Lex Mercator I A
Lex Mercator I A
Since the nineteen sixties legal scholars have been systematically discussing
the nature and function of a purported autonomous body of transnational
commercial rules called lex mercatoria.1 Discussions have been ardent and
the subject has become controversial. Whereas some authors have endlessly
noted the advantages of the lex mercatoria others have denied its existence.
In spite of the numerous academic contributions, the notion of the lex mer-
catoria still remains unknown to the majority of the business and legal
communities. This fact alone could be a good reason for reconsidering the
question of the lex mercatoria. Furthermore, recent developments such as
the process of economical globalization, the irruption of Internet trade, the
adoption of two bodies of codified principles of contract law (the Unidroit
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of
European Contract Law) and the increasingly harmonization of contract
law in the EU, call for a fresh examination of the traditional regulation of
international contracts.
RETTID 2002 46
each country. It became blended with the peculiarities of national law and
thus is lost its uniform character. As states took control over international
trade, the new national mercantile laws regulated economic relations and
cross-border disputes were solved by referring to private international law.
The development of international trade after the Second World
War showed some of the flaws of the traditional regulation of international
contracts. The complexity of private international law rules and the obsolete
character of domestic laws did not satisfy the simplicity and certainty re-
quired by the business community. States soon became aware of the impact
of a legal divided world upon international trade and they reacted by means
of international conventions and model laws, which harmonize private in-
ternational law or substantive law aspects of international transactions. Nu-
merous conventions and model laws have been adopted in the fields of arbi-
tration, factoring, leasing, letters of credit or sales until present time. The
process of negotiation and adoption of these conventions is nevertheless dif-
ficult and time-consuming. The different economical, social and legal back-
ground of the participating states enlarges the negotiating process into vari-
ous decades (e.g. the drafting of the 1980 Viena Convention on International
Sale Contracts, CISG, took over 20 years). Usually, reservations are allowed
in order to adopt a final text. This leads to partial harmonization, different
interpretations of the same convention, and to the risk of having a petrified
regulation, which cannot be revised to adapt it to the further developments
of international trade.
The supremacy of national law in international economic relations
began to be questioned by scholars in the early nineteen sixties. At the same
time, they noted the renaissance of the law merchant phenomenon. Just as
medieval merchants overcame feudal law, present time traders were adopt-
ing alternative solutions to avoid the application of national law to their
transactions. By means of standard clauses, self-regulatory contracts, trade
usages and, especially, by recourse to international commercial arbitration,
traders were creating their own regulatory framework independently from
national law, the so-called new lex mercatoria.4
4
E.g. Schmitthoff, C.M., “Das neue Recht des Welthandels”, RabelsZ 28, 1964, pp.
47-77; Goldman, B., “Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria”, Arch.phil.dr. 9, 1964, p.
89 et seq.; Goldstajn, A., “The New Law Merchant”, J. Bus.L., 1961, p. 11; Kahn,
Ph., La vente commerciale internationale, 1961; Fouchard, Ph., L’arbitrage com-
mercial international, 1965; Stoufflet, J., Le credit documentaire, Paris, 1959.
RETTID 2002 47
general principles, and customary rules spontaneously referred to or elabo-
rated in the framework of international trade, without reference to a particu-
lar national system of law."5 From a positivist approach the lex mercatoria is
defined as a body of rules, transnational in their origin, but which only ex-
ists by virtue of state laws, which give them effect. For the supporters of this
concept the lex mercatoria is "ultimately founded on national law."6
Concerning its substantive quality, there are three main concepts
of lex mercatoria.7 The first one conceives the lex mercatoria as an autono-
mous legal order. The second one characterizes it as a body of rules capable
of operating as an alternative to an otherwise applicable national law. Fi-
nally, a third concept describes the lex mercatoria as a conglomerate of us-
ages and expectations in international trade, which may complement the
otherwise applicable law.
The concept of the lex mercatoria is usually blended with other
concepts, which may be similar or alternative. Some authors, for instance,
refer to transnational law as a synonym of the lex mercatoria. Transnational
law, however, is a broad concept, which encompasses all law regulating
transboundaries actions or events, including public and private international
law and other rules not fitting into those categories.8 The lex mercatoria is a
much narrower concept “used to indicate that part of transnational commer-
cial law which is unwritten.”9
The question of the sources of the lex mercatoria is unsettled as
well. It depends on each definition of the lex mercatoria at hand. From a
positivist viewpoint Schmitthoff included mercantile customs formulated by
international bodies such as the International Chamber of Commerce (e.g.
INCOTERMS, rules for documentary credits) and international legislation.10
From an autonomist position, Goldman embodied the usages of interna-
tional trade and general principles of law as the genuine sources of the lex
mercatoria.11 Under this view, codified usages are part of the lex mercatoria
only if businessmen refer to them with such a degree of frequency that it
may be concluded that the reference is implicit.12 Lando proposed an en-
larged list of sources, which comprises public international law, uniform
laws, the general principles of law, the rules of international organizations,
standard form contracts and reported arbitral awards.13 Goode has noted that
some of these sources would not fall under a strictu sensu concept of lex
mercatoria. Accordingly, the lex mercatoria is by nature customary and
spontaneous and, therefore, it solely consists of customary commercial law,
customary rules of evidence and procedure and general principles of com-
5
Goldman, B., Contemporary Problems in International Commercial Arbitration,
Julian D.M. Lew (ed.), 1986, pp. 113-125, at 116.
6
Schmitthoff, C.M., op.cit., p. 223.
7
Berger, K.P., The creeping codification of the lex mercatoria, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 1999, p. 40 et seq.; Craig, WL., Park, WW., Paulsson, J., International Cham-
ber of Commerce Arbitration, 2nd. edition, 1994, Oceana Publications, p. 603 et seq.
8
The term was first used by Philip C. Jessup in his work Transnational law; Goode,
R., New Developments in International and Consumer Law, Ziegel, J.S. (ed.), Hart
Publishing, Oxford, 1998, pp. 3-35, at 4.
9
Goode, R., ibidem.
10
Schmitthoff, C.M., op.cit., p. 34.
11
Goldman, B., op.cit., p. 114.
12
Ibidem.
13
Lando, O., 34 I.C.L.Q., 1984, pp. 747 et seq., p. 748.
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mercial law, including international public policy.14 Under this position, the
various sources named by Lando would, collectively, make up transnational
commercial law.15
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vention. From the point of view of legal pluralism, however, it is argued that
the lex mercatoria certainly belongs to the domain of "law". The concept of
"law" largely departs from the notion of sanction and social organizations
are capable of producing its own rules.25
Kassis has objected such position and claimed that legal rules
have an obligatory character. The rules enacted by the legislator have an in-
trinsic binding force, whereas customary rules require the so-called opinio
iuris, the feeling to be bound. This does not occur in the case of the pur-
ported rules of the lex mercatoria. Trade usages are a product of party
autonomy; they are contractual practices generally observed and used as a
proof of the will of the parties. The latter may therefore exclude their appli-
cation by an express stipulation in the contract.26 The proponents of the lex
mercatoria have counter-attacked such statement by noting that the societas
mercatorum has mechanisms of coercion to obtain compliance with its rules
such as black lists, damage to commercial reputation or withdrawal from
trade associations' members' rights.27 As a result, merchants actually feel
bound to observe the rules of the lex mercatoria.
Finally, it has been underlined that even if some of its elements
may be described as legal rules, the lex mercatoria does not have the quality
of a legal system. The societas mercatorum cannot present its convictions
and notions in a systematic order, as there is not a single international com-
munity of merchants but a plurality instead.28 At the most, there are only
principia mercatoria.29
25
Goldman, B., Archives de philosophie du droit, v. 9, 1964, pp. 177-192, p. 192.
26
Kassis, A., Théorie Générale des Usages du Commerce, Librairie Générale de
Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1984, p. 165 et seq.
27
Berger, K.P., op.cit., p. 29.
28
Lagarde, P., Études Goldman, LITEC, Paris, 1983, pp. 125-150, p. 139: "il semble
que ce soient seulement des îlots d'organisation qui apparaissent dans le commerce
international, non une organisation unique."
29
Highet, K., Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, Thomas Carbonneau, (ed.), Rev. ed.,
1998, Juris Publishing, Kluwer Law International, p. 134: "The concept of principia
mercatoria more correctly reflects the nature, application, and content of the law
merchant than any suggestion that it amounts to an inchoate or undiscovered legal
system that exists outside national jurisdictions."
30
Von Hoffmann, B., Contract Conflicts, Ed. P. North, 1982, p. 222.
31
Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, series A (Nos. 20-1)
(Judgments Nos. 14 and 15), at p. 41, quoted by Schmitthoff, C.M., op.cit., p. 474.
32
OJ L 266, 9 Oct. 1980; Lagarde, P., Rev. crit. dr. internat. privé, 80 (2), 1991, pp.
287-340, p. 300.
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preted as a mere incorporation of the usages of international trade into the
contract, subject to the mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable law.33
Such hegemony of national law and private international law in
the regulation of international contracts has been proven to be against the
certainty and simplicity required by international trade for different reasons.
Firstly, the localization of international contracts within a particular national
system is arbitrary. Most international transactions present connections of
equal importance with several legal orders. Moreover, some of these trans-
actions take place in the major trade centers and are more closely connected
to the transnational scene than to a single state, e.g. Euro-bonds. In the case
of electronic commerce, it may be complicated to locate the transaction
within the physical territory of a state because the Internet, which plays a
central role in this type of trade, is an immaterial marketplace. Secondly,
private international law rules are complex and their outcome often uncer-
tain. In the event of a dispute the final result will depend on where proceed-
ings are brought. National courts practice in many cases a homeward trend,
which leads to the application of the lex fori. Furthermore, national law is
not suitable for contracts between public bodies and private undertakers.
The applications of the public body’s own national law is not desirable. The
State in question may change the law to the detriment of the private party.
Likewise, a State is rarely willing to be submitted to a foreign law. Finally,
national law is primarily enacted to regulate domestic transactions and does
not take into account the needs of international trade. Sometimes, the appli-
cable law is foreign to the judge and/or the parties and requiring information
on its contents is cumbersome.
In the field of international commercial arbitration disputes are
usually solved by the application of non-national rules, alone or in combina-
tion with municipal law. International commercial arbitrators are not usually
bound to any particular national private international law rules, as their ju-
risdiction is based on the will of the parties and not upon the sovereignty of
a state. They are in many cases allowed to apply non-national law if the par-
ties so choose or in the absence of choice of the applicable law, e.g. Art. 17
ICC Arbitration Rules, Art. 33 of the UNCITRAL Rules on International
Commercial Arbitration, Art. 28 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitra-
tion, or Art.VII of the 1961 European Arbitration Rules. Other recent rules
on arbitration allow the arbitrator to directly find the substantive law appli-
cable to the dispute without previous recourse to private international law
e.g. Art.1496 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure or Art.1054 of the
Dutch Arbitration Act. When awards based on the lex mercatoria have been
subject to recognition or enforcement before national courts, the choice of
substantive law by the arbitrators has not been questioned. It could neither
be shown that the awards were ultra vires nor that the awards violated the
forum's public policy which otherwise would have jeopardized their recog-
nition under Art.V of the 1958 New York Convention.34 In this regard, the
33
Ibid, p. 301; On the distiction between kollisionsrechtliche Verweisung and ma-
teriellrechtliche Verweisung (ægte og uægte partshenvisning) see Lando, O., 189
Collected Courses, Vol.VI, 1984, pp. 255-256; Dicey & Morris, 13th ed., v.II, pp.
1226-1227; Kropholler, J., Internationales Privatrecht, 3rd. edition, Tübingen, 1997,
§ 40 I, pp. 268-269; Arnt Nielsen, P., International privat- og procesret, Jurist- og
Økonomforbundets Forlag, 1997, pp. 483-484.
34
E.g. the Norsolor Case, ICC award No. 3131, XII Yearbook of Commercial Arbi-
tration, 1983, pp. 109-111; the Rakoil Case (deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrge-
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1992 ILA Resolution recommends the validity and enforceability of awards
based on transnational rules where the parties have so chosen or when they
have remained silent as to the applicable law.35
It may be therefore concluded that the existence of the lex merca-
toria is supported by the practice of international commercial arbitration in
isolation from any doctrinal debate. Three are the foundations for this exis-
tence; the principle of party autonomy, the principle of good faith and the
use of arbitration.36
sellschaft mbH at al. v. The Government of the State of R'as Al Khaimah and The
R'as Al Khaimah Oil Company), [1987] 2 All ER, pp. 769-784.
35
Resolution on Transnational Rules adopted at the 65th International Law Associa-
tion Conference in Cairo on April 26, 1992.
36
Dasser, F., Internationale Schiedsgerichte und lex mercatoria, Schulthess Poly-
graphischer Verlag AG, Zürich 1989, p.46; Goldstajn, A., Festschrift für Clive M.
Schmitthoff, Athenäum Verlag, Frankfurt (M), 1973, p. 171.
37
Bonell, M.J., Uniform Law Review, vol. 2, 1996.
38
See: the Preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Con-
tracts, Rome, 1994 and art. 1:101 of the European Principles.
39
Bonell, M.J., 40 Am.J.Comp.L, 1992, p. 629.
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it can be referred to page and article number, and persons who are referred
to its provisions can locate and review them without difficulty. This alone is
a great contribution towards making lex mercatoria definite and provable.”40
There are a considerable number of examples where the legal
community has acknowledged the UP. Accordingly, the UP have been ap-
plied by arbitrators on several occasions and recognized by national courts.41
Likewise, the 1994 Mexico Convention endorses on its arts. 9 and 10 that
the principles of international commercial law recognized by international
organizations shall be considered to ascertaining the applicable law to the
contract. These references include the UP, for so was expressly noted during
the sessions of the Conference that approved the Convention.42
In any case, being the product of academic research, the charac-
terization of the UP and PECL as a whole as lex mercatoria depends on their
recognition by those involved in international trade. Only “when the actors
on the international trade stage, the parties to contracts, the arbitrators and
possibly judges start to use the Principles, the latter may, in due course,
grow into a part of the lex mercatoria.“43 This has been made clear in some
arbitral awards, in which the arbitrators found that some of the UP provi-
sions did not yet reflect a current practice of international trade.44
40
Selden, B.S., 2 Golden Gate University School of Law.
41
The UP have been applied in at least 30 cases, including national courts decisions
e.g. United States District Court, S.D. California, 7 Dec. 1998, Ministry of Defense
and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v Cubic Defense
Systems Inc., which held that the application of the UP in a previous arbitral award
as a source of “general principles of international law and trade usages“ without an
express authorization by the parties thereof constituted no violation of Article
V(1)(c) of the 1958 New York Convention; www.UNIDROIT.org/principles.
42
See, Parra Aranguren, G., 69 Tulane Law Review, 1995, pp. 1239-1252.
43
Boele-Woelki, K., Uniform Law Review, 1996, v. 4, p. 652 et seq., p. 659; also,
Goldman, B, op.cit., p. 114, on the quality as lex mercatoria of standard contracts
and general clauses established under the auspices of an international organisation.
