MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City

March 27, 2000 did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
Puno, J. opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening
by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court
of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
Facts
The MMDA was created to put some order in the
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately
the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a
non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are private street in a private subdivision without any legal
homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not
Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
Dispositive
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from
petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996.
Malonzo vs Zamora
Actions Filed:
1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court
issued temporary restraining order but after
due hearing, trial court denied the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued
preliminary injunction and later ruled that
MMDA has no authority to order the opening
of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road
and cause the demolition of its perimeter
walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the
City Council of Makati by ordinance.
3. MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but
was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

Issues

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune

Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers?
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition
precedent before the MMDA may order the
opening of subdivision roads to public traffic?

Held

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,

ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ vs PEZA
"development authority." All its functions are
FACTS:
administrative in nature.
In 1981, PEZA, initiated before the RTC of Cavite
expropriation proceedings on three parcels of irrigated
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
lands. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) is registered in
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
the name of Salud Jimenez. More than ten years later,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
the trial court upheld PEZA's right to expropriate, among
setting of policies, installation of a system and
others, the lot of petitioner. Petitioner sought
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
reconsideration alleging that the lot would only be
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
transferred to a private corporation, and hence would
power.
not be utilized for a public purpose. The trial court
reconsidered the order and released Lot 1406 A from
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406 B was
welfare of the community. It is the local government
maintained. PEZA appealed the order to the CA.
units, acting through their respective legislative councils
Later on, the petitioner and PEZA entered into a
that possess legislative power and police power. In the
compromise agreement whereby (1) PEZA agrees to
withdraw its appeal while Salud agrees to waive, respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to
quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned
income which it sustained by reason of the possession of in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
said lot by PEZA from 1981-1993; and (2) the parties agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment.
agree to swap Lot 1406B with Lot434 and that instead of Hence, the "original demand" referred to means the
being paid the just compensation for Lot 1406B, the fixing of just compensation. When PEZA failed to fulfill
estate of Salud shall be paid with Lot434. The its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again
compromise agreement is immediately final and demand for the payment but not the return of the
executory. The CA remanded the case to the trial court expropriated Lot 1406-B.
for the approval of the said compromise agreement. The NOTES:
trial court approved the same. (1) As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot434 the power of eminent domain comes into play… It is
inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the said accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
lot. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to partially annul beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the order. The trial court then annulled the compromise the requirement of public use.
agreement and ordered the turn over of Lot1406B to (2) Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of
petitioner. The CA upheld the rescission of the land pursuant to Proclamation No. 1980 dated May 30,
compromise agreement, however, set aside the order of 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos.
the trial court regarding the turn-over of the lot and Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of
ordered the trial judge to proceed with the hearing of respondent is contained in its original charter,
the expropriation proceedings regarding the Presidential Decree No. 66. (3) Accordingly, subject Lot
determination of just compensation. This is in 1406-B was expropriated “for the construction … of
accordance with Art 2041 of the Civil Code which states terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto.”
that "if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the The authority is broad enough to give the respondent
compromise, the other party may either enforce the substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his expropriated property would be utilized. Pursuant to
original demand. this broad authority, respondent leased a portion of the
lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a
ISSUE: Whether the phrase "original demand" pertains transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
to the return of Lot1406B which is sought to be reaffirmed by Republic Act No. 7916, a law amending
expropriated or the determination of just compensation respondent PEZA’s original charter. Therefore, there is
for the lot. no question that the lots were expropriated for public
purpose.
RULING of the SC: In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate
Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The that this case be remanded to the trial court for hearing
first phase ends either with an order of expropriation of the expropriation proceedings on the determination
(where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt
public purpose to which they are to be devoted are payment to the petitioner.
upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a
final one since it finally disposes of the case. The second
phase concerns the determination of just compensation Republic v. Fernandez
to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. It ends
with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant.
Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this
order finally disposes of the second stage. To both
orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when
the July 11, 1991 order of expropriation became final
and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the
terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an
action to partially rescind the same. Obviously, the trial
court could only validly order the rescission of the
compromise agreement anent the payment of just
compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise. It is crystal clear from the contents of the
agreement that the parties limited the compromise
agreement to the matter of just compensation to
petitioner.
Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with
the issue of payment such that failure to pay by
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS public.” However, the concept has expanded to include
OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS, utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the
Respondents. public. “Public use” has now been held to be
G.R. No.: 165354 synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” and
Date: 12 January 2015 “public convenience.”
Ponente: Bersamin, J. It is essential that the element of public use of the
property be maintained throughout the proceedings
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public
San Isidro, Batangas City in order to construct and purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International
maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr., to wit:
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR More particularly, with respect to the element of public
filed a complaint for expropriation in the Regional Trial use, the expropriator should commit to use the property
Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the acquisition of pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
an easement of right of way over a portion of the expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another
property. petition for the new purpose.If not, it is then incumbent
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
