices committed by ESSO, and in support cites excerpts from the
transcript of the proceedings before the Industrial Court in the certification election case. For instance, reference is
made, quoting from said transcript, to the suspension by ESSO of two of its employees in violation of a directive by
the said court that the status quo should be maintained until the case was resolved. We make no finding here as to
whether the fact referred to is true or not; but it does suggest quite forcefully that if the injunction had not been
issued by respondent court ex parte and petitioner here had first been heard the court would have had before it
certain facts vital to the basic question of jurisdiction in the case. As it turned out, in view of the absence of any
hearing and only in accordance with the prayer in the petition before it, respondent Court enjoined the strike, the
picketing and other concerted activities of the MME members in their entirety — activities which fundamentally are
recognized and accorded protection by law.
ESSO invites attention to our recent decision in Associated Labor Union, et al. vs. Judge Ramolete, et al., G.R. No.
L-23527, March 31, 1965, and submits that the same is controlling in the present case. Respondent Judge of First
Instance there issued a preliminary injunctive writ ex parte against specific activities of the Associated Labor Union
consisting of allegedly "harassing and coercive tactics, threats, cajoleries and other overt acts which (were)
claimed to be illegal interference in the contractual relations" between the two other respondents (petitioners Pa
below), the Katipunan Lumber Co. and Roque Abellar. The union applied to us for a writ of certiorari and ge
prohibition, which we denied on the principal ground that in view of the allegations in the petition for injunction
upon which respondent Judge acted he did not do so without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of |
discretion. We said: "In the case at bar, the plaintiffs sought the amount of P50,000.00 by way of damages on 32
overt acts, which they considered illegal, and which had caused them losses. They also asserted that there existed
no employer-employee relationship between them. Generally, therefore, upon such allegations, the CFI had
jurisdiction over the case and it was authorized under the Rules of Court to issue an injunctive writ even ex parte,
upon a valid showing of the necessity thereof."
The case before us is demonstrably different. ESSO'S petition in respondent Court contains no claim for damages
in any stated amount and asserts no specific acts on the part of MME members which are on their face illegal and
to which the injunction is exclusively directed, the same being a blanket one against continuing to strike, picket
and engage in other concerted activities. Those engaged in the strike and picketing are admittedly employees of
ESSO, the existence of a labor dispute between them and the other labor organization (CLU), in which dispute
ESSO became virtually a party, is clearly inferable from its petition below; and such dispute was already before the
Court of Industrial Relations when ESSO went to respondent Court of First Instance.
It is true petitioner here applied to us for relief in a rather precipitate manner, not having waited until respondent
Court could resolve its motion to reconsider the injunction issued. The excuse given is that the striking laborers
were being arrested in mass (32 of them on February 23, 1965) by the police for picketing, in violation of the
broad terms of the injunction. Ordinarily relief by certiorari is not extended unless the lower court has been given a
chance to correct itself; but under the circumstances of this case, especially considering that in our opinion said
court acted without jurisdiction and the question involved should go to the Court of Industrial Relations as an
incident in the certification election case already filed there, the procedural prerequisite referred to should be
disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted; the order complained of is set aside, and the injunction issued by this
Court is made permanent, with costs against private respondent.
[G.R. No. 117169. March 12, 1997]
PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO, CESAR DAVID, EMMANUEL AGUSTIN,
PECSON BARANDA, NELSON BAGUIO, ROLANDO MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO SANTOS,
ISABELO GALOPE, REYNALDO MALEON, AL PEDRIQUE, BAYANI HERNANDEZ, ROBERT LORESCA,
LEONARDO LACSINA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, GEN. RECAREDO SARMIENTO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE &
RUBBER CORPORATION, GERARD BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN, respondents.
Pa
TORRES, JR., J.:
ge
Petitioners challenge in this petition the order of the Secretary of Labor dated September 8, 1994, the |
dispositive portion of which reads:
33
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby certifies the entire labor dispute at Philtread Tire
and Rubber Corporation to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Accordingly, any strike or lockout, whether actual or intended, is hereby strictly enjoined.
All striking workers, except those dismissed employees based on the 15 August 1994 decision of the Labor
Arbiter and those who have been retrenched by the Company and have received separation pay, are
hereby directed to return-to-work within twenty-four (24) hours upon receipt thereof.
The issue involving the retrenched employees who refused to receive separation benefits shall be included
in the certified case.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that might
exacerbate the situation.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The records reveal the following facts:
On May 27, 1994, petitioner Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU), filed a notice of strike, docketed as NCMB-
NCR Case No. 05-281-94, on grounds of unfair labor practice, more specifically union busting and violation of
CBA.[2] On the other hand, on May 30, 1994, private respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation filed a
notice of lockout, docketed as NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-013-94.[3] It also filed a petition to declare illegal the work
slowdowns staged by the petitioner Union. Both cases were then consolidated. Several conciliation meetings were
conducted but the parties failed to settle their dispute. Then on June 15, 1994, private respondent declared a
company wide lockout which continued until August 22, 1994.There were about eighty union members who were
consequently dismissed. This also brought about the filing of the union members of a notice to strike in self-
defense in NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-281-94.[4]
On August 15, 1994, the National Labor Relations Commission declared the slowdowns illegal, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The slowdowns engaged in by
respondents are declared illegal and by engaging in such illegal activities, respondents whose name appear
in Annex A of the petition are deemed to have lost their employment with petitioner. However, this Office,
as a measure of compassion to the working man, resolves not to order respondents to pay petitioner the
damages the latter prays for. As for the costs and attorneys fees, since these were not substantiated by
the petitioner, this Office likewise resolves not to award them to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On August 31, 1994, private respondent corporation requested the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction
over the labor dispute. Hence, on September 8, 1994, Secretary Confesor issued the assailed order. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same was denied on September 26, 1994 for lack of merit.
Petitioners now challenge the order of the public respondent, raising the following issues: 1) Whether or not
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional; and 2) Whether or not public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned orders.
Petitioners contend that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code violates the workers right to strike which is provided
for by Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution. The assailed order of the Secretary of Labor, which enjoins the
strike, is an utter interference of the workers right to self-organization, to manage their own affairs, activities and
programs, and therefore is illegal. The order is likewise contrary to Article 3 of the International Labor Organization
Convention No. 87, which specifically prohibits public authorities from interfering in purely union matters, viz.:
Article 3.
1. Workers and Employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to
elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate
their programs.
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the
lawful exercise thereof.[6]
Petitioners also argue that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of authority. A cursory reading of
Article 263 (g) allegedly shows that the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify a
dispute for compulsory arbitration is strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are indispensable to
national interest. Petitioners posit that the instant labor dispute does not adversely affect the national interest. The
tire industry has long ceased to be a government protected industry and, moreover, Philtread Tire and Rubber
Corporation is not indispensable to the national interest. The strike in Philtread will not adversely affect the supply Pa
of tires in the market and the supply of imported tires is more than sufficient to meet the market requirements. ge
The petition is devoid of merit.
|
34
On the issue of the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the same had already been resolved
in Union of Filipino Employees vs.Nestle Philippines, Inc.,[7] to wit:
In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing Articles 263 and 264 of
the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said
Articles considering that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said
Constitution. Moreover, no court has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution.
On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been
recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715,
otherwise known as Herrera law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and (l) of Article 263 of the
Labor Code.
At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant
to the police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a government to enact
laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of
society (People vs. Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent
domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly
conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted that the argument of petitioners that Articles 263 (g)
and 264 of the Labor Code do not have any constitutional foundation is legally inconsequential.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers constitutional right to strike. The section
provides in part, viz.:
When in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration... .
The foregoing article clearly does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in
the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not
absolute. They are still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The
interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue
preference.
The Labor Code vests upon the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are
indispensable to national interest. Thus, upon the determination of the Secretary of Labor that such industry is
indispensable to the national interest, it will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute of said industry. The
assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common
good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The Secretary of
Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede
the workers right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. This is well-articulated in International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, in this wise:
Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional
directors) and the labor arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary
would not be able to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may
even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may
have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, (i)t is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a
manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.[8]
On the second issue raised by the petitioners, We find that the Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the certification for compulsory arbitration. It had been determined by the Labor Arbiter in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-05-04156-94 that the work slowdowns conducted by the petitioner amounted to illegal
strikes. It was shown that every time the respondent company failed to accede to the petitioners demands,
production always declined. This resulted to the significant drops in the figures of tires made, cured, and
warehoused. However, when the demand of the petitioner union for the restoration of overtime work was allowed,
production improved. The work slowdowns, which were in effect, strikes on installment basis, were apparently a
pattern of manipulating production depending on whether the petitioner unions demands were met.These strikes,
however, had greatly affected the respondent company that on November 11, 1994, it had indefinitely ceased
operations because of tremendous financial losses.
We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to national interest
considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies 22% of the tire products in the
country. Moreover, it employs about 700 people. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, viz.:
The Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less 700 workers. Any
work disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will certainly prejudice the employment and Pa
livelihood of its workers and their dependents. Furthermore, the labor dispute may lead to the possible ge
closure of the Company and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. This will definitely aggravate
the already worsening unemployment situation in the country and discourage foreign and domestic
|
investors from further investing in the country. There is no doubt, therefore, that the labor dispute in the 35
Country is imbued with national interest.
At this point in time when all government efforts are geared towards economic recovery and development
by encouraging both foreign and domestic investments to generate employment, we cannot afford to
derail the same as a result of a labor dispute considering that there are alternative dispute resolution
machineries available to address labor problems of this nature.[9]
The intervention of the Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had
lingered and which had affected both respondent company and petitioner union. Had it not been so, the deadlock
will remain and the situation will remain uncertain. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the Secretary of Labor had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a well-founded basis in issuing the
assailed order. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion when
the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[10]
Considering the foregoing premises, we find no merit in the instant petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed order of the Secretary of Labor dated September 8, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 169829-30 April 16, 2008
STEEL CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SCP EMPLOYEES UNION-NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS, respondent.
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition is seeking to
set aside the Decision1 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 28, 2005 in the consolidated cases Pa
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314, wherein the CA denied the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially ge
granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, as well as the Resolution 2 dated September 22, 2005 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. |
36
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction materials, supplying
approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing materials. 3 On August 17, 1998, SCP-Federated Union of the
Energy Leaders – General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS) filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to
represent the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.4 Respondent SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) – National
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election 5 but the
same was denied for having been filed out of time.6
On September 14, 1998, a consent election was conducted, with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices. Said
election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-and-file employees cast their
votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming that the certification election was characterized by and replete
with irregularities.7 On September 21, 1998, NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for
Certification Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of
petitioner.8The Med-Arbiter denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for certification
election filed by NAFLU and further ordered the conduct of the election with "NAFLU" and "NO UNION" as choices.
Both petitioner and FUEL-GAS appealed to the Secretary of Labor, which appeals were later consolidated. 9
On August 27, 1999, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Undersecretary rendered a consolidated
decision ordering the conduct of a certification election with "FUEL-GAS," respondent and "NO UNION" as
choices.10 Subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied on October 18, 1999. 11 Unsatisfied, petitioner and
FUEL-GAS appealed to the CA by way of certiorari.12
On April 14, 2000, the certification election, as ordered by the Med-Arbiter, proceeded. FUEL-GAS participated
without prejudice to the decision of the CA in its pending petition. In said election, respondent emerged as winner;
hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.13
On July 12, 2000, the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721, rendered a Decision14 which annulled and set aside the August
27, 1999 decision and October 18, 1999 resolution of the Undersecretary. The CA further directed the holding of a
certification election with "FUEL-GAS" and "NO UNION" as choices, to the exclusion of respondent. 15
On July 31, 2000, the Med-Arbiter dismissed FUEL-GAS' election protest but deferred the request of respondent to
be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the pending petitions with the CA. 16 Not
satisfied with the deferment of their certification as winner, respondent appealed to the Labor Secretary. 17 It
further filed a Manifestation before the CA pointing out that in the April 14, 2000 certification election, it emerged
as winner, and thus, the election should be considered as an intervening event sufficient to bar another
certification election.18The CA, however, dismissed said manifestation on December 28, 2000. 19
Meanwhile, on October 16, 2000, the Undersecretary rendered a Decision 20 certifying respondent as the exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioner's employees. Petitioner and FUEL-GAS timely filed motions for reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision.21
As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent sent to petitioner CBA
proposals. Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action on the proposals in view of its pending motion for
reconsideration.22
Finding no justification in petitioner's refusal to bargain with it, respondent filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on December 11, 2000. The union raised the issue of unfair labor
practice (ULP) allegedly committed by petitioner for the latter's refusal to bargain with it. 23
On January 19, 2001, FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA decision. 24On
February 27, 2001, the Undersecretary affirmed its October 16, 2000 decision. 25
On March 16, 2001, the labor dispute was certified to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration, which case was docketed as Cert. Case No. 000200-01.26 Again, on April 2, 2001, another
Notice of Strike27 was filed by respondent for non-recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain;
discrimination against union officers and members; harassment and intimidation; and illegal dismissal, which was
later consolidated with the certified case.
On December 13, 2001, acting on the January 19, 2001 petition for certification election, the Med-Arbiter
recommended the holding of another certification election but with respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders.28 The Pa
decision was appealed to the Labor Secretary. The Labor Secretary in turn dismissed the motion to conduct ge
certification election in a Resolution dated October 17, 2002. 29
|
Meanwhile, in Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC issued a Resolution dated April 17, 2002, declaring petitioner 37
as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair
labor practice; declaring as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the officers
of the union.30 Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 31 of the resolution praying that additional
employees be dismissed. For its part, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 32
On May 20, 2002, respondent filed another Notice of Strike alleging as grounds, petitioner's refusal to bargain and
union busting.33 The notice was later dismissed and respondent was enjoined from holding a strike.34
On January 7, 2003, respondent filed another Notice of Strike on the grounds of refusal to bargain and union
busting.35 Respondent thereafter went on strike on February 4, 2003. On February 7, 2003, the Labor Secretary
certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees to return to work.36 The second certified case was
docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03. On September 8, 2003, the NLRC rendered a Decision 37 ordering
petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly certified bargaining agent. In addition, it ordered the
reinstatement of the employees who were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike, without loss of
seniority rights and diminution of salary. 38 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution39 dated January 26, 2004. The decision and resolution became the subject of a petition before the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82314.
Meantime, in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, the NLRC, in a Decision40 dated February 12, 2003
opted to resolve the parties' respective motions for reconsideration collectively. In said decision, the NLRC
modified its earlier resolution by ordering the reinstatement of the union officers whom it previously ordered
terminated, which in effect denied petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration. 41 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 30, 2003. 42 These decision and resolution became the
subject of a petition before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446.
The petitions before the CA were later consolidated. In CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, herein petitioner argued that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE OFFICERS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE ITS
CONCLUSION THAT [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT HAD CONDUCTED AN ILLEGAL STRIKE. 43
In the other case, CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, petitioner herein argued that:
DIRECTING PETITIONER TO RECOGNIZE PRIVATE RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE DECISION OF THIS
COURT DIRECTING THE HOLDING OF ANOTHER CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED ITS OWN DECISION IN THE SAME CASE WHICH HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY SCPEU-NAFLU IS NOT ILLEGAL.
IV
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO DEFIED THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR.44
On February 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision 45 denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 while partially
granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314. The decretal portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446 is DENIED while the Petition in Pa
CA-G.R. SP No. 82314 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, decreeing herein contending parties to comply with the ge
directives of this Tribunal in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721.
|
SO ORDERED.
38
In denying the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79446, the CA found no cogent reason to reverse the assailed decision of
the NLRC in Cert. Case No. 000200-01. The CA concluded that petitioner's claims are based on pure allegations
and not supported by any substantial evidence. 46
In partially granting the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82314, the CA reasoned that by virtue of its decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 55721 dated July 12, 2000, the second certification election was, in effect, nullified and set aside. It is to be
noted that FUEL-GAS participated in the second election without prejudice to the petition it filed in court. The CA
added that since it did not recognize the second certification election held on April 14, 2000, wherein NAFLU was
voted as the duly-elected bargaining agent of petitioner's rank-and-file employees, clearly it has no basis for its
claim and it has no right to demand that petitioner collectively bargain with it.47
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration48 which was denied in the Resolution49 dated September 22, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals has departed from the law and established jurisprudence when it
affirmed the reinstatement of officers who participated in an illegal strike.
II
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals seriously erred when it failed to declare as illegal the strike held by
the union on february 4, 2003.
III
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals seriously erred when it failed to invalidate the order of the national
labor relations commission directing the reinstatement of the strikers who defied the return-to-work order
of the labor secretary.
IV
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals committed a serious error when it ruled that the nlrc has
reconsidered its conclusion on the illegality of the march 2001 strike.
[Whether or not] the Court of appeals committed a serious error when it concluded that the national labor
relations commission may reconsider in the second certified case its decision on the first certified case
which has become final and executory.50
Petitioner contends that the February 2003 strike held by respondent is illegal. To buttress its claim, petitioner
argues that respondent has no right to demand that it bargain with the latter. Its refusal to recognize respondent
as the bargaining representative of its employees is based on the directive of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 55721 to
conduct another certification election. Petitioner maintains that respondent never denied that its purpose for
holding the strike was to force it to recognize the latter over the other union. Since the strike is a union-
recognition-strike, it is illegal.51
Petitioner further argues that the strike was manifestly illegal for it was in gross violation of the Labor Code,
particularly Art. 264,52 which expressly prohibits the declaration of a strike over an issue that is pending arbitration
between the parties.53 Since the labor dispute in the first certified case, Cert. Case No. 000200-01, was still
pending compulsory arbitration at the time of the strike on February 4, 2003, and since the said strike was based
substantially on the same grounds, i.e., the alleged refusal by petitioner to recognize the union, the strike is illegal
by express provision of the law.
Moreover, petitioner adds that the issue of illegality of the February 2003 strike was already resolved by the NLRC
in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 involving a strike in March 2001 over the same labor dispute, namely, the alleged
refusal of petitioner to recognize respondent. As such, the NLRC's decision in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 Pa
constitutes res judicata in the second certified case, NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.54 ge
|
Petitioner also contends that the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost
their employment. Unlike ordinary members of the union, whose dismissal requires that the employer prove that 39
they committed illegal acts, mere participation of the union officers in an illegal strike warrants their termination
from employment. Consequently, since the strike was illegal, it follows that the termination from employment of
the union officers was warranted.55
Petitioner maintains that it was erroneous on the part of the CA not to have reversed the NLRC decision 56 ordering
the reinstatement of the employees which were dismissed in connection with the February 4, 2003 strike. It argues
that since the termination of the employees was due to their refusal to comply with the return-to-work order
issued by the Labor Secretary, not to their alleged participation in an illegal strike, the CA erred in affirming the
decision.57
Finally, petitioner avers that the CA also committed serious errors on procedural issues when it concluded that the
NLRC may reconsider in Cert. Case No. 000200-01 its decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 00253-03.58
The petition is meritorious.
Whether or not respondent is the recognized collective bargaining agent had been finally resolved in the negative.
Consequently, as correctly concluded by the CA, it could not compel petitioner to bargain with it. Thus, the only
issues left for determination are: the validity of the strike participated in by the officers of the respondent union;
and the validity of their termination from employment by reason of such participation.
The strike is a legitimate weapon in the human struggle for a decent existence. It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the
attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its
exercise.59
In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is patently illegal for the following
reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the
dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary's return-to-work
order.
Respondent's notices of strike were founded on petitioner's continued refusal to bargain with it. It thus staged the
strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike.
As its legal designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union
and not other contending groups, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining
agreement despite the striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal
certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.60
The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as winner, not having been recognized as
valid, it has no authority to represent the rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask petitioner to
bargain with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which had been settled by the
court with finality,61 petitioner cannot, therefore, be faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain
respondent's imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With more reason, this Court
cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such basis.
Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondent's purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the
strike would be declared illegal for having been conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary's return-to-work order
and after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there were several notices
of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were founded on substantially the same grounds –
petitioner's continued refusal to recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code provides:
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over
the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike
or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Pa
Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure the compliance with this
ge
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. x x x. 62
|
The powers granted to the Secretary under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code have been characterized as an 40
exercise of the police power of the State, aimed at promoting the public good. When the Secretary exercises these
powers, he is granted "great breadth of discretion" to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these
powers is the automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or its lifting if one has already taken place. 63
The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing a return to work. The
mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work
order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. 64
A return-to-work order imposes a duty that must be discharged more than it confers a right that may be waived.
While the workers may choose not to obey, they do so at the risk of severing their relationship with their
employer.65
Says the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. –
xxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must
return to his job together with his co-workers so that the operations of the company can be resumed and it can
continue serving the public and promoting its interest. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor
is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any
and all acts that undermine or tend to undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption
and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor
practices on the part of the company, to justify their action.66
Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and certification of the dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration, filed notices of strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor
laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two certified cases which were earlier
consolidated. These disputes could have been averted had respondent respected the CA's decision. That way, the
collective bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been compelled to bargain.
Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the
bargaining agent. The strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and contrary
to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus illegal.
Strikes exert disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and management, but also on the
general peace and progress of society, not to mention the economic well-being of the State. It is a weapon that
can either breathe life to or destroy the union and members in their struggle with management for a more
equitable due of their labors. Hence, the decision to wield the weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational
basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few, and firmly focused on the
legitimate interest of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike
staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. 67
Having settled that the subject strike was illegal, this Court shall now determine the proper penalty to be imposed
on the union officers who knowingly participated in the strike.
Article 264 of the Labor Code further provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.— x x x
Any workers whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in Pa
a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a ge
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. x x x.
|
It bears stressing that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely
41
participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts
during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. For knowingly participating in an illegal
strike or participating in the commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be
terminated from employment. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated
in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union
officers from service.68 Otherwise, the workers will simply refuse to return to their work and cause a standstill in
the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge and preventing management from
filling up their positions.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 in
the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 79446 and 82314 and its Resolution dated September 22, 2005
are MODIFIED in that the strike in question is found ILLEGAL and the order to reinstate the union officers who
participated in the illegal strike is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 119360. October 10, 1997]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE S.
BRILLANTES and THE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

In Our Resolution dated November 18, 1996, the Court dismissed the instant petition for certiorari filed by
Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), seeking the termination from employment of certain members and officers of the
Pa
respondent union PAL Employees Association (PALEA), for staging a strike in violation of the Secretary of Labors
return to work order. ge
|
In doing so, we upheld the March 9, 1995 Order of the respondent Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes
which meted the penalty of suspension upon eighteen (18) PALEA officers and members for eight months, and 42
directing PAL to reinstate them to their respective posts after they have served their suspension.
The dispositive portion of our decision reads:
With the denial of the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 26, 1995, the court
takes note that the union officers concerned have since served their suspensions and returned to service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition
for certiorari that is G.R. No. 119360. The Order of the respondent Honorable Acting Secretary of Labor
Jose S. Brillantes is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On December 27, 1996, PAL filed a Motion for Reconsideration, taking exception to the Courts affirmation of
the Acting Secretarys Order. The order for the suspension of the eighteen PALEA officers and members is tagged
as a violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, and contradicts previous decisions of the Court upon the said
provision, including; Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Drilon, et. al. (193 SCRA 223, 1991); Union of Filipro
Employees vs. Nestle Philippines, Inc. (192 SCRA 396, 1990); Federation of Free Workers vs. Inciong (208 SCRA
157, 1992); St. Scholasticas College vs. Torres (210 SCRA 565, 1992)
Clearly, the unequivocal rule laid down by the foregoing is that:
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption and/or
certification is a prohibited activity and thus illegal. The union officers and members, as a result, are
deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. Stated
differently, from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his
job. The loss of employment status results from the striking employees own act an act which is illegal, an
act in violation of the law and in defiance of authority.
The loss of employment status allegedly results from the application of the second and third paragraphs of
Article 264 of the Labor Code, which, petitioner posits, is mandatory.
Art. 264. xxx
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or
after certification election or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination
of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
xxx
The Court need not dwell on the hermeneutics of the abovementioned provision of law.
The cases cited by the petitioner leave no doubt as to policy of the state not to tolerate actions directed at the
destabilization of the order, where the relationship between labor and management has been endangered by abuse
of one partys bargaining prerogative, to the extent of disregarding not only the direct order of the government to
maintain the status quo, but the welfare of the entire workforce, though they may not be involved in the
dispute. The grave penalty of dismissal visited upon the guilty parties was a natural consequence, considering the
interest of public welfare.
In the instant case, there is no doubting the validity of our observation that in the collective bargaining
process, not only PALEA, but both parties contributed to the volatile atmosphere emerging despite the Secretary of
Labors status quo order, disrupting thereby the orderly continuance of negotiations. As observed by the Acting
Secretary of Labor in his March 9, 1996 Order, PAL did not come to this Office with 'clean hands in seeking the
termination of the officers and members of PALEA who participated in the 16 June 1994 strike. As the records will
show, PAL terminated en massethe employment of 183 union officers and members of PALEA on 6 July 1994 in
violation of our 3 June 1994 Order enjoining the parties to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that
might exacerbate the situation. It is for this reason that we decided not to mete upon the concerned members and
officers of PALEA the capital punishment of dismissal from office, notwithstanding the laws sanction for such a
consequence.
This particular circumstance sets this case apart from previous instances of labor disputes cited by the
petitioner, where the striking union officers were dismissed after breaking the return to work order issued by the Pa
Secretary of Labor. Moreover, in the instant case, the Court invokes its judicial prerogative to resolve disputes in a ge
way to render to each interested party the most judicious solution, and in the ultimate scheme, a resolution of a |
dispute tending to preserve the greater order of society.
43
Thus we declared in our November 18, 1996 resolution, the peculiar nature of the judicial treatment of labor
disputes urges the arbiter of the issues involved to maintain a careful eye, if not a caring hand, to the interests of
the parties, such that industrial peace and labor-management stability is preserved.
Private respondents, in the meantime, made it known to the Court that the union officers who have been
suspended for twelve months and the other members of the union who have been suspended for eight months, in
accordance with the Secretary of Labors order, have not been returned to service until this time. These union
officers and members should be immediately reinstated and paid their backwages and other accrued benefits,
counted from the time they have served their respective suspensions until actual reinstatement, undiminished by
earnings derived elsewhere during the period of their suspension, in accordance with latest
jurisprudence[1] affirming such intent of the legislature.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby RESOLVED to DENY, with finality, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. Petitioner is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE the
union members ordered suspended for twelve months and eight months respectively under the Acting Secretary of
Labors March 9, 1995 order, and to PAY them full backwages and other benefits due, from the time their
suspensions have been served until their actual reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150166 July 26, 2004
FILCON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LAKAS MANGGAGAWA SA FILCON-LAKAS
MANGGAGAWA LABOR CENTER (LMF-LMLC), respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 54803 filed
by petitioner Filcon Manufacturing Corporation. Pa
ge
The Antecedents
|
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of Converse rubber shoes. 3 Its factory was
44
located at General Molina St., Parang, Marikina. In 1989, it employed 1,000 workers to meet its work
commitments.4
Respondent Lakas Manggagawa sa Filcon-Lakas Manggagawa Labor Center was one of the legitimate labor
organizations of the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner, while the Shoe Workers Association and Technology
(SWAT) was the exclusive bargaining agent of such rank-and-file employees. It had an existing collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) with the petitioner effective up to January 15, 1990.
The employees of the petitioner worked in two shifts: from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00
p.m. At around 8:00 p.m. on October 13, 1989, the power supply at the factory was interrupted, resulting in the
stoppage of work. The employees who worked the second shift were directed to go home. Some of them acceded,
but the others chose to wait for the resumption of the power supply. When the power supply remained unrestored,
the employees went home at about 10:00 p.m.
The next day, the second shift employees who had waited for the resumption of the power supply discovered that
their bundy cards reflected that they had logged out at 7:30 p.m. Enraged, they demanded an explanation and
staged a strike. The employees did not receive any explanation from the management. 5 Instead, preventive
suspension orders were issued the next day, October 15, 1989, to the following employees:
1. William Inocencio
2. Luis Villa
3. Noel Liwag
4. Lourdes Martin
5. Joel Floria
6. Joselito Cortez
7. Asuncion Dolot
8. Ronilo Mayordomo
9. Edwin de Guzman
10. Maximiano (sic) Bathan
11. Rene Noel Ciego6
After determining that the aforementioned employees spearheaded the strike, the petitioner terminated their
employment. The employees thereafter filed complaints for illegal dismissal with the National Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The petitioner, in turn, filed a complaint against the said
employees to declare the strike illegal. The complaints were docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-10-04910-89,
00-10-04921-89, 00-11-05361-89 and 00-11-05564-89, raffled to Labor Arbiter Nieves Vivar-de Castro.7
Pending the resolution of the complaints, the respondent union, Bisig Manggagawa and Kampil Katipunan, filed
separate petitions for certification election before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in November 1989, within
the freedom period. On June 18, 1990,8 the respondent union filed a Notice of Strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), in which it alleged that the petitioner committed an unfair labor practice
(ULP) by harassing, illegally suspending its members and illegally dismissing two union officers. The case was
docketed as NCMB-NLRC-06-501-90. On June 25, 1990, a strike vote was conducted. Of the 641 votes cast, 623
voted to stage a strike while 17 voted "NO."9
On June 27, 1990, the respondent union received information that a truckload of raw materials was about to be
transferred outside the company premises. Suspecting that the petitioner was attempting a runaway shop, 10 the
respondent gathered a group of employees outside the factory gate to verify the report. 11 They put up barricades
consisting of big stones, pieces of wood, benches, tables, tents and other means of obstruction, to prevent ingress
and egress to and from the factory.12
At 3:00 p.m. on June 29, 1990, the petitioner attempted to make deliveries to its customers using a truck bearing
plate number PLY-907 driven by Edgardo Iballa. However, some members of the respondent union intercepted the
delivery truck. To prevent the truck from going any further, Nicolas Chavez, a member of the respondent union,
laid down in front of the vehicle.13 The other members of the respondent demanded to see what was inside the
truck. Iballa stepped down and reported the incident to their warehouse manager, and both of them returned to
where the truck was. When the door of the truck was opened, the members of the respondent saw boxes of
converse shoes for delivery to customers. The picketing employees then unloaded and opened the boxes. 14 The
warehouse manager recalled the delivery order and directed Iballa to return the truck to the garage. When he
reached the place, Iballa noticed that the truck’s front tires were flat. 15 A closer examination revealed that they
were punctured.16 Pa
ge
To prevent the attempts to transfer its raw materials, members of the LMF-LMLC who were off duty formed picket
lines at the factory’s side gate.17 |
45
The already tense situation worsened when the respondent union staged a strike on July 3, 1990. Placards, 18
pieces of wood and stones and benches were placed at the factory’s front and side gates. 19 On July 4, 1990, the
petitioner filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order with the NLRC
against the respondent union, SWAT, Noel Mayordomo, John F. Almazan and Domingo Bonagua, praying that the
respondent union’s members be enjoined from picketing its premises, and desist from threatening the
management personnel and non-strikers with bodily harm.20 The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR QC No. 000035.
After failed negotiations, the petitioner filed on August 21, 1990 a complaint to declare the strike illegal, for
violations of CBA provisions, and ULP with damages before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against the
respondent union, SWAT, Filcon Employees Union-SWAT, Noel Mayordomo, John F. Almazan, Domingo Bonagua,
Nicolas Chavez, Alfredo Jungco, Pablito Nava, Florentino Alejandro, Jonathan Josef, Emmanuel Fabiola, Rogelio
dela Cruz, Pedro Ege, Restituto de Leon, Orsie Renales, Joel Bautista, Ferdinand Santo, Maria Teresita Notado,
Ricardo Templo, Florendo Sereno, Maria Elena Presno, Renato Hermoso, Rodrigo Renales, Luis Villa, William
Inocencio, Lourdes Martin, Josefina de Leon, Ranilo Mayordomo, Maximo Bathan, Joselito Cortez, Joel Floria, Edwin
de Guzman, Noel Liwag, Natividad Taquic, Rene Ciego, Asuncion Dolot, Gemma Barcelon, Andres Namoro, Nicolas
Leonardo, et al. The case was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-04521-90.21
On August 30, 1990, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a "Compromise Agreement" to maintain
the status quo ante litem. The agreement was attested to by the NCMB.
On the merits of the cases, the Labor Arbiter directed the parties to submit their respective position papers and
other pleadings. The petitioner alleged the following in its position paper: (a) the respondent union had no legal
personality to file a notice of strike because the SWAT was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees; (b) that the pending certification election barred the filing of notice of strike; and, (c) that the filing of
the notice of strike was violative of the existing CBA provisions, particularly the no-strike-no-lockout clause. The
respondent, for its part, asserted that its agreement with the petitioner contained a non-retaliatory clause and
thereby admitted, without any reservation, all the striking employees; as such, the petitioner condoned the effects
of the illegality of the strike. Contending that it had acquired majority status by reason of the disaffiliation of the
members of the SWAT, the respondent union insisted that it had legal personality to file a notice of strike. It
further alleged that the strike was conducted peacefully and lawfully.
On the other hand, the SWAT asserted that since it was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of the petitioner, the respondent union did not have a personality to file a notice of strike before the
NCMB. The SWAT, likewise, denied any participation in the wild cat strike, and claimed that its members and
officers were coerced and intimidated by the respondent union’s members. The parties then adduced testimonial
and documentary evidence.
Pending the resolution of the complaint in NLRC-NCR No. 00-08-4521-90, Labor Arbiter Vivar-de Castro rendered a
decision in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-10-04910-89, 00-10-04921-89, 00-11-05361-89 and 00-11-05564-89,
declaring the following to have lost their employment status because of their participation in the October 1989
strike and the commission of prohibited acts during the same:
1. Noel Mayordomo
2. Lourdes Martin
3. Ronilo Mayordomo
4. Erwin de Guzman
5. Joel Floria
6. Asuncion Dolot
7. Rene Noel Ciego
8. Andres Namoro
9. William Inocencio
10. Luis Villa
11. Natividad Taquic
12. Nicolas Leonardo
13. Joselito Cortez
14. Maximiano (sic) Bathan22
Dissatisfied, the petitioner and the dismissed employees appealed the decision before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC
NCR No. 000936-90.23
On October 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. rendered a decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-
04521-90, finding the strike staged by the respondent union illegal and declared those who participated in the said Pa
strike to have lost their employment. The dispositive portion reads: ge
|
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the strike staged by respondent LMF-LMLC is hereby declared illegal and
as a consequence of which its Officers and members are hereby declared, to have legally lost their
46
employment status, namely:
1. Nicolas Chavez
2. Alfredo Jungco
3. Pablito Nava
4. Florentino Alejandro
5. Jonathan Josef
6. Emmanuel Fabiola
7. Rogelio dela Cruz
8. Pedro Ege
9. Restituto de Leon
10. Orsie Renales
11. Joel Bautista
12. Ferdinand Santo
13. Maria Teresa Notado
14. Ricardo Templo
15. Florendo Sereno
16. Maria Elena Presno
17. Renato Hermoso
18. Rodrigo Renales
19. Luis Villa*
20. William Inocencio*
21. Lourdes Martin*
22. Josefina de Leon*
23. Ranilo Mayordomo*
24. Maximo Bathan*
25. Joselito Cortez*
26. Joel Floria*
27. Edwin de Guzman*
28. Noel Liwag*
29. Natividad Taquic*
30. Asuncion Dolot*
31. Andres Namoro*
32. Rene Ciego*
33. Gemma Barcelon
34. Nicolas Leonardo*24
The Labor Arbiter ruled that based on the records, the SWAT was the certified exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. Furthermore, the CBA expired on January 15, 1990 and was not
renewed due to the filing by three unions, including the LMF-LMLC, of their respective petitions for certification
election. However, since the CBA provided that it would continue to be in effect until a new one had been entered
into, the no-strike-no-lockout clause was still in effect; as such, the contract bar rule was still applicable, and,
consequently, the strike was illegal.25 The Labor Arbiter, likewise, pointed out that the strike was based on a non-
strikable ground, more specifically, an intra-union and inter-union conflict.
It was, likewise, held that the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that the respondent union blocked the
ingress and egress of the company in the course of their strike. Such actuations constituted prohibited acts under
Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended; hence, the strike staged by the respondent union
was illegal. The Labor Arbiter also declared that the officers of the respondent, as well as the members who
participated in the commission of the illegal acts, were deemed to have lost their employment status. 26 He further
ruled that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties on the maintenance of the status quo ante
litem did not amount to a condonation or waiver by the petitioner of its right to ventilate and litigate the charge of
illegal strike against the respondent union and its members.
Dissatisfied, the respondent union appealed the decision to the NLRC where it alleged that:
I.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR., COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE SHOE WORKERS ASSOCIATION AND
TECHNOLOGY (SWAT) IS THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT OF ALL THE RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES OF APPELLEE FILCON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION. Pa
ge
II. |
47
THE HONORABLE ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE "NO-STRIKE" PROVISION OF THE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT APPLIES TO THE RESPONDENT-APPELLANT LMF-LMLC.
III.
THE HONORABLE LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR. COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL FOR BEING
BASED ON AN INTER-UNION AND/OR INTRA-UNION CONFLICT.
IV.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKE WAS ILLEGAL FOR BLOCKING
THE FREE INGRESS TO AND EGRESS FROM THE COMPANY PREMISES.
V.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THERE WAS NO CONDONATION OR
WAIVER OF THE STRIKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN THE STRIKE.
VI.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE RULED THAT THE STRIKERS LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT
STATUS.27
In the meantime, on December 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR No.
0000936-90.28
On December 29, 1997, the NLRC rendered a decision in NLRC NCR Case No. 006088-94 affirming the decision of
the Labor Arbiter on November 14, 1997.29 It declared that the strike staged on June 27, 1990 was illegal because
respondent union failed to observe the fifteen (15)-day cooling-off period and the seven (7)-day strike ban. It
emphasized that nine days after the filing of the notice of strike and two days after the filing of the strike-vote
report to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the members of the respondent had already engaged
in concerted activities, such as picketing, in clear violation of Article 263(e) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The NLRC also stressed that the respondent did not have any personality to file a notice of strike because its
petition for certification election before the BLR was still unresolved. It declared that pursuant to Article 253 of the
Labor Code, the SWAT remained to be the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner until the resolution of the petition for certification election.
Finally, the NLRC ruled that the illegality of the strike was further heightened when the officers and members of
the respondent union joined efforts in blockading the ingress to and egress from the petitioner’s factory.
The respondent union filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, 30 but the NLRC issued a Resolution dated
June 23, 1999 denying the same.31
The Case Before the Court of Appeals
Undaunted, respondent union filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule
65,32 asserting as follows:
I.
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

WHEN IT RULED THAT SWAT – FILCON EMPLOYEES UNION REMAINED THE SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE
BARGAINING AGENT OF ALL THE RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF THE COMPANY.
II.
Pa
RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION ge
WHEN IT RULED THAT ONLY SWAT-FILCON EMPLOYEES UNION COULD VALIDLY DECLARE A STRIKE TO |
THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER UNIONS AT THE COMPANY.
48
III.

WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER LMF-LMLC DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
OF A STRIKE.
IV.

WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDING OF THE LABOR ARBITER THAT ILLEGAL ACTS WERE COMMITTED DURING
THE STRIKE.
V.

WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE LABOR ARBITER DECLARING THAT THE MEMBERS OF PETITIONER
LMF-LMLC HAD LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT STATUS AS A RESULT OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE STRIKE. 33
In its comment on the petition, the petitioner insisted that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was fully and
substantially supported by the established facts and record based on applicable laws and jurisprudence. It
reiterated that the respondent union lacked the legal personality to file a notice of strike, considering that the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of its rank-and-file employees was the SWAT. Moreover, by engaging in concerted
activities without observing the cooling-off period, the respondent union thereby conducted an illegal strike. The
petitioner also reiterated that the officers and members of the respondent union participated in the prohibited
activities, particularly the blockage of the ingress to and egress from the factory.
On June 8, 2001, the CA promulgated a decision reversing the decision of the NLRC. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Petition, this Court issues the writ of certiorari and sets aside the Decision
of the respondent Commission dated December 29, 1997 and orders the dismissal of NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-0804521-90 and the reinstatement of the dismissed employees with full backwages and other benefits
from the time they were dismissed up to the time of actual reinstatement. 34
While it agreed with the NLRC that the strike staged by the respondent union was illegal, the CA ruled that by
reason of the compromise agreement entered into by the parties on August 30, 1990, the petitioner had, in effect,
condoned the misconduct of the striking employees. The CA emphasized that, under the agreement, the petitioner
agreed to accept all workers without reservation, as evidenced by the non-retaliatory clause contained therein.
Citing Article 2036, in tandem with Article 2028 of the New Civil Code, the CA emphasized that a compromise
agreement comprises not only those objects which are definitely stated, but also those that are, by necessary
implication, included therein. It stressed that the dismissal of the complaint for illegal strike was necessarily
included in the compromise agreement entered into by the parties.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the CA erred when it gave due course to the
petition, considering that the assailed decision had become final and executory by reason of the respondent
union’s failure to include in its petition an explanation for resorting to service via registered mail in serving a copy
of the petition on it, in violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner further asserted that
the CA erred in ruling that the ultimate intention of the parties in their compromise agreement was the
condonation of the misconduct of its employees.
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion in its October 11, 2001 Resolution. 35 Emphasizing the "Christian Dogma of
preferential option for the poor,"36 the CA ruled that, in the interest of justice, equity and fair play, it had to decide
the case on the merits, prescinding from the respondent’s procedural lapse.
The Present Petition
The petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging as follows:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REOPENING AND TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE ISSUE ON THE EXISTENCE OF CONDONATION WHICH WAS NOT RAISED IN THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED IN THE NEGATIVE. ASSUMING THAT SAID
ISSUE COULD STILL BE REOPENED, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO SHOWING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER AND Pa
NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT DID NOT ge
CONSTITUTE A CONDONATION OF THE ILLEGAL ACTS COMMITTED DURING THE STRIKE OR RENDERED
|
MOOT THE PENDING COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE.
49
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE LMF-LMLC’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 11, RULE 13 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ENTERTAINING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME. 37
For its part, the respondent union asserts that by virtue of the compromise agreement, the petitioner had
condoned the misconduct of its officers and members: staging a strike and engaging in prohibited activities in the
course of such strike. Citing the case of Cebu International Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals 38 and Armed
Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 the respondent asserts that a
compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata upon the parties. It stresses that the CA did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it gave due course to its petition for certiorari.
The procedural issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of the NLRC had become
final and executory when the respondent union filed its petition with the CA; and (b) whether or not the
respondent union raised the issue of the petitioner’s condonation therein of its right to assail the illegality of strike
under the compromise agreement; and, if in the negative, whether the CA erred in resolving such issue of
condonation.
On the other hand, the substantive issues to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not the strike staged by
the respondent union on July 27, 1990 was illegal; (b) whether or not the union’s officers and members lost their
employment status as a consequence of the said strike; and, (c) whether or not the petitioner had condoned the
misconduct of the strikers.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitioner contends that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the filing and service of pleadings
and other papers shall be effected personally.40 A resort to other modes of service of pleadings must be
accompanied by a written explanation; otherwise, such pleading shall be considered as not filed. The petitioner
notes that the respondent’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the CA was served on it
only by registered mail without, however, a written explanation why resort thereto was made. Citing the case
of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort,41 the petitioner argues that the petition for certiorari of the
respondent is deemed not to have been filed and, consequently, the decision of the NLRC became final and
executory.
We agree with the petitioner.
Indeed, the records show that although the petition was filed personally with the CA, service of a copy thereof on
the respondent was effected by registered mail without any explanation as to why resort to such mode was made.
In its motion for reconsideration of the CA decision, the petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition because of
the respondent’s failure to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. The respondent was directed by
the CA to comment on the motion, but the respondent failed to do so. The respondent even failed to comment on
the petitioner’s allegation that the decision of the NLRC had become final and executory on such ground; neither
did the respondent offer any explanation in its memorandum in the present case. Evidently then, the CA erred
when it resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration of its decision and gave due course to the petition for
certiorari.
Even on the substantial issues, we find the petition meritorious.
On the issue of whether or not the petitioner condoned the strike of the members of the respondent union and
waived its right to assail the illegality of the said strike under the compromise agreement, the CA ruled:
A careful reading of the Compromise Agreement in the context of the factual milieu convinces this Court
that it was, indeed, a compact between the parties to end their dispute and restore their cordial and
mutually beneficial relationship. The Agreement explicitly stipulated that the strikers would stop their strike,
lift their picket lines and resume work and the company would accept them back. The parties most
significantly agreed to maintain and promote industrial piece, and shall not commit any act which might be
construed as acts of harassment and retaliation. Accordingly, the strikers returned to work and the
company accepted them back. It is difficult to see how an amicable resolution of the dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondents could be effected without the dismissal of the case for illegal strike Pa
when that case was precisely the sword of Democles which hang over the latter’s heads and consequently
ge
caused the instability and discord in the work place.
|
The Labor Arbiter and respondent Commission held that the dismissal of the said cases was not mentioned 50
in the Agreement. True, but it should be remembered that the Agreement which was handwritten was made
by the parties who are non-lawyers and cannot therefore be expected to be very precise in their
terminology. Important to remember is the rule in Art. 2036 of the Civil Code which states that to be
deemed included in the compromise agreement are not only those expressly stated therein but also those
necessarily implied therefrom. This Court has no doubt that the parties intended to terminate the illegal
strike case as implied from the expressly stipulated terms mentioned above. That subsequently, the
respondent company pursued said case was nothing but a change of mind which cannot denigrate much
less suppress the juridical effect of said Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Commission totally ignored the text and tenor of the Compromise Agreement and eskewed
the clear intention of the parties resulting in severe prejudice to the petitioner and its members.
Considering the seriousness of the mistake and gravity of the resulting injury, this Court holds that, indeed,
the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion.
We do not agree with the CA. The compromise agreement executed by the parties attested by the NCMB reads:
AGREEMENT
1) The parties agree to maintain status quo prevailing immediately on the date of strike as follows:
a) The parties agree to immediately resume operations based upon the work schedules to be prepared by
the Company and in the said work schedule. The 17 suspended workers shall be included. In the
preparation of work schedules, no discrimination shall be committed and, if possible, all returning workers
or employees be admitted to work within one (1) week from reliance of the schedules which will be released
on the first week of September 1990;
(b) The parties shall maintain and promote industrial peace, and shall not commit any acts which might be
construed as acts of harassment and retaliation.
2) The cases of Messrs. Renato Hermosa, Marcelino Sabado and Noel Celestial shall be submitted to voluntary
arbitration and Mr. Alvin Villamor has been mutually chosen as the voluntary arbitrator.
3) The parties shall endeavor to facilitate the resolution for the certification election.
4) The Union shall lift its picket on August 31, 1990 and return to work in accordance therewith. However,
consideration shall be given to employees who are unable to report to work immediately due to distance, illness
and other similar consideration.
UNION MANAGEMENT
Sgd. Sgd.
083090 8/30/90
Attested by: Sgd.
for NCMB42
Under Article 2028 of the New Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise under the said provision
contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expense and expenses of litigation or, when
litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result thereof. 43 The caption of an
agreement is not determinative of the true nature thereof. An agreement although captioned a compromise
agreement may not, in fact and in law, be a compromise agreement.44
It must be stressed that when the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
parties, the literal meaning of such terms shall be controlling. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the
parties shall also be principally considered.45 In construing a written contract, the reason behind and the
circumstance surrounding its execution are of paramount importance to place the interpreter in the situation
occupied by the parties concerned at the time the contract was executed. 46
Even a cursory reading of the agreement of the parties will readily show that they did not thereby intend to
write finisor put an end to the cases filed against each other in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Pa
and the NLRC. They merely agreed to maintain their status quo before the commencement of the complaints filed ge
by them, without prejudice to the resolution by the Labor Arbiter of the factual and legal issues raised after the
presentation of their respective evidence. The parties merely agreed that the respondent would stop its strike |
against the petitioner and lift its picket within the latter’s premises, and, that the petitioner, in turn, would allow 51
the members of the respondent union to return back to work to enable the petitioner to resume its business
operations. The parties did not intend to put an end to the cases pending against each other. In point of fact, after
the execution of the said agreement, the parties adduced their respective testimonial and documentary evidences
on the factual and legal issues, instead of asking the Labor Arbiter and the DOLE to dismiss the complaints filed by
the parties against each other. The parties’ presentation of their respective evidence after the execution of their
compromise agreement is conclusive proof that the said agreement is not the compromise agreement envisaged in
Article 2028 of the New Civil Code. The contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties belie the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that the petitioner waived its right to assail the illegality of the strike.
Considering the terms of the compromise agreement, it cannot thereby be concluded that the petitioner waived its
right to assail the illegality of the strike staged by the respondent and defend the validity of its termination of the
employment of the members of the respondent who staged a strike. It must be underscored that a waiver to be
valid and effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a
party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. 47
In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA are one that the strike staged by the respondent was illegal.
We agree with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, viz:
The right to strike is not absolute. It comes into being and is safeguarded by law only if the acts intended to
render material aid or protection to a labor union arise from a lawful ground, reason or motive. But if the
motive which had impelled, prompted, moved or led members of a labor union or organization to stage a
strike, even if they had acted in good faith in staging it, be unlawful, illegitimate, unjust, unreasonable or
trivial, the strike may be declared illegal. (Interwood Employees Association vs. Interwood Hardwood and
Veneer Company of the Philippines, 52 O.G. 3936) (underscoring supplied) For "the law, in protecting the
rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer." (Elizalde Int’l. vs.
C.A., 108 SCRA 247). Thus, "a company has the right to dismiss its erring employees if only as a measure
of self-protection against acts inimical to its interest." (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Zulueta, 69 Phil.
403).
As borne out by the record, respondent SWAT was certified as the sole and (sic) bargaining agent of all the
rank-and-file employees of complainant Filcon Manufacturing Corporation whose Collective Bargaining
Agreement expired last 15 January 1990 and was not renewed due to the filing of Petition for Certification
Election by three (3) unions, namely: 1) Lakas Manggagawa sa Filcon-Lakas Manggagawa Labor Center; 2)
Bisig ng Manggagawa; and 3) Kampli-Katipunan, which up to present is still pending before the Bureau of
Labor Relations. In its Collective Bargaining Agreement, it provides that the provisions contained therein
shall be in full force and effect until a new one has been entered into and one of the provisions therein
reads that there shall be no strike nor lock-out. This provision must be given due respect by all the parties
concerned. Thus, it is evident, therefore, that the contract bar rule applies, thereby, rendering the strike
staged by respondent LMF-LMLC illegal. This is supported by evidence that respondent LMF-LMLC blocked
the free ingress and egress of company premises during the course of their strike. (Exhs. "B," "C," "D," "E,"
"F," "G," "H," "I," and "J"), in violation of paragraph e, Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, to wit:
"Art. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES. –
xxx xxx xxx
(e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation
or obstruct the free ingress or egress from the employer’s premises for the lawful purposes or
obstruct public thoroughfares." (underscoring supplied)
Well-settled is the rule that strikes may only be allowed on grounds of CBA deadlock and unfair labor
practices. Neither of this exist in the case at bar, as respondent LMF-LMLC failed to adduce evidence to the
contrary except the sweeping allegation of its only witness who was dismissed from employment in 1989 or
almost a year before the staging of the strike. Clearly, therefore, this Office is of the opinion and so holds
that the strike was declared more on the ground of inter-union and intra-union conflict which is a non-
strikeable issue pursuant to paragraph (b) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, to wit:
"Art. 263. Strikes, Picketing and Lock-outs. –
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective Pa
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to ge
strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest shall continue to |
be recognized and protected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a
lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes." (underscoring supplied)
52
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent LMF-LMLC before it staged the strike, had complied with all the
legal requisites, namely: 1) Notice of Strike; 2) Strike Vote, thus rendering the same legal. 48
The NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter, viz:
There is no justification to disturb the factual findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter since these are
amply supported by the evidence on record.
Thus, only nine (9) days after the respondent union filed its notice of strike, and two (2) days after the
strike vote, the said respondent union engaged in concerted activities such as picketing and other acts
which are clear indications of a strike. Quite evidently, the respondent failed to observe the cooling-off
period as provided in Article 263, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Labor Code, which ordains that a strike may
only be conducted after fifteen (15) days from date of filing of the notice of strike, if the issue stated
therein is one involving unfair labor practice, and after seven (7) days from strike voting. Even granting
that one of the strikeable issues raised in the notice of strike was union busting allegedly committed
through the dismissal of three (3) union officers and member, nonetheless, there is no proof that the very
existence of the union was threatened due to the alleged acts of dismissals such that it was not justified of
the respondent union to stage the questioned strike immediately even before the mandatory cooling-off
period expired.
What appears insurmountable as a clear proof of the illegality of the strike is that while it has yet to prove
its majority status through a certification election, and worse during the pendency of a petition to that
effect, the respondent union already assumed the role of a sole and exclusive bargaining agent. True
enough, not one of the petitioners including the respondent union are in the certification election as they
failed to garner the required majority of the total votes cast.
As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, the incumbent union, FEU-SWAT, remained to be the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the company’s rank-and-file employees. This finds support in Article 253 of
the Labor Code which, in part, states:
"ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. – xxx.
It shall be the duty of both parties (FILCON & SWAT) to keep the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or
until a new agreement is reached by the parties."
Thus, the respondent falsely assumed its rule when it filed a notice of strike during the 60-day freedom
period, and while a petition for certification election was pending. As a matter of fact, a strike during the
pendency of such petition is patently illegal.49
The findings of facts of the quasi-judicial tribunals, in this case the NLRC which affirmed the findings of the Labor
Arbiter, when based on substantial evidence, have conclusive effect on this Court absent proof that the said
findings are capricious or arbitrary.50
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54803 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of the NLRC is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160302 September 27, 2010
JAILE OLISA, ISIDRO SANCHEZ, ANTONIO SARCIA, OSCAR CONTRERAS, ROMEO ZAMORA, MARIANO
GAGAL, ROBERTO MARTIZANO, DOMINGO SANTILLICES, ARIEL ESCARIO, HEIRS OF FELIX LUCIANO,
AND MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA BALANCED FOODS, Petitioners,
vs.
DANILO ESCARIO, PANFILO AGAO, ARSENIO AMADOR, ELMER COLICO, ROMANO DELUMEN,
DOMINADOR AGUILO, OLYMPIO GOLOSINO, RICARDO LABAN, LORETO MORATA, ROBERTO TIGUE, Pa
GILBERT VIBAR, THOMAS MANCILLA, JR., NESTOR LASTIMOSO, JIMMY MIRABALLES, NATIONAL LABOR ge
RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), PINAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, DR. SY LIAN TIN, AND
DOMINGO TAN, Respondents. |
53
BERSAMIN, J.:
Conformably with the long honored principle of a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor, employees dismissed for
joining an illegal strike are not entitled to backwages for the period of the strike even if they are reinstated by
virtue of their being merely members of the striking union who did not commit any illegal act during the strike.
We apply this principle in resolving this appeal via a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August
18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA),1 affirming the decision dated November 29, 2001 rendered by the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) directing their reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions
without backwages, or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of separation pay equivalent to one-half month per
year of service.2
Antecedents
The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a
corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).
At 8:30 in the morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the Union walked out of
PINA’s premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support for Juanito Cañete, an officer of the Union
charged with oral defamation by Aurora Manor, PINA’s personnel manager, and Yolanda Fabella, Manor’s
secretary.3 It appears that the proceedings in the barangay resulted in a settlement, and the officers and members
of the Union all returned to work thereafter.
As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the March 13, 1993
incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
On April 14, 1993, PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and damages. The complaint was assigned
to then Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino, who ruled in his decision dated July 13, 1994 that the March 13, 1993 incident
was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and that all the Union’s officers, except Cañete, had thereby lost their
employment.4
On April 28, 1993, the Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the
constructive dismissal of its officers.5 On May 9, 1993, the Union held a strike vote, at which a majority of 190
members of the Union voted to strike.6 The strike was held in the afternoon of June 15, 1993.7
PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment of work, stating that they had violated
provisions on strike of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), such as: (a) sabotage by the insertion of foreign
matter in the bottling of company products; (b) decreased production output by slowdown; (c) serious misconduct,
and willful disobedience and insubordination to the orders of the Management and its representatives; (d)
disruption of the work place by invading the premises and perpetrating commotion and disorder, and by causing
fear and apprehension; (e) abandonment of work since June 28, 1993 despite notices to return to work individually
sent to them; and (f) picketing within the company premises on June 15, 1993 that effectively barred with the use
of threat and intimidation the ingress and egress of PINA’s officials, employees, suppliers, and customers. 8
On September 30, 1994, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO), enjoining the Union’s officers and members to cease and desist from barricading and
obstructing the entrance to and exit from PINA’s premises, to refrain from committing any and all forms of
violence, and to remove all forms of obstructions such as streamers, placards, or human barricade. 9
On November 29, 1994, the NLRC granted the writ of preliminary injunction. 10
On August 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera (LA) rendered a decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the subject
strike to be illegal.
The complainant’s prayer for decertification of the respondent union being outside of the jurisdiction of this
Arbitration Branch may not be given due course.
And finally, the claims for moral and exemplary damages for want of factual basis are dismissed.
Pa
SO ORDERED. 11
ge
|
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding that the strike was illegal, but reversed the LA’s ruling that there was
54
abandonment, viz:
However, we disagree with the conclusion that respondents’ union members should be considered to have
abandoned their employment.
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, the union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike
may be declared to have lost their employment status. However, mere participation of a union member in the
illegal strike does not mean loss of employment status unless he participates in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike. While it is true that complainant thru individual memorandum directed the respondents to return
to work (pp. 1031-1112, Records) there is no showing that respondents deliberately refused to return to work. A
worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his work. If his
purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike (BLTB v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 794).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that complainant company
is directed to reinstate respondents named in the complaint to their former positions but without backwages. In
the event that reinstatement is not feasible complainant company is directed to pay respondents separation pay at
one (1/2) half month per year of service.
SO ORDERED.12
Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners assailed the NLRC’s decision through a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not
awarding backwages pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, and in not declaring their strike as a good faith
strike.
On August 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the NLRC.13 In denying the petitioners’ claim for full backwages, the CA
applied the third paragraph of Article 264(a) instead of Article 279 of the Labor Code, explaining that the only
instance under Article 264 when a dismissed employee would be reinstated with full backwages was when he was
dismissed by reason of an illegal lockout; that Article 264 was silent on the award of backwages to employees
participating in a lawful strike; and that a reinstatement with full backwages would be granted only when the
dismissal of the petitioners was not done in accordance with Article 282 (dismissals with just causes) and Article
283 (dismissals with authorized causes) of the Labor Code.
The CA disposed thus:14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed 29 November 2001
Decision of respondent Commission in NLRC NRC CA No. 009701-95 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.15
On October 13, 2003, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. 16
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
The petitioners posit that they are entitled to full backwages from the date of dismissal until the date of actual
reinstatement due to their not being found to have abandoned their jobs. They insist that the CA decided the
question in a manner contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Ruling
We sustain the CA, but modify the decision on the amount of the backwages in order to accord with equity and
jurisprudence.
Third Paragraph of Article 264 (a), >Labor Code, is Applicable
The petitioners contend that they are entitled to full backwages by virtue of their reinstatement, and submit that Pa
applicable to their situation is Article 279, not the third paragraph of Article 264(a), both of the Labor Code. ge
|
We do not agree with the petitioners.
55
Article 279 provides:
Article 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
By its use of the phrase unjustly dismissed, Article 279 refers to a dismissal that is unjustly done, that is, the
employer dismisses the employee without observing due process, either substantive or procedural. Substantive
due process requires the attendance of any of the just or authorized causes for terminating an employee as
provided under Article 278 (termination by employer), or Article 283 (closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel), or Article 284 (disease as ground for termination), all of the Labor Code; while procedural due process
demands compliance with the twin-notice requirement.17
In contrast, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) states:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. – (a) xxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status; Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.
xxx
Contemplating two causes for the dismissal of an employee, that is: (a) unlawful lockout; and (b) participation in
an illegal strike, the third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages only when the
termination of employment is a consequence of an unlawful lockout. On the consequences of an illegal strike, the
provision distinguishes between a union officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike. A union
officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status, but a union
member who is merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly treated. Part of the
explanation for the benign consideration for the union member is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers
who are misled into supporting illegal strikes, absent any finding that such workers committed illegal acts during
the period of the illegal strikes.18
The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal. The NLRC ordered their
reinstatement or, in lieu of reinstatement, the payment of their separation pay, because they were mere rank-and-
file workers whom the Union’s officers had misled into joining the illegal strike. They were not unjustly dismissed
from work. Based on the text and intent of the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor Code, therefore, it is plain
that Article 264(a) is the applicable one.
II
Petitioners not entitled to backwages despite their reinstatement:

A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor
The petitioners argue that the finding of no abandonment equated to a finding of illegal dismissal in their favor.
Hence, they were entitled to full backwages.
The petitioners’ argument cannot be sustained.

The petitioners’ participation in the illegal strike was precisely what prompted PINA to file a complaint to declare
them, as striking employees, to have lost their employment status. However, the NLRC ultimately ordered their
reinstatement after finding that they had not abandoned their work by joining the illegal strike. They were thus
entitled only to reinstatement, regardless of whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer’s
ULP,19considering that a strike was not a renunciation of the employment relation. 20
As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed employee for his loss of earnings during the
whole period that he is out of his job. Considering that an illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have left Pa
his employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him from the employment.21 The grant ge
of backwages to him is in furtherance and effectuation of the public objectives of the Labor Code, and is in the
nature of a command to the employer to make a public reparation for his illegal dismissal of the employee in |
violation of the Labor Code.22 56
That backwages are not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that
they do not render work for the employer during the period of the illegal strike. 23 According to G&S Transport
Corporation v. Infante:24
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor" remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay
unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or
dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. xxx In Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compañia
Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court
stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in
the case at bar. (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners herein do not deny their participation in the June 15, 1993 strike. As such, they did not suffer any
loss of earnings during their absence from work. Their reinstatement sans backwages is in order, to conform to the
policy of a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.
Under the principle of a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during
the period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike.
Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the
latter’s time.25Thus, the Court deleted the award of backwages and held that the striking workers were entitled
only to reinstatement in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort, Inc. (Manila Diamond Hotel) v. Manila Diamond
Hotel Employees Union,26 considering that the striking employees did not render work for the employer during the
strike.
III
Appropriate Amount for Separation Pay

Is One Month per Year of Service
The petitioners were ordered reinstated because they were union members merely instigated or induced to
participate in the illegal strike. By joining the strike, they did not renounce their employment relation with PINA
but remained as its employees.
The absence from an order of reinstatement of an alternative relief should the employer or a supervening event
not within the control of the employee prevent reinstatement negates the very purpose of the order. The judgment
favorable to the employee is thereby reduced to a mere paper victory, for it is all too easy for the employer to
simply refuse to have the employee back. To safeguard the spirit of social justice that the Court has advocated in
favor of the working man, therefore, the right to reinstatement is to be considered renounced or waived only when
the employee unjustifiably or unreasonably refuses to return to work upon being so ordered or after the employer
has offered to reinstate him.27
However, separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a)
when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the
realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer’s interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer
feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced
by the workers’ continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable have supervened; or
(g) strained relations between the employer and employee. 28
Here, PINA manifested that the reinstatement of the petitioners would not be feasible because: (a) it would "inflict
disruption and oppression upon the employer"; (b) "petitioners [had] stayed away" for more than 15 years; (c) its
machines had depreciated and had been replaced with newer, better ones; and (d) it now sold goods through
independent distributors, thereby abolishing the positions related to sales and distribution. 29
Under the circumstances, the grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement of the petitioners was
proper.1awph!1 It is not disputable that the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an
employee is based on equity, which has been defined as justice outside law, or as being ethical rather than jural
and as belonging to the sphere of morals than of law.30 This Court has granted separation pay as a measure of
social justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal has not been due to
serious misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.31
What is the appropriate amount for separation pay? Pa

ge
In G & S Transport,32 the Court awarded separation pay equivalent to one month salary per year of service
|
considering that 17 years had passed from the time when the striking employees were refused reinstatement. In
Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v. NLRC, 33 the Court allowed separation pay equivalent to one 57
month salary per year of service considering that eight years had elapsed since the employees had staged their
illegal strike.
Here, we note that this case has dragged for almost 17 years from the time of the illegal strike. Bearing in mind
PINA’s manifestation that the positions that the petitioners used to hold had ceased to exist for various reasons,
we hold that separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service in lieu of reinstatement fully aligns with
the aforecited rulings of the Court on the matter.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision dated August 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals, subject to the modification to
the effect that in lieu of reinstatement the petitioners are granted backwages equivalent of one month for every
year of service.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS, respondents.
VILLAMOR, J.:p
This is an appeal by the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association from the resolution en banc dated
May 16, 1969 of the Court of Industrial Relations affirming the decision dated February 26, 1969 of Associate Pa
Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissented from the resolution of the majority on ge
the ground that the Industrial Court in a representation case cannot take cognizance of the issue of illegality of a
strike and proceed to declare the loss of the employee status of employees inasmuch as that matter ought to be |
processed as an unfair labor practice case. Judge Tabigne's decision covers two cases, namely, Case No. 1484-MC 58
(1) in which he declared the strike staged on April 22, 1965 by the Association as illegal with the consequent
forfeiture of the employee status of three employees (Jose J. Mapa, President of the Association; Dominador
Mangalino, Vice-President and Herminigildo Mandanas) and Case No. 4344-ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Ben F. Edwards W.E. Menefee which Judge Tabigne dismissed for lack of merit and substantial evidence.
The following proceedings gave rise to the present appeal:
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor organization of Filipino managers supervisors
in Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. After the Association was registered as a
labor organization it sent a letter to the Company on January 21, 1965 informing the latter of the former's
registration; the Company replied inquiring on the position titles of the employees which the Association sought to
represent. On February 8, 1965 the Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the
demands was the recognition of the Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and
supervisors in the Company. To this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between
representatives of management and individuals employed as supervisors and that it is Company's belief that
managerial employees are not qualified for membership in a labor organization; hence, it is digested that the
Association institute a certification proceeding so as to remove any question with regard to position titles that
should be included in the bargaining unit. The Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the
Company1 and so on February 22, 1965 the Company initiated a certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484-
MC.
On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike giving the following reasons:
Refusal to bargain in good faith and to act on demands, a copy of which is enclosed; resort to union-
busting tactics in order to discourage the activities of the undersigned association and its members,
including discrimination and intimidation of officers and members of the association and circulation
of promises of immediate benefits to be given by the company to its employees, officers and
members of this association or those intending to join the same, if the employees concerned in due
course will vote against the selection of this association as the exclusive collective bargaining unit for
managers and supervisors of the Company in the petition for certification the latter filed. (Annex "A"
of Annex "A", Petition).
On March 29, 1965, during the hearing of the certification proceedings, Judge Tabigne cautioned the parties to
maintain the status quo; he specifically advised the employees not to go on strike, making it clear, however, that
in the presence of unfair labor practices they could go on strike even without any notice.2
On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts committed by the Company which the
Association considered as constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22, 1965, after the
efforts exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations to settle the differences between the parties failed. Then, through
an "Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965 filed as Case No. 1484-MC(1), or as an incident of the certification
election proceedings (Case No. 1484-MC), the Company prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court that:
1. The strike of respondent Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association be declared illegal;
2. The officers and members of respondent association who have instigated, declared, encouraged
and/or participated in the illegal strike be held and punished for contempt of this Honorable Court
and be declared to have lost their employee status;
3. Pending hearing on the merits and upon the filing of a bond in an amount to be fixed by this
Honorable Court, a temporary injunction be issued restraining respondent association, its officers,
members and representatives acting for and on their behalf from committing, causing or directing
the commission of the unlawful acts complained of, particularly obstructing and preventing
petitioner, its customers, officers and non-striking employees from entering and going out of its
various offices, in its refinery, installations, depots and terminals and the use or threat of violence
and intimidation;
4. After trial, said injunction be made permanent;
5. The damages that petitioner has suffered and will suffer up to the trial of this action be Pa
ascertained and judgment be rendered against respondent association, its officers, members and ge
representatives jointly and severally for the amount thereof.
|
Petitioner prays for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and
59
equitable in the premises. (Annex "D", Petition)
Such urgent petition was frontally met by the Association with a motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of
the industrial court. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the Company and on May 17, 1965 the trial court
denied the same. Not satisfied with the order of May 17, 1965, the Association moved for its reconsideration
before respondent court en banc.
Because of the settlement between the parties on May 30, 1965 of some of their disputes, the Association filed
with respondent court under date of June 3, 1965 a manifestation (to which was attached a copy of the return-to-
work agreement signed by the parties on May 30, 1965), to the effect that the issues in Case No. 1484-MC (1) had
become moot and academic. Under date of June 15, 1965 the Company filed a counter-manifestation disputing the
representations of the Association on the effect of the return-to-work agreement. On the basis of the manifestation
and counter-manifestation, respondent court en banc issued a resolution on August 24, 1965 allowing the
withdrawal of the Association's motion for reconsideration against the order of May 17, 1965, on the theory that
there was justification for such withdrawal.
Relative to the resolution of August 24, 1965 the Company filed a motion for clarification which the Association
opposed on September 22, 1965, for it contended that such motion was in reality a motion for reconsideration and
as such filed out of time. But respondent court brushed aside the Association's opposition and proceeded to clarify
the resolution of August 24, 1965 to mean that the Company was not barred from continuing with Case No. 1484-
MC(1).
At the hearing on September 1, 1965 of Case No. 1484-MC(1) the Association insisted that the incident had
become moot and academic and must be considered dismissed and, at the same time, it offered to present
evidence, if still necessary, in order to support its contention. Respondent court thereupon decided to secure
evidence from the parties to enlighten it on the interpretation of the provisions of the return-to-work agreement
relied upon by the Association as rendering the issues raised in Case No. 1484-MC(1) already moot and academic.
Evidence having been received, the trial court ruled in its order of February 15, 1966 that under the return-to-work
agreement the Company had reserved its rights to prosecute Case No. 1484-MC(1) and, accordingly, directed that
the case be set for hearing covering the alleged illegality of the strike. Within the prescribed period the Association
filed a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 1966 order to which motion the Company filed its opposition
and, in due course, respondent court en banc issued its resolution dated March 28, 1966 affirming the order.
Appeal from the interlocutory order was elevated by the Association to this Court in G.R. No. L-25955, but the
corresponding petition for review was summarily "DISMISSED for being premature" under this court's resolution of
May 13, 1966.
After a protracted preliminary investigation, the Association's charge for unfair labor practices against the
Company and its officials docketed in a separate proceeding was given due course through the filing by the
prosecution division of respondent court of the corresponding complaint dated September 10, 1965, in Case No.
4344-ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards. As noted by respondent court in its
decision under review, Case No. 4344-ULP was filed by the Association because, according to the latter, the
Company and some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the organization of the Association and he
manifested his antagonism to it and its President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a statement
of policy designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor organizations; that the Company
refused to bargain although the Association commands majority representation; that due to the steps taken by the
Company to destroy the Association or discourage its members from continuing their union membership, the
Association was forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that during the strike
the Company and its officers continued their efforts to weaken the Association as well as its picket lines. The
Company in its answer filed with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor practice.
Considering the interrelation of the issues involved in the two cases and by agreement of the parties, the two
cases were heard jointly. This explains why only one decision was rendered by respondent court covering both
Case No. 1484-MC(1), relating to the illegality of the strike as contended by the Company, and Case No. 4344-
ULP, referring to the unfair labor practice case filed by the Association against the Company, W.E. Menefee and
B.F. Edwards.
The Association assigned the following errors allegedly committed by respondent court:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1). Pa

ge
II |
60
ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SAME ALREADY BECAME MOOT WITH THE SIGNING OF THE RETURN TO
WORK AGREEMENT ON MAY 30, 1965.
III
ASSUMING LIKEWISE THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1),
IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CAFIMSA'S STRIKE WAS STAGED FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO
COERCE THE COMPANY INTO RECOGNIZING THE CAFIMSA AND THAT SUCH STRIKE WAS
UNJUSTIFIED, UNLAWFUL AND UNWARRANTED.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CAFIMSA'S
STRIKE WAS DECLARED IN OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE MARCH 29, 1965 ORDER IN CERTIFICATION
CASE NO. 1484-MC.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING, DESPITE THE
SUBSTANTIAL CONTRARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT THE STRIKERS RESORTED TO MEANS
BEYOND THE PALE OF THE LAW IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE STRIKE AND IN DISREGARDING THE
CONSIDERATION THAT THE STRIKERS MERELY EMPLOYED LAWFUL ACTS OF SELF-PRESERVATION
AND SELF-DEFENSE.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF J.J. MAPA,
CAFIMSA'S PRESIDENT, AND OTHERS, OR IN OTHERWISE PENALIZING THE STRIKERS.
VII
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, IN
DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE COMPANY DAMAGING TO ITS CAUSE, OR
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE COMPANY, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF IN PARI
DELICTO.
VIII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE COMPANY IS BARRED UNDER
SECTION 9(e) OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 875 FROM SEEKING THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN CASE
NO. 1484-MC(1).
IX
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY ABSOLVING THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE
RELATIVE THERETO AGAINST THE COMPANY.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGEMENT FOR THE CAFIMSA IN CASE NO. 4344-ULP
AND IN NOT ORDERING THE COMPANY TO PAY BACK WAGE AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
XI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN PREMATURELY IMPLEMENTING THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF

J.J. MAPA AND DOMINADOR MANGALINO (Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-4).
Pa
To our mind the issues raised in this appeal may be narrowed down to the following: ge
|
1. whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1);
61
2. Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether
respondent court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo
Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the other officers of the Association; and
3. Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor
practice charge.
Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the allegations of the "Urgent
Petition" dated April 26, 1965 filed by the Company in relation to the applicable provisions of law. A reading of said
pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of
Labor); for contempt, obviously pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their
participation in what the Company considered as an "illegal strike."
It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a free
and private agreement between the employer and his employees as to the terms and conditions under which the
employer is to give work and the employees are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by judicial or
administrative intervention. On this premise the lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive
relief involving or growing out of labor disputes.
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a comparable bargaining power with capital and
must be liberally construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp.
485, Certioraridenied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S.
App. D.C., certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the prohibition creates
substantive and not purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board,
49 F. Supp. 886). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking through Justice Labrador, in Social Security
Employees Association (PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11
SCRA 518, 520), there can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a
labor dispute arises in an industry indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is certified by the
President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875.
As a corollary to this, an injunction in an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of
Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities.
To the extent, then, that the Company sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent
court had jurisdiction over the Company's "Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965.
As to the "contempt aspect" of Case No. 1484-MC(1), the jurisdiction of respondent court over it cannot be
seriously questioned it appearing that Judge Tabigne in good faith thought that his "advice" to the Association
during the hearing on March 29, 1965 not to strike amounted a valid order. This is not to say, however, that
respond court did not err in finding that the advice given by Judgre Tabigne during the hearing on March 29, 1965
really constituted an order which can be the basis of a contempt proceeding. For, in our opinion, what Judge
Tabigne statement during said hearing should be construed what actually was — an advice. To say that it was an
order would be to concede that respondent court could validly enjoin strike, especially one which is not certified in
accord with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. To adopt the view of respondent court would not only set at naught
the policy of the law as embodied in the said statute against issuance of injunctions, but also remove from the
hands of labor unions and aggrieved employees an effective lawful weapon to either secure favorable action on
their economic demand or to stop unfair labor practices on the part of their employer.
With respect to the alleged "illegality of the strike," as claimed by the Company, and the consequent forfeiture of
the employee status of the strikers, we believe these matters which are neither pertinent to nor connected with a
certification case as opined by Judge Paredes, to which we agree. Respondent court, therefore, initially erred in
entertaining this issue in Case No. 1484-MC(1). No prejudice, however, has resulted since, as correctly pointed out
by respondent court, the illegality for the strike was squarely raised by the Company as a defense in Case No.
4344-ULP and, in any event, we observe that the Association was given all the opportunity to put forward its
evidence.
We now come to the important issue as to whether the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal.
From an examination of the records, we believe that the lower court erred in its findings in this regard.
To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a partial compromise
between the parties and, more important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield Pa
to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in ge
favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind when the Company
|
unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same
employee status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its intention and conformity not to 62
proceed with Case No. 1484-MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that there is a
reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-
MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to
mention Case No. 1484-MC(1) while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars the Company
from proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would
be taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22, 1965. The records disclose further
that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously
disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in
part from this witness, "to secure the tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement considering that as
I understand there were demotions and suspensions of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover,
there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-
7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the
records.
... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned their original positions and come
to a virtual compromise and agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed
with the declaration of illegality would not only breach this understanding, freely arrived at, but to
unnecessarily revive animosities to the prejudice of industrial peace. (Emphasis supplied)
Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot and academic, we find ourselves unable to
agree with respondent court to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 was
unjustified, unreasonable and unwarranted that it was declared in open defiance of an order in Case No. 1484-MC
not to strike; and that the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of the
strike. As adverted to above, the Association filed its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons therefor any
one of which is a valid ground for a strike.
In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the Association, it is clear that the strike of the
Association was declared not just for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by respondent court, but also
for bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its
officials. But even if the strike were really declared for the purpose of recognition, the concerted activities of the
officers and members of the Association in this regard cannot be said to be unlawful nor the purpose thereof be
regarded as trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company
and the Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to recognize for membership in the
Association the position titles mentioned in Annex "B" of said agreement. 3 This goes to show that striking for
recognition is productive of good result in so far as a union is concerned.
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of Labor is the right to self-organization and
we do not hesitate to say that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor legislation. Indeed, because of
occasional delays incident to a certification proceeding usually attributable to dilatory tactics employed by the
employer, to a certain extent a union may be justified in resorting to a strike. We should not be understood here
as advocating a strike in order to secure recognition of a union by the employer. On the whole we are satisfied
from the records that it is incorrect to say that the strike of the Association was mainly for the purpose of securing
recognition as bargaining agent.
As will be discussed hereinbelow, the charge of unfair labor practice against the Company is well-taken. It is,
therefore, clear error on the part of the Association is unjust, unreasonable and unwarranted.
We said earlier that the advice of Judge Tabigne to maintain the status quo cannot be considered as a lawful order
within the contemplation of the Magna Carta of Labor, particularly Section 10 thereof; to so regard it as an order
would be to grant respondent court authority to forbid a strike in an uncertified case which it is not empowered to
do. The fact that the strike was not staged until April 22, 1965 is eloquent proof enough of the desire of the
Association and its officers and members to respect the advice of Judge Tabigne. However, as shown in this case
during the pendency of the certification proceedings unfair labor practices were committed by the Company;
hence, the Association was justified in staging a strike and certainly this is not in violation of the advice of Judge
Tabigne on March 29, 1965.
Respondent court picked out a number of incidents, taking place during the strike, to support its conclusion that Pa
the strikers resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of a strike. Thus, it made mention of ge
the blocking by a banca manned by two striking supervisors by the name of Dominador Mangalino and one
Bonecillo of the Caltex M/V Estrella when it was about to depart; the blocking at the refinery of the Company in |
Bauan, Batangas of the LSCO WARA, the Hills Bros Pinatubo, and the Mobil Visayas so that they could not dock; 63
the blocking by the strikers of incoming vehicles, non-striking supervisors, and rank-and-file workers to prevent
them from entering the refinery gate in Bauan, Batangas, at the Poro Terminal, at the Company's Padre Faura
office in Manila, and at the Pandacan Terminal; that at the Legaspi and Mambulao Bulk Depots the striking
supervisors refused to surrender to their superiors the keys to the depots and storage tanks; and that also at the
Legaspi Depot the truck ignition keys were mixed up or thrown at the seats of the trucks in violation of the
Company regulations in order to create confusion and thus prevent the trucks from being used. 4 To refute these
and similar findings of respondent court the Association, drawing chiefly and abundantly from the Company's own
evidence,5 called attention to the exculpatory declarations of the Company's own witnesses 6 either establishing or
tending to establish that the picketing the strikers was generally peaceful and orderly. We find that such, indeed,
was the real situation during the strike and it would be the height of injustice to rule otherwise in the face of the
records before us.
In ignoring strong evidence coming from the witnesses of the Company damaging to its case as well as that
adduced by the Association also damaging to the Company's case, we believe that respondent court clearly and
gravely abused its discretion thereby justifying us to review or alter its factual findings (see Philippine Educational
Institution vs. MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26 SCRA 272, 278). 7 There is thus here, to employ the language of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 96 Phil., 63, "an
infringement of cardinal primary rights of petitioner, and justified the interposition of the corrective powers of this
Court (Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, 69 Phil., 635):
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law Ed. 1288.)
In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration." (Ibid., p. 67)8
We are convinced from the records that on the whole the means employed by the strikers during the strike, taking
into account the activities of the Company and the non-striking employees on the same occasion, cannot be
labeled as unlawful; in other words, the Company itself through the provocative, if not unlawful, acts of the non-
striking employees9 is not entirely blameless for the isolated incidents relied upon by respondent court as tainting
the picketing of the strikers with illegality. As we said through Justice Fernando in Shell Oil Workers' Union vs.
Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276:
6. Respondent court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that
attended it. What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that
a union's economic demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from the unfair
labor practice. That the law recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of
force to attain such an objective. For implicit in the very concept of a legal order is the maintenance
of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent, in character, be placed beyond the pale. Care is
to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with
illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the
right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual not collective. A different conclusion
would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and
widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably
concluded then that even if justified as to end, it becomes illegal because of means employed. (Ibid.,
p. 292; emphasis supplied).
In the same case we further observed:
... Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of
picketing as such being "inherently explosive". It is thus clear that not every form of violence
suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment of the guilty
party. (Ibid., pp. 293-294; emphasis supplied)
In the cited case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Employees' Association-NATO, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life insurance
Co., Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, et al., L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244, we held through Justice Castro,
and this is here applicable to the contention of theAssociation, as follows:
Pa
... Besides, under the circumstances the picketers not legally bound to yield their grounds and ge
withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of
|
their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or
unlawful transgression. ... (Ibid., p. 271) 64
In this cited case, by the way, we reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations and
ordered the Company to reinstate the dismissed workers backwages.
Let us now examine the charge of unfair labor practice which respondent court dismissed for lack of merit and
substantial evidence.
Under Sec. 14(c) of Republic Act No. 875, the parties themselves are required "to participate fully and promptly in
such meetings and conferences as the (Conciliation) Service may undertake." In this case, the parties agreed to
meet on April 21, 1965 and yet, notwithstanding this definite agreement, the Company sent no representatives.
The Company's claim to bargaining in good faith cannot be given credence in the face of the fact that W.E.
Menefee the Company's Managing Director, conveniently left Manila for Davao on April 17 or 18, 1965, as admitted
by W.E. Wilmarth. 10
Nowhere is there serious claim on the part of the Company that it entertains real doubt as to the majority
representation of the Association. Consider further that admittedly the certification election proceeding for the
Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company had been pending for six (6) years already. From all appearances,
therefore, and bearing in mind the deliberate failure of the Company to attend the conciliation meetings on April
19 and 21, 1965, it is clear that the Company employed dilatory tactics doubtless to discredit CAFIMSA before the
eyes of its own members and prospective members as an effective bargaining agent, postpone eventual
recognition of the Association, and frustrate its efforts towards securing favorable action on its economic demands.
It is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued its statement of policy (Exh. B). At that time
the Association was seeking recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic demands for the
improvement of the terms and conditions of employment of supervisors. The statement of policy conveyed in
unequivocal terms to all employees the following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential employee needs
fulfilled through sound management administration without the necessity of employee organization
and representations. We respect an employee's right to present his grievances, regardless of
whether or not he is represented by a labor organization. (Emphasis supplied)
An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain impression that there was no need to join the Association.
For he is free to present his grievances regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.
The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's
attention. It will suffice to mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the Company
had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of
promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had inquired into the formation
and organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the
Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A.
Buenaventura, the Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion cases filed at
that time and their subsequent elimination from the charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of
strike; 11 the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members in the refinery; and the use of a
member of the Association to spy for the company. 12 The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against
active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as
charged. 13 Victims of discrimination are J.J. Mapa, A.E. Buenaventura, E.F. Grey, Eulogio Manaay,14 Pete Beltran,
Jose Dizon, Cipriano Cruz, F.S. Miranda and many others. The discrimination consisted in the Company's preferring
non-members of the Association in promotions to higher positions and humiliating active unionists by either
promoting junior supervisors over them or by reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them
before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions. 15
Then, effective July 1, 1969, the Company terminated the employment of J.J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino,
President and Vice-President, respectively, of the Association at that time. And this the Company did not hesitate
to do notwithstanding the Association's seasonable appeal from respondent court's decision. We perceive in this
particular action of the Company its anti-union posture and attitude. In this connection, we find merit in the claim
of petitioner that the dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino was premature considering that respondent court did not
expressly provide that such dismissal might be effected immediately despite the pendency of the appeal timely
taken by the Association. The situation would have been different had respondent court ordered the dismissal of
Mapa and Mangalino immediately. As the decision is silent on this matter the dismissal of said officers of the Pa
Association ought to have been done only upon the finality of the judgment. Because appeal was timely taken, the
ge
Company's action is patently premature and is furthermore evidence of its desire to punish said active unionists.
|
Verily, substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record establishing beyond doubt the charge of 65
unfair labor practices in violation of Sec. 4 (a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic Act No. 875. And
pursuant to the mandate of Art. 24 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that courts must be vigilant for the
protection of one at a disadvantage — and here the Association appears to be at a disadvantage in its relations
with the Company as the records show — adequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must be awarded to
the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the laudable objectives of Republic Act 875
calculated to safeguard the rights of employees, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of
employees and strictly against employer, unless otherwise intended by or patent from language of the statute
itself.
The Court takes judicial notice of the considerable efforts exerted by both parties in the prosecution of respective
cases and the incidents thereof both before lower court and this Court since 1965 to date. Under the circumstances
and in conformity with Art. 2208, No. 11, the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is but just, fair and equitable that the
Association be permitted to recover attorney's fees as claimed in its tenth assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, respondent court's resolution en banc dated May 16, 1969, together with the decision dated
February 26, 1969, is reversed and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Case No. 1484-MC(1), the Court declares the strike of the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors'
Association as legal in all respects and, consequently, the forfeit of the employee status of J.J. Mapa, Dominador
Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas is set aside. The Company is hereby ordered to reinstate J.J. Mapa and
Dominador Mangalino to their former positions without loss of seniority and privileges, with backwages from the
time of dismissal on July 1, 1969. Since Herminigildo Mandanas appears to have voluntarily left the Company, no
reinstatement is ordered as to him.
2. In Case No. 4344-ULP, the Court finds the Company B.F. Edwards and W.E. Menefee guilty of unfair labor
practices and they are therefore ordered to cease and desist from the same. In this connection, the Company is
furthermore directed to pay backwages to the striking employees from April 22, 1965 to May 30, 1965 and to pay
attorney's fees which are hereby fixed at P20,000.00.
Costs against private respondents.
[G.R. No. 158324. March 14, 2005]
ROBERTO RAVAGO, petitioner, vs. ESSO EASTERN MARINE, LTD. and TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME
AGENCY, INC., respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) as well as its Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 66234 which denied the motion
for reconsideration thereof. Pa
ge
|
The Factual Antecedents 66
The Esso Eastern Marine Ltd. (EEM), now the Petroleum Shipping Ltd., is a foreign company based in
Singapore and engaged in maritime commerce. It is represented in the Philippines by its manning agent and co-
respondent Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. (Trans-Global), a corporation organized under the Philippine laws.
Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on board various Esso vessels. On February
13, 1970, Ravago commenced his duty as S/N wiper on board the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted until
February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was assigned to work in different Esso vessels where he was designated diverse
tasks, such as oiler, then assistant engineer. He was employed under a total of 34 separate and unconnected
contracts, each for a fixed period, by three different companies, namely, Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM and Esso
International Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS), Singapore Branch. Ravago worked with Esso vessels until August
22, 1992, a period spanning more than 22 years, thus:
CONTRACT DURATION TO POSITION VESSEL COMPANY

FROM
13 Feb 70 10 Feb 71 SN/Wiper Esso Bataan ETI[2]
07 May 71 27 May 72 Wiper Esso EEM[3]
Yokohama
07 Aug 72 02 Jul 73 Oiler Esso Kure EEM
03 Oct 73 30 Jun 74 Oiler Esso Bangkok ETI
18 Sep 74 26 July 75 Oiler Esso EEM
Yokohama
23 Oct 75 22 Jun 76 Oiler Esso Port EEM
Dickson
10 Sep 76 26 Dec 76 Oiler Esso Bangkok ETI
27 Dec 76 29 Apr 77 Temporary Jr. Esso Bangkok ETI
3AE
08 Jul 77 15 Mar 78 Jr. 3AE Esso Bombay ETI
03 Jun 78 03 Feb 79 Temporary 3AE Esso Hongkong ETI
04 Apr 79 24 Jun 79 3AE Esso Orient EEM
25 Jun 79 16 Jul 79 3AE Esso EEM
Yokohama
17 Jul 79 05 Dec 79 3AE Esso Orient EEM
10 Feb 80 25 Oct 80 3AE Esso Orient EEM
19 Jan 81 03 Jun 81 3AE Esso Port EEM
Dickson
04 Jun 81 11 Sep 81 3AE Esso Orient EEM
06 Dec 81 20 Apr 82 3AE Esso Chawan EEM
21 Apr 82 01 Aug 82 Temporary 2AE Esso Chawan EEM*
03 Nov 82 06 Feb 83 2AE Esso Jurong EEM
07 Feb 83 10 Jul 83 2AE Esso EEM
Yokohama
31 Aug 83 13 Mar 84 2AE Esso Tumasik EEM
04 May 84 08 Jan 85 2AE Esso Port EEM
Dickson
13 Mar 85 31 Oct 85 2AE Esso Castellon EEM
29 Dec 85 22 Jul 86 2AE Esso Jurong EIS[4]
13 Sep 86 09 Jan 87 2AE Esso Orient EIS
21 Mar 87 15 Oct 87 2AE Esso Port EIS
Dickson
20 Nov 87 18 Dec 87 1AE Esso Chawan EIS
Temporary
19 Dec 87 25 Jun 88 2AE Esso EIS
Melbourne
04 Aug 88 19 Mar 89 Temporary 1AE Esso Port EIS
Dickson
20 Mar 89 19 May 89 1AE Esso Port EIS*
Dickson
28 Jul 89 17 Feb 90 1AE Esso EIS
Melbourne
16 Apr 90 11 Dec 90 1AE Esso Orient EIS Pa
09 Feb 91 06 Oct 91 1AE Esso EIS ge
Melbourne |
16 Dec 91 22 Aug 92 1AE Esso Orient EIS
67
* Upgraded/Confirmed on regular rank on board.[5]
On August 24, 1992, or shortly after completing his latest contract with EIS, Ravago was granted a vacation
leave with pay from August 23, 1992 until October 28, 1992. Preparatory to his embarkation under a new contract,
he was ordered to report, on September 28, 1992, for a Medical Pre-Employment Examination.[6] The Pre-
Employment Physical Examination Record shows that Ravago passed the medical examination conducted by the
O.P. Jacinto Medical Clinic, Inc. on October 6, 1992.[7] He, likewise, attended a Pre-Departure Orientation Seminar
conducted by the Capt. I.P. Estaniel Training Center, a division of Trans-Global, on October 7, 1992.[8]
On the night of October 12, 1992, a stray bullet hit Ravago on the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride
in Cubao, Quezon City. He fractured his left proximal tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine Orthopedic
Hospital. Ravagos wife, Lolita, informed Trans-Global and EIS of the incident on October 13, 1992 for purposes of
availing medical benefits. As a result of his injury, Ravagos doctor opined that he would not be able to cope with
the job of a seaman and suggested that he be given a desk job. [9] Ravagos left leg had become apparently shorter,
making him walk with a limp. For this reason, the company physician, Dr. Virginia G. Manzo, found him to have
lost his dexterity, making him unfit to work once again as a seaman. [10]Citing the opinion of Ravagos doctor, Dr.
Manzo wrote:
Because of his unsteady gait, pronounced limp, and loss of normal dexterity of his leg and foot, we doubted
whether Mr. Ravago can physically tackle the usual activities of a seaman in the course of his work without any
added risk over and above the ordinary or standard risk inherent to his job. These activities include climbing up
and down the engine room through a long flight of iron stairs with narrow steps which could be slippery at times
due to grease or oil, jumping from an unsteady and floating motor launch or boat to board or alight a tanker
through a flight of steps or climbing up and down a pilot ladder, wearing of heavy safety shoes, etc.
Mr. Ravagos doctor replied that, after being informed about the nature of the job, he believes that Mr. Ravago
would not be able to cope with these kinds of activities. In effect, the Orthopedic doctor said Mr. Ravago is not fit
to go back to his work as a seaman.
We concur with the opinion of the doctor that Mr. Ravago is not fit to go back to his job as a seaman in view of the
risk of physical injury to himself as result of the deformity and loss of dexterity of his injured leg.
As a seaman, we consider his inability partial permanent. His injury corresponds to Grade 13 in the Schedule of
Disability of the Standard Employment Contract. [11]
Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, EIS paid him his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) [12] as of
March 1, 1993 and his final tax refund for 1992. After deducting his Social Security System and medical
contributions from November 1992 to February 1993, EIS remitted the net amount of P162,232.65, following
Ravagos execution of a Deed of Quitclaim and/or Release.[13]
However, on March 22, 1993, Ravago filed a complaint [14] for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement,
backwages, damages and attorneys fees against Trans-Global and EIS with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration Adjudication Office.
In their Answer dated April 14, 1993, respondents denied that Ravago was dismissed without notice and just
cause. Rather, his services were no longer engaged in view of the disability he suffered which rendered him unfit
to work as a seafarer. This fact was further validated by the company doctor and Ravagos attending physician.
They averred that Ravago was a contractual employee and was hired under 34 separate contracts by different
companies.
In his position paper, Ravago insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury activities as evidenced by the
certification[15] issued by Dr. Marciano Foronda M.D., one of his attending physicians at the Philippine Orthopedic
Hospital, that at present, fracture of tibia has completely healed and patient is fit to resume pre-injury activities
anytime.[16] Ravago, likewise, asserted that he was not a mere contractual employee because the respondents
regularly and continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his continuous service, was awarded a CEIP payment
upon his termination from employment.
On December 15, 1996, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes rendered a decision in favor of Ravago, the
complainant. He ruled that Ravago was a regular employee because he was engaged to perform activities which
were usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer. The Labor Arbiter noted that
Ravagos services were repeatedly contracted; he was even given several promotions and was paid a monthly
service experience bonus. This was in keeping with the increasing number of long term careers established with
the respondents. Finally, the Labor Arbiter resolved that an employer cannot terminate a workers employment on
the ground of disease unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the said disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical Pa
treatment. He concluded that Ravago was illegally dismissed. The decretal portion of the Labor Arbiters decision
ge
reads:
|
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dismissal illegal and ordering 68
respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.
Further, the respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay complainant backwages from the time of his
dismissal up to the promulgation of this decision. Such backwages is provisionally fixed at US$96,285.00 less
the P162,285.83 (sic) paid to the complainant as Career Employment Incentive Plan. And ordering respondents to
pay complainant 10% of the total monetary award as attorneys fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Aggrieved, the respondents appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on July
3, 1997, raising the following grounds:
THE DECISION IS VITIATED BY SERIOUS ERRORS IN THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH, IF NOT CORRECTED,
WOULD CAUSE GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE DAMAGE OR INJURY TO THE RESPONDENTS. THESE FINDINGS ARE:
(A) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE WAS HIRED AND REHIRED IN
VARIOUS CAPACITIES ON BOARD ESSO VESSELS IN A SPAN OF 23 YEARS;
(B) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS A REGULAR EMPLOYEE BECAUSE HE WAS ENGAGED IN THE SERVICES
INDISPENSABLE IN THE OPERATION OF THE VARIOUS VESSELS OF RESPONDENTS;
(C) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS FIT TO RESUME PRE-INJURY ACTIVITIES AND HIS FRACTURE COMPLETELY
HEALED NOTWITHSTANDING A CONTRARY MEDICAL OPINION OF COMPLAINANTS OWN
PHYSICIAN AND RESPONDENTS COMPANY PHYSICIAN; AND
(D) THAT COMPLAINANT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENTS.[18]
On April 26, 2001, the NLRC rendered a decision affirming that of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC based its
decision in the case of Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[19] wherein it was held that:
It is, likewise, clear that petitioners had been in the employ of the private respondents for 20 years. The records
reveal that petitioners were repeatedly re-hired by private respondents even after the expiration of their respective
eight-month contracts. Such repeated re-hiring which continued for 20 years, cannot but be appreciated as
sufficient evidence of the necessity and indispensability of petitioners service to the private respondents business
or trade.
Verily, as petitioners had rendered 20 years of service, performing activities which were necessary and desirable in
the business or trade of private respondents, they are, by express provision of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
considered regular employees.[20]
The NLRC, likewise, declared that Ravago was illegally dismissed and that the quitclaim executed by him could
not be considered as a waiver of his right to question the validity of his dismissal and seek reinstatement and other
reliefs. According to the NLRC, such quitclaim is against public policy, considering the economic disadvantage of
the employee and the inevitable pressure brought about by financial capacity.
The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, claiming that the ruling of the Court
in Millares v. NLRC[21] had not yet become final and executory. However, the NLRC denied the motion.
Thereafter, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on the following grounds: (a) the ruling
in Millares v. NLRC had not yet acquired finality, nor has it become a law of the case or stare decisis because the
Court was still resolving the pending motion for reconsideration; (b) Ravago was not illegally dismissed because
after the expiration of his contract, there was no obligation on the part of the respondents to rehire him; and (c)
the quitclaim signed by Ravago was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement of the
account due him.
On August 29, 2001, the respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin and restrain the Labor Arbiter from enforcing his decision. On
September 5, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution [22] temporarily restraining NLRC Sheriff Manolito Manuel from
enforcing and/or implementing the decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.
On November 14, 2001, the CA granted the application for preliminary injunction upon filing by the
respondents of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. Thus, the respondents filed the surety bond as directed by
the appellate court. Before the approval thereof, however, Ravago filed a motion to set aside the Resolution dated
November 14, 2001, principally arguing that the instant case was a labor dispute, wherein an injunction is Pa
proscribed under Article 254[23] of the Labor Code of the Philippines. ge
In their comment on Ravagos motion, the respondents professed that the case before the CA did not involve a
|
labor dispute within the meaning of Article 212(l)[24] of the Labor Code of the Philippines, but a money claim 69
against the employer as a result of termination of employment.
On August 28, 2002, the CA rendered a decision in favor the respondents. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the NLRC are hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE and the injunctive writ issued on November 14, 2001, is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The CA ratiocinated as follows:
The employment, deployment, rights and obligation of Filipino seafarers are particularly set forth under the rules
and regulations governing overseas employment promulgated by the POEA. Section C, Part I of the Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels
emphatically provides the following:
SECTION C. DURATION OF CONTRACT
The period of employment shall be for a fix (sic) period but in no case to exceed 12 months and shall be stated in
the Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be subject to the mutual consent of the parties.
It is clear from the foregoing that seafarers are contractual employees whose terms of employment are fixed for a
certain period of time. A fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance of seamens employment contracts to
which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular employment under Article 280 of the Labor
Code does not find application. The contract entered into by a seafarer with his employer sets in detail the nature
of his job, the amount of his wage and, foremost, the duration of his employment. Only a satisfactory showing that
both parties dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no dominance exercised by the employer over
the seafarer is necessary to sustain the validity of the employment contract. In the absence of duress, as it is in
this case, the contract constitutes the law between the parties.[26]
The CA noted that the employment status of seafarers has been established with finality by the Courts
reconsideration of its decision in Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27] wherein it was ruled that
seamen are contractual employees. According to the CA, the fact that Ravago was not rehired upon the completion
of his contract did not result in his illegal dismissal; hence, he was not entitled to reinstatement or payment of
separation pay. The CA, likewise, affirmed the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued, declaring that an
injunction is a preservative remedy issued for the protection of a substantive right or interest, an antidote resorted
to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be rendered under any
standard compensation.
Hence, the present recourse.
Ravago, now the petitioner, has raised the following issues:
I.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPLEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND VIOLATED THE LABOR CODE WHEN IT
ISSUED A RESTRAINING ORDER AND THEREAFTER A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
66234.
II.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, [AND] BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE ON PROTECTION TO FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, AND COUNTENANCED
UNWARRANTED DISCRIMINATION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT BECOME A REGULAR EMPLOYEE. [28]
On the first issue, the petitioner asserts that the CA violated Article 254 of the Labor Code when it issued a
temporary restraining order, and thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction, to derail the enforcement of the final
and executory judgment of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC. On the other hand, the respondents
contend that the issue has become academic since the CA had already decided the case on its merits.
The contention of the petitioner does not persuade.
The petitioners reliance on Article 254[29] of the Labor Code is misplaced. The law proscribes the issuance of
injunctive relief only in those cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. The case before the NLRC neither Pa
involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. It did not involve the fixing of terms or conditions of employment or ge
representation of persons with respect thereto. In fact, the petitioners complaint revolves around the issue of his
alleged dismissal from service and his claim for backwages, damages and attorneys fees. Moreover, Article 254 of
|
the Labor Code specifically provides that the NLRC may grant injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof. 70
Besides, the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically, is freedom at the workplace. It is more
appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor and industrial disputes. [30]
Generally, an injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of a persons substantive rights or
interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but a mere provisional remedy, an appendage to the main suit.
Pressing necessity requires that it should be resorted to only to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be
remedied under any measure of consideration. The application of an injunctive writ rests upon the presence of an
exigency or of an exceptional reason before the main case can be regularly heard. The indispensable conditions for
granting such temporary injunctive relief are: (a) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory
to establish a proper basis for injunction, and (b) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.[31]
It bears stressing that in the present case, the respondents petition contains facts sufficient to warrant the
issuance of an injunction under Article 218, paragraph (e) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. [32] Further,
respondents had already posted a surety bond more than adequate to cover the judgment award.
On the second issue, the petitioner earnestly urges this Court to re-examine its Resolution dated July 29, 2002
in Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission [33] and reinstate the doctrine laid down in its original decision
rendered on March 14, 2000, wherein it was initially determined that a seafarer is a regular employee. The
petitioner asserts that the decision of the CA and, indirectly, that of the Resolution of this Court dated July 29,
2002, are violative of the constitutional mandate of full protection to labor, [34] whether local or overseas, because
it deprives overseas Filipino workers, such as seafarers, an opportunity to become regular employees without valid
and serious reasons. The petitioner maintains that the decision is discriminatory and violates the constitutional
provision on equal protection of the laws, in addition to being partial to and overly protective of foreign employers.
The respondents, on the other hand, asseverate that there is no law or administrative rule or regulation
imposing an obligation to rehire a seafarer upon the completion of his contract. Their refusal to secure the services
of the petitioner after the expiration of his contract can never be tantamount to a termination. The respondents
aver that the petitioner is not entitled to backwages, not only because it is without factual justification but also
because it is not warranted under the law. Furthermore, the respondents assert that the rulings in the Coyoca v.
NLRC,[35] and the latest Millares case remain good and valid precedents that need to be reaffirmed. The
respondents cited the ruling of the Court in Coyoca case where the Court ruled that a Filipino seamans contract
does not provide for separation or termination pay because it is governed by the Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment.
The contention of the respondents is correct.
In a catena of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that seafarers are contractual, not regular, employees.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora,[36] the Court ruled that seamen and overseas contract workers are not
covered by the term regular employment as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code. The Court said in that case:
The question immediately provoked ... is whether or not a voluntary agreement on a fixed term or period would be
valid where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. The definition seems non sequitur. From the premise that the duties of an
employee entail activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
the conclusion does not necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be forbidden to stipulate any
period of time for the performance of those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a definite
period of an employment contract and the nature of the employees duties set down in that contract as being
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The concept of the employees duties
as being usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer is not synonymous with or
identical to employment with a fixed term. Logically, the decisive determinant in term employment should not be
the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be that which
must necessarily come, although it may not be known when. Seasonal employment, and employment for a
particular project are merely instances of employment in which a period, were not expressly set down, is
necessarily implied.[37]
...
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for seasonal work nor for
specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment
contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all Pa
that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding;also ge
appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and other administrative offices
|
in educational institutions, which are by practice or tradition rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed
terms are a necessity without which no reasonable rotation would be possible. ... [38] 71
...
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article
280 of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the
employees right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all
written or oral agreements conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be
construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to
circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was
agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless, thus, limited in its purview, the
law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless
and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.[39]
The Court made the same ruling in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations Commission [40] and declared that a
seafarer, not being a regular employee, is not entitled to separation or termination pay.
Furthermore, petitioners contract did not provide for separation benefits. In this connection, it is important to note
that neither does the POEA standard employment contract for Filipino seamen provide for such benefits.
As a Filipino seaman, petitioner is governed by the Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment and
the said Rules do not provide for separation or termination pay. ...
...
Therefore, although petitioner may not be a regular employee of private respondent, the latter would still have
been liable for payment of the benefits had the principal failed to pay the same. [41]
In the July 29, 2002 Resolution of this Court in Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,[42] it
reiterated its ruling that seafarers are contractual employees and, as such, are not covered by Article 280 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines:
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual employees. They cannot be
considered as regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the
contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires.
Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under the exception of Article
280 whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. We need not depart from the rulings of
the Court in the two aforementioned cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the employment
status of seafarers.
...
... The Standard Employment Contract governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I, Sec. C, specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be for a
fixed period. And in no case should the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months. It reads:
Section C. Duration of Contract
The period of employment shall be for a fixed period but in no case to exceed 12 months and shall be stated in the
Crew Contract. Any extension of the Contract period shall be subject to the mutual consent of the parties.
Petitioners make much of the fact that they have been continually re-hired or their contracts renewed before the
contracts expired (which has admittedly been going on for twenty [20] years). By such circumstance they claim to
have acquired regular status with all the rights and benefits appurtenant to it.
Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance of continuous re-hiring was dictated by practical Pa
considerations that experienced crew members are more preferred. Petitioners were only given priority or ge
preference because of their experience and qualifications but this does not detract the fact that herein petitioners
|
are contractual employees. They can not be considered regular employees. We quote with favor the explanation of
the NLRC in this wise: 72
xxx The reference to permanent and probationary masters and employees in these papers is a misnomer and does
not alter the fact that the contracts for enlistment between complainants-appellants and respondent-appellee Esso
International were for a definite periods of time, ranging from 8 to 12 months. Although the use of the terms
permanent and probationary is unfortunate, what is really meant is eligible for-re-hire. This is the only logical
conclusion possible because the parties cannot and should not violate POEAs requirement that a contract of
enlistment shall be for a limited period only; not exceeding twelve (12) months.
From all the foregoing, we hereby state that petitioners are not considered regular or permanent employees under
Article 280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners employment have automatically ceased upon the expiration of their
contracts of enlistment (COE). Since there was no dismissal to speak of, it follows that petitioners are not entitled
to reinstatement or payment of separation pay or backwages, as provided by law. [43]
The Court ruled that the employment of seafarers for a fixed period is not discriminatory against seafarers and
in favor of foreign employers. As explained by this Court in its July 29, 2002 Resolution in Millares:
Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that employment of seafarers are for a fixed period only.
Constrained by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it is for the mutual
interest of both the seafarer and the employer why the employment status must be contractual only or for a
certain period of time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay for a long
and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore society during the employment will have an
adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a
reality that necessitates the limitation of its period.[44]
In Pentagon International Shipping, Inc. v. William B. Adelantar,[45] the Court cited its rulings
in Millares and Coyoca and reiterated that a seafarer is not a regular employee entitled to backwages and
separation pay:
Therefore, Adelantar, a seafarer, is not a regular employee as defined in Article 280 of the Labor Code. Hence, he
is not entitled to full backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as provided in Article 279 of the Labor
Code. As we held in Millares, Adelantar is a contractual employee whose rights and obligations are governed
primarily by [the] Rules and Regulations of the POEA and, more importantly, by R.A. 8042, or the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The latest ruling of the Court in Marcial Gu-Miro v. Rolando C. Adorable and Bergesen D.Y.
Manila[46] reaffirmed yet again its rulings that a seafarer is employed only on a contractual basis:
Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a regular employee notwithstanding that the work he performs is
necessary and desirable in the business of respondent company. As expounded in the above-
mentioned Millares Resolution, an exception is made in the situation of seafarers. The exigencies of their work
necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis.
Thus, even with the continued re-hiring by respondent company of petitioner to serve as Radio Officer onboard
Bergesens different vessels, this should be interpreted not as a basis for regularization but rather a series of
contract renewals sanctioned under the doctrine set down by the second Millares case. If at all, petitioner was
preferred because of practical considerations namely, his experience and qualifications. However, this does not
alter the status of his employment from being contractual.
The petitioner failed to convince the Court why it should restate its decision in Millares and reverse its July 29,
2002 Resolution in the same case.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 28,
2002 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No.

170830 August 11, 2010

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,

THE NLRC RULING

We find the petition partly meritorious.

Requisites of a valid strike

Strike may be illegal for commission of prohibited acts

For the Company

For the Respondents

A: They hold around, joining hands, moving picket.[47]

MR. PEDRO: No, sir. They were not able to enter.[49]

MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.

MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir. [50]

MS. CATALAN: No sir.

MS. CATALAN: Yes, sir.[51]

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x

PHIMCO failed to observe due process

b) The strikers/picketers did not file a notice of strike;

c) The reasons for the strike/picket involve a non-strikeable issue; Pa

The strike conducted by the respondents is hereby declared as illegal.

CLOTHMAN KNITTING CORPORATION,

Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

1. Petitioners, BUKLURAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA CLOTHMAN SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS FOR EMPOWERMENT AND

On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

1. Itigil ang sabwatan ng KATIPUNAN (FABIAN GROUP) at management BMC-SUPER;

The Valenzuela Police left at about 1727H.

So m et i me i n M ar ch 1 998 , th e m aj o ri ty of th e e mpl o y e e s of th e p eti ti on e r o rga n i z ed

On D e c em b er 3 , 1 998 , p ri v at e r e sp o n den t Un i on fi l ed a N oti c e of St ri k e wi th th e Na ti on al

On J u n e 29 , 199 9, th e p eti ti on e r fi l ed a c om pl ai n t f o r i ll egal st ri k e wi th th e N LR C agai n s t

W H E R EF OR E , p r emi s es c on si de r ed , r es pon de n ts ar e h e r e b y d ecl a r ed t o h a v e s tag e d an

Fi n all y, al l i n di vi dual r e sp on d en t s a r e h e r eb y di r ec t ed t o i mm edi at el y r em o v e

Pri v at e r e sp on d en t s app eal ed t o t h e N L RC w h i ch , on N ov e mb e r 29 , 2 000 , p r o mu l gate d

W H ER EF OR E , th e app eal i s h e r eb y gr an t ed . A cc o rdi n gl y, th e D e ci si on

II. W H E TH E R OR N O T T H E PR IVA T E RE SP O ND E N TS W H O P AR T IC IPA T ED IN T H E

I. T H E C OUR T OF A PP E AL S G RAV E L Y E RR ED A ND D EC ID E D T H E ISSU E S IN T H E INS TA N T

II. T H E C O UR T OF APP E A LS G RAV E L Y E RR ED B Y F A IL IN G T O AD DR ES S T H E O T H ER IS SU ES

Th e u n di spu t ed fa ct , h ow e v e r, i s th at a t th e ti me th e s tri k e wa s stag e d i n Ju n e 1 999 , v ol u n tar y

Art . 26 4. P r oh ibit ed a cti viti e s .

N o st ri k e o r l o ck ou t sh al l be d e cl ar ed a ft e r as su mpti on of j u ri sdi cti o n b y th e

Th i s C ou rt h a s h el d th at st ri k e s s tag ed i n vi ol ati on o f ag r e e men ts p r o vi di n g f o r ar bi trati on

Th e al l eged di smi s s al s of L u c en te an d r e sp on d en t Lan o ri as, b oth u n i on m em be r s , w h i ch

Fo r fai l i n g to e xh a u st al l st ep s i n th e a r bi trati on p r oc e edi n g s by vi rt u e o f th e Su bmi s si o n

Wi th r e sp e ct t o r e s pon de n ts av e r m en t th a t a ssu mi n g a rg u en d o th at th e N oti c e o f St ri k e an d

Arti cl e 263( f) i n p a rt stat e s: In e v e ry ca s e , th e u n i o n o r th e em pl oy e r sh al l fu rn i sh th e

H ow e v e r , i n ca s e o f u n f ai r l ab o r p ra cti c e i n v ol vi n g th e di s mi ssal f r om empl o y men t

Th e i mpl e m en ti n g r u l es cl a ri fy A rti cl e 263( c) i n th at th e u n i on m ay st ri k e i mm edi at el y

Wh at i s m or e , th e st ri k e h ad b ee n att en d e d by th e wi de s pr e ad c o mmi s si on o f p r oh i bi ted

Th e f ol l owi n g a ct s h a v e b e en h el d t o b e p r oh i bi ted a c ti vi ti es: wh er e th e st ri k e r s

In th e d et e rmi n ati o n of th e l i abi l i ti es o f th e i n di vi du al r e s pon de n ts , th e appl i cabl e p r o vi si on i s

A rt . 264 . P r oh ib it e d A cti viti e s (a ) x x x

In S am ah an g M an g g ag a wa s a Su l pi ci o Lin e s , In c . - NAF LU v . Su lpi ci o Lin e s , In c. [ 4 9 ] th i s

Respondent Illegal Acts

Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;

Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;

Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;

Knowingly participating in an illegal strike;

Rey Arsenal Member Intimidating, harassing, preventing, and

Cursing and use of abusive language