Constitutional Law II Reviewer

Constitutional Law II
guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus

false testimony can be questioned by the
Bill of Rights accused regardless of the time that lapsed.

I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND c. Judgment according to law
CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE
POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION d. Tribunal with jurisdiction

Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due Administrative Due Process
process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. In administrative proceedings, the
elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in
obligation of contracts shall be passed. justiciable cases before administrative tribunals:

a. There must be a hearing, where a
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY party may present evidence in support of his case.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not presented by a party.
even required to be conferred by the Constitution, c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide
are the police, eminent domain, and taxation the case correctly, its decision must be supported
powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due by evidence.
process, equal protection and non-impairment d. The evidence supporting the decision
clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such
powers by imposing on the State the obligation to relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is as adequate to support a conclusion.
addressed to the State, notably the government, e. The evidence must have been
telling it what it cannot do to the individual. presented at the hearing or at least contained in the
record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own
A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive independent consideration of evidence, and not
rely on the recommendation of a subordinate.
Civil Procedural Due Process g. The decision must state the facts and the
law in such a way that the parties can know the
In civil cases, the SC laid down its issues involved and the reasons for the decision.
elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v.
Palanca:
Substantive Due Process
a. Court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

b. Court with jurisdiction over the party- F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by
defendant the police for having been transported from Masbate
to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an
c. Judgement rendered according to law. action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality
of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of
heard (requirement on notice and hearing) the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do
so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this
petition for review.

HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC
Criminal Due Process jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
In criminal cases, the elements were laid court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in
down in Vera v. People: all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of
a. Accused is informed why he is a statute in the first instance.
proceeded against, and what charge he must answer. (2) There is no doubt that by banning the
slaughter of these animals (except where there at
b. Judgment of conviction is based on least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon
evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be
defendant was heard. conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding
and preventing their improvident depletion. We do
If the prosecution produces the not see, however, how the prohibition of the
conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder
can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep.
province than in another. Obviously, retaining the The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive
carabao in one province will not prevent their them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to
slaughter there, any more than moving them to challenge the validity of the LOI.
another province will make it easier to kill them (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to its face. It has behind it the presumption of validity.
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption
easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live may condition the constitutionality of legislation the
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of
cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no some factual foundation of record overthrowing the
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure;
flippant, dead meat. it is an apporpriate response to a problem.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the
commander, were returned to the petitioner only petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does
a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated not render it invalid. The govt is not required to
upon his failure to produce the carabaos when adhere to a policy of "all or none."
ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo.
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles
immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps.
out forthright. The measures struck him at once and would be ultra vires. VV.
pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized
prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers Massage Services Valid.
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry
may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold
see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a
condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous fee for operating massage clinics separately from
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even those operating barber ships and (2) To prevent
corruption. One searches in vain for the usual immorality w/c might probably arise from the
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better construction of separate rooms.
still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining
VV. ordinances based on general welfare clause. VV.

Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
B. Due Process and Police Power
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs
in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance
prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses
Valid. to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the
ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and petition for certiorari.
EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the
energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of
as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not
(Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as
Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power
providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, to regulate the establishment, maintenance and
confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true
registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c
the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was purported to give municipalities the power not only
discriminatory and a denial of due process. The to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of
resps. denied the petitioner's allegations and argued nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law
that the suit amounted to a request for advisory remained the same so that the power granted to
opinion. municipalities remains that of regulation, not
prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as
granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a petititioners have not shown that the area being
way that it violates the constitutional provision that developed is land reform area and that the affected
"every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall persons have been given emancipation patents and
be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has
recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of
power to regulate the establishment, and operation the police power and likewise eminent domain. VV.
of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses
and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
granted. VV.
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing
Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD
1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands
The taking by the State of private property for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to
in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They
public use, (2) with just compensation, and (3) brought this suit in the SC challenging the
upon observance of due process. constitutionality of PD 1224.

Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for
be take for public use without just compensation. the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not
public use since it will benefit only a handful of
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving
interest of national welfare or defense, establish concept influences by changing conditions. Urban
and operate vital industries and, upon payment of renewal or redevelopment and the construction of
just compensation, transfer to public ownership low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose,
utilities and other private enterprises to be not only because of the expanded concept of public
operated by the government. use but also because of specific provisions in the
Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state
concern since it directly and significantly affects
1. Taking either for public use or public health, safety, the environment and, in sum,
public purpose. the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are
vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of
Public Use which are owned by a few landowners only. Why
should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It not confined to landed estates. The test to be
is not confined merely to use by the public at large applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was
(e.g. roads). It is enough that it serves a public the area of the land and not the number of people
purpose, even if it benefit a large group of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through
short of the public in general (e.g. expropriating the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate
property for the relocation of squatters). the property. The property owner may not interpose
objections merely because in their judgment some
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 other property would have been more suitable. The
provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224,
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were
expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for
and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV.
equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the
CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession
of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it 2. Just compensation must be
to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands judicially determined
for tourist zone development of a sports complex.
The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed Just Compensation
a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended
that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the Just compensation is the fair and reasonable
land was covered by the land reform program; and equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the
(3) expropriation would impair the obligation of property due to the taking; it is the fair market
contracts. value of the property measured at the time of the
taking, no matter how long ago it was taken (e.g. the
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to time of the taking was in the 1920's, the time of
traditional purposes for the construction of roads, payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and
bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" Amigable cases, supra), and using the conversion
means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long rates at the time of taking (because according to
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power those cases, Art. 1250 of the Civil Code applied only
of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to to contractual obligations).
state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use. The EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
expropriation, or question the amount of payments

F: The San Antonio Development Corporation fixed by the decree, but the decision of the NHA are
was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669
which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The and 1670 are declared unconstitutional.
commissioners appointed by the trial court
recommended that the San Antonio Development Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now
Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v.
petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 LTA that the power of Congress to designate the
the compensation should be the fair and current particular property to be taken adn how much may
market value declared by the owner or the market be condemned thereof must be duly recognized,
value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. leaving only as a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. The
under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible SC now rules that such singling out of properties does
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such
court technically would still have the power to expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due
determine the just compensation for the property, process and equal protection and just compensation
following the decree, its task would be relegated to guarantees of the Constitution. VV.
simply stating the lower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just
compensation means the value of the property at the
time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent 3. Due process must be observed
for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
improvements and capabilities should be considered.
In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard
just compensation were made long before the to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road
declaration of martial law when the land was much Project, originally called for the expropriation of
cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. Later
those documents which are outdated would be on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided
arbitrary and confiscatory. VV. to make the proposed extension pass through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the
protests of residents of the latter, the Commission on
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) Human Settlements recommended the reversion to
the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large route withh save the government P2 million. The
estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog- government filed expropriation proceedings against
Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets,
expropriated in two decrees issued by President among whom was petitioner.
Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners
contend that the decrees violate their constitutional HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan
right to due process and equal protection since by streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial
their mere passage their properties were aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission
automatically expropriated and they were concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it
immediately deprived of the ownership and can be disregarded in making a choice between the
possession thereof without being given the chance to two lines. The factor of functionality strongly
oppose such expropriation. The government on the militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del
other hand contends that the power of eminent Pan streets, while the factor of social and economic
domain is inherent in the State and when the impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta
legislature or the President through his law-making Avenue. While the issue would seem to boil down to a
powers exercises this power, the public use and choice between people, on one hand, and progress
public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of and development, on the other, it is to be
the just compensation become political in nature and remembered that progress and development are
the courts must respect the decision. carried out for the benefit of the people. VV.

HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the
procedures adopted and the powers given to the
NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily
proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated
by decree without the slightest semblance of a Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)
hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several
immediately upon the signing of the decree. No properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets
deposit before the taking is required. There is not which the Government sought to expropriate to give
provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of
installments. Not only are the owners given drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain
absolutely no opportunity to contest the the Government from proceeding with the
expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower taking under the power of eminent domain.
court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower Considering the nature and effect of the installation
court decision and granted the relief asked for by De of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by
Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant
The case was remanded to the lower court. higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for
No further action was taken despite the SC an indefinite period deprives private respondents of
decision until two years later, in 1983, when the ts ordinary use.
Government moved for the dismissal of the case on For these reasons, the owner of the property
the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which
340 expropriating the same properties for the same should neither be more nor less, whenever it is
purpose. The lower court denied tthe motion. Appeal. possible to make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property. Just equiivalent has
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of always been understood to be the just and complete
this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
between the parties, it is equally true that the right expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
of petitioner to take private properties for public use expropriation. The price or value of the land and its
upon payment of just compensation is so provided in character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the
the Constitution and the laws. Such expropriation criteria for determining just cmpensation. Charo.
proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not
only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
but also by taking appropriate court action or by D. Equal Protection
legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived
was based on supervening events that occured after of life, liberty or property without due process of
the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
was rendered. The social impact factor which protection of the laws.
persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be
arbitrary had disappeared. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to highest priority to the enactment of measure that
the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter protect and enhance the right of all the people to
making its own independent assessment of the human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of political inequalities and remove cultural inequities
undertaking the expropriation of properties in by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
question and thereafter by enacting the for the common good.
corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The To this end, the State shall regulate the
Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must property and its increments.
yield to the subsequent legislative fiat. Charo.

1. Economic equality

Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social
justice shall include the commitment to create
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991) economic opportunities based on freedom of
initiative and self-reliance.
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-
Limay transmission lines, Napocor's lines have to pass Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full
the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way and unorganized, and promote full employment
easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent and equality of employment opportunities for all.
domain proceedings. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
easement fee or full compensation for the land including the right to strike in accordance with
traversed by its transmissin lines. law. They shall be entitle to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and living wage. They
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, shall also participate in policy and decision-making
the power of eminent domain results in the taking or process affecting the rights and benefits as may be
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the provided by law.
expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears The State shall promote the principle of
why said power may not be availed of to impose only shared responsibility between workers and
a burrden upon the owner of the condemned employers and the preferential use of voluntary
property, without loss of title or possession. It is modes in settling disputes including conciliation,
unquestionable that real property may, through and shall enforce their mutual compliance
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right therewith to foster industrial peace.
of way." In this case, the easement is definitely a
The State shall regulate the relations

between workers and employers, recognizing the
right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to
expansion and growth. Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)

But there are areas where aliens cannot be
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon kept away for the simple reason that they cannot be
recommendation of the economic and planning deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially
agency, when the national interest dictates, when they are admitted to the country as
reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to immigrants.
corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA
or such higher percentage as Congress may 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city ordinance
prescribe, certain areas of investments. The imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage engage in the pursuit of an occupation. The SC noted
the formation and operation enterprises whose that this violated the uniformity of taxation, and
capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. deprived aliens of the right to earn a common
In the grant of rights, privileges and livelihood.
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited
authority over foreign investments within its the employment of aliens in any occupation or
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its business unless they first secured a permit from the
national goals and priorities. Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent,
an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and
Id., Sec. 2. xxx obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the
The State shall protect the nation's marine ordinance null and void.
wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial
differences in situations among aliens and for that
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It
and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal also lays down no guide for granting/denying the
assistance shall not be denied to any person by permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise
reason of poverty. of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance
denies aliens due process and the equal protection of
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall the laws. VV.
have the following powers:
xxx In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed
protection and enforcement of constitutional milk (non-fat) to put on its label the warning that the
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all milk is harmful for infants, was struck down as
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the the same labeling in the case of filled milk (coco-fat
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a added)
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all At that time of the decision thought, the law
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, was already inoperative.
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture
and sale of filled milk products. They brought an
action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in
There are areas of economic activity which respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. This provision
can be limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself required that "all condensed skimmed milk in
acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of whatever form, from which the fatty part has been
marine wealth (Art. XII, Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas removed totally or in part or put on sale in the
of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few. Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers with the words: This milk is not
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), suitable for nourishment for infants less than one
the SC upheld the validity of the law which year of age.
nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of
the law can be observed by the national interest.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by of BP 52, sec. 4 of which provides for the
RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied only to skimmed disqualification as candidate of any person convicted
milk and not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced of subversion, insurrection or rebellion or similar
only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk offenses.
but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus
denying them the equal protection of the laws. VV. HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor
charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from
being candidates for local elective positions. They
2. Political equality have no personal or substantial interest at stake and
therefore no locus standi. Neither can they sue as
taxpayers because the statute does not involve
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be disbursement of public funds. VV.
detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations.
3. Social equality
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to
public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give
highest priority to the enactment of measure that
protect and enhance the right of all the people to
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of Batas Blg. 52 political inequalities and remove cultural inequities
disqualifying retired elective local officials who have by equitably diffusing wealth and political power
received retirement benefits and would have been 65 for the common good.
years old at the start of the term. It does not violate To this end, the State shall regulate the
equal protection, for it gives younger blood the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
opportunity to run the local government. property and its increments.
.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
retired elective provincial, city ot municipal official
who has received payment of the retirement benefits
to which he is entitled under the law and who shall A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
have been 65 years of age at the commencement of
the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to
shall not be qualified to run for the same elective be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
local office from which he has retired." Petitioner, effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground that it inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
was contrary to the equal protection and due process arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
guarantee of the Constitution. determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
application of the provision. No petition seeking his and particularly describing the place to be
disqualification has been filed against him. His searched and the person or things to be seized.
petition is a mere request for advisory opinion.
Nevertheless, because of public interest, the Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and
question should be resolved. The purpose of the law correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon
is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
governments and therefore, not invalid. The retired order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
employee in effect declares himself tired and Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
unavailable for the same government work. VV. the preceding section, shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980),
however, the disqualification of candidates convicted 1. Requirements for Search Warrants
or simply charged with national security offenses was
struck down as unconstitutional, for violating the
presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
equal political protection.
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda,
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, a SW was
issued to search the store and premises of the
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member petitioner, accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law.
of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as taxpayer Receipt books, PNs and other articles were seized and
and voter, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement retained in the possession of the Anti-Usury Board.
accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda.

ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid It does not appear that he examined the applicant
SW were complied with. and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the
description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his and on the assumption that the receipt issued is
application, swore that "he made his own personal sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the
investigation and ascertained that petitioner is prop. seized were not delivered to the court w/c
lending money without a license, charging usurious issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they
rates." The witness he presentted testified before the were turned over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used
judge and swore that he knew that YEE was lending by him in building up cases against petitioner.
without a license because he personally investigated Considering that at the time the warrant was issued,
the victims who secured loans from the petitioner. there was no case pending against the petitioner, the
Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they averment that the warrant was issued primarily for
could be held liable for perjury. The existence of exploration purposes is not w/o basis.
probable cause has been determined by the justice of
the peace before issuing the warrant complained of, IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.
as shown in the warrant itself. Charo. IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.

To constitute a waiver of constitutional right,
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938) it must appear first that (1) the right exists; (2) that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) that
secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain right.
documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an It is true that the petitioner did not object to
agent of the Anti-Usury Board. the legality of the search when it was made. She
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, could not have objected bec. she was sick & was not
obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac, present when the warrant was served upon Salas.
Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to Certainly, the constitutional immunity from
search the person, house or store of the petitioner unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal
for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the
other papers relating to her activities as userer." person whose rights are invaded or one who is
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
by a captain of the PC, went to the office of the The failure on the part of the petitioner and her
petitioner, and after showing the SW to the bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the
petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the presence of warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of the
the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, consti. right. It is but a submission to the authority
proceeded w/ the execution thereof. Two packages of the law. The delay in making the demand for the
of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several return of the documents seized is not such as to
papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a result im implied. waiver. RAM.
receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate
criminal cases were filed against petitioner.
Petitioner demanded the return of the documents Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of
the SW and the devolution of the documents Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom
demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI
denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the
though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and
part of the petitioner. the We Forum were search and printing machines,
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used
1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be in the printing, publication and distribution of the
nullified in these proceedings. newspapers as well as papers and other literature
seized on the ground that they were used in the
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and commission of the crime of subversion. Petitioners
seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to brought and action to annul the warrants and compel
be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; the return of the things seized.
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the
judge himself and not by the applicant or another; HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit.
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts
judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
produce; & (4) the warrant issued must particularly has been committed and that the objects sought in
describe the place to be searched and persons or connection with the offense are in the place sought
things to be seized. to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper
In the instant case, the existence of probable publisher or editor, the application for a warrant
cause was determined not by the judge himself but must contain a specification stating with particularity
by the applicant. All that the judge did was to the alleged subversive materials he has published or
intending to publish. Broad statement in the were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr.
application is a mere conclusion of law and does not Prudente.
satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Another
factor that makes the search warrants ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of RULING: NO.
Texas, the US SC declared this type of warrant void. (1) The warant was not issued on the basis of
VV. personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness.
The probable cause required under the Constitution
for the issuance of a search warrant must be in
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) connection with one specific offense, and the judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for in the form of searching questions and answers, in
the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in writing and under oath, the complainant and any
committing the crime of sedition. Seized were witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known
printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper to them and attach to the record their sworn
dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and statements together with any affidavit submitted.
tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The However, in the case at bar, Dimagmaliw merely
petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion stated in his application that his knowledge was
was denied. based "on gathered infrmation from verified sources."
The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles
mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the in the form of searching questions and answers.
requirement of probable cause. The language used is What appears on the record are leading questions
all embracing as to include all conceivable words and answereable by yes or no.
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they
are legal or illegal. The search warrant under (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant particularly describe the place to be searched, the SC
which is objectionable. VV. ruled that the description of the place to be searched
is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) intended to be searched. Here, the SW described the
place as PUP, with its address and specifically
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. mentioned the offices of the "Dept. of Military
Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the
against Bache & Co. and its pres., Seggerman for Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other
violation of the provisons of the NIRC. As Judge Ruiz rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
was then conducting a hearing, the deposition of de
Leon and his witness, Logronio, was taken by the (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW
Dep. Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to was issued for one specific offense. The warrrant was
the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several
the truth of his statements. The judge then signed offenses. While there was failure to state the
the SW and accordingly issued the same. particular provision of the law violated, the warrant
itself qualified the description of the offense as
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This suffices to
SW were complied with. cure the defect.
The fact that the word "etc." was added to
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine refer to ammunitions and explosives did not violate
the complainant and his witnesses. The judge did not the rule on single offense, for notwithstanding that
have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of possession of firearms, explosives and ammunitions
the deponents and to propound initial and follow-up are punished in different sections of the PD, they are
questions which his judicial mind, on account of his treated as belonging to a single specie. An exception
training, was in the best position to conceive. This is to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single
important in arriving at a sound inference on the all- offense is when existing laws prescribe a single
importatnt question of w/n there was probable punishment for various offenses. Charo.
cause. Charo.

Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp.
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. judge was invalid. They also question the
Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of Witness," extrajudicial confession taken from them without
executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a search warrant according them the right to assistance of a counsel.
for the search and seizure of arms, ammunitions and The articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of
explosives in the premises of the PUP which were dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for
supposed to be in possession of Dr. Prudente. In violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
enforcing the warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW a judicial recourse, and to recommend action of
states that it is in connection with "the violation of appropriate authorities.
RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was
"there is probable cause to believe that Olaes of meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that
Olongapo City has in his possession and control, ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and
marijuana dried stalks which are suject of the detached judge to determine the existence of
offense stated above." Although the specific section probable cause for purposes of arrest or search.
of the law is not stated, there is no question at all Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally
that the specific offense alleged to have been interested in the success of his case. Although his
committed as basis for determining probable cause office "is to see to it that justice if done and not
is alleged. Furthermore, the SW specifically necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused,"
described the place to be searched and the things to he stands invariably, as the accused's adversary and
be seized. his accuser. To permit him to issue warrrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the and jury in his own right, when he is neither. This
accused, the same are deemed inadmissible against makes to our mind and to that extent, PD 1636 as
them. In People V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional.
the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty The "responsible officer" referred to under
of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason the Cosntitution is one not only possessing the
for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of necessary skills and competence but more
arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his significantly, the neutrality and independence
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial
and that any statement he might make could be used officer.
against him. The person arrested shall have the right
to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means - by Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial and EO 1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty
presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, Salazar, having verified that she had no license to
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the operate a recruitment agency. He further ordered
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias,
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be being used or intended to be used as the means of
waived but the wiaver shall not be valid unless made commiting illegal recruitment. This order was
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid suit for prohibition.
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly
issue warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under
These requirements were even made stricter Art. 38 of the Labor Code?
under the 1987 Constitution which provides that the
rights of a person under custodial investigation HELD: NO.
cannot be waived except when made in writing and in The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now
the presence of counsel. Charo. embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying
vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights
moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may
SCRA 348 (1989) issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is
in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 aliens, whom the President of the Commissioner of
to serve as the President's arm called upon to combat Immigration may order arrested, following a final
the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
salting of foreign exchange. The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer
issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorities must go through the judicial process. To
authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 that extent, we declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor
Constitition. Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of
the PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that a. Existence of probable cause.
will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon
the body, quasi-judicial responsiibilities relative to Probable cause is such facts and circum-
offenses punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is stances as would reasonably make a prudent man
simply to determine w/n probable cause exists to believe that a crime have been committed and that
warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, the documents or things sought to be searched and
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to seized are in the possession of the person against
whom the warrant is sought. Without probable

cause, there can be no valid search warrant. Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
(1985), the testimony based on investigation reports
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 that certain items in the Philippine Times were
(1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged subversive were held to be not personal knowledge,
violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and and thus the search warrant issued was not valid.
Customs Code, the NIRC, and the Revised Penal Code.
The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was e. The search warrant must describe particularly
impossible for the judge to have found probable describe the place to be searched and the things to
cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have be seized.
been violated by the petitioner. How could he even
know what particular provision of each law had been Failure to state with particularity the place
violated? If he did not know this, how could it be to be searched and items to be seized makes the
determined if the person against whom the warrant warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant)
was issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this which is void.
was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity
of domicile and privacy of communications. To In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description
establish the requirement of probable cause, the rule which read "subversive documents, leaflets, papers to
is: One crime, one warrant. promote the objective of the Movement for a Free
Philippines, the Light a Fire Movement, and the April
b. As determined by a judge 6 Movement" were held not to be particular
descriptions, thus making the warrant a general
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can warrant.
issue a warrant; the offensive and much abused
phrase "and other responsible officer as may be In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of
authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times,
removed subversive documents, articles, printed matters,
handbills, leaflets, banners, and typewriters, tape
c. After personally examining under oath or recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the
affirmation the complainant and his witness. description was not at all particular or specific, thus
making the warrants general warrants.
The examination conducted by the judge
takes the form of searching questions. When it comes to printed matters, the
offensive material need not be set out in full. It is
The requirement that the judge must enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses articles. The instruction to seize "subversive
means that the actual examination cannot be materials" is not valid because the determination of
delegated to someone else, like the clerk of court. whether a material is subversive or not is not for the
police officer to decide; no unfettered discretion
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. must be granted to him.
Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case, when the BIR
agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle The matter is different if goods were
of a hearing, the judge suspended the hearing and searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality
directed the branch clerk to examine and take the (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the
testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. After he goods were searched for the ideas they contain (as
was through with the hearing, he went back to his when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the
chambers and finding that the examination was latter case, a more detailed description of the
finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if physical features of the item is required to avoid
they affirmed what they what they testified to, after delegating the appreciation of ideas, and thus
which he issued the search warrant in question. threaten free expression.

d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the 2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant
facts that they are testifying to.
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The determination of the reasonableness of
the judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of The reason is the person may escape easily if
one who has personal knowledge of the facts to a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. In
which he testifies. The testimony cannot be based on the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are
mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report. specifically authorized to search and seize vehicles
Otherwise, the warrant is void. even without a warrant.

Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA Checkpoints are valid in some instances
800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a
Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g.
that the newspaper We Forum was used for probable cause that the criminal is inside the car).
subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge There is no question that when a child has been
and so was inadmissible. reported kidnapped in a community, the police can
stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier
one of them. that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for
rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of the
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid documents seized, charges of subversion and
arrest. rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office merely
charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to subversive materials. Milagros asked for suppression
lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully arrested may be of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which obtained. The search warrant described the things to
may be used as proof of the commission of an be seized as "Documents, papers and other records of
offense, without a search warrant. (Rules of the CPP, NPA and NDF, xxx".
Court.)
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to
A person arrested may be searched for describe with particularity the things to be seized. It
dangerous weapons or anything that proves the does not specify what the subversive books and
commission of the offense. It follows that the search instructions are and what the manuals not otherwise
can only be made within the area of control of the available to the public contain to make them
arrested person, and within the time of the arrest. subversive. There is absent a definite guideline as to
what items might lawfully be seized, thus giving the
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985); officers discretion regarding what articles they should
Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant.
the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at But the seizure of the articles could be justified as an
11:30 a.m., having been wanted as high officers of incident of a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as
the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2 an incident of an arrest, the place of premises where
blocks away, was searched and some documents the arrest was made can also be searched without a
seized. The SC at first held that the search was valid search warrant.
even if the warrant issued was void for failing to
describe with particularity the things to be seized, (c) When things seized are within plain view of a
because it was an incident of a valid arrest. searching party

But after the EDSA revolution, the Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
reconstituted SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because there was F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp.
a valid arrest did not mean that the search was judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house was
likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed
"incidental" to the arrest, that is, not separated by in the warrant was discovered. The officers
time or place from the arrest. If the basis for conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver
allowing incidental searches is looked into, one can & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now
see that this situation is not one involving a valid the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
incidental search.
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is
The law allows the arresting officer to search hereby declared null and void and accordingly set
a person validly arrested (by frisking him for aside.
instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested
person may be turned against his captor and (b) he The petitioner claims that no depositions
may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule
officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true.
judge. Depositions were taken of the complainant's 2
witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was them. It is correct to say, however, that the
conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is no complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
longer any danger that the captured may turn against interrogation.
the captor; and if the documents in the apartment By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did
were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer be was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his
justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew
the apartment and destroy the documents, having and understood the same," and only bec. "the
been arrested already. application was not yet subscribed and sworn to."
The suggestion is that he would not have asked any
questions at all if the affidavit had already been
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) completed when it was submitted to him. In any
case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He
with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and
Group. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit
officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 presented to him. Such written deposition is
a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
premises were searched and 428 documents, a properly determine the existence or non-existence of
the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
person giving it if it will be found later that his publications and other reading materials believed to
declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) be obscene, pornographic, and indecent and later
The applicant was asking for the issuance of burned the seized materials in public. Among the
the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy
personally known to him. His application, standing Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was
warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA,
witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty
establish the applicant's claims. against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Even assuming then that it would have suffied
to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
of the applicant himself, there is still the question of
the sufficiency of their depositions. HELD: YES.
A study of the deposition taken from It is basic that searches and seizure may be
witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who done only through a judicial warrant , otherwise,
both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows they become unreasonable and subject to
that they were in the main a mere restatement of challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) ,
their allegations in their affidavits, except that they the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC
were made in the form of answers to the questions authorizing the serach of the premises WE Forum and
put to them by the resp. judge. Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by
One may well wonder why it did not occur to reason of a defective warrant. There is a greater
the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid,
certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or
he was from the window, or whether it was on the invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an
first floor or second floor, or why his presence was obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a
not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really political case, because speech is speech, whether
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, political or "obscene".
considering that these acts were against the law. The authorities must apply for the issuance of
These would have been judicious questions but they the a search warrant from the judge , if in their
were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must
of the witnesses were readily accepted and the convince the court that the materials sought to be
warrant sought was issued forthwith. seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present
danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED interference and action. The judge must determine
W H AT E V E R D E F E C T W H E N T H E P E T I T I O N E R WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the
MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. judge's sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a
search warrant will issue.
We do not agree. What we see here is
pressure exerted by the military authorities, who
practically coerced the petitioner to sign the (d) Stop and Frisk
supposed waiver as guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
were conducting.
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the
bec. an offense is malum prohibitum, the subject Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is surveillance along Magallanes, St., Davao City. While
immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply Colleges, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag
bec. they are prohibited. A SW is still necessary. & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They
approached the petitioner and identified themselves
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee
before coming to the SC, filed a motion to quash the but was stopped by the 2. They then checked the
search warrant by the resp. judge. But as we said "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade,
in view of the seriousness and urgency of the & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner
consitutional issues raised." RAM. was brought to the police station for further
investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989) Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and
trial on the merits, a decision was rendered finding
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed
Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized and confiscated decision in toto.
from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
Hence, the petition for review, the main for an officer rather than simply to
thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or shrug his shoulder and allow a crime
search and seizure, the items w/c were confiscated to occur, to stop a suspicious
from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible individual briefly in order to
in evidence against him. determine his identity or maintaing
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R the status quo while obtaining more
136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested may be info."
searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c
may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense, PETITION DENIED. RAM.
w/o a SW.

HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an (e) When there is a valid express waiver made
arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace voluntarily and intelligently.
officer or private person, among others, when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an the person consented or did not object to the search,
offense, or when an offense has in fact, just been for it many happen that he did so only out of respect
committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts for the authorities. The waiver must be expressly
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. made.
At the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had People v. De lara
committed, or was actually committing, the offense.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust
the buri bag. They did not know what its contents operation was conducted by the police, as a
were. The said circumstances did not justify an consequence of which, accused was arrested. The
arrest w/o a warrant. accused already pocketed the marked money and
However, there are many instances where a handed two foils to the police when he sensed the
warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily presence of police operatives. He tried to retrieve
being preceded by an arrest, foremost of w/c is the the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He
'stop & search' w/o a SW at military or police tried to escape by running inside his house. The
checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c has been police pursued him and were able to subdue him.
upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a
S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. The
the search thereof in the case at bar, there is no team, together with the accused, proceeded to WPD
question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable headquarters for investigation. During the
considering that, unlike in the former, it was effected investigation, accused was apprised of his
on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to
attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a give a written statement, he refused to do so pending
probable cause that he was concealing something arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited
police officers to inspect the same. drugs was null and void. He also contends that he
It is too much indeed to require the police was not assisted by counsel during custodial
officers to search the bag in the possession of the investigation, where he was forced to sign the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of
for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be Property Seized, and the Booking and Information
useless, futile and much too late. Sheet.
As the Sol-Gen said:
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and
"The assailed S & S may the seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
still be justified as akin to a 'stop and
frisk' situation whose object is either RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante
to determine the identity of as a result of a buy-bust operation. There was no
suspicious individuals or to maintain need for a warrant. The policemen were not only
the status quo momentarily while the authorized but were also under obligation to
police officers seeks to obtain more apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant.
info. ... The US SC held in Terry v. The policemen’s entry into the house of the accused
Ohio that "a police officer may in without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
appropriate circumstances & in an person caught committing an offense in flagrante.
appropriate manner approach a The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
person for the purpose of The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the
investigating possible criminal a c c u s e d ’s a r r e s t i n s i d e t h e h o u s e . A
behaviour even though there is no contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the
probable cause to make an arrest." person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity
In such a situation, it is reasonable where the arrest was made.
there was general chaos and disorder at that time

ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused because of simultaneous and intense firing within the
during the investigation were admissible in evidence. vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
put into writing. (The rejection of these evidence therein were deserted.
would not affect the conviction of the accused in
view of the abundance of other evidence establishing Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our
his guilt.) Bam. considered opinion that the instant case falls under
one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military
People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994) operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in
this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a
F: The incidents involved in this case took place crime was being committed. There was consequently
at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was action. Furthermore, under the situation then
charged in two separate informations for illegal prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
possession of ammunition and explosives in apply for and secure a search warrant from the
furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the
homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but dispensed with.
was acquitted of attempted homicide. There are two separate statutes penalizing
Surveillance was undertaken by the different offenses with discrete penalties. The
military along EDSA because of intelligence Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart
reports about a coup. Members of from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses,
the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing such as illegal possession of firearms, that might
one member of the team. A searching team raided conceivably be committed in the course of a
the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and
confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal
bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different possession of firearms committed in the course or as
calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the part of a rebellion.
rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De Subject to the presence of the requisite
Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano, elements in each case, unlawful possession of an
holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may
door. The team arrested appellant. They were then give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of
made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case
team. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
of firearms. punished by a special law while the second is a felony
That judgment of conviction is now punished by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant
challenged before us in this appeal. elements.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms
seizure in this case. and ammunition is committed in furtherance of
rebellion. At the time the offense charged in this case
Ruling: YES was committed under the governance of that law, the
It is admitted that the military operatives imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the
who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could
with a search warrant at that time. The raid was only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial
office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in
Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted connection therewith.
on the premises wherein the surveillance team was
fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar 3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal
building. When the military operatives raided the target zonings."
place, the occupants thereof refused to open the
door despite requests for them to do so, thereby Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
compelling the former to break into the office. The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/
it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the the mission of conducting security operations w/in its
usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the
is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of purpose of establishing an effective territorial
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing
high-powered firearms and explosives could not be an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to
maitain peace and order, the NCRDC installed saturation drives follow a common pattern of human
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. rights abuses.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the Respondents stress 2 points. First, the
institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela resps. have legal authority to conduct saturation
residents are worried of being harassed and of their drives. And, second, they allege that the accusations
safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for
whimsical disposition of the military manning the human rights, are total lies.
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the
are being subjected to regular searches and check- Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the
ups, especially at night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or executive departments, bureaus and offices. He
court order. Their alleged fear for their safety shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed."
increased when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be
allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it
ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
warning shots fired in the air. forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. xxx
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and
apprehension at being harassed by the military HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to some violations were actually committed. This is so
declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for
been presented before the Court to show that, in the the thousands of residents"to submit themselves
course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, voluntarily for character and personal verification."
committed specific violations of petitioners' rights However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions,
against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
The constitutional right against unreasonable nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots
only by those whose rights have been infringed, or or violent demonstration if they do not move in
threatened to be infringed. sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. necesary as long as the rights of the people are
Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden. protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all
may be considered as a security measure to enable police actions to one on one confrontation where
the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing search warrants and warrants of arrest against
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy may
and order for the benfit of the public. Checkpoints reign if the military and the police decide to sit down
may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots in their offices bec. all concerted drives where a
to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public show of force is present are totally prohibited.
security. The remedy is not an original action for
Between the inherent right of the state to prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where not
protect its existence and promote public welfare and one victim complains, and not one violator is properly
an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c charged, the problem is not initially for the SC. It is
is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should basically one for the executive departments and for
prevail. the trial courts.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the Under the circumstances of this TP's suit,
military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can
same manner that all governmental power is order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional ascertained through an orderly procedure, no
inconveninece, discomfort and even irritation to the permanent relief can be given at this time. Further
citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard
when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of look by admin. officials at the policy implications of
the price we pay for an orderly society and a the prayed for blanket prohibition are also
peaceful community. warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima
facie showing that some abuses were probably
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990) committed and could be committed during future
police actions, we have to temporarily restrain the
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the
to prohibit the military and police officers herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for
represented by public respondents from conducting examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
"areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. residences even if these are humble shanties of
The 41 petitioners state that they are all squatters, and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to
of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers the conscience.
and leaders in their respective communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target
zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas 4. Wire Tapping
pinpointed by the military and police as places where
the subversives are hiding. Petitioners claim that the
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) 6. Exclusionary Rule

F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 this (privacy of communication and
from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan correspondence) or the preceding section
through a telephone extension as requested by (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be
Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation One of the remedies of one who was
upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
listened to the telephone conversation without suppression of the things seized and the evidence
complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan illegally taken.
and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping
Act (RA 4200). The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any
evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2 and 3 (1) of
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". The
prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts evidence is absolutely useless. This has not always
use to overhear a private conversation would been the case.
constitute an unlawful interception of communication
between 2 parties using a telephone line. In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC,
following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that
HELD: NO evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily
An extension tel. cannot be placed in the excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of
same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted,
devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use without prejudice to any criminal, civil or
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or administrative liability of the officer who illegally
cable of a telephone line. This section refers to seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be evidence is not effected by the illegality of the
presumed by the party or parties being overheard means by which it was acquired.
because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following
tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969, when the
conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines,
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be the SC noting that the total suppression of the thing
there for ordinary office use. seized is the only effective means of ensuring the
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal constitutional right which it seeks to preserve. The
statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the Court noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies
accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on (e.g. action for damages, criminal punishment,
WON an extension tel. is included in the phrase resistance), especially in the Philippines where
"device or arrangement" the penal statute must be violations were committed by those in power and
construed as not including an extension tel. were thus equipped with the pardoning power to
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record water down the gravity of the other penalties
shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, imposed to violators of those constitutional rights.
through punishment, persons suchj as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups The victim may or may not get back the thing
from installing devices in order to gather evidence for seized, depending on whether it is contraband or
use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be
unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. returned, and only its suppression can be asked for.
Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its
be punishable must stricly be with the use of the return, even if no criminal prosecution has yet been
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar filed, as in the Stonehill case.
nature.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
5. What may be seized
F: Upon application of the officers of the govt
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges)
seized.-- A search warrant may be issued for the issued a total of 42 search warrants against
search and seizure of the following personal petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were
property: officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
(a) Subject matter of the offense; perons named and/ or the premises of their offices,
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several
proceeds or fruits of the offense; and personal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen
(c) Used or intended to be used as a means or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used
of committing an offense. (Rules of Court.) or intended to be used as the means of committing
the offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search A civil case for damages can also be filed
warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially lifted In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the
or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and privilege of the writ is suspended, the court can
things seized from the officers of the corporations; nevertheless entertain an action not only against the
but the injunction was maintained as regards those task force but even against the top ranking officials
found & seized in the residences of petitioners. who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for the
illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire into
in the offices of the corporations, w/n petitioners the validity of the suspension of the privilege.
have cause of action to assail the validity of the
contested warrants.
(2) In connection w/ those found & 8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the
search warrants in question and the searches and People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
seizures made under the authority thereof are valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the
documents, papers and things may be used in Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
evidence against petitioners. Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes,
following standard operating procedure, opened the
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to boxes for final inspection. When he opened
assail the legality of the contested warrants and the appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted therefrom.
seizure made in pursuance thereof bec. said His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles
corporations have their respective personalities, allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves
separate and distinct from the personality of inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
petitioners. The legality of a seizure can be cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
contested only by the party whose rights have been one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
impaired thereby and that the objection to an cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and contents thereof.
cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI
and requested a laboratory examination of the
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti: (a) that It turned out that the dried leaves were
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic
determined by the judge in the manner set forth chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
therein; & (b) that the warrant shall particularly Thereafter, an information was filed
describe the things to be seized. against appellant for violation of RA 6425.
None of these requirements has been
complied w/. It was stated that the natural and APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of
juridical persons has committed a violation of CB the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of
laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense had been his consti. rights against unreasonable searches and
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof seizures and privacy of communication and therefore
w/ respect to the offense committed were abstract. argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges evidence.
who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the The case at bar assumes a peculiar
introduction of competent proof that the party character since the evidence sought to be excluded
against whom it is sought has performed particular was primarily discovered and obtained by a private
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a person, acting in a private capacity and w/o the
given provision of our criminal laws. intervention and participation of state authorities.
General search warrants are outlawed bec.
they place the sanctity of the domicile and the ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in
privacy of communication and correspondence at the violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace invoked against the state?
officers.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly by the Consti. cannot be invoked against the State.
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of This constitutional right refers to the immunity of
Rights-- that the things to be seized be particularly one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
described-- as well as tending to defeat its major interference by govt. xxx (Villanueva v. Querubin.)
objective: the elimination of general warrants. The contraband in the case at bar having
RAM. come into possession of the govt w/o the latter
transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
7. Civil Action for Damages searches and seizures (S & S), the Court sees no

cogent reason why the same should not be admitted writing and under oath of the complainant and his
against him. witnesses in the form of searching questions and
Appellant, however, would like this Court to answers, that a probable cause exists and that
believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and there is a necessity of placing the respondent
seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the case. The arguments of appellant stands to fall the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of
on its own weight, or the lack of it. arrest. (Rules of Court.)
First, the factual considerations of the case
at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI
agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of
merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate complainant; record.-- The judge must, before
that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form
forwarding agency, who made the search/ of searching questions and answers, in writing and
inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a under oath the complainant and any witnesses he
SOP on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary may produce on facts personally known to them
measure bef. delivery of packages to the Bureau of and attach to the records their sworn statements
Customs or Bureau of Posts. together with any affidavits submitted.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is
did not convert the reasonable search effected by relaxed in that the judge can rely on the certification
Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the
Consti. Merely to observe and look at that w/c is preliminary investigation and has found probable
plain sight is not search. Having observed that w/c cause on the part of the accused. The judge can
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid issue the warrant on the basis of the information filed
thereof, is not search. by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the
Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts of The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v.
private individuals finds support in the deliberations Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that it has been
of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of Rights governs the practice long settled and that a judge can issue an
relationship between the individual and the state. Its order to arrest on the basis of the certificate.
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals. Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can
xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas.) always ask the fiscal to submit the records of the
The constitutional proscription against preliminary investigation, so he could determine for
unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint himself if, on the basis of the affidavits, there exists
directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked probable cause. It he is satisfied with the affidavits,
w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only he need not summon the affiants.
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
is imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a
inititiation of the proprietor of a private preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in complaint for robbery filed by complainant
the case at bar, and w/o the intervention of police Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
authorities, the right against unreasonable S & S from a portion of her land directly adjoining
cannot be invoked for only the act of private Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani
the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of
as to bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani
intrusion by the govt. returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground
that the transmittal of the records was “premature”
9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant
distinguished from SEARCH warrants, the judge of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde
may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that
probable cause although he found that a probable cause existed, he
did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA.

Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
may issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-- fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to
Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial the performance of the act to be required of the
Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to
accused. perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
investigation is satisfied after an examination in
the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself

ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima personally examine the complainant and his
facie evidence that the accused commited the crime witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
charged.
report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
H E L D : T H E P U R P O S E O F A P R E L I M I N A RY and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
OFFICER. require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is the existence of probable cause. Sound policy
conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and
accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
issue, the investigating judge must have examined in
before their courts.
writing and under oath the complainant and his xxx
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he
must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and 10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
there must be a need to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant;
of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely when lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person
discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been
discretion.
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an indicating that the person to be arrested has
information immediately so that the RTC may issue a committed it;
warrant for the arrest of the accused. Bam. (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment of place where he is serving final
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for from one confinement to another.
libel against the petitioners, who were publisher and In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. 12, be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
1987 entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
Administration:" "If you will recall, during the Aug. accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of
29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her bed, while Court.)
the firing was going on-- perhaps the first
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests",
Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. The fiscal cases where an arrest can be made either by the
deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case peace officer or a private person without need of a
against the petitioners and filed the case in court w/ warrant.
c thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the The key element in the first case is that the
petitioners. The petitioners filed a petition for offense was committed "in his presence". The key
certiorari and prohibition. element in the second case is that he has "personal
knowledge".
HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the
word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and the deletion Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986),
of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue the arrest made by the constabulary without a
warrants to "other responsible officer as may be warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that
authorized by law," has apparently convinced he was a subversive was held unconstitutional, since
petitioner Beltran that the Consti. now requires the there was no personal knowledge of the offense
judge to personally examine the complainant and his itself.
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an The gun and subversive documents found by
accurate interpretation. What the Consti. the officer and admitted by the former to be his were
u n d e rsc or e s i s t h e e x c l u si ve a n d p e r s on a l likewise held inadmissible because the admission
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of violated the Miranda rule.
something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan together

a. Strict enforcement of rule with his companions approached the male person and
the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) as police officers, they asked the male person, the
tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar contents of their pockets, which the male person, the
Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while plowing driver and the passengers of the tricycle did. The
his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, male person brought out from his pockets 2 small
on charges of illegal possession of firearm in plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves.
furtherance of subversion. A .38 caliber revolver was The tricycle driver brought out from his right front
found buried under his house. Subversive documents pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes.
were also seized from a place near his house. Two Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2
arresting officers testified that the appellant had passengers of the tricycle.
readily admitted ownership of the gun and the The appellant contends that the police
documents. The appellant was found guilty of the officers had no personal knowledge that he was
charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as were 10-15 meters away from the alleged sale
maximum, and the gun and documents were ordered transaction. The arrest therefore was not valid as the
confiscated. requirements for a warrantless arrest were not
complied with.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting
officer must have personal knowledge that the crime Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
has been committed, is being committed, or is about
to be committed, in order to justify an arrest w/o a Ruling: YES.
warrant. The offense must also be committed in his The warrantless arrest made by the law
presence or w/in his view. There is no such personal enforcers was valid since it falls under the provisions
knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which
appellant was illegal. provides:
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm and A peace officer or a private person may, without a
document are inadmissible in evidence. warrant, arrest a person:
(3) The prosecution argues that the (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
appellant admitted ownership of the gun and claims arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
that it was he who pointed to the place where the attempting to commit an offense;
subversive documents were hidden. However, as the
appellant was not informed of his constitutional Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a
rights at that time, his admission is inadmissible result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were
under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6 days not only authorized but were also under obligation to
later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of
the assistance of counsel, but it was then already too arrest. The police officers were tipped off by an
late. informer about the illegal trade of the accused. The
(4) As the remaining evidence against the exact location where this trading in drugs was taking
appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and it is place was given to them. The 'suspicious stuff' taken
uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant should from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana
be acquitted, but the gun and the subversive after tests were conducted on them. The attendant
documents must be confiscated. circumstances taking place before their eyes led the
police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989) was actually being committed.

F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call
from the desk officer of Sub-Station I, namely, b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person
named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No. 8199 (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and requested
that said person be apprehended. Acting on this Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of
policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC)
from the house located at 8199 Constancia St., filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that the persons
Makati. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board, detained have not been illegally arrested nor
a driver and 2 passengers, stop in front of the house arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to
at 8199 Constancia St. They also saw a male person liberty and that the circumstances attending these
come out of the said house and approach and talk to cases do not warrant their release on HC.
the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars.
male person go back to the house and a little later (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as amended is justified
come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a when the person arrested is caught in flagrante
suspicious stuff of a cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or
they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give when an offense has just been committed and the
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of

the facts indicating that the person arrested has The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
committed it. Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions
for HC have been filed had freshly committed or were In view of the revelations made by Rogelio
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino house in
so that their arrests, w/o warrant were clearly Marikina Heights was placed under military
justified, and that they are, further detained by surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant to a search
virtue of valid informations filed against them in warrant , a search of the house was conducted at 5
court. PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the course of the search
were found several firearms, regular power supply,
I antennae, speaker and subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received not produce any permit or authority to possess the
confidential info. about a member of the NPA- firearms, ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to
Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at CIS HQ for investigation. When questioned, he
the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Ave., Q.C. It was refused to give a written statement, although he
found that the wounded person, who was listed in the admitted that he was a staff member of the
hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation International Dept. of the CPP.
squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred at RC's house. When arrested, he readily submitted
to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. to the military agents that he is a regular member of
Upon positive identification by an the CPP/ NPA and that he went to the place to
eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City deliver letters to "Ka Mong," referring to RC and other
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed members of the rebel group. Also found in
w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. charging Dural w/ Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper
the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents containing the jumbled tel. no. of Florida Roque,
of persons in authority." sister of Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place
Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as military
and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not agents and after seeking permission to search the
lie in favor of an accused in a crim. case, who has place, w/c was granted, the military agents
been released on bail. conducted a search in the presence of the occupants
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the of the house and the barangay captain of the place.
act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was he arrested The military found the place to be another
after the commission of said offense for his arrest safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They found firearms,
came a day after the shooting incident. However, subversive documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers,
Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an among others. Amelia admitted ownership of the
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a documents seized.
continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is Roque was brought to the Caloocan City
justified as it can be said that he was committing an Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging her w/
offense when arrested. viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for viol. of
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Roque and
whether as its fighting armed elements, or for also to Buenaobra.
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on
rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the hearing,
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting stockade at Camp Crame, Q.C. Accordingly, the
them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, petition for HC on his behalf is now moot and
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the academic.
prosecution of offenses w/c requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of III
probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Anonuevo v. Ramos.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and
committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived
the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. at the house of RC w/c was still under surveillance.
Enrile.) The military noticed bulging objects on their waist
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be
now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the loaded guns. They were asked to show their permit
trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no longer or license to possess or carry firearms and
available ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence,
they were brought to PC HQ for investigation.
II
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed no less than by
Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former former comrades of the petitioners.
comrades. VI
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol.
of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On 8/24/88, a Espiritu v. Lim.
petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of
HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of
unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home located
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by his sister who
were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his
in their person when apprehended. jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he
There is also no merit in the contention that was immediately put under arrest. When he asked
the info. filed against them are null and void for want for the warrant, the men bodily lifted him and placed
of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., him in their owner type jeepney. He demanded that
having been first conducted, is sanctioned by Rule his sister be allowed to accompany him, but the men
112, Sec. 7, ROC. did not accede to his request.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142,
provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners ask RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him.
for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-
against them in court. con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through tri-media was
heard urging all drivers and operators to go on
IV nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the
Ocaya v. Aguirre. NPC in order to investigate him, but he gave the
lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he was
and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command, heard as saying,
armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a "Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa
house located at Marikina Green Heights, believed to magkagulo na."
be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP- Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o
NPA. In the course of the search, Ocaya arrived in a warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R
car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents 113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is detained
and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal. by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the competent
pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were court, he may not be released on HC.  
brought to the PC HQ for investigation, when O.
could not produce any permit or authorization to VII
possess the ammunition, an info. charging her w/
viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was Nazareno v. Station Commander.
released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo
behalf of these 2. Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects in the killing
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on
that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No. prel. 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to
inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of
warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Bunye II. In view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant,
Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC. picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ
for questioning.
V xxx
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying the
Roque claim that the firearms, ammunitions and petition for HC, it appearing that said Narciso
subversive documents alleged to have been found in Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
their possession, when arrested, did not belong to reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti.,
them, but were planted by the military to justify MM.
their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the
introduced any evidence to support their claim. On police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R 113,
the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on the part ROC, after he was positively implicated by his co-
of the arresting officers that could cause the said accused; and after investigation by the police.
officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners The obligation of an agent of authority to
falsely, has been shown. make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a
fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is
sufficient that the agent or person in authority
making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several
to believe the existence of an act having the persons who, the day before his arrest, w/o warrant,
characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds had shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car.
exist to beleive that the person sought to be detained Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or
participated therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.) would shoot other policemen, anywhere as agents or
representative of an organized govt. It is in this
sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on
an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
VIII overriding objective of overthrowing organized govt is
attained.
In all the petitions here considered, criminal His arrest was based on "probable cause."
charges have been filed in the proper courts against Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for
the petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the
officer under process issued by a court or judge, and person arresting has personal knowledge of facts
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the indicating that the person to be arrested is the one
process or make the order, or if such person is who committed the offense.
charged before any court, the writ of HC will not be It has been ruled that personal knowledge
allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.) of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be based upon
probable cause, w/c means on actual belief or
On the Ilagan Doctrine. reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re- when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of the officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested
Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
and the better practice would be, not to limit the on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
w/c issued the process, judgement or order of probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
commitment, or bef. whom the detained person is A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, the peace officers making the arrest.
but rahter, as the court itself stated in Morales, Jr. v. Said confidential info. received by the
Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the court must inquire arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was being
into every phase and aspect of petitioner's treated for a gunshot wound was based on actual
detention-- "from the moment petitioner was taken facts and supported by circumstances sufficiently to
into custody up to the moment the court passes upon engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in
the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a said hospital. The actual facts supported by
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due circumstances are: (1) the day bef., or on 1/31/88,
process clause of our Constitution in fact has been 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo.,
satisfied." Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251 said hospital for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie
Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital
P E T I T I O N S E E K I N G S E PA R AT E M O T I O N S F O R records were fictitious and the wounded man was in
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION reality Dural.
PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
On good faith.-- The peace officers who
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the
that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid same in good faith, considering that law enforcers
ground for his arrest w/o warrant. are presumed to regularly perform their official
duties.
We find no merit in the motions for A few days after Dural's arrest, an info.
reconsideration. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault against
agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is Caloocan City. He was placed under judicial custody.
justified as it can be said that, w/in the On 8/31/88, he was convicted and sentenced to
contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was reclusion perpetua.
committing an offense, when arrested, bec. Dural
was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo,
outlawed org., where membership is penalized, and R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests, w/o warrant,
for subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under Garcia v. are also justified. They were searched pursuant to a
Padilla, a continuing crime. warrant issued by a court of law and were found w/
Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a unlicensed firearms, explosives and/ or ammunitions
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply bec. he on their persons. They were, therefore, caught in
was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest
w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. A few days

after their arrests, informations were filed in court NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of
against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while Nazareno's
custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition is moot arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14
bec. he had chosen to remain in detention. days later, teh arrest falls under Sec. 5 (b), R113,
The reason which compelled the military since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police
agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably
given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
by RC and the other by Benito Tiamson) were being arrest had to be made promptly, even w/o a warrant
used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations, w/ info. as (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse
to their exact location and the names of RC and BT as of 14 days to prevent possible flight.
residents and occupants thereof. Nazareno has since been convicted by the
And at the time of the actual arrests, the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion
following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of perpetua.
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c
confirmed the belief of the military that the info. ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
they had received was true and the persons to be
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of These admissions strengthen the Court's
certain crimes: first, the search warrant was duly perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the
issued to effect the search of the Constantino arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant,
safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the
person named RC, who admitted that he was a persons arrested were probably guilty of the
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/
possession were unlicensed firearms and communist Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the
equipment; third, at the time of their arrests, in other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested
their possession were unlicensed firearms, are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their
ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of
they admitted ownership thereof as well as their determining the guilt or innocence of persons
membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly after arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for
their arrests, they were positively identified by their HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
former comrades as CPP/ NPA members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R
113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
our community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does not F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-
depend upon the fact of the crime, but xxx upon the bust” operation. The two marked ten-peso bill were
nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization retrieved from him. He was asked to sign his name
may reasonably be inferred by the officer or on the two marked bills. The ten handrolled
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were
the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the submitted for examination. After finding these
liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation

ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Linsangan denied the
subversive or any "continuing offense," but for charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon
uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx appeal, one of the assertions of Linsangan was that
hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the trial court erred in not holding that when the
the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition. policemen required him to initial the marked bills,
they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to
Many persons differ as to the validity of such remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while
perception and regard the language as falling w/in under custodial investigation.
free speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the
authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF
w/o warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or
THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE
soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the
balancing of authority and freedom, w/o obviously WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
becomes difficult at times, the court, has in this
case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by
for purposes of the arrest (not conviction.) counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police
found tucked in his waist, his right against self-
Supervening events made this case moot and incrimination was not violated for his possession of
academic. for E. had bef. arraignment asked the the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the
court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
did not appear. Case against E. has been marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based
provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled.
on the presence of his initials on the marked bills,

but on the fact that the trial court believed the 1. Right to remain silent
testimony of the policemen that they arrested him
while he was actually engaged in the selling a) To make him aware of it.
marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the
interrogating atmosphere
party. The trial court gave more credence to their
c) To show the individual that his
categorical declarations than to the appellant’s interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege
denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, should he choose to invoke his right.
they are presumed to have performed their official
duties in a regular manner. Their task of 2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to
apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug remain silent, anything he says can and will be used
trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural against him.
technicalities to make it doubly so.
a) To warn him of the consequences of
waiving his right to remain silent.
11. Immunity from arrest of b) To make him aware that this is an
members of Congress adversary system, and that the police are not acting
in his interest.
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of
the House shall, in all offenses punishable by not 3. Right to counsel before and during the
more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision interrogation
correcional), be privileged from arrest while
Congress is in session. xxx a) To mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the inherent
pressures initially overcome by the right to remain
B. Rights of Persons under custodial silent may again run unless coupled with the right to
interrogation counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under police.
custodial investigation for the commission of an
offense, shall have the right to be informed of his 4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford
right to remain silent and to have competent and counsel, then one will be provided for him by the
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. state.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot a) To inform him that if he does not have
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel or cannot afford one, he does not have to
counsel. defend himself alone.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, b) To inform him that his poverty is no
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the reason why he should lose his right to counsel.
free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other (The reading of these rights is no less
similar forms of detention are prohibited. indispensable even if the person arrested is a
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he may
violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall be already know these rights, the purpose is not so much
inadmissible in evidence against him. to inform him, as to assure him that his interrogators
(4) The law shall provide for penal and are willing to respect his rights amidst the pressure of
civil sanctions for violations of this section, as well custodial investigation.)
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families. The reading of these rights is required during
"custodial investigation".

Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) A police investigation consists of 2 stages:

According to Chief Justice Warren, when a 1) "General exploratory investigation" -
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere when the investigation consists merely of general
and run through menacing police interrogation questions to find out who might be the culprit, but
procedures, where compulsion is forcefully potential without being directed at anyone's guilt in particular.
and his will is likely to be subjugated, the officers At this stage, the Miranda rule is not yet applicable;
must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the otherwise, people who could otherwise explain their
reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the innocence would be arrested.
investigation to ensure that the statements made are
truly the product of free choice. 2) "Custodial investigation" - when the
investigation now focuses on the guilt of a person
Any person under custodial or police such that he is no longer allowed to leave the
investigation has the right to be informed of the premise. It is at this stage that the Miranda ruling is
following rights: necessary, since the purpose of the interrogation is to
evince evidence that can be used to prosecute the obtained by law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel
person. and inhuman methods to secure confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible
running with a stained knife away from an apparently even the most unquestionably true inculpatory
dead man, he can rung after X and having grabbed statements." xxx This is not bec. such confessions
him, ask him for an explanation as to what he saw are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to
without reading his Miranda rights. But once A arrests extract them offend an underlying principle in the
X and starts interrogating him in the police precinct, enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an
then his rights must now be read, for there can only accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -- a
be one purpose to the questioning, and that is to system in w/c the State must establish guilt by
elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. evidence independently and freely secured and not
by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v. Richmond, J.
Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61 Phil. Frankfurter.)
LJ 409
THE MIRANDA RULE
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF
PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. The prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
Since the introduction of the American custodial interrogation of the def. unless it
accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
Phils., the rule has been that involuntary confessions effective to secure the privilege against self-
are inadmissible in evidence against the accused. incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
The question is on whom the burden of proof questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
is placed. The early rule placed the burden of after a person has been taken to custody or
proving that the confession was voluntary and, otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
t h e re fore , a d m i ssi b le i n e vi d e n c e , on t h e significant way. xxx
prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was held that a
confession not shown to have been voluntarily given II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS
could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings, MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
even for the first time on appeal in the SC.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings
code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of proof on the to be given by police interrogators bef. a person in
accused to show that his confession was involuntary. custody may be interrogated, w/c have been adopted
Under the new rule, it was sufficient that the by the Phil. SC:
confession was given under conditions w/c accredit 1. The person in custody must be informed in
prima facie its admissibility. clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to
In 1953, a further change took place when remain silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his
the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A confession, privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself,
to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have to overcome the inherent pressures of the
been obtained by force and violence, but also that it interrogation atmosphere, and to assure the
is false or untrue, for the law rejects the confession individual that his interrogators are prepared to
when, by force or violence or intimidation, the recognize his privilege, should he choose to exercise
accused is compelled against his will to tell a it.
falsehood, not even when such force and violence he 2. The person in custody must be warned
is compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of that anything he will say can and wilol be used
Peo. v. Villanueva, the Court stated "the admissibility against him. This warning is intended to make him
of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed aware not only of the privilege but also of the
illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth consequences of foregoing it.
or falsity of the facts or admission contained therein. 3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-
The illegality of the means used in obtaining custody interrogation can operate very quickly to
evidence does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. overbear the will of one merely made aware of his
People's Court.) privilege by his interrogators, it is indispensable that
he has the assistance of counsel.
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH
AND SEIZURE CASES
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule
in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v. Diokno) At what stage of the police interrogation
worked a parallel in the law of confession. W/o must the warnings be given? The Consti. does not
expressly overruling its decision in de los Santos and state at what stage of the interrogation process they
Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro, went back to must be made. but in Miranda, the court specified
the former rule that involuntary or coerced that it is only at the custodial phase of the
confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and interrogation that its ruling applied. As the Court
void. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular 4. With regard to confessions given after
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti. requires that the
police carries out a process of interrogation that waiver to be valid, must be in writing and w/ the
leads itself to eliciting incriminating statements that assistance of counsel.
the rule begins to operate.
IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested,
w/o a warrant, for vagrancy. He was taken to police Any confession or admission obtained in
precint no. 2 in Mla. The next day, he was included violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be
in a police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti.
by the complainant as a complanion of the main says. No distinction is made bet. confession or
suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of
to stay and sit in front of the complainant, while the confessions only, I have argued that it was not so
latter was interrogated. The accused was then limited but that it also embraced uncounselled
charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to dismiss statements. For "if a statement made wore in fact
the case against him on the ground that he had been exculpatory, it could ... never be used by the
denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. prosecution, in fact, statements merely intended to
His motion was denied. Hence, this petition for be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to
certiorari. impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate
untruths in the statement given under interrogation
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the and thus to prove guilt by implication."
start of an interrogation, when the police officer
starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. and/ or EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
confessions or admissions from the accused. As the
police line-up in this case was not part of the The phrase "for any purpose in any
custodial inquest, the petitioner was not entitled to proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule excluding
counsel xxx. evidence illegally obtained is absolute. No similar
phraseology is used in the exclusionary rule
implementing the Miranda rule. Does this mean there
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS. can be instances, where uncounselled statements
may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit,
It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver for a limited purpose?
of rights and the waiver of warnings. The first can be
made provided that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing In Harris v. US, it was held that although a
and intelligent" but the second cannot. As the confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda
warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing
apprised of his rights so that any subsequent waiver in chief the confessor's guilt, it may nevertheless be
of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing and presented in evidence to impeach his credit.
intelligent," it is obvious that there can be no valid Petitioner, as a def., in a prosecution for selling
waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be heroin, claimed that what he had sold to a police
presumed. officer was baking powder, as part of the scheme to
defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the suspect must be perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
warned that he has a right to remain silent and to confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance
have the assistance of counsel does not apply. such
confessions, even though presented in evidence in a In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a
trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti., are "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. xxx.
admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the "There is public safety exception to the requirement
traditional test of voluntariness. that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's
answers may be admitted in evidence." It held that
2. With respect to confessions obtained after the warnings were not themselves Constitutional
Jan. 17, 1973, but before March 20, 1985, when the rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure
decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is the right against self-incrimination. The Court noted
that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely,
silence and to counsel must be determined on a case- that the giving of warnings might deter suspects from
to-case basis, taking into account the circumstances answering questions and this might lead in turn to
under w/c the waiver was made. fewer convictions. It then ruled that the social cost
is higher when the giving of warnings might deter
3. With regard to confessions obtained after suspects from answering questions than are necessary
March 20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987, when the to avert an immediate threat to public safety. When
present Consti. took effect, the rule is that a waiver answers are not actually coerced, this social cost
of the rights to remain silent and to the assistance of outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. In such
counsel, to be valid, must be made w/ the assistance exigent circumstances, police officers must not be
of counsel. made to choose bet. giving the warnings at the risk
that public safety will be endangered and withholding
the warnings at the risk that probative evidence will was Atty. Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of
be excluded. Tanjay, whose interest is admittedly adverse to
the accused and who is not an independent
counsel. On top of this, there are telltale signs
People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 that violence was used against the accused.
Certainly, these are blatant violations of of
F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. The Sec. 12, Art III of the 1987 Constitution which
victim, Pagdalian was found dead, sustaining stab protects the rights of the accused during
wounds. When the policemen inquired about the custodial investigation. Suzette.

circumstances of the incident, they were informed
1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions
that the deceased was with two companions, on the executed before January 17, 1973
previous night. The accused was apprehended. In the
vehicle where the accused boarded, on his way to the
Police Station, Bolanos allegedly admitted that he 2. Not applicable to res gestae statements
killed Pagdalian because he was abusive.
People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111 (1988)
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is
admissible in evidence. an exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence.
Res gestae is based on the belief that because certain
HELD: The trial court, in admitting the extra-judicial statements are made naturally, spontaneously and
confession of the accused in evidence, violated his without deliberation during the course of an event,
they leave little room for misunderstanding/
Constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent
misinterpretation upon hearing by someone else( i.e.
and to have a counsel of his choice, while already in by the witness who will later repeat the statement to
police custody. Since the extra-judicial confession the court) and thus the courts believe that such
was the only basis for the conviction of the accused, statements carry a high degree of credibility.
the trial coust’s judgment was reversed. Bam. Evidence which can be admitted into evidence as Res
gestae fall into three headings:

People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566 Words or phrases which either form part of, or
explain a physical act,
F: After he and his wife were individually Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie
hogtied and their house ransacked, Atty. Garay concoction, and
was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . For Statements which are evidence as to someone's state
his death and the loss of their things on the of mind.
occasion thereof, Bandula, Sidigo, Dionanao,
and Ejan were charged in court for robbery 3. Not applicable to statements given in
with homicide. On the basis of the administrative investigations
extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made
by Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
investigation which the court found to "have all
the qualities and have complied with all the It should at once be apparent that
requirements of an admissible confession, it there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt
appearing from the confession that acussed with in the section, namely:
were informed of their rights under the law
regarding custodial investigation and were duly 1) the right against self-incrimination i.e.,
represented by Counsel (Atty. Zerna)", it the right of a person not to be compelled to be a
disregarded the defenses interposed by the witness against himself set out in the first sentence,
accused and convicted Bandula. The 3 other which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
accused were acquitted for "insufficiency of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to
evidence". that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the
American Constitution, and
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of 2) the right of a person in custodial
Bandula conformed with the constitutional interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
requisites for its validity, hence admissible in investigation for the commission of an offense."
evidence.
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution
HELD: NO indicates much more clearly the individuality and
From the records, it can be gleaned disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights
that when accused Bandula and Dionanao were in separate sections. The right against self-
investigated immediately after their arrest, incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a
they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel witness against himself," is now embodied in Section
came in only a day after the custodial 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The rights of a
investigation with respect to Dionanao, and 2 person in custodial interrogation, which have been
weeks later with respect to Bandula. And made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12
counsel who supposedly assisted both accused of the same Article III.
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be

Right Against Self-Incrimination appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be
The first right, against self-incrimination, afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After
mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 such warnings have been given, such opportunity
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative or make a statement. But unless and until such
proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
a witness against himself." It prescribes an "option of prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a
refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a result of interrogation can be used against him.
prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
one the answer to which has a tendency to atmosphere, resulting in self- incriminating
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right statement without full warnings of constitutional
can be claimed only when the specific question, rights."
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It The rights above specified, to repeat, exist
does not give a witness the right to disregard a only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court
the time appointed. has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
The right against self-incrimination is not officers after a person has been taken into custody or
self-executing or automatically operational. It must otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
be claimed. It follows that the right may be waived, significant way."
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at
the appropriate time. Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards
Giving of Testimony
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
In fine, a person suspected of having
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
also treats of a second right, or better said, group of commission in court, has the following rights in the
rights. These rights apply to persons "under matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or
and this is what makes these rights different from with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
that embodied in the first sentence, that against self- investigation), but after having been taken into
incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, significant way, and on being interrogated by the
civil, criminal, or administrative. police: the continuing right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be
This provision granting explicit rights to subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or
persons under investigation for an offense was not in any other means which vitiates the free will; and to
the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from have evidence obtained in violation of these rights
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. rejected; and
Arizona, a decision described as an "earthquake in
the world of law enforcement." 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

Section 20 states that whenever any person is a) to refuse to be a witness;
"under investigation for the commission of an b) not to have any prejudice
offense"-- whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf,
1) he shall have the right to remain silent subject to cross-examination by the
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, prosecution;
2) no force, violence, threat, intimidation, d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall answer a specific question which tends to
be used against him; and incriminate him for some crime other than
3) any confession obtained in violation of that for which he is then prosecuted.
these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this
Miranda rights case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be
He must be warned prior to any questioning properly understood, prior to and during the
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything administrative inquiry into the discovered
he says can be used against him in a court of law, irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Police who identified a statement of the accused
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver
come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. of the right to remain silent and to counsel. When
Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in
4. Custodial Phase of Investigation the statement, the defense objected, contending
that Yupo's statement was given without the
Police Lineups assistance of counsel. Respondent Judge sustained
the objection on the ground that the right to counsel
Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988 cannot be waived.

Police line-up not part of custodial inquest HELD: The right to counsel during custodial
interrogation may be waived provided the waiver is
F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in made intelligently and voluntarily, with full
Manila. The following day, he was included in a police understanding of its consequences. In this case, the
line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a statement made only a perfunctory opening question,
robbery case. He was later charged with robbery and after informing the suspect that he was under
charged. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground investigation, that he had a right to counsel and that
that the conduct of the line-up, without the anything he said could be used for or against him and
assistance of counsel, was unconstitutional. after asking whether he was willing to answer
questions and he answered "yes." The statement was
HELD: The police line-up was not part of the in Tagalog which the defendant, a native of Samar,
custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet had not been shown to be fully acquainted with. The
entitled, at such stage, to counsel. VV. date of execution of the statement before the
municipal court was not indicated. The separate
statement signed by the defendant stating he was
US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967) made to read the opening statement containing the
Miranda warnings and that they were explained to
People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 him all the more engenders doubt as to whether the
defendant was properly informed of his right.
F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while
walking with several companions including Ongue who People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980)
vaguely recognized the assailant, describing the
latter as a "mestizo." Two days later, Ongue was Public trial; waiver of right to counsel
invited by the police to identify the suspect in a
police line- up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners
assailant. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On
made to stand in the police line-up, he was not June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso
assisted by counsel. Hence, his identification therein Saminado, another prisoner. Afterwards, they
by Ongue is inadmissble. surrendered to the prison guard, saying "surrender po
kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they
RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing.
station for indentification, technically, he was not yet They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty.
under custodial investigation. Thus, the right to They took the witness stand and affirmed their
counsel does not yet apply. confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while
However, there is every reason to doubt the Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the
regularity of the identification of the suspect by the Penitentiary. On review, it was contended that
witness. During the proceedings in the police station, Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to
Ongue identified Hatton not because he was certain counsel.
that Hatton was really the assailant but because he
was the only mestizo in the station and because he HELD: The record does not show that the public was
was pointed by the police as the suspect. This cannot actually excluded from the place where the trial was
be considered as positive identification of the held or that the accused was prejudiced by the
accused by the witness. holding of the trial there. Anyway, the right to public
trial may be waived. In another case where Avila was
5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights also a defendant, the SC directed that, for security
reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National
Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that
No valid waiver. he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but
despite this, he was willing to answer questions of
People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) the police. There is no doubt that the confession was
voluntarily made. The truth is that shortly after the
Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That
is voluntary, knowing and intelligent spontaneous statement, elicited without
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the
F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By
murder in the CFI of Bulacan. The prosecution means of that statement given freely on the spur of
presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan the moment without any urging or suggestion, the
two waived their right to remain silent and to

counsel.
People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985)
People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986)
F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with
No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The principal
prosecution witness testified that he heard the
F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77- defendant and his wife, who was the mother of the
year-old woman and sentence to death. His witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the
conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their
confession which he disowned in court. The house because he and his companions had robbed
confession was given to the police and subscribed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the
before the clerk of court and contains a waiver. extrajudicial confession of the defendant.

HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question HELD: The confession of the defendant is
whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of inadmissible because it was obtained through torture.
his right to counsel. His answer was categorical The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face
enough, to be sure, but the question itself was not with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet bowl full
since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As of human waste. It was only after they had broken his
worded, the question suggested a tentativeness that will that the defendant signed the confession and
belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the
his right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver at investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there
all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two
but not that one could be provided for him for free. weeks after he executed the salaysay that his
VV. relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement
does not contain any waiver or right to counsel and
Since Royo's conviction for murder was based yet during the investigation he was not assisted by
on a written confession showing that he was apprised one. These constitute gross violations of his right.
of his right not only by the police but also by the The SC cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile
fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the where it laid the procedure in custodial
waiver found to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent investigations: No custodial investigation shall be
and thus admissible. conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on
his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his
1987) behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
It is not enough that the confession is assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver must violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
be made in the presence of counsel. Waiver of the in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
right to counsel must be made with the assistance of
counsel. This rule applied from March 20, 1985 to
February 2, 1987. Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit
rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v.
In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in
SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and
538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation concurred in by all the Justices except one who took
should be conducted unless it be in the presence of no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts
counsel, and that although the right to counsel may regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and
be waived, the waiver should not be valid unless embraced its ruling.
made with the assistance of counsel.
In this case, the prosecution sought to prove
In the Galit case, however, the adoption of its charge of subversion against Asis by means of her
the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession confession given in the hospital, in which she
in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the admitted through a leading question, that she was a
SC did not need the Morales obiter in order to member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the
disallow the confession. encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision
excluding the confession on the ground that the
Under the facts of the case, the accused waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the
Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on the assistance of counsel.
basis of his confession, which was obtained through
torture. The NBI investigators covered Galit's face
with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986)
human waste. It was only after they had broken his
will that he signed the confession and posed for F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At
pictures for re-enactment as directed by the the trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an
investigators. extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital.
In that confession, she admitted, through a leading 6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers
question that she was a member of the NPA. The trial is on the prosecution
court excluded the confession on the ground that the
waiver of Miranda rights was made without the The burden to prove that there was a valid
assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that waiver of the Miranda warning devolves upon the one
the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to seeking to present the confession, that is, on the
counsel may be waived only with the assistance of prosecution. This rule applies whether in the pre-
counsel, was only a dictum. Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule.

HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC
decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in
except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal
and Moncupa v. Enrile. form. Investigators automatically type it together
with "opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign it
or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired
punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does
People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991) not create an impression of voluntariness or even
understanding on the part of the accused.
In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986),
Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with Whenever a Constitutional protection is
homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial waived by one entitled to that protection, the
confessions taken in 1977. The confessions and the presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the
special counsel before whom the confessions were prosecution must prove with strongly convincing
signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given, evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
but these were not made in the presence of counsel. voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly
The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that the and deliberately manifested that he was not
GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, interested in having a lawyer assist him during the
especially since in this case the trial court decision taking of that confession.
was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.

People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986)

People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with
homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda.
F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of
basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the
which the trial court found substantial to establish killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo
guilt. Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty
of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo
HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial
counsel was made without the assistance of a confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The
counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, confessions were taken while the two were held
People v. Galit and People v. Sison (1986) that this incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and
requirement is mandatory. Any statement obtained in after two weeks of detention.
violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in
evidence. VV. HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987) which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a
legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and artificial style does not create an impression of
made in the presence of counsel voluntariness or even understanding on the part of
the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
investigation for the commission of an offense shall Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is
have the right to be informed of his right to remain waived by the person entitled to that protection, the
silent and to have competent and independent presumption is always against the waiver.
counsel preferably of his choice. If the person Consequently, the prosecution must prove with
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was
not interested in having a lawyer assist him during
the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in
Under the new Constitution, any waiver must this case.
now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence
of counsel.

7. What may be waived: The right to remain The reason, continued the Court is that the
silent and to counsel, but not the right to be given shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot be
"Miranda warnings" perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
The right to remain silent and to counsel, prior inconsistent utterances.
which are the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can
be waived. Public Safety

What cannot be waived are: Public Safety may justify the police in taking
confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the
1. The right to be given the Miranda U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct.
warnings. (For how can one waive what one does not 2626 (1984).
know?)

2. The right to counsel when making the
waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).

In the case, the Court excused the giving of
8. Exclusionary rule the Miranda warning because the public safety
required that the weapon had to be located before it
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx could be used by the accused against those in the
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in supermarket.
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. The criticism hurled against this ruling is that
while the police may be justified in forcing the
assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is
Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the not justified to present this in evidence in the
exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained in subsequent criminal prosecution.
violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
There are two exceptions to the exclusionary C. Right to bail
rule. One, to impeach the credibility of the
accused. Two, public safety. Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
Impeach the credibility perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
The unwarned or uncounselled confession is sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
not totally without use. While it is not admissible to provided by law. the right to bail shall not be
prove the guilt of the accused, it may be used against impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
him to impeach his credibility by showing that he is habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
lying in court, so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in not be required.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
1. When right may be invoked

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) The right to bail is available from the very
moment of arrest (which may be before or after the
In this case, Harris was arrested for twice filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of
selling heroin to an undercover police agent. He conviction by final judgement (which means after
confessed to the crime during the police appeal).
interrogation, but the confession was uncounselled,
and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. But No charge need be filed formally before one
when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that can file for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So
what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.
the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to 634 (1945).
introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he
was lying. The case was unique in that after the war,
the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC
In justifying the admission of the testimony, to allow for a longer time to detain persons because
Justice Burger said that it is one thing to say that of the impossibility of filing charges within the
the government cannot make an affirmative use of reglementary period due to the number of indictees.
the evidence unlawfully obtained, and quite another
to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method Bail and Habeas Corpus
by which the evidence in the possession of the
government was obtained to his own advantage, In the case of bail, there is an implicit
providing himself with a shield against perjury and recognition that the arrest and detention, are valid,
the contradiction of his untruths. or that even if they were initially illegal, such
illegality was cured by the subsequent filing of a case
in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one be amount of bail considering primarily, but not
released temporarily from such valid detention, and limited to the following guidelines:
this can be made anytime after arrest. (a) Financial ability of the accused to give
bail;
In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely (b) Nature and circumstances of the
that the arrest and detention are illegal, so that the offense;
prayer is to be released permanently from such (c) Penalty of the offense charged;
illegal detention. When the privilege of the writ is (d) Character and reputation of the
suspended, the arrest and detention remain illegal, accused;
but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not (e) Age and health of the accused;
available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the (f) The weight of the evidence against the
effect of the suspension has been considerably accused;
lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours (g) Probability of the accused appearing in
from the illegal arrest, otherwise the detainee is to trial;
be released. (h) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(i) The fact that accused was a fugitive
The Constitution now provides, overruling from justice when arrested; and
Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension of the privilege (j) The pendency of other cases in which
of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the accused is under bond.
the right to bail. Habeas Corpus refers to illegal Excessive bail shall not be required.
detention, while bail refers to legal detention, or
even detention that started as illegal but was cured
by the filing of a case in court. Where the right to bail exists, it should not
be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is
2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a excessive, otherwise, it becomes "a promise to the
matter of discretion ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a
munificent bequest in a pauper's will" (Jackson).
Bail is a matter of right in all cases not Thus, said the SC in De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1
punishable by reclusion perpetua. (1971).

It is a matter of discretion in case the In this case, a bail of P1.195 million imposed
evidence of guilt is strong. In such a case, according against Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and
to People v. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1966), the 12 frustrated murder was found excessive.
court's discretion to grant bail must be exercised in
the light of a summary of the evidence presented by The SC laid down the following guidelines in
the prosecution. Thus, the order granting or refusing fixing the amount of bail in Villasenor v. Abano, 21
bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the SCRA 312 (1967), later contained in sec. 6 of Rule
prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or 114.
not the evidence of guilt is strong.
1. Ability of the accused to give the bail.
The only time bail may be denied is when (a) 2. Nature of the offense.
the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and 3. Penalty for the offense charged.
(b) the evidence of guilt is strong. 4. Character and reputation of the accused
5. Health of the accused.
With the abolition of the death penalty (III, 6. Character and strength of the evidence.
20), and the automatic commutation of a death 7. Probability of the accused appearing in
sentence to reclusion perpetua, it is contended that trial.
when the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in 8. Forfeiture of other bonds.
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, it is 9. Whether the accused was a fugitive from
meant to apply only to those crimes which were once justice when arrested.
punishable by death. For if it includeds even those 10. If the accused is under bond for
crimes which before and now are really punishable by appearance at trial in other cases.
reclusion perpetua, it would go against the very spirit
of the Constitution. Even when the accused has previously
jumped bail, still he cannot be denied bail. the
People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the
bail (Siquiam v. Amparo).
3. Bail in courts-martial
5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad
Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
4. Standards for fixing bail changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
Rule 114, Sec. 6. Amount of bail; of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
guidelines.-- The judge who issed the warrant or impaired except in the interest of national
granted the application shall fix a reasonable security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law.
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and

the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 142 SCRA 149 after arraignment, trial may proceed
(1986), the SC disallowed a person released on bail to notwithstanding the absence of the accused
travel abroad for a business trip. The Court gave 2 provided that he has been duly notified and his
reasons why bail operates only within the country. failure to appear is unjustifiable.

One, the accused may be placed beyond the
jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave 1. Presumption of innocence
the Philippines without sufficient reason, thus
affecting one of the conditions in the grant of bail, In People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 69 (1971), the
namely to have the accused available whenever the SC noted that the requirement of proof beyond
court requires his presence. reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent.
Two, implicit in the bail is the agreement
between the State and the surety that the State will
do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a law
the defendant upon order of the court. If the court disqualifying candidates charged with national
thus allows his to leave, then the State loses its right security offences was struck down as
to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself unconstitutional, for violating the presumption
has breached its obligation to the surety. against innocence.

The case leaves the question of allowing an
accused under bail to go abroad for humanitarian In Alejandro v. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1980), a
reasons open-ended. This reason was not foreclosed judge who allowed the accused to present his
by the Court, which hinted that the accused could be evidence ahead of the prosecution, over the
allowed to leave if he had "sufficient reason". What objection of the prosecution, after the acused
the Court found insufficient was the business trip. admitted the killing but invoked self-defense, was
reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in
the order of trial violated the constitutional
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986) presumption of innocence which places the burden
proof on the prosecution.
F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two
corporations, in one of which he was the president. This ruling was modified by Rule 119, sec. 3
The firms were placed under a management (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
committee by the SEC and petitioner was placed "on now reverses the order of trial when the defendant
hold" by the Commission of Immigration. Petitioner admits the act but invokes a justifying or exempting
was charged with estafa. He later asked for circumstance.
permission to leave the country for business reasons,
but his request was denied by the courts. He filed a
petition for certiorari but his petition was also People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739
dismissed for lack of merit. He appealed to the SC.
F: De Guzman, Castro and Catap were
HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114, sec. 1 charged with murder for the killing of an
upon the accused to make himself available unidentified person on Nov. 16, 1994. Only De
whenever the court requires his presence, operates Guzman and Castro were arrested and both
as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The pleaded not guilty. They were convicted by
constitutional right to travel is not absolute, but is the court mainly on the basis of the testimony
subject to lawful orders of the court. VV. of Adelia Angeles. She positively identified the
2 accused as the persons who were with Catap
who maltreated an unidentified person whom
6. Waiver of the Right to Bail they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon
seeing her, she testified that they untied the
People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) man and brought him towards the direction of
the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away.
D. Rights during trial This was further strengthened by the
extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused
Art. III, Sec. 14. (1) No person shall be Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan
held to answer for a criminal offense without due that it was Catap who killed the victim and
process of law. that he and de Guzman acted only as look-
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused outs.
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature innocenec of the accused has been overcome.
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the HELD: YES
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
Though there is no direct evidence to

link the 3 accused to the killing of the If the defendant appears without attorney,
unknown victim, the circumstantial evidence he must be informed by the court that it is his right
presented satisfied Sec. 4, Rule 133 ROC to have attorney before being arraigned., and must
namely: (1) there is more than one be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the reasonable time must be allowed for procuring
combination of all the circumstances is such as attorney.
to produce conviction beyond resonable doubt.
With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Not one of these duties had been complied
Police Cpl. Cunanan, there is no evidence that with by the trial court.
Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against One of the great principles of justice
accused. While it is true that accused's EJC was guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person
made without the advice and assistance of counsel, shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
hence inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy
as a verbal admission of the accused established the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In
through the testimonies of persons who heard it or criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
who conducted the investigatiuon of the accused accused be given the opportunity to be heard by
(Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473). Moreover in Peo v counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
Alvarez, the court ruled that an extrajudicial if it does not include the right to be heard by
confession is admissible against a co-accused when it counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man
is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the may have no skill in the science of the law,
probability of the participation of said co-accused in particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
the crime committed. counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his
2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is
to any person by reason of poverty (Art. III, Sec. 11.) deemed so important that it has become a
No matter how educated one may be, he may not constitutional right and it is so implemented that
know how to establsih his innocence for the simple under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
reason that he does not know the rules of evidence Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an
said the SC in People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952). attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires
People v. Holgado, 85 Phil 752 (1952) and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure
an attorney of his own.
F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the
court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because he did "feloniously and without Q: What happens if the accused files a
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on the
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case)
eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of and this motion is denied -- could the defense still
her personal liberty." Accused, unaided by counsel, present its own evidence?
pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed by Mr.
Ocampo to do so. In Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949), the
Accused was convicted of a capital SC ruled in the affirmative, contending that the right
offense. of the accused to present his evidence is a
Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty constitutional right which cannot be defeated by the
and no evidence appears to have been presented by dismissal of the motion of demurrer.
either party, the trial judge must have deduced the
capital offense from the facts pleaded in the Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right
information. to be heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.)

Ruling: Under the circumstances, particularly the Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949)
qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided
by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for F: Fidel Abriol, together with six other persons,
the trial court to render such a serious judgment was accused of illegal possession of firearms and
finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and ammunition. After the prosecution had presented its
imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years evidence and rested its case, counsel for the defense
and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, moved to dismiss the case on the ground of
without absolute any evidence to determine and insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the
clarify the true facts of the case. accused. After hearing the arguments for and against
The proceedings in the trial court are the motion for dismissal, the court held the proofs
irregular from the beginning. It is expressly provided sufficient to convict and denied said motion,
in our rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3 (now Rule whereupon counsel for the defense offered to
116, Sec. 6), that: present evidence for the accused. The provincial
fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the heard but on the contrary as in the instant case
defense, contending that the present procedural invokes that rough, and the court denies it to him,
practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed; it
cases from presenting any evidence after it had has no power to sentence the accused without
presented a motion for dismissal with or without hearing him in his defense; and the sentence thus
reservation and after said motion had been denied, pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked
and citing as authority the case of United States vs. in a habeas corpus proceeding.
De la Cruz, 28 Phil., 279. His Honor Judge S. C. Although the sentence against the petitioner
Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial is void for the reasons hereinabove stated, he may be
fiscal and, without allowing the accused to present held under the custody of the law by being detained
evidence in their defense, convicted all of them and or admitted to bail until the case against him is
sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years finally and lawfully decided. The process against him
of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,000. in criminal case No. 1472 may stand should be
resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by
Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be
present evidence after the denial of their motion to heard. Up to the point when the prosecution rested,
dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the proceedings were valid and should be resumed
the prosecution from there.

Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present
evidence. People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973)

1. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal
accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense
after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a F: After prosecution presented its witnesses, the
palpable error which resulted in denying to the said defense moved for dismissal of the case on the
accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill ground of insufficiency of evidence. The judge
of Rights embodied in the Constitution, it being granted the motion.
provided in Article II, section 1 (17), of the
Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the Issue: Did such dismissal operate as an acquittal of
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself the accused?
and counsel and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. Ruling: YES
There is no law nor "procedural practice" under which A dismissal ordered after the termination of
the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution
before being sentenced. has the force and effect of an acquittal. Since there
Now that the Government cannot appeal in is a failure to prove the guilt of the accused, the case
criminal cases if the defendant would be placed must be dismissed, and it will be a bar to another
thereby in double jeopardy (sec. 2, Rule 118), the prosecution for the same offense even though it was
dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express
after the prosecution has rested terminates the case consent of the defendant, in exactly the same way as
then and there. But if the motion for dismissal is a judgment of acquittal.
denied, the court should proceed to hear the
evidence for the defense before entering judgment Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After
regardless of whether or not the defense had the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
reserved its right to present evidence in the event its dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
motion for dismissal be denied. The reason is that it evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint
is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2)
in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. on motion of the accused filed with proper leave of
Of course if the accused has no evidence to present court.
or expressly waives the right to present it, the court If the court denies the motion for dismissal,
has no alternative but to decide the case upon the the accused may adduce evidence in his defense.
evidence presented by the prosecution alone. When the accused files such motion to dismiss
without express leave of court, he waives the right
2. The main question to decide is whether to present evidence and submits the case for
the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case like the judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
present. prosecution. (Rules of Court.)
We have already shown that there is no law
or precedent which could be invoked to place in 3. Right to free legal assistance
doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to
present evidence in his defense before being Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts
sentenced. On the contrary, the provisions of the and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly assistance shall not be denied to any person by
guarantee to him that right. Such constitutional right reason of poverty.
is inviolate. No court of justice under our system of
government has the power to deprive him of that
right. If the accused does not waive his right to be People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991)
In this spirit, the Court ordered the

F: On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-
Ricardo Rio, in two (2) letters dated 14 December appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor
1989, addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. General to file their respective briefs, upon submis-
Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. sion of which the case would be deemed submitted
Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal for decision.
due to his poverty.
From the records of the case, it is
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of established that the accused- appellant was charged
the basic privileges of the accused in a criminal with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by
prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before
and the right to a preliminary examination. President 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the
Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in province of Rizal, which reads as follows:
his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the That on or about the 24th day of March,
inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the 1984, in the Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro
accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance of Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of
counsel for the defense' ". Today said right is this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for, as Judge means of force and intimidation did then and there
Cooley says, this is "perhaps the privilege most wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
important to the person accused of crime." knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing will.
unless the accused be given an opportunity to be On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo
little meaning if it does not include the right to be of the Makati CLAO office, as counsel de oficio,
heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or edu- entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
cated man may have no skill in the science of the xxx
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, The trial court found the accused-
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he appellant guilty of the crime of rape.
is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. And this can happen more The theory of the defense at the trial level
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It was grounded on alibi. The accused claimed that at
is for this reason that the right to be assisted by the time of the alleged commission of the crime of
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a rape he was in Romblon. This claim was corroborated
constitutional right and it is so implemented that by the accused's brother, Amado Rio. However, this
under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the claim was, as aforestated, rebutted by the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit
attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so Romblon.
desires and he is poor, or grant him a reasonable time
to procure an attorney of his own." HELD: On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio
This right to a counsel de oficio does not changed the theory of the defense. The new theory
cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua
court. It continues, even during appeal, such that consented when accused-appellant had sexual
the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was
persists where an accused interposes an intent to stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred
appeal. Even in a case, such as the one at bar, where on 24 March 1984 and that, allegedly, it was the
the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his fourth time accused had abused complainant. This
appeal, the court is required to inquire into the allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole to lock the door to the bathroom could only have
reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, as in this been due to the fact that there was consent. The
case, the court must assign a counsel de oficio, for charge was filed, according to defense counsel de
despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the oficio, only because the complainant's mother caught
rights of the accused subsists and perhaps, with them.
greater reason. After all, "those who have less in life This theory of the defense on appeal that
must have more in law." Justice should never be there had been consent from the complainant, fails
limited to those who have the means. It is for to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt, for it
everyone, whether rich or poor. Its scales should would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe
always be balanced and should never equivocate or that one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways
cogitate in order to favor one party over another. of the world, would permit the occurrence of an
It is with this thought in mind that we charge incestuous relationship with an uncle, a brother of
clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect her very own mother. The Court notes the sudden
with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13, swift in the theory of the defense from one of total
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be denial of the incident in question, by way of alibi, to
above reproach and that never (if possible) will an one of participation, that is, with the alleged consent
innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not of the complainant. This new version could only be
committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free. attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on
appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical
Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this injuries in the City Court of Cebu. After one
sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear,
accused or a desperate effort to get himself the case was reset. Again, petitioner failed to appear,
acquitted, the Court deems it more likely that this despite notice to his bondsman. The court then
shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite
the appellant's brief without examining the entire the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. After
records of the case. If the appointed counsel for the the offended party had testified and presented
accused, on appeal, had read the records and documentary evidence, the court found petitioner
transcripts of the case thoroughly, he would not have guilty. The CFI affirmed the decision. Hence, this
changed the theory of the defense for such a shift petition for certiorari.
can never speak well of the credibility of the
defense. Moreover, the rule in civil procedure, which HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of
applies equally in criminal cases, is that a party may discretion and his decision is void. Because petitioner
not shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio was not arraigned, he was not informed of the nature
had been more conscientious, he would have known and cause of accusation against him. Arraignment is
that the sudden shift would be violative of an indispensable requirement in any criminal
aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to proceeding.
the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
The Court hereby admonishes members of 5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial
the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as
advocates of their clients' causes, whether acting de (1) Speedy Trial
parte or de oficio, for "public interest requires that
an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the The right to a speedy trial means one that is
prosecution or defense of his client's cause." Lawyers free from vexatious and oppressive delays. Its
are an indispensable part of the whole system of objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety
administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a and expense of a court litigation, or otherwise, to
lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and have his guilt determined within the shortest possible
candor not only protects the interests of his client; time, compatible with the presentation and
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the consideration of whatever legitimate defense the
Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community accused may interpose.
to the legal profession. This is so because the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it While reasonable delay may be allowed as
correlative duties not only to the client but also to determined on a case to case basis, an unreasonable
the court, to the bar and to the public. delay on the part of the prosecution to present its
While a lawyer is not supposed to know all case, thereby causing the threat of penal liability to
the laws, he is expected to take such reasonable remain hanging over the head of the accused for an
precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client extended period of time, violates the right of the
and for his professional guidance as will not make accused to a speedy trial.
him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor
of its precepts. The remedy of the accused in this case is
The fact that he merely volunteered his habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty,
services or the circumstance that he was a counsel de or certiorari, prohibition or mandamus for the final
oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of dismissal of the case; and dismissal based on the
professional responsibility owed to his client. The denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an
ethics of the profession require that counsel display acquittal.
warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective
of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any So said the SC in Acevedo v. Sarmiento, 36
attempted presentation of a case without adequate SCRA 247 (1970), a case involving the prosecution for
preparation distracts the administration of justice damage to property through reckless imprudence
and discredits the Bar. which had been pending for 6 years, the last step
taken being the start of the cross-examination of the
4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of complaining witness, who did not appear thereafter.
accusation The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice,
thus acquitting the accused.
The arraignment in criminal prosecution is
precisely intended to comply with the right of the (2) Public Trial
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. As noted in Vera v. A public trial does not require that the entire
People, procedural due process requires that the public can witness the trial. It is enough if it is
accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted conducted at a place where one's relatives and
and what charge he must meet. friends can be accommodated and the public may
know what is going on.
Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977)
The right is not absolute. The court can
No valid trial in absentia without arraignment order the public out of the trial room in the interest
of morality and order.
In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the

In Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970), the requirement of a trial being public if the accused
SC dismissed the contention of one party that the could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge no matter with what offense he may be charged."
on the ground that the objection came too late (the Then, too, reference may also be made to
party only complained after the 14th hearing) and the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had
that the place was agreed upon by the parties for been held in chambers of the city court Judge,
their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air without objection on the part of respondent
conditioned). policemen. xxx

(3) Impartial trial
Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970)
One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and magistrate who exercises cold impartiality.
prohibition, one which thus far has remained
unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), it was
constitutional right to public trial. held that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of
the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation
Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the of the drinking laws, could not be an impartial
judge violative of the right to a public trial? judge. Under such a situation, he would be
interested in convicting those he tries so he would
Ruling: NO earn more.
The defendants in this case agreed that the
hearings be held in the chambers. On fourteen Another aspect of an impartial trial is an
separate occasions this was the case and there was impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the
no objection on their part. There was no evidence to strict rules of evidence and procedure.
substantiate the claim that any other person was
excluded from the chambers. It is thus evident that In Olaguer v. Military Commission, 150 SCRA
what took place in the chambers of the city court 144 (1987), the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried
judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. by a military court (in connection with the Light a
The trial must be public. It possesses that Fire Movement) so long as the civil courts are open
character when anyone interested in observing the and operating, even during Martial Law.
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such 6. Right to confront witness
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of
no moment. No relationship to the parties need be The purpose of this right is to enable the
shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is accused to test the credibility of the witness. The
the belief that thereby the accused is afforded best means of confrontation is the process of cross-
further protection, that his trial is likely to be examination.
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any
impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate 7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and
Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this the production of evidence in his behalf)
right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a There are various means available to the
right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and
Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the the production of documents and things needed in
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be the prosecution or defense of a case in an adversarial
heard is posted, no problem arises. It the usual manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum:
course of events that individuals desirous of being depositions and other modes of discovery;
present are free to do so. There is the well perpetuation of testimonies.
recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be 8. Trial in Absentia
characterized as "offensive to decency or public
morals." Although the right to be present is not
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was explicit in the provision, it is inferrable from the
that for the convenience of the parties, and of the phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the
city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned absence of the accused"
chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to
investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? This right to be present may, however, be
The answer must be in the negative. There is no waived by the accused. Rule 115, sec, 1(c), talks of 3
showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express
be admitted that the size of the room allotted the waiver pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his
Judge would reduce the number of those who could bail bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered
be present. Such a fact though is not indicative of by the court for purposes of identification; (b)
any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of implied waiver when the accused without any
uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular
Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly date of which he had notice; and (c) implied waiver
when the accused under custody who had been constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia.
notified of the date of trial escapes. The respondent Judge denied the motion and
In cases in which there have been a waiver of suspended all proceedings until the return of the
the right to be present, whether expressed or accused. Hence, this petition.
implied, the trial may be held "in absentia". The
requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (i) the HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Avanceña
accused has been arraigned; (ii) he was duly notified has been modified by Art. IV, sec. 19 [now Art. III,
of the hearing; and (iii) his failure to attend the trial sec. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial
is unjustified. in absentia. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping
thwart his continued prosecution and possible
There can be no valid trial in absentia unless eventual conviction provided only that (a) he has
the accused has been arraigned, ruled the SC in Boria been arraigned; (b) he has been duly notified of the
v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), a case involving a trial; and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. The
charge for slight physical injuries where the accused right to be present at one's trial may now be waived
failed to appear and so the trial court allowed the except only at that stage where the prosecution
prosecution to present its evidence even if the intends to present witnesses who will identify the
accused has not yet been arraigned. Arraignment is accused. The defendant's escape will be considered a
crucial because it informs the accued of the nature waiver of this right and the inability of the court to
and cause of the accusation against him. Conviction notify him of the subsequent hearings will not
without arraignment violates due process and ousts prevent it from continuing with his trial. VV.
the court of its jurisdiction.

Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the
1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in which
HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived criminal prosecution could not move because the
petitioner of his right to be heard by himself and accused has either escaped or jumped bail.
counsel. The indispensable requirement for trial in
absentia is that it should come after arraignment. In People v. Prieto, 84 SCRA 198 (1978), the
VV. SC ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the
accused to jump bail. Just because th Constitution
allows trial in absentia does not mean that the
Waiver of the right to be present implies also accused is now free to waive his right to be present
waiver of the right to present evidence. Thus, if the during the trial. If he does, he runds the risk of
accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes having his bail bond forfeited.
arraignment), without any justifiable cause, the
prosecution can proceed with the presentation of the Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for
evidence, and thereupon, the court may consider the jumping bail
case submitted for decision. The court will decide
the case on the basis only of the prosecution's F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario
evidence. This does not violate the constitutional Gamayon to appear, respondent Judge declared the
presumption of innocence because it does not mean bail bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to
that the judgment of the trial court will result in produce the accused within thirty days and to show
conviction. cause why no judgment should be rendered against
them. However, on motion of defense counsel, who
So ruled the SC in People v. Salas, 143 SCRA invoked the last sentence of Art. IV, section 19 [now
163 (1986), which further ruled that trial in absentia Art. III, sec. 14(2)] on trial in absentia, respondent
applies even to capital cases. Judge reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial
could be conducted after the accused has been
arraigned and identified, the conclusion is
People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the
bail bond is premature." The prosecution filed a
Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases petition for certiorari.

F: Mario Abong was originally charged with HELD: The innovation introduced by the present
homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge
arraigned, the case was reinvestigated on motion of to continue with the trial even if the accused is not
the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an present under the conditions therein specified. It
amended information was filed, with no bail does not give the accused the right to jump bail. VV.
recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial
commenced but while it was in progress, the prisoner Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988)
took advantage of the first information filed and
succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into In trial in absentia accused waives the right to
granting him bail and ordering his release. The present evidence and confront witnesses
respondent Judge, learning of the trickery, cancelled
the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr., together with five
But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved others, was charged with murder. After arraignment,
that the hearing continue in accordance with the during which he pleaded not guilty, the case was set
for hearing on Sept. 18, 1973 but he escaped. He was (b) The accused must be present at the
tried in absentia. The trial court rendered judgment arraignment and must personally enter his plea.
dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record,
in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the
give him the chance to cross examine the witnesses validity of the proceedings.
against him and present evidence. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
b. During trial, for identification
HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused
escaped from the custody of the law and failed to People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra.
appear during the trial? No. As we have consistently
ruled, jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may
instance of parties but continues until the case is now be waived except only at that stage where
terminated. The lower court was correct in the prosecution intends to present witnesses
proceeding with the reception of evidence but it who will identify the accused.
erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the
respondent. The court need not wait for the time c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light
until the accused finally decides to appear. To allow offense, in which case accused may appear by
this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional counsel, or a representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.)
provision on trial in absentia.
E. Priviledge against self incrimination
9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY
Art. III, Sec. 17. No person shall be
In People v. Avancena, 32 O.G. 713, the SC compelled to be a witness against himself.
held that (a) the accused has the right to be present
during trial; (b) if he is in the custody of the law, Any confession or admission obtained in
presence in all stage is likewise a duty during (i) violation of section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
arraignment, (ii) entering a plea, and (iii) evidence against him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)]
promulgation of judgment. This rule however has
been modified. 1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory
Testimonial self-incrimination
As things stand, the following are the rules:
The privilege covers only testimonial
1. Generally, the accused has the right to be incrimination obtained compulsorily. It refers
present at all stages the trial (from arraignment to therefore to the use of the mental process and the
rendition of judgment). communicative faculties, and not to a merely
physical activity. If the act is physical or mechanical,
2. If the accused is in the custody of the law, the accused can be compelled to allow or perform
his presence during the trial is a duty only if the the act, and the result can be used in evidence
court orders his presence to enable the prosecution against him.
witnesses to identify him. (People v. Salas, infra.
reiterating Aquino v. Military Commiission, infra. Thus the accused can be required to allow a
modifying People v. Avancena, infra.) sample of a substance taken from his body (U.S. v.
Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)).
3. Although the accused is not in the custody
of the law (and more so if he is in the custody of the F: This defendant was charged with the crime
law), his presence is required in the following cases: of rape. He was found guilty of the charge. He
appeals the decision on the ground that the lower
a) Arraignment, regardless of the court erred in admitting the testimony of the
offense; physicians about having taken a certain substance
from the body of the accused while he was confined
b) Entering a plea, regardless of in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of
whether the plea is guilty or not guilty. the substance to demonstrate the physical condition
of the accused with reference to a venereal disease.
c) Promulgation of judgment, except It was discovered that the rape victim was infected
that when the judgment is for a light offense, by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal
he may be represented by his counsel or a disease in the accused was material to his conviction.
personal emissary. Upon this information the defendant was
arrested and taken to the police station and stripped
of his clothing and examined. The policeman who
examined the defendant swore from the venereal
a. Arraignment and plea, disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a
whether of innocence or of guilt portion of the substance emitting from the body of
the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of
Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis
how made.-- made of the same. The result of the examination
xxx
showed that the defendant was suffering from declarations implicating them in the commission of a
gonorrhea. crime. (People vs. Gardner, 144 N. Y., 119.)
The doctrine contended for by appellant
Issue: Whether or not the information that the would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a
accused has gonorrhea may be used against him defendant even, for the purpose of disclosing his
identity. Such an application of the prohibition under
Ruling: YES. The accused was not compelled to discussion certainly could not be permitted. Such an
make any admissions or answer any questions, and inspection of the bodily features by the court or by
the mere fact that an object found on his person was witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under
examined: seems no more to infringe the rule the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the
invoked, than would the introduction in evidence of accused as a witness it does not call upon the
stolen property taken from the person of a thief. defendant for his testimonial responsibility. Mr.
The substance was taken from the body of Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from
the defendant without his objection, the examination the accused, is not testimony but his body his body
was made by competent medical authority and the itself.
result showed that the defendant was suffering from
said disease. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier,
had the defendant been found with stolen property The accused can be ordered to expel the
upon his person, there certainly could have been no morphine from his mouth (U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36
question had the stolen property been taken for the Phil 735, (1917)).
purpose of using the same as evidence against him.
So also if the clothing which he wore, by reason of U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917)
blood stains or otherwise, had furnished evidence of
the commission of a crime, there certainly could have Counsel for appellant raises the
been no objection to taking such for the purpose of constitutional question that the accused was
using the same as proof. No one would think of even compelled to be a witness against himself. The
suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in contention is that this was the result of forcing the
the case indicated, taken from the defendant, could accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth.
not be used against him as evidence, without To force a prohibited drug from the person of an
violating the rule that a person shall not be required accused is along the same line as requiring him to
to give testimony against himself. exhibit himself before the court; or putting in
But the prohibition of compelling a man in a evidence papers and other articles taken from the
criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan
prohibition of the use of physical or moral Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the
compulsion, to extort communications from him, not accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a
an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine
material. The objection, in principle, would forbid a Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article,
jury (court) to look at a person and compare his substance, or thing taken from a person accused of
features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we are crime could not be given in evidence. The main
not considering how far a court would go in purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
compelling a man to exhibit himself, for when he is testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order
exhibited, whether voluntarily or by order, even if to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners
the order goes too far, the evidence if material, is implicating them in the commission of a crime.
competent. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.)
The prohibition contained in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to
be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition The accused can be made to take off her
against legal process to extract from the defendant's garments and shoes and be photographed. (People v.
own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)).
Mr. Wigmore, in his valuable work on
evidence, in discussing the question before us, said:
If, in other words, it (the rule) created A woman accused of adultery can be
inviolability not only for his [physical control] in compelled to show her body for physical investigation
whatever form exercised, then it would be possible to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41
for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed against present standards,
with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy however, it is possible that this method of
the authority of the law to employ in evidence determining pregnancy would violate due process as
anything that might be obtained by forcibly being too barbaric.
overthrowing his possession and compelling the
surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)
ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely
compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, . . . F: The facts are not dispute. In a criminal case
but testimonial compulsion. (4 Wigmore, sec. 2263.) pending before the Court of First Instance of the city
The main purpose of the provision of the of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco
Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral are charged with the crime of adultery. The court
examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, to submit
for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or her body to the examination of one or two competent
doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The she had sworn to tell the truth before the
accused refused to obey the order on the ground that investigator authorized to receive statements under
such examination of her person was a violation of the oath, and under said oath she asserted that the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. documents in question had not been written by her.
Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and Were she compelled to write and were it proven by
was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until means of what she might write later that said
she should permit the medical examination required documents had really been written by her, it would
by the court. be impossible for her to evade prosecution for
perjury.
Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit The reason for the privilege appears evident.
her body to be examined by physicians to determine The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and
if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the
Philippine Bill of Rights certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person,
in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing
Ruling: The constitutional guaranty, that no person evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a purpose, then the evidence must be sought
witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. the person himself, then he must be promised and
The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. to do so legally, or he should be asked, one for all, to
The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. furnish such evidence voluntarily without any
Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its condition. This court is of the opinion that in order
corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as that the constitutional provision under consideration
cases arise. may prove to be a real protection and not a dead
It is a reasonable presumption that in an letter, it must be given a liberal and broad
examination by reputable and disinterested interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
physicians due care will be taken not to use violence In view of the foregoing consideration and
and not to embarass the patient any more than is holding, as it is hereby held, that the complainant is
absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection to the perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the
physical examination being made by the family respondent's petition is denied.
doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex
can be seen. Also requiring the accused to reenact the
crime is not allowed, for this also involves the mental
The taking of footprint sample to see if it process.
matches the ones found in the scene of the crime is
allowed (People v. Salas and People v. Sara).
People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525
However, making the accused take dictation
to get a specimen of her handwriting is not allowed, F: Villarojo, Cademas and Sorela were convicted
for this involves the use of the mental process. in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon.
[Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937).] Olvis, the alleged principal by inducement, was
acquitted. The three accused were convicted on the
Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937) basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by
them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the
F: In connection with this administrative case, NBI to handle appellants' case, and the reenactment
said respondent filed, six letters which, for purposes done by them of the circumstances surrounding the
of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 34, 35, killing.
36 and 37. He contends that said six letters are the
complainant's, but the latter denied it while she was RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are
testifying as a witness in rebuttal. inadmissible. They were made in the presence of a
Respondent required complainant to copy counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants'
the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of own choice. He cannot therefore be said to have
the investigator. The complainant, refused invoking been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his
her right not to incriminate herself. The investigator, presence at the confession proceedings.
upholding the complainant, did not compel her to But the accused were denied their right to
submit to the trial required, thereby denying the counsel not once but twice when they were forced to
respondent's petition. re-enact the crime. Forced re-enactments like
uncounselled and coerced confessions come within
Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced the ban against self-incrimination. This constitutional
to make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting privilege has been defined as a protection against
testimonial compulsion but this has since been
Ruling: No. It would violate her right against self- extended to any evidence communicative in nature
incrimination. acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially,
The constitution provides: "No person shall be the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the
compelled to be a witness against himself." It should repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman
be noted that before it was attempted to require the procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or
complainant to copy the six documents above-stated,
any other case, to furnish the missing evidence F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed
necessary for his conviction. on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for
People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73 preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged
F: After a buy-bust operation accused were therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative
arrested by the police. Upon the presentation of a case for alleged immorality, counsel for
search warrant, the house of the accused was complainants announced that he would present as his
searched, and several prohibited drugs were seized. first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the
They were charged with and convicted of violation of respondent in such malpractice charge. Thereupon,
the Dangerous Drugs law. They contended that they petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record
had not been shown a search warrant. In concluding his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be
that a search warrant had been presented to the exempt from being a witness against himself.
accused prior to the search, the trial court relied on Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took
a document entitiled “Certificate of Re-conduct of note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at
Search”, signed by the accused. the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965,
petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as
ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure
in evidence. a restraining order from a competent authority.
A decision was rendered by the lower court
RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-
The second paragraph of the Certification appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting
amounts to an implied admission that shabu, the respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to
marked money, and shabu papaphernalia had been act and testify as a witness for the complainant in
found by the police authorities at the residence of said investigation without his consent and against
the Go spouses and therefore, subject to the control himself."
and custody of the accused (the spouses) and
necessarily in their possession. To this extent, the HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his
“Certification” is a declaration against the interest license as a medical practitioner, for some an even
and tacit admission of the crime charged. The greater deprivation.
second paragraph of the Certification is a self- Why it should be thus is not difficult to
incriminatory statment made at a time when the discern. The constitutional guarantee, along with
spouses were not assisted by counsel and under other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief
circumstances (in the course of or immediately after that while crime should not go unpunished and that
the search of the residence and seizure of quantities the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives
of shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their should not be accomplished according to means or
right against self-incrimination open to serious doubt. methods offensive to the high sense of respect
The Court considers that there is nothing to accorded the human personality. More and more in
prevent admission of the “Certification” to line with the democratic creed, the deference
substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by accorded an individual even those suspected of the
a judge had been brought to the attention of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote
spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust from Chief Justice Warren, "the constitutional
operation carried out at their residence and that in foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a
the course thereof, no force or intimidation had been government ... must accord to the dignity and
exercised upon the spouses. integrity of its citizens."
Notwithstanding such, the accused were Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth
convicted of the crime charged against them. Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables
the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
2. In what proceedings available government may not force to surrender to his
detriment." So also with the observation of the late
The privilege is available in any proceedings, Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private
even outside the court, for they may eventually lead enclave where he may lead a private life. That right
to a criminal prosecution. is the hallmark of our democracy." In the light of the
above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 objection could be legitimately raised against the
SCRA 344 (1969), the SC held that the privilege correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold
against self-incrimination extends to administrative that in an administrative hearing against a medical
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent
aspect. In this case, it was held that a doctor who Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with
was being investigated by a medical board for alleged the self-incrimination clause, compel the person
malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty, proceeded against to take the witness stand without
could not be compelled to take the witness stand his consent.
without his consent.
In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 was held to extend to fact-finding investigation by an
(1969) adhoc body.

immunity that the State must grant in order to

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985) protect the privilege against self-incrimination.

A person can be compelled to testify provided he is Transactional Immunity
given immunity co-extensive with the privilege
against self- incrimination In a transactional immunity, a person is given
immunity from prosecution of the crime in
F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver connection with which he gave his testimony. The
and Major General Prospero Olivas testified before immunity is from the prosecution, not merely from
the Agrava Board looking into the killing of former the use of the testimony. Thus, even if the guilt of
Senator Benigno Aquino. They were subsequently the person testifying can be proven by independent
accused of murder in two cases for the killing of Sen. means, he can not be prosecuted anymore.
Aquino and Rolando Galman. They were charged as
accessories in both. The prosecution offered in Use and Fruit Immunity
evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the
Agrava Board, but on the latter's objections, the In a use and fruit immunity, a person is
Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. The private exempted from the use of his testimony as well as
and public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari. the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened up in a
criminal prosecution arising from what he testified
HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the on. The immunity in this case is from the testimony
Agrava Board were "under investigation for the given. Thus, if the state can procure evidence,
commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. independent of the testimony and its fruits, it can
III, sec. 12. It is to be noted that the framers of the prosecute the person testifying nevertheless.
Constitution did not adopt the Miranda reference to
"custodial investigation." The subject matter dealt
with and the questioning before the Agrava Board History in the United States
indubitably evinced purposes other than merely
determining the surrounding facts and circumstances In Councilman v. Hitchcock (1892), the SC
of the assassination. The respondents were called to ruled that the only way to respect the right against
determine their probable involvement in the crime. self-incrimination is to give transactional immunity;
Yet they were not informed or at the very least anything less violates the constitutional right.
warned of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against them. Thus, Congress in 1893 passed the
The first portion of Sec. 5 of PD 1886 denied them Compulsory Testimony Act, providing for transactional
the right to remain silent, and gave power to the immunity.
Board to punish refusal to testify. The SC said it is not
satisfied that when they testified they waived their In 1964, the U.S. SC in Murphy v. Waterfront
constitutional right not be compelled to be a witness Commission of New York hinted that it was not really
against themselves, much less their right to remain necessary to give transactional immunity in order to
silent. The SC also said it cannot be contended that protect the right against self incrimination.
the privilege against self- incrimination applies only
to criminal prosecutions. Art. III, sec. 17 of the Const. This gave the U.S. Congress the cue to revise
provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a the Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use
witness against himself." and fruit immunity".

With the validity of this limited immunity was
raised, the SC in Castigas v. U.S. and Zicarelli v. U.S.
Compare People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989), supra. ruled that the right is amply protected by the use and
fruit immunity.
3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. "Transactional
Immunity"
In the Philippines
When the State requires testimony to be
made before a board or body, it has to grant There is no fixed rule in the Philippines.
immunity by means of law to the persons testifying, "Transactional immunity" can be found in the
so as not to violate their right against self- following:
incriminatrion. This is the only way to reconcile two
conflicting values; public interest to get certain Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on
relevant information, say, to legislation, that can only Human Rights shall have the following powers and
be supplied by the testimony of certain persons and functions
the highly primed constitutional right not to make a xxx
person a witness against himself. (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to
any person whose testimony or possession of
Through an immunity statute, the state in documents or other evidence is necessary or
effect exchanges immunity for the testimony of a convenient to determine the truth in any
witness. The problem concerns the extent of investigation conducted by it or under its authority.

Use and Fruit Immunity the testimony, as already noted, is not admissible
under the exclusionary rule.
On the other hand, "use and fruit immunity
can be found in P.D. 1886, which created the Agrava When the privilege is violated by the court
Fact Finding Board, and which was the subject- itself, that is, by the judge, the court is ousted of its
matter of Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985). jurisdiction, all its proceedings are null and void, and
it is as if no judgment has been rendered. A classic
In this case, Ver and other high-ranking AFP case is Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663
officials were made to testify before the Agrava (1968).
Board investigating the double murder of Sen. Aquino Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 663 (1968)
and Galman. Under P.D.1886, every person
summoned by the Board has to appear and testify on F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in
pain of being held in contempt. Any testimony made, his original and supplementary petitions invoking
in turn, was exempted from being "used" in a criminal jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on
prosecution. Despite this however, a case was file habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon
against Ver in the Sandiganbayan, and one of the the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
evidence presented was the testimony he made conviction he was denied his constitutional right not
before the Board. When objected to, the to be compelled to testify against himself. There is
Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. And so the his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be
matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to
strike down the two resolutions of the Court of
The SC held that the testimony could not be Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief,
used in a subsequent proceeding. it hinted that were and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward
it not for the provision in the decree conmpelling his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was
attendance and testimony on pain of being held in raising purely questions of law.
contempt, the accused could have invoked the right Accused Chavez was made to testify as a
against self-incrimination. But since the state witness for the prosecution without him being
needed the testimony, it gave them immunity and so considered a state witness inspite of objections by his
now, the State must honor its obligation and disallow counsel.
the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution. Roger Chavez was found guilty. The court
had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any
Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra. defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness
for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond
HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified reasonable doubt." The trial court branded him "a
into two: one, which grants "use immunity" and the self- confessed culprit".
other, which grants what is known as "transactional
immunity." The distinction between the two is: "Use Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against self-
immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled incrimination was violated
testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection
with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the Ruling: YES
other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity The right agianst self-incrimination is "not
to the witness from prosecution for an offense to merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which his compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is
5 grants merely immunity from use of any statement mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and
given before the Board, but not immunity from substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of
prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. VV justice.
The constitutional proscription was
established on broad grounds of public policy and
4. Exclusionary rule humanity; of policy because it would place the
witness against the strongest temptation to commit
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx perjury, and of humanity because it would be to
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every
violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be species and degree of which the law abhors.
inadmissible in evidence against him. Therefore, the court may not extract from a
defendant's own lips and against his will an admission
The paradigmatic application of the of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to
exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts
confession, and not so much on uncounselled usable against him as a confession of the crime or the
statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a tendency of which is to prove the commission of a
person cannot be used in evidence against that crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to
person. remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
5. Effect of denial of the privilege by court free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not
When the privilege against self-incrimination necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be
is violated outside of court, say, by the police, then the product of unintentional statements. Pressure
which operates to overbear his will, disable him from
making a free and rational choice, or impair his was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion the violation of his right against self- incrimination.
be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force The SC granted the petition and released him.
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." Habeas Corpus, as shown by this case, is an
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different extraordinary post-conviction, mid-sentence,
tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas remedy. The petition for habeas corpus is such that
an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the it inquires into all questions of illegal detention.
witness stand and claim the privilege as each When the judge compelled the accused to take the
question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at witness stand, he was ousted of his jurisdiction and
him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the all subsequent proceedings became void. Ultimately,
witness stand and refuse to answer any and all the judgment of conviction and even the sentence
questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an were likewise void, thus making the detention of
accused as a witness for the People would be to Chavez illegal, and thus actionable by habeas corpus.
incriminate him. The case also illustrates the difference
between the ordinary witness and the accused. A
xxx With all these, we have no hesitancy in witness can be conmpelled to take the stand; he can
saying that petitioner was forced to testify to only object to the questions as they come, invoking
incriminate himself, in full breach of his his right against self-incrimination.
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said But in the case of the accused, he cannot
now that he has waived his right. He did not even be made to take the witness stand, for the only
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; purpose of such is to incriminate him.
he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, Of course, the moment the accused agrees to
he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If take the stand, he is deemed to have waived his
petitioner nevertheless answered the questions right, and must now thus submit himself to cross-
inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or examination.
being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot
be counted against him. His testimony is not of his E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of
own choice. To him it was a case of compelled civilians by military courts
submission. He was a cowed participant in
proceedings before a judge who possessed the power Animas v. Minister of National Defense, 146 SCRA 406
to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain (1986)
silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court
made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of
on direct examination would be taken right then and a military tribunal to try twelve accused persons,
thereon the first day of the trial. only one of whom is in the military, for the offense
The course which petitioner takes is correct. devoid of any national security or political
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is complexion and committed long before the
traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to proclamation of martial law,
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained The petitioners were charged with murder
such as when the accused's constitutional rights are in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson, a
disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or political leader,during the November 11 elections.
loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial The accused were arrested almost a year
and the consequent conviction of the accused whose later, on September 21, 1972 after martial law was
fundamental right was violated. That void judgment proclaimed. It was only in 1974 that a "summary
of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, preliminary investigation" was conducted by a PC
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General
Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction Service. The petitioners were recommended for
where the consitutional rights of the accused were prosecution before the Military Tribunal, considering
violated. that one of them, petitioner Sgt. Rodolfo Animas is a
A court which denies the accused of his military personnel. Thereafter, the Judge Advocate
constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. The General filed the corresponding charge sheet, but he
judgment of conviction pronounced by a court modified the crime charged from "Murder" to
without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned " V i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 8 7 8 o f t h e Re v i s e d
thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of
the same Code and Presidential Decree No. 9, " Illegal
Notes on the case: In this case, the accused Possession of Firearms with Murder."
Chavez was compelled by the judge with the threat On February 16, 1978, the Minister of
of being held in contempt to take the witness stand, National Defense referred the case to the Military
in spite of his objection that he had the right to Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General's
remain silent and not to be a witness against Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to
himself. And so he took the witness stand and was respondent Military Commission No. 27.
convicted by qualified theft. He appealed but the
lawyer failed to file the appellant's brief and so the Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. 27 is
appeal was dismissed, the judgment became final without jurisdiction over the criminal case
and executory, and he served his sentence. Years
later, Chavez went to the SC on habeas corpus, Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction.
contending that his convictioin was void because it
We apply the rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v.

Hon. Alejandro R. Leopando, et al, (G.R. No. 62798,
December 22, 1983 and March 13, 1984) where the Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988)
lone military personnel was ordered tried together
with 19 civilians accused before a civil court. It is F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced
also clear from the records that the acts for which in this Court on October 1, 1986 to test the legality
Sgt. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the of the continued detention of some 217 so-called
performance of official duty. "political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of
The crime for which the petitioners were official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid
charged was committed on November 10, 1971 long Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand
before the proclamation of martial law. There was no trial for common crimes before various courts
question about the case being prosecuted by civilian martial; if any of these offenses had any political
fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time. Now that color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
it is already late 1986, and martial law is a thing of Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and
the past, hopefully never more to return, there is no only 26 confirmed as military personnel.
more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should
still be retained, at this time, by a military tribunal. Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction
over civilians

Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA Ruling: No
144 As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or
tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law during the period of martial law, over civilians for
if the civil courts are open offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the
civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
the respondent military commission and sentenced to is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
death. They filed a petition for habeas corpus, the military tribunal concerned
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the SC, The fact cannot be ignored, however, that
questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. crimes appear to have been committed, and there
are accusations against herein petitioners for those
HELD: In Aquino v. Military Commission (1975), the SC offenses. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to
held that "Martial law creates and exception to the absolve the petitioners of these charges, or establish
general rules of exclusive jurisdiction, and renders that the same are baseless, so as to entitle them to
offenses against the laws of war as well as those of a immediate release from detention. It is not to be
civil character, triable by military tribunals.xxx" Due forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the
process, however demands that in all criminal cases petitioners have as much interest as the State has to
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to, among prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds.
others, a trial. As explained by Justice Teehankee in Justice will be better served if the detention of such
his dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Military Commission of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released
supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution or excepted, is continued until their cases are
exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts as are transferred to the ordinary courts having jurisdiction,
established by law. Judicial power exists only in the and the necessary informations have been filed
courts which have the exlcusive power to hear and against them therein, as has already been done in the
determine those matters which affect the life or case of petitioners Imperial D. Usman and Samu
liberty or property of a citizen." Since we are not an Gumal. The State should be given a reasonable
enemy occupied territory and even on the premise period of time to accomplish this transfer, at which
that martial continues in force, the military tribunals time the petitioners may apply for bail for their
cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for temporary release.
civil offenses committed by them which are properly The Solicitor General not unreasonably
cognizable by the civil courts. anticipates questions to arise as to the availability of
xxx certain defenses to the petitioners upon their
"The presiding officer at a court martial is not prosecution before the civil courts. It seems evident,
a judge whose objectivity and independence are however, that no breach of the constitutional
protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and prohibition against twice putting an accused in
nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would
officer. Substantially different rules of evidence and result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases, for
procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of
differences, the suggestion of the possibility of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners
influence on the actions of the court-martial by the prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid
officer who convenes it, selects its members and the previous proceedings are required in order that the
counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the
command and authority over its members is a accused in the second prosecution.
pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous
efforts to eliminate the danger. VV. G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative adjudication of
guilt

Bill of Attainder prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they
A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes joined with the specific intent to further its basic
the legislative determination of guilt for a judicial objectives.
determination. Through a statute, the legislature
finds individuals or groups guilty, without the benefit H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases
of being proven so in court.
Art. III, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the
A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and penalties bodies.
(imposition of a lesser penalty).

In People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972), the
Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the The right to a speedy disposition of cases
Communist Party of the Philippines a clear and complements the right to a speedy trial. After the
present danger to Philippine security, and thus case has been submitted for decision, so that
prohibited membership in such organization, was technically the trial stage is terminated, the
contended to be a bill of attainder. The SC, however, Constitution mandates that the judicial, quasi-
dismissed the contention, holding that although the judicial or administrative body or tribunal must
law mentions the CPP in particular, its purpose is not decide the case consistent with the right of the
to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify accused to a speedy disposition of his case.
the legislative determination that membership in
such organization is a crime because of the clear and To carry out this mandate, the Constitution in
present danger to national security. several other places provides periods for deciding a
case:

People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 (1972) The Supreme Court has to decide cases within
24 months from the date of submission of the case for
F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the decision which is the date of filing of the last
constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act, which pleading [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (1).]
outlaws the Communist Party and other "subversive III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
associations", and punishes any person who CLAUSE
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
himself, with, becomes or remains a member," of the
Party and of any other similar "subversive" A. What acts cannot be criminalized
organization.
1. Mere beliefs and aspirations
ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder.
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
HELD: NO detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which aspirations.
inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. The constitutional ban 2. Debts and civil obligations
against bill of attainder serves to implement the
principle of separation of powers by confining Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.
legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
When the Act is viewed in its actual
operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the What the law prohibits is imprisonment for
Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the members non-payment of a contractual obligation.
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does
is simply to declare the Party to an organized When one is convicted of estafa and sent to
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for prison, the imprisonment is not for the non- payment
the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in of debt but for the deceit or abuse of confidence
the outlawed organization. The term "CPP" is used employed by the convict.
solely for definition purposes. In fact the Act applies
not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion Thus, in Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 123
having the same purposes and their successors". Its (1986), the SC again upheld Batas Blg. 22 (Bouncing
focus is not on individuals but on conduct. Checks Law) as not unconsitutional for being violative
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of of the rule against non- imprisonment for debt. It is
attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge true that under this law deceit is not necessary. It is,
Communists in court, as the law alone, without more however, a valid exercise of the State of its power to
would suffice to secure their punishement. But the determine what acts constitute a crime.
undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be
judicially established. The Government has yet to
What the Consitution further prohibits is non-stock and non-profit corporation created under
imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax, which is a the laws of the land, and praying for the
tax imposed on certain persons regardless of their detremination of the validity of Sec. 8, RA 6132 and a
property or business. The prohibition does not apply declaration of petitioner's right s and duties
to non-payment of property taxes and taxes on thereunder. Petitioner claims that the challenged
privilege. provision constitutes an ex post facto law.

ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law.
Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)
HELD: NO
F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes An ex post facto law is one which:
or draws and issues any check on account or 1. Makes criminal an act done before the
for value, knowing at the time of issue that he passage of the law which was innocent when done,
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with and punishes such an act;
the drawee bank for the payment of said check 2. Aggravates a crime , or makes it greater
in full upon presentment, which check is than it was, when committed;
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank 3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a
for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners greater punishment than the law annexed to the
challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the crime when committed;
following grounds: 1) It offends the 4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and
constitutional provision prohibiting authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs freedom than the law required at the time of the commission
of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal of the offense;
protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates 5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and
legislative and executive powers; and 5) its remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
enactment is flawed because the Interim deprivation of a right for something which when done
Batasan prohibited amendment of the bill on was lawful; and
3rd reading. 6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished entitled, such as the protection of a former
in BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
worthless check or a check that is dishonored [Quoting Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74 (1902)]
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the This constitutional prohibition refers only to
non- payment of an obligation which the law criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.
punishes. The law punishes the act not as an While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a
offense against property but as an offense violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec.
against public order. Recent statistics show 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
that one third of the entire money supply of committed after the approval of the law and not
the country consists of currency in circulation. those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in
These demand deposits in the banks constitute the law that remotely insinuates that its provisions
the funds against which commercial papers are shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval.
drawn. The amount concerned justifies the
legitimate concern of the state in preserving B. What punishments cannot be imposed
the integrity of the banking system.
1. Involuntary servitude
3. Acts which when done were innocent
Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary
Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or sevitudes in any form shall exist, except as a
bill of attainder shall be enacted. punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been convicted.
Ex Post Facto Law

An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to 2. Excessive fines
punish an act which, when committed, was not yet a
crime or was not as heavily punished. It is a law that Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall
retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
prejudice to the person performing the act. Its punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death
unfairness consists in the fact that the person could penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons
not have known the act was criminal, and thus could involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
not have avoided the crime. When a law is more provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
favorable to the accused, however, it is allowed to shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
retroact.

In re Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428 3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments

F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall
Villegas Kami Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death murder. Three appealed to the SC which found them
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons equally liable for the killing. The penalty for murder
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter under the RPC is reclusion temporal to death. The
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed question concerns the penalty to be imposed in view
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. of Art. III, sec. 19 which provides that "Neither shall
Id., Sec. 12. xxx the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
free will shall be used against him. Secret reduced to reclusion perpetua."
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited. HELD: Art. III, section 19 does not change the periods
of the penalty prescribed by Art. 248 of the RPC
except insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the
Assuming that judgment has been rendered death penalty adn reduces it to reclusion perpetua.
and the accused has been convicted the Constitution The range of medium and minimum penalties remain
now further prescribes certain standards as to the the same. VV.
punishment that can be meted out. After all, due
process prohibits barbaric and disproportionate
penalties. People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991)

The employment of physical, psychological or F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC
degrading punishment against any prisoner or of Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, charging Remelito
detainee, or the use of substandard or inadequate Lubreo along with crime of Homicide in connection
penal facilities under subhuman conditions, shall be with the killing of Mamerto Sanico. Judge Gorgolon
dealt with by law. [Art. III, Sec. 19 (2).] of said court conducted both the preliminary
investigation and preliminary examination.
In 1935, the prohibition was against "cruel Thereafter, he forwarded the records of the case to
and unusual" penalty, in 1973; it was against "cruel or the Office of Provincial Fiscal. The fiscal conducted
unusual " penalty; in 1987, the prohibition is against his own PI and on the basis thereof, he filed an
"cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. The information for murder not only against remelito but
purpose in changing the phraseology is to allow for also against Lucresio Lubreo. Trial Court find them
experimentation, and not to fix the concept of what guilty of the crime charged.
is cruel to the standards of the present civilization,
or those of antiquity. This notion is supposed to ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of
expand and grow, so that what today is considered as innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been overturned
acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as by the prosecution
cruel penalty.
HELD: NO.
Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends An accused is presumed innocent until the
on its form or whether it depends on its severity has contrary is proved. The burden of proof is upon the
been ambivalently answered by the SC: prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently
discharged , the accused continues to enjoy the
In People v. dela Cruz, 92 Phil. 900 (1953) the presumption of innocence. In the instant case, the
SC ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis of its
in antiquity (pillory desembowelment, etc.) and not conclusion that he was positively identified by
its severity, that constituted "cruel and unusual" witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as
penalty under the 1935 Constitution. Thus a one of the assailants, and that therefore, his defense
disproportionate penalty (10 years imprisonment for of alibi would not prosper. Unfortunately, the
theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is only a testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses did not
matter of severity of an acceptable form of categorically stated or proved that Lucrecio took part
punishment (imprisonment). in hacking the victim.
Though Monter categorically stated in her
The SC spoke in a different way in People v. direct examination that she saw the accused Lucresio
Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979), Borja was sentenced and hacking the victim, in the "re-enactmment", she
he served at the national penitentiary for 20 years however candidly informed the court Lucresio was
before the case came to the SC. The Court said that just standing by and she could not remmenber as to
Borja had been living in the shadow of death. who actually hacked the victim. From her version,
Although the sentence was initially valid, it had the participation of Lucrecio is at one enveloped
become cruel by the lapse of time. And yet, this was inserious doubt. It is worse in the case of
a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. Pangatungan. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted
in hacking as if they will come one after the other in
hacking his mind (sic) and the neck", he never
People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking " means.
He could not even specify the part of the body of
F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio.
a mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that There is evidently insufficient evidence to
they were cattle rustlers. They were found guilty of show the actual participation of Lucresio in teh
crime. There being no evidence of conspiracy, he Thus, in Melo v. People, 85 Phils. 766 (1950),
cannot be held for the acts of his co- appellant. the SC allowed the amnedment of the information
from its original cahrge of frustrated homicide,
4 . S e c r e t d e t e n t i o n p l a c e s , s o l i t a r y, because after the filing of the information, the victim
incommunicado and other forms of detention and died.
the use of substandard or inadequate penal
facilities (2) The facts constituting the graver charge
became known or were discovered only after the
filing of the former complaint or information.
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, This overrules People v. Yorac, where the SC
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the disallowed the amendment of the information from
free will shall be used against him. Secret slight physical injuries to frustrated murder after the
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other prosecution subjected the victim to another medical
similar forms of detention are prohibited. examination and found a wound, that it was the fault
of the prosecution if they had an incompetent
Id., Sec. 19. xxx medical examination.
(2) The employment of physical,
psychological, or degrading punishment against any (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or was made without the consent of the fiscal and the
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman offended party.
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
Identity of offenses and identity of act
5. Indefinite Imprisonments
When an act gives rise to two or more offense
People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra. which are punished by the same authority, and an
individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case
C. The protection against double jeopardy dismissed without his consent, of one of these
offense (Crime A), there is no double jeopardy if he is
Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice charged of another offfense (Crime B) flowing from
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same the same act. Double jeopardy arises only when he is
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an again charged of that same offense (Crime A). Thus,
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either this is called double jeopardy by "identity of
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for offenses".
the same act.
But when an act which give rise to two or
more offenses is punished by two different
Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People authorities (a law and an ordinance), then if an
v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): individual is convicted, acquitted, or the case
dismissed without his consent, of any of these
(1) Court of competent jurisdiction; offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law),
(2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in even if he is charged of another offense which is
form and substance to sustain a conviction; punished by the other auhtority (Crime B by
(3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused; ordinance), there is double jeopardy, because both
(4) Conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of the offenses, one punished by a law and the other
c a s e w i t h o u t t h e e x p r e s s c o n s e n t , o f t h e punished by an ordinance, flowed from the same
accused. act. Thus, this is called double jeopardy by "identity
of act."
Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following:
Sum: If only a law in involved, there is
(1) Same offense double jeopardy only when there is an identity of
(2) Attempt of the same offense offenses. But is a law and an ordinance are involved,
(3) Frustration of the same offense there is double jeopardy when there is an identity of
(4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st act.
offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute
some of the elements of the 1st offense) Identity of Offenses:
(5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st
offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute If a married man maintains as concubine a
some of the elements of the 2nd offense) married woman not his wife, the man is guilty of both
concubinage and adultery. From the same act
Exceptions to no. 5: (cohabiting with the married woman), two offenses
arise. And yet he can be prosecuted for both
(1) The graver offense developed die to because, the two offenses coming from the same
"supervening facts" arising from the same act or authority, there is no identity of offenses.
omission constituting the former charged.
Identity of Act:

People v. Relova, 48 SCRA 292 (1987), Relova offense charged under an ordinance be different from
was prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City the offense charged subsequently under the national
for the use of wiring to tap electricity without statute such as the RPC provided that both offenses
permission from the local authorities, but the case spring from the same act or set of acts. VV.
was dismissed because the crime has prescribed. So
the fiscal filed a case for theft of electricity under
the RPC. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA
already, and so the second case could no longer be 175 (1987)
filed. For although the offenses were different, both
flowed from the same act. And in this case, the act F: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto
was punished by a law and an ordinance. Pangilinan, was accused of violating Sec.7, in relation
to Sec. 11 RA 3060 and Art. 201(3) of the RPC, in two
Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy separate informations filed with the City Court of
Manila. Upon arraignment, accused Gonzales
If the court has no jurisdiction, or was ousted pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other
of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to accused, Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he is still at
due process of the parties, the decision is null and large. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the
void, the accused may again be charged. informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said
informations did not charge an offense. Motion
In People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985), the denied. Later, he again moved to quash the
SC, held that the move by the trial court of information in one of the Criminal case on the ground
summarily dismissing a criminal case for theft on the of duble jeopardy, as there was according to him,
ground that it merely involved a question of also pending aginst him another criminal case, where
ownership deprived the prosecution of due process by the informatin allegedly contain the same allegations
denying it the chance to introduce its evidence. This as the information in the first criminal case. Court
ousted the court of its juridsiction. granted the motion.

In Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
(1986), the SC declared the criminal prosecution of
the 26 accused in the Aquino-Galman double murder HELD: NO
case a "mistrial" after the SC commission found that It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of
the Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan double jeopardy, 3 requisites must be present: (1) a
prosecutors had been summoned by the President and first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
instructed on how to conduct the trial. Due process second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
is a right not only of the accused but also of the terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
State. Once the court deprives either party, which in teh same offense, or the second offense includes or is
this case is the State, of a fighting chance, then it is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
ousted from its jurisdiction, and double jeopardy first information, or is an attempt to commit the
would not apply. Thus, the accused were ordered same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do
retried. not exist in this case,
The 2 informations with which the accused
1. Two situations contemplated was charged , do not make only one offense, contrary
to private repondent's allegation. In other words, the
People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) offense defined in Sec. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing
the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by
F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not
of Ordinance No. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City include or is not included inthe offense defined in
prohibiting the installation of electric wiring devices Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of
without authority from the city government. He indecent and immoral motin pictures.
admitted installing the electric wiring devices found The elements of the 2 offenses are
by the police in order to decrease the readings of different. The gravamen of the offense defined in
electric current. The case was however dismissed on RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion
the ground that the offense had prescribed. Fourteen pictures which has not been previously passed by the
days later, the City Fiscal filed another case for theft Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion
against him. The court also dismissed this case on the picture may be indecent or immoral but if it has not
ground of double jeopardy. The prosecution appealed been previously approved by the Board, its public
contending the offense was different. showing constitutes a crimnal offense. On the other
hand, the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is
HELD: The contention has no merit. The first the public showing os indecent or immoral plays,
sentence of Art. III, sec. 21 states the general rule: scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy The nature of both offenses also differs. The
is not available where the second prosecution is for crime punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh
an offense that is different from the offense charged criminal intent need not ber proved because it is
in the first or prior prosecution, although both may presumed, while the offense punished in Art. 201(3)
be based from the same facts. The second sentence of the RPC is malum in se, which criminal intent is an
provides an exception: that the protection against indispensable ingredient. Suzette.
double jeopardy is available although the prior
one alleged in the first information, but also that the

2. Rules of Court provisions two offenses are identical. There is identity between
the two offenses when the evidence to support a
Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
acquittal; double jeopardy.-- When an accused warrant a conviction for the other.
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case This rule of identity however does not apply,
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated however, when the second offense was not in
without his express consent by a court of existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the
compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or simple reason that in such case there is no possibility
information or other formal charge sufficient in for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
form and substance to sustain a conviction and convicted for an offense that was then inesistent.
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the injuries and after conviction the accused dies, the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another charge for homicide against the same accused does
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any not put him twice in jeopardy.
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, Accordingly, an offense may be said to
or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily include or to be necessarily included in
necessarily included in the offense in the former another offense, for the purpose of detremining the
complaint of information. existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses
However, the conviction of the accused were in existence during the pendency of the first
shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was
offense which necessarily includes the offense then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor
charged in the former complaint or information during the first prosecution, and consequently a
under any of the following instances: subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute a
(a) the graver offense developed due to second jeopardy. Suzette.
supervening facts arising from the same act or
omission consituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA
became known or were discovered only after the 637 (1983)
filing of the former complaint or information; or
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense F: This is a petition to review the order of the
was made without the consent of the fiscal and of City Court of Manila Branch XI, dismissing the
the offended party. information for homicide thru reckless imprudence
In any of the foregoing cases, where the filed against Gapay, in a criminal case on the ground
accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the
judgement, he shall be credited with the same in accused having been previously tried and convicted
the event of conviction for the graver offense. of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
for the resulting death of the victim would place the
accused in double jeopardy.
Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950)
ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for
F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI, Rizal serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
with frustrated homicide , for having allegedly convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently
inflicted upon Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the
intent to kill, several serious wounds on different offended party dies as a result of the same injuries.
parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a
period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him HELD: YES
from performing his habitual labor for the same Well settled is the rule that one who has
period of time. On Dec. 29, 1949, at 8 am, accused been charged with an offense cannot be charged
pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. At 10:15 again with the same or identical offense though the
am of the same day, Obillo died from his wounds. An latter be lesser or greater than the former. However
amended information was filed charging accused with as held in the MELO case, the rule of identity does
consummated homicide. Accused filed a motion to not apply when the second offense was not in
quash the amended information alleging double existence at the time of teh first prosecution , for
jeopardy. Motion denied. the reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused during the first prosecution, to be
ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day
HELD: NO the information was filed , and the accused was
Double jeopardy means that when a person arraigned 2 days after or on October 20, 1972 . When
is charged with an offense and the case is terminated the information for homicide thru reckless
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other imprudence was, therefore, filed on October 24,
manner without the consent of the accused, the 1972, the accused was already in doubly jeopardy.
latter cannot again be charged with the same or Suzette.
identical offense. The phrase "the same offense" has
always been construed to mean not only that the
second offense charged is exactly the same as the People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971)
RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as

F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law -
physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the the offenses with which petitioner was charged
offended party being Lam constitute, strictly different offenses, although,
Hock who, according to the medical cerificate issued under certain conditions, one offense may include
by Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, was confined since April 8 the other, and accordingly, once placed in jeopardy
1968 up to the present time for head injury in for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order
Occidental Negros Provincial Hspital. Accused as regards the other.
pleaded guilty on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being Thus, if the injuries mentioned in the second
penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. On information were not established by the evidence,
April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the
information charging the same defendant with very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in
frustrated murder arising from the same act against the first case, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further Charo.
diagnosis, the healing period for the injuries caused
to accused was found to be longer. A motion to
quash was filed by the accused on the ground of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43
double jeopardy.
F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the
ISSUE: W/N the defendant, who had already been proceedings on the trial of the Aquino-Galman duble
convicted of slight physical injuries for injuries murder case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan
inflicted on Lam Hock , and had served sentence and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
therefor, may be prosecuted anew for frustrated constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
murder for the same act committed against the same justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights
person of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. The SC dismissed.
HELD: NO. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision
In order not to violate the constitutional acquitting all the accused of the crime charged.
prohibition on double jeopardy, there is the Respondents submitted that in view of the SB
indispensable requirement of the existence of a new decision, the case has become moot and academic.
fact which supervenes for which the defendant is Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
responsible changing the character of the crime SC ruling. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to
imputed to him and together with the facts existing look into petitioners' allegations.
previously constituting a new and distinct offense.
In this case, there is no supervening fact RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that
which occurred to justify the non-existence of double Pres. Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the
jeopardy. The wound causing the delay in the healing Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt
of the injuries caused to the victim was already in and make a mockery of the judicial process in this
existence at the time of the first examination of the case. The unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the
doctor. Said delay was caused by the very superficial accused after the rigged trial would accomplish the
and inconclusive examination then made resulting to two principal objectives of satisfying the public
a later finding of fracture. Suzette. clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giviing them, through their acquittal,
Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy the legal shield of double jepardy.
available.-- (1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of However, double jeopardy does not attach
evidence; (2) dismissal bec. of denial of accused's where a criminal trial was a sham. A dictated,
right to speedy trial; (3) accused is discharged to be coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as in
a state witness. this case is a void judgment. In legal contemplation,
it is no judgment. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- The criminal collusion as to the handling and
When the case is dismissed other than on the merits treatment of the cases by public respondents
upon motion of the accused personally, or through completely disqualified them and voided ab initio the
counsel, such dismissal is regarded as w/ express SB verdict. DJ cannot be invoked where the
consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to prosecution, which represents the sovereign people
have waived the right to plea double jeopardy. in crimnal cases is denied due process.

Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959
People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249
F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in
violation of a city ordinance. Later he was charged F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged
again in another criminal case in the same court with that through violence and intimidation, Obsania had
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. carnal knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the
Yap moved to quash the latter information. latter's will. Later, the fiscal amended the complaint
Meanwhile, petitioner was acquitted in the first case. to allege therein that the offense was committed
with lewd designs. The accused after pleading not
ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. guilty moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the first information was fatally
defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns," and A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ directed
that the amended information did not cure the to the person detaining another, commanding him to
jurisdictional infirmity. The motion of the defense produce the body of the detainee at a designated
was sustained by the judge. Hence this appeal by the time and place, and to show cause why he should
fiscal. continue to be detained.

RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have
"lewd designs" in the first information does not affect the immediate determination of the legality of the
the sufficiency in substance of the information, for deprivation of physical liberty.
unchaste motives are deemed inherent in the very
act of rape itself. In any case, the lower court erred What is suspended is the privilege of the writ,
in dismissing the case by failing to distinguish and not the writ itself. The writ will always issue as
between the concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency a matter of course. But when the privilege of the
in substance of an indictment. writ is suspended, all the detaining office needs to do
As to the question of double jeopardy, the when he receives the writ of habeas corpus is to show
following requisites must have been obtained to to the court that the detainee is being detained for
invoke the constitutional protection against it: an offense covered by the suspension, and the court
(1) a valid complaint or information; cannot inquire any further to find out if the detention
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; is legal. Under the Conmstitution, this is so only for 3
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; days. After 3 days, the Court can now require the
and detaining officer to produce the body of the
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or detainees and show cause why he should not be
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or released.
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ
The only remaining and decisive issue in this applied only to crimes related to invasion or
case seems to be as to whether or not the case was rebellion. An extensive discussion was made under
dismissed without the prior consent of the accused. the Commander-in- Chief clause of the President,
The SC ruled that as a general rule, when the supra. This rest of the section will be confined to
case is dismissed, other than on the merits, upon habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses.
motion of the accused, such dismissal is to be
ragarded as with the express consent of the accused In general as already noted above, the
and consequently he is deemed to have waived his privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy to
right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped question the illegality of the arrest or detention, or
from claiming such defense on appeal by the any other restraint to liberty. When all else is lost, it
Government or in another indictment for the same is the last recourse to get someone out of his illegal
offense. detention.
The exception to this is where the dismissal is
sought by the accused on the ground that they were 1. Functions of the writ
denied their right to a speedy trial and that the
government failed to prosecute; in which case double Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)
jeopardy will set in. The case of herein accused falls
under the general rule. Habeas corpus is available not only for those
who are in actual detention but even for those whose
D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus liberty is merely restrained. Thus, in Moncupa v.
Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986), the SC granted habeas
Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ corpus to petitioner who, though temporarily
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in released, could not travel outside Metro Manila,
cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public could not change his residence, could not be
safety requires it. interviewed by media, and had to report to the
military.

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, the President may, for a 2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction
period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the privilege remedy
of the writ of habeas corpus...

The suspension of the privilege of the writ In Chavez v. Court of Appeals, supra, habeas
shall apply only to persons judicially charged for corpus was the remedy of one whose confinement
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly was the result of a void judgnment of conviction
connected with invasion. arrived at after the judge violated due process by
compelling him to take the stand and testify against
During the suspension of the privilege of the himself.
writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 633 (1986),
be released. (Art. VII, Sec. 18.) supra.

A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees

In Gumabon v. Director of Prison, 37 SCRA 420
(1971), some persons who were charged with the Free Market Place of Ideas
complex crime of rebellion with homicide, rape, or
other common crimes, did not appeal their conviction 1. For the discovery of political truth
and so were sentenced accordingly. The other
accused, however, appealed their conviction, When men have realized that time has upset
resulting in a new ruling in People v. Hernandez to many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
the effect that there can be no complex crim of more than they believe the very foundations of their
rebellion with homicide, rape, etc., for these own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. As a reached by free trade in ideas-- that the best test of
result, while those who appealed were now free, truth is the power of the thought to get itself
those who did not remained in jail. The SC ruled accepted in the competition of the market, and the
that those who conrtinued to languish in jail could truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of safely can be carried out. (Justice Holmes, Abrams
their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in v. United States, 250 U.S. 616. (1919)
People v. Hernandez.
The theory behind freedom of expression is
3. Suspension of the privilege the principle that ours is a democratic society, and so
the only way to rule ultimately is by, means of public
Art. VII, Sec. 18. opinion, which is possible only when everyone can
Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971) speak their minds out and compete in the free
market place of ideas.
E. Affirmative rights
2. For self government
1. Free access to the courts
United States v. Bustos, 37 P 731 (1918)
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts
and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal
assistance shall not be denied to any person by Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984),
reason of poverty. supra

2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure,
rights the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" were padlocked and sealed, with the further
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx result that the printing and publication of said
(4) The law shall provide for penal and newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the
civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
torture or similar practices, and their families. fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print.
3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of This state of being is patenly anathematic to a
tortures democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political
Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well New York Times v. Sullivan, 380 US 51 (1964)
as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families. 3. For individual protection

B. Prior Restraints

Thus any system of prior restraints of
IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality, giving the
government a heavy burden to show justification for
Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed the imposition of such restraint. (New York v. United
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or States (1971); also in New York Times v. Pentagon and
of the press, or the right of the people peaceably Bantam Books v. Publication of Pentagon Papers).
to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievance.
Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529 (1990)
Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be
detained solely by reason of his political beliefs Subsequent Punishment
and aspirations.
xxx And even subsequent punishment is tempered
by the greater interest of promoting free public
opinion. The most significant expression is the law general provision of the statute may be
on libel. constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if
its natural and probable effect was to bring about the
We consider this case against the background substantive evil which the legislative body might
of a profound national commitment to debate on prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).]
public issues being uninhibited, robust and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, Example: Art. 142. Inciting to sedition.
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on When the legislature has decided that one who
government and public officials. The falsity of some advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime, the
of the factual statements and alleged defamations do court cannot intrude. As it evolved, this test was
not qualify the role. And just as factual error supposed to apply when there is a statute, in contrast
afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would to the clear and present danger rule which applies
otherwise be free, the same is true of injury to when the speech is not prohibited by statute.
official reputation. (New York Times v. Sullivan, 380
U.S. 51 (1964) Clear and Present Danger Test: The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in
The interest of society and good government such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
demands a full discussion of public affairs. Whether create a clear and present danger that they will bring
the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
proper comment. Public policy, welfare of society, to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
and the orderly administration of government have [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).]
demanded protection for public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the The emphasis of the test is the nature of the
development and adoption of the doctrine of circumstances under which it is uttered. The speech
privilege. [Justice Malcom, United States v. Bustos, itself may not be dangerous. As Holmes said: "Many
731 (1918).] things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not
While, uncer the Revised Penal Code, any be endured so long as men fight." Or saying "Fire" in
defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious a crowded movie house.
(malice-in-law), when the defense proves that the
communication is privileged, such a presumption of Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the
malice does not arise because of the greater public gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
interest involved. justifies such an invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger. [Dennis v. United
If the communication is absolutely privileged States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned
(as in parliamentary freedom of speech), the Hand.]
prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact.
This test was meant to supplant the clear and
If the communication is only qualifiedly present danger. They both emphasize the
privileged (Art. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair circumstances of the speech, but this latter test
and true reporting of an official proceeding; legal consider the weighing of values.
moral or social duty), the burden is shifted on the
prosecution to prove malice-in-fact, which the Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional
defense can overcome by proving the truth of the guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a
defamatory statement (which in the case of public State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
officials may or may not constitute a crime, so long force or of law violation, except where such advocacy
as related to the conduct of his office) and good or peech is directed to inciting or producing
motive. imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or
produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
C. Content-Based Restrictions 444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA
438 (1985).]
1. Test of validity of content-based
restrictions The test emphasizes the very words uttered:
(a) What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely
The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and
imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court, have present danger test for being top dependent on the
evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of circumstances. Speaker may, when tested show no
speech. incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to
sedition.
Dangerous Tendency Test: When the
legislative body has determined generally, in the Balancing of Interest Test: The court must
exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing
kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of
they may be punished, the question whether any the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of
specific utterance coming within the prohibited class the free enjoyment of rights. [American
is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383 cited in
is not open to consideration. In such cases, the Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)]
says it, one can be held liable for what one has said if
The test applied when two legitimate values it causes damage to the rights of others.
not involving national secuirty crimes compete.
Involves an appoint of the competing interest.
(Gonzales v. Comelec) Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988)
In Aver v. Capulong and Enrile, for instance, it
is a question of balancing the freedom of expression F: The President of the Philippines filed a
of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile. complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were
the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star,
(not in VV's revised outline) based on the following statement in Beltran's column
Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat of Oct. 12, 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the
the clear-and-present danger test is over- simplified Aquino Administration": "If you recall, during the
judgement unless it takes into account also a number August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her
of other factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the first
danger in comparison with the value of the occasion Commander-in-Chief to do so." Beltran did not submit
for speech or political activity, (2) the availability of a counter affidavit and instead, moved to dismiss the
more moderate controls than those the State has complaint. The fiscal denied his motion. Thus, this
imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with petition for certiorari.
which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in
Dennis v. United States in the concurring opinion of HELD: xxx
Justice Frankfurter). (3) As regards the contention of petitioner
Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel bec.
of the privileged character of the publication, the
2. Applications of tests in various contexts Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that
such a defense is best left to the trial court to
a. Freedom of expression and national security appreciate after receiving the evidence of the
parties. As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow
Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling
316 (1984) effect" on the press freedom, the Court finds no basis
at this stage to rule on the point. VV.
F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. On
different dates in July 1980, they were summoned by Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
military authorities for interrogation regarding their
work, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and Libel suits based on official criticisms should be
even private lives. In addition, one of them was dismissed outright unless made in bad faith
charged with libel by a General who sought to
recover P10 million in damages. They brought an F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-
action for prohibition to stop the NIB from Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly
questioning them and from filing libel suits on committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's
matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the clients. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo
NIB. Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet
and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But the agents
HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that, while o f r o b b e r y. Pe t i t i o n e r f o u n d p r o s e c u t o r s
ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages
answer some questions is not illegal or against the agents. Later, the Bulletin Today
constitutionally objectionable, under certain published a news item based on petitioner's letter to
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily ASAC. This became the basis of an action for libel
assume a different appearance as when it comes from brought against petitioner and his clients. Petitioner
a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking moved to quash the case but his motion was denied.
military officers and the designate interrogation site
is a military camp. HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and
substantive law, the charge is defective. The letter
b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official constitutes privileged communication. It was sent by
conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice" petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the discharge
of his legal duty to his clients. He could also invke his
Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies
and 361-362 in the public service. The complaint was addressed to
the official who had authority over them and could
Freedom of expression and libel impose proper disciplinary sanctions. As an index of
good faith, the letter was sent privately, directly to
Freedom of speech versus right to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. As
reputation. Libel is the most common form of for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the
subsequent punishment. Although one cannot be petitioner, an ordinary citizen without known ties to
prevented from saying something before he actually newspaper, could have by himself caused the
publication. It does not appear either that the report
was paid for like an advertisement. At any rate, the to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
news item is a true and fair report of a judicial imperfection in the choice of words.
proceeding, made in good faith and without .
comments or remarks. VV.
Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982)

Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of
a telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public
F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection Works requesting investigation of Mrs. Virginia
with the publication in the Feb. 23, 1981 issue of Mercado of the Public Service Commission "as we
Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear." The have reason to believe that she has enriched herself
plaintiffs, sugar planters of Bacolod, complained that thru corrupt practices xxx." He filed a motion to
the article portrayed them as exploiters of sugar dismiss on the ground that his communication was
workers. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint privileged, but his motion was denied. He filed
on the ground that the article was not libelous since another motion which was also denied. Thus, this
it did not single any particular individual. The trial petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in
court denied the motion and petitioner filed a the SC.
petition for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed.
Thus, this appeal to the SC. HELD: US v. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating
by forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme
HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the survive the test of whether or not the offending
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to publication is within the guarantees of free speech
apply to every individual in that group or class, or and free press. However, Justice Malcolm in US v.
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the Bustos was careful to point out that qualified
class or group can prove that the defamatory privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can proof of malice." What casts doubt on the good faith
bring the action separately if need be. The disputed of petitioner is his conduct, vis-à-vis private
portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled respondent. The tenacity with which petitioner had
out Sola. The news report merely stated that the pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem
victim had been arrested by members of a special to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be
police unit brought into the area by Sola, the mayor. entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. The
Hence, the report referring as it does to an official prosecution should be given a chance to prove
act is within the realm of privileged and is protected malice.
by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
press. VV. c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy

Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979)
fear in the Visayas" did not specify any individual, it
cannot be libelous. An article must be sufficiently, F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story
specific or at least sweeping as to apply to all based on a book written by Rodriguez. xxx Nelly
members of a group, in order to be deemed libelous. Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to
the movie on the ground that it contained a portrayal
Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970) of Padilla's private and family life, including scenes
about his mother, Maria Soto vda. de Gonzales, and a
The pictures of a former mayor was certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. Subsequently,
inadvertently published and mistaken for another Nelly Amante, together w/ her sister and mother,
man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit, use and
authorities about the Babuyan Islands, claiming of develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes
murders there, so they could go and he could be of producing the pictures," in consideration of
rescued. An erratum was published by the This Week P20,000. Petitioner paid P5,000 but as he failed to
magazine. The SC, quoting Quisumbing v. Lopez, pay the balance agreed upon, he was sued.
however, found for plaintiff, but with reduced Judgement was rendered against him by the trial
damages, since the error in in this case could have court, w/c was affirmed by the CA. Petitioner
been checked consideringing that this was a weekly appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to
magazine and not a daily. enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss
caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the
Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955) relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in
the life of M. Padilla since Padilla was a public
Newspapers should be given leeway and figure.
tolerance to enable them to courageously and
effectively perform their important role in our HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Being
democracy. In the preparation of stories, press a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto
reporters and editors usually have to race to their a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a
deadlines; and consistently with good faith and person's privacy to disseminate public information
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, does not extend to fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how a public
figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by
is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the ecclesiatical officials.
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits
that he included a little romance in the film bec. w/o In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable
it, it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. because his name is part of history and this cannot be
Freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a changed or altered; thus his name can be used so
preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. long as only his public life is dwelled only. But in
It is not, however, w/o limitations. In the particular Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public
circumstances presented and considering the figure, the movie dealth with both the public and
obligations assumed by petitioner under the private lives of Moises Padilla.
agreement, the validity of such agreement will have
to be upheld particular bec. the limits of freedom of d. Freedom of expression and administration of
expression are reached when expression touches upon justice (contempt of court)
matters of private concern. [In the agreement signed
by him, petitioner admitted that in the picture In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990
produced, he had "exploited the life story of Moises
Padilla for pecuniary gain, and other profit motives, Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989)
and (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises
Padilla's immediate family, and (had) in fact included, Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957)
in the PICTURE's case, persons portraying some of
MOISES PADILLA's kin..."] A contempt imposed by the court on the
party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action
Committee complaining about the delay in the
Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988 disposition of the agrarian case, was lifted by the SC.
It held that although such a letter should have been
F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an sent to the SC and not the PAC, it was nevertheless a
action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners valid exercise of speech which did not significantly
from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution," destroy, the orderly administration of justice.
a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the
ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939)
contended that the movie would not involve his
private life not that of his family. But the trial court A person can be held liable for making
issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered comments on a pending case (sub judice) which have
petitioners to desist from making the movie making the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly
reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this administration of justistice. But if the case is not
action for certiorari. pending, such comment is a valid exercise of the
freedom of expression.
HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes
freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case
them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the
Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression Flag burning when done to express dissent is
by petitioners. Because of the preferred character of protected speech.
speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of
invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The F: Respondent Johnson participated in a
Judge should have stayed his hand considering that political demonstration where he burned an American
the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically
was no "clear and present danger." The subject injured or threatened with injury, although several
matter of the movie does not relate to the private witnesses were seriously offended by the flag
life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than burning. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a
necessary to keep the film a truthful historical venerated object in violation of a Texas statute which
account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of (1) prohibited the desecration of, among other
equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case things, a state or national flag, and (2) defined
between freedom of speech and of expression and desecration as the physical mistreatment of such
the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a objects in a way which the actor knows will seriously
requirement that the proposed motion picture must offend one or more persons likely to observe or
be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of discover the act. A state court of appeals affirmed.
facts. There must be no showing of a reckless The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed,
disregard of truth. holding that the desecration statute as applied
violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech
Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment,
the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously because the statute (1) was too broad for First
been asked for the use of his character in the movie Amendment purposes as it related to breaches of the
and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming peace, and (2) was not adequately supported by the
because he did not want any mention of his and his state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of
family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by unity.
the lower court on the ground that it amounted to
prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the
ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is validity. Censorship is allowable only under the
unconstitutional clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public
HELD: YES. Decision Affirmed. health or any other legitimate public interest. The
Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting
the First Amendment under the particular petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie
circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was was classified as "For adults only" without deletion.
sufficiently imbued with elements of communication However there is not enough votes to consider the
to implicate the First Amendment, given that this flag abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there
burning was the culmination of a political were reasons for its action because of the scenes
demonstration and that the state conceded that the showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing
protester's conduct was expressive; (2) the state's and caressing each other like lesbians. VV.
interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not
implicated on the record in this case, since (a) no
disturbance of the peace actually occurred or Notes: The movie involved in this case was
threatened to occur because of the flag burning, (b) "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in
it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes some part and to label "For Adults". The SC rules that
serious offense at a particular expression is movies are within the constitutional protection of
necessarily likely to disturb the peace, and (c) the freedom of expression, so that censorship is
flag burning does not fall within the small class of presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint.
"fighting words" that are likely to provoke the The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a
average person to retaliation and thereby cause a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger
breach of the peace; and (3) the state's asserted of a substantive evil against national security or
interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of public morals or other public interest. In all other
nationhood and national unity does not justify the cases, the Board can only classify.
conviction, since (a) the attempted restriction on
expression is content-based, and thus subject to the But a different standard must be followed in
most exacting scrutiny, given that the flag television because of the pervasive and intrusive
desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the influence of the medium on people who watch its
physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but programs without having to pay anything.
only against impairments that would cause serious
offenses to others and is aimed at protecting On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that
onlookers from being offended by the ideas expressed sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being
by the prohibited activity, and (b) although the state whether, using contemporary community standards,
has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest.
treatment of the flag, it may not foster its own view (Miller v. California). Thus on this score, it found
of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for
to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning subjecting the producer to difficulty and for
the flag as a means of political protest. entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked
the votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
f. Movies Censorship
Tests of obscenity:
While prior restraint is the general rule, (1) Whether the average person, applying
censorship in the movies is tolerated because by the contemporary community standards, would find that
nature of the medium, it has a greater impact on the the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas interest.
it presents, unlike newspapers which are read by (2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in
people separated by walls. a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable law.
(3) Whether the work, taken as a whole,
Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985) lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. (Miller v. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419.)
F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie
Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for g. Radio Broadcast
Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition
that certain deletions were made and that it was In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, 137 SCRA 647,
shown on adults only. The petitioner brought an the SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the
action, claiming violation of their freedom of protection of the freedom of expression. If closed
expression. down, the owners enjoy the rights to due process
according to the standards set in Ang Tibay v. CIR.
HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a
method for the communication of ideas and the But radio deserves greater regulation than
expression of the artistic impulse. The power of the newspapers because it could invade the privacy of
Board is limited to the classification of films. For everyone for no fee, and it is such that one is likely
freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the to listen to what is being said.
exception. The power to impose prior restraint is not
to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA power of the government; if it furthers an important
647 (1985) or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
F: The petitioners filed this action to compel of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
respondent government officials to allow the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is
reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been essential to the furtherance of that interest. [US v.
closed for allegedly having been used to incite the O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v.
people to sedition. The petitioner contended that it COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)]
was denied due process because no hearing was held
and no proof was submitted to establish a factual 1. Regulation of political campaign
basis for the closure. However, before the Court
could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it
had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and F: Petitioners herein were representatives of
that the National Telecommunications Commission mass media which were prevented from selling and
had expressed its willingness to grant the requisite donating space or air time for political
license. advertisements under RA 6646.

HELD: The case has been moot and academic. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation
However, for the guidance of the inferior courts and of the constitutional right to freedom of expression.
administrative bodies, the following guidelines must
be observed: 1) The cardinal primary requirements in RULING: NO. The Comelec has been expressly
administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay authorized by the Constitution to supervise or
v. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
may be closed; 2) All forms of communication are franchises or permits for the operation f media of
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of communication and information. The fundamental
expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of purposes of such power are to ensure "equal
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,"
in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for
and print media. This limitation derives from the fact the use of such media facilities, in connection with
the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive "public information campaigns and forums among
presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The candidates."
government has a right to be protected against Of course, the law limits the right of free
broadcasts which incite listeners to violently speech and of access to mass media of the candidates
overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the themselves. The limitation however, bears a clear
special protection given to all forms of media by the and reasonable connection with the objective set out
due process and freedom of expression clauses of the in the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited
Constitution. purchase of print space and radio and television time
that the resources of the financially affluent
h. Freedom of Information candidates are likely to make a crucial difference.

Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to F: Petitoner, Adiong, a 1992 senatorial
documents and papers pertaining to, official acts, candidate, assails Comelec Resolution No. 2347
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
research data used as basis for policy development, stickers on mobile places, public or private, and
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limits their location or publication to authorized
limitations as may be provided by law. posting areas.

Baldoza v. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14 (1976) ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution is constitutional.

Access of official records (the docket book) RULING: NO. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
for any lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases citizen's fundamental right of free speech. There is
for a report on the peace and order situation of the no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
municipality) is guaranteed. But it is subject to kind of restriction involved in this case. The posting
reasonable conditions by the custodian of the of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not
records. endanger any substantial government or public
interest. Under the clear and present danger rule,
not only must the danger be patently clear and
Garcia v. BOI, 177 SCRA 374 (1989) pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided,
must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over
one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
D. Content-Neutral Restrictions Significantly, the freedom of expression
curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the
O'brien test: A government regulation is candidate or the political party. The regulation
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional strikes at the freedoom of an individual to express his
preference and, by displaying it on his car, to by 100 meters from the rallyists. They must be in full
convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be uniform, with their names visibly written. They can
furnished by a candidate but once the car owner carry no firearm except a nighstick, but they are
agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle, the allowed protective devices.
expression becomes a statement by the owner,
primarily his own and not of anybody else. If they anticipate trouble, the police must
Morever, The restriction is so broad that it call the attention of the leader of the rallyists. When
encompasses even the citizen's private property, trouble actually erupts, the police must not disperse
which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In the crowd right away but first give a warning. If
consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal violence persists, they must give a second warning. If
right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated still violence continues, only then can they fight
which is that no person shall be deprived of his back.
property without due proocess of law.
If a rally does not have a permit, the police
2. Freedom of Assembly can disperse the crowd, but they cannot use
violence. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and
Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) organizers.

A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to
Office of the Mayor at least, five working days before inform the members of their duty under the law, (b)
the day of the rally. to police their own rank, and (c) to cooperate with
local authorities in maintaining peace and order.
But no permit from the mayor is required in
case the rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks,
(ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of Notes: The freedom to use public places to
the owner), and (iii) campuses of state universities peaceably assemble is best expressed thus:
(which are left to university authorities) "Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
The application must be in writing and must the public and, time out of time have been used for
include: (1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) purposes of assembly, communicating thought betwee
date and time, place and street, (3) size (4)manner citizens, and discussing public questions." (Justice
of the use of the street, (5) sound system to be used Roberts. Hague v. CIO)
(6)purpose. It must also have a statement of the
duties of the rallyists. Although under a "permit system", before one
can use a public place, one must first obtain prior
The written application is filed with the permit from the proper authorities, the principle has
Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its always been that one has the right to a permit,
receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the subject only to reasonable regulation. The validity of
application, then it is enough for filing purposes if a the permit system has been upheld by the Court,
copy is posted in the premises. provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, place
and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the
The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing
application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted. the groups which could use the public place and
discriminate others.
But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear
and present danger" to public peace, order, health, As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80
etc., and he has proof of this, he should not deny the Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority
application right away. He should hold a hearing to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be
during which the applicant can be heard. If after construed to be limited to the time, place, and
hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists, manner of the parades socially to secure public order,
then he can deny the application. convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the
Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the
The applicant can then go to any court other Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by
than the Supreme Court for the review of the the recent national election were still high and a rally
decision of denial of the mayor. The courts have 24 to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate
hours to act on the petition. If the judgment is a the matter, was overturned by the court.
reversal of the denial, or in any case if the applicant
is satisfied with the decision, the judgment becomes
final and executory immediately, and no appeal can Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71
be taken by the local authorities anymore.
F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by
But if the decision is not satisfactory to the petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the
applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt to Coalesced Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso
appeal to the SC. of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the holding
of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the
During the rally, the police must be limited to purpose of petitioning the government for redress of
maintaining peace and order and so must stay away grievances. The Mayor denied the application on the
ground that passions still run high due to the recent prior necessity of securing a permit from the
election, and a rally to protest election anomalies government and that such right cannot be fully
might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption enjoyed without the corresponding right to use public
of public order. places for that purpose.

ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a
permit amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right
RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor to freedom of assembly.
under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board
pursuant to its authority under the Revised HELD: NO.
Administrative Code which pertains to the use of The respondent Mayor has not denied nor
streets and public places, can be construed only to absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner.
mean the power to regulate, which means and He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for
includes the power to control, govern, and to restrain the peaceful assembly during certain days and time,
but cannot be construed as synonymous with and at a place when they would not disrupt the
"suppress" or "prohibit." normal activities of the community.
The Court quoted with approval the decision The respondent mayor possesses reasonable
in the American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, discretion to determine or specify the streets or
" a statute requiring persons using public streets for a public places to be used for the assembly in order to
parade or procession to procure a special license secure convenient use thereof by others and provide
therefor from the local authorities is not an adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of
unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of disorder and maintain public safety and order.
assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific
as the statute is construed by the state courts, the legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the their application for a permit unconditionally.
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, Experience in connection with present assemblies and
place, and manner of the parade or procession, with demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear
a view to conserving the public convenience and of and imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner has
or refuse license..." manifested, it has no means of preventing. Charo.

But under the same ordinance, the SC, in In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the
Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to
mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use
weekdays, on a finding that everytime there was an of a klosk within the town plaza in order to avoid any
announced rally, stores closed and business was untoward incident with members of the Roman
gravely affected because of violent incidents. It Catholic Church, whose tenets are opposed to those
found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only of the petitioners, and whose church is very near the
during weekends to be reasonable. klosk.

Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)
Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)
F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the
Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of
association of students, workers and peasants, the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town
applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on
a rally at Plaza Miranda. Respondent Mayor denied the ground that the permit, if granted, may give rise
the application to hold the rally on the date and to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being
time specified by petitioners in view of the events performed by the Catholic Church which was said to
that transpired during the last demonstration held by be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which
them which ended in the destruction of public and might lead to any untoward incident with members
private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a of the rival denomination.
score of other persons and the closing down of
schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.
suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens
near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553
during weekends and earlier during the day so that it (1983), the SC found no basis for the denial of permit
may end before dark. to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from
Petitioner challenged the action of the Luneta to the street fronting the U.S. Embassy. It
Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is
violation of their right to freedom of assembly. free to all. It found the fear entertained by city
Petitioner contended that the right of the people to authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by
peaceful assembly and to petition the government for provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of
redress of grievances may be exercised without the
the NPD that adequate security measures were hearing mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins
provided by the police. the Malacañang grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts
and, with clenched fists, marched on the street and
The Court did not rule on the validity of the shouted anti-government invectives. They were
ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the
meters from any foreign embassy as a means of Presidential Security Command. They brought an
complying with the Geneva Convention that requires action for mandamus.
the host country to protect the premises and
personnel of the embassy. HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the
marchers, their fists clenched and chants of anti-
Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of government investives support the government's
permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies claim that the petitioners purpose was not really to
must do so within a sufficient time so the authority worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government
can have time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises demonstration close to the residence of the
over a denial of a permit, the applicant can question President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is
the denial in the lower court, which can try questions justified. The need to secure the safety of heads of
of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the states cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their
SC on an expedited procedure. lives is constant and felt throughout the world. The
petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of
J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983) religion but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action.
F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC
Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, upheld the right to expression of students who held a
1983 starting 2 p.m. from Luneta to the gates of the rally in a private university. But since they held it
US Embassy. He filed this petition because as of Oct. beyond the time granted in a place other than the
20, there was yet no action on his request to hold a one allowed by the administration, their suspension
rally. was condoned.

HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984)
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without censorship or F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
punishment. There is to be no previous retraint Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
whether in the form of libel suits, prosecution for Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a
damages, or contempt proceedings unless there is a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the
"clear and present danger of a substantive evil that university. On the scheduled date, the students
the State has a right to prevent." There can be no continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time
legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and and held it in a different place from that indicated in
present danger of a substantive evil to the holding of the permit. They expressed in a vehement language
a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither can there be their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes
objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were
US Embassy. A statute requiring persons to secure a placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they
special license to use public streets for a procession were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and
is not unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities oral defamation. They were suspended for one
are strictly limited to the consideration of the time, academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in
place and manner and the authorities are not the SC.
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a
permit. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and
academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC
In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to
the SC upheld the power of the city authorities to pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect
close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly
rallies as a form of "area restriction", in order to and free speech calls for the setting aside of the
protect the President and his family, based on the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is
incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace out of proportion considering that the vigorous
were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case presentation of views was expected. The excitement
purported to merely worship at St. Jude's. of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should
In case a rally is held in a private place, no be taken into consideration.
permit from the mayor is required. However, the
consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.
Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)
German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)
F: Petitioners were officers and members of the
F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
businessmen, students and employees, met on JP Foundation. They were refused enrollment for having
Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of led a rally on Sept. 28, 1982.
The inclusion of the right to unionize in this

HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the article is ill-advised because while the right to
course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic unionize is an economic and labor right, the right to
audience goading them on, utterances, extremely association in general is a civil- political right.
critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is Discussed elsewhere is the argument why
quite understandable. They would be ineffective if public employees cannot engage in collective
during the rally they speak in the guarded and bargaining and strike.
judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even
a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full
credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into SSS Employees Assn vs CA, 175 SCRA 686 (1989)
account the excitement of the occasion, the
propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages
of youth. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. against petitioners
the students is a highly disproportionate penalty. SSSEA, alleging that the officers and members of the
Notes: Note that while the permit system is latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
not allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking
the case of assembly. In publication, censorship is employees from reporting to work and SSS members
presumptively unconstitutional. There is very little from transacting business w/ SSS. The Public Sector
possibility or justification for the regulation of news. Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to
The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent return to work but the strikers refused to do so. The
punishment. SSSEA went on strike bec. SSS failed to act on the
But in assembly regulation is allowed because union's demands.
it is needed by the very nature of the expression, Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
when people use streets, they may deprive other complaint for lack of jurisdiction, w/c motion was
groups which want to use the streets too. So as long denied. The restraining order w/c was previously
as only the incidents of speech are regulated, the issued was converted into an injunction after finding
measure is constitutionally acceptable. the strike illegal. Petitioners appealed the case to
the CA. The latter held that since the employees of
SSS are govt employees, they are not allowed to
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987) strike.

F: While these cases were pending in the SC, HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort
the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work
had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate stoppages, like workers in the private sector, in order
of the Court and set up picket quarters, at times to pressure the Govt. to accede to their demands. As
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
premises. When required to show cause why they Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of
should not be held in contempt of court, their lawyer Govt. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect after
apologized and assured that the above incident would the initial dispute arose, the terms and conditions of
not be repeated. employment in the Govt, including any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt.
HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar owned and controlled corporations with original
situations to apply the full force of the law and charters, are governed by law and employees therein
punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
the Court into acting one way or the other in any thereof.
case pending before it. Grievances must be The statement of the court in Alliance of
ventilated in the proper channels, i.e. through Govt Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment
appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale
respect due the courts as impartial administrators of for distinguishing bet. workers in the private sector
justice. Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike?
to have the causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or Since the terms and conditions of
public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not govt. employment are fixed by law,
only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally govt. workers cannot use the same
a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse weapons employed by workers in the
parties and the citizenry at large. private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle
3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in behind labor unionism in private
the public sector industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through
Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, compulsion of law. Relations bet.
including those employed in the public and private private employers and their
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies employees rest on an essentially
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be voluntary basis. Subject to the
abridged. minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare
legislation, the terms and conditions
of employment in the unionized itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it
private sector are settled through the shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
process of collective bargaining. In For the above reason, mandamus is not
govt employment, however, it is the available for the petitioner. There is no duty on the
legislature and, where properly given part of the School to admit her to study since the
delegated power, the administrative School clearly has the discretion to turn down even
heads of govt w/c fix the terms and qualified applicants due to limitations of space,
conditions of employment. And this facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and
is effected through statutes or component considerations. There are standards to
administrative circulars, rules, and meet and policies to pursue. What a student
regulations, not through CBA's possesses is a privilege rather than a right.

E. Academic Freedom UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989)

Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975) F: In 1972, the UP BOR approved the
establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve, among
F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology others, "as a laboratory and demonstration school for
refused to readmit petitioner, Garcia, in its M.A. prospective teachers - provided that UPCBHS must be
program because they felt that "her frequent self-supporting." However, the Dept of Professional
questions and difficulties were not always pertinent Education in Baguio was never organized. So, the BOR
and had the effect of slowing down the progress of decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the
the class;" that it would be "to the best interest (of conditions for its creation. The UPCBHS Foundation
the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more Inc. sought to restrain the University from phasing
compatible with her orientation. Garcia assailled her out the UPCBHS.
expulsion for being unreasonable; that the reasons
given therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in
that her conduct constituted a violation of the an institution of higher learning such as the UP?
school's regulations and grave misconduct.
RULING: NO. UP invokes its exercise of academic
ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by freedom. Private respondent invokes the right to
mandamus to readmit petitioner. quality education and to free secondary education.
The rights invoked by private respondent may
RULING: NO. The Constitution recognizes the be asserted only as against the Government through
enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of the the DECS. UP was created under its charter to
right to academic freedom. The school decides for provide advanced tertiary education. An institute of
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for
them. It is free from outside coercion or interference secondary education.
save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy higher learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS
certainly extending to the choice of the students. was established subject to a number of
The collective liberty of an organization is by conditionalities. Failing on such conditions, UP can
no means the same thing as the freedom of the order its abolition on academic grounds. Charo.
individual members within it. In considering the
problems of academic freedom, one must distinguish
between autonomy of the university, as a corporate UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993
body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher. F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and
The personal aspect of the freedom consists the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for
of the right of each university teacher to seek and damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors
express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his Jerome Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed the
academic work and in his capacity as a private authenticity of the Tasaday find and made a
citizen. This status of the individual teacher is as proposition in various conferences attended by them
important as the status of the institution to which he that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the
belongs and through which he disseminates learning. Tasadays.
On other hand, the internal conditions for UP intervened, aaserting its duty to
academic freedom in a university are that the protect the respondents as faculty members for acts
academic staff should have de facto control of the and utterances made in the exercise of academic
following functions: (a) admission and examination of freedom. The lower court denied UP's motion to
students; (b) curricula for courses of study; (c) dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. Hence
appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; this petition.
and (d) allocation of income among the different
categories of expenditure. It is the business of a RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint
university to proviide that atmosphere which is most for "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It ethnic community, the lower court is cautioned that
is an atmosphere in which the four essential the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration
freedoms of a university prevail - to determine for of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in
a petition for declaratory relief. The complaint was is not entirely possible, because the use of
filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. classrooms and electricity are costs in the State),
Indeed, it is beyond the province of the court religious instruction in public elementary and
to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken secondary schools during class hours, by one
and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint approved by the authorities of the religion of the
for damages, the court may find congruence in what child or ward is allowed. [Art. XIV, Sec. 3(3).]
is justiciable and what falls within the field of the Religion can even be integrated in the school
sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its curriculum. [Civ. Code, 359 (1).]
proper role and function is the determination of legal
issues. 3. Anti-evolution laws

V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968),
the SC held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory
Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools
respecting an establishment of religion; or by parents whose religions finds the theory offensive.
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools
worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967), the SC
required for the exercise of civil or political rights. disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational
prayer before the start of classes in public schools as,
A. Non-Establishment Clause violative of the Non- Establishment clause.

The clause prohibits excessive government Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1967)
entanglement with, endorsement or disapproval of
religion [Vicoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 F: The respondent Board of Education upon the
SCRA 54 (1974); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984) recommendation of the State Board of Regents,
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny County v. directed the School's District principal to cause the
Greater Pittsburg ACLU, 492 US 574 (1989).] r e c i t a t i o n i n p u b l i c schools of a brief,
denominationally neutral prayer. Its observance on
The clause prohibits the State from the part of the students was voluntary.
establishing a religion. In assessing the validity of the
law, the questions to be asked are: RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York,
a. Is the purpose of the law religious, or is it by using its public school system to encourage the
secular? recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a
b. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
religion? Clause. The prayer was composed by govt officials as
c. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an part of a governmental program to further religious
excessive entaglement between the State and beliefs. The constitutional prohibition against laws
religious matters in religion? respecting an establishment of religion means at
least that it is not part of the business of the
The Non-Establishment clause is violated government to compose official prayers for any group
when the State gives any manifest support to any one to recite as part of a religious program carried on by
religion, even if nothing is done against the the govt.
individual. The clauses of the 1st Amendment which
prohibit laws respecting an establishment of religion
It is likewise violated if the State favors all and abridging the free exercise thereof, although
religions, for there may be atheists who are not so overlapping in certain instances, forbids two diff
favored. kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious
freedom. The stablishment clause, unlike the free
1. Operation of sectarian schools exercise clause, does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by
While the ownership, creation and the enactment of laws which establish an official
management of educational institutions must be in religion, whether or not those laws operate directly
the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipino-owned to coerce non-observing individuals. It rests on the
corporations, sectarian schools and those run by belief that a union of govt and religion tends to
religious groups and missions board are exempted destroy govt and to degrade religion, and upon an
from these requirements, provided the administration awareness of the historical fact that governmentally
is in the hands of Filipinos, who could be sectarian. established religion and religious persecutions go
[Art. XIV, Sec. 4(2).] hand in hand.

In Abington School District v. Schemp, 374
2. Religious instruction in public schools U.S. 203 (1963), it likewise disallowed the reading of
a passage from the bible without comment in public
schools as contrary to the Non- Establishment clause.
Provided it is upon the written petition of the
parents and it is at no cost to the State (although this
Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203

(1963) Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board, 51 Phil.
352 (1927)
The issue was whether the establishment clause was
violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the F: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted Church, represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia,
pursuant to statutory authority requiring the reading is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San
without comment, at the opening of each school day, Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On the south siide is a part of
of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the the church yard, the convent and an adjacent lot
Lord's prayer by the students in unison. The students used as vegetable garden. In the center is the
and parents may refuse to participate in the school remainder of the churchyard and the church. On the
exercises. These exercises were prescribed as part of north side is an old cemetery and the base of what
the curricular activities of students who are required was once a tower. The Prov. Board imposed a tax on
by law to attend school and held in school buildings the whole land.
under the supervision and participation of teachers
employed in those schools. ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal.

RULING: YES, the establishment clause was violated. RULING: NO. The exemption in the payment of the
The establishment clause prohibits a state land tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the
from placing official support behind the tenets of one religious entities refers to the home of the priest who
or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause presides over the church and who has to take care of
guarantees the right of every person to freely choose himself in order to discharge his duties. It therefore
his own course with reference to religious training, must include not only the land actually occupied by
teaching and observance, free from any compulsion the church but also the adjacent ground destined for
from the State. the ordinary incidental uses of man.
The test in determining whether a legislative Except in large cities where the density of
enactment violates the Establishment clause which the population and the development of commerce
withdraws all legislative power respecting religious require the use of large tracts of land for buildings, a
belief or the expression thereof, is the PURPOSE and vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the case
the PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. If either is of a convent, its use is limited to the necessities of
the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the the priest. Therefore, which comes under the tax
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as exemption.
circumscribed by the First Amendment. To withstand As to the lot which was formerly the
the strictures of the establishment clause, there must cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect is it used for commercial purposes and, accdg to the
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. evidence, is now being used as a lodging house by the
The place of the Bible as an instrument of people who participate in religious festivities. The
religion cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly so same constitutes an incidental use in religious
where the State's recognition of the pervading functions. It also comes within the exemption.
religious character of the exercise is evident from the
rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the 6. Public aid to religion
Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a
recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the The payment or use of public money or
exercises, none of those factors being consistent with property for any religious institution or clergy is not
the contention that the Bible is used either as an allowed; except in those cases provided in the
instrument for non-religious moral inspiration or as a Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP, penal
reference for the teaching of secular subjects. institution, government orphanage, or leprosarium.
[Art. VI, Sec. 29 (2)]
5. Tax exemption
But in Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937), the
Art. VI, Sec. 28. xxx SC held that the stamp printed by the government
(3) Charitable institutions, churches, showing the map of the Philippines with a rosary to
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic
mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, Congress to be held in Manila did not violate the Non-
buildings and improvements, actually, directly, and Establishment clause because its main purpose, was
exclusively used for religious, charitable or to call the world's attention to Manila as the site of
educational purposes shall be exempt from an international congress, and whatever benefit it
taxation. gave the Catholic Church was only incidental.

The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v.
Provincial Board, 51 Phil. 352 (1927) is modified to
the extent now that the property must be "actually, Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937)
directly and exclusively" used for religious purposes
to be exempt. F: The petitioner, Mons. Aglipay, Head of the
Phil. Ind. Church, sought to restrain respondent
If not for religious purposes, educational purposes. Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
stamps commemorative of the 33rd International since the national anthem and recite the patriotic
Eucharistic Congress. The Director issued the stamps pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept. Order No.
under the provisions of Act 4052 which appropriates 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag
public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
the stamps. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of
the stamps was done in violation of the Constitutional ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a
provision that no public money or property shall be religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be
appropriated for the use, benefit or support of any expelled from school (both private and public), for
sect or religion. refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take
part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by
ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable. a band) or singing the Phil. National Anthem, saluting
the Phil. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
RULING: NO. Act 4052 contemplated no religious
purpose in view. What it gave the Director of Posts HELD: NO.
was the discretionary power to determine when the The idea that one may be compelled to salute
issuance of special postage stamps would be the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
advantageous to the government. patriotice pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
The purpose in issuing the stamps was to being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled
advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
this country. The officials concerned merely took generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill
advantage of an event considered of international of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech
importance to give publicity to the country and its and the free exercise of religious profession and
people. The stamp contained a map of the Philippines worship.
and the location of Manila, and an inscription as xxx
follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic xxx Forcing a small religious group, through
Crusade." What was emphasized was not the event the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
but Manila. that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
It was obvious that while the stamps may be conducive to love of country or respect for duly
said to be inseparably linked with an event of a constituted authorities.
religious character, the resulting propaganda received xxx
by the Roman Catholic Church was merely incidental The sole justification for a prior restraint or
and was not the aim and purpose of the government. limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a
In Ignacio v. Ela, supra, the dissenting opinion character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil
of Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor to public safety, moral, health or any other
disapproved the application for a permit not so much legitimate public interest, that the state has a right
because he was afraid that breach of peace would and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to public
ensue but because he wrongly though the kiosk safety, the expulsion of the pets. from the schools is
should be used for public purposes only and not for not justified.
religious purposes. When the Jehovah's Witness xxx
members use the public squares, they are no Although petitioners do not participate in the
different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in
who use the street: that they are performing external acts or behavior that would offend their
religious acts is only incidental. So long as the use of countrymen who believe in exercising their love of
public property is only incidentalally and temporarilly country through the observance of the flag
for religious purposes and so long as the use is such as ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the
to be reasonably compatible with the use to which ceremony to show their respect for the right of those
other members of the community are similarly who choose to participate in the solemn
entitled, then the non-establishment clause is not proceedings. As there is no disruption, expulsion is
violated. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the unwarranted.
public facility compatible with general use? (2) Is However, if they should commit breaches of
the resulting benefit to the religious group only peace by action that offend the sensibilities, both
incidental. religious and patriotic, of other persons, the school
authorities have the power to discipline them.
B. Free Exercise Clause

1. Flag Salute Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
US 624 (1943)
Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of
Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993) F: The State Board required public school pupils
to salute the flag of the United States while reciting a
Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to pledge of allegiance under penalty of expulsion
salute the flag. entailing liability of both pupil and parents to be
proceeded against for unlawful absence. Appellees,
F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, consider the
expelled from their classes by the public school flag as a graven image which they are forbidden to
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag,
salute under their religious beliefs. The State asserts society, for in so doing, it would impair its free
the power to condition access to public education. exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship, as well as its right to disseminate religious
ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid. beliefs.

RULING: NO. 3. Exemtion from union shop
In connection with pledges, the flag salute is
a form of utterance. It requires an affirmation of a Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54
belief and an attitude of mind. It is now a (1974)
commonplace that censorship or suppression of
expression of opinion is tolerated by the Constitution F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the
only when the expression presents a clear and Elizalde Rope Factory. In 1962, he resigned from the
present danger of action of a kind the State is respondent labor union on the ground that the Iglesia
empowered to prevent and punish. Here the power of ni Kristo of which he is a member prohibits union
compulsion is invoked without any allegation that membership. As the union demanded his dismissal
remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a from employment pursuant to a closed shop
clear and present danger that would justify an effort agreement, Victoriano brought this action for
even to muffle expression. injunction. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from
To sustain the compulsory flag salute, we are the closed-shop contracts members of religious sects
required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
individual's right to speak his mind left it open to labor organization. The union appealed.
public authorities to compel him to utter what is not
in his mind. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of
The Court applies the limitations of the association. It does not impair the obligation of
Constitution with no fear that freedom to be contracts for not only are existing laws read into
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary contracts in order to fix the obligation of the parties
will disintegrate the social organization. To believe but the reservation of essential attributes of
that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic sovereign power is also read into such contracts.
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of Neither does the law constitute an establishment of
a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering religion. It has been held that in order to withstand
estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free objections based on this ground, the statute musr
minds. have a secular purpose and that purpose must not
directly advance or diminish the interest of any
2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines religion. Congress acted merely to relieve persons of
the burden imposed by union security agreements.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386
(1957) 4. Disqualification from local government
office
F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and
sale of bibles and religious articles. The City Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978)
Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise F: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected
without securing the necessary license and paying the mayor of Albuquerque, Bohol. A petition was filed
requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance. against him on the basis of section 2175 of the
Plaintiff protested against this requirement as Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase
constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal
It claimed that it is not engaged in business which office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons
necessitates the securing of a license as it never receiving salaries from provincial funds, or
made any profit from the sale of its bibles. contractors for public works." The CFI dismissed the
petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election
petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of Code.
petitioner's right to free exercise of religion.
HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Seven
HELD: YES. The power to tax the exercise of the justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative.
privilege is the power to control or suppress its Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of religious test on the exercise of the right to run for
religious practice can make its exercise so costly as public office contrary to Art. III of the 1935
to deprive it of the resources necessary for its Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section
maintenance. It is true that the price asked for the 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. Five
religious articles was in some instances a little bit justices held that section 2175 is constitutional.
higher than the actual cost of the same, but this
cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
for profit. The mark up can only be treated as
contributions by the faithfuls to the religious cause. Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order considered in the light solely of the constitutional
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
impaired except in the interest of national to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is
security, public safety, or public health, as may be appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
provided by law. powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In
Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980) that context, such request or demand should submit
to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
Right to travel the President to determine whether it must be
granted or not.
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito
Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus
proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a
certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case,
Salonga v. Madella, the case became moot and
academic. The present petition is likewise moot and
academic. In the motion to dismiss filed by the
Solicitor General, it was stated that the certificate of
eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner.
Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that
this Court may be faced again with the same
situation, it is desirable that respondent Travel
Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to
avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be
subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. The
freedom to travel is one of the most cherished. xxx

Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760
(1989)

F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition
asks the Court to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. The case for
petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right
of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the provisions of the Constitution
respecting one's liberty of abode and right to travel.
Respondents argue the primacy of the right of the
State to national security over individual rights.

RULING: The right involved in this case is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries
or within the Philippines. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a
totally distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to
travel.
The right to return to one's country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is the Court's well
considered view that the right to return may be
considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law, and under our Constitution, is part
of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the Intl. Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e. against being arbitrarily
deprived thereof.
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be

Constitutional Law II Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Constitutional Law II Reviewer

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Constitutional Law II Reviewer

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Constitutional Law II

guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus

expropriation, or question the amount of payments

The State shall regulate the relations

accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda.

whom the warrant is sought. Without probable

there was general chaos and disorder at that time

Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) 6. Exclusionary Rule

the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself

something to the male person. Pat. Pajilan together

person making the arrest has personal knowledge of

w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. A few days

on the presence of his initials on the marked bills,

and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be

two waived their right to remain silent and to

process to secure the attendance of witnesses and

Though there is no direct evidence to

In this spirit, the Court ordered the

In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the

immunity that the State must grant in order to

We apply the rule in Rolando A. de Guzman v.

one alleged in the first information, but also that the

RULING: YES. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law, as

A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees

The inclusion of the right to unionize in this

Abington School District v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203

You might also like