had not negotiated with them before entering the private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
property and that the entry was done without their same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation
consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
NAPOCOR’s entry provided it would pay just indispensable element for the proper exercise of the
compensation not only for the portion sought to be power of eminent domain, namely, the particular
expropriated but for the entire property whose public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due Accordingly, the private property owner would be
to the project. denied due process of law, and the judgment would
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness
Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation and equity.
Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to reach It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to
an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be acquire the land in question for public use. The
expropriated was no longer necessary for public purpose fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
because of the intervening retirement of the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent
transmission lines installed on the respondents’ domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment
property; that because the public purpose for which that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the
such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
the proceedings for expropriation should no longer necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason
continue, and the State was now duty-bound to return that the action cannot be maintained at all except when
the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or the expropriation is for some public use. That must be
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any
accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. other stage of the proceedings. If, for example, during
the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings to the satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is
should be discontinued or dismissed pending appeal. not for some public use, it would be the duty and the
obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for even during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be
expropriation at the instance of NAPOCOR is proper, made to appear to the satisfaction of the appellate court
but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of that the expropriation is not for public use, then it
Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the would become the duty and the obligation of the
proceedings must be upon such terms as the court appellate court to dismiss it.
deems just and equitable. Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of
nature of the power of eminent domain. The right of the element of public use. To continue with the
eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the sovereign expropriation proceedings despite the definite
power to appropriate, not only the public but the cessation of the public purpose of the project would
private property of all citizens within the territorial result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor
sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of such of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential
right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements element of public use.
should underlie the Government’s exercise of the power Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue
of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a particular the proceedings subject to the conditions to be shortly
public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of the
to the property owner. These requirements partake the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must
nature of implied conditions that should be complied point out that NAPOCOR entered the property without
with to enable the condemnor to keep the property the owners’ consent and without paying just
expropriated. compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit
any amount as required by law prior to its entry. The No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary
Constitution is explicit in obliging the Government and expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot
its entities to pay just compensation before depriving simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent
any person of his or her property for public use. domain power, given that the property subject of
Considering that in the process of installing transmission expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and
lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants public policy imposes upon the public utility the
without payment, and the installation of the obligation to continue its services to the public. To
transmission lines went through the middle of the land hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of
as to divide the property into three lots, thereby due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of
effectively rendering the entire property inutile for any the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of
future use, it would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be which is to serve the greater good.
made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not
their property rights from the time of entry until the necessarily lead to the return of the property to the
time of restoration of the possession of the property. landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and compensation.
the eventual return of the property to the respondents, Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market
there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them value of the property at the time of taking
because their property would not be taken by Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private
NAPOCOR. Instead of full market value of the property, owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-
therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the established rule is that the fair equivalent of a property
respondents for the disturbance of their property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at
rights from the time of entry until the time of the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just
restoration of the possession by paying to them actual compensation’ is not to reward the owner for the
or other compensatory damages. property taken but to compensate him for the loss
This should mean that the compensation must be based thereof. The owner should be compensated only for
on what they actually lost as a result and by reason of what he actually loses, and what he loses is the actual
their dispossession of the property and of its use, value of the property at the time it is taken.
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in
destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the this case
transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring and fundamental duty is the application of the law
during the appeal, the Court now treats the dismissal of according to its express terms, interpretation being
the expropriation proceedings as producing the effect of called for only when such literal application is
converting the case into an action for damages. For that impossible. To entertain other formula for computing
purpose, the Court remands the case to the court of just compensation, contrary to those established by law
origin for further proceedings. The court of origin shall and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of
treat the case as if originally filed as an action for economic policies – a matter which this Court has no
damages. competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable
principles only come into full play when a gap exists in
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo the law and jurisprudence.
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015 Velasco Dissent:
Facts: The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute;
Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived
among the private properties traversed by MacArthur of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
Highway in Bulacan, a government project undertaken As such, failure of the government to institute the
sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of taking an
requisite expropriation proceedings and without their individual’s property. In this case, since the property was
consent. In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of already taken, the complainants must be equitably
the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered compensated for the loss thereof.
to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as recommended by the For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the
appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo land should be determined from the time the property
filed a complaint for recovery of possession with owners filed the initiatory complaint, earning interest
damages. Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s
and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural
interest per annum from the time of filing of the until
infirmities which, in turn, would amount to unjust
full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and
held that computation should be based at the time the enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts
property was taken in 1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But would be licensing the government to continue
because of the contrasting opinions of the members of dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
the Division and transcendental importance of the issue, private property.
the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due
process should be nullified
Republic vs Gingoyon on 21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a
481 SCRA 457 [GR No. 166429 December 19, 2005] Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional
Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for
Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special
constructed to serve as the country’s show window to raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the
the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. complaint the issuance of a writ of possession
Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the authorizing it to take immediate possession and control
terminal complex way back it has not yet been over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared
operated. This has caused immeasurable economic that it had deposited the amount of
damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land
discredit in the international community. In the first case Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3
that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,the contracts terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The
which the Government had with the contractor were case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC,
voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon
second case now before the Court involves the matter of (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint
just compensation due the contractor for the terminal was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance
complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it
fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court’s to “take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3
2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the
expropriation law. The present controversy has its roots RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the
with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for
PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and
decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the upon deposit made by the government of the amount
Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites
entered into between the Philippine Government present, particularly noting that “[t]he case record
(Government) and the Philippine International Air shows that [the Government has] deposited the
Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank
and supplements thereto. The agreement had of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown
authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport by the certification attached to their complaint.” Also on
terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession.
maintain the said terminal during the concession period According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take
of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after
that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did the Writ of Possession was issued. However, on 4
not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of
was contrary to public policy. At the time of the Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in
promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier
had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to
completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974
nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as “An Act to
of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or
construction of the facilities. PIATCO and several Location for National Government Infrastructure
respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions Projects and For Other Purposes” and its Implementing
for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had
motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution amended Rule 67 in many respects.
dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). However, the Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the
Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.
rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even
the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this
rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should
the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section
the Government to put the airport terminal into 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement
immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government
NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings may take over the property.
were commenced before the International Chamber of It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede
Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment “immediate payment” in cases involving national
Disputes, although the Government has raised government infrastructure projects.
jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then,
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of
of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and- the property to be seized. Such payment of the
transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance
6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is
development projects normally financed by the public precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one
sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented which facially complies with the prescription laid down
by the private sector. Under the build-operate-and- in the 2004 Resolution.
transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC
undertakes the construction, including the financing, of when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant
a given infrastructure facility. expropriation proceedings.
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights
over the facilities which it had financed and constructed.
The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right
when it mandated the payment of just compensation to
PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of
NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to
eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a
concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if
no such right is recognized, then there should be no
impediment for the Government to seize control of
NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are
established, the nature of these facilities should now be
determined.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties
just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-
classifications of real property and divergent treatment
based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be
based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There
may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil
and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet
there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a
variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both
the land itself and the improvements thereupon are
susceptible to private ownership independent of each
other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken
from the owner, considered as a deprivation of
property. The owner of improvements seized through
expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the
owner of land seized through similar means. Equal
protection demands that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of
expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as
the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and
a disparate treatment between those two classes of real
property infringes the equal protection clause.
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that
law’s application in this case, the threshold test must
still be met whether its implementation would conform
to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution.
Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act
No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which
requires the payment of just compensation before any
takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The
2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such
payment must be effected before the takeover, but it
unquestionably requires at least some degree of
payment to the private property owner before a writ of
possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No.
8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum
requirement, as it assures the private property owner