Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.

Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.

Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of 23 and 26 April, 1979, the
judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22 October 1979 of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial
conference.

Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children
of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers
purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining
years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-
ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum
dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and
lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners
with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father.

Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the
deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It
was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his
family were staying in Cebu.

After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter
vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them.

Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January
1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the proceeds
between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds
(2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the
use of the house by respondent after their father died.

In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as
the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof
should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the property.

Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers of both
parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with private respondent executing
a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and enter into any amicable
settlement in his behalf.1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-
trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife to Dumaguete City where she would be
a principal sponsor in a wedding.

On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court denied the motion
and directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.

When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel
appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he executed a special
power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff,
declared defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.

On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of
default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and plaintiff presented
his evidence.

On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and
plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement.
However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's
continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued
maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-
owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the
proceeds divided equally between the parties.

The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as
rentals2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the time the action was filed.

On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22 October 1979 the
trial court denied the motion.

Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and decision of
the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying defendants motion for
postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in
default and authorizing plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July
1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as
well as the assailed judgment rendered by default., The appellate court found the explanation of
counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of a manifest
intention to delay the disposition of the case. It also ruled that the trial court should have granted the
motion for postponement filed by counsel for defendant who should not have been declared as in
default for the absence of his counsel.

Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding that the motion
of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding
the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.

The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for
his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and
whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.

We find merit in the petition.

As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is
mandatory.3 A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as
in default.4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the
scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial
thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into account two factors in
the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and
(b) the merits of the case of movant.6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to
cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as
25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April
1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to
justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the
denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the
postponement for lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-
trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time indeed we
emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial
procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and
inexpensive disposition of cases.

Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled
pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date,
respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But,
since nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in default and directing
the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was proper.7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate
court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of
the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of
subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot
at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be
divided equally according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the time their
father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges
that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On
the part of petitioner, he claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of
P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.

In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be
sold to third persons and the proceeds divided between them equally, and for respondent to pay
petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with
their stipulated sharing reflected in their written agreement.

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of
monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial
court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them
who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one
case,8 this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the
properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.

However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any
compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of
the other co-owners.9 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same. 10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and
lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the
property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent
and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to
petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time
the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property
appertaining to petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the
right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and
his family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold
and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should
be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16
October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-
P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is
ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay
petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time
he received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the
premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision conformably with
Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Page 97, Rollo.

2 Presumable per month although the decision does not so specify.

3 Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 213.

4 Sec. 2, Rule 20, Rules of Court; Insular Veneer v. Plan, G.R. L-40155, 10
September 1976, 73 SCRA 1.

5 Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp. No. L-26325, 15 November 1982, 118
SCRA 229.

6 Guzman v. Elbinias; G.R. No. 57395, 17 April 1989, 172 SCRA 240.

7 Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40111, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 366.

8 Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 171.

9 Article 486, Civil Code.

10 Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450 (1912).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 56768 October 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO LACTAO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 15 April 1979, Apolonia Aramburo, then in the early bloom of her youth,1 was allegedly detained
by the accused in his 2m. x 3m. dwelling for about two weeks, and there raped every night while his
wife, at one time, watched with amusement. This is the version of the prosecution.

Thus by reason of the evidence presented by the prosecution, which the trial court pronounced to be
credible, accused PABLO LACTAO was found guilty of the crime of rape with serious illegal
detention, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of the
Twelve Thousand pesos (P12,000.00). He is now before us insisting on his innocence.

Apolonia testified that on 15 April 1979, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, she was outside the
house of one Teresita Alburo Perfecto in Bitan-O, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, where she was staying.
While throwing garbage, Luz Lactao, wife of accused Pablo Lactao, arrived and fetched her on the
pretext that her father wanted to see her.2Since Luz was known to her, as Luz and Pablo were the
agricultural tenants of her father,3 she went with Luz. They boarded a tricycle and proceeded to Sts.
Peter & Paul Subdivision. However, instead of bringing her to her father, she was brought to the
house of the accused where she was detained in a small room for about two weeks.4

That evening, the accused entered the room where she was lying down, removed her panties,
placed himself on top of her, and for about an hour, had sexual intercourse with her, while Luz who
was then a meter and a half away watched, laughing.5

Thereafter, every evening, for the entire duration of her detention, she was raped by the accused.6

Apolonia likewise said in open court that even prior to 15 April 1979, accused had dragged her a
number of times to a camarin adjacent to her house where she was repeatedly raped.7 Her
centenarian father who was living in the house was of little help since he was already half blind.8

Avelina Cadag, half-sister of Apolonia, then narrated that she reported the disappearance of her
half-sister to the police, but the police never found her. She saw Apolonia again only on 29 April
1979 after the latter was able to escape from the accused.9

That same afternoon, Apolonia was examined by the Senior Resident Physician of the Sorsogon
Provincial Hospital who found her hymen to have old healed lacerations which could have been
caused by continuous sexual contact, strenous exercise, accident, repeated scratching of the
vagina, and even climbing a tree or sitting or sliding on a stone. 10

The accused on the other hand asseverated the he never raped nor had sexual intercourse with
Apolonia before or after 15 April 1979. He was merely accused of raping Apolonia because he failed
to leave the land of Gabriel Aramburo, father of Apolonia and Avelina. Avelina, he said, had earlier
sought his ejectment as she wanted to gather the coconuts from the land he was
tenanting. 11 Besides, he asserted that he could not rape anyone in front of his wife and in the
presence of his five children who were there in their house. 12

On her part, Luz swore that on or about 15 April 1979 she could hardly move as she had just
delivered a baby on 7 April 1979 and was still recuperating therefrom. Thus, she could not have
fetched Apolonia in the morning of that day. 13

On 9 December 1980, the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, Tenth Judicial District, Br. I,
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, 14while discrediting Avelina Cadag's testimony as it was "muddled with
inconsistencies,"15 nevertheless found the testimony of Apolonia to be plausible, and convicted the
accused of rape with serious illegal detention. Hence, this appeal.

Accused argues the uncorroborated testimony of private complainant is not only incredible and
unbelievable but likewise saddled with inconsistencies showing the tendency of private complainant
to exaggerate and prevaricate facts.

The Solicitor General however counters that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Apolonia
refer only to minor details which are not intended to pervert the truth and were not sufficient
significance as to denote a deliberate intent to utter a falsehood; consequently, the penalty imposed
should be death considering that the accused was found guilty of the complex crime of rape with
serious illegal detention.

It may be worth to mention at the outset that there is no complex crime of rape with serious illegal
detention. If the purpose is to deprive the offended party of liberty, the crime committed is illegal
detention. And, if during the course of the illegal detention, the offended party is raped, a separate
crime of rape is committed; in this instance, two independent crimes are committed. However, if the
objective of the offender is to rape the victim only, and in the process, the latter had to be illegally
detained, only the crime of rape is committed since illegal detention is deemed absorbed in rape.

Hence, in People v. Ching Suy Siong, 16 Sionga was found guilty of two independent crimes, i.e.,
serious illegal detention and acts of lasciviousness, because the two acts did not come within the
purview of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code which applies to complex crimes, for certainly, one
cannot be considered as a means to commit the other. And, in People v. Bernal, 17 the appellants
were held guilty of the separate crimes of illegal detention and of multiple rape since the illegal
detention was not a necessary means to the commission of the crime of rape, and the offended
party could have been raped even if she was not illegally detained. 18 Thus, in People v. Gan,19 on
which the lower court entirely based its judgment in convicting the accused in the instant case,
Joaquinito Gan was found guilty only of the crime of rape even if he kept the offended party in a hut
for about four nights, and there repeatedly raped her. But notwithstanding the Gan ruling, the trial
court erroneously declared accused Lactao guilty of the complex crime of rape with serious illegal
detention, instead of rape.

Still, however, the case of People v. Gan 20 is not applicable since, in the case at bar, the evidence
presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of conviction.

While the trial court was correct in discrediting the testimony of Avelina Cadag for being "muddled
with inaccuracies," and which therefore needs no further elaboration, it failed to reject the testimony
of Apolonia which was not only replete with discrepancies but likewise inconsistent with human
experience and the natural course of things. Thus, when confronted by the defense counsel
regarding the length of her supposed detention, Apolonia averred —
 Q. In the direct examination, you testified that you were detained in
the house of the accused for one week. In your affidavit, sworn
affidavit, which you executed, you testified that you were detained for
two weeks. Now which is correct?

A. The two weeks is correct.

Q. In other words, the one you answered to the question of the Fiscal
during your direct examination was or is not true that you were
detained for one week?

A. Yes, sir. 21

When queried as to where she was allegedly abused on 15 April 1979, her answer was —

Q. A while ago you testified that when you lay down you had no mat,
you had no pillows nor mosquito net; in Question and Answer No. 10,
the accused went inside the mosquito net where you were sleeping.
Now which is correct?

A. There was a mat.

Q. In other words, you are changing your answer that you lay down
without a mat, without pillows, without mosquito net?

A. I was only mistaken. 22

And, when asked regarding her age, as the prosecution was trying to established that at the time the
incident happened, the alleged victim was less than twelve years old, she replied —

COURT:

Q. Why is your age in that affidavit wrong?

A. Because at that time I did not know yet, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. BORROMEO:

Q. In other words, even if you did not know exactly your age you
answered to the interrogating officer in this affidavit to the question
above that your age was 14 years?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Presently, you testified that your age is 12, is it not?

A. Yes, sir. 23
The flip-flopping of Apolonia not only creates serious uncertainty in her entire testimony but weakens
altogether the case of the prosecution which is left with only her depiction to prove its case after the
averments of the other prosecution witness have been totally discredited by the trial court.

Even the medical findings of the resident physician of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, Dr. Jaime
Co, who examined Apolonia the very day she was said to have escaped, is inconclusive that she
was indeed raped. Thus said Dr. Co —

Q. Doctor, what may have possibly caused this old healed laceration
at 3:00 o'clock, 7:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock?

A. It may be caused by sexual contact, by strenous exercise like

riding on a bicycle.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And the cause of the injury could not be exactly determined?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact it could have been caused by continuous scratching of the

vagina by herself Apolonia Aramburo?

A. It could be.

Q. And it could be also by climbing a tree considering that Apolonia

Aramburo is only about twelve years of age?

A. Possible. 24

Besides, Dr. Co testified that when he examined Apolonia on 29 April 1979, he found that the
lacerations in her hymen had already healed.25 This contradicts the claim that Apolonia was raped
every single day from 15 April 1979 to 29 April 1979.

In fine, inaccuracies between the statement of an alleged rape victim before a municipal judge and
her court testimony negate her credibility.26 Serious inexplicable discrepancies between her
previously executed sworn statement and her testimonial declarations raise grave doubt on the
veracity of her account. 27

Furthermore, Apolonia's testimony that she freely and intimately conversed with the children of the
accused during her entire detention in the house of the latter where she was repeatedly abused,
belies the claim that she was illegally detained, much more, ravished. And, it is highly improbable
that accused would abuse Apolonia in the presence of his five children and his wife who, if we are to
believe Apolonia, seemed to have enjoyed the horrid scene.

The version of complaining witness Apolonia is simply implausible as perversion has never been
considered a part of the Filipino marriage and family life. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the
accused would rape a young girl, the playmate of his own children, in the presence of the latter, and
in front of his amused wife who had just given birth. That is why, we say, the tale is contrary to
human experience and our way of life, and thus calls for absolute rejection. 28
In crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman should not be received with
precipitate credulity. 29The evidence for conviction must be clear and convincing to overcome the
constitutional presumption of
innocence.30 Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution was too weak and insufficient to
jettison that presumption.

On the other hand, the assertions of the defense remain uncontradicted and thus assume
importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the evidence for the prosecution.31 The
defense then that the charge for rape was trumped-up by Avelina Cadag to blackmail the accused
and his family into vacating the land so that she could gather the coconuts herself, even at the
expense of exposing the honor of her half-sister, deserves serious consideration. Indeed, it is not
far-fetched that the filing of the rape charge against accused Pablo Lactao was motivated by the
obssession of Apolonia's family to win back possession of their piece of land tenanted by him. 32

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused PABLO LACTAO guilty of the crime
of rape with serious illegal detention is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged; consequently, his immediate release from confinement is
ORDERED unless lawfully held for another cause. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 In her affidavit, Apolonia said when was 14 years old. However, during her direct
examination, she testified that she was only 12. Rectifying the inconsistency, she
stated on cross-examination that her age in her affidavit was erroneous, and
explaining that at that time she did not know yet her exact age.

2 TSN, 4 October 1979, pp. 6-7.

3 Id., p. 27; 6 February 1980, p. 8.

4 Id., 4 October 1979, pp. 7-9, 26.

5 Id., pp. 9-12, 22, 24-26.

6 Id., p. 32.

7 Id., p. 30.

8 Id., p. 32-33.

9 Id., 23 October 1979, p. 11.

10 Id., pp. 4-6.

11 Id., 6 February 1980, pp. 22-23.

12 Id., p. 20.

13 Id., pp. 3-4.

14 Judge Rustico de los Reyes, presiding.

15 Decision of the trial court, p. 9.

16 97 Phil. 989, unrep. (1955).

17 No. L-30483, 31 July 1984, 131 SCRA 1.

18 Compare with People v. Ablaza, No. L-27352, 31 October 1969, 30 SCRA 173,
where Ruben Ablaza was charged by Annabelle Huggins with forcible abduction with
rape, and while the case was pending, he kidnapped Annabelle, detained her for a
week for the purpose of causing her to withdraw her previous charge against him,
and while under detention, raped her again, the crime committed is serious illegal
detention because the act of rape was incidental and used as a means to break
Annabelle's spirit and induce her to dismiss the criminal charge.

19 No. L-33446, 18 August 1972, 46 SCRA 667.

20 Id.

21 TSN, October 1979, pp. 26-27.

22 Id., p. 23.

23 Id., pp. 15-16.

24 TSN, 23 October 1979, pp. 5-7.

25 Id.

26 See People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 79316, 10 April 1992, 208 SCRA 34.

27 See People v. Casim, G.R. No. 93634, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 390.

28 People v. Dag-uman, G.R. No. 96548, 28 May 1992, 209 SCRA 407.

29 People v. Casim, supra; Note 27.

30 People v. Tiwaken, G.R. No. 92988, 9 September 1992, 213 SCRA 701.

31 People v. Ambih, G.R. No. 101006, 3 September 1993.

32 See People v. Nuñez, supra; Note 26.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 48817 October 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, Br. X, GUMACA, QUEZON, and GREGORIO
MALCO, respondent-appellees.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Pedro O. Laurel for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The crux of the instant petition is the validity of the judgment of acquittal penned by a trial judge
detailed to a vacant branch of the court but promulgated after a permanent judge has been duly
appointed to the vacancy.

In an Information,1 dated 25 May 1976, private respondent Gregorio Malco was charged before the
then Court of First Instance of Quezon with attempted rape, docketed as Crim. Case No. 463-G and
raffled to Branch X of the same court then presided by Judge Mapalad A. Nañadiego. On 15 October
1977, after the defense rested, the case was submitted for decision.2 However, on 17 April 1978,
Judge Nañadiego retired without deciding the case.

Meanwhile, Judge Juan B. Montecillo, Presiding Judge of Branch III, was designated pro tempore to
take over Branch X. Among the cases submitted it to him for decision was this case of respondent-
appellee Gregorio Malco, which the judge decided on 22 May 1978.

On 9 June 1978, Judge Conrado R. Antona was appointed Presiding Judge of Branch X. He took his
oath and assumed office the following day,3 terminating ipso facto the temporary designation of
Judge Montecillo.

On 20 June 1978, Special Deputy Clerk of Court Mateo M. Cabangon promulgated said of Judge
Montecillo dated 22 May 1978 acquitting private respondent Malco of attempted rape.4 On 30 June
1978, Special Counsel Hjalmar P. Quintana moved to set aside the judgment of acquittal. On 10 July
1978, Judge. Antona denied the motion on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction "to
review and declare illegal the actuation of a co-equal Court."5On 8 August 1978, the Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied,6 thus sustaining the acquittal of private respondent. This
prompted Provincial Fiscal Dante H. Diamante, with authority from the Office of the Solicitor General,
to institute the present petition contending in essence that the decision of Judge Montecillo was null
and void since he was no longer judge-designate of Branch X when his decision was promulgated
as Judge Antona had already been appointed and qualified.
Still, the Solicitor General, tasked to submit the Brief for Petitioner, maintained that the appointment
and qualification of Judge Antona to preside over Branch X had the effect of immediately terminating
the temporary assignment of Judge Montecillo thereto, hence, his decision promulgated after the
expiration of his temporary detail was null and void and that, as a consequence, the trial court then
presided by Judge Antona should have set aside the judgment of acquittal penned by Judge
Montecillo.

The petition must fail. A trial judge whose temporary detail to a vacant branch has expired remains
to be the incumbent judge of the branch of the court where he is permanently assigned. Thus, he
may still decide cases submitted to him for decision during his temporary detail in the vacant branch
even after the vacancy has been filled. In one case,7 it was held that it was not unusual for a judge
who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record since the trial judge who tried the case
may have already died or retired. In fact, as early as 1915, this Court already ruled that "[t]here is no
law which prohibits a judge from deciding a case because he did not see some of the witnesses
when they testified therein. In the absence of any express prohibition of this kind, we cannot imply
one."8 The Court also said then —

[T]oday, when stenographers are employed in the courts in the trial of cases and
when a complete, authentic record of everything that transpires during the trial is kept
and when from said record, every one . . . may read . . . said record, and be informed
fully of every act, objection, or exception taken or made during the trial, there seems
to be but little reason for asserting that one qualified person may not be able to reach
a just and fair conclusion from said record . . . Every person may ascertain for
himself the correctness of any disputed fact in said record.9

As if realizing the practicability and validity of this procedure, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
Resolution dated 10 February 1983 laying down the guidelines in the distribution of cases in the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129) par. I, subpar. 1, of which
provides —

1. Cases already submitted for decision shall be decided by the Judge to whom they
were submitted for decision to judges who were promoted to higher courts or to
those who are no longer in the service.

Quite apparently, the foregoing provision does not state to whom the case was submitted for
decision must be the same judge who heard the case, totally or partially, although that would be
ideal. It does not even require that he heard any of the witnesses for the parties.

As may be noted, the pertinent portion of the Resolution of 10 February 1983 merely requires that
the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, i.e., in this case, a judge of the same
court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is promulgated.

Consequently, in the instant case, the judgement of acquittal penned by Judge Montecillo must be
declared valid. It is not necessary that he be the presiding judge of Branch X at the time his decision
was promulgated since even after the expiration of his temporary designation at Branch X he
continued to be an incumbent of Branch III. After all, where a Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) is divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and
separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a
complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said
branch of the judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. 10
Judge Montecillo penned the decision on 22 May 1978 while his temporary designation at Branch X
expired only on 10 June 1978 when Judge Antona qualified for the position. And, Judge Montecillo
was still an incumbent judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, being the permanent judge of
Branch III, at the time his decision was promulgated. Thus, he continued to possess authority to
dispose of the case. In fact, eve after his temporary designation, he continued to have authority and
could decide the case as it was one of those submitted to him for decision during his detail.

Besides, we have reviewed the records and we fail to find any evidence of bad faith on the part of
Judge Montecillo in preparing and signing the decision, nor on the part of Special Deputy Clerk of
Court of Cabangon in promulgating it. As adverted to, when Judge Montecillo took over Branch X in
an acting capacity, this case was one of those submitted to him for decision. Consequently, he
worked on the case, read and studied the records, and thereafter penned the decision. Except for
the authority of Judge Montecillo, who was legally without jurisdiction, neither the petitioner nor the
Solicitor General ascribes any regularity in the manner the case was resolved. The petition does not
question the soundness of the decision, but merely points to a technicality to annul the judgment of
acquittal.. Suffice it to say that the Court frowns upon technicalities, especially so if these are used to
put in jeopardy the acquittal of an accused who should be benefitted by a liberal construction of the
rules. In fine, the questioned decision being in accord with law and the facts, there is no reason to
disturb it; otherwise, double jeopardy will set in.

What is more, Judge Antona adopted the judgment of acquittal by denying the motions filed by the
prosecution. After all, the decision of Judge Montecillo cannot be said to be a decision of another
court, but of the same Court of First Instance of Quezon, and Judge Montecillo penned the decision
in fact as Presiding Judge of Branch X. To rule otherwise would be disruptive of an orderly judicial
process, for then the new judge would again have to start reviewing the case from its inception until
he can formulate his own decision. This is not the concept of a judge on detail to a vacant bench.

Indeed, it would have been difficult altogether if the judge whose decision was promulgated had,
prior to its promulgation, died, resigned, retired, been dismissed, promoted to a higher court, or
appointed to another office with inconsistent functions. Then, he would no longer be an incumbent
member of a court of equal jurisdiction, and his decisions written thereafter would be invalid.

A word of caution, Let not this case be considered by trial judges as a precedent for them to
continue to exercise authority over court where there are already incumbent judges, except where
the circumstances fall squarely within the ambit of the instant case. Detailed judges or those on
special assignments are strongly advised that before acting on any case of the branch where they
are assigned temporarily to ascertain whether they have authority over such case. Needless to
stress, judges should be extra careful and prudent in determining their authority over specified cases
to avoid any imputation or inference of irregularity, misdeed or wrongdoing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED; consequently, the decision of
the respondent Court ACQUITTING private respondent GREGORIO MALCO is AFFIRMED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 27.

2 Id., p. 29.
 3 Letter of Judge Conrado R. Antona to the Provincial Fiscal, dated 30 September
1978; Rollo, p. 30.

4 Rollo, p. 31-36.

5 Id., p. 44.

6 Id., p. 49.

7 People v. Collado, G.R. No. 88631, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 519.

8 United States v. Abreu, 30 Phil. 402, 411 (1915).

9 Id., p. 415, citing Enriquez v. Watson, 3 Phil. 279 (1904).

10 People v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 51513, 15 May 1984, 129 SCRA 233, citing Lumpay
v. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968 (1959).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the people.

NARVASA, C.J.:

In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in payment of his
share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated — petitioner Albino Co delivered
to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank,
postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1 The check was deposited on January 3,
1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
ACCOUNT."

A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 222 was filed by the salvage company
against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's
conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty
(60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was
reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on
the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160
(1987)3 — i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an
obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of
the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as
follows:

2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg.
22.

Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the

payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally
liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia
Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs.
Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A.
Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria
Aquino, August 7, 1981).

This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984
(Ministry Circular No. 12) — almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check
to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that
Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the
intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an
obligation," as follows:4

Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having

interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but
that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs.
Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim
that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an
obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.

Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. Citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to
the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP
22, enacted on April 3, 1979.

From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court
dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court
required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on
appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment,
Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
 Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code.
"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares
Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .5

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases.
These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576
which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of
loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado
v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on
June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given
retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect
that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no
retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be
convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before
publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the
soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a
tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by
RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding
that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect
adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590
of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an
employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason
whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"

So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial
Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964,
the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People
v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958).6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa,7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete
reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
 Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis
vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of
the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine
of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No
97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8

We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was
mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest
bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on
September 29, 1979.

At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as
amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited above. The petitioners
Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for
pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But
while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4
of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the
contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).

The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to
decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized in People v. Jabinal, 55
SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view
is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the
oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a
statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity.
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera,9 promulgated on April 24, 1985 — which declared
"that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no
force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in
reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." — the Court said:

. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had
taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no
rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 — concerning the effects of the invalidation of
"Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued
by the then President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v.
Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer . . ." — the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11

. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional
act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering
from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify
any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially
declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount.
Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not
however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the
declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in
force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done
while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in
all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
 existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on
whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a
declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a

statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot
County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil.
1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]).
An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the
Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).

Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision in Olaguer v. Military Commission No
34, 12 — declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against
civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons — this Court,
in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:

In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle,
be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final
when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military
courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the
convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional
rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on
the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be
released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and
commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were
created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated
declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did
not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision
in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the
limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27
SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a
municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check
issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22
— should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.

Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128,
applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is
inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go
Chico are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law
violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest
misconstruction of the law under legal advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the
present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a
private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government,
the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a
constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature
and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17 Senarillos
vs.Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that
in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary
construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.

This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must
be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are
reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED,
with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co, representing
Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella, representing Tans-Pacific
Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating were apportioned chiefly between FGU
Insurance and Development Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed
P2,329,022.00 and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.

2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for reconsideration,

promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of the Court on September 21,
1987, written for the division by Paras,J., with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez,
Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its "stamp of
approval" on the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now
settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."

4 Emphasis supplied.

5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the textbook of retired
Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1,
pp. 22-23) viz : 1) laws remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after
not habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power : e.g.,
tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259, Valencia et al. v.
Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5) substantive right declared for first
time unless vested rights impaired (Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v.
Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).

6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving prosecutions for illegal
possession of firearms, and both holding that appointment by the Provincial
Governor or Provincial Commander of a person as a "secret agent" or "confidential
agent" "sufficiently placed him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.

7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.

8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al., and is reported
in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas case is Tupas v. Damasco, et
al., reported in 132 SCRA 593 [1984].

9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.

10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the text of the
decision.

11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 (1987)
(Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where the question arose
as to whether the judicial nullification of an executive order creating a municipality
wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA
686 (1990); Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino
Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,
212 SCRA 425.

12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).

13 SEE also Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of February 26, 1991;
and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 [1991].

14 SEE footnote 3, supra.

15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person who shall
expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . . any flag, banner,
 emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, . . .

16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.

17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA 47.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 104731 October 27, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RENATO PASTORES y AVILA, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintif-appellee.

Prospero A. Crescini for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the trial court finding appellant Renato Pastores y Avila guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of selling "shabu".

Renato Pastores was prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The criminal information alleged:

That on or about the 30th day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any authority of law, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away .65 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug, worth P600.00, Philippine Currency, to one Sgt. Cresendo
Molina, who acted as poseur-buyer, in violation of the aforesaid law.

Contrary to law.1

Appellant on arraignment entered a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.

On 28 January 1992, the trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him as follows:

Wherefore, finding the accused RENATO PASTORES Y AVILA guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime charged, as defined and penalized under Section 15,
Article III, Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
 as amended by PD 1683, he is hereby sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus
costs.

So Ordered.2

Appellant, in his brief,3 ascribed the following errors to the trial court:

1. The court a quo erred in convicting the accused on the basis of doubtful evidence.

2. The court a quo erred in rejecting the evidence of the defense on the basis of
speculation.

3. The court a quo erred in giving more weight to the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty than the constitutional presumption of
innocence.

4. The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused on the basis of reasonable
doubt.

The evidence of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of four (4) witnesses,
namely,: (1) P/Sgt. Cresendo Molina, (2) P/Sgt. Rodrigo Ventura, (3) P/Cpl. Jaime Amor and (4)
P/Lt. Elizabeth Ayonon. A plastic bag containing "shabu", and six (6) marked one hundred peso
(P100) bills allegedly seized from the accused, were offered in evidence. P/Lt. Ayonon was the
forensic chemist who conducted the laboratory examination of the bag of "shabu" here involved.

The testimonies of the four witnesses for the prosecution were summarized by the trial court, as
follows:

P/Cpl Jaime Amor (Cpl. Amor, for short), Sgt. Cresendo Molina (Sgt. Molina, for
short) and Sgt. Rodrigo Ventura (Sgt. Venture, for short) are (sic) assigned to the
Special Task Force Unit, Quezon City Anti-Drug Abuse Council, Office of the Vice
Mayor, Quezon City Hall. On complaints received by said office which were listed in
a logbook, that a certain "Rey" Pastores ("Rey", for short) has been selling prohibited
drugs in La Loma, a surveillance was conducted by them. On July 30, 1991 at about
4:00 o'clock in theafternoon, a confidential informant called the Quezon City Anti-
Drug Abuse Council, with the information that "Rey" has been peddling "shabu". Sgt.
Molina, Sgt Ventura, Cpl. Amor and their Officer-in-charge Fernando M. Vinculado
(Vinculado, for short) set up a buy-bust operation at the corner of Iba and Cuenco
streets, La Loma, Quezon City. Sgt. Molina was designated as the poseur-buyer and
was given six P100.00 bills which he receipted for and on which he affixed his initial
under the logo of the Central Bank (Exhibits D, D-1 to D-6). Thereafter, Sgt. Molina
contacted the confidential informant for the latter to arrange the sale with "Rey". At
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of that same day, Sgt. Molina, Sgt. Ventura and a
certain Sgt. Malipayon proceeded to the area of operation, at the corner of Iba and
Cuenco streets. Sgt. Molina parked his car at Cuenco street about 6 meters from the
corner and alighted leaving Sgt. Ventura and Sgt. Malipayon inside to wait for the
pre-arranged signal which was the scratching or touching of Molina's head. "Rey"
arrived in a red Ford Cortina car at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. He parked
along Iba Street near the corner. He alighted and talked with the confidential informer
near the corner of Iba and Cuenco streets. Sgt. Molina was about 10 meters away.
Then the confidential informant called Sgt. Molina and introduced him to "Rey" as a
 friend and buyer, Sgt., Molina told "Rey" that he has P600. "Rey" went to his car.
When he returned to Sgt. Molina, "Rey" handed a plastic bag containing white
crystalline powder suspected for methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known
as "shabu" (shabu, for short). Sgt. Molina in turn handed the six marked P100.00 bills
to "Rey", who received it, then Sgt. Molina scratched his head. Thereupon, Sgt.
Ventura and Sgt. Malipayon rushed to them and pounced on the suspect. As they
were boarding "Rey" in the car of Molina, Sgt. Amor arrived, Sgt. Ventura drove the
car of Molina while Molina drove the car of the accused and they all proceeded to
Quezon City Hall. The six marked P100.00 bill were recovered from "Rey's" pocket.
Sgt. Molina turned him over to Sgt. Amor for interrogation together with the plastic
bag containing suspected "shabu" (Exhibit G) and the six marked P100.00 bills
(Exhibit D-1 to D-6), Sgt. Ventura conducted a search on the car of "Rey" but did not
find anything. During the interrogation "Rey" gavehis true name as Renato Pastores
but refused to give his statement, Sgts. Molina and Ventura gave their written
statements (Exhibits A, A-1, B, B-1), On the following day Sgt. Amor turned over the
plastic bag containing suspected "shabu" and the letter request for laboratory
examination signed by Vinculado, addressed to the chief, PNP Crime Laboratory
Service, Camp Crame (Exhibits C, C-1, H-2, H-3). Laboratory examination was
conducted by Forensic Chemist P/Lt. Elizabeth L. Ayonon on the contents of the
plastic bag and was found positive for 0.65 gram of Methampethamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibits E, H). In a referral letter, the matter was
referred to the Quezon City Prosecutors Office for proper disposition (Exhibit F).
Sgts. Molina and Ventura drew and sketched the buy-bust area
(Exhibits I, J).4

The accused-appellant presented another version of the facts leading to his arrest on 30 July 1991
which was summarized by the trial court as follows:

. . . On July 30, 1991 at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, accused left his house to
go to his sister-in-law at Mariveles street to borrow money for the registration of his
wife's car (Exhibits 13, 14, 17, 1,7-a to 17-c) in addition to the P400.00 which he had
in his pocket then. His sister-in-law gave him P2,940.00. Thereafter, he went to the
house of John Corpus also at Mariveles street and chanced upon Rafael and Dindo
Antonio who arrived there earlier. They talked about the fighting cock that they will
use in the San Juan Derby. After about 30 minutes accused left but when he was at
Cuenco Street he remembered that he forgot to relay to his sister-in-law his wife's
message for his sister-in-law. Instead of turning back he decided to park his car in
front of Iba and Cuenco Streets and just walk back to his sister-in-law's house which
was about 20 meters away. Before he could step out of the car, a red Toyota car
blocked his car in front; another vehicle parked right on accused car's side and
another vehicle, a Ford Fiera at the back. Armed men, among them, Sgts. Molina
and Ventura, alighted. Sgts. Ventura and Molina poked a gun at him and forced him
to step out of the car. Accused followed and was ordered to place his hands on top of
his car while Sgt. Molina searched his body but did not find anything. They dragged
him and boarded him at the backseat of Sgt. Molina's car. This incident was allegedly
witnessed by Layag and de la Pasion who executed their affidavits (Exhibits 8, 8-A,
9, 10, 10-a).

Sgt. Molina took the accused's Citizen diver's watch worth P6,000,00. His car was
driven by Sgt. Molina while Molina's car was driven by Sgt. Ventura. He sat at the
back with Sgt. Ventura and Cpl. Amor. While inside the car Cpl. Amor took the
P400.00 from the accused's pocket. They proceeded to the SOU, NARCOM, Camp
Crame. MSgt. Jose C. Pedrosa was there. While at said office, Sgt. Molina ordered
 him to undress and took the P2,940.00 which he borrowed from his sister-in-law. Sgt.
Molina asked him where he was hiding the "shabu". Thereafter he was directed to
dress up and board the back seat of Sgt. Molina's car. Msgt. Pedrosa, Sgts. Molina
and Ventura likewise boarded the car. They proceeded to the police headquarters at
EDSA where Sgt. Molina dropped off. Then they drove to the gasoline station at
Timog. After 15 minutes Sgt. Molina arrived and accused was directed to remove his
T-shirt, handcuffed and blindfolded with his T-shirt which the police officers tore. The
car moved and he heard someone asking where they will throw him. Accused
pleaded to them not (sic) do it because he is innocent. They stopped for a while and
Vinculado arrived and the accused was transferred to another vehicle. They
proceeded to Camp Crame. His blindfold was removed in Camp Crame and he was
brought to Vinculado. Vinculado asked him if he knew Bebot Remolacio and Gary
Sugid but when he answered no he was blindfolded again and maltreated for more
than more or less one hour. He sustained injuries but was not brought to a doctor
despite his request. He was detained at the NIU detention cell for 2 months.5

The version of the accused, with respect to the circumstances leading to his arrest by the special
task force, was corroborated by Mrs. Salud Layag and Mr. Danilo de la Pasion.

Mrs. Layag testified that at about 7:00 in the evening of 30 July 1991 she saw the accused about to
park his car in front of her sari-sari store. She noticed three vehicles quickly close-in on accused's
car Plain clothes men with long and short firearms alighted from these vehicles. Two armed men on
board the red car which led the pack of vehicles directed appellant to step out of the car and raise
his arms behind his head. These men bodily searched appellant. Mrs. Layag was about three (3)
meters away from the accused and the men who searched appellant. After the precipitate search,
accused was placed on board the red car and the team drove away.

Danilo de la Pasion testified that he was relaxing on a bench of Mrs. Layag's stare some four (4)
meters away from accused's car when a red Toyota cut across the path of the accused and two (2)
other vehicles hemmed in closely behind accused's car, De la Pasion declared that two (2) armed
men from the red Toyota went over, to accused who was seated inside the car and without any
companion. The accused stopped out of his vehicle upon orders of the two (2) men. De la Pasion
noticed that these men were searching for something. De la Pasion declared that he could clearly
see the faces of the men who searched accused and the car because of the bright fluorescent light
of Mrs. Layag's store that night. After the search, the accused was placed on board the red Toyota.
One of the two (2) armed men drove accused's car and the team of four (4) cars sped away.

Clearly, there is here an irreconcilable conflict between the testimonies of the police officers, on the
one hand, and the statements given on the witness stand by the accused, Mrs. Layag and Mr.
Pasion, on the other. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the detailed demeanor of
all witnesses and to listen to their respective testimonies, gave "full faith and credit" to the
declarations made by the prosecution witnesses. The narration given by law enforcers outweighed
that of the witnesses for the defense because, according to the trial court, the witnesses for the
prosecution were Narcom agents presumed to have regularly performed their duties while accused-
appellant was a notorious drug pusher. The trial judge concluded that the defense of extortion was
the accused's attempt to taint with illicit motives the acts of the Narcom agents.6

This Court, ordinarily, would rely upon the settled principle that "findings of the trial court on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by appellate courts."7 There are of course well-recognized exceptions. When (1) the
conclusion was a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; or, (2) the
inference drawn was manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; or, (3) there was grave abuse of
discretion; or (4) the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts; or (5) the court, in making
its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and the appellee, the Court has not hesitated to disregard the trial court's rulings on
questions of fact.8

We have carefully scrutinized the evidence on record and it appears to us that there was some
misapprehension of facts in this case and either a deriving of inferences from the facts which are
manifestly mistaken or a failure to draw reasonable inferences from the facts shown on the record.

Firstly, the Court notes that the testimonies, both oral and documentary, of the prosecution's
witnesses were replete with inaccuracies and inconsistencies which engender serious doubts as to
the veracity of the Narcom agents' narration of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the
accused.

Sgts. Molina and Ventura, as well as Cpl. Amor, testified that the accused was arrested during a
buy-bust operation carefully planned by their Officer-in-charge, Capt. Vinculado. During the
supposed planning meeting, these witnesses were present and were assigned specific tasks. Sgt.
Molina was designated as poseur-buyer while Sgt. Ventura and Cpl. Amor were directed to provide
the necessary back-up. The team used two cars: Sgt. Molina, Sgt. Ventura and Sgt. Malipayon were
on board one, while Cpl. Amor and his driver were in the other.9 Yet, the responses elicited from the
three witnesses at the witness stand reveal that Cpl. Amor was not present during the actual
operation. In fact, he arrived only after the accused had been apprehended and he proceeded to the
premises for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the circumstances leading to the arrest of
the accused.

Sgt. Molina, the poseur-buyer, appeared uncertain about several aspects of the transaction between
himself and the accused. In his sworn affidavit, marked and offered in evidence as Exhibit, "A" 10 and
executed on the night of the buy-bust operation, he declared that he handed the marked bills to the
accused before the bag of white powder was delivered to him. On direct, examination in open court,
he testified that he delivered the marked money after the bag was handed to him by the
accused. 11 The defense counsel pointed out to Sgt. Molina the apparent discrepancy between the
statements contained in Exhibit "A" and those made on the witness stand, Sgt. Molina agreed with
the defense counsel that his (Molina's) memory was accurate at the time he executed his affidavit.
Yet when Fiscal Gabriel, in the latter's attempt to reinstate the credibility of the witness, asked Sgt.
Molina on re-direct examination which of his statements — those contained in his affidavit and those
made on the witness stand — were true and correct, Sgt. Molina declared that his statement on the
stand was the true and correct narration of the events. His testimony was recorded as follows:

Prosecutor Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct examination:

Q: Which is true, which truth do you want the Court to understand,

that which is placed in your affidavit, or that which you testified the
last time around?

A: Sir, in my affidavit sir.

Q: You are retracting again what you said in open court?

A: What was the question before?

Court to the interpreter :

 You translate for the second time, or third time.

A: No, sir, the one I am testifying here in Court is the truth. (Emphasis
supplied)

Later, however, Sgt. Ventura, who was allegedly just a few meters away from the supposed
negotiation and whose testimony was offered to corroborate the testimony of Sgt. Molina,
contradicted the testimony of the supposed poseur-buyer Sgt. Molina. The testimony on direct
examination of Sgt. Ventura, in pertinent part, follows: 12

Prosecutor Gabriel:

Q: When the accused talked to Sgt. Molina, what happened next?

A: I saw Sgt. Molina gave (sic) something to the suspect which I am

very sure that it was the buy-bust money. Binonot niya po sa bulsa
niya yong pera. He was taking out the money from his pocket.

Q: After Sgt. Molina drew the money from his pocket, what
happened?

A: He gave it to the suspect.

Q: After he gave the money to the suspect, what next transpired?

A: The suspect went back to his car and got something from the
compartment and returned to Molina.

Q: After that what happened?

A: I saw him gave a transparent plastic bag to Molina.

Q: How far were you from Molina and the accused at the time that
was happening?

A: Just near, sir, about seven to 10 meters. (Emphasis supplied)

Sgt. Molina also gave conflicting accounts of incidents which allegedly transpired prior to his
encounter with accused-appellant. Sgt. Molina, during his direct examination, outlined the relevant
events: first, a tip from an informer was phoned-in; then, the operation was mapped out by Capt.
Vinculado; thereafter, the "asset" (i.e., informer) was again contacted by phone to set-up a meeting
between accused and Sgt,. Molina. The following testimony of Sgt. Molina is pertinent.

Prosecutor Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct-examination:

Q: About 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, do you remember

of anything to which your attention was called?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?

A: When our confidential informant called us in our office that a

certain alias Rey Pastores was engaged in the delivery of
metamphetamine chloride, commonly known as shabu. 13

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did you do when he revealed that information?

A: I asked (sic) my commanding officer Capt. Fernando Vinculado

that one alias Rey Pastores was selling shabu and delivering
metamphetamine hydrochloride.

Q: And what was the reaction of your superior?

A: He set a buy-bust operation, along corner Iba and Cuenco Streets,

La Loma.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now what actually was the pattern set forth by the buy-bust
operation?

A: I was designated as poseur-buyer, by our commanding officer.

Q: And being designated as poseur-buyer, what was your designated

mode of action or activity? What were you supposed to do as poseur-
buyer?

A: To receive the money and contact again the confidential

informant.14

xxx xxx xxx

Q: After receiving the six one hundred peso bills from

Capt. Vinculado, what did you do?

A: We set the operation, sir.

Q: How did you set it up?

A: I was to act as poseur-buyer. We contacted the confidential

informant to set-up the buy-bust operation.

Q: What time was the buy-bust operation set-up?

A: At around past 6:00 o'clock.

Q: I see. How were you able to contact your confidential informant?

 A: Through telephone sir. 15

Yet, on cross-examination, Sgt. Molina recalled that their informant had tipped them off about the
illegal activities of the accused, and had informed the Narcom agents that a meeting had been
arranged between accused and Sgt.Molina. Sgt. Molina said on cross-examination:

Atty. Crecini to Sgt. Molina an cross-examination:

Q: And so, how were you able or from were you able to obtain the
information that the supposed sale between you, pretending to be the
buyer, and the accused, would take place at 7:30 in the evening of
that date?

A: My informant, sir.

Q: So, after calling you at 4:0 o'clock are you saying that he called
you again?

A: No, sir. He did not call me up again.

Q: Are you saying that when he called you at 4:00 o'clock, July 30,
1991, he already told you that he has made an appointment to meet
with the accused at 7:30 in that evening?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Are you very sure about it?

A: Yes, sir. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

There are other gaps and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses relating to
the buy-bust operation that Narcom agents claimed to have planned and executed. Notably, for
instance, the prosecution witnesses could not, agree on whether or not, or by whom, the car driven
by appellant Pastores was searchedby the police for drugs or other contraband items. The
extraordinary testimony of the prosecution witnesses on this point is summarized by the defense in
the following terms:

Cpl. Amor testified that he did not search the car driven by appellant because he was
told by Sgts.Molina and Ventura that they already searched it and found nothing
inside (t. s. n. October 7, 1991, pp. 28-30). Sgt. Molina, however, said that he never
searched the appellant's car either at the site of the operation or at their office at City
Hall (t.s.n., October 15, 1991, pp. 25-26). Sgt. Ventura gave an entirely opposing
version. He said that at the scene of the operation, they did not search the car of the
accused, but when they reached their headquarters, he, Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Amor
searched the car! (t.s.n., October 21, 1991, pp. 49-50). 17 (Emphasis supplied)

Even the very composition of the police team sent to carry out the operation, and the participation of
each member, became the subject of murky and inconsistent testimony from the police witnesses
which has been summarized by appellant's counsel as follows:
 . . . [Sgt. Molina] has never satisfactorily explained why in his affidavit (Exhibit
"A"), he placed Cpl.Amor as a member of the back-up team when he (and Sgt.
Ventura) knew only too well that the other member was Agent Malipayo, not
Cpl. Amor. The versions of these three as to the presence of Cpl. Amor at Iba Street
are at head-on collisions. Cpl. Amor said that he proceeded to Iba Street because
Sgts. Molina and Ventura called him at their office and that was after appellant had
been arrested (October 7, 1991, p. 20).

For his part, Sgt. Molina said that he was surprised when he saw Cpl. Amor arrive at
the scene of the buy-bust operation because Cpl. Amor, as investigator, was
supposed to be on duty in their office at City Hall awaiting the outcome of their
operation. He said he never told Cpl. Amor to join them there at Iba Street either
before or after the operation (October 15, 1991, pp. 23-24).

Sgt. Ventura gave a different account. He said that Cpl. Amor was supposed to be
with him as back-up but Cpl. Amor was just delayed along the way (October 21,
1991, p. 26). But in answer to the question of the court, Sgt. Ventura said that when
they went to the place of the buy-bust operation, he was with Sgt. Molina and
Malipayon in one car, and in the other, Cpl. Amor and his driver (Id., p. 27). Asked by
Pros. Gabriel what was the participation of Cpl. Amor in the buy-bust
operation, Sgt. Ventura admitted that Cpl. Amor arrived after the arrest of the
appellant (Id., pp. 38, 51). Sgt. Ventura categorically denied having called Cpl. Amor
by telephone to follow them at the area of the operation (Id., p. 51.).18(Emphasis
supplied)

We must note that the Office of the Solicitor General failed to address and reconcile the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which appellant's counsel had
underscored. 19

Generally, we have declared that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses do not affect
their credibility. 20In the case at bar, however, as pointed out by counsel de parte of appellant, the
inaccuracies do not, in the aggregate, just refer to collateral matters. Each individual inconsistency
or inaccuracy pointed out by appellant's counsel might, if considered by itself, not appear serious;
when, however, these inconsistencies and inaccuracies are viewed in their totality, they appear to
the Court substantially to erode the credibility of the Narcom officers and raise a lot insubstantial
doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution's theory that the accused had in fact been arrested as a
result of a buy-bust operation. 21 The doubt which has been generated in our mind relates, not to
whether the accused had been arrested, but to whether or not a buy-bust operation had indeed been
mounted and carried out and the accused's arrest, effected in the course of such operation. It is very
difficult for the Court to understand why, if a buy-bust operation had indeed been planned and
executed by the Narcom officers, an operation which does not seem unusually complex and difficult,
the testimonies of the Narcom officers about that operation and the modality thereof should not have
been more forthright and specific and consistent, with each other in relevant detail.

Secondly, we do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that sufficient evidence had been
adduced establishing accused's notoriety, as a drug pusher. Sgt. Molina's bare testimony is not
sufficient to establish the charge that the accused had regularly peddled or traded "shabu" along Iba
and Cuenco Streets, La Loma, Quezon City. 22 Neither does an allegation by Sgt. Molina that
accused's name was included in the Order of Battle, a police logbook said to contain the names of
notorious drug pushers, sufficiently prove that accused had in fact been involved in illegal activities.
The surveillance supposedly conducted by Narcom agents had apparently been carried out in such
a relaxed and casual manner as to render the state's witnesses unable to answer elementary
questions about the accused, much less questions concerning the extent of the drug trade going-on
in Iba and Cuenco Streets. The testimony of Sgt. Molina as to the nature and extent of the
surveillance said to have been carried out prior to appellant's arrest, was as follows:

Fiscal Gabriel to Sgt. Molina on direct examination:

Q: In this statement Exhibit A, you stated among other things that you
conducted surveillance over the accused before a buy-bust
operation. Why must it necessary for you to conduct a surveillance?

A: Because of the many reports to us, sir, about him.

Q: How long did you place him under surveillance before the buy-bust
operation?

A: More or less, one (1) month, sir. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Crescini to Sgt. Molina an cross examination:

Q: During the one month surveillance that you

conducted, you (sic) were never able to determine or find out where
the accused was living?

A: No, sir.

Q: Did you exert effort to locate where the accused was living
considering that there were many complaints against him? did you
exert efforts?

A: We exerted efforts, sir.

Q: What effort did you exert?

A: To find out those who know him.

Q: All right. You received numerous complaints. Were you able to

determine the identities these complainants to verify the truth of their
complaints?

A: No sir. It was reported through the telephone.

Q: So these complaints were anonymous the telephone calls?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: There was never anyone who gave his name to you so that you
could verify how true or how false the complaint was?
A: No, sir. Nobody gave a name. That is why we conducted a
surveillance.

Q: Very good. What did the surveillance consist of. Did you go to that
area of Iba and Cuenco street to make inquiries about these alleged
activities of the accused?

A: Yes, sir. I went there twice.

Q: Did you talk to anyone who provided you with positive information?

A: Yes, sir, a certain Rudy.

Q: What is the full name of Rudy?

A: Hindi ko po maano.

Q: What do you mean "hindi maano"?

A: I do not know the full name.

Q: But you talked to him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you ask him what his full name?

A: No. sir.

Q: Did you not ask him where he lives?

A I asked him, sir.

Q: Did he give you his address? his exact address?

A: No, sir.

Q: I am asking whether Rudy gave you his address?

A: Yes, I asked him.

Q: Did he refuse to give to you?

A: No, sir. He did not refuse to give his address, but he just told me
that he is from that place.

Q: And you were satisfied with listening to the story of this Rudy
whose address you did not even bother to find out?

A: No, sir.
 Q: All right. If you were not satisfied with the statement of Rudy did
you obtain additional information to satisfy you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who else did you interview from that place? name (sic) names if
you can.

A: I cannot remember anymore, sir.24 (Emphasis supplied)

The amount, of "shabu" allegedly confiscated from appellant at the time of the bust detracts from the
trial court's conclusion that accused was a notorious drug pusher. We note that the anonymous
informant had advised the Narcom operatives that heavy drug trafficking was going, on in Iba and
Cuenco Streets. Yet, only a fraction of a gram was confiscated from accused. No other substance
was found in the vehicle driven by the accused.

Thirdly, the testimony of accused was corroborated by two disinterested witnesses. As earlier noted,
the trial court seriously doubted the credibility of the defense witnesses because their testimonies
were apparently in conflict with respect to the precise actual positions of the vehicles that boxed-in
accused's car. 25 We do not understand why such an inaccuracy should have completely destroyed
the credibility of the witnesses for the defense. The judge should have simply subjected their
testimonies, specially that of Mrs. Salud Layag and Mr. Danilo de la Pasion, to the ordinary
processes of evaluation; and accordingly assigned to such testimony the weight and probative value
called for.

The testimony of accused, as corroborated by Salud Layag and Danilo de la Pasion, was to the
effect that no buy-bust operation had in fact been conducted. The accused had just pulled over to
the carrier of the street and was about to alight from his car when three (3) vehicles cam and boxed
his car in between; he was forthwith arrested. The character of the accused may not be
unblemished. He admitted using "shabu" before. His chosen occupation may not be admirable
either. He admitted that he was engaged in loaning large sums of money, to gamblers. But these
circumstances, by themselves, do not disqualify accused-appellant as a competent witness.
Moreover, his testimony, independently of his bad or good moral character, was not inherently
improbable. The trial court had no adequate basis for concluding that the testimonial evidence
ofappellant was absurd, illogical and incredible." 26

We are also concerned over the perfunctory way the trial court disregarded appellant's charges of
maltreatment. The accused, during the preliminary investigation conducted upon his request, filed
counter charges against the Narcom agents for grave threats, grave coercion, robbery and
perjury. 27 During the trial of the case, the accused gave a straightforward and detailed account of his
experiences while in the custody of his captors for more than two (2) months. 28 The trial court
completely ignored the testimony of the accused, saying only that if the Narcom agents had
maltreated the accused, the latter should have sought the help of his wife and his father who was
also a police officer. 29 We do not see any necessary relationship between failure to seek assistance
from one's relative and a finding that there was no maltreatment of a detainee by the detaining
officers. Clearly, the inference reached by the trial judge was not sufficiently grounded on facts
established during the trial.

Finally, we are aware that "frame-up" is a common defense in drug and other cases.30 Frame-up, like
alibi, may be a weak, defense that is easily alleged. 31 The accused in the case at bar stated that he
had been subjected to harassment and extortion on at least two (2) previous occasions at the hands
of police officers despite his innocence. Accused was, in other words, asserting that in the instant
case he had been arrested, charged and jailed because he was unable to comply with extortionate
demands of police officers. What is remarkable here is that the accused's testimony to this effect, as
well as to the effect that he had been divested of cash and personal property he had with him at the
time of his arrest, was very specific and concrete names; dates; the values of particular personal
property; and amounts demanded from and given by him to police officers, were specified. As
summarized by the trial court, the testimony of appellant on these matters was as follows:

Accused testified that Cpl. Amor robbed him of P400.00 cash and Sgt. Molina his
diver's watch worth P6,000.00 and P2,940.00 cash which he borrowed from his
sister-in-law for the registration of his wife's car. He claimed that he is a casino
financier with a capital of up to a million and thereabout and that he lends money to
casino gamblers from P50.000.00 to P100,000.00 with cars and checks as collateral.
He has been in the business since 1985 until July 30, 1991 but at the time of the
arrest he had no money. He cried (sic) to explain his seemingly pathetic financial
state by saying that he had just lent P100,000.00 in May, 1991 to Mandy Antonio
with the agreement that he shall pay him before Christmas of 1991 at 2% a day
interest. Mandy Antonio is bankrupt, has a recruiting agency, and has gone to Japan
but accused lent the money to him just the same without collateral because he
simply trusted him. Unfortunately, Mandy Antonio has not paid him.

xxx xxx xxx

Accused testified that, there were previous occasions when he was apprehended
because of "shabu." The first was in 1988 when Lt. Jimmy Carbonell, Pat. Basco and
Patrolman San Jose entered his house to arrest him for possession of "shabu" but,
the arrest was not pursued because he gave them P101,000.00. The second
occasion was on February 23, 1991 when Lt. Rey Arceo, Cpl. James Baldomera and
many others arrested him at the corner of Luna St. and Tacio Street also because of
"shabu" but they did not file a case against him because he gave them P30,000.00.
The third occasion happened on April 10, 1991 when he was arrested by Sgt. Jack
Jacinto, Cpl. Caballes Arturo, Amy Yerro and Sgt. Quitoriano. This time he did not
give any money, because his father P/Col. Alfredo Pastores intervened by talking
with General San Diego. His father and General San Diego allegedly agreed that the
accused was not released and instead a case was filed in court which is still pending
before Judge Tirso D. C. Velasco. He claims that he is not guilty in all cases. He
cannot give money anymore because he does not have any since his money worth
P300,000.00 was lent to Mandy Antonio, a friend, who went to Japan and has not
paid him yet. He executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibit 15). He found later that his
wife's car was divested of its stereo, amplifiers, 4 speakers, spare tires, antenna, one
pack of blue seal cigarettes, Bally shoes and 35 pieces of cassette
tapes. . . . 32

Again, appellant's testimony on the above matters might not, by itself, suffice to tilt the balance of
proof in his favor; the prosecution did not try to rebut appellant's detailed testimony, and the trial
court airily waived away appellant's statements about having been robbed and about the extortion
sought to be exercised an him. But his above testimony must be considered in conjunction with the
weakness of the evidence given by the prosecution's witnesses previously discussed. Upon the one
hand, appellant's defense of frame-up tends to reinforce the doubt already engendered by the
weaknesses of the prosecution's evidence about the supposed buy-bust operation; upon the other
hand, it was not indispensability necessary to inquire into the truthfulness of appellant's allegations
concerning frame-up and extortion whereas in this case, the evidence of the prosecution is weak. 33 It
was incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate accused's culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Independently of whatever defense has been offered by the accused, the evidence of the
prosecution must survive the test of moral certainty. Conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's evidence, not merely on the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty,
and certainly not on the weakness of the accused's defense; otherwise, the constitutional
presumption of innocence will be reduced to a conspicuous futility.

In the light of the facts and circumstances on record, the Court finds that the evidence adduced by
the prosecution was insufficient to support accused's culpability. The presumption of regularity of the
performance of the official duty does not by itself overcome the presumption of innocence to which
accused is entitled. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt; the Court's mind and conscienceremain vexed and uneasy.

WHEREFORE, for failure of proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt, the accused Renato
Pastores is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The decision of the trial court dated 28
January 1992 is hereby REVERSED. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 6; 3 Records, p. 1.

2 Id., p. 32; Certified Xerox Copy of the decision dated 28 January 1992 is attached
to Appellant's Brief, p. 46.

3 Id., p. 46.

4 Id., pp. 20-23; see also Certified Xerox Copy of the Decision in Appellant's Brief, p.
46.

5 Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 9-12; Rollo, p. 46.

6 See Decision dated January 28 1992; Records, p. 46.

7 See People vs. Gerones, 193 SCRA 263 (1991); People vs. Natan, 193 SCRA 355
(1991); People vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493 (1991); Concepcion vs. CA, 193 SCRA 586
(1991); People vs. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36 (1991); People vs. Arenas, 198 SCRA
172 (1991).

8 People vs. Deocariza, G.R. No. 103396, 3 March 1993; People vs. Salcedo, 195
SCRA 345 (1991); People vs. Yutuc, 188 SCRA 1 (1990); People vs. Taruc, 157
SCRA 182 (1988); Arcado Cortes y Vengson vs. Court of Appeals and People, 163
SCRA 139 (1988).

9 See TSN, 7 October 1991; 1 Records, p. 32. TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 27;
Records, p. 129; TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 7, Records, p. 68.

10 See 2 records, p. 1.
11 TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 13; Records, p. 74.

12 TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 32; 1 Records, p. 134.

13 TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 6; Records, p. 67.

14 Id., p. 7; Records, p. 68.

15 Id., p. 9; Records, p. 70.

16 TSN, 21 October 1991, p. 3; Records, p. 106.

17 Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 20.

18 Id., pp. 21-22.

19 Appellee's Brief, Rollo, p. 57.

20 See People vs. Barba, 203 SCRA 436 (1991); People vs. Bragaes, 203 SCRA
555 (1991).

21 See also People vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350 (1991); People vs. Lim, 196
SCRA 809 (1991).

22 See Testimony of Sgt. Molina, TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 6; Records, p. 67.

23 TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 17; Records, p. 78.

24 TSN, 15 October 1991, p. 34; Records, p. 95.

25 See Decision, pp. 28, 29; Records, p. 46.

26 Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 28.

27 3 Records, pp. 3, 4.

28 TSN, 4 December 1991, p. 2-10; 1 Records, p. 232-238.

29 Decision dated 28 January 1992, p. 14; Records, p. 46.

30 See People vs. Tejada, 170 SCRA 497 (1989).

31 People vs. Madarang, L-70569, 147 SCRA 123 (1987); People vs. Paco, G.R. No.
76893, 170 SCRA 681 (1989); see also People vs. del Pilar, G.R. No. 86360, 188
SCRA 37 (1989); People vs. Vocente, G.R. No. 80533, 188 SCRA 100 (1990).

32 Trial Court Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, 25-26.

33 People vs. Salguero, 198 SCRA 357 (1991).

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 101833-34 October 26, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO ARCE y BORROMEO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Azcuna, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Alberto Arce y Borromeo was charged with rape and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, in
two (2) separate informations. In Criminal Case No. VIII-635, he was charged with rape committed
as follows:

That on or about January 30. 1990, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Alberto Arce y Borromeo, together with one John Doe who was not identified, armed
with a gun, conspiring together and helping each other, with lewd design and by
means offorce, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Perlita Acio de Leon,
against her will and consent.1

In Criminal Case No. VIII-637, the information charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
read as follows:

That on or about January 30, 1990, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
Alberto Arce y Borromeo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [have]
in his possession and under his control and custody one (1) cal .38 Rev. (Paltik)
Smith and Wesson, with four (4) [rounds of] live ammunition, without first securing
the necessary permit or license to possess the same from the corresponding
government agency/agencies authorized to issue such permit or license; and which
loose and/or unlicensed firearm was carried and brought by the accused outside of
his residence without first obtaining a written authority to carry the same outside of
his residence from the proper and lawful authorities. 2

Arce pleaded not guilty to each of the two (2) informations. On motion of the defense and with the
consent of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the joint trial of the two (2) cases.3
After trial, the court a quo convicted Arce of both crimes. The dispositive portions of the decision
read in part as follows:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, the Court in (1) Criminal Case No.
VIII-635, finds the accused Alberto Arce y Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal, of the crime of rape as charged in the information and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law; to pay the offended party Perlita A. de Leon, the sum of
P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and for him to pay
the costs.

(2) In Criminal Case No. VIII-637, the Court likewise finds the accused Alberto Arce y
Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms as charged in the information, and there being an aggravating
circumstance that the unlicensed firearm was used in the commission of a crime
committed at night time and no mitigating circumstance to off-set the same, hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law; the gun, cal. 38 (Exhibit "C") is ordered forfeited in favor of
the government and for him to pay the costs.

xxx xxx xxx4

Appellant Arce now urges:

(1) in respect of the rape case, that the trial court erred in finding him the assailant of
Perlita A. de Leon; and assuming, without admitting, that he was her assailant, in
holding that he had also raped Perlita A. de Leon; and

(2) in respect of his conviction for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, that
the trial court erred in holding Arce as the possessor of the unlicensed handgun
found at or near the scene of the rape.

The trial court summarized the facts it found in the following manner:

At about 2:15 in the early morning of January 30, 1990, the complainant Perlita Acio
de Leon accompanied by one Rodalyn Medrano, a 10 year old girl, went to see her
husband Bernard de Leon, alias Boyet, at the Double J Disco, Centro, Aparri,
Cagayan. They were not able to see her husband thereat and on their way back
home near the Metro Bank building, Perlita was accosted by aperson from behind,
later identified as the accused Alberto Arce, whose face was then covered by a T-
shirt. Complainant ran towards the Double J disco to seek assistance but she
stumbled, hence, she was overtaken by the accused and the latter brought her at the
back of the Tana ricemill with a gun caliber 0.38 poked at her left temple. Meanwhile,
her companion Rodalyn Medrano ran to report the incident to [her] father Rudy
Medrano, and the latter together with others, immediately went to report the incident
to thepolice authorities, who responded immediately.

When they reached the back of the ricemill, the accused [initially tore the front portion
of the dress of Perlita, then] ordered [her] to remove her duster which she complied
because of the poked gun on her temple. She was later dragged to a corner of the
ricemill and was forced to lie down. The accused lowered his pants and underwear,
then went on top of her, holding hertightly with his hands around her neck and kept
 on kissing her. She struggled but the person held her tightly then lowered the left
side of her panty and inserted his penis. Not being successful to do the sexual
intercourse, the accused again lowered her panty above her knees, but that was the
time the policemen arrived focusing their flashlight. The accused hit her left eye with
the gun telling her to hide, and not to shout, but she was able to take possession
ofthe gun and shouted for help, as the accused was confused and probably shocked
and afraid, even as she bumped her head on the cemented wall. After which, the
accused ran away and jumped into the Apagonan river. The complainant
surrendered the gun to the police team who rescued her. The policemen tried to
pursue the accused but failed to overtake him despite warning shots. Thefollowing
morning, the accused was picked up, and Perlita recognized him, [due to] his voice,
as the real culprit.

At the scene of the crime, the gun which is unlicensed (Exhibit "C") was recovered,
and same was surrendered by complainant; the gray t-shirt (Exhibit "D") which was
used by the accused was likewise recovered; the duster (Exhibit "E") and the green
slippers (Exhibit "F") were also recovered; and the maong pants (Exhibit "G") used
by the accused which was still wet when the policemen went to the house of the
accused that same morning was likewise recovered.

The accused put up a defense of alibi . . . .5

Appellant Arce's view of the facts, insofar as the rape charge is concerned, was essentially the
following:

On the night of 29 January 1990, Arce, together with his wife, his brother and mother, slept in their
house in Minanga, Aparri, Cagayan. He made love with his "common law" wife Evelyn Vallejo that
night, first at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening after which he slept, and then again at around 4:00
o'clock in the following early morning. He then slept until 6:00 o'clock a.m. At 7:00 o'clock that
morning, he was picked up by three (3) policemen from his residence and brought to the PNP
Headquarters where he was identified by complainant Perlita A. de Leon as her attacker and rapist.

Appellant stresses that no prosecution witness had asserted having actually seen him at the scene
of the crime before, during or immediately after the assault. He avers that, therefore, the trial court
could not reasonably conclude that he was the assailant of Perlita A. de Leon and that he was the
possessor of the allegedly unlicensed firearm found at the scene of the rape. In respect of the rape
charge, appellant Arce further argued that the trial court had erred in finding that rape had been
committed against Perlita A. de Leon, considering the absence of medical evidence establishing the
fact of rape and in view of Perlita's admission that she had been "nearly raped" and not actually
violated.

We have carefully gone over the record of this case and we consider the above arguments of
appellant Arce bereft of merit. Rape is a crime that is normally witnessed only by the victim and her
assailant; acquittal or conviction of the assailant would, therefore, frequently depend upon the
victim's testimony. The court has consistently held that a person charged with the crime of rape may
be convicted thereof on the testimony of the victim as lone witness, provided that that testimony is
credible and convincing.6

Testifying on what happened on the night of the physical and sexual assault upon her, Perlita A. de
Leon stated that: while running away from appellant, who was chasing her, she stumbled and fell on
the road, hurting her hands and bruising her knees in the process; that appellant caught up with her
when she fell to the ground and then forced her to stand up; that when appellant started assaulting
her behind the ricemill, she was pushed to the ground; that although her assailant had already
partially inserted his male member into her private part, she fought back and thereby bruising
various parts of her assailant's body; that her continuous struggle prevented her assailant from fully
inserting his male organ into her; that her assailant pulled open the side of her underwear in a
renewed attempt at full introjection; that her assailant again failed in his effort at full penetration
because he became aware of the police approaching with lights and calling out complainant's name
and arriving at the scene of the crime; that the approach of the police caused the assailant to strike
her in the face, hitting her left eye with the butt of his handgun in an attempt to silence her; that when
she cried out for help, appellant repeatedly pounded her head against the cement wall of the ricemill;
that she used her elbows to try to shield her head from injury; that before the police could lay their
hands on appellant, despite the warning shots of the police, appellant ran away into the dark,
stumbling towards the nearby river and plunging into it.7

Perlita de Leon's testimony was corroborated in its salient points by other prosecution witnesses.

Dr. Romulo A. de Rivera, the Municipal Health Officer and attending physician of complainant after
the rape, corroborated her testimony concerning her injuries. The trial court summed up the
testimony of Dr. Rivera in the following terms:

Next to testify for the prosecution was Dr. Romulo de Rivera, Municipal Health
Officer of Aparri, Cagayan. He declared that he examined Perlita de Leon and he
issued a medical certificate to that effect marked as Exhibit "I". Wound No. 1 located
on the left eyelid must have been caused by a fingernail and the victim and the
accused might have been face to face. It could also be possible that the injury was
caused when the victim was pushed and the said portion hit a rough surface. Wound
No. 2 located on the left eyebrow might have been caused when the victim was
pushed and the said part struck a hard surface on the ground. Wound No. 3 located
below the left eye might have been caused by a blunt instrument. It could also be
caused by a fist blow. Wound No. 4 located on the upper right arm could be possibly
caused by a fist blow, blunt instrument or hand handling tightly that part of the body.
Wound No. 5 located on the left forearm could be possibly caused by a fingernail, an
object with rough surface or maybe when the victim was pushed to the ground.
Wound No. 6 located on the left right finger could be possibly caused when it came in
contact with hard surface or when the victim was pushed to the ground. Wound No. 7
located on the right knee could be possibly caused when the victim stumbled forward
with her knee hitting the ground. Wound No. 8 could be possibly caused when the
victim was pushed. Wound No. 9 located on the middle part of the leg could be
possibly causedsimilar to the injuries of the knee. All the wounds indicate that there
was violence and these signs of violence might be the result of the victim's
resistance.8 (Emphasis supplied)

The circumstance that no medical examination of the victim's private parts was conducted, does not,
constitute a fatal hiatus in the prosecution's evidence. The Court has previously held that in crimes
against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for
the successful prosecution of the crime, the purpose of the examination being commonly merely
corroborative in nature.9

Perlita de Leon's testimony concerning the events preceding the assault and rape were also
corroborated by Rodalyn Medrano, the 10-year old child-companion of the complainant on the night
of the crime. Rodalyn Medrano testified to e.g., the masked man with the gun chasing the
complainant; the direction of the chase; and the complainant stumbling to the ground while fleeing
and sustaining knee injuries and arm bruises. 10
Also on the record are the testimonies of Sgt. Pedro Adap, Rudy Medrano and Corporal Eddie
Reyes, all of whom were at the scene of the crime and who corroborated complainant's testimony on
matter's contemporaneous with and immediately after the assault, e.g., complainant's physical
condition and appellant's manner and mode of escape.11

In view thereof, the Court finds no basis for disregarding; and overturning the credence given by the
trial court to the testimony of the complainant. The observations of the trial court are worth noting:

. . . she related her testimony with a ring of truth and never faltered even during cross
examination.There was no evidence presented that she fabricated her story and
there was no evidence adduced to show that she has reason to falsely accuse
Alberto Arce. Settled is the rule that the lone testimony of the victim can be the basis
of conviction if found worthy and credible. The manner, the demeanor and the way
the complainant testified, lead to the inevitable conclusion that indeed she was raped
by the accused. She will not dare come out in the open and stand the rigors and
suffer humiliation during public trial, if her motive is not to obtain justice. She has no
reason to fabricate (People v. Bravo, 180 SCRA 694) and considering the age and
education of the complainant, she has no reason to fabricate her story. [sic] (People
v. Reyes, 137 SCRA
99).12 (Emphasis supplied)

In respect of appraisal of the credibility of witnesses, the firmly settled rule is that the findings of the
trial court are to be accorded great respect and at times deemed final, that court having been in a
position to observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness
chair. Appellate magistrates will generally not disturb such findings of the trial court, unless the latter
has patently overlooked facts of substance and value which, when considered will affect the
resolution of the case. Here, the court: finds no reason to depart from the general rule and no basis
for reversing the trial court's finning that complainant Perlita de Leon had in fact been assaulted and
raped on the night of 30 January 1990.

As to the fact or extent of execution of the rape, it is sufficient to recall that the slightest degree of
penetration of thepudenda by accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape. Thus,
complete or even substantial introjection is not necessary, and Perlita did testify that Arce's member
did partially enter her private parts.

It is true that no one at the scene of the crime had identified appellant as the assailant of Perlita de
Leon, considering that the assault and rape had occurred in the dead of night and the place of the
rape was unlighted. Complainant herself at the time of commencement of chase did not see
appellant's face because the latter's face was, at least partly, covered with his T-shirt.

Identification of the doer of a crime is not, however,exclusively limited to identification by visual or

optical perception of the face and person of the accused. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court, conviction may rest on indirect or circumstantial, evidence when the proven circumstances,
taken together, constitute an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him. In the instant case,
at least three (3) circumstances converged to sustain Arce's guilt.

First, there was the wet maong pants of appellant Arce. The prosecution had established that
appellant was wearing maong pants when the latter, in making good his escape jumped into the
nearby river and swam or waded away. When appellant was arrested at his house a few hours after
the incident at the ricemill, the arresting officers retrieved from appellant's clothes hamper, and from
among the other soiled dry clothes, a pair of wet maong pants, whichadmittedly belonged to
appellant. 13 No explanation was given by appellant regarding the wet condition of his denim pants,
except that it, together with other clothes, was then due for washing.

Second, appellant, at the time of his arrest, was found with bruises and other injuries on his person.
The complainant had testified that in the ensuing assault on her person, she in the course of
defending herself, inflicted bodily injuries, e.g., bruises and scratches, upon her assailant. 14 Corporal
Reyes, testifying on the circumstances surrounding the arrest of appellant Arce, stated:

Cpl. REYES:

At first there were three suspects, they were Guillermo, Boy Ursonio
and Arturo Oliva, Sir.

COURT:

There were three suspects?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So, you have no definite idea of the culprit at the time you found
the victim?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: The victim did not reveal to you the person who molested her?

A: No, Sir.

FISCAL:

By the time the victim did not know yet, Your Honor.

Q: After presenting these three suspects what did you do with them?

A: After presenting them to the victim, she told us that they were not
the ones so we took another person and we discovered that Arce
sustained some injuries, Sir.

COURT:

Who is that suspect?

A: Alberto Arce, Sir.

FISCAL:

How long have you known Alberto Arce?

A: For a long time already, Sir.

 Q: How come that you were able to get him?

A: Barangay Captain Oliva told us that it might be Arce and when we

were going to see him, we met Alberto Arce, so we took him with us,
Sir.

Q: Where did you get him?

A: In front of the house of Lao, Sir.

Q: When you encountered Alberto Arce in that place, what did you do
next?

A: We brought him to the victim and presented him to her, Sir.

COURT:

Where did you present him?

A: Inside the Headquarters, Sir.

Q: What transpired there?

A: She pointed out that he was the one who dragged her to the back
of Tana Ricemill, Sir.15

In his direct testimony, accused-appellant described his injuries as follows:

FISCAL MIGUEL:

As a matter of fact, Brgy. Captain Orlando Oliva together with the

policemen even saw the injuries that you sustained . . .

ATTY MACADAEG: [Defense Counsel]

No basis, Your Honor.

COURT:

Witness may answer.

APPELLANT:

Yes, Sir.

FISCAL MIGUEL:

What part of your body?

[INTERPRETER]:
 Witness pointed to his right upper lip; right check bone and right
elbow. 16 (Emphasis added)

Appellant Arce tried to explain away his injuries as having been caused by a bicycle fall just the day
before his arrest. The trial court did not give his explanation much credit in view of, among other
things, his failure to corroborate the same and in view of the circumstantial evidence.

Third, complainant Perlita A. de Leon identified appellant Arce as her assailant and rapist through
his voice. In the course of assaulting and raping her, the assailant spoke to Perlita at least three (3)
times. The relevant portions of Perlita's testimony follow:

[FISCAL MIGUEL TO COMPLAINANT PERLITA A. DE LEON]

Q: And what happened when your were at the back of the ricemill?

A: He stopped pushing me, sir.

Q: And what did he do next when he stopped pushing you?

A: When he stopped pushing me, he told me "do not shout I will kill
you", sir.

Q: And what did you say?

A: Why, what do you want from me", sir. (bakit ano ban ang gusto mo
sa akin).

Q: What was his answer?

A: Why don't you know (bakit hindi mo ba alam) and he tore my

duster, sir.

Q: And what part of your duster was torn?

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Now after removing your panty, what did he do next?

A: That was the time when [the] persons were flashing their flashlight,
sir.

Q: And what did you do when you observed that there were persons
focusing their flashlight?

A: When he noticed that persons were flashing their flashlights, he

told me to hide, sir?

Q: And did you hide?

A: Yes, sir.
 Q: And what happened next after that?

A: When he told me to hide, he also followed me, sir.

Q: When he followed you, what did he do next?

A: He again poked his gun to me, sir.

Q: What part of your body?

A: To my left temple sir.

Q: And what did he do again when he poked that gun to the same
portion of your body as you indicated?

A: When he poked again, he said, "do not shout, I will kill you", sir.

Q: And what happened next?

A: While he was telling me do not shout I will kill you, I slowly reached
for the gun he was holding, Sir. 17 (Emphasis supplied)

The verbal exchanges between complainant and appellant were not, of course, prolonged
and extensive. The assailant's words were, however, of such a deadly serious and
threatening nature and conducted under such dramatic and stark circumstances as
reasonably to have impressed themselves firmly on the consciousness and memory of
complainant Perlita de Leon. The next day at the police station, the police authorities first
showed three (3) persons who were potential suspects to complainant de Leon: one
Guillermo, Boy Ursonio and Arturo Oliva. Complainant Perlita did not point to anyone of them
as her assailant. Subsequently, however, appellant Arce was brought in together with other
persons and complainant Perlita de Leon was once more asked to look them over. Perlita
asked the potential suspects to speak. Appellant Arce spoke first and immediately upon
hearing his voice, Perlita de Leon, without hesitation or qualification, identified Arce's voice
as the voice of the man who had uttered threats against her as he assaulted and raped her.
The following portions of appellant's own testimony are noteworthy:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Atty. Macadaeg

Q: Did you go with the policemen as requested by them?

APPELLANT Alberto Arce

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Where did they bring you?

A: At the police headquarters, Sir.

Q: What happened at the headquarters?

 A: They let me sit down, Sir.

Q: What happened next?

A: After a while, Cpl. Adap went inside the office and brought out a
woman [later identified as the complainant], then they asked me to
talk and when I talked, the woman said "that is the voice."

Q: Is that all that the woman told Cpl. Adap?

A: Yes, Sir."

Q: And that woman turned out to be Perlita de Leon?

A: Yes, Sir. 18 (Emphasis added)

On cross-examination of appellant, the prosecution brought out the following facts:

FISCAL MIGUEL:

When you were there together with this Roderick Guillermo, Jr.,
the woman whom they called came out and pointed to you that you
were the one who bused her on the night of January 29, 1990. . . .

ATTY. MACADAEG:

Misleading, she said "that is the voice".

FISCAL MIGUEL:

When she heard your voice she even pointed to you is that correct?

APPELLANT:

They asked me to talk first then she pointed at me saying "that is the
voice".

Q: And when that woman pointed to you, Roderick Guillermo, Jr., was
there?

A: Yes Sir and other persons who are from Minanga were also there,
they were Arthur Oliva and Roderick; Brgy Captain Orlando Oliva
even uttered that if they will point to his son they would rather kill
each other. 19 (Emphasis added)

Aggregating the above circumstances, we consider that appellant Arce was shown, beyond
reasonable doubt, to be the person who has assaulted and raped Perlita de Leon on the night of 30
January 1990.
We turn to Criminal Case No. VIII-637 for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. It is
important to recall that the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused did not have a license to possess a firearm and did not have any legal authority to carry a
firearm outside of his residence. It is, of course, the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays
that burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm, and every ingredient or essential
element of an offense must be shownby the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In People v. Pajenado, 20 the Court through Dizon, J. wrote:

It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179, and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758,
could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person charged with
illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess
the firearm, but We are of the considered opinion that under the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as to
the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the
prosecution must be proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged",
the burden of proof was with the prosecution in this case to prove that the firearm
used by appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.

It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of

the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information filed against the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681)
specifically alleged that he had no "license to permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol
mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely
to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar
adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with
having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the
qualifications required to be a voter. It wasthere held that the negative fact of lack of
qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime charged and should
be proved by the prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564)
where the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had
diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients
from whom he received monetary compensation, without having previously obtained
the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as
provided in 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of the
negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the qualifications
provided by law, is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution
has the burden of proving the same , although in view of the difficulty of proving a
negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a
prima facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both
appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case
upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former
Chief Justice Moran upholds this views as follows:

"The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of the proof
of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of the burden of
proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have
acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar
instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a
business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution
aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly,
although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more
facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party
 alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject
matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of
the accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice
to cast the onus upon him" (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition,
p. 8) (Emphasis added)

Here, the record is bereft of even a prima facie showing of the essential element of lack or absence
of a license or legal authority to carry the firearm here involved. In other words, the prosecution,
although it had shown at leastprima facie that the seized firearm had been held or used to appellant
Arce, failed to prove thatappellant had no license or authority to possess that firearm and to carry it
outside his residence. The very paucity of testimony and other evidence on this point is remarkable;
it is also indicative of the casual way in which this charge was handled by the police and the public
prosecutor. The only relevant testimony on this point is the following:

WITNESS (Cpl. Reyes)

When we showed her the suspect, it was the time; when she told us
that he was the person from whom she grabbed the gun, Sir.

COURT:

Aside from the information given to you by the offended party, did you
exert effort to verify as to whether or not there is another person who
has the license with respect to this firearm?

A: None, Sir.

Q: Did you go to the PC to verify who is the owner of that gun?

A: No, Sir.

COURT:

That will be all. 21 (Emphasis supplied)

We are compelled to conclude that the guilt of appellant Arce in respect of the charge of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition was simply not established by the necessary quantum of
proof.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing:

(1) the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. VIII-635 for rape is hereby AFFIRMED en toto;

(2) however, the decision in Criminal Case No. VIII-637 for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition is hereby REVERSED and appellant Alberto Arce ACQUITTED of such offense on
ground of reasonable doubt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Records of Criminal Case No. VIII-635, p. 3.

2 Records in Criminal Case No. VIII-637, p. 1.

3 Records in Criminal Case No. VIII-635, p. 48.

4 RTC Decision, p. 15; Rollo, p. 30.

5 Id., p. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

6 People v. Rabanes, 208 SCRA 768 (1992); People v. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647
(1992); People v. Alvarez, 213 SCRA 722 (1992); People v. Mabunga, 215 SCRA
694 (1992); People v. Biendo, 216 SCRA 626 (1992).

7 TSN, dated 7 June 1990, pp. 9-19.

8 RTC Decision, p. 5, Rollo, p. 20. See also People v. Estolano, 193 SCRA 730
(1991).

9 People v. Diaz, 212 SCRA 147 (1992); People v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 518 (1990).

10 TSN, dated 14 June 1990, pp. 24-30.

11 TSNs, dated 14 June 1990, pp. 37, 46; dated 24 July 1990, p. 24; dated 25 July
1990, p. 18, respectively.

12 RTC Decision, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 27-28.

13 TSN, dated 28 February 1991, pp. 17-19.

14 TSN, dated 7 June 1990, pp. 15-16, et. seq.

15 TSN, dated 25 July 1990, pp. 12-14.

16 TSN, dated 28 February 1991, pp. 25-27.

17 TSN, dated 7 June 1990, pp. 11-17.

18 TSN, dated 28 February 1991, pp. 19-20, et seq.

19 Id., pp. 25-27.

20 31 SCRA 812 (1970). Also People v. Ti

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and
LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents.

VITUG, J.:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita
Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.
On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews
of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as
well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. a petition
for Review on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court
referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent court,
thus —

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF

SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as "The Family Code of the Philippines," is explicit.

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
 (3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by

consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in
accordance with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to
paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209,
expressing as follows:

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the
wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), exactly
adopted that found in then Article 336 of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter I, Title II, of
the said decree provided :

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.

Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under which regime, a joint adoption by the
spouses was apparently not made obligatory. The provision was later amended, however by
Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino. The new Article
29 expressed, thus —

Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be
exercised as if the child were their own by nature.

If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt.
Otherwise, the adoption shall not be allowed.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both
spouses were of the same nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the
necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances —

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or

(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can
aptly find governance.

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the
legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses
in accordance with this Code.

The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James
Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of
the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to
legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from
adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname
of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that
obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties.

We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring
not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also
realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral,
social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place
been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is given,1 we must obey its full
mandate.

Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having to call the attention of the
appropriate agencies concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on inter-country adoption, a
matter that evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph, Family
Code).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes

1 At least until such time as the "rules on inter-country adoption" are provided for by
law pursuant to Article 184 of the Family Code.