The Fault (S) in Negligence Law: Alan Calnan

WORKING PAPER NO.
0712
THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW
Alan Calnan
SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL

November 1, 2007
This paper can be downloaded without charge on Southwestern Law School’s website:
http://www.swlaw.edu/faculty/faculty_listing/ssrn
and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=478971
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW

By Alan Calnan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern tort law has a familiar theoretical structure. That structure

has enjoyed formal recognition since the 1930s, when the first
Restatement of Torts arranged all torts into three divisions. Division
One collects intentional torts,1 Division Two addresses negligence2 and
Division Three includes theories of absolute or strict liability.3 Although
there are an untold number of specific tort actions, every tort is grounded
in one of these three concepts.
As the Restatement made plain, the law’s tripartite structure is
subject to an additional theoretical distinction. All torts are either fault-
based or fault-free. Intentional torts and negligence are actionable
because they are wrongful.4 Strict liability activities, by contrast, are
actionable irrespective of the actor’s innocence.5
Such line-drawing rests upon and reinforces two key assumptions.
First, the fault-based theories of negligence and intentional torts are
fundamentally different from and mutually exclusive of the theories of
strict liability. Second, while both negligence and intentional torts
require proof of fault, negligence – which operates on an objective
standard of care – is nevertheless inherently distinguishable from the
subjective theories of intentional tort law.
Although all of tort’s theories are essential to this structure, the true
lynchpin here is the theory of negligence. Negligence sits at the
conceptual midpoint of the liability continuum, separating the subjective
fault of intentional torts from the no-fault of strict liability. Negligence
*
Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. My thanks to Southwestern Law School for
funding this project with a summer research grant.
1. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 1–280 (1934) (entitled “Intentional Harms to
Person, Land and Chattels”).
2. See id. §§ 281–503 (entitled “Negligence”).
3. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 504–524 (1938) (entitled “Absolute Liability”).
4. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 21-23 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER] (explaining the fault basis of tort law).
5. See id. at 22, 32, 534-38 (explaining the policy basis of the no-fault theory of strict
liability).
101
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 102
also identifies the four conceptual elements – duty, breach, causation and
harm – inherent in all torts.6 Finally, negligence “owns” the standard of
evaluation – reasonableness – which often appears in the other torts and
always provides the negative benchmark for the theories of strict
liability.7 Thus, if something is wrong within the law of negligence, the
entire structure of the tort system would surely be cast into doubt.
Currently, neither negligence law nor the paradigm of which it is a
part arouse much suspicion. Indeed, the American Law Institute
(“ALI”), which has begun reconsidering tort law’s “basic principles”8
and has already revised specific sections of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, has only tinkered with negligence law 9 and has completely
refused to review the law’s tripartite structure, seemingly accepting it as
indisputable truth. Thus, unless something changes, tort law’s current
paradigm soon will be perpetuated for use by future generations of
lawyers.
This, I believe, would be a mistake. Even a general survey of
negligence law reveals numerous glaring problems of
mischaracterization, misunderstanding, and misfit. Ironically, the
mischaracterization and misunderstanding problems surround the very
concept of tortious fault. Relying on a notion of moral culpability,
negligence often seems to condemn some innocents – like the mentally
disabled – while exonerating some wrongdoers – like those who refuse
to provide easy aid to people in distress.10
The misfit problems are more technical, though no less substantial.
They suggest that negligence law is both over- and under-inclusive. On
the one hand, negligence contains a number of doctrines – like
6. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 2-3 (2d ed.
2002) (describing these elements as the “four elements of any cause of action in tort.”).
7. Strict liability, in essence, is liability that attaches despite the exercise of reasonable
care.
8. This portion of the Third Restatement already has gone through several drafts. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (DISCUSSION DRAFT) (1999);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
(TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1) (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) (TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2) (2002).
9. Early debates have centered on specific doctrinal issues, like the role of duty, the
definition of reasonableness, and the nature of causation. These issues were addressed in a
symposium held at Vanderbilt Law School on September 15-16, 2000. See John C.P.
Goldberg, Symposium, The John W. Wade Conference on the Third Restatement of Torts, 54
VAND. L. REV. 639 (2001) (providing a summary of the issues addressed in the symposium).
10. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 376 (“Such decisions [rejecting a duty to rescue] are
revolting to any moral sense.”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur11 – that impose a form of strict
liability, or at least liability without affirmative proof of fault. On the
other hand, negligence fails to capture many other intentional tort and
strict liability doctrines – like necessity and product defectiveness – that
clearly turn on the “negligence” concept of reasonableness.12
This article will explore these and other anomalies in an effort to
evaluate the remaining strength of the current paradigm and the depths
of its structural, theoretical and substantive crises.13 In Part II, I examine
the idea of tortious fault, exposing its ambiguities and demonstrating its
conceptual and explanatory inferiority to the concept of reasonableness.
14
Then, in Part III, I show specifically how a classical-liberal conception
of reasonableness better accounts for “hard” negligence cases like those
11. In a res ipsa case, the mere happening of the accident provides circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s negligence. See Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893
(7th Cir. 1967) (holding that the circumstances of a plane crash were enough to sustain a
negligence claim against the defendant-airline). In cases of negligence per se, fault is
presumed from the violation of a statute or regulation. See Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 117
N.E.2d 74 (Ill. 1954) (holding that evidence that a taxi driver left the key in the ignition of his
taxi, in violation of a statute, was sufficient to hold his employer liable for damages caused
when a thief stole the cab and crashed it into the plaintiff’s vehicle).
12. On the relationship between reasonableness and the necessity privileges of
intentional tort, see DAN C. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 249 (2000) (“The privilege [of
private necessity] can only be invoked when the defendant is threatened, or reasonably
appears to be threatened, with serious harm and the response is reasonable in light of the
threat.”); and id. at 251 (“To invoke the privilege [of public necessity] the actor must show
that (a) public rather than private interests are involved, (b) he was reasonable in believing
that action was needed, and (c) the action he took was a reasonable response to that need.”).
On the relationship between reasonableness and product defectiveness, see id. at 980-81, 987
(noting that the risk-utility test used to determine product defectiveness is the substantial
equivalent of the analysis used to determine negligence).
13. A paradigm cannot be eliminated unless another stands ready to take its place, and a
new paradigm cannot commence without completely destroying its predecessor. As Thomas
Kuhn has noted, “[t]he decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision
to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both
paradigms with nature and with each other.” Id. at 77. In other scholarship, I have begun to
explore the viability of such an alternative paradigm of tort law. See Alan Calnan, Anomalies
in Intentional Tort Law, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 187 (2005).
14. I have examined the concept of reasonableness, and the related notion of justice, in
previous scholarship. See ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT LAW: FROM
HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM (2005); ALAN CALNAN, JUSTICE
AND TORT LAW 2, 7, 23-26, 32, 64 (1997) [hereinafter CALNAN, JUSTICE]; Alan Calnan,
Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 SW. U. L.
REV. 577, 586-87 & nn.30, 31, 32 (1998). Since reasonableness is so essential to the theory
of negligence, which in turn is so crucial to the field of tort law, a certain amount of repetition
is inescapable here. Thus, those already familiar with my work may want to proceed directly
to Part III. For all others, Part II provides a lengthy enough summary to make further
“outside” reading unnecessary.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
involving mental incapacity and the failure to provide easy aid to others.
Having revealed negligence’s substantive dysfunction, I next turn to its
theoretical and structural deficiencies. In Part IV, I first take on tort
law’s fault matrix, arguing, in dramatic opposition to the modern view,
that negligence and intentional torts are essentially indistinguishable in
both substance and procedure. Thereafter, in Part V, I look beyond the
fault matrix to the concept of strict liability, only to find many of its
characteristics comfortably hidden within the law of negligence. I shall
conclude by suggesting some of the ramifications of these findings.
II. FAULT & REASONABLENESS
The affinity between negligence and fault is one of the most basic
truths in tort law. Indeed, the latest edition of Black’s Law Dictionary
includes a cross-reference to “Negligence” in its definition of fault,15 and
at one time listed “Negligence” as fault’s primary connotation. 16 In
many cases, the two concepts do bear remarkable symmetry. However,
contrary to popular belief, they are not coextensive. Negligence is based
on reasonableness, not fault. In some cases, unreasonable conduct is not
faulty at all; in others, fault implies more than unreasonableness seeks to
convey. I will elaborate on this claim in three steps. After discussing
the unique nature of fault, I will identify the conceptual essence of
reasonableness. Later, in the next Part, I will point out some of the
scenarios where the two concepts part company.
A. The Nature of Fault
The term “fault” carries a lot of baggage. The Oxford English

Dictionary17 lists ten separate definitions for fault, many dating back to
the sixteenth century. Excluding entries with a specialized connotation,
there are at least five meanings which have general application. These
are: (1) a deficiency; (2) a default, failing or neglect; (3) a defect or
imperfection; (4) something wrongly done, including a misdeed,
transgression or offense, and a slip, error or mistake; and (5) the
responsibility for an untoward occurrence. 18 Webster’s New World
College Dictionary19 offers four relevant definitions for fault: (1) “the
15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (7th ed. 1999).

16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (6th ed. 1990).
17. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 508 (1995).
18. See id.
19. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 517 (4th ed. 2001).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
failure to have or do what is required” – a lack of something; (2)

“something that mars the appearance, character or structure” – a defect
or failing; (3) “something done wrongly” – a misdeed or offense, or an
error or mistake; and (4) “responsibility for something wrong”” – blame.
The legal connotations of fault are equally plentiful. The sixth
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary provides a diverse array of
definitions, including the following: (1) “negligence; an error or defect
of judgment or of conduct”; (2) “any deviation from prudence, duty, or
rectitude”; (3) “any shortcoming, or neglect of care or performance
resulting from inattention, incapacity, or perversity”; (4) “a wrong
tendency, course, or act”; (5) “bad faith or mismanagement”; (6)
“neglect of duty”; (7) “breach of a duty imposed by law or contract”; or
(8) “an act to which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming or
culpability attaches.” 20 Black’s 21 seventh edition condenses these
definitions into a couple of information-packed entries. According to
this version, fault is either “[a]n error or defect of judgment or conduct,”
or “any deviation from prudence or duty resulting from inattention,
incapacity, perversity, bad faith, or mismanagement.”22
After sorting through the redundancies, and doing some synthesis, a
central principle emerges. Fault, in essence, is the deviation from a
standard, or at least the conclusion that a standard has been violated. It
can apply to people, identifying character flaws or deficiencies in those
with substandard values. Or it can apply to things, identifying defects or
imperfections in objects which fail manufacturing or performance
standards. It can describe acts, including mistakes and misdeeds which
violate personal and social standards of behavior. Or it can describe
omissions, involving defaults, failings or any neglect of an affirmative
standard of care. It may even cover choices, identifying defects of
judgment or mismanagement that violate a standard of efficacy. Or it
can cover motives like perversity or bad faith that transgress moral or
religious standards of decency.
Yet despite its broad reach, there is one thing that fault lacks. It
provides no intrinsic or uniform standard of evaluation. While fault
identifies deviance, it offers no measuring rod of its own. Fault simply
declares abnormality wherever it exists; it does not decide what is
normal in any given context. Because fault can attach to any standard, it
is tied to no standard in particular. From a jurisprudential standpoint,
20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (6th ed. 1990).

21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
22. Id. at 623.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
this indeterminacy has several deleterious consequences.

First, fault can have unlimited normative bases. Indeed, there is
virtually no end to the standards that might be used to judge human
events. On a broad philosophical scale, one could base liability on
values ranging from morality to economics. Depending on the
prevailing standard, fault might mean violating a social norm or merely
failing to act efficiently. Within the realm of morality, several other
possibilities remain. In a pluralistic society, fault could be linked to a
variety of norms ranging from liberalism to communitarianism. Thus,
fault might consist of affirmatively infringing the liberties of others, or
simply failing to act benevolently on their behalf. Even here, different
standards could be used. One could adopt a purely subjective standard
defined by the actor’s own intentions and values. 23 Or, fault could be
defined by an objective standard, like a social custom, a political
platform or a religious commandment.24 Because the concept of fault
neither prefers nor excludes any of these alternatives, it cannot clarify
the legal standard of liability. In fact, to the extent that it carries
connotations at odds with the chosen standard, it can actually make that
standard less clear.
Second, no matter what standard is used, fault imbues it with a
universal character. A faulty act is faulty regardless of its consequences.
For example, throwing a rock at a defenseless child would be faulty even
if the child were not struck. In fact, such an act would be offensive not
just to the intended victim, or to others in the line of fire, but to every
law-abiding member of the actor’s community. In this case, and others
like it, the judgment of fault is both unilateral in focus and boundless in
scope. It is unilateral because it fixates on the actor and her act, and is
not dependent upon their impact on the world. It is boundless because it
can be made by anyone within the same value system. Fault merely
searches for standards violations, not victims, and it places no
23. Subjective fault determinations are personal. For example, to orthodox Jews, eating
nonkosher meat is morally faulty; to others it is not. To dictators, government criticism is
politically faulty; to democrats, it is a protected act of self-expression and political
prerogative.
24. Objective fault assessments are based on group norms. These norms can be shared
by just a few people or by nearly everyone. For example, virtually all societies and cultures
condemn acts of murder and incest. See Roe v. Butterworth, 958 F. Supp. 1569, 1577 (S.D.
Fla. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Murder, robbery, extortion, bigamy, incest,
theft, and many other crimes have been committed since before histories were recorded. Yet,
because societies considered them destructive, immoral, indecent, or generally evil, they have
all been prohibited at one time or another.”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
restrictions on who can do the looking.25

Finally, fault is relentlessly moral and personal. It does not just
describe standards violations, it actively condemns them as wrong. In
many cases, a judgment of fault carries strong moral overtones. Thus, a
faulty actor is not merely a nonconformist, but more of a social deviant.
This instinct is heavily influenced by fault’s usage. While fault
identifies deviance of any sort, it openly condemns deviance in human
transactions and relationships.
In fact, this moral conception of fault has a long history in tort law.
In medieval England, torts were considered both crimes and sins. 26
Many offenders were not tried, but were subject to battles and ordeals.27
In these rituals, God decided guilt or innocence. Later, as such practices
waned, litigants and witnesses swore oaths in religious ceremonies.28 In
colonial America, laws were backed by biblical citations.29 As late as
the seventeenth century, local codes punished moral indiscretions like
gaming, idleness, lying, fornication and drunkenness.30
Eventually, religion lost its grip on the law. However, the concept
of fault did not. To this day, courts, commentators and jurors continue
to equate fault with moral indiscretion.31 This does not mean that fault is
a dangerous idea. However, it does mean that “fault” is a loaded term.
Thus, if “fault” is to have a place in the lexicon of tort law, we must be
careful about how we use it and cognizant of the impact it can have upon
determinations of civil liability.
25. Because of its universality, fault is a perfect fit for the criminal justice system,
where the state, on behalf of the general public, seeks to punish every wrongful act it can find.
However, fault’s value is less obvious in tort actions, where private parties seek compensation
for specific injuries inflicted upon them by their neighbors. In this context, the concept of
fault can both confuse the issue of responsibility and control the determination of liability.
26. See ANDREW MCCALL, THE MEDIEVAL UNDERWORLD 25-26 (1979).
27. See id. at 53-63.
28. See id. at 54.
29. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 70 (2d ed. 1973).
30. See id. at 72-73.
31. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME 16-17 (2000) (“[J]urors see doing justice in
the accident case as the proper response to a morality play . . . in which the good guy triumphs
precisely to the extent that the bad guy gets his or her comeuppance.”); ERNEST J. WEINRIB,
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (arguing that tort law is founded on Aristotle’s theory of
corrective justice and Kant’s theory of abstract right); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility
in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (arguing that much of tort law is based on John
Rawls’ first principle of justice).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
B. The Nature of Reasonableness
Reasonableness suffers from the same sort of definitional ambiguity

as fault. It can be a deliberative process conducted in accordance with
reason, 32 a decision-making mindset which strives toward sound
judgment, 33 or any condition or state of affairs that is fair, logical or
moderate.34 Despite it elusiveness, reasonableness, too, can be boiled
down to a single basic idea. At bottom, reasonableness is a standard of
evaluation. It allows us not only to assess and weigh our own choices,
but also to judge the choices of others.
As a standard, reasonableness invariably dovetails with fault. Since
fault is the deviation from any standard, any deviation from the standard
of reasonableness necessarily will be faulty in some sense. But
reasonableness is only one of many standards within fault’s domain. An
unreasonable act is not automatically faulty in the sense that it is
immoral. Nor does it always carry a stigma of personal culpability.
Reasonableness has its own unique sources, scope and character, and
these features set it apart from all other conceptions of fault.
1. The Source and Values of Reasonable Laws

The ultimate source of reasonableness is reason. Reason is both an
intellectual faculty for making decisions, 35 and a process by which
conclusions are logically drawn from premises. 36 Thus, reason is
exclusive and prescriptive. On the one hand, reason excludes passion or
prejudice as a basis for decision-making. On the other hand, it requires
that decision-making be deliberative, informed and logical.
In law, reason has two functions: identifying the principles of
justice, and applying these principles in a manner that is just. Each
process is governed by norms that arise from values embedded within
the legal community and the community-at-large. A law or act is
reasonable only if it comports with these values. Obviously, as values
change, the concept of reasonableness will change with it. But there is
no denying that values dictate reasonableness, and reason dictates that
laws protect these values.
32. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1250 (1996) (“reasonable,” entry
adj. 2).
33. See id. (entry adj. 1).
34. See id. (various entries).
35. See id. (“reason,” entry n. 3).
36. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 1250 (1996) (n. 1).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
In American culture, freedom and equality are the values which

inform our sense of right and wrong. Thus, unlike the concept of fault,
which can have unlimited normative bases, the American concept of
reasonableness is inexorably tied to these foundational values. In earlier
works, I explained how these values substantiate American tort law.37
Thus, I will not belabor the point here. Nevertheless, to truly appreciate
the gaps between reasonableness and fault, a brief synopsis is in order.
Tort law is a mechanism for distributing freedoms to people both
before and after their lives intersect.38 Freedoms are secured by rights
and duties. Rights protect freedom; duties take freedom away. Rights
give their holders the power to limit the freedom of others. Duties
identify the specific individuals who are subject to these powers.
Tort law distributes rights and duties in accordance with the
concept of distributive justice. 39 Distributive justice does not require
absolute equality. Rather, it requires only that benefits or burdens be
allocated according to a predetermined ratio.40 The ratio allows some
parties to receive more freedom than others. Nevertheless, the scheme is
reasonable so long as the criteria used to establish the ratio are fair, and
the ratio is faithfully observed every time a new distribution is made.
In tort law, need and risk are the criteria by which rights and duties
are distributed.41 Both criteria derive from the values of freedom and
equality. Some people are in great jeopardy of losing their freedom or
are incapable of protecting it. Vulnerable parties in imbalanced
relationships fit this description. The need criterion gives these parties
extra latitude to secure their interests. 42 Other people exploit their
freedom by engaging in extraordinarily risky activities. Drunk drivers
and blasters are apt examples. The risk criterion distributes stricter
duties (freedom restrictions) to these parties as a means of neutralizing
their advantage. While the criteria permit variations in freedoms, their
37. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 2, 7, 23-26, 32, 64; Calnan, supra note 14,
at 586-87 & nn. 30, 31, 32.
38. See Calnan, supra note 14, at 587-88.
39. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 85-98, 127-29, 168-69, 182-87, 208
(discussing the distributive nature of tort law); see also Calnan, supra note 14, at 587-601
(elaborating on this idea).
40. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 150-53 (J.E.C. Welldon, trans.,
Prometheus Books 1987).
41. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 88-89, 128; Calnan, supra note 14, at 590.
42. Specifically, they may force their counterparts to take affirmative measures to
protect them from harm. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 857 (2000) (“The Restatement
recognizes five kinds of formal relationship that require the defendant to use reasonable care
for the plaintiff’s safety, including reasonable affirmative efforts to rescue.”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
ultimate collective objective is to return all parties to a state of equality.

So long as the law abides by this premise, its rules will be considered
reasonable, even though they do not always treat everyone the same.
2. Legal Limits on the Duty of Reasonableness

If the law is reasonable, then any act which violates the law is
necessarily unreasonable. 43 Unreasonable conduct may come in two
forms, depending on the type of law it transgresses. Some acts are
presumptively unreasonable. Such behavior typically violates a rule of
proscription. Proscriptive rules identify acts or activities that are
socially suspect no matter how carefully they are carried out. 44
Intentional tort duties fall into this category. They prohibit behavior
which is calculated to inflict harm on others. Because such conduct is
inherently blameworthy, these duties are broadly drawn and universal in
scope.45 They apply to all who engage in this behavior, and they protect
everyone endangered by it.
Negligent acts are different. They are not automatically
unreasonable. Rather, they are unreasonable only because of the
circumstances in which they are committed. As a result, tort law does
not ban such behavior. It regulates it with a standard of ordinary care.46
The duty to follow this standard is limited in scope. It neither
condemns every culprit nor protects every victim. Instead, it dispenses
responsibilities in a highly personal and episodic manner. It arises when
the actions of one party place others in undue danger, or when the
relationship among parties gives one an unfair advantage over the others.
In short, the duty of reasonable care is a product of risks and relations.
Relationships are formed by consent or by operation of law.47 In
consensual relationships, the parties establish their own unique set of
responsibilities, while in legal relationships, the state predetermines the
parties’ obligations. In each type of relationship, the duties of care are
restrictive. They cover only certain persons and certain things. If one
party to the relationship harms a protected interest of another, her breach
43. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 145 (“The law-breaker being . . . unjust and the
law-abiding just, it is clear that whatever is lawful is in some sense just; for such things as are
prescribed by legislative authority are lawful, and all such things we call just.”); CALNAN,
JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 129.
44. CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 165-66.
45. See id. at 167.
46. See id. at 177-78.
47. See id. at 179-80. “Legal” relationships include those between parent and child and
between state and prisoner.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
is both faulty and actionable. However, if she inflicts a loss beyond her
relational responsibilities, she is neither negligent nor liable, even if her
conduct is morally blameworthy.
Risk implies relation of a different sort. Action breeds risk. When
action is self-contained, risk is purely a private matter. However, when
action takes place in the outside world, risk becomes a matter of public
concern. The actor’s freedom invades the freedom of her victim. The
two become tangled in a web of conflict. Here, risk is the thread that
ties their lives together.48
Because risk is potentially oppressive, every risk-creator is
obligated to control it. 49 However, risk does not just create
responsibility, it also limits its scope. To control risk, one must have an
ability and opportunity to take precautions. The power to control risk, in
turn, is determined by knowledge or knowability. One can control risk
only if she actually knows about it or is capable of discovering it through
reasonable investigation.
Risk also identifies specific duty beneficiaries and activates their
rights to protection.50 Duties and rights are correlative. Every tort duty
is connected to someone else’s right to enforce it.51 These right-holders
remain anonymous until the risky activity begins. At that time, a
foreseeable zone of danger is created. Only parties who fall within the
danger zone are entitled to care and respect; those outside it are not.
Once the class of duty beneficiaries is known, risk activates their
rights to respond. In some cases, they may take preemptive action to
stop the threatening conduct.52 In others, they may regulate the manner
in which such acts are performed.53 In still others, they must wait and
seek compensation if the act later results in injury.54 Though prodigious,
these powers are ephemeral and unique. They come and go as
circumstances change and can never be enforced by anyone else.
Negligence law is grounded on these principles. The duty to
exercise reasonable care is not unlimited. It is owed only to people
endangered by the defendant’s conduct. These individuals alone accrue
48. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 48.

49. See id. at 92-93.
50. See id. at 95-96.
51. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 62; Calnan, supra note 14, at 594.
52. Preemptive measures like self-defense generally are reserved for the prospective
victims of intentional torts. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 24, 168-69.
53. Nuisance claimants can obtain injunctions to force adjacent property owners to
change the way that they conduct their activities. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 24.
54. This is the conventional “corrective” remedy of tort law. See CALNAN, JUSTICE,
supra note 14, at 24-25.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
a right to expect protection. If that expectation is violated, they alone

enjoy a power to take defensive or remedial action. Should the risk
result in injury, they alone may cry foul. For these unfortunate few, the
act is faulty. For everyone else in the world, it is a matter of personal
indifference.
This is the lesson of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,55 still
the best explanation of the duty-risk relationship. In Palsgraf,
employees of a railroad attempted to assist a passenger onto a moving
train. 56 In doing so, the employees caused the passenger to drop a
package onto the rails below. 57 Unbeknownst to the employees, the
package contained fireworks. 58 The fireworks exploded when the
package hit the ground.59 The blast knocked over a free-standing scale
at the end of the railway station platform. 60 The scale struck the
plaintiff, causing her injury. 61 The plaintiff sued the railroad for the
negligence of its employees.62 The trial court entered a judgment for the
plaintiff and the Appellate Division affirmed.63
The New York Court of Appeals took the case to clarify the
railroad’s duty. Judge Andrews, writing in dissent, argued that the
railroad’s duty was universal.64 It extended from the boarding passenger
to the plaintiff and even beyond.65 According to Andrews, if the railroad
committed any sort of negligent act, that act would be “a wrong not only
to those who happen to be within the radius of danger, but to all who
might have been there – a wrong to the public at large.”66
The majority, however, adopted a narrower view. Speaking on
their behalf, Judge Cardozo noted that “[n]egligence . . . is . . . a term of
relation.”67 The concept that establishes this relation is risk. According
to Cardozo, the duty of the railroad was limited by the orbit of
foreseeable risk created by its employees.68 This zone of danger also
determined who was entitled to protection. To sustain her claim, the
55. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co ., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 225 N.Y.S. 412 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927).
64. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101-03.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 102.
67. Id. at 101.
68. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
plaintiff had to prove that she fell within this danger zone.
Unfortunately, she could not. Although the employees could have
foreseen that they might dislodge the passenger’s package, nobody
expected that they would injure a bystander thirty feet away. Thus,
concluded Cardozo, even if this conduct was “a wrong in its relation to
the holder of the package, [it] was not a wrong in its relation to the
plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at
all.”69
Negligence is not just relational, it is inherently bilateral as well.
This truth limits the notion of tortious fault in two additional ways. It
means (1) that conduct is not faulty unless it produces wrongful
consequences, and (2) that these consequences can be redressed only by
the person who created them.
Every tort case involves a clash of interests. The concept of
corrective justice both describes the nature of this conflict and
determines how it is to be resolved. Corrective justice requires the
rectification of wrongs. 70 A wrong is a disturbance in the moral
equilibrium between two or more people. When such a disturbance
occurs, the perpetrator receives a wrongful gain and the victim incurs a
wrongful loss. Corrective justice loathes this imbalance. It negates the
perpetrator’s gain and redresses the victim’s loss.71 However, it does not
attack each deviation separately. Subjugation is part of the perpetrator’s
gain. Oppression is part of the victim’s loss. One cannot be defined
without reference to the other. Thus, corrective justice cannot come
from outside of the parties’ relationship, but must come from within.72
To restore balance to this relationship, the perpetrator must surrender to
the victim what she has taken, and the victim must take back from the
perpetrator what she has lost.
Corrective justice gives the concept of reasonableness its distinctive
bilateral dimensions. Because corrective justice requires a wrongful
gain and loss, one cannot characterize conduct as unreasonable without
considering both its culpability and its consequences.73 If A leaves a
roller skate on the sidewalk, her conduct may be antisocial or even
morally culpable, but it is not unreasonable to B ten blocks away. Since
B suffers no loss, A’s conduct is not a personal affront. Even for her
69. Id. at 99.

72. See id. at 601-02.
73. See CALNAN, supra note 14, at 62-63.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
neighbors, A’s oversight is not unreasonable unless and until it invades

one of their legally protected interests. Thus, only pedestrians who
actually slip on the skate may sue to negate their losses and deny A the
benefits of her carelessness. Those who pass safely by have no loss to
redress and therefore no standing to haul A into court to take away her
gains.
Corrective justice determines not just whether an act is
unreasonable but also who may be found responsible for that act. In the
above example, the injured neighbor may not sue another homeowner
who happened to leave a skate on a different sidewalk in a different
community. Granted, the other homeowner’s behavior may have been
faulty. It may even have injured another passerby. But it would not be
unreasonable to the person bringing the action. 74 Because each
transaction is morally unique, rectification for the victim’s loss must
come from the party who caused it. As far as the victim is concerned, no
other person is really a wrongdoer, and no one else can truly repair the
moral imbalance that results from their encounter.
3. Unreasonable Behavior
Reasonableness does not just impose formal constraints on the law
and legal duty; it also establishes behavioral guidelines for personal
conduct. In this context, fault typically implies a strong sense of moral
culpability. However, reasonableness does not necessarily carry either
innuendo. In many cases, unreasonableness is a kind of social or
political fault. Although such conduct may be wrongful, it need not be
damnable. Rather, it is wrongful in the moral sense of being unfair.
The link between reasonableness and fairness is of ancient origin.
In his Nicomachean Ethics,75 Aristotle describes fairness as a mean of
equality between two or more persons. Unfairness results when one
person receives more, and another less, than she deserves. 76 Such
unfairness might occur in distributions, as where the state unequally
allocates civil benefits and burdens. Or, it might occur in transactions,
as where one party takes goods from another. In the latter scenario, the
resulting deficiency does not itself suggest blame. The taker is
responsible for an imbalanced transaction only if she acts unfairly to
create it.
74. See id.

75. ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 150-51, 155.
76. Id. at 153.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
For Aristotle, responsibility requires human agency, and agency

requires volition. Aristotle defines volition as that which “is in a
person’s power, and is performed by him knowingly.”77 While power
establishes the agent’s ability to impact others, knowledge gives her the
opportunity to exercise that ability. Together, power and knowledge
create a freedom of choice. Those who abuse that freedom are blamed.78
Those who lack that freedom are pitied or pardoned.79
Aristotle does not equate volition with deliberation. Even
unintentional acts can be unjust if they bring about preventable
inequalities. Mistakes fit this description. Although mistakes are always
committed in ignorance, 80 ignorance itself can be culpable or
excusable.81 As Aristotle notes, “we punish people[] whenever it seems
that their ignorance was due to carelessness; for they had it in their
power not to be ignorant, as they might have taken the trouble to inform
themselves.”82
Because of its magnitude, fairness cannot be reduced to specific
rules. Aristotle does not even try. Instead, he concludes his remarks
with two general observations. In the abstract, fairness is justice
determined by right reason.83 In practice, fairness is a standard of care
determined by a prudent man.84
These observations form the basis of the modern standard of
reasonable care. Although timeless in its dimensions, reasonableness
has been adapted to suit liberal sensibilities. As informed by liberalism,
reasonableness uses rights and duties to fairly distribute freedoms and
freedom restrictions. Thus, anytime a person breaches a duty of
reasonable care, she necessarily takes more freedom than she is due. If
she causes harm in the process, she also interferes with the freedom of
someone else. Such conduct is unfair and unreasonable even if it is not
morally reprehensible.
Indeed, every negligent tortfeasor is guilty of a double-cross. She
cheats her victim by taking the latter’s interests without consent or
compensation. But she also cheats her fellow citizens by doing things
that they have restrained themselves from doing. In many cases, these
77. Id. at 169-70.

78. See id. at 66.
79. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 66.
80. See id. at 171.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 83.
83. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 55, 86.
84. See id. at 55.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
acts are deserving of condemnation. But, as we shall see below, in some

hard cases they are simply unfair, and thus unreasonable, without being
faulty in the popular sense of that word.
III. NEGLIGENCE’S HARD CASES
Although fault is more pejorative than unreasonableness, most

unreasonable conduct displays some form of fault. Reckless acts like
drunk driving are certainly both unreasonable and morally offensive.
Even simple acts of forgetfulness, like leaving a pack of matches in
reach of a child, might earn both epithets if tragic consequences result.
However, these concepts are not always shades of the same color.
Sometimes they are as different as black and white. In fact, their
disjunctions underlie some of negligence law’s most important and
controversial doctrines.
Two doctrines are especially infamous. The no-duty-to-rescue rule
appears to excuse from the reasonableness standard conduct that
generally is considered morally repugnant. Conversely, the standard of
care for the mentally incompetent seems to condemn as faulty behavior
that is uncontrollable, involuntary or even innocent. Yet these doctrines
are not unexplainable. While they are irreconcilable within the fault
matrix, they are surprisingly coherent within the realm of
reasonableness.
A. The No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule
The no-duty-to-rescue rule says that people are not required to

rescue others in distress.85 Thus, someone who fails to offer aid cannot
be held civilly liable if the victim later succumbs to the danger. This
liability exemption applies no matter how grave the risk facing the
victim, and no matter how simple, easy and safe the rescue opportunity
for the bystander.86
To most people, the no-duty-to-rescue rule seems clearly at odds
85. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 853.

86. The Second Restatement illustrates the point:
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching
automobile. A could prevent B from doing so by a word or touch without delaying
his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no duty
to prevent B from stepping into the street, and is not liable to B.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 illus. 1 (1965).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
with the concept of fault.87 Instinctively, it feels wrong to stand idly by

as another human being suffers harm. This instinct could be rooted in a
number of possible sources. Most societies embrace values of
benevolence and altruism.88 Most religions preach good samaritanism
and denounce selfishness.89 Whatever their source, our sensibilities tell
us that one who fails to rescue others is herself morally deficient.
If moral fault were the appropriate standard of analysis, the no-
duty-to-rescue rule would rest on shaky ground. However, it is this
standard, not the rule, which is out of kilter. Tort law is based on
reasonableness, not fault. Unlike fault, which merely signifies deviance,
reasonableness is a standard of evaluation. To be sure, reasonableness
helps us evaluate conduct to determine whether it is worthy of praise or
condemnation. However, this is not its only function. It also helps us
evaluate the law itself. In judging the law, reasonableness requires that
we take a broad view, taking in all of its principles and doctrines. It also
requires that we examine the law’s objectives and values. When this is
done, two truths become apparent. First, the no-duty-to-rescue rule is
not a rule at all. Rather, it is an exception to a broader liability principle.
Second, this principle is not unreasonable. In fact, it goes as far as the
law’s values will permit.
87. See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 33-36 (1988) (arguing for duty to rescue based upon a feminist ethic of caring);
Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. Rev. 673, 677 (1994)
(offering a theory for a general duty to rescue); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 250 (1980) (arguing that the law should impose a duty of "easy"
rescue).
88. See WILLIAM CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN JAPAN 98-99 (Lexington, Mass ed.,
Lexington Books 1976) (noting that an ethic of altruism is deeply embedded in Japanese
culture and firmly established in practice); LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, THE BYSTANDER:
BEHAVIOR, LAW, ETHICS 39-42 (Lexington, Mass ed., Lexington Books 1978) (describing the
altruistic ethic which prevails in Asia); F.J.M. Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A
Comparative Survey of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J.
COMP. L. 630, 655-57 (1966) (listing the European countries that recognize duties to aid).
89. See George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1,
37 (1999) (noting that idea of helping others “is integral to most religions, including Judaism,
Islam, and Christianity.”). See also Roger Bern, A Biblical Model For Analysis of Issues of
Law and Public Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and
Public Policy Issues, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 124 (1995) (explaining the Christian ethic of
good samaritanism); Anne Cucchiara Besser & Kalman J. Kaplan, The Good Samaritan:
Jewish and American Legal Perspectives, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 193, 211 (1994) (noting that
Jewish law supports a duty to aid).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
1. The Rule is the Exception

Although tort law does not impose a duty to rescue, it has long
recognized a duty to cooperate. This duty is not active, but passive. It
allows distressed parties to take property from, or inflict injury upon,
unwitting or unwilling bystanders. In turn, it requires bystanders to
succumb to such incursions. The duty here is one of passive sacrifice,
not affirmative assistance. Yet the effect is the same. Withholding aid
is tortious unless excused. Under this perspective, liability is the rule,
no-liability the exception.
The duty to cooperate is evident throughout intentional tort law. In
cases of self-defense, the imperiled party is entitled to use whatever
force is necessary to stop an aggressor in her tracks.90 However, her
entitlement does not stop there. She also may commandeer the interests
of innocent bystanders. For example, a party claiming self-defense may
endanger or even injure a passerby. The only limit is that she act
reasonably under the circumstances. 91 In this situation, the passerby
cannot recover damages for her harm. Instead, she must sacrifice her
interests for those of the privilege-holder.
The privileges of public and private necessity are even more
demanding. Private necessity allows a party in imminent danger of
losing her own property to appropriate, use or destroy the property of
someone else, even if the owner contests the taking. 92 The public
necessity privilege gives similar powers to private citizens who seek to
avoid or end public catastrophes.93 In each case, the persons subject to
90. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 162 (“Many courts . . . traditionally permit the use of
deadly force to counter deadly force without any general requirement of retreat.”).
91. These are cases of “transferred defense.” In essence, the defendant’s privilege of
self-defense is transferred from the attacker to an innocent bystander injured by the
defendant’s response. See Shaw v. Lord, 137 P. 885, 886 (Okla. 1914) (holding that a person
who fires a weapon in self-defense is not liable to a bystander struck by the bullet); Goodrich
v. Morgan, 291 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) (noting that a person who fires a gun
in self-defense is not liable for an injury to a bystander unless she is guilty of negligence).
92. See Commercial Union Assurance Co., v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 220 Cal. 515, 520
(Cal. 1934) (holding that a property owner may save his own property at the expense of
another’s if she acts reasonably under the circumstances); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §197 (1965) (allowing a party to enter or remain on another’s land if she reasonably
believes it necessary to prevent serious harm).
93. See Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 70 (Cal. 1853) (holding that a defendant who
destroyed the plaintiff’s house to prevent the spread of fire was not liable for the loss); S.D.
Dep't of Health v. Heim, 357 N.W.2d 522, 524 (S.D. 1984) (holding that, "[t]he hazard to
human health, welfare and safety created by the . . . elk herd was of sufficient gravity to
require its abatement for the protection of the general public . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §196 (1965) (“One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
these privileges cannot resist the intrusion. They are obligated to

surrender their goods to alleviate the exigency. Should they fail to do
so, their obstinacy may itself be punished as a tort.
The 1908 case of Ploof v. Putnam94 provides an apt illustration of
this ancient principle. In Ploof, bad weather forced a ship owner to
moor his boat to the defendant’s dock without the latter’s permission.95
Unmoved by the ship owner’s plight, the defendant untied the boat and
allowed it to drift into the storm.96 Ultimately, the boat ran aground,
causing it to sustain damage.97 In the ship owner’s action against the
defendant-dock owner, the court upheld the ship owner’s right to moor
his vessel to the dock, even in the absence of the dock owner’s consent.98
In doing so, however, the court also recognized the dock owner’s duty of
cooperation.99 Because of the emergency, the defendant could not resist
the encroachment to his dock.100 Instead, he was obligated to step aside
and accede to the ship owner’s wishes.101 Whether he liked it or not, the
dock owner became a cooperative assistant to the ship owner’s plan to
save his boat.102 Although the dock owner did not have to secure the
boat himself, he was obliged nevertheless to aid the ship owner by
adopting a position of passive noninterference.103
The duty to cooperate also shows up in negligence law. Its most
notable hide-out is the emergency doctrine. Under this doctrine, a
person caught in an emergency has great powers. She may take all
reasonable measures to secure her safety, including any which may have
the unintended effect of harming innocent bystanders. These bystanders,
by contrast, have virtually no choice but to submit to the invasion, and
no recourse afterwards.
This principle is best illustrated by the casebook classic, Cordas v.
Peerless Transportation Co.104 In Cordas, a cab driver was accosted by
an armed robber. To save his life, the cabby jumped from his taxi while
if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purposes of averting an imminent
public disaster.”).
94. Ploof v. Putnam , 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908).
95. Id. at 188-89.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Ploof, 71 A. at 189.
103. Id.
104. Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co ., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. City Ct. 1941).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
it continued in motion.105 The abandoned vehicle eventually rolled onto

a crowded sidewalk, where it struck a mother and her two infant
children. 106 The mother brought a negligence action against the cab
company, but the case was summarily dismissed.107 The court based its
decision on the cabby’s reduced standard of care.108 Noted the court:
“[t]he law in this state does not hold one in an emergency to the exercise
of that mature judgment required of him under circumstances where he
has an opportunity for deliberate action.”109
However, behind the court’s words lay an unstated, correlative
principle. Emergencies do not just lower the imperiled party’s
responsibilities, they also heighten the duties of those around them. For
the Cordas plaintiffs, this burden did not require disabling the armed
criminal in the cab. But it did require that they sacrifice some of their
freedom. Specifically, it forced them to relinquish their security, and
even their bodily integrity, for the good of a citizen in distress.
2. The Reasonableness of the Rule

As this discussion demonstrates, the idea of a tort-based duty to
cooperate is not controversial. The real controversy is over how that
duty is triggered. In the scenarios noted above, the imperiled party
triggers the duty through her own defensive action. Under a “good
samaritan” rule, that duty would be triggered by risk. Although the risk
must pose a clear and present danger to the victim, it may come from
any source. It might be created by the victim herself, by some third
party, by force majeure or by any combination of these factors.
However, it need not, and in most cases will not, be tied to the proposed
rescuer. The question is whether such an undifferentiated risk, by itself,
provides a sufficient basis for assessing legal liability.
Like most of the law’s foundational issues, the answer to this
question lies in the concept of reasonableness. Since reasonableness is
value-driven, the duty to cooperate could not be justified on instinct
alone. Rather, it would have to be validated by concepts of distributive
and corrective justice.110 To date, no one has succeeded in marshaling
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Cordas, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 201-02.
109. Id. at 201 (quoting Kolanko v. Erie R.R. Co., 212 N.Y.S.2d 714, 717 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1925)).
110. Distributive justice controls the state’s relationship to the public. Specifically, it
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
this support. And for good reason. Instead of promoting the morality of
tort law, an affirmative duty to cooperate actually undermines its
sustaining principles.
Distributive justice has four requirements. First, there must be an
authorized giver. Second, there must be an authorized receiver. Third,
there must be something to distribute. And fourth there must be a
legitimate reason, like need or risk, for the receiver to receive the
distributed item.111
In many distributive scenarios, the state is the giver and some group
of citizens is the receiver. Welfare programs fit this description.
Because of its representative authority, the state possesses an inherent
power to distribute. 112 As long as the recipient group qualifies for
special treatment, the resulting distribution enjoys the stamp of
legitimacy.
In a tort case, however, both the giver and the receiver are private
parties. Although the state creates the rules, the plaintiff dispenses the
burden of liability. And although others may violate the rules, the
defendant alone must bear its weight. Here, the status of the parties
raises special concerns. Because private parties have no inherent
regulatory authority, they may not invade the interests of others without
a special license to do so. By the same token, people typically are not
required to donate money or service to their neighbors. Thus, they need
not make such sacrifices unless there are good distributive reasons for
requiring their beneficence.
In a typical emergency scenario, the imperiled party is in danger of
losing her property, her bodily integrity or her life. Thus, she clearly
qualifies for special treatment under the law. Because she is in need of
determines how the state may regulate the freedoms of its citizens. Corrective justice, by
contrast, applies only to private relationships. In particular, it provides standards for
determining when one private party may interfere with the freedom of another. When a tort is
committed, these concepts overlap. The state uses tort law to regulate the harmful behavior,
but delegates to the victim the power to enforce its regulatory agenda. To prevent
overreaching, both distributive and corrective justice place restraints on this power.
112. There is little doubt that the state itself has the authority to force people to act on
behalf of others, even complete strangers. Under the social contract theory, citizens expressly
or impliedly agree to duties of altruism enacted by their elected representatives. Alternatively,
the principle of unjust enrichment suggests that since citizens enjoy the benefits of political
association they cannot selectively disavow its burdens, including the occasional burden of
social sacrifice. Even the liberal harm principle may favor duties of altruism if the harm to
liberty created by those duties is considered less severe than the overall moral, political and
personal harm resulting from the desperate acts of people in need of basic welfare goods like
food and shelter.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
protection, distributive justice permits her to take defensive action. To

activate this license, the state grants her regulatory authority. In doing
so, it turns a private party into a deputy attorney general. Equipped with
privileges of self-defense or necessity, this private regulator has the
power to force her peers to sacrifice their interests for her own.
In this situation, the imperiled party determines who will receive
the burden of sacrifice. Indeed, by exercising her privilege, she hand-
selects her rescuers.113 In many cases, however, the privilege-holder will
have neither the time nor the opportunity to react. Thus, there will be no
predetermined helpers. If someone is to bear the burden of rescue, the
state must designate the appropriate receiver.
To make the right selection, the state must find some reason for
picking certain bystanders over others. Since the rescue duty is
obligatory, the selection criterion must comport with common sense
notions of responsibility. Obviously, responsibility may mean different
things to different people. However, all connotations share at least one
common feature: human agency.
Generally speaking, agency is an active force which has an impact
on the world.114 In a tort case, agency is conduct that poses a threat to,
or has an untoward effect upon, another person or thing. Either way, the
concept of agency has normative dimensions. First, it is distinctive.
Although everyone acts, each act is a unique combination of motive,
movement and circumstance. And while every act has a consequence,
no two consequences are ever exactly the same.
Second, agency is relational. Since every act has an effect, agency
establishes an unmistakable link between the two. Thus, when an act is
directed against another human being, it forges a special bond between
the actor and the person acted upon.
Finally, in light of its relational character, agency is both moral and
113. However, the imperiled party makes this selection at her own risk. Since people
lack any inherent coercive authority, the decision to harm is presumptively wrongful. To
overcome this presumption, the imperiled party must prove that her conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances. We already saw examples of this above. Both the privilege of self-
defense and the emergency doctrine excuse harmful conduct that is reasonably calculated to
end an imminent threat of serious bodily harm. Here, the risk to the privilege-holder’s
interests overrides the competing interests of the bystander. Where the privilege-holder’s
stakes are lower, reasonableness adjusts accordingly. In cases of private necessity, the
privilege-holder is permitted to take a bystander’s property in order to protect her own.
However, this privilege is not absolute. To avoid an unjust enrichment, reasonableness
requires that the privilege-holder pay for her power of usurpation.
114. See WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 25 (4th ed. 2001) (defining
agency as “1 active force; action; power 2 that by which something is done; means;
instrumentality”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
political. Because action is a manifestation and projection of the agent’s

will, any harmful act is susceptible to praise or condemnation. And
since agency is a power to impose one’s will on another, the agent stands
out as a perennial threat to the equality and freedom of her fellow
citizens, and to the stability and order of the social system.
In an emergency situation, a bystander does not have to create the
original danger to be responsible for the victim’s injuries. It suffices if
her conduct has some influence over the victim’s fate. There are
basically two ways that this might happen. First, she might enter into a
relationship with the victim before the emergency develops. Here, she is
not a bystander at all; rather, she is part of the problem. By assuming a
protective status, she lulls the victim into a false sense of security. In
some cases, as in landlord-tenant relationships, she places the victim in a
risk environment that she alone controls. In most cases, the landlord
induces the tenant to forgo other opportunities for protection. In every
case, she becomes the tenant’s caretaker. If the landlord lets down her
guard, the building becomes vulnerable to intruders. If the tenant is
attacked, the assailant is not the only culprit. The landlord also shares in
the blame. Indeed, as the gatekeeper to the tenant’s safety, the landlord
is a co-agent in her loss.
The other way a bystander may incur responsibility is by
intervening after an emergency arises. As a bystander, she is an
observer. But once she gets involved, she becomes an active agent in
the outcome. This may occur directly – say, by moving the victim’s
body and aggravating her injuries. Or, it may occur indirectly – perhaps
by inducing the victim to give up other rescue options or discouraging
other rescuers from offering help. Either way, the bystander turned
agent leaves her unmistakable imprint on the tragedy.
Not coincidentally, these agency-based circumstances already
trigger duties to aid. These duties constitute the only two exceptions to
the general rule. 115 One exception is for undertakings. 116 When
someone undertakes to aid another, she incurs an obligation not to make
the situation worse. If she breaches this duty, the law holds her
responsible for mucking things up.117 The other exception is for special
115. The defendant also may be held liable if she fails to rescue the plaintiff from a peril
that she (the defendant) helped to create. Here, the defendant’s agency is unmistakable. See
DOBBS, supra note 12, § 316.
116. See id. §§ 319, 320, 321.
117. A party who undertakes to help may breach her duty to rescue in three ways. She
may increase the danger facing the prospective victim. See id. at 861-62. She may cause the
victim to justifiably rely on the undertaking to her detriment. See id. at 862-64. Or, she may
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
relationships. 118 When a special relationship is formed, the caretaker

assumes responsibility for the safety of her charge. If she shirks this
responsibility, the law makes her pay for the effects of her dereliction.
This is as far as the law may go. Without proof of agency, the duty
to rescue would become nothing but a game of chance. Liability would
depend not on causal responsibility or fault, but on random factors like
proximity, fortuity, and physical strength. Those close to an emergency
would have to help. However, those farther away could mind their own
business. People carrying cell phones might be expected to get
involved. However, those unequipped could remain incommunicado.
While hearty adults might be drafted into service, the weak, infirm and
youthful would be free to walk away. In each case, the assignment of
responsibility would be based on circumstances beyond the assignee’s
power of control. Misfortune would trigger the need for action, but luck
would determine the duty to act.119
When the state allocates benefits to the public, luck and need may
serve as appropriate distributive criteria. One who, through no act or
fault of her own, happens to fall on hard times deserves state largesse.
However, when the state distributes burdens to fund such a scheme, it
uses criteria other than random chance to identify potential contributors.
Typically, all but the most disadvantaged are required to pay into the
system. But within the general population, some citizens usually are
asked to contribute more than others. In most cases, wealth and ability
to pay serve as the distinguishing criteria. Granted, some people may
attain this status by sheer luck, but many do not and ultimately the
manner in which they become well-off is not the reason they are
selected. They are selected because they have a greater ability to bear
the burden of giving, and their sacrifice limits their freedom less than
discourage assistance by other potential rescuers. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 381.
118. See DOBBS, supra note 12, § 317.
119. Luck seems to determine the fate of certain bystanders. As noted previously, an
imperiled party may take defensive measures to protect her interests. On some occasions, she
may accidentally injure an innocent bystander. If the reaction is reasonable, the bystander
must bear the loss. Still, this passive duty to sacrifice is far different from an affirmative duty
to rescue. Unlike the duty to rescue, which imposes a continuous burden of care, the duty to
sacrifice is episodic only. It does not follow the bystander wherever she goes. Rather, it
arises only when some desperate party forces her to get involved. Moreover, unlike the rescue
duty, which is imposed by the state in the abstract, the duty to sacrifice is imposed by private
persons responding to real risks and a primal instinct for survival. Finally, unlike the rescue
duty, which is nonnegotiable, the duty to sacrifice openly recognizes the bystander’s right to
protect her own interests. Indeed, if the opportunity permits, the bystander herself may take
reasonable steps to deflect the impending encroachment. As a result, the sacrifice here is less
fortuitous and more voluntary than the burden of affirmative rescue.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
those with fewer assets.

In the tort system, too, victims may be injured by chance, but their
injurers’ liability is never a matter of luck. Instead, the burden of
liability is based on the fair distributive criterion of risk. This criterion
not only fails to support a duty to rescue, it actively opposes such an
obligation. The reason is that bystanders do not create risk. Risk
already exists. Nor do bystanders impose risk upon others. Someone or
something else does that. Unless the bystander stands in a special
relationship with the victim, she does not even influence the victim’s
risk environment. In this situation, the risk criterion has nothing to
regulate. As long as the bystander remains uninvolved, her inactivity is
not a threat to freedom. Rather, it is an appropriate exercise of her own
freedoms of self-determination and self-protection.120
Risk does not just create duties, it also activates rights. Absent a
preexisting relationship, people generally have no right to inject
themselves into the lives of their neighbors. Freedom, at its core,
implies a right of privacy. This right includes the power to keep
intruders out. Risk breaks down these barriers. When one party places
another in danger, their lives become intertwined. Here, risk establishes
an ad hoc relation.
By creating risk, the actor ties a jeopardy hook to a responsibility
line and latches it onto her potential victim. Once hooked, the victim
may seize that line to regulate the actor’s behavior. Because bystanders
create no risk, they cast no line of responsibility. Thus, an imperiled
party has nothing to grasp. Except for her fortuitous presence at a
particular place for a brief moment in time, the bystander is just like any
other stranger to the victim’s world. Indeed, the only thing the two have
in common is their humanity.
This connection, however, is innate, not transactional. Since
humanity is a characteristic held by all, the duty to rescue would extend
to the public at large. Such a duty would be social, not personal. As
such, it could not support a tort action. Unless the parties are linked by
risk or relationship, the victim has no right to impair the bystander’s
freedom, and the state has no authority to give the victim that power.
If the rule was otherwise, and bystanders were obligated to
intervene, the risk criterion would condemn it as unjust and
120. This “freedom” can also be a duty. A person who causes, aggravates or fails to
mitigate her damages may be held responsible for all or part of her loss. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 3, 8 (2000). In this sense, the law
imposes a duty to protect one’s interests from unreasonable, unnecessary or voluntary risks.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
unreasonable. As mentioned above, the risk criterion aims to eliminate

excessive risk from social transactions. In so doing, it must balance
several interests, including the security interest of each party to the
transaction and the state’s interest in maintaining peace and order.
Conceivably, a tort-based duty to rescue could compromise all three of
these interests.
First of all, by forcing heroic efforts, the rule subjects rescuers to
risks that they would not otherwise confront. A rescuer might be
entrapped by a criminal feigning distress. If she lends physical
assistance, she might sustain physical injuries during the emergency.
Or, by immersing herself into a traumatic event, she may suffer a
lifetime of psychological trauma. Even if she merely phones 911, or
shouts for help, she may become the immediate object of attack. Or, she
might become the victim of a later act of retaliation. In any event, she
exposes herself to enormous legal jeopardy. Since both emotions and
stakes run high in emergencies, the good samaritan may eventually find
herself in court, even if she does the best that she can under the
circumstances.
At the same time, the rule may actually increase, rather than
alleviate, the risks confronting imperiled parties. In cases of direct
assistance, an unskilled, frantic or overzealous rescuer may aggravate
the victim’s injuries or cause her to sustain an entirely new harm. Where
there is an ongoing altercation, the rescuer’s intervention might enrage
or provoke the attacker. As a result, an otherwise controlled aggressor
may turn to violence, or an already aggressive attacker may increase her
use of force. In any case, the rescuer may simply make a mistake,
injecting herself into the lives of those who do not need or want her
assistance.
Finally, such a rule jeopardizes the interests of the state. By
requiring intervention, the rule increases the number of people who must
interact. It also turns up the heat in the pressure cooker in which they
are thrown together. In short, a duty to aid does not just change the
dynamics of private crises. It threatens to turn simple skirmishes into
full-blown breaches of the peace, and minor crises into major
catastrophes.
The duty to rescue fares no better under the concept of corrective
justice. Corrective justice is a mechanism for undoing private wrongs.
It empowers one who has suffered a wrongful loss to take action to
redress it. However, it also places limits on this power. It allows
recovery only against the person who caused the loss, and only if that
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
party has reaped a wrongful gain from their encounter.

Unfortunately for people in peril, innocent bystanders do not meet
either of these criteria. As noted above, proximity is not agency. A
witness to an event is no more a cause of that event than those unaware
of its occurrence. Unless the witness has precipitated or exacerbated the
event, or has inhibited its safe culmination, she is not a player in the
victim’s saga. Rather, she is merely part of the stage on which it
unfolds.
Given her detachment, the bystander receives no benefit from the
victim’s loss. Indeed, for many bystanders, the event will be
psychologically damaging. For others, it might be a matter of complete
indifference. But it certainly is no advantage. Because the bystander
does not act, she takes nothing from the victim. Moreover, because the
bystander and victim are unrelated, the bystander owes her no personal
debt of service. Thus, her inaction is not a gain in the sense that it is a
withheld benefit.
Absent the existence of a wrongful loss and gain, and a causal
nexus between the two, corrective justice provides no support for the
victim’s call for assistance. In fact, because of the bystander’s
neutrality, any attempt to coerce her help might itself amount to a
wrongful infringement of her autonomy.
The no-duty-to-rescue rule is just one part of a larger liability
scheme that promotes the values of freedom and equality. Imperiled
parties are free to defend their interests, even to the point of injuring
bystanders. Bystanders are free to protect their interests, even to the
point of ignoring imperiled parties. If an imperiled party chooses to
defend herself, she is bound to exercise reasonable care. If a bystander
chooses to protect others, she is held to the same level of caution.121
Should the imperiled party sustain injury, she may sue the person who
created the emergency. Should a rescuer succumb to the danger, she
may bring a similar action of her own.122 Together, these rules ensure
121. Once a bystander endeavors to help, she must do so reasonably. If she fails to meet
this standard, she may held liable for injuries caused by her negligent assistance. See Malloy
v. Fong, 232 P.2d 241, 247 (Cal. 1951); see also United States v. DeVane, 306 F.2d 182, 182
(5th Cir. 1962) (holding that the decision to undertake or abandon rescue is discretionary,
"[b]ut having undertaken the rescue and engendering reliance thereon, the obligation arose to
use reasonable care in carrying out the rescue.").
122. This protection is provided by the rescue doctrine. “The basic precept of the
‘rescue doctrine’ is that the person who has created a situation of peril for another will be held
in law to have caused peril not only to the victim, but also to his rescuer, and thereby to have
caused any injury suffered by the rescuer in the rescue attempt.” New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Oliver, 730 So. 2d 700, 702 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
proportionality and balance. Each party enjoys a right of self-

actualization, yet neither party holds a power of oppression.
Of course, different values might yield different rules. 123 If
Americans lived by an ethic of altruism, the duty to rescue would fit
right in. Mutual assistance would be both a legal right and a moral
obligation. However, unless and until our values change, balancing
freedoms remains the law’s main objective. In some situations, as in
cases of emergency, this may make the law seem immoral. Since the
law imposes no duty to rescue, it permits bystanders to make bad
choices. Yet by extending such deference, tort law does not necessarily
sacrifice its morality. Rather, it prioritizes its moral principles, placing
123. Those who favor a duty of easy rescue see it as a rather trivial exception to a
general rule of responsibility. Although the duty may restrict certain freedoms, it generally
complements the standard of reasonable care. See John M. Adler, Relying Upon the
Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law
Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 914-16. Under this view,
the duty requires no wholesale value change. Rather, it is ready for immediate
implementation.
This view misunderstands tort law’s essential nature. Tort law is founded on a competitive
framework. Under that framework, people are entitled to pursue their own ideals of
happiness. To achieve that goal, each person must enjoy a freedom of action. However, as
people exercise their freedoms, their paths will often cross, and their interests clash. For
example, the freedom of the speeder competes with the freedoms of other motorists who wish
to travel in comfort and safety. To level the competition, the law must accord each person the
freedom to protect or defend her own interests. In such a system, duty proceeds from action.
The actor who creates risks or forms relationships is bound to exercise care. These acts, in
turn, forge personal connections between the actor and other freedom-holders. When an actor
behaves negligently, she breaks these bonds, and assumes an unfair advantage in the
competition. When her negligence causes loss to others, it imposes upon them unfair
disadvantages, and activates their rights to redress. Tort law restores the integrity of the
competition by returning the parties to the starting line.
The duty to rescue does not fit within this framework. It creates duty without action. It
allocates responsibility without risk or relationship. It grants claim-rights without personal
connection. It shifts consequences without causation. It assigns blame without overreaching.
Instead, it bases duty on inaction. It equates responsibility with humanity. It fashions claim-
rights from social ties. It shifts consequences by proximity. And it finds fault in under-
loving. Such a scheme does not just alter the rules, it changes the whole nature of the game.
A brief analogy makes this clear. Both football and baseball are competitive sports. Each
team goes on the offensive to accomplish an objective. Each team has a chance to defend
against its opponent. Both must obey rules designed to keep the match fair. If one changed
the rules – say, by adding an extra down or a fourth strike – each game would remain
substantially the same. The manner of playing would vary but both sports would continue to
be competitive. However, if one changed the objectives – for example, by requiring better
teams to affirmatively assist their opponents – each sport would be radically transformed.
Rather than being competitive contests, each would become an exhibition of altruism. The
change evoked by the duty to rescue is on this same order of magnitude. To accommodate it,
tort law would have to do more than simply rearrange its liability principles. It would have to
shift from a paradigm of competition to a paradigm of cooperation.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
the core principle of freedom above all others. Seen in this way, the no-
duty-to-rescue rule is not an abhorrent aberration, but rather a model of
corrective and distributive justice – and nothing could be more moral, or
more reasonable, than that.
B. The Standard of Care for Mental Incompetents
Unlike the no-duty-to-rescue rule, the mental incompetent

standard’s connection to reasonableness is, in one sense at least, more
obvious. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, mental incompetence is
a condition marked by “an essential privation of reasoning faculties.”124
Such a person “is incapable of understanding and acting with discretion
in the ordinary affairs of life.” 125 Thus, all deranged conduct is
unreasonable per se. Although it may not be depraved,126 it necessarily
lacks the essential attributes of reason.127
The state can respond to such “unreasonable persons” in one of two
ways. It can change the “normal” standard of care to account for their
incapacity, or it can leave the standard as is and hold them liable each
time they fail to comply. The majority of courts have chosen the latter
alternative. 128 The resulting rule is reminiscent of strict liability. It
disregards the actor’s inculpability and forces her to act at her own peril.
In another sense, however, the reasonableness of the mental
incompetent’s standard remains in doubt. In fact, to some
commentators, the standard seems downright unfair, especially when
contrasted with the child standard which adapts to accommodate the
cognitive limitations of youth. 129 In reality, however, the mental
124. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 986 (6th ed. 1990).

125. Id.
126. In many cases, mental incompetence is congenital. In others, it may arise from a
tragic accident or traumatic event. Either way, the disability is not necessarily the fault of the
person disabled. Moreover, because the incompetent cannot determine what is appropriate,
and is unable to behave normally, her conduct also is not morally blameworthy.
127. Obviously, there are many forms of mental incapacity. Some are permanent, others
are temporary. Some are totally disabling, others merely diminish cognitive function. Some
can be controlled through medication, others are untreatable. By mental incompetence, I
mean an uncontrollable condition which renders its sufferer incapable of understanding or
appreciating behavioral risks that would be apparent to a reasonable person.
128. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 284-85 (“The standard of care applied to an adult
suffering mental impairment or psychological disturbance remains the standard of the
reasonable prudent person of normal intelligence, judgment and rationality.”).
129. “A minor, even an older one, is not required to conduct himself as a reasonable
adult or even as a reasonable child of similar age. The minor is instead required to conduct
himself only with the care of a minor of his own age, intelligence, and experience in similar
circumstances . . . .” See id. at 293.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
incompetent’s rule is just right. Not only is it reconcilable with the child
standard, it actually comports with fundamental principles of justice.
Both the child and mental incompetent standards are consistent
with the concept of distributive justice. The child standard is based on
the distributive criteria of need and risk. The mind of child is like a
blank slate that gradually is filled with knowledge and experience. By
the time a child reaches adulthood, she is expected to possess enough
information to think and act reasonably. In order to acquire this
information, however, she must have the freedom to experiment. The
need criterion gives her this freedom. Kids can get away with things
adults cannot because they need to learn from their mistakes.
The state can afford to extend kids this latitude because they
generally are less dangerous than adults. Kids are smaller, weaker and
less autonomous than grown-ups. As a result, they pose less of a social
threat. Besides causing fewer accidents outside the home, they tend to
inflict less serious injuries. Along with this diminished risk comes less
responsibility. Under the risk criterion, kids are afforded greater
freedom of action because they cannot reciprocate the danger imposed
upon them by their elders.
These concepts apply differently to adults with mental incapacities.
Like a child, the mental incompetent lacks the ability to act like a mature
adult. However, the incompetent’s nonconformity is intrinsic, not
developmental. Unlike the child, whose reasoning faculties are merely
immature, the incompetent’s faculties are inherently flawed. For
whatever reason, the incompetent’s brain cannot analyze risk
information like everyone else. This deficiency does not improve over
time, nor can it be erased through trial and error. The incompetent does
not need, and cannot use, the extra freedom given to children. No matter
how much slack she is given, her conduct will remain both illogical and
unpredictable. Thus, there is no reason under the need criterion for
altering her standard of care.130
Even if such a reason existed, the risk criterion would overpower it.
Though mentally challenged, an incompetent’s physical development
remains unimpeded. Thus, she is just as dangerous as any other able-
bodied adult. In fact, because she does not understand the power she
wields, and may be incapable of controlling it, she presents an even
greater threat to society.
Given that enhanced threat, the law is justified in holding
incompetents to a heightened standard of care. Consider what happens
130. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 183-84.

CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
to children who engage in inherently dangerous or adult activities.

Because such activities are far more risky than childish pastimes, kids
who attempt them are subject to a full adult standard of care.131 For
mental incompetents, excessive danger is not a choice but an everyday
fact of life. Risk follows them wherever they go. In this respect, they
are both “inherently and abnormally dangerous” people. Thus, much
like overly-adventurous children, they are held to the same standard of
“ordinary” care applied to every “normal” adult. Although this standard
is beyond their capabilities, it complies with the criterion of risk. If
anything, it may be too lenient. An extraordinary risk herself, the mental
incompetent could face a duty of extraordinary care.
The child and mental incompetent standards also comport with the
tenets of corrective justice. A child who commits a childish act does not
gain from her negligence, even if she ends up injuring somebody else.
Since the freedom of experimentation is necessary for a child’s
development, the exercise of this freedom is neither exploitative nor
excessive. Rather, it is a fundamental step in the process of social
assimilation which everyone takes early in life.
By contrast, a mental incompetent’s negligence is neither necessary
nor normal. Since her incompetence is unaffected by experience, she
develops no greater rationality by venturing out into the world. Because
her faculties are dysfunctional, she comes no closer to meeting society’s
expectation of safety. Indeed, no matter what she does, or where she
goes, the incompetent remains incapable of showing due care for the
interests of others.
Unlike a child, the incompetent reaps an unfair benefit by
exercising unbridled abandon. Granted, her gain may not be calculated.
Indeed, she may not even realize her advantage. But unless she is held
liable for her conduct, she stands to gain in several ways. First, she
enjoys a freedom of “carelessness” not shared by the more able-minded.
Second, she holds a power of subjugation over her victims, converting
them into unwilling caretakers who must sacrifice their interests for her
own. Finally, she becomes the beneficiary of an obvious double
standard, acting according to her own subjective whim while everyone
else adheres to an objective rule of law. Corrective justice rejects such
favoritism. By calibrating liability to a common standard of reasonable
131. “Most courts . . . now hold that children engaged in certain activities are held to the
adult reasonable person standard of care. Most of the cases have held so when a child was
operating a motorized vehicle, boat, plane, snowmobile or machine.” See DOBBS, supra note
12, at 298 (footnotes omitted).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
care, corrective justice keeps the scales of justice evenly balanced for all.
The fault matrix hides these truths. It equates negligence liability
with moral indiscretion. But if morality were the standard, mental
incompetents frequently would be free of blame. However, the purpose
of tort law is not to distinguish sinners from saints, but rather to resolve
social disputes. To do this, the law implements a social standard of
reasonable care. Mental incompetents, by their very nature, fail to meet
this standard. When they act, they do not just jeopardize themselves;
they endanger the innocents around them. Here, right and wrong are
relational, not abstract, ideas. The law cannot relax the standards for
some without increasing the burdens on everyone else. Nor can it favor
the few without disrespecting the rest. By keeping its objectivity, the
mental incompetent’s standard strikes the appropriate balance between
freedom and security.
In short, the mental incompetent may act without reason, but if her
act leads to injury, her victim is protected against the consequences of
her irrationality. Here, reasonableness is not a behavioral guide. It is a
formula for social accommodation and, in that capacity, an instrument of
justice.
IV. THE SYMMETRY OF NEGLIGENCE AND INTENTIONAL TORTS
Within the theory of negligence – particularly within the hard cases

mentioned above – the modern paradigm of tort law seems incapable of
distinguishing between fault and reasonableness. Between the theories
of negligence and intentional torts, however, that paradigm adamantly
asserts and vigorously defends such a distinction. Intentional torts are
premised on the display of a wrongful subjective intent. Negligence, by
contrast, is founded on the violation of an objective standard of
reasonable care.
Although both theories are grounded in fault, the modern paradigm
categorizes them as fundamentally different concepts. An intentional
tort is never negligent, and a negligent act is never intentional. Of
course, there is some truth in this observation. The way things stand
now, unreasonableness and intent part company at the border of
substantial certainty. But on a much deeper level, the modern
paradigm’s fault dichotomy is both false and misleading. As I will
demonstrate below, intentional torts and negligence display symmetry in
both procedure and substance.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
A. Procedural Similarities
Upon initial examination, negligence and intentional tort theories

seem to have little in common. As noted earlier, a negligence claimant
must prove the four elements of duty, breach, causation and damages. A
plaintiff asserting an intentional tort has different evidentiary
obligations. Specifically, she must prove that the defendant acted
intentionally to bring about some legally forbidden consequence.132 Yet
despite these discrepancies, the two theories bear three important
procedural similarities. They both require proof of facts indicative of
wrongdoing. They both shift burdens of proof when facts or policy
require. And they both adjust fault and harm requirements in accordance
with a principle of inverse proportionality.
The modern paradigm classifies both negligence and intentional
torts as fault-based theories of recovery. This classification, however,
does not necessarily indicate who bears the burden of proof on the
ultimate issue of fault. The plaintiff may have to prove the defendant’s
fault, or the defendant may have to establish her faultlessness. Both
negligence and intentional torts appear to place this obligation on the
plaintiff. A negligence claimant must prove that the defendant owed her
a duty of care, and that the defendant’s conduct breached that duty. An
intentional tort plaintiff, by contrast, must prove only that the defendant
acted with a tortious intent.
In each theory, the plaintiff has the initial burden of coming
forward with incriminating facts. In negligence, evidence of breach
signals unreasonableness; in intentional torts, proof of intent bespeaks
fault. Although these elements of proof may be phrased differently, and
may require different types and amounts of evidence, both theories start
the procedural ball in the plaintiff’s side of the court.
Once the plaintiff offers evidence of fault, each theory also permits
the burden of proof to shift to the defendant. Intentional torts do this as
a matter of course. In civilized legal systems, intentionally harmful
conduct threatens individual liberty, social stability and the rule of law.
Thus, it is automatically suspect. If a claimant can prove that the
defendant acted with a wrongful intent, tort law presumes that she was at
fault. At this point, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that she
was privileged to commit the offending act.
In negligence cases, the shift in evidentiary burdens is more
sporadic. Conduct that is self-promoting, but unintentionally risky for
132. See Calnan, supra note 13, at 199.

CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
others is not necessarily wrongful. Indeed, it may be innocent or even

desirable. Thus, tort law does not presume fault every time an
unintentional act causes someone injury. However, certain unintentional
acts are worse than others. For these acts, negligence law operates in
almost precisely the same fashion as an intentional tort.
For example, under both res ipsa loquitur and negligence per se,
the plaintiff first must prove facts that raise a presumption of
wrongdoing. In res ipsa, there are just two predicate facts: (1) the
incident probably resulted from negligence, and (2) the defendant
probably was the culpable party. 133 In negligence per se, the only
triggering facts are that (1) the defendant violated an applicable statute,
regulation or ordinance, and (2) that violation caused the plaintiff’s
harm. 134 Once the plaintiff satisfies these minimal requirements, the
defendant must produce evidence to rebut the inference that she acted
negligently. 135 If she fails to do so, the plaintiff often may prevail
without presenting any other evidence of fault.136
The procedural similarities between negligence and intentional torts
are not limited to how the burden of proof is allocated between the
parties. Procedural adjustments also take place within the elements of
each theory. Both negligence and intentional torts coordinate
evidentiary burdens in relation to degrees of fault and harm. In general,
the greater the defendant’s fault, the lesser the plaintiff’s proof of harm
will be. Conversely, the greater the plaintiff’s harm, the lesser her fault
burden will be.
This inverse relationship is especially noticeable in intentional torts.
Because tortious intent is so wrongful, an intentional tort plaintiff

134. See id. at 315-16.
135. In some cases, proof of a statutory violation provides mere evidence of negligence.
See Stewart v. Van Deventer Carpet Co., 50 S.E. 562, 564-65 (N.C. 1905) (“The fact of the
accident furnishes merely some evidence to go to the jury, which requires the defendant ‘to go
forward with his proof.’”). In others, it creates a rebuttable presumption. See Zeni v.
Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976) (“[V]iolation of the statute which has been
found to apply to a particular set of facts establishes only a prima facie case of negligence, a
presumption which may be rebutted by a showing on the part of the party violating the statute
of an adequate excuse under the facts and circumstances of the case.”). In still others, it
completely shifts the burden of proof on the issue of negligence. See Jones v. Blair, 387
N.W.2d 349, 352 (Iowa 1986) (once the plaintiff proves a statutory violation, the burden then
shifts to the defendant to prove that his conduct was legally excused). The same three
approaches also apply to res ipsa loquitur. See Sullivan v. Crabtree, 258 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1953) (listing and discussing the three procedural approaches).
136. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 315-16 (“In the absence of a valid excuse, violation
conclusively shows negligence.”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
normally is not required to prove any actual damage. Instead, the law
presumes dignitary or political harm from the mere commission of the
act. Thus, even if the plaintiff was not injured, she is entitled to at least
an award of nominal damages.
In certain intentional torts, however, the configuration of fault and
harm is quite different. For example, a plaintiff who asserts intentional
infliction of emotional distress bears a heightened burden on the issue of
fault. Given the speculative nature of psychic injuries, the plaintiff must
do more than prove intent or recklessness. She also must show that the
defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.137 On the other hand,
if the defendant’s conduct is less serious, the plaintiff is required to
substantiate her claim of harm. For instance, in a trespass to chattel
claim, the defendant merely interferes with the plaintiff’s personal
property. Thus, to warrant the state’s attention, she also must prove the
interference caused her some actual damage.138
Negligence displays this same kind of symmetry. Generally
speaking, unintentional or negligent behavior is less blameworthy than
intentional misconduct. Thus, unlike an intentional tort plaintiff, a
negligence claimant must, as a matter of course, offer proof of her
damages. If successful, the negligence claimant may only receive
compensation for her actual loss; she may not recover punitive damages.
However, things change when the fault-harm balance is tilted too
far in either direction. For example, when the defendant is reckless, the
plaintiff’s damage requirements adjust in one of two ways. In an
ordinary tort case, punitive damages become available. 139 In a
defamation action, damages are presumed. 140 Where damages are
speculative, the plaintiff’s fault burden increases accordingly. For
instance, if the plaintiff sustains only economic loss, she must prove
more than the mere foreseeability of the harm – she must show that the
loss was a highly probable or particularly foreseeable consequence of the
defendant’s act. 141 The same is true in bystander emotional distress
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1) (1965).

138. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 124 (“To establish liability for trespass to chattels, the
possessor must show legally recognizable harm.”).
139. See Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1988) (allowing punitive damages
where the defendant displayed a knowing and reckless disregard for the rights of others);
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268, 283 (Va. 1988) (noting that punitive damages
apply to willful and wanton conduct).
140. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 1192 (“When the plaintiff proves a knowing or
reckless falsehood, punitive damages are constitutionally permissible.”).
141. See People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J.
1985) (holding that mere foreseeability was not enough; instead the plaintiff must prove that
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
cases. Because the loss is hard to ascertain, the plaintiff may not rely on
proof of negligence alone. She must demonstrate, in addition, a strong
probability that such harm would occur.142
These procedural similarities are not coincidental, but are driven by
the law’s strong liberal value system. Liberty means that people have
both the right to act and the right to be free from the harmful acts of
others. Tort cases pit one group of right-holders against another. Tort
law is the instrument used by one group – victims suffering harm – to
inhibit the acts of and to take money from people in the other group.
Where it is not clear that an actor has exceeded her rights, the plaintiff
cannot abridge her freedom without first proving that she did something
wrong. However, where the actor’s conduct seems inherently excessive,
she bears the burden of correcting this misimpression and demonstrating
that she acted within her rights. No matter what her activity, the actor’s
rights will depend on the consequences of her behavior. As acts and
consequences vary, the law’s evidentiary burdens constantly adapt to
strike the appropriate balance between liberty and safety.
B. Substantive Sameness
The fact that negligence and intentional torts are so similar in the
procedural realm admittedly is not enough to reverse the modern
paradigm’s determination to keep them apart. After all, many different
theories display like tendencies, and these tendencies are constantly
changing to suit the needs of the time. The more important
consideration is whether the theories are really different in substance.
Unfortunately, the modern paradigm fails here as well, perhaps to
an even greater extent. As it turns out, intentional torts and negligence
are not different in kind, only in degree. Both theories seek out duty
violations. Both theories base duties on distributive justice. Both
theories use risk and agency to activate duties in specific cases. And
while intent is the marquee concept of intentional torts, both theories
he belonged to “[a]n identifiable class of plaintiffs [who were] particularly foreseeable in

terms of the type of persons or entities comprising the class, the certainty or predictability of
their presence, the approximate numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of economic
expectations disrupted.”).
142. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (rejecting a mere
foreseeability test and requiring proof of the following three elements: (1) the plaintiff is
closely related to the victim, (2) the plaintiff was present at the scene of the event and was
contemporaneously aware that the victim was being harmed, and (3) the plaintiff suffered
severe emotional distress from the event); see also DOBBS, supra note 12, at 841 n.14 (listing
cases).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
premise liability on the transtheoretical concept of reasonableness.

In negligence, duty is a prominent player. It is the first element in
the plaintiff’s cause of action, and the primary vehicle for determining
the defendant’s responsibility. In intentional torts, duty is nowhere to be
seen. Intentional torts do not require proof of a duty, nor do they solicit
evidence of breach. Instead, they focus on the defendant’s intent.
However, the fact that intentional torts eschew the language of duty
does not mean that they are substantively distinct from negligence. It
merely means that in intentional torts, the question of duty is already
decided by, and its resolution is entirely encapsulated within, the
element of intent.
Unlike acts of negligence, intentional misdeeds appear to
demonstrate both a disregard for human dignity and a contempt for the
rule of law. Thus, unless otherwise indicated, everyone always bears a
duty to refrain from intentionally harming others.143 Unlike negligence
duties, which are limited by zones of danger, intentional tort duties are
virtually absolute, immutable and universal. 144 Consequently, the
intentional tort plaintiff never needs to prove that the defendant was
duty-bound to desist from intentional mischief. The duty is subsumed
within the element of intent.
For that matter, so is the notion of breach. If the defendant is
forbidden from deliberately encroaching upon the interests of others, but
does so anyway, the mere fact that she committed the act with the
requisite intent is presumptive evidence of her duty violation. To the
extent that negligence and intentional torts each premise liability on
breaches of behavioral duties, both theories display a significant
substantive likeness.
This likeness is intensified by their common philosophical
foundation. Earlier, we saw how the principles of distributive justice
underlie the doctrines of negligence law, including some doctrines that
are particularly controversial. Generally speaking, negligence duties
conform to the criteria of need and risk. The more freedom one needs,
the more negligence law tends to lighten her duty of care. By contrast,
the more risk one imposes on others, the more the law seeks to regulate
her behavior.
Intentional torts adhere to the same set of principles. The
distributive criterion of risk determines the elementary structure of each

144. See id. at 167.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
intentional tort.145 From both a social and personal standpoint, nothing

is as risky as intentionally other-directed conduct. Because the
intentional actor either desires the consequences of her conduct, or
knows to a virtual certainty what those consequences will be, very little
is left to chance. Unless the actor changes her mind, common sense
suggests that someone somewhere will suffer the effects of her behavior.
Such a high degree of risk warrants a particularly onerous duty of care.
Intentional torts internalize this reasoning by presuming duty and breach
from proof of act and intent.
While the risk criterion substantiates the defendant’s duty of care,
the need criterion affords her a number of possible defenses. Under the
need criterion, a person threatened with serious bodily harm may take
extraordinary measures, including killing her perceived attacker, in order
to protect herself. The same principle supports the privileges of defense
of others, defense of property and public and private necessity. 146 In
each case, intentional tort law gives to people in need the freedom to
safeguard their interests from those bold enough to challenge them.
The duties of negligence and intentional torts are not just similarly
constituted; they also respond to the same substantive catalysts. In
negligence, duties of care normally arise from risk and agency. An actor
who creates risk becomes duty-bound to protect those within the danger
zone. The duties of intentional torts are activated in the same manner.
Although intent is necessary to establish a duty in the abstract, it is not
sufficient to enforce a duty against any particular individual.
For example, a person who devises a plan to kill her enemy
commits no tort simply by harboring that intent. During the planning
stage, her intent poses no immediate threat to her proposed victim.
However, as the schemer begins to implement her plan, the risk to her
victim increases. When that risk becomes imminent, the schemer
becomes vulnerable to her victim’s privilege of self-defense. The victim
may then respond with proportionate force to protect her interests. Or, if
the victim fails to curb the threat, she may demand compensation for her
injuries. Here, as in negligence, the schemer’s mental state merely
signifies her moral perversity. Unless and until she acts on that intent,
she remains free from any civil responsibility.147
Whether one acts intentionally or negligently, the applicable
liability standard remains the same. At first, this sounds anathema.
145. See id. at 168-69.

146. See id. at 169.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
According to the modern paradigm, negligence rests on the flexible

standard of ordinary care. Intentional torts, on the other hand, employ
more rigid rules, like the rule against contacting someone in a harmful or
offensive fashion148 or the rule which prohibits entries onto real property
without the possessor’s consent.149 No matter how the duty is phrased,
however, the breach never changes. The failure to obey a reasonable
law is always unreasonable and unfair.
From the negligence side of things, this proposition is
unremarkable. Since reasonableness is the foundation of the ordinary
care standard, all negligent acts must necessarily be unreasonable.
However, in intentional torts, the reasonableness standard is
conspicuously absent. Thus, if this statement is to be proven correct, the
proof must come from the doctrines of intentional tort law.
The best proof comes from the concepts of intent and privilege.
Since reasonableness requires respect for the interests of others, proof of
an intentionally invasive act creates a presumption of unreasonableness.
If the defendant has an explanation for her behavior, she may offer it to
rebut this presumption. To succeed, however, she generally must show
that her conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Of course, her
defenses are not so simply stated. Instead, they are cast as privileges
like self-defense, defense of others, defense of property, necessity and so
on. Nevertheless, at the core of each defense are long-standing
reasonableness principles that excuse or justify her behavior.150
When the plaintiff’s proof of intent conflicts with the defendant’s
proof of reasonableness, reasonableness always wins. Indeed, the
implicit finding of reasonableness that accompanies a successful
privilege is enough to completely exonerate her of all responsibility.
The fact that she happened to act intentionally becomes immaterial.
Conversely, should the defendant fail to excuse her behavior, the
presumption of unreasonableness created by her intentional mental state
remains unsullied. In this situation, the lingering inference of fault is
powerful enough to hold her liable. Either way, the operative feature of
any intentional tort is not the element of intent, but the universal concept
of reasonableness. The only difference is one of prominence. In
negligence, reasonableness is openly embraced. But in intentional torts,
148. This rule is implemented by the action of battery. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965) (prohibiting harmful or offensive contacts).
149. This rule is implemented by the action of trespass to land. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (prohibiting unauthorized entries onto real property).
150. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 156-57.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
reasonableness remains hidden in the shadows, still waiting for its day in
the sun.
V. THE SYMBIOSIS OF NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY
Because the modern paradigm already groups negligence and

intentional torts into the same fault matrix, the overlap between these
theories may not seem particularly alarming. However, this is not the
full extent of the paradigm’s conceptual osmosis. Negligence does not
just bleed into intentional torts, it also absorbs the characteristics of strict
liability. Granted, the crossover is not permanent or complete. But it is
clear that, when circumstances warrant, negligence can be just as strict
as strict liability.
Both literally and conceptually, negligence is the theoretical norm
of tort law. Intentional torts, which display extreme culpability, lie at
the far end of the fault spectrum. Strict liability, which requires no fault
at all, falls at the other end. Negligence sits right in the middle of this
scheme, separating intentional torts and strict liability with its standard
of reasonableness.
A negligence cause of action has its own state of normalcy.
Generally speaking, negligence applies to specific acts, not general
activities. It imposes a standard of ordinary care and places on the
plaintiff the initial burden of proof. It permits the defendant to plead and
prove defenses like comparative fault and assumption of risk that may
reduce or preclude her liability.
This state of normalcy is not intractable. Where the plaintiff
requires special protection, or the defendant requires special regulation,
negligence can make the appropriate adjustments. Activities may be
condemned, duties can be expanded, standards can be increased,
defenses can be limited, and procedural burdens can be relaxed. With
each adjustment, the law deviates from the norm by becoming easier on
plaintiffs and harder on defendants. As these adjustments accumulate,
the law gets stricter and stricter. In some cases, it may require little to
no actual proof of fault. When this point is reached, it is hard to tell
where negligence ends and strict liability begins.
A. The Focus and Scope of Liability
According to the modern paradigm, one of strict liability’s

distinctive characteristics is the breadth of its focus and scope. It is
broad in focus because it examines entire activities. If an activity is
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
abnormally dangerous, one who engages in it may be held liable even

though she acts in a reasonable manner.151 It is broad in scope because it
protects a larger group of victims and regulates a larger group of
tortfeasors. To do this, it must expand the definition of duty, and extend
the reach of proximate cause.152
However, negligence law also gravitates to the same extremes.
Although negligence usually condemns specific courses of action,
nothing prevents it from condemning the more general activities of
which they are a part. Of course, there are political constraints. Courts
are not supposed to legislate. And if they do, they are not supposed to
contradict the will of the legislature. As a result, instances of categorical
fault are somewhat rare. Nevertheless, where public policy permits,
negligence law has demonstrated the ability to paint fault with a broad
brush.
Most findings of activity-based negligence spring from state
statutes. Here, public policy is no problem. By enacting the statute, the
state expresses its distaste for the subject activity. Drunk driving is a
good example. Most, if not all, states have passed laws prohibiting such
conduct. Negligence turns this criminal prohibition into an absolute
civil responsibility. Under the doctrine of negligence per se, drunk
driving becomes an unreasonable activity.153 Thus, anyone who drives
while drunk is negligent as a matter of law. It makes no difference how
or why that activity was performed. If the driver causes an accident, she
is deemed responsible unless and until she justifies her behavior.
Other activities are regulated on an ad hoc basis. Often, these
regulations are phrased as bright-line rules of law. In most cases, these
rules are based on experience and common sense. For example,
experience shows that epileptics are prone to unexpected convulsions.
Thus, common sense says that they should not operate automobiles
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) (TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1) § 20 (b)(1) (2001) (“An activity is abnormally
dangerous if…the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical harm
even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors.”).
152. The Second Restatement holds the strict liability actor responsible for nearly all
intervening causes, including innocent, negligent and reckless acts of human beings, acts of
animals and acts of God. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (a), (b), (c) (1977).
Under certain circumstances, she may even be responsible for an intentional act of a third
party. See id. (caveat following the section).
153. See Hasson v. Hale, 555 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Miss. 1990) (holding that truck
driver’s intoxication was negligence per se); Davis v. Rigsby, 136 S.E.2d 33, 34 (N.C. 1964)
(holding that drunk driving is negligence per se); Cook v. Spinnaker’s Rivergate, Inc., 878
S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that driving while intoxicated is negligence per se).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
without appropriate medication. 154 Likewise, experience shows that

children are rash and irresponsible. Thus, common sense says that they
should not operate dangerous equipment.155 For both groups, negligence
places certain activities off-limits. Those folks who mind these
restrictions are reasonable; those who do not act at their own risk.
Rules of this sort are not merely vestiges of the past. Rather, they
have continuing vitality. Indeed, the Restatement (Third) of Torts
openly acknowledges the possibility of inherently negligent activities.
The idea first emerged in the recent restatement of products liability
law. Specifically, section 2, comment e of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability provides that some products may be
categorically defective because their designs are “manifestly
unreasonable.” 156 In this situation, the manufacturer is liable for any
harm the product may cause, even though it could not be made any safer.
The problem with the product lies not in its construction, packaging or
labeling, but rather in its very conception. In essence, the manufacturer
is faulted simply for engaging in the activities of making the product and
selling it to the public.
The same concept appears in the Third Restatement’s new chapter
on negligence. In section 3, comment j, the Reporters concede that
sometimes the mere “decision to engage in a particular activity [may]
create[] an unreasonable risk of harm.” 157 Although these claims are
“uncommon,” they are not prohibited by any “general rule.”158 In fact,
they can arise in a variety of circumstances. According to the comment,
“when a person’s vision has been impaired by disease, or when the
person needs to take medication that produces continuing grogginess, the
person can be found negligent for engaging in the activity of driving a
car.”159
154. See Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 530 (Neb. 1994) (holding that epileptic who
drove despite knowledge of infirmity was negligent as a matter of law); Eleason v. Western
Cas. & Sur. Co., 35 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Wis. 1949) (finding negligence by epileptic who
drove with knowledge that he could pass out).
155. See Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 394 (Wash. 1979) (applying an adult
standard of care to a thirteen-year-old boy who operated a thirty-horsepower snowmobile);
Perricone v. DiBartolo, 302 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (applying adult standard to a
minor who operated a mini-bike on the sidewalk at speeds of up to twenty-five miles per
hour); Huebner v. Koelfgren, 519 N.W.2d 488, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying an adult
standard of care to a teenager who handled a gun).
156. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (1998).
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) (TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 1) § 3 cmt. j (2001).
158. See id.
159. See id.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
In all of these situations, the plaintiff is free from having to

demonstrate exactly what aspect of the defendant’s conduct is
blameworthy. She need only establish that the activity is wrongful in
itself, either because it is categorically unreasonable, or because it is
always unreasonable when performed by a particular group of people.
Here, the spotlight is not on the ethically ambivalent details of the
activity, but on its intrinsic risk characteristics. Any way you look at it,
this is a strict liability perspective, even if it is filtered through the lens
of negligence.
As broad as negligence’s focus may be, its approach to duty and
proximate cause are even more ambitious. In theory, strict liability is
supposed to provide the greatest amount of protection to the most people
for the largest range of risks. However, negligence is no slouch in these
areas either. In fact, the history of negligence law in the twentieth
century has mostly been a movement from lesser to greater
responsibility.
Early negligence law was replete with duty limitations and
immunities. However, since the latter half of the nineteenth century,
these obstacles have steadily fallen. Gone are the charitable, 160
spousal,161 parental162 and sovereign immunities.163 Gone, too, are the
privity limitation 164 and limits on recovery for wrongful death 165 and
emotional distress. 166 The entrant classification system of premises
liability is in decline.167 Even proximate cause limits like unforeseeable
consequences and superseding cause are rapidly disappearing and in
jeopardy of extinction.168

161. See id. at 752.
162. See id. at 754-55.
163. See id. at 695, 716.
164. The privity limitation limited the defendant’s duty to parties with whom she had a
direct contractual relationship. Although it still survives in actions against utilities, see H.R.
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the privity
limitation in an action against a water company), it has been eliminated in product liability
actions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (2)(b) (1965) (products liability
applies even though “the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.”).
165. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 803-04.
166. See id. at 836.
167. See id. at 615-16, 619-20.
168. See Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence:
Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002) (noting
that comparative fault has caused a decrease in superseding cause arguments which cut off the
defendant’s responsibility).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
In each case, the defunct or near-defunct rule has been replaced or

eroded by the more flexible concept of foreseeability. Unlike duty rules,
foreseeability knows no bounds. It is not limited by time, protecting
people months or years after the completion of a tortious act.169 It is not
limited by space, protecting people in the most distant and remote
places.170 It also is not limited by theory, protecting both negligence
victims, and the victims of strict liability activities. 171 In each case,
foreseeability can stretch as far as justice requires. As one Court has
noted, “there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee
forever.”172 On these days, the duties of negligence law can reach the
limits of strict liability and even go beyond.
B. Standards of Care and Defenses
Duty and proximate cause determine who can sue and who can be
sued. They do not determine what the parties must prove in order to
prevail. To establish negligence, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant violated a standard of care. To make out a defense, the
defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury
or negligently brought it about. However, these substantive
requirements are not set in stone. Though negligible in some cases, they
are especially onerous in others. Indeed, where justice requires,
negligence law can make the defendant’s standard strict and can take
away her affirmative defenses.
For over a century now, negligence has employed a standard of
reasonable care.173 This standard has two components: a norm and a
medium. Reasonableness is the norm. It represents society’s
169. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (drug manufacturer held
liable to the daughter of a consumer who ingested the drug decades earlier); Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (psychologist held liable for murder
committed two months after his last consultation with the perpetrator).
170. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (transit company
held liable for damage to a bridge located nearly three miles downstream from the place
where the company improperly moored a ship); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Stanford, 12
Kan. 354 (1874) (railroad held liable for fire damage to a barn located four miles away from
the place where the railroad started the fire).
171. See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 925 (Wash. 1991), amended, 817 P.2d
1359 (Wash. 1991) (applying foreseeability analysis in an abnormally dangerous activity
claim); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 15-16 (Md. 1975) (applying foreseeability
analysis in a strict products liability case).
172. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989).
173. The reasonable care standard appeared as early as 1837 in the English case of
Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
expectations about how people should act. Reason is the medium. It is

the means by which such expectations are discovered. In negligence
law, the medium never changes.174 No matter who the parties are, or
what the circumstances of their encounter, reason always judges their
behavior. However, the norm used to evaluate the parties and their
conduct can vary from case to case. 175 While in some situations
reasonableness might require little thought of safety, in others it may
seem to demand the world.
The level of rigor is determined by distributive justice. Social
expectations rise and fall in accordance with the distributive criteria of
need and risk. Reasonableness tracks these expectations. Where need or
risk are low, a standard of ordinary care suffices. However, where need
or risk are great, reasonableness is not reluctant to raise the bar. Such
heightened standards tend to appear in two types of cases: those
involving special relationships, where the need for protection is
paramount;176 and those involving dangerous activities, where the risk of
harm is prodigious.177
In every special relationship, one party has the power to exploit the
other. Negligence law harnesses this power by enhancing the dominant
party’s standard of care. 178 For each relationship, the standard
corresponds to the power differential separating the parties. The greater
the disparity in power, the stricter the standard of care will be. As
relationships change, the standard adapts with them and keeps on
adjusting until duty off-sets dominance.
Such relational standards come in a variety of forms. Professionals
are “held to a higher standard of care than that of the ordinary prudent
person when the alleged negligence involves the defendant’s area of
expertise.” 179 Product manufacturers are expected to be “experts” in
their respective fields. 180 Although innkeepers normally owe their
174. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 277 (“The standard for determining negligence
purports to apply invariantly to all negligence cases.”).
175. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 175 (“The conduct of the reasonable person will vary
with the situation with which he is confronted.”).
176. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 182-83, 184-85.
177. See id. at 182-83, 185.
178. See id. at 182-83, 184-85.
179. See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharm., Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1132-33 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994).
180. See O’Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir. 1967) (“A manufacturer is
held to the skill of an expert in its particular field of endeavor, and is obligated to keep
informed of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning that field.”); Guffie v. Erie
Strayer Co., 350 F.2d 378, 381 (3d Cir. 1965) (“While a manufacturer is not required to be
clairvoyant he is rightly held to the standard of an expert in regard to his own product.”);
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
guests “a high degree of care,”181 in some cases they bear “the highest
standard of care – strict liability – for the safekeeping of the personal
property of a guest.”182 Likewise, common carriers must exercise “the
utmost care” toward their passengers,183 a duty that extends “as far as
human care and foresight will go.”184 And anyone dealing with children
must use “extraordinary care” to protect “infants too young to take care
of themselves.”185
Similar standards apply to people engaged in hazardous activities.
Here, too, duty is a relative concept. For every degree of risk the
defendant creates, the law imposes an added degree of responsibility.186
Thus, one who carries a loaded weapon “is bound to exercise
extraordinary care.”187 Likewise, those who handle gasoline are held to
“a very high duty of care.” 188 People who maintain high voltage
equipment “must exercise the highest degree of care to avoid
injuries.”189 Manufacturers and sellers of natural gas owe “a higher duty
of care” than others. 190 Indeed, anyone who uses “substances or
instrumentalities” that “might endanger persons or property [is] held to a
high degree or an extraordinary degree of care.”191
Increasing the standard of care is not the only way to expand
responsibility. Because responsibility is a bilateral concept, every duty
of care is connected to someone else’s duty of self-protection. Once
linked, these duties fluctuate according to an inverse proportion.192 The
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 528 (Or. 1974) (holding a drug manufacturer
to an expert standard); Lopez v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 546 So. 2d 291, 294 (La. Ct.
App. 1989) (“The standard of knowledge, skill, and care in regard to the failure to use
alternative products or designs is that of an expert, including the duty to test, inspect, research,
and experiment commensurate with the danger.”).
181. Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1048, 1053 (La. 1982).
182. Cook v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 807 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
183. Robinson v. Conn. Co., 122 Conn. 300, 300; 189 A. 453, 453 (1937); Nelson v.
Flathead Valley Transit, 824 P.2d 263 (Mont. 1992) (holding common carrier must exercise
the utmost care and diligence in the care of its passengers); Markwell v. Whinery’s Real
Estate, Inc. 869 P.2d 840, 845 (Okla. 1994)(same).
184. Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 49 N.W.2d 501, 504 (Iowa 1951).
185. Crosswhite v. Shelby Operating Corp., 30 S.E.2d 673, 674 (Va. 1944).
186. See Winfrey v. Rocket Research Co., 794 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(“[T]he amount of care necessary varies with the danger which is incurred by negligence, for a
prudent and reasonable man increases his care with the increase of danger.”).
187. Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 400 (Pa. 1957).
188. Waters v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 212 So. 2d 487, 490 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
189. Winfrey, 794 P.2d at 1303.
190. Halliburton v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 804 P.2d 213, 215-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
191. Waters, 212 So. 2d at 490.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
greater the actor’s duty of care, the lesser the potential victim’s duty of
self-protection will be. Because the balance can be altered from either
side of the relational axis, there are two ways to increase someone’s
responsibility: by heightening her duty of care, or by diminishing her
counterpart’s duty of self-protection.
In negligence law, the plaintiff’s duty of self-protection appears in
the doctrines of comparative fault and assumption of risk. This duty can
be reduced to a simple maxim: Those who unreasonably, or who
reasonably but voluntarily, expose themselves to risk must accept
responsibility for all or part of the consequences. Normally, the
defendant may rely on this maxim to limit her own liability. Sometimes,
however, she cannot. Where public policy is compelling, negligence
law reduces or even extinguishes the plaintiff’s duty of self-protection,
securing her against her own bad choices. To provide this security,
however, the law must also increase the defendant’s duty of care by
limiting or eliminating her defenses.
Such drastic measures are fairly common in negligence per se
actions. Although a defendant accused of a statutory violation usually is
permitted to offer an excuse or justification for her behavior, this is not
always true. Certain statutes are enacted to protect a class of people who
cannot protect themselves.193 Statutes prohibiting child labor, or the sale
of firearms to minors, fall into this category.194 Such statutes have two
clear policy objectives: to impose absolute duties on those they regulate,
and to bestow absolute security on those they protect. To promote these
objectives, the law denies the defendant some or all of her affirmative
defenses. 195 When this restriction is imposed, negligence liability
becomes anything but ordinary. Instead, it establishes, in the words of
one court, “a standard of duty akin to strict liability.”196
Public policy defeats defenses in other ways as well. For example,
corporate defendants often draft contractual provisions to limit their
liability. When the plaintiff signs such a waiver, the defendant may
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 cmt. c (1965) (“There

are…exceptional statutes which are intended to place the entire responsibility for the harm
which has occurred upon the defendant. A statute may be found to have that purpose
particularly where it is enacted in order to protect a certain class of persons against their own
inability to protect themselves.”).
194. See id. cmts. c, e.
195. See Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Amenia, 234
N.E.2d 243, 246 (N.Y. 1967) (rejecting contributory negligence defense); Herr v. Booten, 580
A.2d 1115, 1121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (rejecting assumption of risk defense); see generally
DOBBS, supra note 12, § 141 (discussing the “no excuse” approach to negligence per se).
196. Sloan v. Coit Int’l, Inc., 292 So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. 1974).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
assert the defense of express assumption of risk. However, public policy

sometimes renders such clauses unenforceable.197 For example, if the
contract is one of adhesion, or if it concerns an essential service, the
plaintiff may lack the bargaining power to make an informed decision.198
Likewise, if the defendant exempts herself from intentional tort liability,
society may lose its ability to maintain law and order.199 Either way,
society’s need to enforce the defendant’s duty of care far exceeds the
defendant’s right to enforce the plaintiff’s duty of self-protection. In
these situations, negligence law bans the defendant’s assumption of risk
defense by invalidating her contractual waiver.
Even where such defenses are permitted, they are on a steady road
of decline. In most jurisdictions, the defense of assumption of risk is
disfavored.200 In many others, it has been split into pieces and merged
into other doctrines, like duty or comparative fault.201 In still others, it
has been completely absorbed into the prevailing comparative fault
system.202 As this trend continues, negligence liability becomes harder
and harder to escape. Indeed, it begins to look a lot like strict liability.
No matter what this scheme is called, one thing is clear. It is not
determined solely by the plaintiff’s liability theory, but is defined as well
by the number and variety of defenses afforded to the defendant.
C. Proof
In most cases, the plaintiff and the defendant have the burden of
proving each other’s fault. For the plaintiff, this burden has two
dimensions. First, she must show that the defendant breached the
applicable standard of care; and second, she must show that this breach
caused her loss. In certain situations, however, negligence law alters this
procedural scheme. Sometimes, it lowers the plaintiff’s burden of
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e &

Reporters’ Note to cmt. e (2000) (listing circumstances where exculpatory clauses violate
public policy and collecting cases supporting the list).
198. See id.
199. See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 484 (exculpatory agreements “generally are not
construed to cover the more extreme forms of negligence, described as willful, wanton,
reckless or gross, or to any conduct which constitutes an intentional tort.”).
200. See DOBBS, surpa note 12, at 534 (“Assumed risk today is increasingly discarded as
a separate defense.”).
201. See id. at 538-41 (discussing the different approaches).
202. See Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1983) (merging assumption of risk
and contributory negligence under comparative negligence statute); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 & cmt. c (2000) (abolishing implied
assumption of risk in favor of a comparative responsibility scheme).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
proving breach. Other times, it shifts to the defendant the burden of

proving her innocence. On occasion, it relaxes the plaintiff’s causation
requirements or assigns them to the defense. Individually, each
modification has a substantive effect. As such changes accumulate, they
move the cause of action away from a theory of ordinary fault and closer
to a form of strict liability.
In negligence per se actions, proof of fault turns on just a few facts.
The plaintiff does not have to present expert testimony to establish the
defendant’s standard of care. Nor must she present cost-benefit
evidence to prove the defendant’s breach. Instead, she need only show
three things: (1) the defendant violated the terms of a statute, regulation
or ordinance; (2) the statute, regulation or ordinance was designed to
protect her from the type of harm she actually sustained; and (3) the
violation caused her injuries.203 In most cases, such proof will come
from public records, lay witnesses and the jury’s own common sense.
Thus, the plaintiff does not so much prove fault as she describes events
that create a compelling inference of fault.
Rules of law work in much the same way. Unlike positive law
enactments, rules of law are created by judges. Nevertheless, both create
bright-line behavioral requirements.204 For example, many courts have
ruled that drivers who approach railroad crossings must stop, look and
listen before proceeding.205 Others have adopted the “range of vision”
rule, which requires motorists to drive at speeds that allow them to stop
short of visible obstructions. 206 Since only the stipulated conduct is
reasonable, everything else is unreasonable as a matter of law. Here, the
plaintiff does not have to prove fault; fault is predetermined by the rule
itself. All the plaintiff has to do is point out the defendant’s
noncompliance.
The evidentiary requirements of res ipsa loquitur are even more
203. See Capolungo v. Bondi, 224 Cal. Rptr. 326, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring
proof of four elements: (1) the defendant violated an ordinance of a public entity; (2) the
violation proximately caused injury to person or property; (3) the injury resulted from an
occurrence of the nature which the ordinance was designed to prevent; and (4) the person
suffering the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose
protection the ordinance was adopted.).
204. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 310 (“A rule of law…forbids any assessment of the
evidence to determine whether it was negligent in the particular circumstances or not.”).
205. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 203
n.2 (2005).
206. See Nickell v. Russell, 525 N.W.2d 203, 208-09 (Neb. 1995); Marshall v. S. Ry.
Co., 62 S.E.2d 489, 491-92 (N.C. 1950); see also DOBBS, supra note 12, at 310 (discussing
the rule).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
lax. To establish res ipsa, the plaintiff need only demonstrate three
facts: (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident normally would not
happen without negligence, and (3) the defendant exclusively controlled
the instrumentality that brought it about.207 There are no standards or
rules to worry about. The plaintiff merely explains how the incident
occurred and lets the circumstances speak for themselves. When the
designated facts are all present, they create an automatic inference of
fault. When they are convincing, they may preclude any other
conclusion.208
Indeed, doctrines like these often have two effects. Besides
alleviating the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, they enhance the burden
facing the defendant. The latter effect typically results from a legal
presumption. Presumptions remove the issue of fault from the plaintiff’s
case-in-chief and transfer that issue to the defendant. Such a transfer can
be temporary or permanent. If temporary, the plaintiff maintains the
ultimate burden of proof on that issue, 209 but the defendant bears the
burden of producing evidence to negate the inference of fault. 210 If
permanent, the entire burden of proof on that issue stays with the
defendant. 211 Either way, the plaintiff’s position is better, and the
defendant’s position worse, than her counterpart in an ordinary
negligence action.
Presumptions can be doctrine-wide or case-specific. As previously
noted, the doctrines of negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur apply
presumptions as a matter of course.212 Other presumptions apply only in
specific factual circumstances. For example, one presumption
establishes negligence against bailees who return property in a damaged
207. See Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d 513, 514 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
Some jurisdictions replace the “instrumentality” element with a requirement that the plaintiff
eliminate other possible causes, including himself. See Errico v. LaMountain, 713 A.2d 791,
795-96 (R.I. 1998).
208. See Imig v. Beck, 503 N.E.2d 324, 329-30 (Ill. 1986) (“[I]n exceptional cases the
plaintiff may be entitled either to a directed verdict or to a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because the unrebutted prima facie proof of negligence is so strong that all of the
evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the defendant, so overwhelmingly
favors the plaintiff that no contrary jury verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.”);
DOBBS, supra note 12, at 377 (“It is possible to imagine that the plaintiff’s evidence creates an
inference so strong that, unless the evidence is simply not credited, it should carry the case for
the plaintiff in the absence of rebuttal.”).
209. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 368 (terming these “minimum power presumptions”).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 367 (terming these “maximum power presumptions”).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 133-136.
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
condition. 213 Another faults carriers who lose or destroy their

customers’ goods. 214 Some presumptions blame employers for the
negligent driving of their employees. 215 Still others hold car owners
responsible for the carelessness of their permitees.216
The law’s procedural favoritism is not limited to the element of
breach, but appears in the element of causation as well. Occasionally,
the plaintiff cannot determine who caused her harm. In such cases, the
law helps her find the culprit.
Two scenarios recur with some frequency. In one scenario, two or
more tortfeasors act negligently towards the plaintiff. However, only
one actually causes the plaintiff’s injury. 217 Through no fault of her
own, the plaintiff cannot identify the true wrongdoer. The doctrine of
alternative liability eases her burden.218 Specifically, it shifts to each
defendant the burden of disproving causation. 219 Any defendant who
213. See Aronette Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Piece Dye Works Inc., 160 N.E.2d 842, 845 (N.Y.
1959) (“[I]f the bailor can prove the condition of the goods when delivered, the nature of the
subsequent injuries and that they were not the result of ordinary wear and tear, the burden of
going forward with the evidence is shifted to the bailee who had the goods exclusively under
his control and who should be able to show the manner in which he discharged his contract
obligations.”); Polack v. O’Brien, 100 N.Y.S. 385, 387 (N.Y. App. Div. 1906) (“As a general
rule, when a bailee fails on demand to deliver to the bailor property which the latter is entitled,
the presumption of liability arises.”); Tidewater Stevedore Co. v. Lindsay, 116 S.E. 377, 380
(Va. 1923) (recognizing a presumption of negligence where a bailee returned property in
damaged condition).
214. See Hornsby v. Logaras, 49 So. 2d 837, 839 (Miss. 1951) (“[W]hen a bailor shows
that goods are delivered to his bailee in good condition and are lost or destroyed or returned in
a damaged condition, this fact creates a prima facie presumption of negligence; and it
thereupon devolves upon the bailee to absolve himself from negligence.”); Gore Prods., Inc. v.
Tex. & N.O.R. Co., 34 So. 2d 418, 421 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (requiring plaintiff to prove only
(1) that the carrier received the shipment in good condition, (2) that the shipment arrived at its
destination in a damaged condition, and (3) the amount of the loss.).
215. See Cofield v. Burgdorf, 115 So. 2d 357, 358 (La. 1959) (recognizing a
“presumption that where one is in the possession of…a vehicle of another and is using it in the
service of such other, he is the servant or agent of the owner.”).
216. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stroh, 550 A.2d 373, 375 (Md. 1988) (“[W]here an
automobile owner-passenger grants permission to another to drive his car, and the permissive
operator drives negligently, the owner has presumptively consented to the negligence.”); Ross
v. Burgan, 126 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ohio 1955) (“[W]here an owner is present in his automobile,
there is a rebuttable presumption that he has control and direction over it.”).
217. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (two defendants fired their weapons at
plaintiff; however, plaintiff was struck by shot from only one gun).
218. This doctrine is set forth in section 433B of the Second Restatement of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (3) (1965).
219. See id. (“Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortuous, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which
one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.”).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
satisfies this burden is relieved of responsibility, while those who cannot

are held jointly and severally liable.220
The other scenario arises primarily in products liability cases. Here,
a large number of manufacturers produce the same defective product.
The plaintiff is injured by one of these goods, but cannot identify the
offending item.221 Under the doctrine of market share liability, she need
not prove factual causation. 222 She need only prove that the named
defendants held a substantial share of the market for that product.223 At
that point, the defendants take the hot seat. Either they prove that they
did not make the injurious item, or they pay damages as if they had.224
Sometimes the problem is not who caused the loss, but whether the
loss resulted from negligence at all. This problem arises most often in
medical malpractice cases. The plaintiff suffers from a serious illness.
By the time she sees a doctor, her chance of surviving the malady is less
than fifty percent. The doctor performs a negligent diagnosis. Because
of the misdiagnosis, the plaintiff does not discover the condition until
sometime later on. The delay further reduces her chance of survival.
Under a normal factual cause analysis, the plaintiff cannot recover. Since
the plaintiff was destined to die anyway, the doctor’s negligence is not a
“but for” cause of that outcome.
Nevertheless, negligence law is quick to come to her aid.
Sometimes, it lowers the plaintiff’s burden of proof. Instead of
demanding proof of causation by a preponderance of the evidence, it
requires only a “substantial possibility” of that connection. 225 Other
times, it changes the proof requirement altogether. Under the “lost
220. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 5 (“[E]ach defendant is liable for the whole damage
whether they [sic] are deemed to be acting in concert or independently.”).
221. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (plaintiff’s mother ingested
DES produced by one of 200 manufacturers; plaintiff could not determine which manufacturer
made the offending pills).
222. See id. (creating the theory of market share liability).
223. See id. at 145 (“If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial
share of the DES which her mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of
proof to defendants to demonstrate that they could not have made the substance which injured
plaintiff is significantly diminished.”).
224. See id. at (“Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judgment
represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the
product which caused plaintiff's injuries.”).
225. See Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966) (“ When a defendant's
negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a person's chance of survival, it does
not lie in the defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he
has put beyond the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable.”); Thomas v. Corso, 288 A.2d
379, 390 (Md. 1972) (applying the “substantial possibility” standard).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
chance” doctrine, the plaintiff need not satisfy the “but for” test at all. If
the doctor significantly reduces her chance of survival, she can recover
for her loss just the same.226
According to the modern paradigm, such procedural stratagems are
supposed to be unique to strict liability. Indeed, strict liability is defined
by two important procedural characteristics: the elimination of the
plaintiff’s burden of proving fault, and an increase in the defendant’s
burden of defense. Yet, as we saw above, both of these distinctions are
false. Where policy permits, negligence reduces the plaintiff’s fault
burden, sometimes to the point of elimination. Conversely, where
fairness dictates, the law raises the defendant’s burden of proof,
sometimes to the point of insuperability. Of course, this does not prove
that the modern paradigm is wrong. However, it does raise doubts about
its accuracy. If negligence and strict liability work the same way, then
they may be more alike than different. And if they share a procedural
likeness, then it may be better to bring these theories together than to
keep them so far apart.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modern paradigm of tort law recognizes three separate theories

of tort liability: intent, negligence and strict liability. It further
characterizes these theories as either fault-based or fault-free. The fault
matrix consists of negligence and intentional torts. These theories are
similar in that both require plaintiffs to plead and prove wrongdoing.
Yet they remain fundamentally different. Whereas intentional torts
require subjective knowledge, negligence involves the breach of an
objective standard of care. Threaded through this tripartite structure is a
continuum of fault. Intentional torts are the faultiest. Strict liability
requires no fault at all. And negligence, the law’s normative reference
point, falls somewhere in between.
Upon closer analysis, it appears that the modern paradigm rests on
many false assumptions and distinctions. First, intentional torts and
strict liability do not fall on opposite ends of the liability spectrum.
Rather, they are on the same side. In an intentional tort action, the
plaintiff does not have to prove the defendant’s fault. Fault is presumed
226. See Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990) (awarding percentage of
wrongful death damages in accordance with the plaintiff’s lost chance of survival); Wollen v.
v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1992) (recognizing “lost chance” doctrine);
Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (same).
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
from the element of intent. To rebut this presumption, the defendant

must come forward with an excuse or justification. If she fails to do so,
she may be held liable even though she committed no wrong. In this
sense, every intentional tortfeasor is like her strict liability counterpart: if
she acts and injures, she does so at her own peril.
Second, intentional torts and negligence are not inherently
distinguishable. Indeed, they are more alike than different. Both torts
impose a behavioral duty, punish mistakes, implement objective
community norms, and most importantly, base liability on the common
concept of reasonableness.
Finally, the theories of negligence and strict liability are not
mutually exclusive. Rather, each often overlaps the other. On a
procedural level, negligence may lower the plaintiff’s evidentiary
burdens or shift them entirely to the defendant. On a substantive level,
negligence sometimes assumes a broad focus and scope, requires no
proof of fault and limits or eliminates the defendant’s affirmative
defenses.
In summary, the relationships among these theories may be
described as follows. Some negligence doctrines are strict, while others
apply a standard of ordinary reasonableness. Thus, the theories of
negligence and strict liability at least partially converge at a point of
substantive and procedural rigor. While strict liability professes a no-
fault and no-reasonableness basis, there is no reason in theory why
negligence’s flexible approach could not be expanded to capture many,
most or perhaps even all of the subjects currently included within strict
liability’s ambit. As for intentional torts, all of these theories already are
grounded in reasonableness, even if that relationship is seldom
acknowledged and often hidden from view. Thus, it is fair to say that
intentional torts are or could be completely subsumed within a
reasonableness-based theory like negligence. Interestingly, all
intentional torts also impose a form of strict liability. Thus, they are
completely contained within that theory as well. In essence, intentional
torts lie in the previously mentioned area of overlap between negligence
and strict liability, where reasonableness permits a presumption of fault
from just a few facts.
Taken together, these pieces of insight create a picture of tort law
that is radically different from the one depicted by the modern paradigm.
The truth is, tort law is not bifurcated by fault and then trifurcated by
theory. Rather, it is built upon a coherent dichotomy of ordinary and
strict liability, and all of its theories either are or potentially could be
CALNAN0712 11/1/2007 11:28:56 AM
rooted in the concept of reasonableness.

From these observations, it appears that the tort law is not just ill; it
suffers from a deep intrinsic infirmity. This problem is not susceptible to
some quick-fix solution. We cannot restore the law’s integrity by
changing a few words in a statute, reinterpreting a few common law
doctrines or rewriting a few sections of the Restatement. Rather, we
must alter the way we think about and analyze liability issues. In short,
we must begin to shift toward a brand new paradigm of tort law.
Obviously, such a course will not be easy, but at least we have the time-
tested notion of reasonableness to help us find our way.

The Fault (S) in Negligence Law: Alan Calnan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Fault (S) in Negligence Law: Alan Calnan

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Fault (S) in Negligence Law: Alan Calnan

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

WORKING PAPER NO.

THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW

SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL

and at the Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:

THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW

Modern tort law has a familiar theoretical structure. That structure

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 102

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 103

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 104

II. FAULT & REASONABLENESS

A. The Nature of Fault

The term “fault” carries a lot of baggage. The Oxford English

15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (7th ed. 1999).

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 105

failure to have or do what is required” – a lack of something; (2)

20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (6th ed. 1990).

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 106

this indeterminacy has several deleterious consequences.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 107

restrictions on who can do the looking.25

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 108

B. The Nature of Reasonableness

Reasonableness suffers from the same sort of definitional ambiguity

1. The Source and Values of Reasonable Laws

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 109

In American culture, freedom and equality are the values which

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 110

ultimate collective objective is to return all parties to a state of equality.

2. Legal Limits on the Duty of Reasonableness

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 111

48. See CALNAN, JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 48.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 112

a right to expect protection. If that expectation is violated, they alone

55. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co ., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 113

69. Id. at 99.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 114

neighbors, A’s oversight is not unreasonable unless and until it invades

74. See id.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 115

For Aristotle, responsibility requires human agency, and agency

77. Id. at 169-70.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 116

acts are deserving of condemnation. But, as we shall see below, in some

III. NEGLIGENCE’S HARD CASES

Although fault is more pejorative than unreasonableness, most

A. The No-Duty-To-Rescue Rule

The no-duty-to-rescue rule says that people are not required to

85. See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 853.

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 117

with the concept of fault.87 Instinctively, it feels wrong to stand idly by

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 118

1. The Rule is the Exception

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 119

these privileges cannot resist the intrusion. They are obligated to

2007] THE FAULT(S) IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 120

it continued in motion.105 The abandoned vehicle eventually rolled onto

2. The Reasonableness of the Rule