114. A. SORIANO AVIATION vs. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF A.

SORIANO AVIATION
G.R. No. 166879 August 14, 2009
CARPIO MORALES, J p:

FACTS: On May 22, 1997, A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) which is engaged in providing transportation of
guests to and from Amanpulo and El Nido resorts in Palawan, and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation
(the Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1997 up to December 31, 1999. The CBA included a "No-Strike, No-Lock-out"
clause.

On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays and peak season for the company, eight mechanics-members of
respondent Union, its herein co-respondents Albert Aguila (Aguila), Reynante Amimita (Amimita), Galmier Balisbis (Balisbis),
Raymond Barco (Barco), Gerardo Bungabong (Bungabong), Josefino Espino (Espino), Jeffrey Neri (Neri) and Rodolfo Ramos, Jr.
(Ramos), refused to render overtime work.

Petitioner treated the refusal to work as a concerted action which is a violation of the "No-Strike, No-Lockout" clause in the
CBA. It thus meted the workers a 30-day suspension. It also filed on July 31, 1997 a complaint for illegal strike against them,
docketed as NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, which was later dismissed at its instance in order to give way to settlement, without
prejudice to its re-filing should settlement be unavailing.

The attempted settlement between the parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on October 3, 1997, attributing to petitioner the following acts: (1) union busting,
(2) illegal dismissal of union officer, (3) illegal suspension of eight mechanics, (4) violation of memorandum of agreement, (5)
coercion of employees and interrogation of newly-hired mechanics with regard to union affiliation, (6) discrimination against
the aircraft mechanics, (7) harassment through systematic fault-finding, (8) contractual labor, and (9) constructive dismissal
of the Union President, Julius Vargas (Vargas).

As despite conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the Union went on strike on October 22, 1997.

Meanwhile, pursuant to its reservation in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, petitioner filed a Motion to Re-Open the Case which
was granted by Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion by Order of October 21, 1997.

By Decision dated September 28, 1998 rendered in petitioner's complaint in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the Labor Arbiter
declared that the newly implemented work-shift schedule was a valid exercise of management prerogative and the refusal of
herein individual respondents to work on three consecutive holidays was a form of protest by the Union, hence, deemed a
concerted action. Noting that the Union failed to comply with the formal requirements prescribed by the Labor Code in the
holding of strike, the strike was declared illegal.

The Union appealed to the NLRC which dismissed it in a per curiam Decision dated September 14, 1999, and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated November 11, 1999.

In the interim or on June 16, 1998, eight months into the "second strike", petitioner filed a complaint against respondents
before the Labor Arbiter, praying for the declaration as illegal of the strike on account of their alleged pervasive and
widespread use of force and violence and for the loss of their employment, citing the following acts committed by them:
publicly shouting of foul and vulgar words to company officers and non-striking employees; threatening of officers and non-
striking employees with bodily harm and dousing them with water while passing by the strike area; destruction of or inflicting
of damage to company property, as well as private property of company officers; and putting up of placards and streamers
containing vulgar and insulting epithets including imputing crime on the company.

By Decision of June 15, 2000, Labor Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes declared the "second strike" illegal. Taking judicial notice
of the September 28, 1998 Decision of Labor Arbiter Asuncion, he noted that as the Union went on the "first strike" on a non-
strikeable issue — the questioned change of work schedule, it violated the "No-Strike, No-Lockout" clause in the CBA and, in
any event, the Union failed to comply with the requirements for a valid strike.

The Labor Arbiter went on to hold that the Union deliberately resorted to the use of violent and unlawful acts in the course of
the "second strike", hence, the individual respondents were deemed to have lost their employment.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's decision, by Resolution dated
October 31, 2001. It held that even if the strike were legal at the onset, the commission of violent and unlawful acts by
individual respondents in the course thereof rendered it illegal.

ISSUE: Whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the "No
Strike-No Lockout" clause of the CBA and, if in the affirmative, whether individual respondents are deemed to have lost their
employment status on account thereof.

HELD: The Court rules in the affirmative.

The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics' refusal to
work on 3 consecutive holidays was prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work schedule.
Having been grounded on a non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements, then the same is a
violation of the "No Strike-No Lockout Policy" in the existing CBA. Respecting the second strike, where the Union complied
with procedural requirements, the same was not a violation of the "No Strike- No Lockout" provisions, as a "No Strike-No
Lockout" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid stipulation but may be invoked only by employer
when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that
are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor
practice. In the present case, the Union believed in good faith that petitioner committed unfair labor practice when it went on
strike on account of the 30-day suspension meted to the striking mechanics, dismissal of a union officer and perceived union-
busting, among others.

The Court holds that the second strike became invalid due to the commission of illegal action in its course.

The Union committed illegal acts during the strike. The Union members' repeated name-calling, harassment and threats of
bodily harm directed against company officers and non-striking employees and, more significantly, the putting up of placards,
banners and streamers with vulgar statements imputing criminal negligence to the company, which put to doubt reliability of
its operations, come within the purview of illegal acts under Art. 264 and jurisprudence.

That the alleged acts of violence were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that the strike
was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in Art. 264 does it
require that violence must be continuous or that it should be for the entire duration of the strike.

The acts complained of including the display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the part of the company
and its officers, apparently with the end in view of intimidating the company's clientele, are, given the nature of its business,
that serious as to make the "second strike" illegal. Specifically with respect to the putting up of those banners and placards,
coupled with the name-calling and harassment, the same indicates that it was resorted to to coerce the resolution of the
dispute — the very evil which Art. 264 seeks to prevent.

As to the issue of loss of employment of those who participated in the illegal strike:

The liability for prohibited acts has thus to be determined on an individual basis. A perusal of the Labor Arbiter's Decision,
which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC, shows that on account of the staging of the illegal strike, individual respondents were
all deemed to have lost their employment, without distinction as to their respective participation.

Of the participants in the illegal strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in the case of union
officers or knowingly participated in the commission of violent acts during the illegal strike in the case of union members, the
records do not indicate. While respondent Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no indication if he
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. The Court not being a trier of facts, the remand of the case to the NLRC is in order
only for the purpose of determining the status in the Union of individual respondents and their respective liability, if any.
118. Escario vs NLRC
G.R. No. 160302
September 27, 2010

FACTS: The petitioners were among the regular employees of respondent Pinakamasarap Corporation (PINA), a
corporation engaged in manufacturing and selling food seasoning. They were members of petitioner Malayang
Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods (Union).
At 8:30 in the morning of March 13, 1993, all the officers and some 200 members of the Union walked out of PINA’s
premises and proceeded to the barangay office to show support for an employee and officer of the union who was
charged with oral defamation by a manager of the company. All officers and members of the union went back to
work afterwards.
As a result of the walkout, PINA preventively suspended all officers of the Union because of the March 13, 1993
incident. PINA terminated the officers of the Union after a month.
On April 14, 1993, PINA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) and damages. LA ruled that the incident
was an illegal walkout constituting ULP; and that all the Union’s officers, except Cañete, had thereby lost their
employment.
Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that PINA was guilty of union busting through the constructive dismissal of
its officers. Union held a strike vote, at which a majority of 190 members of the Union voted to strike.
PINA retaliated by charging the petitioners with ULP and abandonment of work, stating that they had violated
provisions on strike of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
On September 30, 1994, the Third Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO). On November 29, 1994, the NLRC granted the writ of preliminary injunction.
The LA rendered decision declaring the strike as illegal.
NLRC sustained, but held that there was no abandonment on the part of the employees.
CA sustained the NLRC and explained that they were not entitled to full back wages as only instance under Article
264 when a dismissed employee would be reinstated with full backwages was when he was dismissed by reason of
an illegal lockout; that Article 264 was silent on the award of backwages to employees participating in a lawful
strike; and that a reinstatement with full backwages would be granted only when the dismissal of the petitioners
was not done in accordance with Article 282 (dismissals with just causes) and Article 283 (dismissals with
authorized causes) of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: WON they are entitled to back wages during the illegal strike

HELD: Petitioners not entitled to backwages despite their reinstatement.

A fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.
Back-wages are not granted to employees participating in an illegal strike simply accords with the reality that they
do not render work for the employer during the period of the illegal strike.
With respect to backwages, the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor” remains as the basic factor in
determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless,
of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or
otherwise illegally prevented from working.
Under the principle of a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor, the petitioners were not entitled to the wages during
the period of the strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work during the strike.
Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed employees should litigate against their employer on the
latter’s time.