44
ICC Award No.7375, Int'l Arb. Rep., 1996; see Berger, K.P., Uniform Law Re-
view 2000-1, p. 169, ICC Award No. 8873, Journal du droit international 1998,
1017; see http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/caselaw/caselaw-main.htm.
RETTID 2002 53
contract law where several directives have been issued.45 This has led to a
"communitarisation" of contract law.46
The intervention of the Community in the field of private law has
been fragmentary and it is not well coordinated. Furthermore, in those areas,
which still remain unharmonized, recourse has to be made to private interna-
tional law rules e.g. the Rome Convention. This leads to a paradox; whereas
law has been one of the main tools for European integration, the latter is, at
the same time, a great obstacle for the completion of the internal market. As
contracts are the main legal tool used in the circulation of goods and ser-
vices, the existence of fifteen different contract laws within the European
Union may hamper the optimal functioning of the internal market. Increased
transaction costs due to the necessary legal advice on foreign contract law
and uncertainty as to the outcome of possible future disputes hold many
traders away from the European market and keep them within their own na-
tional boundaries.47 Ultimately, consumers end up paying the price of legal
uncertainty.
The heterogeneous regulation of contracts in the national, communi-
tary and international context has given rise to a discussion on the need of a
common basis for contract law in Europe. For some time the debate on har-
monization of contract law has been merely academic, with an almost non-
existent political back up. Only two resolutions of the European Parliament
in 1989 and 1994, respectively, called for work to be started on the possibil-
ity of drawing up a common European Code of Contract Law.48 However,
over the past three years the issue on harmonization of contract law has been
impregnated of a political character. Indeed, in 1999 the conclusions of the
European Council held in Tampere requested ”as regards substantive law an
overall study on the need to approximate Member States legislation in civil
matters in order to eliminate obstacles to the good functioning of civil pro-
ceedings” (para. 39).49 Moreover, in its resolution of 16 March 2000 the
European Parliament again insisted on ”that greater harmonisation of civil
law has become essential in the internal market” and requested the Commis-
sion to undertake a study in this area. Finally, the European Commission
published in 11th July 2001 a Communication to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament on European Contract Law,50 seeking information from all
interested parties as to whether the co-existence of different national contract
laws hinders the functioning of the internal market (para. 72) and if so which
45
E.g. Council Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ L
095, 21/04/1993, p. 0029-0034, Council Directive 86/653/EEC on self-employed
commercial agents, OJ L 382, 31/12/1986 p. 0017-0021, Council Directive
85/577/EEC on Doorstep Sales, OJ L 372, 31/12/1985 p. 0031 – 0033, Council Di-
rective 87/102/EEC on consumer credit, OJ L 042, 12/02/1987 p. 0048-0053, Coun-
cil Directive 90/314/EEC on package tours, OJ L 158, 23/06/1990 p. 0059-0064, or
Directive 94/47/EC on time share, OJ L 280 , 29/10/1994 p. 0083 – 0087.
46
Benacchio, G., Diritto Privato della Comunità Europea, CEDAM, Padova, 1998,
p. 9.
47
Lando, O., International Contracts and Conflicts of Laws, Petar Sarcevic (ed.),
Kluwer, 1990, pp. 1-13, p. 2.
48
OJ C 158, 26.6.1989, p. 400 (Resolution A2-157/89); OJ C 205, 25.7.1994, p. 158
(Resolution A3-0329/94).
49
Presidency conclusions, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, SI
(1999) 800.
50
COM (2001) 398 final, 11th July 2001.
RETTID 2002 54
option would be the most appropriate to solve such problem (para. 73). Four
options were suggested by the Communication (para. 46):
I. To leave the solution of any identified problems to the market
II. To promote the development of non-binding common contract law
principles, useful for contracting parties in drafting their contracts, national
courts and arbitrators in their decisions and national legislators when draw-
ing up legislative initiatives
III. To review and improve existing EC legislation in the area of contract
law to make it more coherent or to adapt it to cover situations not foreseen at
the time of adoption
IV. To adopt a new comprehensive legislation at EC level e.g. a European
Contract Code
The idea of a European Contract Code (option IV) meets strong cultural,
political and legal difficulties.51 Consequently, other less interfering alterna-
tives are to be preferred. Amongst them is the notion of optional harmoniza-
tion. This has been described as the process of unification that takes place
from below, in the sense that it is not imposed by legislative means.52 In this
way, it is up to the different actors involved in intra-community trade to
contribute to a further unification.53 Diverse "private" projects have already
taken the initiative of setting up a common background for the unification of
private law in Europe e.g. the Pavia Group on a European Contract Code,
the European Civil Code Group, the Trento Project on the Common Core of
European Private Law and the Commission on European Contract Law,
drafter of the PECL.
It has been suggested that the PECL may function as a sort of European
Restatement of contract law (option II)54 or that they may be enacted as a
Model Law like the UCC.55 Both possibilities present certain flaws. Na-
tional laws giving effect to model laws are often enacted in somewhat al-
tered versions. The uniformity achieved is thus limited.56 It follows that a
European Uniform Contract Code adopted by means of a model law would
demand the uniform interpretation of a Supreme Court. The ECJ could func-
tion as such, but its competence would require a legal basis, which currently
is doubtful. As regards the Restatement method, the viability of a European
construction of national contract law in the light of the PECL "requires a
solid dogmatic groundwork in the respective European jurisdictions."57 It is
not clear whether courts within the EU will interpret national provisions
contra legem.58
51
Such as Euroscepticism, feasibility of reaching an agreement covering all areas of
private law, legal petrification or a doubtful legal basis for accomplishing unifica-
tion.
52
The latter is called mandatory unification.
53
Lando, O., European Review of Private Law, vol. 1, 2000, pp. 59-69.
54
Lando, O., New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, Cappelletti (ed.),
1978, p. 267 et seq.
55
See e.g. Schmid, Ch.U., Evolutionary Perspectives and Projects on Harmonisa-
tion of Private Law in the EU, Feiden, S. and Schmid, Ch.U. (eds.), EUI Working
Paper Law No. 99/7, pp. 103-124, p. 124.
56
Reimann, M., 3 Maastrich Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1996, pp.
217-234, at p. 228.
57
Berger, K.P., European Review of Private Law, vol. 1, 2001, pp. 21-34, p. 32.
58
See Case 192/94, ECR I 1281, Corte Inglés S.A. v Cristina Blázquez Rivero;
Lando, O., EUI Working Paper Law No. 99/7, pp. 11-29, at p. 25.
RETTID 2002 55
Another alternative could be to let the PECL contribute to the approxima-
tion of contract law in Europe through market forces and the lex mercatoria
doctrine (option I). The PECL could function as the governing law of intra-
community contracts if the parties so choose. This option would require an
amendment to or an extensive interpretation of the Rome Convention Art.
3.59 The American counterpart of the Rome Convention, the 1994 Mexico
Convention, empowers the judge to apply non-national rules that are espe-
cially designed to cope with the needs of international trade.60 By allowing
the parties to choose the PECL as applicable law traders may obtain the
flexibility, practicability and legal certainty international transactions re-
quire.61 The latter could be further consolidated when the two Protocols that
endorse the competence of the ECJ to interpret the Rome Convention enter
into force or when the Rome Convention is transformed into a EC Regula-
tion. Ultimately, the interplay between the PECL and national laws may
bring national contract laws closer together.
As to option III, no one seems to deny the need to simplify and consoli-
date the legal conglomerate produced by the Community in the field of con-
tract law. This is however, an entirely different pursuit from that of under-
taking the harmonization of the whole area of contract law.
59
Boele-Woelki, K., op.cit., p. 676.
60
Juenger, F.K., 45 Am.J.Com.L., 1997, pp. 195-208, p. 204.
61
Berger, K.P., op.cit., p. 154.
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