1. OCCENA vs. HON.

ICAMINA

FACTS: Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation Vegrafia for
allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and
statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas."
Vegrafia entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the
offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No
damages were awarded to petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks
uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

RULING: YES. (The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is
ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.)
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to, repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which
private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability
results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private
person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right
of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed
to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

2. PACIS vs. MORALES

FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of the deceased Alfred Dennis Pacis, a minor in a
shooting incident inside a gun store and respondent is the owner of said gun store. The
facts show that when Jarnague, the regular caretaker of the store, was not around he
assigned Matibag and Herbolario, sales agents, to look after the store. Jarnague entrusted
to the two, a key to the drawer where a fatal gun sent for repair was kept and when the
two sales agents brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on the table Alfred got
hold of the same. It was when Matibag who asked that it be returned and subsequently
handed to him that the gun went off, with the bullet hitting young Alfred in the head
causing his death. Matibag was sued for homicide, which was acquitted by the Supreme
Court due to the exempting circumstance of “accident”. The instant case is then an action
for damages against the gun store owner.

ISSUE: Is respondent civilly liable?

 RULING: Yes. Under Art. 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim
for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Art. 100 of the RPC
or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In
this case, petitioners opted the latter against whom they alleged is Matibag’s employer
under 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer
under Art. 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter,
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own
negligence.

Respondent is clearly negligent. Under PNP Circular No. 9, a person engaged in the
business purchasing and selling firearms and ammunition must exercise extraordinary
diligence. Thus, respondent has the duty to ensure that all guns are not loaded and stored
unloaded separate from ammunition when not needed for defensive use and with more
reason in accepting defective guns. Furthermore, there was no showing that respondent
had a License to Repair in the first place.

3. People vs. Amistad

FACTS: The court acquitted the respondent in a case of estafa filed against him by the
petitioner holding that “the case of the prosecution is civil in nature” and that “the guilt of
the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.” Petitioner contends that she
had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case, the
prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting
Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the
accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also discussed extensively the civil liability of the
accused, despite which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter’s civil liability to the
complainant. Upon appeal, CA denied the same.

ISSUE: In a decision of acquittal, may the complainant in a criminal action for estafa
appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case?

RULING: No, because the source of obligation is the criminal action which the
respondent have been acquitted. The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon
by the petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the
proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused may file the appropriate responsive
pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal action,
notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy.
Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious
reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-
trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except on the
 occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved in the civil action
deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held
in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21. It can be deduced from past cases ruled by the court is
that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action
to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall
together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission
of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required. She can institute
a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict
or one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but
certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted.

4. Jarantilla vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Private respondent, Jose Kuan Sin was sideswiped by a vehicle driven by petitioner
Edgar Jarantilla, private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence.
Petitioner was charged for serious physical injuries in a criminal case thru reckless
imprudence. Private respondent did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action
and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.
Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case “on reasonable doubt”
Later on, private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners in a civil action that
involved the same subject matter and act complained on in the Criminal Case

Issue: Whether or not Private Respondent, who was the complainant in a criminal action
which concluded in an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and who participated in the
prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission
complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission?

Ruling:
Yes, This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code, The well settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Article 29 enunciates the
rule, as already states that a civil action for damages is no precluded by an acquittal on
reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission

5. People v. Navoa

FACTS: Mario Navoa, Rafael Navoa, Ricardo Sitchon (accused Mario Saguinza was
 discharged and utilized as a state witness) were found by the then Court of First Instance
of Bataan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. This is a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the Court which affirmed the judgment of conviction
upon the three defendants-appellants and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua, and
to indemnify, jointly and solidarily, the heirs of the victim, Tomas Izon, in the amount of
P30,000.00. One of the two assigned errors is "that defendant-appellant Mario Navoa's
death on June 14, 1984 properly manifested before the Intermediate Appellate Court on
June 20, 1984, had not been accorded proper legal consideration in the Decision."

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the defendant-appellant Mario Navoa will extinguish
the latter’s civil liability even if the the decision by the Court had been promulgated.

RULING: No. When counsel for the accused manifested that fact (the death of Mario
Navoa) before the Appellate Court on June 20, 1984, he was unaware that the latter had
already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn, promulgated its Decision on July
31, 1984 unaware of appellant Mario Navoa's death. The judgment of conviction will
thus have to be set aside as against him. However, the plea for extinguishment of the
deceased's civil and criminal liability is without merit. Only his criminal liability is
extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains.

ACCORDINGLY, 1) the prayer for the acquittal of the two remaining accused is hereby
denied; 2) the dispositive portion of the Decision of this Court promulgated on July 31,
1984, is hereby modified to read as follows:

"WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of conviction imposed upon Rafael Navoa and
Ricardo Sitchon and sentence then to suffer reclusion perpetua. And since the guilt of
Mario Navoa has been established beyond reasonable doubt, his death during the
pendency of this appeal extinguishes only his criminal liability but not his civil liability,
so that, his estate and the accused Rafael Navoa and Ricardo Sitchon are hereby
sentenced to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the victim, Tomas Izon, in the
amount of P30,000.00. With proportionate costs.

6. People vs Badeo

Facts: Eñega Abrio, at around six o’clock in the evening was walking on her way home.
Cresenciano Germanes was walking ahead of her. Near the house of Esperidion Badeo,
four men using bolos attacked and killed Cresenciano. Uldarico Germanes, a nephew of
Cresenciano, believed that his uncle was killed by the four because Cresenciano was
instrumental in dividing the land being tenanted by Manuel into two portions. One
portion was to be retained by Manuel while the other half would be tenanted by him
(Uldarico). Manuel did not like the arrangement because according to him, he could still
work on the whole area.
Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he did so in self-
defense. Manuel stated in court that Enega Abreo testified against him because her
husband, Sabino, was the first suspect in the killing of Cresenciano as there was “bad
blood”between Sabino and Cresenciano.

Esperidion Badeo, on the other hand, denied being at the scene when the killing occurred.
He was then in the mountain in Saransang making a kaingin.

Both were found guilty for murder by the Regional Trial Court. Both then appealed to the
Supreme Court. Esperidion died. Inasmuch as no final judgment had as yet been
rendered, in the resolution of August 21,1991, the case against Esperidion was dismissed
with costs de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August 22,1991. On September
17, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the reconsideration of said resolution
alleging that while the criminal liability of appellant Esperidion Badeo had been
extinguished by his death pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, his civil
liability arising from the criminal offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and
1161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling
in People vs. Pancho, 145 SCRA 323. Hence, as provided for in Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, upon proper notice, the legal representatives of the deceased appellant
should appear as substitute parties herein insofar as the deceasedÊs civil liability for the
crime is concerned.

Issue: Should Esperidion be liable for any civil liabilities?

Ruling: Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the
punishment of the guilty party, and also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing,
repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses whether the particular act or
omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not punishable by law,
subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an appellant is
extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall
answer for his civil liability.

Concerning Esperidion Badeo’s civil liability, we find that there is no basis for its
imposition in view of the absence of a clear showing that he committed the crime
imputed to him. Esperidion could not have been at the scene of the crime because the
kaingin area was a good five-hour hike away through a trail. Alibi is generally considered
a weak defense but it assumes importance where the evidence for the prosecution is weak
and betrays concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the
crime. In this case, Esperidion was implicated by the uncorroborated testimony of sole
 prosecution eyewitness Iñega Abrio. Her identification of Esperidion as one of the
perpetrators of the crime is, however, short of the positiveness and reliability essential for
conviction. As several people committed the crime, it is probable that Abrio mistook
Esperidion for another person considering that according to her, the attack was
perpetrated when it was already getting dark.

The resolution of August 21,1991 is hereby reconsidered insofar as it considers as

extinguished Esperidion Badeo’s civil liability. However, finding that Esperidion Badeo
should be acquitted as he did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is
hereby imposed on him. No costs.

7. Rolito Calang and Philtranco vs. People of the Philippines

Facts: Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by Philtranco along
Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear left
side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a
result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost control of the
vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the
highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at about
25 meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers, Armando Nablo and an
unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained serious
physical injuries.

The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical
injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Calbayog City.
The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries
and damage to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of thirty
days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional,
as maximum. The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay
P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Armando; P50,000.00 as death indemnity
to the heirs of Mabansag; and P90,083.93 as actual damages to the private complainants.

Issue: Is PHILTRANCO liable even if it was not a party to the case?

Ruling: Yes. However, it can only be subsidiarily liable and not jointly and severally
liable with Calang.

The RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
Calang. We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC.
Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action
against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco
 jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious
liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision
of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.

However, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102
and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable.
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. Thus, Philtranco’s liability may only
be subsidiary.

8. Air France vs Carrascoso

Facts: Air France through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, issued to Mr.
Carrascoso a first class roundtrip airline ticket from Manila to Rome. However, during
the stopover at Bangkok, the manager of the airline told him to vacate the first class seat
because there was a white man who had “better rights than him”. A commotion then
ensued when defendant refused to vacate his seat. After a heated discussion, defendant
reluctantly gave his first class seat.

Issue: Is Air France liable for damages?

Ruling: Yes. Air France’s liability can be grounded on culpa contractual and culpa
aquiliana.

CULPA CONTRACTUAL:

The court is of the opinion that there was substantial averment of the facts that there
existed a contract to furnish defendant a firs t class passage; such contract was breached
when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; there was bad faith
when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of
which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages.

CULPA AQUILIANA
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation.This, is because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a
relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
 Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier—a case of quasi-delict. Damages are
proper. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.

9. JOSE CANGCO vs. MANILA RAILROAD CO

FACTS: Jose Cangco was an employee of Manila Railroad Company. In coming daily by
train to the company's office he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him
to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, when
Jose Cangco got off the train, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving
car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. He was therefore brought at
once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his
arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, the plaintiff was
carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was
again amputated higher up near the shoulder.

He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover damages
from the company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving
them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains. The company’s defense was that the direct and proximate cause of the
injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.

ISSUEs:

1. Was Manila Railroad liable for damages?

2. How is the liability of employers Under Article 2180 different from their liability for
breach of contract?

RULING:

1st Issue
Yes. The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care
in its performance.
It may be noted that the plaintiff was ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was
caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was
bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains. The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. The
conduct of the plaintiff therefore was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore
he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

2nd Issue

Extra Contractual

• The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act
or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
caused damage to another.
• When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a
negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence
— if he does not his action fails.
• When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after
the selection, or both. However, this presumption may be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.

Ex Contractu

• In contractual obligations, the duty was direct and immediate, and its non-performance
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's
servants.
• When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of
plaintiff, proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
warrant a recovery.
• The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise
of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability
for the breach of his contract.
10. JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO vs. BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS

FACTS: Singson, along with his co-defendants, was sentenced to pay the sum of
P105,539.56 to Philippine Milling Co. Because of one of the co-defendants’ (Villa-
Abrille & Co.) failure to file an appeal, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served
upon the BPI — in which Singson had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille's
credits were concerned.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of BPI, upon reading the name of
Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment, without further reading the body of the
said garnishment, prepared two letters for the signature of BPI President Freixas
informing Singson and the Special Sheriff of the garnishment of Singson’s deposits.

Subsequently, two checks issued by Singson were dishonored. In view thereof, Singson
wrote BPI a letter claiming that he was not included in the Writ of Garnishment. Freixas,
after confirming such information, apologized to Singson and informed him that the
action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. Singson then
commenced the present action against BPI and Freixas, for damages in consequence of
said illegal freezing of his account.

ISSUE: Does the existence of a contract between the parties bar a plaintiff’s claim for
damages based on torts?

RULING: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. In Air France vs. Carrascoso, an airplane passenger who, despite his
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and
compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment was held entitled to recover damages
from the air-carrier upon the ground of tort. Although the relation between a passenger
and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, the act that breaks the contract may
also be a tort.

11. So Ping Bun v. CA

FACTS:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co. entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan
and Sons, Inc. involving four (4) premises in Binondo, which the former used to store
textiles. The agreements were for one (1) year, with provisions for month-to-month rental
should the lessee continue to occupy the properties after the term. In 1976, Tek Hua
Trading Co. was dissolved, and the former members formed Tek Hua Enterprises Corp.,
herein respondent. So Pek Giok, managing partner of the defunct company, died in 1986.
Petitioner So Ping Bun, his grandson, occupied the warehouse for his own textile
 business, Trendsetter Marketing. On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a
letter to petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the premises. Petitioner refused, and
on March 4, 1992, he requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI. The contracts
were executed. Private respondents moved for the nullification of the contract and
claimed damages. The petition was granted by the trial court, and eventually by the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not So Ping Bun is guilty of tortuous interference of contract.
HELD:
Yes. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse. Petitioner's
Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result
petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter's property right. Clearly, and as
correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-
mentioned are present in the instant case.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease
the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it,
nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. While we do
not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained
of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence
of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the
contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing
ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without
awarding damages.

12. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. MARJORIE
NAVIDAD

FACTS:
On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the
area approached Navidad and a misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
A complaint for damages was then filed against Escartin, Roman, the LRTA, the Metro
Transit Organization Inc. and Prudent for the death of Navidad. The RTC then held that
Prudent and Escartin were liable and it ordered them to pay jointly and severally the
damages for the death of Navidad.

On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent and Escartin from any liability for the death of
Navidad and held that LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. It ruled that the
contract of carriage had already existed when Navidad entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token
therefor.

ISSUE:
1. Should LRTA be held liable based on breach of contract of carriage?
2. Should Prudent be made likewise liable?

RULING:
1. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a
common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they
ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The statutory provisions render a
common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or
willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. Thus, in this case, the
foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify
the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the
high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail
itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either
case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of
carriage.
2. If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise,
however, for the employer's liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee.
Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can
only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
Additional Notes:
How must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation
 can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil
Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes
a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

13. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz
and Company, CPA’s (“L.C. Diaz”), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice
of accounting and which opened a savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its
cashier, Mercedes Macaraya , filled up a savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks
deposit slip. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit
the money with Solidbank and give him the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to
Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller
acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the
two deposit slips. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another
deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When
Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that
somebody got the passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to
Macaraya. The following day,, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C.
Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C.
Diaz could open a new account followed by a formal written request later that day. It was
also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day
before of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of
the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo
received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C.
Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the
Regional Trial Court. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank
and dismissing the complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Solidbank must be held liable for the fraudulent withdrawal on
private respondent’s account.
Held: Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they
return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers
know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in
possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to
the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the
passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the
passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller
No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the
 passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same. However,
L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by
its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of
Solidbank should be reduced. Hence, the liability of Solidbank for actual damages was
reduced to only 60%, the remaining 40% was borne by private respondent.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code on simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The law imposes on
banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. RA 8791 declares that
the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of
integrity and performance.” This new provision in the general banking law, introduced in
2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding that “the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.”
NOTE: Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they
return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers
know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in
possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner.

14. ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC.

Facts:
May 1991, petitioner Estela Crisostomo contracted services of respondent Caravan
Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and
accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe. Petitioner was given a 5% discount
on the amount, which included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived because
petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent companys ticketing manager. Pursuant
to said contract, Menor went to her aunts residence on June 12, 1991, Wednesday to
deliver petitioners travel documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave the full
payment for the package tour. Menor then told her to be at NAIA on Saturday, two hours
before her flight. Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on
Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight Mnl to Hkg. However, the flight she was
supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She learned that her plane ticket
was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour the British Pageant
which included England, Scotland and Wales in its itinerary. For this tour package,
petitioner was asked to pay US$785.00 or P20,881.00 ($1/P26.60). She gave respondent
US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip.
Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement
of P61,421.70, representing the difference between the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe
and the amount she owed respondent for the British Pageant tour. Despite several
demands, respondent company refused to reimburse contending that the same was non-
refundable. Petitioner was thus constrained to file a complaint against respondent for
breach of contract of carriage and damages, at the RTC Makati City.
In her complaint, petitioner alleged that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was due to
respondents fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on the plane ticket;
negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee Menor; that
the British Pageant was merely a substitute for the Jewels of Europe tour, such that the
cost of the former should be properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter.
In defense, respondent, through its Operations Manager, Chipeco, denied responsibility
for petitioners failure to join the first tour; insisted that petitioner was informed of the
correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The
travel documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip. Petitioner
had only herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm
her flight schedule as printed on the ticket.
Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid for Jewels of
Europe, considering that the same had already been remitted to its principal in Singapore,
Lotus Travel Ltd.
Lastly, respondent maintained that the British Pageant was not a substitute for the
package tour that petitioner missed. This tour was independently procured by petitioner
after realizing that she made a mistake in missing her flight for Jewels of Europe.
RTC held in favor of petitioner. CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether respondent did not exercise the standard of care of common carrier
Ruling: Respondent is not a common carrier.
By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or
association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one
place to another for a fixed price.[9] Such person or association of persons are regarded
as carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers.
A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public.

It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the
business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor
a common carrier. Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to
another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in
their behalf. Respondents services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and
facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.

While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent
company, this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most,
respondent acted merely as an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately
contracted for her carriage to Europe. Respondents obligation to petitioner in this regard
 was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly booked with the airline for the
appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination, meanwhile, pertained
directly to the airline.

Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil
Code. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent
person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to
determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which
an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.

Issue: Whether Menor is negligent hence liable for contractual breach

Ruling: No.
it is clear that respondent performed its prestation under the contract as well as everything
else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due
diligence in the conduct of her affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss
the flight. Needless to say, after the travel papers were delivered to petitioner, it became
incumbent upon her to take ordinary care of her concerns. This undoubtedly would
require that she at least read the documents in order to assure herself of the important
details regarding the trip.

The lower court declared that respondents employee was negligent. This factual finding,
however, is not supported by the evidence on record. While factual findings below are
generally conclusive upon this court, the rule is subject to certain exceptions, as when the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight and substance which will affect the result of the case.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that respondent company performed its
duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot
recover and must bear her own damage.
15. BARREDO vs GARCIA, 73 Phil. 607, July 8, 1942

FACTS: At about one in the morning of May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided
by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal
action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia
and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on brought an action in the Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as
he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. The main theory of the
defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro
Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla?
2. Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable?

RULING:
1. Yes. The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but
not because of the same, but because of the cuasi- delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to
(minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in
not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. One
is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this
being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those
persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.

2. No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his
right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the
SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also
proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that
Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate
civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not
being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for
his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

--------------------
For purposes of discussion (No need to write in the digest):
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
“1. That crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delitos are only of private concern.
“2. That consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
 “3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because for the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include
all acts in which ‘ any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.’ However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging
in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos
or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and
that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer – in this case the defendant-petitioner – is
primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.”

16. Elcano vs. Hill

Facts: This is an Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et
al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for
recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and
getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."

Issue #1: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

Ruling: No. Article 2177of the New Civil Code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
…Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery."
In the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
 or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, we here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant
action against him.

Issue #2: May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?

Ruling: Yes. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by
the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual.
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
17. Virata vs Ochoa, G. R. No. L-46179, 31 January 1978.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
 FACTS: Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking by a
passenger jeepney owned by Victorio Ochoa and driven by his employee Maximo
Borilla. A criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide was insituted
against the driver. During the hearing the private prosecutor made a reservation to file a
separate civil action for damages, but he later withdrew the reservation. After which, the
heir of the decease reserved their right to insitute a separate civil action, which they
subsequently commenced in an action for damages based on quasi-delict against the
driver Maximo Borilla and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa.
Defenants (respondents in this case) moved for the dismissal of the civil action on the
ground that there is a pending criminal action between the same parties for the same
cause. Borrilla was acquitted of the criminal charge and the court trying the action for
damages dismissed the claim.

ISSUE: Can the heirs of Virata maintain an action for damages based on quasi-delict
against the driver and owner, respectively, of the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio
Virata?

RULING: YES. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose
between an action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. For the petitioners to
prevail in the action for damages they have only to establish their cause of action by
preponderance of the evidence.

The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before
Criminal Case was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a
separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney
based on quasidelict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged is
not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source
of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case is quasi-delict, not an act or
omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
quasi-delict and an act or omission punishable by law are two different sources of
obligation.
18. Banal vs Tadeo

FACTS: Fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing
Checks Law were filed against private respondent Rosario Claudio. Petitioner is one of
the complainants. Respondent Claudio was arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to the
charges.
Petitioner move to intervene through private prosecutor but was denied by respondent
Judge Tadeo on the ground that the charge is for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which does
not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, “it is not a crime against
property but public order.”
ISSUE: Whether or not private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for violation
of B.P Blg. 22 which does not provide for civil indemnity?
RULING: Yes.
The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
“Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable” (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).
Consequently, when a person commits a crime he offends two entities, namely: (1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor,
chastity, or property was actually and directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission.
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and id the direct and proximate cause thereof.
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil actions.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
“Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another.
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party,
and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses.