Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja
Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja
Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja
Ferrer-Calleja
203 SCRA 596
G.R. No. 94716
November 15, 1991
Topic: Effect of Pending Petition or Cancellation of Trade Union Registration
CASE: We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the DOLE, more
specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), to supervise the activities of
government employees; in this case, unions of judiciary personnel who serve in the
Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
1. April 4, 1990: the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals
(UCECA), a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election
with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as BLR Case No. 4-11-90) alleging that
the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is the
incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the
rank-and-file employees. The UCECA alleged that there was a mass resignation of
ACAE members on April 14, 1989.
May 10, 1990: the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that the listing
by the ACAE of its membership at 303 employees was a product of fraud. It charged the
UCECA with misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition,
a copy of the names of members some of which were twice listed, written without
consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were forged. In addition, the
petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon learning of the fraudulent
act, resigned from the union.
In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraud and
claimed that any mistakes were only clerical errors.
2. June 18, 1990: petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of
Registration of the UCECA in BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration Certificate No. 159 and in
preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for
deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-
90.
July 16, 1990: the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being dilatory, to
which ACAE replied that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur should be applied as the
"fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak for themselves."
On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relations ruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation
proceedings) is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. It granted the
UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found that UCECA was supported
by 303 or 40% of the 762 rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election, ACAE
filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition. We issued a temporary restraining order
effective August 29, 1990.
The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to
handle disputes among associations of employees working for the judiciary.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent BLR acted with grave abuse of discretion when it granted the
petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining agent to represent
the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals (NO)
WON a petition for cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification
election is a bar to the resolution of a prior petition for certification election (NO)
HELD:
1. NO. It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the
power, to regulate all activities of Judges and court personnel, the Supreme
Court included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity of
the judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised.
It is axiomatic, for example, that any demands of court employees for higher
compensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the context of the fiscal
autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article
VIII, Section 3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other
agency would have jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved
legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by us, the final
decision on all such questions would still be with this Court.
All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to supervise
the details of self-organization activities in the courts. In the same way that CSC validly
conducts competitive examinations to grant requisite eligibilities to court employees, we
see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification process in the Court of
Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity.
Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register
with both CSC and DOLE. This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities,
personnel, or experience in the conduct of certification elections. The BLR has to do the
job.
Insofar as power to call for and supervise the conduct of certification elections is
concerned, we rule against the petitioner.
One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE cannot
persuasively challenge the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because its very
personality to bring this suit is premised on its having organized under the same
executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads:
2. NO.
The petitioner likewise argues that the certification proceedings should be suspended
pending its petition for the cancellation of union registration of the UCECA.
The records show that UCECA was registered with the CSCn on March 16, 1990. When
the said union was organized, some of its members allegedly used to be members of
the ACAE who tendered mass resignations on August 14, 1989 and on September 29,
1989. On January 30, 1990, the officers of ACAE, in Board Resolution No. 8 resolved
that the resignations tendered were irregular and must be accomplished individually.
Thereafter, for some reasons, some of the listed members in the Registry Book of the
UCECA wrote individual letters to UCECA in April, 1990 either questioning the inclusion
of their names or tendering their resignations.
On June 18, 1990, the petitioner herein filed its petition to cancel the union registration
of UCECA. The act of the petitioner in charging commissions of fraud and
misrepresentation against UCECA only after realizing the rising membership of the
latter and the subsequent petition for certification election raises grave suspicions as to
whether or not it wants to subvert the right of the employees to determine the proper
exclusive representative or agent now that they are given two unions from which to
choose. Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner ACAE had lawful grounds
to challenge the existence of the UCECA, it should have done so, soon after the date it
had notice or knowledge of the registration of the latter to protect its own interests and
not at a later time when its bargaining position was already at the risk of being lost.
At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public
respondent that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the
respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union
filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an
order directing a cancellation.
It is the policy of the State in protecting the rights of labor to ensure and maintain
industrial peace. For this reason, all employees of an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be given an opportunity to organize and to determine which labor organization should
be their exclusive bargaining representative. Hence, a petition for certification election
filed by an interested labor organization shall be dealt with accordingly, with a view to
attaining this objective. This is especially true when it involves the ultimate respect for
and protection of the rights of government employees. In granting to employees in the
civil service the right to organize, a procedure has been enacted to allow them to select
what union shall be the recognized representative for all those in one agency, i.e., a
certification election. (Sections 5, 6 and 12; Executive Order No. 180; Sections 3 and 4,
Rule V and Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Government
Employees to Self-Organization)
The freedom of choice given to workers is a constitutional right. Therefore, the holding
of a certification election, being a statutory policy, should not be circumvented.
SUMMARY:
1. Respondent UCECA, a registered union filed a petition for accreditation and/or
certification election -> BLR. (Case No. 4-11-90)
Allegations:
Petitioner ACAE which is the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the
support of the majority of the rank-and-file employees.
-> there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.
ACAE moved for deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 (certification
election filed by UCECA) pending the case of BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation of UCECA’s
certificate of registration).
UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) for being
dilatory.
ACAE replied that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur should be applied as the "fraudulent
documents submitted by UCECA speak for themselves."
Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election, ACAE
filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition.