Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 Vincent Pouliot International Security in Practice The Politics of NATO Russia Diplomacy Cambridge University Press 2010

International Security in Practice
How do once bitter enemies move beyond entrenched rivalry at the dip-
lomatic level? In one of the fi rst attempts to apply practice theory to
the study of International Relations, Vincent Pouliot builds on Pierre
Bourdieu’s sociology to devise a theory of practice of security communi-
ties and applies it to post-Cold War security relations between NATO
and Russia. Based on dozens of interviews and a thorough analysis of
recent history, Pouliot demonstrates that diplomacy has become a nor-
mal, though not a self-evident, practice between the two former enemies.
He argues that this limited pacification is due to the intense symbolic
power struggles that have plagued the relationship ever since NATO
began its process of enlargement at the geographical and functional lev-
els. So long as Russia and NATO do not cast each other in the roles that
they actually play together, security community development is bound to
remain limited.
v i n c e n t p ou l io t is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political

Science at McGill University. His PhD, on which this book is based, was
awarded the 2009 Vincent Lemieux Prize by the Canadian Political
Science Association.
Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 113
International Security in Practice
editors
Christian Reus-Smit
Nicholas J. Wheeler
editorial board
James Der Derian, Martha Finnemore, Lene Hansen, Robert Keohane,
Rachel Kerr, Colin McInnes, Jan Aart Scholte, Peter Vale,
Kees Van Der Pijl, Jutta Weldes, Jennifer Welsh, William Wohlforth
Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cambridge

University Press and the British International Studies Association (BISA). The
series will include a wide range of material, from undergraduate textbooks and
surveys to research-based monographs and collaborative volumes. The aim of
the series is to publish the best new scholarship in International Studies from
Europe, North America and the rest of the world.
Cambridge Studies in International Relations
112 Columba Peoples

Justifying ballistic missile defence
Technology, security and culture
111 Paul Sharp
Diplomatic theory of international relations
110 John A. Vasquez
The war puzzle revisited
109 Rodney Brucea Hll
Central banking as global governance
Constructing Financial Credibility
108 Milja Kurki
Causation in international relations
Reclaiming causal analysis
107 Richard M. Price
Moral limit and possibility in world politics
106 Emma Haddad
The refugee in international society
Between sovereigns
105 Ken Booth
Theory of world security
104 Benjamin Miller
States, nations and the great powers
The sources of regional war and peace
103 Beate Jahn (ed.)
Classical theory in international relations
102 Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami
The English School of international relations
A contemporary reassessment
Series list continues after index
International Security
in Practice
The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy
V i nc e n t P ou l io t
c amb ri dge unive rs it y p re s s
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Cambridge University Press
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Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
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© Vincent Pouliot 2010
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First published 2010
Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Pouliot, Vincent, 1979–
International security in practice : the politics of NATO–Russia diplomacy / Vincent
Pouliot.
p. cm. – (Cambridge studies in international relations ; 113)
ISBN 978-0-521-19916-2 (hardback)
1. Security, International. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization–Russia
(Federation) 3. Russia (Federation)–Foreign relations. I. Title. II. Series.
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or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
Diplomacy is letting someone else have your way.
Lester B. Pearson, Nobel Peace Prize (1957)
Contents
List of figures and tables page x

Preface xi
Abbreviations xiv
1 Introduction 1
Part I: Restoring the practical logic of peace 9

2 The logic of practicality: a theory of practice of
security communities 11
3 A “sobjective” methodology for the study of practicality 52
Part II: The symbolic power politics of

NATO–Russia diplomacy 93
4 The logic of practicality at the NATO–Russia Council 95
5 The early steps: NATO, Russia and the double
enlargement, 1992–1997 148
6 The fallout: NATO and Russia from Kosovo to
Georgia, 1998–2008 194
7 Conclusion 231
Bibliography 251
Index 275
ix
Figures and tables
Figure 2.1 Diplomacy in interstate relations 43
Table 2.1 Constructivist interpretations of the logic of

appropriateness 19
Table 2.2 Two ways of knowing in psychological theory 25
Table 2.3 Two ideal types of knowledge 29
Table 4.1 Three indicators of the embodiment of
diplomacy 96
Table 7.1 Evolving (mis)match of positions and dispositions in
NATO–Russia relations 236
Table 7.2 Practice theory and IR theories 249
x
Preface
I have long been convinced that the practice of diplomacy is just as

necessary to International Relations (IR) theory as the latter is to the
former. While I am far from the fi rst to put forward such an argu-
ment, in this book I try to substantiate it with a new perspective on
international politics largely inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology.
As powerful as theory may be to explain the origins and structure of
contemporary practices, abstract models and concepts generally are
unable, in and of themselves, to account for the practical logics that
make everyday action possible and meaningful. Hence my recourse to
practice theory, an oxymoron that aptly captures the particular bent
of this book.
One generation after the end of the Cold War, continuing ten-
sions in security relations between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Russia constitute something of a trag-
edy in international politics. Despite some progress, both sides have
missed a rare opportunity to genuinely pacify and fi nally move
beyond self–fulfi lling security dilemmas. Things obviously did not
have to go that way; if this book can help explain what went wrong
and why in the post-Cold War Russian-Atlantic relationship, it will
have achieved more than I can hope. In a pragmatic spirit, my anal-
ysis starts with the world as its actors have (erratically) shaped it.
I am not normatively attached to current forms of interstate diplo-
macy and I do hope that better alternatives are in the making. In
the meantime, however, I believe that IR scholarship should try to
illuminate, in a rigorous and thorough fashion, the political and
social dynamics that too often produce self-defeating outcomes on
the international stage. The task I set myself in this book is thus pri-
marily analytical. Its critical implications are in showing, fi rst, how
things could have been otherwise in NATO–Russia diplomacy and,
second, what prevented both sides from taking a direction more
favorable to peace.
xi
xii Preface
An impressive number of people have helped with the completion of

this book. It started as a PhD dissertation at the University of Toronto,
where I was blessed with the mentorship, supervision and now friend-
ship of Emanuel Adler. Emanuel will have a deep and lasting influence
on my thinking and I learned a great deal from his constant stimula-
tion and intellectual exchange. As well as being a fi rst-rate mind, he
is also a very kind and supportive human being who will inspire my
own professorship for long years to come. I am also grateful to David
Welch and Stefano Guzzini, the other two dissertation committee
members, who provided very useful advice along the way.
During my PhD years and later, a number of scholars were kind
enough to read my works and comment on them extensively, dem-
onstrating in and through practice that debate and critique are the
real engines of social scientific refi nement. Among them I am espe-
cially indebted to Alexander Wendt, who generously encouraged me
and shared his thoughts with me on my theoretical works very early
on; to Michael Williams, who was a tremendous source of intellec-
tual and personal inspiration in using Bourdieu in the study of inter-
national security; as well as to Iver Neumann, who enthusiastically
communicated his passion for social theory and Russian politics at
a later stage of writing. Other members of the academic commu-
nity who generously helped along the way include, with apologies to
those inadvertently omitted: Amar Athwal, Steven Bernstein, Janice
Bially Mattern, Christian Büger, Jeffrey Checkel, James Der Derian,
Raymond Duvall, Henry Farrell, Karin Fierke, William Flanik, Frank
Gadinger, Catherine Goetze, Patricia Greve, Lene Hansen, Matthew
Hoffman, Ted Hopf, Jef Huysmans, Patrick Jackson, Markus
Kornprobst, Érick Lachapelle, Niels Lachmann, Anna Leander,
Halvard Leira (and other NUPI staff), Catherine Lu, Gale Mattox,
Frédéric Mérand, Jennifer Mitzen, Daniel Nexon, T. V. Paul, Liliana
Pop, Edward Schatz, William Schlickenmaier, Nisha Shah, Ole Jacob
Sending, Jean-Philippe Thérien, Trine Villumsen, Antje Wiener and
Ruben Zaiotti. Many thanks to each of them for their valued contri-
bution to my thinking.
John Haslam, Carrie Parkinson and the rest of the team at Cambridge
University Press provided timely guidance in the fi nal stages of produc-
tion. I am also grateful to my research assistants Virginia DiGaetano
and Séverine Koen, who not only helped with copyediting but also
pushed me to clarify important parts of my argument. In addition,
Preface xiii
I want to thank the editors and publishers of the Journal of Peace

Research (Sage), International Organization (Cambridge University
Press) and International Studies Quarterly (Wiley Blackwell) for
allowing me to reuse and build upon already published materi-
als. Chapter 1 contains a summary of my “Pacification Without
Collective Identification: Russia and the Transatlantic Security
Community in the Post-Cold War Era,” Journal of Peace Research
44(5): 603–20; Chapter 2 is a revised and expanded version of “The
Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities,”
International Organization 62(2): 257–88; and Chapter 3 draws
on and further develops “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist
Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51(2): 359–84.
A number of institutions provided invaluable practical support,
in particular by making possible the many trips abroad that my
methodology required. Many thanks to the Trudeau Foundation
(including Lloyd Axworthy), the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Fonds québécois pour la
recherche sur la société et la culture (FQRSC) and the University of
Toronto’s School of Graduate Studies, Centre for International Studies
and Department of Political Science. I also want to thank Jocelyne
Mathieu and Tanya Mogilevskaya who helped organize my stay in
Moscow through the Université Laval’s Centre Moscou–Québec.
I fi nally want to acknowledge my many interviewees who spared some
of their precious time to meet with me and made the whole project
much more interesting.
My deepest debt of gratitude goes to my partner Magdaline Boutros,
who staunchly stayed on my side throughout the PhD’s hardships and
beyond. I discussed many of the ideas below with her fi rst, and she
turned out to be at once my toughest critic and my strongest sup-
porter. My most sincere thanks for all the happiness – past, present
and future.
I dedicate the book to my parents, Lorraine and Claude, whose
delicate care and stimulating upbringing lie behind much of what
follows.
Abbreviations
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (treaty)

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (treaty)
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU European Union
G8 Group of Eight
IFOR Implementation Force
IR International Relations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
KFOR Kosovo Force
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRC NATO–Russia Council
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe
PfP Partnership for Peace
PJC Permanent Joint Council
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SFOR Stabilization Force
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe
SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
START Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty
UN United Nations
xiv
Abbreviations xv
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO World Trade Organization
1 Introduction
What if we adopted a different perspective on international secu-

rity – one that stresses the practical logics of day-to-day diplomacy?
More specifi cally, what if we conceived of interstate peace less as
an abstract category than as a particular way to engage with the
world of diplomacy? On the ground of international politics, how
do daily interactions between representatives whose states are at
peace differ from those of rival states? What makes a given inter-
national practice more or less commonsensical in certain contexts
but not in others? How are pervasive power relations and domina-
tion patterns expressed, in and through practice, on the interna-
tional stage? In brief, what can we learn by adding to our theories
and social scientifi c interpretations the practical perspectives of
those agents involved in the quotidian unfolding of international
security?
In this book I argue that, in practice, interstate peace rests on self-
evident diplomacy. When security practitioners engage in the non-
violent resolution of disputes as if it were the axiomatic way to go,
they come to debate with diplomacy but not about its opportunity.
Diplomacy becomes commonsensical – the practice from which all
further interactions take place. Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s soci-
ology, I show that this peaceful commonsense is made possible by
the contingent alignment between the practitioners’ dispositions
(the stock of background knowledge accumulated from experience)
and their positions in the field of international security (defi ned by
evolving rules of the game and stocks of valued resources). When
diplomats on both sides of an interstate relationship behave in tune
with how the structure and terms of the relationship are understood
to work, then the non-violent settlement of disputes may become
self-evident, paving the way to peace in and through practice. Where
a mismatch between positions and dispositions exists, however,
1
2 International Security in Practice
chances are that the development of a peaceful order will be under-

mined by more or less intense symbolic power struggles over the
very terms of interaction.
This book demonstrates that the politics of NATO–Russia diplo-
macy appertain to the second of these scenarios. I argue that in
the post-Cold War era, the non-violent settlement of disputes has
become a normal yet not self-evident practice between the two
former enemies, largely due to a growing disconnection between
the dispositions that players embody and their positions in the con-
temporary game of international security. The dominant player,
NATO, possesses large stocks of resources that are highly valued in
the contemporary field of international security; as a result Alliance
officials think from their superior position to Russia and act accord-
ingly. In Moscow, however, pervasive Great Power dispositions lead
security practitioners to construe their country’s position as much
higher in the international security hierarchy than other players in
the field, especially NATO, are inclined to recognize. As a result
of this mismatch, which after Bourdieu I call hysteresis, the con-
temporary Russian–Atlantic relationship is primarily characterized
by fierce symbolic power struggles that thwart security community
development.
Although real, pacification between NATO and Russia remains
limited. On the one hand, compared to the Cold War era and
the continually looming specter of mutually assured destruc-
tion, contemporary Russian–Atlantic relations have significantly
pacified. The possibility of a military confrontation has receded
considerably and the many heated disputes that have plagued the
relationship over the last twenty years have consistently been solved
peacefully. On the other hand, NATO–Russia diplomacy has been
and remains rather uneasy: bones of contention abound, startling
differences in international outlook keep surfacing, and legacies of
mistrust endure. Overall, Moscow and the Alliance have come to
solve their many disputes through power struggles that, as intense
as they may be, do not hinge anymore on the possibility of using
military force against one another. Despite persisting tensions and
struggles, NATO–Russia power politics seem to have uneasily
migrated from the realm of war, however cold, to that of norma-
lized diplomacy.
Introduction 3
Security community development and the

NATO–Russia puzzle1
One of the oldest and most fruitful theoretical lenses through which
to study international peace is the concept of security community. As
Karl Deutsch et al. conceptualized fifty years ago, a security com-
munity is an interstate group of peoples among whom there is a “real
assurance that the members of that community will not fight each
other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”2
With the constructivist turn in International Relations (IR) theory,
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett revisited the concept to argue,
in opposition to the view that the international system is invariably
based on rivalry and self-help because of anarchy, that states can
establish a variety of intersubjective forms of order, one of which is
a security community. By their defi nition, a security community is
“a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people
maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change,” where peace-
ful change means “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for
organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.”3 Contrary
to a widespread view, then, security communities are not character-
ized by the absence of disputes, but rather by the fact that disputes are
systematically solved peacefully.4
According to the standard constructivist account, the main mecha-
nism of security community development is collective identity for-
mation – “a cognitive process in which the Self–Other distinction
becomes blurred and at the limit transcended altogether.”5 As the
redefi nition of Self and Other creates a common in-group identity,
this sense of community or “we-ness” leads to the shared belief “that
common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of
‘peaceful change.’”6 Mutual identification plays a constitutive role
by redefi ning states’ interests and instilling a pacific disposition.
We-ness, the cement of a security community, becomes part of states’
self-understandings and practices, thus producing dependable expec-
tations of peaceful change. Deutsch et al. theorized that we-ness
1
This section draws on Pouliot (2007).
2 3
Deutsch et al. (1957, 5). Adler and Barnett (1998, 30 and 34).
4 5 6
See Pouliot (2006). Wendt (1999, 229). Deutsch et al. (1957, 5).
fosters dependable expectations of peaceful change among countries

because transnational interactions instill a sense of community that
leads statesmen to solve their disputes “without resort to large-scale
physical force.”7 Likewise, for Adler and Barnett mutual identifica-
tion is a “necessary condition of dependable expectations of peaceful
change.”8 As such, for students of security communities, collective
identification is the key source of common interests in fostering inter-
national cooperation and eventually pacification.
Yet this account of security community development faces seri-
ous limitations in the case of post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic secu-
rity relations. On the one hand, the post-Cold War track record of
peaceful settlement of disputes between NATO and Russia seems to
provide evidence of a security community: even profoundly vexing
confl icts, such as the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution or
the Georgia War, did not lead to a military standoff between the
two former enemies. That fierce disputes such as these could be con-
sistently solved “by means short of war,” as Deutsch et al. would
have it, is testimony to peaceful change – the essence of security
community. In addition, contemporary Russian–Atlantic relations
score at low to medium levels on all five indicators of security com-
munity devised by Adler and Barnett.9 In effect, NATO and Russia
have: (1) established numerous multilateral channels; (2) significantly
decreased border defense; (3) partly adapted military planning away
from mutual confrontation; (4) similarly defi ned several security
threats; and (5) generally held, although with some inconsistencies,
a discourse of community.10 Although it has made a comeback in the
wake of the American project of ballistic missile defense, nuclear
deterrence has also receded from the security landscape.11 Overall,
then, it is quite plausible that a trend toward a rudimentary Russian–
Atlantic security community has developed over the fi rst post-Cold
War generation.
7 8
Deutsch et al. (1957, 5). Adler and Barnett (1998, 39).
9
Adler and Barnett (1998, 55–6).
10
Pouliot (2007) expands on each of these indicators.
11
In 1994, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin pledged to re-target all their nuclear
forces away from each other’s territories. As two Russian experts confi rm,
“deliberate conventional or nuclear war between Russia and the European
Union or the NATO states is unthinkable”; Arbatov and Dvorkin (2006, 32).
On more recent developments in nuclear relations, see Pouliot (n.d.).
Introduction 5
Paradoxically, however, this process is not accompanied with what

Deutsch and Adler and Barnett theorize as the key mechanism of
security community development: we-ness or collective identification.
In effect, survey data indicate that mutual representations between
Russia and the NATO member states are quite lukewarm twenty years
after the end of the Cold War.12 Qualitative studies also indicate that
the two entities still construe each other as political “Others.” Ted
Hopf contends that the West constitutes the main “External Other”
in Russian foreign policymaking, whereas Iver Neumann observes
that Russia has historically been and remains to this day Europe’s
“Eastern Other.”13 This NATO–Russia puzzle suggests that the con-
structivist hypothesis by which security community development
rests on collective identification is in need of theoretical refi nement.
Peoples and state representatives do not have to think of themselves
as the same to develop dependable expectations of peaceful change.
In fact, the notion that stable interstate peace has to rest on some
form of prior consensus about a collective identity seems mistaken,
as the transatlantic rift over Iraq recalled.14 Communities, whatever
their nature, continually experience disputes, including about their
own identities. The symbolic power politics of peace are irreducibly
part of security community processes. Interstate peace does not imply
perpetual agreement about collective identity; instead, it emerges out
of shared practices in the management of disagreements.
In taking a “practice turn” in the study of security communities, in
this book I make the wager that it is not only who we are that drives
what we do; it is also what we do that determines who we are. By
starting with the concrete ways in which state representatives handle
disputes in and through practice, I reverse the traditional causal arrow
of social action – from ideas to practice – and emphasize how prac-
tices also shape the world and its meaning. With Adler, I start from
the premise that security communities are fi rst and foremost “com-
munities of practice.”15 This leads me to focus less on how people rep-
resent one another than on what practitioners actually do when they
interact on the diplomatic floor. To use Bourdieu’s formula, I want
12
See, e.g., PIPA (2002); Zimmerman (2002); White, Light and McAllister
(2005); Allison (2006); Colton (2008); and the EU’s yearly Eurobarometer.
13
Hopf (2002); Neumann (1999).
14 15
Pouliot (2006). Wenger (1998); Adler (2005).
to look into interstate pacification as a modus operandi instead of

an opus operatum. In order to do this, I develop a theoretical and
methodological framework to conceptualize and empirically recon-
struct the logic of practicality in NATO–Russia diplomacy.
Plan of the book

This book intends to demonstrate that in order to understand inter-
state pacification, our theories need to be attentive to the logic of
practicality on the ground of diplomacy. In the fi rst part of the book,
I develop a theoretical and methodological framework specifically
geared toward the restoration of the practical logics of peace. In the
second part, I delve into the politics of NATO–Russia diplomacy and
account for the limited development of a security community with the
growing symbolic power struggles over the rules of the international
security game.
Chapter 2 develops a theory of practice of security communities.
I begin by showing that most theories of social action focus on what
people think about instead of what they think from. I then explain how
taking a practice turn redresses this representational bias. Building on
Bourdieu’s sociology, I theorize the logic of practicality and argue
that any and all practices are informed by a substrate of inarticulate
know-how. Finally, I apply this insight to the issue of international
peace and contend that security communities exist in and through
practice when security practitioners resort to diplomacy – the non-
violent settlement of disputes – as a self-evident, everyday practice
to solve disagreements. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa
and hysteresis, I devise a theoretical apparatus to explain the power
dynamics that render such a peaceful commonsense possible or, alter-
natively, undermine it.
Chapter 3 lays out a sobjective methodology that is specifically
tailored to the recovery of the logic of practicality in world politics.
My main contention is that social scientific inquiries need to develop
not only objectified (or experience-distant) but also subjective (expe-
rience-near) knowledge in order to produce incisive narratives about
international life. I start with a short discussion of the epistemological
and ontological requirements of the constructivist style of reasoning.
I then infer the need for a methodology that is inductive, interpre-
tive and historical. A sobjective methodology follows a three-step
Introduction 7
logic from the recovery of subjective meanings to their objectifica-

tion, thanks to contextualization and historicization. I inventory a
number of methods that can be put to work toward that end, paying
special attention to the challenges of studying practices and their non-
representational dimension. After a brief discussion of standards of
validity, I explain the methodological underpinnings of my case study
and offer a detailed picture of how the research proceeded.
Turning to the case study, Chapter 4 reconstructs the logic of prac-
ticality at the NATO–Russia Council (NRC). Building on sixty-nine
interviews conducted in 2006 with officials in Moscow, Brussels,
Washington, Berlin, London and Ottawa, I look at diplomatic deal-
ings from the point of view of their practitioners. In order to opera-
tionalize my theory of practice of security communities, I abductively
devise a set of three empirical indicators of the embodiment of diplo-
macy: the disappearance of the possibility of using force, the normali-
zation of disputes and daily cooperation on the ground. The evidence
that I present is mixed: while diplomacy was the normal practice in
NATO–Russia relations in 2006, it stopped short of self-evidence.
I also discover that at the NRC table there are two masters but no
apprentice. As a result, fierce symbolic power struggles characterize
Russian–Atlantic politics at the practical level.
Chapters 5 and 6 seek to trace back in time the sources of symbolic
upheaval or hysteresis in NATO–Russia diplomacy in the post-Cold
War era. My main focus is on NATO–Russia dealings over the dou-
ble enlargement (geographical and functional) – certainly the main
bone of contention over the last fifteen years. My analytical narra-
tive hinges on the evolving match or mismatch between players’ dis-
positions and their respective positions in the game of international
security. I fi rst show that in the immediate aftermath of the Cold
War, NATO promoted the internal mode of pursuing security while
Russia seemed happy to play the junior partner. Yet NATO’s 1994
decision to enlarge both in functions and membership abruptly put an
end to this pattern of domination, largely because, for the Russians,
the Alliance’s practices undermined the new rules of the international
security game. The resurgence of the Great Power habitus in Moscow
created intense hysteresis effects that were compounded in the wake of
the Kosovo crisis. Despite a temporary hiatus in the immediate after-
math of September 11, 2001, which led to another short-lived honey-
moon in Russian–Atlantic relations, the Great Power habitus further
consolidated in Moscow as NATO’s double enlargement continued

into the new millennium. I conclude that the Georgia War of summer
2008 vividly illustrated the sharp decline in the Alliance’s authority
over Russia. Overall, the politics of NATO–Russia diplomacy consist
of shifting phases of alignment and misalignment between disposi-
tions and positions – an evolution that explains the limited security
community development in the post-Cold War era.
Finally, the seventh and concluding chapter takes stock of the con-
tributions that this study seeks to make to IR scholarship, as well as to
the analysis of the post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic relationship. First,
I return to my theory of practice of security communities and highlight
how it expands and rejuvenates the study of international security and
interstate peace more specifically. Second, I infer from my theoretical
framework two key policy recommendations that might contribute to
easing contemporary symbolic power struggles between NATO and
Russia. Finally, I briefly analyze how practice theory shares common
ground with existing IR theories, while also opening new avenues for
dialogue and cross-fertilization. Ultimately a better grasp of the logic
of practicality in international politics promises innovative solutions
to pressing problems, both practical and theoretical.
Pa rt I
Restoring the practical logic

of peace
2 The logic of practicality: a theory of
practice of security communities
Most theories of social action focus on what agents think about at the
expense of what they think from. In IR, rational choice theorists pri-
marily emphasize representations and reflexive knowledge in explain-
ing political action. In the rationalist equation (desire + belief = action),
ideas factor in an individual calculation informed by intentionality.
Agents deliberately reflect on the most efficient means to achieve their
ends. For their part, several constructivists theorize that norms and col-
lective identities reflexively inform action. Intersubjective representa-
tions of reality, morality or individuality determine socially embedded
cognition and action. In a related fashion, Habermasian constructiv-
ists concentrate on collective deliberation and truth-seeking as a form
of communicative action. Overall, the three logics of social action
that have the most currency in contemporary IR theory – the logics
of consequences, appropriateness and arguing1 – suffer from a similar
bias toward representational knowledge. Conscious representations
are emphasized to the detriment of background knowledge – the inar-
ticulate know-how from which reflexive and intentional deliberation
becomes possible.
In and of itself, this focus on representational knowledge is not nec-
essarily a problem: the logics of consequences, appropriateness and
arguing cover a wide array of social action, as recent studies about
socialization in Europe have demonstrated. 2 The problem rests with
the many practices that neither rational choice nor rule-based and
communicative action theories can explain properly. Take the case of
diplomacy, perhaps the most fundamental practice in international
politics. For most IR theorists, diplomacy is primarily about strate-
gic action, instrumental rationality and cost-benefit calculations. Yet
this scholarly understanding is at odds with that of practitioners,
1 2
March and Olsen (1998); Risse (2000). See Checkel (2005).
11
who rather emphasize the very practical and inarticulate nature of

diplomacy. A former diplomat turned professor argues that diplomacy
is “not a matter of mathematical calculation; it is not an exact science;
it remains a matter of human skills and judgments.”3 In fact, seasoned
diplomats are at pains to explain their craft in abstract, social scien-
tific terms: Harold Nicolson contends that “common sense” is the
essence of diplomacy, while Ernest Satow defi nes it as “the application
of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the
governments of independent states.”4 Clearly, commonsense, intelli-
gence and tact cannot be learned in books through formal schemes;
nor are they strictly the result of conscious deliberation or reflection.
The diplomatic skills identified by practitioners, and that constitute
the social fabric of international politics, are background dispositions
acquired in and through practice.5
This chapter starts from the premise that in everything that people
do, in world politics as in any other social field, there is always a
practical substrate that does not derive from conscious deliberation
or thoughtful reflection – instrumental, rule-based, communicative or
otherwise. An essential dimension of practice is the result of inarticu-
late, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear self-
evident or commonsensical.6 Citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, Charles
Taylor illustrates this fundamental point:
Some outsider, unfamiliar with the way we do things, might misunder-

stand what to us are perfectly clear and simple directions. You want to get
to town? Just follow the arrows. But suppose that what seemed the natural
way of following the arrow to him or her was to go in the direction of the
feathers, not of the point? We can imagine a scenario: there are no arrows
in the outsider’s culture, but there is a kind of ray gun whose discharge fans
out like the feathers on our arrows.7
Rules do not come with their own instruction manual, concludes

Taylor; most of the time people figure out their application unthink-
ingly, based on their practical experience in the world.
3 4
Watson (1991, 52). Nicolson (1963, 43); Satow (1979, 3).
5
Neumann (2002; 2005a; 2007).
6
Practices are patterned social activities that embody shared meanings; see
Adler and Pouliot (n.d.). As Barry Barnes notes, contrary to habits, practices
can be done correctly or incorrectly (Barnes 2001).
7
Taylor (1993, 45).
A theory of practice of security communities 13
I call this inarticulate sense that allows agents to perform social

activities the logic of practicality, a fundamental feature of social life
that is often overlooked by social scientists. By emphasizing this logic,
I join a larger trend advocating a “practice turn” in social theory.8 To
simplify a bit, practice theorists seek “to do justice to the practical
nature of action by rooting human activity in a non-representational
stratum.”9 Against the representational bias that pervades most theo-
ries of social action, practice theory brings background knowledge
to the foreground of analysis. In IR, a few pioneering scholars are
already part of this theoretical movement. Neumann urges students
of world politics to move away from the “armchair analysis” of dis-
course to study social action as enacted in and on the world.10 Hopf
suggests that social identities (and foreign policies) thrive on a “logic
of habit” that generates unreflexive action.11 Adler uses the concept of
“community of practice” to theorize the background knowledge that
cements constellations of agents across borders.12 Michael Williams
takes inspiration from Bourdieu to reconceptualize security prac-
tices as cultural strategies in the international field.13 Jennifer Mitzen
emphasizes routine and unthinking action in the international drive
for ontological security.14
Building on these works, in this chapter I seek to bolster the prac-
tice turn in IR theory by offering an in-depth discussion of the logic
of practicality.15 The fi rst section levels a theoretical critique at domi-
nant strands of social and IR theory, arguing that both rationalism
and constructivism suffer from a representational bias whose episte-
mological roots run deep into modernity. The second section explains
how other disciplines including philosophy, psychology and sociology
provide important clues as to how to conceptualize the logic of prac-
ticality in world politics. In the third part of the chapter, I defi ne prac-
tical knowledge and distinguish it from representational knowledge.
Using Bourdieu’s conceptual apparatus, I assert the ontological prior-
ity of the logic of practicality in relation to the mutually constitutive
8
Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny (2001).
9 10 11
Schatzki (2005, 177). Neumann (2002). Hopf (2002).
12 13 14
Adler (2005). Williams (2007). Mitzen (2006).
15
Though inspired by Bourdieu’s “logic of practice,” the notion of
practicality is meant to specifically theorize the non-representational basis
of practices. In Bourdieu’s more ambitious framework, the logic of practice
covers both representational and non-representational action (see
Bourdieu 1990a).
dynamics between agency and structure. Overall, the relationship

between practicality, consequences, appropriateness and arguing is
one of complementarity. The fourth section seeks to illustrate this
point with the case of security communities. I argue that peace
exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense
makes diplomacy the self-evident way of solving interstate disputes.
Finally, the concluding section addresses the peculiar methodological
challenges raised by the study of the logic of practicality in world
politics.
The representational bias

Most contemporary theories of social action are unable to account for
the non-representational bedrock on which practices rest. The logics
of consequences, appropriateness and arguing all tend to focus on
what agents think about (reflexive and conscious knowledge) at the
expense of what they think from (the background of know-how that
informs practice in an inarticulate fashion). This representational bias,
which pervades both modern and postmodern social theory, fi nds its
epistemological roots in the evolution of Western thinking since the
Enlightenment and the scientific revolution. In an illuminating book,
Stephen Toulmin laments that the epistemic revolution of modernity
gave birth to an imbalance between universal rationality and contex-
tual reasonableness. Local knowledge that makes sense in particular
contexts is dismissed in favor of generalizable and abstract precepts;
so much so that nowadays “the human values of Reasonableness are
expected to justify themselves in the Court of Rationality.”16 Against
this powerful tide, Toulmin advocates everyday experience as the nec-
essary complement to “desituated” and “disembedded” logic.
The epistemic shift that has led Western thinkers away from practi-
cal knowledge over the last few centuries can be illustrated with the
practice of map-making.17 During the Middle Ages, “maps” consisted
of rectilinear routes from an origin to a destination, comprising the
different steps to go through (places to eat, to shelter, to pray and so
on) and walking distances in days between them. In other words,
medieval maps were performative itineraries that reproduced the
knowledge learned in and through practice. Starting in the fifteenth
16 17
Toulmin (2001, 2). De Certeau (1990, 177–9).
and sixteenth centuries, however, maps began to evolve into the geo-
graphical representations from above that still exist today. Of course,
this epistemic transformation took place over centuries. For a while,
maps conveyed both practical and representational knowledge: in pre-
modern maps, for instance, “ships drawn on the sea convey the mari-
time expedition that made representations of the coast possible.”18
But progressively the god-like posture of modern science, which looks
at the world from above, triumphed over practical knowledge. As
“totalizing representations,” contemporary maps do not convey the
practical operations that made them possible. The entire modern sci-
entific enterprise can be interpreted as a similar movement away from
practical knowledge and toward formal and abstract representations
of the world.
The representational bias in modern thinking is reinforced by the
logic of scientific practice and its institutional environment. In try-
ing to see the world from a detached perspective, social scientists
put themselves “in a state of social weightlessness.”19 Looking at the
world from above and usually backward in time implies that one
is not directly involved in social action and does not feel the same
proximity and urgency as agents do. In contrast to practitioners,
who act in and on the world, social scientists spend careers and lives
thinking about ideas, deliberating about theories and representing
knowledge. As a result, they are enticed “to construe the world as a
spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as
concrete problems to be solved practically.”20 The epistemological
consequences of such a contemplative eye are tremendous: what sci-
entists see from their ivory tower is often miles away from the practi-
cal logics enacted on the ground. For instance, what may appear to
be the result of rational calculus in (academic) hindsight may just as
well have derived from practical hunches under time pressure. This
“ethnocentrism of the scientist”21 leads to substituting the practical
relation to the world for the observer’s (theoretical) relation to prac-
tice – or, to use Bourdieu’s formula, “to take the model of reality for
the reality of the model.”22
18
De Certeau (1990, 178).
19
Bourdieu (2003, 28). This and further translations from French are mine.
20 21
Wacquant (1992 , 39). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 69).
22
Bourdieu (1987, 62). See also Bourdieu (1990b); and Pouliot (2008) for an
epistemological discussion in IR.
To return to diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, whose career spanned

the divide between the academic and the policy worlds, concurs that
“there is a vast difference between the perspective of an analyst and
that of a statesman”:
The analyst can choose which problem he wishes to study, whereas the
statesman’s problems are imposed on him. The analyst can allot whatever
time is necessary to come to a clear conclusion; the overwhelming chal-
lenge to the statesman is the pressure of time … The analyst has available
to him all the facts … The statesman must act on assessments that cannot
be proved at the time that he is making them. 23
As a result, diplomacy is an art, not a science. 24 It is a practice enacted

in and on the world, in real time and with actual consequences for the
practitioner. As such, the practicality of diplomacy cannot be fully
captured by detached, representational observation. At issue is not
whether diplomats carefully ponder their options – they clearly do – but
whether IR scholars appropriately take into account the considerably
different context in which they do so (for instance, thinking forward
as opposed to backward). Diplomacy certainly contains a strategic
ingredient; but where does Thomas Schelling’s “focal point”25 come
from, for instance, if not from an inarticulate and socially shared
practical sense?
From this perspective, the epitome of the representational bias is
rational choice theory and its tendency to deduce from the enacted
practice (opus operatum) its mode of operating (modus operandi).26
23
Kissinger (1994, 27).
24
Kissinger (1973, 2 and 326). There is no doubt that, in so arguing, Kissinger
is also positioning himself as the holder of better knowledge than his fellow
IR scholars. Beyond its analytical value, the distinction between the art and
the science of politics is obviously part of a larger symbolic struggle over
authoritative knowledge in the field of IR. As will become clear in
Chapter 3, I believe that both practical and theoretical knowledge are
necessary and mutually enlightening.
25
Schelling (1980).
26
Because it argues that the cost-benefit model “is a legitimate approximation
of real processes,” empiricist rational choice is the primary target here
(Tsebelis 1990, 38). However, instrumentalist rational choice, premised on
the notion that models need not be realistic so long as they explain social
outcomes accurately, also falls victim to the representational bias in that
it overlooks the process of practice (which is modeled regardless of what
happens at the level of action) to focus on its outcome (as congruent with
The problem is deeper than the well-known tautology of revealed

preferences. By mistaking the outcome of practice for its process,
rational choice “project[s] into the minds of agents a (scholastic) vision
of their practice that, paradoxically, it could only uncover because
it methodically set aside the experience agents have of it.”27 While
social scientists have all the necessary time to rationalize action post
hoc, agents are confronted with practical problems that they must
urgently solve. One cannot reduce practice to the execution of a theo-
retical model. For one thing, social action is not necessarily preceded
by a premeditated design. A practice can be oriented toward a goal
without being consciously informed by it. For another, in the heat
of practice, hunches take precedence over rational calculations. In
picturing practitioners in the image of the theorist, rational choice
theory produces “a sort of monster with the head of the thinker
thinking his practice in reflexive and logical fashion mounted on the
body of a man of action engaged in action.”28 In IR, the literature on
the rational design of international institutions best exemplifies this
representational bias.29 It is correct that states seek to mold interna-
tional institutions to further their goals; but it does not follow that
this design is instrumentally rational. The outcome of political strug-
gles over institutions and the process of struggling over institutions
follow two different logics – observational vs. practical. What has
been done (output) cannot fully account for what is being done (proc-
ess). Imputing to practitioners a theoretical perspective that is made
possible by looking at social action backward and from above comes
with great analytical costs.
In IR, the representational bias is not the preserve of rational choice
theory, however: dominant constructivist interpretations of rule-based
behavior also fall victim to it. In James March and Johan Olsen’s
seminal formulation, the logic of appropriateness deals with norm-
and rule-based action conceived “as a matching of a situation to the
demands of a position.”30 This defi nition, however, encompasses two
what the model expects). In other words, instrumentalist rational choice

suffers from a bias toward representation at the level of observation, whereas
empiricist rational choice is biased toward representations at the level of
action.
27 28
Wacquant (1992 , 8). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 123).
29
See Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001).
30
March and Olsen (1989, 23).
distinct modes of social action.31 On the one hand, the logic of appro-
priateness deals with rules that are so profoundly internalized that
they become taken for granted. On the other hand, the logic of appro-
priateness is a reflexive process whereby agents need to figure out
what behavior is appropriate to a situation.32 Ole Jacob Sending calls
these two possible interpretations “motivationally internalist” vs.
“motivationally externalist,”33 a distinction that hinges on whether
agents reflect before putting a norm into practice. I argue that a vast
majority of constructivist works fall in the latter camp, according to
which norm-based actions stem from a process of reflexive cognition
based either on instrumental calculations, reasoned persuasion or the
psychology of compliance. Even those few constructivists who theo-
rize appropriate action as non-reflexive assimilate it to the output of a
structural logic of social action or to a habit resulting from a process
of reflexive internalization. Problematically, nowhere in these inter-
pretations is there room for properly theorizing the logic of practical-
ity (see Table 2.1).
Three main strands of constructivist research construe appropri-
ateness as a motivationally externalist logic of social action.34 A fi rst
possibility is to introduce “thin” instrumental rationality in the con-
text of a community or a norm-rich environment. Margaret Keck
and Kathryn Sikkink’s “boomerang model” is one of the best-known
frameworks of this genre: state elites’ compliance with transna-
tional norms fi rst comes through strategic calculations under nor-
mative pressure; only at a later stage do preferences change.35 Frank
Schimmelfennig’s notion of rhetorical action – “the strategic use of
norm-based arguments”36 – follows a similar logic of limited strategic
31
Risse (2000, 6).
32
March and Olsen lean toward this second interpretation when they write that
in order to enact appropriate behavior, actors pose questions such as “Who
am I?” or “What kind of situation is this?” (March and Olsen 1989, 23).
33
Sending (2002).
34
Arguably, a fourth externalist strand is rule-based constructivism, which also
seems to presume a reflexive dimension to rule-following. As Nicholas Onuf
writes: “As agents begin to realize that they should act as they always have,
and not just because they always have acted that way, the convention gains
strength as a rule” (Onuf 1998, 67; emphasis added). By contrast, I suggest
below that rules become doxa, and thence gain strength, precisely when they
are forgotten as rules.
35 36
Keck and Sikkink (1998). Schimmelfennig (2001, 62).
Table 2.1 Constructivist interpretations of the logic

of appropriateness
Logic of (1) Externalism (a) Thin rationality within

appropriateness normative environments
(b) Communicative action/
persuasion
(c) Psychological mechanisms of
compliance
(2) Internalism (a) Structural logic of action
(b) Habituation through reflexive
internalization
action constrained by constitutive communitarian norms and rules.

A second possibility is to conceive of appropriateness as a logic that
relies on reasoned persuasion. Building on Jürgen Habermas’s theory
of communicative action, some constructivists theorize that the “logic
of arguing” leads actors to collectively deliberate “whether norms of
appropriate behavior can be justified, and which norms apply under
given circumstances.”37 Other constructivists build on the notion of
“social learning” to explain the workings of argumentative persua-
sion in social context.38 Finally, a third externalist interpretation of
appropriateness emphasizes cognitive processes that take place at the
level of the human mind. Relying on psychological notions such as
acceptability heuristic, omission bias and images, Vaughn Shannon
argues that “[a]ctors must feel justified to violate a norm to satisfy
themselves and the need for a positive self-image, by interpreting the
norm and the situation in a way that makes them feel exempt.”39
Meanwhile, a few constructivists take the internalist route and
emphasize the non-deliberative nature of the logic of appropriate-
ness. Yet I contend that even these works fail to capture the practica-
lity of social life because they construe appropriateness either as
37
Risse (2000, 7). Note that Thomas Risse tends to emphasize the
representational dimension of Habermas’s social theory (i.e. collective truth-
seeking) at the expense of what the Frankfurt theorist calls Lebenswelt or
lifeworld.
38 39
Checkel (2001). Shannon (2000, 300). See also Johnston (2001).
a structural logic devoid of agency or as a form of habituation that

is reflexive in its earlier stages. To begin with the former, some
constructivists claim that the internalist logic of appropriateness
is plagued with a “structural bias” that renders it “untenable as a
theory of individual action.”40 In this account, the essence of agency
rests with choice and the capacity to deliberate among options before
acting: “If the [logic of appropriateness] is to be individualistic in
structure, the individual actor must be left with a reasonable degree
of choice (or agency).”41 But this restrictive notion of agency seems
unwarranted within the structurationist ontology that characterizes
constructivism. Agency is not simply about “defying” structures by
making choices independently of them. It is a matter of instantiating
structures in and through practice.42 Without practice intersubjective
realities would falter; thus agency or the enactment of practice is what
makes social reality possible in the fi rst place. In introducing con-
tingency, agency need not be reflexive; and inarticulateness does not
logically imply structural determination.
Taking a different tack, a number of constructivists equate the
logic of appropriateness to the internalization of taken-for-granted
norms. For instance, Jeffrey Checkel seeks to understand how norm
compliance moves from “conscious instrumental calculation” to
40
Sending (2002 , 445).
41
Sending (2002 , 451). As Sending continues: “It is thus a central feature of
structuration theory, which is a key building block of constructivist theory,
that the actor is always in a position to evaluate, reflect upon and choose
regarding what rules to follow and how to act” (Sending 2002 , 458). On a
closer look, however, there is nothing in Anthony Giddens’s defi nition that
restricts agency to choice: “Agency concerns events of which the individual is
the perpetrator” (Giddens 1984, 9).
42
Patrick Jackson locates agency in:
the double failure of social structures to cohere on their own. First,
particular constellations of processes are never inevitable, but represent
ongoing accomplishments of practice. The “fit” of particular legitimating
practices with one another has less to do with intrinsic properties of the
practices themselves, and more to do with active processes of tying practices
together to form relatively coherent wholes. Second, cultural resources
for action are always ambiguous, and do not simply present themselves
as clearly defi ned templates for action. Instead, cultural resources provide
opportunities, but actualising those opportunities demands practical,
political and discursive work to “lock down” the meaning of the resource
and derive implications from it. (Jackson 2004, 286).
“taken-for-grantedness.” In what he calls “type II socialization,”

agents switch “from following a logic of consequences to a logic of
appropriateness.”43 A similar view can be found in Alexander Wendt’s
discussion of internalization, from “First Degree” to “Third.” This
process essentially consists of certain practices getting “pushed into
the shared cognitive background, becoming taken for granted rather
than objects of calculation.”44 Norms begin as explicit “ought to”
prescriptions but progressively fade from consciousness and become
taken for granted. Significantly, this internalist interpretation remains
embroiled in the representational bias that plagues externalism: the
taken-for-granted knowledge that informs appropriateness necessar-
ily begins as representational and conscious.
In distinguishing the “logic of habit” from that of appropriateness,
Hopf comes closest to accounting for practical knowledge in IR. As he
perceptively argues: “Significant features distinguish habitual action
from normative compliance. Generally, norms have the form ‘in cir-
cumstance X, you should do Y,’ whereas habits have a general form
more like ‘in circumstance X, action Y follows.’ ”45 This all-important
distinction, upon which this chapter builds, represents a significant
step toward a practice turn in IR theory. That said, I want to fi x
three main limitations in Hopf’s framework. First, it remains partly
embroiled in an internalization scheme not so distant from Checkel’s
or Wendt’s. In using the language of norm selection vs. norm compli-
ance, Hopf implies that the internalist logic of habit follows from the
externalist logic of appropriateness. By contrast, this chapter theo-
rizes practical knowledge as unreflexive and inarticulate through and
through. Second, while both logics of habit and practicality build on
past experiences, the latter does so contingently while the former is
strictly iterative.46 While habit is fundamentally repetitive, practical-
ity is partly improvisatory because it results from the intersection of a
particular set of dispositions and a social configuration. Third, Hopf
insists that his is only a methodological distinction between the logic
of habit and the logic of appropriateness, which entices researchers to
look for evidence of norm compliance in the unsaid instead of explicit
43 44
Checkel (2005, 804). Wendt (1999, 310–11).
45
Hopf (2002 , 12). See also Weldes (1999) on the social construction of
“commonsense.”
46
See Hopf (n.d).
invocations.47 Though an important piece of methodological advice,

this point falls short of granting practicality the full ontological status
that it deserves in social theory.
At the level of observation, in IR the representational bias also
shows up in a lack of attention to the structural conditions under
which practices of meaning-making are enacted. Intersubjective
knowledge and discourse are produced out of social and political
struggles that exert very real and practical constraints on intertex-
tuality and other interpretive processes. As I argue in the concluding
chapter, the positional dimension of the social construction of knowl-
edge has yet to be fully taken into account by IR constructivists,
including those located closer to postmodernism. In fact, by its very
epistemological standpoint, postmodernism tends to epitomize the
representational bias: detached from, and sometimes even willingly
indifferent to, the social urgency of practices, it runs the risk of intel-
lectualizing discourse to the point of distorting its practical logic and
meaning. Against this tendency, a number of poststructuralists fruit-
fully move closer to Michel Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse
as practice.48 Discourse must always be studied in combination with
political structures in order to understand the positional constraints
on practices. Taking a practice turn promises to help overcome the
representational bias in IR theory, whether rationalist, constructivist
or postmodernist.
Practice turns
Still a recent development in IR, the practice turn has also been pro-
moted in a number of other disciplines. The philosophical interest in
practical knowledge dates back at least to Aristotle who, in his discus-
sion of practical reasoning (that is, reasoning oriented toward action),
highlighted the importance of topoi or the “seat of argument.”49 These
commonplaces are tacit in nature: one discusses or acts with them but
not about them. According to Gilbert Ryle, however, this Aristotelian
insight was later overshadowed by his disciples’ fascination with rep-
resentational knowledge. With René Descartes, centuries later, the
representational bias entrenched itself within Western philosophical
47 48
Hopf (2002 , 11 fn. 44). E.g. Ashley (1987); Neumann (2002).
49
In IR, see Kratochwil (1989).
thought, a situation that lasts to this day.50 In an illuminating critique

of this philosophical evolution, Toulmin equates the philosophical
tendency to favor the universal to the detriment of the contextual
with “the behavior of an intellectual ostrich.”51 This view is inspired
by the later Wittgenstein, arguably the most prominent figure in
opposing the representational bias in philosophy.52 Most famously,
Wittgenstein denounced his colleagues for studying language as a
theoretical system of signs and representations whereas it is primarily
a practice whose meanings are determined not in abstracto but in and
through its context and use. In his Wittgensteinian interpretation of
rule-following, Taylor aptly summarizes the case for practice theory
in philosophy and more largely in social science:
To situate our understanding in practices is to see it as implicit in our

activity, and hence as going well beyond what we manage to frame repre-
sentations of. We do frame representations: we explicitly formulate what
our world is like, what we aim at, what we are doing. But much of our
intelligent action in the world, sensitive as it usually is to our situation and
goals, is carried on unformulated. It flows from an understanding which is
largely inarticulate … Rather than representations being the primary locus
of understanding, they are similarly islands in the sea of our unformulated
practical grasp on the world. 53
Three other disciples of Wittgenstein – Ryle, Michael Polanyi and

John Searle – have also been instrumental in advocating a practice
turn in philosophy. The first convincingly derides the doctrine of the
“ghost in the machine” that pervades Western philosophy, according
to which a chef has to recite his recipes to himself before cooking.54
On the contrary, Ryle argues, “[e]fficient practice precedes the theory
of it.”55 His distinction between “knowing-that” and “knowing-how”
remains fundamental to the practice turn. In the same way, Polanyi
asserts that one may know how to use a machine without knowing that
doing so requires the operation of such and such mechanisms.56 This
50 51
Ryle (1984). Toulmin (2001, 168).
52
Wittgenstein (1958). Among other philosophers who argued in a similar
direction, the American pragmatists (e.g. John Dewey, Charles Peirce) as well
as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are particularly prominent.
53 54
Taylor (1993, 50). Ryle (1984, 15–16, 29).
55 56
Ryle (1984, 30). Polanyi (1983, 19).
know-how Polanyi calls “tacit knowing,” which consists of attending

from something (e.g. the machine’s internal mechanisms) to something
else (e.g. using the machine).57 Tacit knowing primarily rests on bodily
experience and practice: it is knowledge within the practice instead of
behind the practice. This is obviously not to say that the brain plays
no role in tacit knowing. A professor of chemistry, Polanyi recalls that
“mathematical theory can be learned only by practicing its applica-
tion: its true knowledge lies in our ability to use it.”58 One may know
the theorems by heart but their application must be learned in and
through practice as a form of tacit knowing. A similar insight informs
Searle’s notion of Background. As he explains, “the general thesis
of the Background … is that all of our intentional states, all of our
particular beliefs, hopes, fears, and so on, only function in the way
they do – that is, they only determine their conditions of satisfaction –
against a Background of know-how that enables me to cope with the
world.”59 This pre-intentional knowledge is non-representational and
pre-reflexive: it is only activated in and through practice.
The philosophical metaphysics of the practice turn find solid empiri-
cal support in the latest strands of psychological research. In his Nobel
Prize lecture in 2002, Daniel Kahneman argues that there are “two
generic modes of cognitive function: an intuitive mode in which judg-
ments and decisions are made automatically and rapidly, and a con-
trolled mode, which is deliberate and slower.”60 These two modes of
cognition coexist and complement each other. But intuitive judgments
are not mere perceptions although both are equally fast: contrary to
the latter, the former “deal with concepts” and “can be evoked by
language.”61 Psychologists usually refer to these two ways of knowing
as “System 1” and “System 2.”62 The theoretical revolution here regards
automatic cognition: with the exception of the Freudian tradition, psy-
chology has traditionally paid most of its attention to conscious cogni-
tion. More recently, thanks to several experiments, psychologists have
found “evidence from everyday life of the existence of an automatic,
intuitive mode of information processing that operates by different
rules from that of a rational mode.”63 From that perspective, cognition
falls into two ideal-typical categories, as Table 2.2 shows.
57 58 59
Polanyi (1983, 10). Polanyi (1983, 17). Searle (1998, 108).
60 61
Kahneman (2002 , 449). Kahneman (2002 , 451).
62 63
Stanovich and West (2000). Epstein (1994, 710).
Table 2.2 Two ways of knowing in psychological theory
Experiential way of knowing Rational way of knowing

(System 1) (System 2)
1. Holistic 1. Analytic
2. What feels good 2. What is sensible
3. Associative 3. Logical
4. Behavior mediated by hunches 4. Behavior mediated by conscious
from past experiences; automatic appraisal of events; controlled
5. Encodes reality in concrete 5. Encodes reality in abstract
images, metaphors, and narratives symbols, words, and numbers
6. More rapid processing: oriented 6. Slower processing: oriented
toward immediate action toward delayed action
7. Slower to change: changes with 7. Changes more rapidly: changes
repetitive or intense experience with speed of thought
8. Context-specific processing 8. Cross-context processing
9. Experienced passively and 9. Experienced actively and
preconsciously; tacit thought consciously; explicit thought
processes processes
10. Self-evidently valid 10. Requires justification via logic
and evidence
Note: Adapted from Epstein (1994, 711); and Stanovich and West (2000, 659).
Though interactive, System 1 and System 2 in Table 2.2 present

different characteristics. A form of cognitive unconscious, System 1 is
“a fundamentally adaptive system that automatically, effortlessly, and
intuitively organizes experience and directs behavior.”64 Empirical
data suggest that this is the natural mode of operation and that it is a
lot more efficient than conscious cognition. A pioneer in this strand
of psychological theory, Arthur Reber builds on decades of empirical
studies to establish the pervasiveness of “implicit learning” in cog-
nitive processes, that is, “the acquisition of knowledge that takes
place largely independently of conscious attempts to learn and largely
in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired.”65
Importantly, Reber insists, acting on the basis of such tacit knowl-
edge does not make individuals irrational. Their practices, which
64 65
Epstein (1994, 710). Reber (1993, 5).
are informed by past experiences and exposure to environmental

demands, should rather be conceived as “arational,”66 that is, based
on non-representational knowledge and thought processes.
Philosophical and psychological arguments in favor of a practice
turn have spilled over to social sciences. For instance, Roy D’Andrade’s
“cognitive anthropology” intends, among other things, to counter
the representational bias in social theory. As he argues, “social sci-
entists sometimes ascribe rules to the actor when it is only the actor’s
behavior that is being described. In many cases in which behavior
is described as following rules, there may be in fact no rules inside
the actor.”67 In sociology, Eviatar Zerubavel emphasizes the social
aspects of cognition as well as the tacit dimension of socialization,
for instance in the process of learning a language.68 In becoming part
of collectives, human beings learn how to think socially, a skill that
rests on inarticulate knowledge fi rst and foremost. A similar premise
gave birth to Harold Garfi nkel’s ethnomethodology and to Giddens’s
structuration theory.69
More recently, a few prominent scholars have advocated taking a
practice turn in social theory.70 Among the theoretical innovations
advanced is the premise that social action stems from practical log-
ics that are fundamentally non-representational. These inarticulate
meanings cannot readily be verbalized or explicated by the agents
themselves because “practice does not account for its own production
and reproduction.”71 In sociology, this theoretical strand has been
best developed by Bourdieu, whose works have the rare advantage
of being systematically applied to various empirical investigations. In
IR, a handful of scholars have already demonstrated how Bourdieu’s
sociology could enrich our understanding of security,72 power,73 inte-
gration74 or political economy.75 This chapter adds to this burgeoning
66 67
Reber (1993, 13). D’Andrade (1995, 144).
68
Zerubavel (1997, 16). 69 Garfi nkel (1967); Giddens (1984).
70
Schatzki, Knorr Cetina and Von Savigny (2001).
71
Barnes (2001, 19).
72
Bigo (1996); Gheciu (2005); Huysmans (2002); Villumsen (2008); Williams
(2007).
73
Ashley (1987); Guzzini (2000).
74
Adler-Nissen (2008); Kauppi (2005); Pop (2007); Madsen (2007).
75
Dezalay and Garth (2002); Fourcade (2006); Leander (2001). For wider
discussions of Bourdieu in IR, see Mérand and Pouliot (2008) and Jackson,
Peter (2008).
literature by focusing on Bourdieu’s attempt to reach the inarticulate

in social life – the huge body of background knowledge that every
social being carries and uses constantly, if unconsciously, in daily
practices. Many practices appear self-evident without our having to
reflect on them; how can that be? Bourdieu’s conceptual triad of habi-
tus, field and practical sense offers a useful apparatus to theorize the
logic of practicality.
The logic of practicality

Practice theory seeks to save practical know-how from the “nocturnal
abyss” of social activities in order to put it at the center of social scien-
tific inquiries.76 The objective, ultimately, is to bring the background
to the foreground. By countering the representational bias, practice
theory opens a whole new domain of inquiry too often excluded from
modern theories of social action: the logic of practicality. This section
defi nes what practical knowledge consists of and then establishes the
ontological priority of the logic of practicality over the logics of con-
sequences, appropriateness and arguing. Throughout this theoretical
discussion, I use Bourdieu’s theory of practice as the linchpin of my
argument for a practice turn in IR.
Practical knowledge
An interesting starting point to understand the logic of practical-
ity is James Scott’s Seeing Like a State, a rare study, in political sci-
ence, that takes practical knowledge seriously. To explain the failure
of certain states’ grand schemes for social engineering, Scott argues
that state projects of societal legibility and simplification usually fail
because they ignore what the Greeks used to call mètis, “a rudimen-
tary kind of knowledge that can be acquired only by practice and that
all but defies being communicated in written or oral form apart from
actual practice.”77 This practical knowledge is absolutely necessary
for the implementation of any policy because it is on it, and not on
bureaucratic models, that people’s everyday lives thrive. Contrary to
the abstract schemes produced by technocrats and social scientists,
mètis presents three main characteristics. First, it is local and situated.
76 77
De Certeau (1990, xxxv). Scott (1998, 315).
Mètis is knowledge-in-context and derives from concrete applications.

Second, mètis is plastic and decentralized: there is no core doctrine
since it is continually changing with the practices it informs. Third,
mètis knowledge is extremely difficult to convey apart from putting it
in practice. In Scott’s words, “[m]ètis knowledge is often so implicit
and automatic that its bearer is at a loss to explain it.”78 It resists
being translated into the deductive and abstract models required by
states’ social engineering initiatives.
Whether called mètis, tacit knowing, background or an experiential
way of knowing, this stock of inarticulate know-how learned in and
through practice that makes conscious deliberation and action pos-
sible can conveniently be called practical knowledge. Table 2.3 cap-
tures, for heuristic purposes, the main differences between practical
and representational knowledge (this distinction is obviously blurred
in practice). While representational knowledge is conscious, verbal-
izable and intentional, practical knowledge is tacit, inarticulate and
automatic. The former type of knowledge is acquired through formal
schemes, whereas the latter is learned experientially, in and through
practice, and remains bound up in it. Representational knowledge
is rational and abstract; practical knowledge is reasonable and con-
textual. Thus the inferences drawn from each type are respectively
explicit and justified vs. implicit and self-evident. Representational
knowledge factors in reflexive cognition (in situation X, you should
do Y – whether for instrumental or normative reasons), whereas
practical knowledge remains unsaid (in situation X, Y follows).79
In fact, it is precisely because it is unthinking that the background
is forgotten as knowledge. It is located within practices instead of
behind them. Practical knowledge is inarticulate because it appears
self-evident to its bearer: “This is simply what I do,” as Wittgenstein
quipped.80 Thus, a defi ning feature of the practices informed by the
background is that their rules are not thought but simply enacted.
Inarticulate, concrete and local, practical knowledge is learned from
experience and can hardly be expressed apart from practice. It is
“thought-less”: that is, without thought – what popular parlance
calls commonsense, experience, intuition, knack, skill or practical
mastery.
78 79
Scott (1998, 329). Hopf (2002 , 12).
80
Wittgenstein (1958, § 217).
Table 2.3 Two ideal types of knowledge
Representational Practical knowledge

knowledge (knowing-that) (knowing-how)
Cognitive status Conscious, verbalizable, Tacit, inarticulate,

intentional automatic
Mode of Acquired through formal Learned experientially, in
learning schemes; reflexive and through practice;
unsaid
Relation to “Behind” the practice; Bound up in the practice;
practice knowledge precedes knowledge is in the
practice execution
Nature of Explicit and prone to Implicit and self-evident
inferences justification
Direction of fit Mind-to-world (observing) World-to-mind (doing)
Type of “In situation X, “In situation X, Y
reasoning you should do Y ” follows” (unthinking)
(instrumental or
normative reasons)
Popular Scheme, theory, model, Commonsense,
categories calculation, reasoning experience, intuition,
knack, skill
Another useful way to grasp the distinction between representa-

tional and practical knowledge is what Searle (after John Austin and
G. E. M. Anscombe) calls the “direction of fit” between the mind and
the world.81 As Searle explains, when a man goes to the grocery store
and buys items on his shopping list, the direction of fit is from world
to the mind: the man alters the world to fit his mind (here material-
ized in the list). But imagine now that a detective investigates what
groceries this man buys and notes them on a list as they are being
placed in the cart. Now the direction of fit is reversed, from the mind
(the detective’s list) to the world. The list is trying to match the world
as it is being acted upon. A similar difference arises between practi-
cal knowledge, which is oriented toward action (world-to-mind direc-
tion of fit), and representational knowledge, which seeks to capture in
81
Searle (1998, 100–2).
words or other representations practices enacted in and on the world

(mind-to-world direction of fit). Doing and observing, in sum, are two
distinct ways of relating to the world.
Although practical knowledge is generally taken for granted or
unreflexive, not all taken-for-granted knowledge is practical. In
Hopf’s logic of habit, for instance, taken-for-granted knowledge was
once reflected upon before becoming internalized; whereas practical
knowledge is learned tacitly. But just how could a minimally com-
plex practice be learned without ever being explicitly taught? Building
on decades of experiments, psychologist Reber asserts the “primacy
of the implicit”: “other things being equal, implicit learning is the
default mode for the acquisition of complex information about the
environment.”82 Babies learning the complex syntactic rules of their
mother tongue are a good example of such non-representational com-
petence-building. In Ryle’s example, even the game of chess need not
be explicitly taught for a boy to be able to play by the rules:
By watching the moves made by others and by noticing which of his own
moves were conceded and which were rejected, he could pick up the art of
playing correctly while still quite unable to propound the regulations in
terms of which “correct” and “incorrect” are defi ned … We learn how by
practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, but often quite unaided
by any lessons in the theory.83
The point is not that practices rest exclusively on implicit learning,

but that there is always some part of implicit learning in any prac-
tice. Though often imperceptible, implicit learning is the rule not the
exception.
In world politics, for instance, state elites come to master the inter-
national rules of sovereignty and non-intervention in part through
implicit learning. Most of them were never trained in the formal
schemes of international law. Statespersons simply replicate, in and
through practice, the way things are done in international society (or
else they may face social or political sanctions). As such, it is no won-
der that realpolitik practices form the dominant commonsense among
international practitioners.84 On the international stage, most of the
82 83
Reber (1993, 25). Ryle (1984, 41).
84
Ashley (1987); George (1993).
complex workings of diplomatic practice rest on a stock of practi-

cal knowledge that is tacitly learned. Reviewing dozens of classics on
diplomacy, G. R. Berridge observes that there is “an overwhelmingly
strong sentiment that practical knowledge could be acquired only at
the elbow of a master, that is to say, by apprenticeship.”85 This inar-
ticulate mode of learning is a useful complement to the dominant
model of norm internalization and socialization advocated by several
IR constructivists.
Habitus, field and practical sense

As a “knowledge that does not know itself,”86 practical knowledge
does not lend itself easily to scientific inquiry. In this endeavor,
Bourdieu’s theory of practice appears especially helpful because his
conceptual triad of habitus, field and practical sense has been empiri-
cally operationalized time and again – it works in practice. To begin
with, habitus is a “system of durable, transposable dispositions, which
integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix
of perception, appreciation and action, making possible the accom-
plishment of infi nitely differentiated tasks.”87 Four main dimensions
of the concept need to be highlighted. First, habitus is historical. The
dispositions that comprise it are the sediment of individual and col-
lective trajectories. It turns history (and intersubjectivity) into second
nature; as a result the past is actualized into the present. In Bourdieu’s
theory of practice, people do what they do because “this is how things
are” according to the collective and individual experiences embodied
in their habitus. These dispositions are acquired through socializa-
tion, exposure, imitation and symbolic power relationships. Though
“ever-changing” as history unfolds, the habitus instills path depend-
ence in social action, for revisions take place on the basis of prior
dispositions.88
Second, habitus is practical. It is learned by doing, from direct expe-
rience in and on the world: “The core modus operandi that defi nes
practice is transmitted through practice, in practice, without acced-
ing to the discursive level.”89 This is not to say that individuals do
85 86
Berridge (2004, 6). De Certeau (1990, 110).
87 88
Bourdieu (2000, 261). Bourdieu (2003, 231).
89
Bourdieu (2000, 285).
not form representations; but they do so on the basis of the habitus’s

inarticulate dispositions. Without reflection or deliberation, habitus
tends to generate commonsensical or reasonable practices whose prin-
ciple agents may fi nd difficult to explain. In that sense, it is a form of
“learned ignorance” (docte ignorance).90 Borrowing from Merleau-
Ponty, Bourdieu contends that habitus is inarticulate because it is
comprised of “corporeal knowledge” (connaissance par corps), a
practical mastery of the world that profoundly differs from represen-
tational knowledge. Whether one rides a bicycle or plays a flute, these
practices express an unspoken, bodily knowledge that is learned and
deployed corporeally: “Our body is not just the executant of the goals
we frame or just the locus of the causal factors which shape our repre-
sentations. Our understanding itself is embodied.”91 Being a female or
a male, to take a general example, is a bodily form of knowledge that
informs most of our practices without conscious reflection about it.
People behave in a gendered manner often without any explicit teach-
ing; their masculine or feminine behavior is not something they can
readily express in words. In world politics, meetings between states-
persons similarly involve the bodily knowledge of habitus as a “sense
of one’s place” and of the other’s place.92 As Bourdieu explains: “What
is ‘learned by body’ is not something that one has, like knowledge that
can be brandished, but something that one is.”93 In this sense, practice
theory de-emphasizes what is going on in people’s heads – what they
think – to focus instead on what they do. This is not to say that the
mind plays no role in social action: the point rather is that more often
than not, mental processes are so inarticulate that the brain should be
treated as just one part of the body among others.94
Third, habitus is relational: its dispositions are embodied traces
of intersubjective interactions. In tune with the view that agents are
the products of social relations,95 Bourdieu calls this process the
90 91
Bourdieu (2000, 308). Taylor (1993, 50).
92 93
Williams (2007, 28–31). Bourdieu (1990a, 73).
94
One example of a non-reflexive practice that nevertheless goes through
the brain is verb conjugation. When one conjugates a verb in one’s mother
tongue, one usually applies grammatical rules without thinking: practical
mastery is based on background knowledge derived from experience.
This is starkly different from conjugating verbs in a foreign language, an
action that cannot be undertaken without reference to formal and explicit
representations such as conjugation tables.
95
Jackson and Nexon (1999).
internalization of externality. Though located at the subjective level,

habitus constitutes the intersection of structure and agency. Thus
what look like individual dispositions are in fact profoundly social.
Social psychologist Lev Vygotsky similarly supports the view that
“[a]ny higher mental function [is] external because it was social at
some point before becoming an internal, truly mental function.”96
More recently, an increasing body of psychological theory postulates
“the dynamic mutual constitution of culture and the psyche.”97 As a
kind of socialized subjectivity, the concept of habitus paves the way
to a relational ontology of practice.
Fourth, and fi nally, habitus is dispositional. Far from automatically
or deterministically leading to a specific practice, habitus instead
inclines or disposes actors to do certain things. It generates propensi-
ties and tendencies. One could compare habitus to legal custom: both
work on the basis of a small number of schemes that generate a lim-
ited number of possible responses or “regulated improvisations.”98
Habitus is not habit, for the former is fundamentally generative while
the latter is strictly iterative. Habitus is an “art of inventing” that
introduces contingency into social action: the same disposition could
potentially lead to different practices depending on the social context.
That said, habitus also negates complete free will or fully fledged cre-
ativity: agents improvise within the bounds of historically constituted
practical knowledge. Habitus is a grammar that provides a basis for
the generation of practices; but it does so only in relation to a social
configuration, or field.
The concept of field is the second key notion in Bourdieu’s theory of
practice. Simply put, a field is a social configuration structured along
three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of struggle and
taken-for-granted rules. First, fields are comprised of unequal posi-
tions, where some agents are dominant and others are dominated. It
is the control of a variety of historically constructed forms of capital,
from economic through social to symbolic, that defi nes the structure
of power relations in the field and the positions that result. Specific to
a field, capital refers to any type of resources that are recognized as
such in a given social context, thus allowing a player to play the game
more or less successfully. For instance, one may own huge stocks of
96
Quoted in Marti (1996, 67).
97 98
Fiske et al. (1998, 915). Bourdieu (2000, 301).
economic capital in the form of money, yet in the academic field that
will only take one so far. It is rather the accumulation of a specific
form of cultural capital, notably publications and professional titles,
that can move the agent toward the top of this unique configurational
hierarchy. In Bourdieu’s words, “capital is accumulated labour”: “It
is what makes the games of society … something other than sim-
ple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility of a
miracle.”99 Since positions in the field are defi ned by the distribu-
tion of capital, the concept paves the way to relational and positional
analysis.
Second, fields are defi ned by the stakes at hand, that is, the issues
around which agents converge. Fields are relatively autonomous
because they are characterized by certain struggles that have been
socially and historically constituted. All participants agree on what
it is they are seeking – political authority, artistic prestige, economic
profit, academic reputation and so on. Thus the field is a kind of social
game, with the specificity that it is a game “in itself” and not “for
itself”: “one does not embark on the game by a conscious act, one
is born into the game, with the game.”100 In addition to this innate
investment in the game, which Bourdieu calls illusio, agents also
struggle over the value and forms of capital, leading both to evolve
over time and space. Hence the third characteristic of fields is that
they are structured by taken-for-granted rules. This doxa is com-
prised of “all that is accepted as obvious, in particular the classify-
ing schemes which determine what deserves attention and what does
not.”101 Positions in the field are determined by the possession of cer-
tain resources whose value is defi ned by doxa. Generally, dominant
players have a vested interest in preserving the doxic rules of the game
(including the conversion rate between forms of capital) by turning
them into social things – institutions, norms, procedures, etc. In this
endeavor, symbolic capital – those resources that allow one to change
or maintain the rules of the game and to endow these rules with a
doxic aura of naturalness and legitimacy – becomes a “meta-capital,”
because it potentially presides over the defi nition of other capital con-
version rates.102
99 100
Bourdieu (1986, 241). Bourdieu (1990a, 67).
101 102
Bourdieu (1980, 83). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 114).
From the interplay between habitus and field results practical sense,
“a socially constituted ‘sense of the game.’ ”103 As the intersection of
embodied dispositions and structured positions, practical sense makes
certain practices appear reasonable and axiomatic, that is, in tune
with commonsense. Of course, agents are not all equally endowed
with this social skill. In order to have a feel for the game, agents need
to have embodied specific dispositions (habitus) in the past and face a
social context (field) that triggers them. It is through the actualization
of the past in the present that agents know what is to be done in the
future, often without conscious reflection or reference to explicit and
codified knowledge. In this sense, practical sense is fundamentally
dialectic – a synthesis between the social stuff within people and that
within social contexts.104 Thanks to practical sense, agents do what
they could instead of what they should. Practice is “the done thing …
because one cannot do otherwise.”105 Contrary to normative com-
pliance in the logic of appropriateness, practical sense unthinkingly
aims at the commonsensical, given a peculiar set of dispositions and
positions.
The practical sense is inarticulate not only because it feeds on the
unreflexive dispositions of habitus, but also because it hinges on what
I call positional agency. Positional agency refers to those practices that
derive from their performers’ location in a field’s hierarchical struc-
ture. To paraphrase the famous dictum, where you sit is what you do.
Generally speaking, people go on with their lives using the tools and
resources that are ready at hand and enact practices based on their
resource endowments and the opportunity constraints they face. Put
differently, they think from the resources in their possession (i.e. their
position in the field). In the same way that players are taken by their
game, agents are “invested” by the field, including its capital value
delineations. As such, they make use of what is available around them
to get their way. In practice, social action often derives from the mate-
rials that are immediately available in the social configuration; means
regularly matter more than ends. The practical sense is an inarticulate
feel for the game at both dispositional and positional levels.
The notion of practical sense offers a promising way to tease out the
mutually constitutive dynamics between agency and structure. Social
103
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 120–1).
104 105
Bourdieu (1981, 305–8). Bourdieu (1990a, 18).
action derived from the feel for the game follows neither a structural
nor an individualistic logic, but a relational dialectic of “the internali-
zation of exteriority and the externalization of interiority.”106 Habitus
is embodied at the subjective level but it is comprised of intersubjective
dispositions. The field is a bundle of structured relations within which
agents are variously positioned. Put together, habitus and field trigger
practice in a non-representational way, as an intuition that more or
less fits a social pattern. Given a social configuration and agents’ tra-
jectories, action X follows somewhat unreflexively from situation Y.
Suspended in between structure and agency, practical sense is a “pre-
reflective, infraconscious mastery that agents acquire of their social
world by way of durable immersion within it.”107 This view is akin to
what Erving Goffman calls the “sense of one’s place” – the seemingly
natural feeling people usually have about how to behave in a given
social situation. It is the practical sense and not interests, norms or
truth-seeking that allows people to thoughtlessly comport themselves
in tune with commonsense.108 In Bourdieu’s sociology, then, social
action is neither structural nor agentic, but relational.
By implication, the logic of practicality is ontologically prior to the
other three logics of social action mentioned above. To put it simply,
it is thanks to their practical sense that agents feel whether a given
social context calls for instrumental rationality, norm compliance or
communicative action. The intersection of a particular set of embod-
ied dispositions (constituted by a historical trajectory of subjectiv-
ized intersubjectivity) and a specific field of positions (comprised of
power relations, objects of struggle and taken-for-granted rules) is the
engine of social action – be it rational, rule-based, communicative or
habitual. For instance, while it may make sense to be instrumentally
rational when planning investments in the economic field, it is quite
nonsensical (and socially reprehensible) to constantly calculate means
and ends with family and friends. In certain social contexts, but not
others, instrumental rationality is the “arational” way to go thanks
to the logic of practicality. Practicality is ontologically prior to instru-
mental rationality because the latter is not a priori inscribed in human
106 107
Bourdieu (2000, 256). Wacquant (1992 , 19).
108
Goffman (1959). As I explain below, however, the practical sense is not
infallible as dispositions can be out of touch with positions (what Bourdieu
calls the “Don Quixote effect” or hysteresis).
beings’ minds but historically constituted in habitus and fields. Of

course, people continuously think, talk, deliberate, make judgments,
have expectations, etc. in what is overall a very active reflexive life.
Yet it is the logic of practicality, as the contingent intersection of
structure and agency, that makes this reflexivity and intentionality
possible in the fi rst place.
The same logic applies to rule-governed behavior: in that case, the
practical sense reads from context and embodied dispositions the
need for socially appropriate or norm-based action. This inarticu-
late feeling differs from the externalist interpretation of the logic of
appropriateness by which agents reflexively match the demands of
a situation with their identity in order to decide on the course to be
taken. To return to the example above, one would not instrumentally
calculate costs and benefits within family because this is not appropri-
ate. But one need not reflect to “know” this because it is an unspoken
disposition learned in and through practice. Even when the logic of
appropriateness requires reflexivity, prior to intentional deliberation
the agent must feel from practical sense that rule-based reasoning is
the way to go given habitus and the field. In other words, contrary to
norm compliance, the logic of practicality is not based on a “should”
but instead on a “could”: “The practical sense is what allows one
to behave appropriately without posing or executing a ‘should.’ ”109
There is no explicit ought-to because “practice does not imply – or
rather excludes – mastery of the logic that is expressed within it.”110
When one feels from practical sense that the way to go is to comply
with a norm, one may be able to verbalize what that norm is, but
one probably cannot explain why one figured one had to follow a
norm in the fi rst place. Although it is inarticulate, the logic of practi-
cality is ontologically prior: as the dynamic intersection of structure
and agency, it determines which further logic of social action applies,
given positions and dispositions.
Another important implication is that the relationship among the
four logics of social action is one of complementarity instead of mutual
exclusion. The ontological priority of the logic of practicality means
that it informs any and all conscious and reflexive action, whether
it stems from the logic of consequences, appropriateness or arguing.
109 110
Bourdieu (2003, 201). Bourdieu (1990a, 11).
For instance, Adler notes that “the capacity for rational thought and
behavior is above all a background capacity.”111 The same could be
said of normative compliance and communicative action. Contrary to
practicality, these three logics of social action share a similar focus
on representations: instrumental rationality is premised on calculated
interests; appropriateness derives from normative judgment; and com-
municative action is informed by explicit notions of truth and deliber-
ation. In practice, however, the four logics are necessarily interwoven
because any reflexive action stems from the practical sense. When
contemporary statespeople are involved in a deterrence situation, for
instance, their practical sense may lead them to calculate the costs
and benefits of their policy options. In the field of military strategy,
comparing means and ends is inscribed in agents’ dispositions as well
as in the rules of the game. When the same statespeople face close
allies in a disagreement about core values, their practical sense may
guide them to abide by shared norms. Within NATO, for instance,
cold calculations do not always make sense in view of the embodied
shared identity and history of the community. When, fi nally, these
statespeople seek to reach an agreement on new international norms
of intervention, they may feel from their practical sense that reasoned
dialogue is the way to reach a compromise. In sum, which logic of
reflexive social action is to apply typically depends on an unreflexive
practical mastery of the world. Such is also the case with interstate
peace.
Outline of a theory of practice of security communities

Both Deutsch’s and Adler and Barnett’s frameworks on security com-
munities tend to focus on the study of representational knowledge.
In Deutsch’s scheme, a crucial test of “integration” consists of the
“subjective” representations that elites share about themselves: “Did
influential people in all parts of the wider area believe that a fi rm
sense of community existed throughout its territories?”112 The focus
here is on what people think about each other, that is, how they rep-
resent each other. Similarly, Adler and Barnett’s revamped frame-
work asserts that collective identity – the blurring of the Self–Other
111 112
Adler (2002 , 103). Deutsch et al. (1957, 32).
distinction – is a “necessary condition of dependable expectations

of peaceful change.”113 Mutually encompassing representations are
theorized as the constitutive foundation of peace. No doubt these
representations are important for the social construction of peaceful
realities: Deutsch’s subjective beliefs factor in rational decisionmaking,
while Adler and Barnett’s collective identity informs socially appro-
priate behavior. Admittedly, the logics of consequences, appropriate-
ness and arguing all play an important role in security communities.
Yet there is more to peace than representations. To begin with, one
could argue that identity is not entirely reflexive and articulate. In
fact, a number of studies in IR have shown its practical and everyday
dimension.114 Inside the research program on security communities,
however, identity has traditionally been theorized as a representation,
a discourse or a narrative.115 Veronica Kitchen argues, for instance,
that “identity is reflexive and intersubjective. That is, in this particu-
lar case, it exists only as long as states consciously see themselves as
having the Atlantic identity.”116 Given her interest in argumentation
as a process of identity change, a focus on the explicitly invoked obvi-
ously makes sense. My point is not that mutual representations do
not matter, but simply that they may not play the principal role in
explaining peace.
Moreover, it is quite limiting to treat identity as primordial to
practices. Because of the representational bias, IR constructivists
typically envision the following theoretical sequence: identity consti-
tutes interests, which drive action. Discussing identity change in the
transatlantic security community, Kitchen observes that “the ques-
tion of ‘who we are together’ defi nes the question of what we do
together.”117 But what happens if we reverse the theoretical order and
conceive of practice as the determinant of identity? From a practice
perspective it is equally true that what we do together defi nes the
question of who we are. As Etienne Wenger argues: “The experi-
ence of identity in practice is a way of being in the world. It is not
equivalent to a self-image; it is not, in its essence, discursive or reflec-
tive … Who we are lies in the way we live day to day, not just in
what we think or say about ourselves.”118 All in all, taking a practice
113 114
Adler and Barnett (1998, 38). E.g. Neumann (2005a); Hopf (2002).
115 116
E.g. Mattern (2005). Kitchen (2009, 100).
117 118
Kitchen (2009, 97). Wenger (1998, 151).
turn throws light on the constitutive nature of practices, including

identity and security community.
From this perspective, peace is a very practical relation to the
world, characterized, among other things, by non-violent dealings.
While it is primarily mutual representations that strike the eye of the
social scientist, on the ground the practicality of peace entails several
non-representational dimensions. Security communities thrive on a
practical modus operandi that has a different logic than its objec-
tified opus operatum. Take, for instance, the key role played by trust,
correctly theorized by Adler and Barnett as the second constitutive
foundation of security communities. Trust, defi ned as “believing
despite uncertainty,”119 is a good example of an inarticulate feeling
derived from practical sense. Based on personal and collective history
(habitus) and faced with a particular social context (field), security
practitioners “feel” (practical sense) that they could believe despite
uncertainty – that is, they trust their security community counter-
parts. As a background feeling, trust does not derive from instru-
mental calculations, norm compliance or reasoned consensus: it is
informed by the logic of practicality. The reasons why an agent trusts
another are not readily verbalizable; they derive from tacit experience
and an embodied history of social relations. Trust is practical sense.
Given its central role in interstate peace, and for that matter in almost
any aspect of world politics and social relations, the logic of practical-
ity needs to be integrated into the security communities framework
and into IR theory in general.
Self-evident diplomacy
How does peace exist in and through practice? The fi rst conceptual
challenge is to identify the constitutive practice of security com-
munities. I defi ne a constitutive practice as a social action endowed
with intersubjective meanings that are shared by a given community
and that cement its practitioners.120 In the IR literature, Adler sug-
gests that “peace is the practice of a security community.”121 But this
119 120
Adler and Barnett (1998, 46). See Wenger (1998).
121
Adler (2005, 17). In a more recent article, Adler suggests that security
communities “spread by the co-evolution of background knowledge and
subjectivities of self-restraint” (Adler 2008, 197). See also the Norbert Elias-
inspired notion of “habitus of restraint” in Bjola and Kornprobst (2007).
formulation needs to be refi ned because peace is better categorized as

a social fact (such as money) than as a practice (such as purchasing
groceries). In the everyday life of the current interstate system, security
communities are all about the practice of diplomacy, defi ned as “[t]he
conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing
in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.”122 As a
dialogue of states “by means short of war,”123 the diplomatic prac-
tice constitutes peace in the current Westphalian system. Critics may
fi nd this claim tautological. Yet it is no more tautological than saying
that H 2O constitutes water: atoms constitute molecules in the natural
realm in a way analogous to how practices constitute social facts in
the social world. Without atoms there cannot be molecules; without
practice there cannot be any social reality. The semblance of tautology
here stems from the very logic of constitutive analysis.124 One would
hardly dispute that the discovery of the atomic structure of water was
no tautology but an all-important step forward for humankind. The
same arguably goes for the search for the constitutive practices of the
social fact of interstate peace.
Of course, the simple occurrence of the diplomatic practice does
not mean that peace is waiting around the corner. Diplomacy may be
observed in highly turbulent relationships and insecurity communi-
ties, from the contemporary Middle East to the East–West rivalry
during the Cold War. No doubt diplomacy is not the preserve of secu-
rity communities. The key distinction lies in the self-evidence of the
practice. Inside a mature security community, diplomacy is the only
thinkable way to solve disputes, to the exclusion of others (includ-
ing violent practices). As peace settles in, diplomacy becomes second
122
Bull (1995, 156). Limited to the current international order, this historically
contingent observation does not rule out that peace may be constituted
by different practices in political orders other than the current interstate
system, nor is it a normative stance in favor of the international status quo.
My focus on state-to-state peace certainly does not exhaust diplomacy in
twenty-fi rst-century global politics.
123
Watson (1991, 11). In this book I do not thickly describe the diplomatic
practice and its evolution over time because my main focus is not on the
practice per se but on the political processes that make it self-evident in
certain contexts and not in others. For rich accounts of the diplomatic
practice, see Cross (2006); Der Derian (1987); Hamilton and Langhorne
(1995); Jönsson and Hall (2005); Neumann (2005a; 2007); Sharp and
Wiseman (2007); and Watson (1991).
124
Wendt (1998).
nature. The theory of practice of security communities argues that

peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical
sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way of solving interstate dis-
putes. Diplomacy is the constitutive practice of security communities
insofar, and only insofar, as it is the axiomatic or “natural” practice,
to the exclusion of violent ones. When diplomacy is doxa, states do
not live under the shadow of war anymore: diplomacy is the com-
monsensical way to go.
The theory of practice of security communities leads to a positive
notion of peace, defi ned as an international relationship in which
security practitioners think from, instead of about, diplomacy. Peace
is more than simply non-war; it is self-evident diplomacy. Conversely,
an insecurity community is characterized by the fact that resorting
to diplomacy to solve disputes is only one possibility among others,
including violent practices. In between these two political constella-
tions, one fi nds what Ole Wæver (after Hakan Wiberg) calls a “non-
war community,”125 which entails normal though not self-evident
diplomacy. Figure 2.1 illustrates how different degrees of diplomacy
embodiment lead to a variety of interstate relations in and through
practice. In mature peaceful interstate relations, the non-violent set-
tlement of disputes forms the background against which all further
interactions take place. Officials continue to think about a variety
of policies, either instrumentally or normatively; but they take for
granted that all possible options for solving mutual disputes start
from the diplomatic practice. They think from diplomacy and not
about its opportunity. The scenario of violence (or threats thereof)
recedes from their horizon of possibility, which is narrowed down
to a set of diplomatic possibilities. This is peace in and through
practice.
By way of illustration, take the case of the transatlantic security
community.126 Innumerable pundits have announced its demise in the
wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq. Most famously, Robert Kagan
argued that “on major strategic and international questions today,
Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree
on little and understand one another less and less.”127 Thanks in part
to all this expert talk, the transatlantic rift in security cultures and
125 126 127

Wæver (1998). See Pouliot (2006). Kagan (2003, 3).
War community:
Diplomacy in parallel Non-war
with organized community:
violence Insecurity Normalized diplomacy
community:
Diplomacy under the Security
shadow of organized community:
violence Self-evident diplomacy
Degree of embodiment of diplomacy
Figure 2.1 Diplomacy in interstate relations
identities may become a new intersubjective reality. That said, while

the Iraq crisis revealed important differences in international out-
look between certain NATO members, it has made equally obvious
that even deep disagreements over sensitive issues of defense cannot
distract allies from what they have come to routinely do together –
diplomacy: that is, the peaceful resolution of mutual disputes. That
a security community such as NATO is inhabited by disagreements
and identity struggles should hardly come as a surprise: politics and
confl ict never recede, not even from tightly knit circles of friends. But
so long as diplomacy remains the axiomatic or self-evident practice
in mutual dealings, one has to conclude that the security community
is alive and well. Recent strains between transatlantic countries, all
solved peacefully if at times painfully, empirically demonstrate just
that. In practice, even disagreements over the most sensitive issues of
security and defense have not prompted anything like a veiled threat
of possible violent retaliation among community members. Insofar
as the non-violent settlement of disputes remains the self-evident
practice among security officials, or, better put, insofar as practition-
ers think from diplomacy instead of about it, then the transatlantic
security community is a social reality to be reckoned with.
When this axiomatically peaceful logic of practicality settles in, it
takes on a dimension of habit or routine. Without instrumental cal-
culations, reflexive rule-following or communicative action about
the opportunity of settling disputes non-violently, the security offi-
cials’ practical sense leads them to go on diplomatically. Although
routine is an important part of practicality, however, practical sense
cannot be reduced to habit. Routinized diplomacy is more than

habitual repetition because practical sense results from the neces-
sarily contingent intersection of a set of dispositions (habitus) and
positions (field). For instance, Frédéric Mérand shows that the dip-
lomatic practices behind the design of the European Security and
Defense Policy followed neither a rational nor a structural pat-
tern, but a haphazard, creative and combinatorial one. Dozens
of interviews with practitioners indicate that to build tools, they
try materials that work and discard others that do not, following
their inspiration to change the shape of the object incrementally.
Eventually, security officials end up with something completely dif-
ferent from what they had planned (a “bricolage”).128 Another study
of the European diplomatic corps concludes that its autonomy does
not so much depends on the institutions and explicit rules of the
game that formally defi ne and constrain it. Instead, the room for
maneuver rests with what diplomats do with these constraints in
and through practice.129 Even when routinized as in security com-
munities, then, the diplomatic practice retains a crucial element of
contingency. To paraphrase Ryle, practitioners attend from diplo-
macy to the contingent matters at hand.
Hysteresis, (dis)positions and order in

security communities
The crucial question awaits: how do we get there? What are the
sociopolitical processes that turn diplomacy into the self-evident
way of solving interstate disputes? The conventional constructivist
take on the matter would center on norm internalization. Following
this, the peaceful settlement of disputes begins as an explicit norm
with which security elites at fi rst comply out of instrumental ration-
ality. With iteration, the practice becomes internalized as legitimate
or taken-for-granted. In this connection, Checkel envisions three
“modes of rationality” whereby deep socialization occurs: instru-
mental (strategic calculation), bounded (role-playing) and commu-
nicative (normative suasion).130 Though useful, this internalization
framework suffers from two main shortcomings. First, it remains
128 129 130

Mérand (2008, 134). Cross (2006). Checkel (2005).
embroiled in the representational bias: taken-for-granted knowl-

edge necessarily began as explicit representations upon which
agents once reflected intentionally. Practice theory, by contrast,
emphasizes tacit learning, a cognitive mechanism that accounts for
the transmission of practices without explicit teaching or reflexive
compliance. For example, the concept of communities of practice
allows for the theorization of “learning as social participation.”131
Collective learning occurs in and through practice, within com-
munities of doers.
Second, the norm internalization framework is sociologically
thin: the social context that makes the logic of practicality possible
is barely theorized. Especially lacking is a theorization of the power
relations that constitute self-evident practices such as diplomacy
within security communities. Contrary to widespread liberal views,
peace is more than the result of the “arrangement of differences”
or a “win-win compromise.” Peace originates from the imposition
of meanings through power relations, as barely perceptible as they
may be. As Foucault argues: “What makes power hold good, what
makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us
as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.”132 Just like
any social fact, peace or security communities never simply happen
to be there: they are necessarily the result of past struggles among
agents to defi ne reality. As Barnett and Adler observe, “the ability
to create the underlying rules of the game, to defi ne what consti-
tutes acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit
to these rules because they are now part of their self-understandings
is perhaps the most subtle and effective form of power.”133 Peace is
a form of doxa and it is infused with all the symbolic violence that
comes with the order of things. Indeed, symbolic power – the impo-
sition of meanings (including legitimacy) through social relations –
turns a zero-sum struggle for defi ning reality and morality into
something that has all the attributes of a win-win relationship: inter-
state peace.
131
Wenger (1998, 4).
132
Foucault (1980, 119). In IR, see Barnett and Duvall (2005); and Guzzini
(2005).
133
Barnett and Adler (1998, 424).
Security communities are peaceful patterns of order in interstate

relations.134 At the micro level, this pattern rests on diplomatic
practical sense. At the macro-level, it is doxa that consolidates self-
evident diplomacy into intersubjective, taken-for-granted structures.
The micro–macro mechanism that links up the two levels is the
power-laden aligning of positions and dispositions. A given practice
becomes doxic – or, put differently, a pattern of social order settles
in – when there exists what Bourdieu calls a “homology” between
positions in the field and dispositions in habitus. In other words,
when agents’ habitus mirrors the configurational hierarchy of which
they are part, the practical sense becomes a self-regulating mecha-
nism whereby inclinations become in perfect tune with the struc-
ture of positions and the rules of the game. This is the inarticulate
side of Goffman’s sense of one’s place. Under conditions of homol-
ogy, necessity makes virtue, so to speak. The (objectively) impos-
sible is (subjectively) unthinkable and the (objectively) plausible is
(subjectively) inevitable.135 This “orchestra without a conductor” is
at the very root of social order and domination: a habitus that is
homologous to the field’s structure basically reproduces it as part
of the order of things. As Bourdieu notes: “It is the pre-reflexive fit
between the objective and the embodied structures … that explains
the ease (which in the end really is amazing) with which, throughout
history but for a few crisis situations, dominant agents impose their
domination.”136
The use of the gerund form – the aligning of positions and dis-
positions – is meant to introduce agency and political struggles in
the fight for domination of the field. Dispositions do not simply hap-
pen to fit with positions (a functionalist argument) but are actively
and often painstakingly fitted by the dominant agents.137 The order
of things is established through the iterated practices performed by
capital-endowed players: in effect, their doing something in a certain
way makes the implicit but powerful claim that “this is how things
are.”138 Power is exerted at the level of inarticulate knowledge: mean-
ings are imposed in and through practice. This “practical mimesis,”
as Bourdieu notes, differs from imitation, which requires “a conscious
134
Mattern (2001; 2005); Williams (2001); and Pouliot and Lachmann (2004).
135 136
Bourdieu (2003, 332–3). Bourdieu (2003, 256–7).
137 138
Jackson (2006a). See Swidler (2001, 87).
effort.”139 The archetype of a power relation in and through prac-

tice is apprenticeship, in which the master’s competence is felt by the
apprentice as a relation of immediate adherence to the very nature of
things. As Polanyi put it:
To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master

because you trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot ana-
lyse and account in detail for its effectiveness. By watching the master and
emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice uncon-
sciously picks up the rules of the art, including those which are not explic-
itly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated
only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the
imitation of another.140
The key resource in aligning positions and dispositions is symbolic

power, which, by legitimizing the order of things, “somatizes” domi-
nation. As a result, patterns of order (i.e. self-evident practices) cloak
themselves as doxa – “the relationship of immediate adherence that
is established in practice between a habitus and the field to which it
is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows
from practical sense.”141
When habitus is perfectly attuned to the field’s distribution of posi-
tions and rules of the game, dominant players become masters whose
higher position in the game and control over its rules are self-rein-
forcing assets. In effect, a habitus homologous to the field’s structure
is the ultimate vehicle of domination because the weaker players, dis-
posed to take a social configuration for granted as part of the natu-
ral order of things, become complicit in maintaining the domination
pattern. Despite the clear disadvantage conferred by their position
in the distribution of capital and especially by the rules of the game,
dominated players partake in their domination as they willingly
(though usually not reflexively) play the game of their own exploi-
tation. In this context, domination becomes invisible to the domi-
nated: it is self-evident, as part of the natural order of things. This
is what Bourdieu calls “misrecognition” – “the fact of recognizing a
violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive
139
Bourdieu (1990a, 73).
140
Quoted in Lynch (1997, 339).
141
Bourdieu (1990a, 68); see Bourdieu (2001a).
it as such.”142 Misrecognition renders domination invisible as part of

the (legitimate) order of things: misrecognized power is recognized as
authoritative but miscognized as the source of domination. Under a
perfect alignment between positions and dispositions, order is just as
strong as it is invisible.
Conversely, when the homology between history-made things (field)
and history-made bodies (habitus) is broken, the domination pattern
weakens. Bourdieu calls the possible disconnection between positions
and dispositions “hysteresis,” a concept derived from the Greek hys-
terein (to be behind) that refers, in physics, to the lag that may occur
between the cause and its effects on the behavior of a particle subject
to a physical force. Comparing a social field with a magnetic field
(where the magnet is the stake at hand), Bourdieu defi nes hysteresis
as “cases in which dispositions function out of phase and practices
are objectively ill-adapted to the present conditions because they are
objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain.”143 In any type
of social configuration, one always fi nds agents who exhibit awkward
practices and who behave out of place.144 These “Don Quixote effects”
are captured by the notion of hysteresis. When their practical sense
(i.e. the interplay between habitus and field) is socially ill-adapted
to a concrete situation, quixotic agents do not behave in tune with
commonsense. Given one’s historical exposure to struggles in other
fields, for instance, one may be inclined to mistake one’s own place
in a social configuration. In Bourdieu’s words: “Habitus is a principle
of invention which, generated by history, is somewhat dragged away
142
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 168).
143
Bourdieu (1990a, 62). For an intriguing modelization of hysteresis in
economics, see Katzner (1999).
144
In international politics, Williams uses a trivial yet telling example of
hysteresis when General Alexander Lebed from Russia visited President
Clinton in the 1990s, a meeting that prompted negative reactions inside the
White House. As Williams comments:
What was “shocking” was that Lebed clearly did not appear to be the
“kind of man” that he was supposed to be, that in significant ways it
appeared he did not “belong.” That he didn’t know where to stand, and
could not “look you in the eye,” reflects a series of judgements emerging
out of the habitus of the American official and the field of accepted practice
in which it operates. This is then directly and evaluatively applied in an
appreciation of Lebed’s personal and political stature via an evaluation of
his own bodily hexis. (Williams 2007, 30).
from history: since dispositions are durable, they spark all sorts of
hysteresis effects (of lag, gap, discrepancy).”145 When the subjectiv-
ized imprint of habitus is not homologous to intersubjective rules of
the game and positions in the field, this disconnection weakens social
order and domination patterns and opens the door to social change.
In Bourdieu’s theory, therefore, domination rests not only with the
possession of valuable resources (capital) as mediated by the rules of
the game. While power is a social distance defi ned along structural and
relational properties, it also hinges on the ways that these are reflected
within agents’ bodies. In other words, a power relation is necessar-
ily “sobjective” – both objectified and subjective (see Chapter 3). As
Bourdieu contends, conceiving power in symbolic terms “does remind
us that social science is not a social physics; that the acts of cognition
that are implied in misrecognition and recognition are part of social
reality and that the socially constituted subjectivity that produces
them belongs to objective reality.”146 One cannot understand domina-
tion patterns unless one inquires into the embodied dispositions of the
players involved, both dominant and dominated. First, while capital
accumulation defi nes the objectified structure of the field in positional
terms, the very defi nition and value of capital is the object of constant
struggle among agents. The issue, thus, is not only what power agents
have but also what power is in practice.147 Second, domination can
only work if it is (mis)recognized as such in and through social rela-
tions. For this to happen, there must be a homology between history-
made bodies (habitus) and history-made things (field). As Bourdieu
sums up: “One only preaches to the converted.”148
Interestingly, this dispositional view generates a different under-
standing of social causality than usual. For instance, Ryle recalls that it
is not correct to say that the glass broke because a stone hit it. Instead,
we should say that the glass broke when the stone hit it because it is
breakable. In other words, we cannot say that one specific event has
had a determinant effect on behaviors in and of itself; instead, it is
dispositions that, being susceptible to such a determinant effect, give
the event its historical efficacy.149 In terms of social practice, Searle
145
Bourdieu (1990a, 135).
146
Bourdieu (1990a 122); see also (Bourdieu 1989).
147
I owe this formulation to Stefano Guzzini.
148 149
Bourdieu (2001a, 186). Quoted in Bourdieu (2003, 214).
similarly notes that “we should not say that the experienced baseball
player runs to fi rst base because he wants to follow the rules of base-
ball, but we should say that because the rules require that he run to
fi rst base, he acquires a set of background habits, skills, dispositions
that are such that when he hits the ball, he runs to fi rst base.”150 It is
habitus that makes social patterns possible, not free-floating struc-
tures. In order to capture this crucial dimension of social life, one
must recover the logic of practicality.
All in all, applying Bourdieu to security communities leads to two
key theoretical innovations upon which this book’s case study builds.
First, it defi nes self-evident diplomacy as the constitutive practice
of security community. When a practice is so fully part of everyday
routine that it is commonsensically enacted, it forms the background
knowledge against which all social interaction takes place. When this
embodiment takes place among states’ officials, diplomacy becomes
the shared background against which they interact. They think from
diplomacy not about its opportunity. As a result, peaceful change can
be dependably expected; the orchestra can play without a conductor.
Second, the doxic nature of diplomacy inside security communities
is part of patterns of domination that rest on matching dispositions
and positions. Wielding power in and through practice endows diplo-
macy with a doxic aura of self-evidence and naturalness. Under such a
political pattern, the practicality or self-evidence of diplomacy makes
the social fact of international peace possible.
Conclusion
The logic of practicality is meant to be an epistemic bridge between
practical and theoretical relations to the world. In fact, the very
notion is an oxymoron: practice is logical to the point that being logi-
cal ceases to be practical, as Bourdieu quips.151 This raises thorny
issues at the methodological level.
150
Searle (1995, 144). As Searle further notes, a dispositional conceptualization
of causality and power is in fact akin to Charles Darwin’s evolution theory,
which basically turned conventional wisdom on its head. Instead of: “The
fish has the shape that it does in order to survive in water,” Darwin
professed: “The fish that have that shape (thanks to their genes in reaction
to environment) are more likely to survive than fish that do not.”
151
Bourdieu (1987, 97–8).
The representational bias that plagues modern social theory

arguably originates from the fact that norms, ideas or identities usu-
ally lend themselves to empirical scrutiny more easily than background
knowledge does. Representations such as norms are part of discourse
and debates; they are often explicitly invoked and the objects of open
contestation. Background knowledge, by contrast, is unsaid and
unthought. Agents almost never explicitly mention it even though it is
part of each and every one of their practices. Practical knowledge is
everywhere but always concealed in practices. Consequently, it must
be interpreted from contexts and practices as well as through agents’
dispositions and subjective meanings. Even so, gaining knowledge
about background knowledge is often like asking fish, if they could
speak, to describe the water in which they swim.152
In his critique of practice theory, Stephen Turner calls this predica-
ment the “Mauss problem.”153 In order to decipher the meanings of a
practice, the practice must be both alien and native to the interpreter’s
own system of meanings. On the one hand, if the meanings of a prac-
tice are too deeply embodied by the interpreter, chances are they will
remain invisible as second nature. If, on the other hand, the meanings
of a practice are completely alien to the interpreter, then they may not
be properly understood within their context. The Mauss problem is a
genuine methodological challenge for practice theorists as well as for
interpretivists. The next chapter takes it up by devising a sobjective
methodology in tune with practice theory.
152
Rubin and Rubin (1995, 20).
153
Turner (1994, 19–24) after French sociologist Marcel Mauss.
3 A “sobjective” methodology for
the study of practicality
This chapter seeks to map out the main lines of a methodology

specifically geared toward a constructivist approach centered on prac-
tices. In keeping with the argument put forward in Chapter 2 , my
objective is to overcome the representational bias by systematically
restoring the practical logics of international politics and social life in
general. The “sobjective” label intends to convey the central idea that
constructivist inquiries need to develop not only objectified, but also
subjective knowledge about social and international life. As Bourdieu
famously explains, both forms of knowledge “are equally indispen-
sable to a science of the social world that cannot be reduced either
to a social phenomenology or to a social physics.”1 The methodology
outlined below offers practical guidance as to how to achieve such a
sobjective-with-an-o social science.
Methodology is, according to one prominent observer, “the major
missing link in constructivist theory and research.”2 Another leading
scholar concurs that “the time is ripe for further debate about best
practices for those working with discourse and texts.”3 Indeed, con-
structivists have yet to devise a distinct modus operandi designed to
study the social construction of meaningful realities. This is not to deny
the commonly held view that “constructivist analysis is compatible with
many research methods currently used in social science and political
science”4; indeed, I would argue that constructivism does not require
the development of brand new methods. That said, the approach would
certainly benefit from engaging more systematically and coherently
with pressing methodological issues. In addition, the consolidation of
constructivist methodology would facilitate dialogue with other IR the-
oretical approaches by making its standards of validity more explicit
and amenable to non-constructivist ways of doing research.
1 2
Bourdieu (1990a, 25). Adler (2002 ,109).
3 4
Checkel (2004, 239). Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 392).
52
A “sobjective” methodology 53
As such, this chapter seeks to foster methodological conversations

across the spectrum of IR approaches, particularly by allowing for
the comparative assessment of constructivist works and more main-
stream research. By showing how scholars with arguably unbridge-
able ontological and epistemological differences can still share some
methods and use a similar language, I aim to ground abstract debates
and avoid all-too-common dialogues of the deaf. There is no pretense
here that positivism and interpretivism can ultimately be reconciled –
they most probably cannot. Nevertheless, there is much to be gained
from learning how to make constructivist and mainstream works
speak to each other on fundamental issues of validity, falsifiability
and generalizability. Although conversions are unlikely, academic
conversations across metatheoretical divides often are at the source
of promising new ways of thinking.
Following others, I distinguish between research methods, which
consist of concrete tools of inquiry, and methodology – an encom-
passing term referring “to those basic assumptions about the world
we study, which are prior to the specific techniques adopted by the
scholar undertaking research.”5 Put differently, while the same meth-
ods may be shared by various methodologies, a methodology com-
prises a set of epistemological and ontological requirements that
formulates its own scientific standards and truth conditions. Research
methods, in other words, should be aligned with the researcher’s style
of reasoning – ontology and epistemology.6 I do not mean to dispute
that methodological choices need to be problem-driven – that research
questions should come fi rst and methods second. But on a deeper level,
the horizon of thinkable (or what is deemed interesting or relevant)
research questions is circumscribed by one’s style of reasoning.
The chapter contains five sections. In the fi rst section I discuss the
peculiarities of the constructivist style of reasoning as I conceive of it.
The second section argues that constructivist methodology needs to
be inductive, interpretive and historical in order to develop not only
objectified but also subjective knowledge about social and interna-
tional life. In the third section I outline a three-step methodology that
moves from the recovery of practical logics to their contextualiza-
tion and objectification. The fourth section engages with mainstream
methodology and specifies where constructivism stands on scientific
5 6
Fierke (2004, 36). See Hall (2003).
standards such as validity, falsifiability, and generalizability. Finally,

I conclude the chapter with a discussion about the book’s case study
and its methodological underpinnings.
Two qualifiers about the purpose of the chapter are in order. First,
I do not claim to develop the constructivist methodology but a con-
structivist methodology. The goal is certainly not to force anyone into
a methodological straitjacket but simply to offer one view about how
to “go on” with constructivist research; there is no doubt that meth-
odological pluralism remains a valuable state of affairs in IR. Second,
in the following pages I neither claim to survey the entire construc-
tivist literature of the last decade nor do I intend to reinvent the con-
structivist wheel, so to speak. I take inspiration from existing works
and seek to systematize, under the sobjectivist umbrella, a variety of
methodological insights that remain scattered to this day. Ultimately,
my objective is to foster debate about best research practices, not only
among constructivists but within IR scholarship more generally.
The constructivist style of reasoning

The central claim of this fi rst part is that constructivism constitutes
a “style of reasoning” of its own in social science, a claim that has
crucial methodological implications. Following Guzzini, I conceive
of constructivism as a “metatheoretical commitment” based on three
tenets: fi rst, knowledge is socially constructed (an epistemological
claim); second, social reality is constructed (an ontological claim);
and third, knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive (a reflexive
claim).7 Accordingly, the social construction of knowledge and the
construction of social reality are two sides of the same coin.
The notion of “style of reasoning” was developed by philosopher
of science Ian Hacking in the early 1980s.8 Reminiscent of Thomas
Kuhn’s “paradigms,” Hacking’s concept underscores the fact that
throughout history there have been “new modes of reasoning that
have specific beginnings and trajectories of development.”9 However,
contrary to Kuhn, Hacking is preoccupied not by the incommen-
surability of styles of reasoning – that different paradigms are not
7
Guzzini (2000; 2005); see Adler (2002).
8
Hacking (1982; reprinted in Hacking 2002a, 159–77).
9
Hacking (2002a, 162).
mutually expressible – but rather by their capability to define new

worlds as well as the very meanings of truth and falsehood. For
Hacking, styles of reasoning are historically constituted epistemes.
Some have disappeared over time: alchemy and witchcraft, domi-
nant during the Middle Ages, or Renaissance medicine are examples
of vanished styles of reasoning that are almost impenetrable to the
twenty-fi rst-century mind. In the natural sciences, Hacking docu-
ments the historical emergence of the “laboratory style” (“which does
not observe the workings of nature but intervenes in them”) and,
later, of the “probabilistic style” (which envisions “a world in which
everything is cloaked in probabilities”).10
A style of reasoning is defi ned by “a new domain of objects to
study” (an ontology), a new kind of “truth conditions” (an episte-
mology), as well as “its own criteria of proof and demonstration”
(a methodology).11 First, “[e]very style of reasoning is associated with
an ontological debate about a new type of object.”12 For instance,
today’s scientific realists argue that unobservable theoretical entities
in the laboratory style really exist; empiricists deny this. Second, styles
of reasoning “introduce new ways of being a candidate for truth or for
falsehood.”13 To return to the example of statistics, Hacking argues
that this style contains within itself all the epistemological standards
for “self-authentification.” The objective truth of a sentence depends
on reasoning in a manner that recognizes such truth; hence the rela-
tive stability of scientific styles of reasoning, which internally defi ne
their standards of validity.
Third, a style of reasoning rests on a number of techniques and
methods that produce a specific type of evidence. Methodology settles
“what it is to be objective (truths of certain sorts are what we obtain
by conducting certain sorts of investigations, answering to certain
standards).”14 People in laboratories do not use the same research tech-
niques as statisticians to arrive at truth. Consequently, the validity of
their fi ndings is assessed in fundamentally different ways. This is the
crucial lesson taken from Hacking’s philosophy of science: any style
of reasoning entails a particular methodology, which is itself com-
prised of a set of methods that are specifically geared toward tackling
10 11
Hacking (2002b, 3). Hacking (2002b, 4).
12 13
Hacking (2002a, 189). Hacking (2002a, 190).
14
Hacking (2002a, 181).
a particular kind of object (ontology) and arriving at a characteristic

notion of truth (epistemology).
Hacking does not venture very far in identifying styles of reasoning
in social sciences; this is not, after all, his domain of philosophical
inquiry. In keeping with the insight that each new style “brings with
it new sentences, things that we quite literally never said before,”15
one can imagine a few social scientific styles of reasoning. Though
it has fallen into disrepute, structural functionalism and its talk of
systems, equilibria and structures can be considered an autonomous
style with its own structural ontology and functionalist epistemology.
In contemporary political science and IR, the dominant style of rea-
soning remains rationalism or rational choice. This style possesses its
own language (e.g. cost-benefit calculations, expected utility), its own
ontology (a world comprised of pre-given, calculating individuals),
as well as its own epistemology (positivism). It has been argued that
the main contender for the rationalist style of reasoning in current
IR scholarship is constructivism.16 No doubt constructivism too has
its own dialect, full of social constructions, norms, and identities.
Admittedly, however, there is no common front in terms of ontology
and epistemology. While a few scientific realists advocate a natural-
istic version of constructivism in tune with positivism, others exhibit
strong postmodernist leanings. In between these two extremes can be
found the great majority of constructivists whose ontology/epistemol-
ogy can conveniently be labeled “postfoundationalist.”17
A slash divides ontology and epistemology because more and more
constructivists argue that “the nature of being (ontology) cannot be
separated from ways of knowing (epistemology).”18 Developing knowl-
edge about ontology is an activity fi rmly grounded in epistemology,
and vice versa. Indeed, Jackson’s view is in tune with Guzzini’s afore-
mentioned three tenets of constructivism when he notes that “a monist
position avoids the thing/thought dichotomy altogether, concentrat-
ing instead on those practical (worldly) activities that give rise to both
15 16
Hacking (2002a, 190). Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner (1998).
17
Pouliot (2004). Postfoundationalism is a metatheoretical commitment to
the notion that, in the absence of ontological foundations of knowledge, the
best way forward for social science is to build on the social facts that are
already reified by agents. Thanks to Daniel Nexon who suggested the term
“postfoundationalism.”
18
Fierke (2005, 7).
‘things’ and ‘thoughts.’”19 First, constructivism holds that knowledge

and meaning in general are socially constructed. This epistemological
claim is far-reaching for it also includes scientific knowledge. Second,
constructivism posits that social reality is constructed instead of
exogenously given. Our world is intersubjectively real because others
agree it is. Third, constructivism stresses “the reflexive relationship
between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of
social reality.”20 In other words, many constructivists postulate that
knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive, mostly through lin-
guistic feedbacks such as looping effects and self-fulfi lling prophecies.
There is no meaningful reality prior to knowledge and vice versa.
In sum, postfoundationalist constructivism is just as much a sci-
ence of knowing as it is a science of being. 21 Neither ontology nor
epistemology should have priority over the other, for they are two
sides of the same coin. Importantly, to say that reality and knowledge
are mutually constitutive is not to give in to Idealism. As Friedrich
Kratochwil explains, “hardly anyone – even among the most ardent
constructivists or pragmatists – doubts that the ‘world’ exists ‘inde-
pendent’ from our minds. The question is rather whether we can rec-
ognise it in a pure and direct fashion, i.e., without any ‘description,’
or whether what we recognise is always already organised and formed
by certain categorical and theoretical elements.”22 For constructiv-
ists, the phenomenal world cannot be known outside the socially con-
structed meanings that we attach to it: one simply cannot know the
world apart from meaning ful realities. Thus the world (ontology) and
knowledge (epistemology) are mutually constitutive processes.
Contrary to scientific realism, which gives precedence to ontol-
ogy over epistemology, postfoundationalism remains agnostic as to
what is “really real” and what is not. There are three related rea-
sons for such agnosticism which, when taken together, suggest that
postfoundationalism is a more coherent metatheory for constructiv-
ism than is scientific realism. First, assuming an a priori reality in
the manner of Wendt’s “rump materialism” carries political con-
sequences that essentially contradict constructivist tenets: material
conditions need to be politically construed as limitations instead of
19 20
Jackson, Patrick (2008, 133). Guzzini (2005, 499).
21
I thank David Welch for this language.
22
Kratochwil (2000, 91).
scientifically assumed. 23 Indeed, assuming the existence of a world

prior to knowledge leads to reifying one’s commonsensical and/or
scientific representations as natural and universal. Second, claiming
with realists that what our models depict is “really real” or “out
there” amounts to scientific hubris. History shows that scientific con-
cepts are just that – concepts, not reality – and that others will super-
sede them as new theories surface. Third, the positivist notion that
science should aim at defi ning big-R reality – grasping its essence, so
to speak – runs counter to the critical disposition that constructiv-
ism endorses by its very logic. Again with Hacking, to say that X is
socially constructed aims to show that X is neither “natural” nor
“inevitable.”24 Instead of seeking to establish the defi nitive and uni-
versal ontology of reality, constructivism must problematize what is
held to be real in diverse political contexts by looking into the consti-
tutive effects of knowledge.
A principled refusal to assume reality prior to knowledge means
that, for postfoundationalist constructivism, there are no such things
as ontological foundations of knowledge. A correspondence theory of
truth is therefore impossible. Yet postfoundationalism certainly does
not embrace epistemological relativism either. Inside a style of reason-
ing, there exist criteria for validity that are not transcendental but
intersubjective, an issue to which I will return in the fourth section
of this chapter. In this postfoundationalist context, the way forward
consists of building on the social facts25 that are naturalized by social
agents. Already reified by agents, social facts provide constructivists
with “epistemic foundations”26 that allow them to develop knowledge
about social life while remaining agnostic about reality. The focus
is on what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, take to
be real. In this epistemological sense, social facts are “the essence
of constructivism.”27 They are reified knowledge that makes social
worlds come into being. Ultimately, to know whether a social fact is
“really real” makes no analytical difference; the point is to observe
whether agents take it to be real and to draw the social and politi-
cal implications that follow. In so doing, postfoundationalism charts
23 24
Zehfuss (2002). Hacking (1999, 6).
25
Social facts are “those facts that are produced by virtue of all the relevant
actors agreeing that they exist” (Ruggie 1998, 12). The concept is Émile
Durkheim’s and the classic example used by Searle is money (Searle 1995).
26 27
Adler (2005). Pouliot (2004).
a middle course between scientific realism (which rests on allegedly

natural foundations) and antifoundationalism (which denies the pos-
sibility of foundations for knowledge altogether).
Methodological implications
Three main methodological implications follow from characterizing
the constructivist style of reasoning as postfoundationalist social sci-
ence. First, induction is the primary mode of knowing because social
facts constitute the essence of constructivism. Research must begin
with what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, believe to
be real. Second, interpretation constitutes the central methodologi-
cal task, as constructivism takes knowledge very seriously. To use
Clifford Geertz’s famous words, it is fi rst and foremost a science “in
search of meaning.”28 Third, the constructivist style of reasoning is
inherently historical for it “sees the world as a project under con-
struction, as becoming rather than being.”29 The mutual constitution
of knowledge and reality therefore necessitates a process-centered
approach.
An inductive methodology
Inductive analysis – a research strategy that moves from the local to
the general – is the necessary starting point for any constructivist
inquiry, as theorization destroys meanings as they exist for social
agents. Deductive theorizing, for instance, deliberately imposes scien-
tific categories upon practical ones. Yet constructivism’s foundations
of knowledge rest not on a set of a priori assumptions but on agents’
taken-for-granted realities. In order to recover such meanings, the
analyst must avoid superseding them with theoretical constructs. In
addition, since the construction of social reality hinges on the social
construction of knowledge, analysts also need to refrain, within the
realms of possibility, from imposing their own taken-for-granted
world onto their object of study. In sociology, Barney Glaser and
Anselm Strauss famously dubbed this inductive enterprise “grounded
theory”:30
28 29
Geertz (1973, 5). Adler (2005, 11).
30
Glaser and Strauss (1967, 226).
a fi rsthand immersion in a sphere of life and action – a social world –

different from one’s own yields important dividends. The field worker who
has observed closely in this social world has had, in a profound sense, to
live there. He has been sufficiently immersed in this world to know it, and
at the same time has retained enough detachment to think theoretically
about what he has seen and lived through.
Induction allows constructivists to recover the meanings and work-

ings of the world as it exists for the actual agents of international
politics. In so doing it acts as a safeguard against two related falla-
cies in social science. The fi rst fallacy, well known since Durkheim’s
exhortation to fight against “prenotions,” results from the socially
constructed world inside which the analyst happens to live, with
all its taken-for-granted realities. Of course, it is impossible to fully
evade one’s world and its meanings; because of the “Rashomon
effect,” different researchers never recover exactly the same practi-
cal meanings.31 But that does not mean it is not worth trying to be
as faithful and accurate as possible. The second fallacy countered by
induction, which is by far the most pernicious, is what I called the
representational bias in Chapter 2 . Most social scientists have become
used to taking the point of view of an external spectator with a view
from nowhere. While perhaps inevitable, this god-like posture has
profound epistemological consequences, as the theoretical relation to
the world is fundamentally different from the practical one. To repeat
Bourdieu’s aphorism, a practice is logical up to the point where to
be logical ceases to be practical.32 Using induction and immersion,
researchers resist imposing a scholastic and alien logic on practices
that are fundamentally defi ned by their practical urgency and embed-
dedness in a social context.
That said, my plea in favor of induction does not amount to say-
ing that social science should rely exclusively on subjective mean-
ings. Contra Alfred Schütz’s “postulate of adequacy,” a study that
narrowly sticks to the meanings held by actors lacks the detachment
required for their historicization (where meanings come from and how
they came to be) and their contextualization (how meanings relate to
others and to patterns of domination). Interpretation also requires
objectification.
31 32
Heider (1988). Bourdieu (1987, 97–8).
An interpretive methodology
According to Adler, constructivism rests on “an epistemology in
which interpretation is an intrinsic part of the social sciences.”33
Constructivism’s interpretive methodology seeks to comprehend
meanings in order to explain social life. Decades ago, Geertz convinc-
ingly exposed why interpretation must be part of any social scientific
inquiry: a twitch is not a wink, a difference that hinges on intersub-
jective meanings and nothing else.34 Because of this interest in under-
standing meaningful realities, constructivists just “cannot escape
the interpretivist moment.”35 In contrast to other styles of reason-
ing, however, in constructivism this interpretivist moment is double.
Interpretation means not only drawing inferences from data, as even
diehard positivists do, but also recognizing (and taking advantage of)
the fact that “an important part of the subject matter of social sci-
ence is itself an interpretation – the self-interpretation of the human
beings under study.”36 A constructivist social science therefore devel-
ops meanings about meanings.
How do these double hermeneutics transform the meanings that
are being interpreted? Building on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s under-
standing of interpretation as a “fusion of horizons” or a meaningful
dialogue with an “Other,” Paul Ricoeur famously describes the proc-
ess of interpretation as the “objectification” of meanings.37 A central
claim of Ricoeur’s interpretivism is that meanings need to be objec-
tified in order to be not only understood but also explained. Building
on speech act theory, he argues that moving from discourse to text
transforms meanings in four objectifying ways. First, discourse loses
its perlocutionary effect (what one does by saying) and to some extent
its illocution too (what one does in saying). What remains is the locu-
tionary dimension of discourse inscribed in the text (the act of saying).
Second, contrary to discourse, in a text “the author’s intention and
the meaning of the text cease to coincide.”38 Intentionality loses its
salience in favor of intertextuality. Third, a text is free from “osten-
sive references,” that is, the immediate references drawn from the
33 34
Adler (2005, 12). Geertz (1973, 6).
35
Price and Reus-Smit (1998, 271).
36
Neufeld (1993, 43–4). On the “double hermeneutics,” see also Giddens
(1984) and Jackson (2006b).
37 38
Ricoeur (1977). Ricoeur (1977, 320).
context shared with the audience. And fourth, whereas discourse is

addressed to someone, a text creates its own (and changing) audience.
Objectified meanings lose their temporality and locality to become
open to timeless, universal interpretation.
The crucial implication of this line of argument is that, through
interpretation, subjective meanings become objectified as part of an
intersubjective context. To objectify meanings is to inquire into what
something means not for a specific agent but in a larger context of
intersubjectivity. This is the central feature of the hermeneutic cir-
cle: interpretation proceeds by relating the parts in terms of the whole
and vice versa.39 To illustrate this idea, Ricoeur uses the example of
a proverb. In order to interpret the meaning of a proverb, one has
to put it in the wider context of a culture, a language, and a set of
related practices. Proverbs are proverbs because uttering them in a
certain context means more than they say. This surplus of meaning is
to be found outside the specific words contained in the proverb and
outside subjective beliefs such as intentions or expectations. Equally,
a culture cannot be appropriately interpreted apart from its particu-
lar expressions such as proverbs. In interpretation, the whole and the
parts cannot be analyzed separately.
Ricoeur’s interpretivism targets more than discourse and language;
importantly it deals with practices more generally, understood as
patterned social activities endowed with intersubjective meaning
(see Chapter 2). As he puts it: “Meaningful action is an object for
science only under the condition of a kind of objectification which
is equivalent to the fi xation of a discourse by writing.”40 Therefore
the meaning of a practice is detached from its advent through the
four objectifying transformations outlined above. Just like a text,
any action becomes amenable not only to Understanding – the sub-
jective interpretation of the reasons and beliefs that inform it – but
also to Explaining – the objectifying interpretation of its intersubjec-
tive context. Interpretivist constructivism is not exhausted by dis-
course: practice is its main object of study.
A historical methodology
An inductive and interpretive methodology amounts to something
similar to Geertz’s “thick description,” which consists of “sorting
39 40
Ricoeur (1977, 328 ff.). Ricoeur (1977, 322).
out the structures of signification”41 – both subjective and objectified.

Yet meanings are never fi xed or static but always part of a dialectical
process between knowledge and reality. Meanings constantly evolve
over time. As a consequence, constructivism is a profoundly historical
science: “rather than using history as a descriptive method, construc-
tivism has history ‘built in’ as part of theories. Historicity, therefore,
shows up as part of the contexts that make possible social reality.”42
In addition, the path dependence and feedback loops that characterize
the dialectics of knowledge and reality further reinforce the need to
study the social construction of international politics in time. As Paul
Pierson recalls, one can stir jam into pudding but one cannot stir it
out.43 Process and sequence matter because social life is fundamentally
temporal – that is, practice unfolds in real time at the level of action.
Such a historicized understanding of social life is in tune with con-
structivism’s denaturalizing disposition. Recall that to say that X is
socially constructed means that X is neither natural nor inevitable: X
is historical. We know X to be socially constructed in part because
it has a history of its own and results from social processes that are
traceable over time. The historicization of X leads to its denaturali-
zation: X needs not be, for it has not always been (or has not always
been as it is). As a result, historicization “neutralizes, at least theoreti-
cally, the effects of naturalization and in particular the amnesia of the
individual and collective genesis of a given world that presents itself
under all the guises of nature.”44
A historical methodology is concerned with the genesis of its object
of study, that is, with the historical processes that make possible the
constitution of specific social contexts. Since no social realities are nat-
ural, they are the results of political and social processes that are rooted
in history. To trace them, the analyst needs to build a narrative – a
dynamic account that tells the story of a variety of historical processes
as they unfold over time. As Donald Polkinghorne explains: “Narrative
explanations are retrospective … They draw together the various epi-
sodes and actions into a story that leads through a sequence of events
to an ending.”45 In IR, Ruggie takes inspiration from Max Weber to
similarly advocate building “narrative explanatory protocols” that
show “why things are historically so and not otherwise.”46
41 42 43
Geertz (1973, 9). Adler (2002 , 102). Pierson (2004, 157).
44 45
Bourdieu (2003, 262). Polkinghorne (1988, 170).
46
Ruggie (1998, 32). See Finnemore (2003) for an application.
Narrative-building is different from causal analysis as understood

by positivists. Instead of searching for constant antecedents, the
researcher traces contingent practices that have historically made
a given social fact possible. The small vs. large N controversy is
thus irrelevant; from this perspective, explaining causality is sub-
ordinate to understanding meaning. Narrative causality traces the
historical evolution of meanings (both subjective and intersubjec-
tive) in order to explain how they brought about, or made possible,
a given social context. Causes are not ontological substances to be
isolated “out there” but heuristic focal points used by the researcher
to make sense of social life. Explanatory narratives order variegated
meanings and practices in time around a number of plots or causal
stories. Like counterfactual analysis, causal narratives reason back-
wards in order to understand why the branching tree of history
took one direction instead of others. Inside the constructivist style
of reasoning, then, historical analysis and interpretation go hand
in hand. And because it implies temporally (and figuratively) stand-
ing back from current meanings, historicization leads to further
objectification.
To tie the three strings together, a constructivist methodology that
is inductive, interpretive and historical is able to develop both sub-
jective knowledge (from the meanings that social agents attribute to
their own reality, i.e. the logic of practicality) and objectified knowl-
edge (which derives from “standing back” from a given situation by
contextualizing and historicizing it). While inductive interpretation
is necessary for recovering subjective meanings and practical logics,
contextual and historical interpretation is required for their objec-
tification in a larger context of intersubjectivity, social relations,
and patterns of domination. This sobjective-with-an-o methodology
aims at overcoming the epistemological duality of subjectivism and
objectivism by restoring the practical logic of social life and casting it
under the analytical light of its intersubjective context and history.
Geertz’s useful distinction between “experience-near” and “expe-
rience-distant” concepts, which he borrows from Heinz Kohut,
conclusively drives the main point of sobjective methodology home.
Experience-near concepts are developed through phenomenological
inquiry with the goal of grasping as accurately as possible a real-
ity that is known by the agents under study. By contrast, an experi-
ence-distant concept is constructed by the scientist in order to break
with commonsensical experience and provide an outsider viewpoint,

different from the ones that are practically engaged in the situation
at hand. As Geertz explains: “Confi nement to experience-near con-
cepts leaves an ethnographer awash in immediacies, as well as entan-
gled in vernacular. Confi nement to experience-distant ones leaves
him stranded in abstractions and smothered in jargon.”47 Striking
a fi ne balance between practicality (experience-near concepts) and
theory (experience-distant concepts) is the main task of a methodol-
ogy that is inductive, interpretive and historical. In practical terms,
as Geertz continues,
The real question [is how] ought one to deploy [experience-near and
experience-distant concepts] so as to produce an interpretation of the way
a people lives which is neither imprisoned within their mental horizons, an
ethnography of witchcraft as written by a witch, nor systematically deaf to
the distinctive tonalities of their existence, an ethnography of witchcraft as
written by a geometer.48
The third part of the chapter explains how to go on with construc-

tivist research by delving into the methodical practice of sobjective
research.
The methodical practice of sobjectivism

Sobjectivism is a three-step methodology that moves along a con-
tinuum bordered at one end by experience-near concepts and at the
other by experience-distant concepts. One begins with the inductive
recovery of agents’ realities and practical logics, then objectifies them
through the interpretation of intersubjective contexts and thereafter
pursues further objectification through historicization. In the spirit
of grounded theory and abduction, however, these three steps should
not be conceived as a unidirectional, linear pathway. As research
unfolds, chances are that the analyst will feel the need to move back
and forth between practical, contextualized and historicized knowl-
edge. In practice, induction, interpretation and historicization should
always be put in a close, abductive dialogue.
47 48
Geertz (1987, 135). Geertz (1987, 135).
Recovering subjective meanings and practical logics

The fi rst step consists of recovering as faithfully as possible the mean-
ings that agents attribute to their reality: that is, the logic of practi-
cality. Social action is understood from within, so as to recover the
logic of practicality as it unfolds at the level of action. This is the
most inductive step of all as it shies away from theorization. As Hopf
notes: “Theorizing is a form of interpretation, and it destroys mean-
ing. As soon as we begin to impose categories on evidence, that evi-
dence stops meaning what it meant in its earlier context.”49 From this
perspective, he continues, “[the] backbone of an interpretivist epis-
temology is phenomenology and induction. Phenomenology implies
letting the subjects speak [while induction] involves the recording of
these identities as atheoretically as possible.”50 By immersing oneself
in practical lifeworlds, the knowledge apprehended at this fi rst step
needs to be as close as possible to the subjective meanings held by
agents so as to develop a form of “cultural competence.”51
This turn to phenomenology runs counter to dominant strands of
IR theory, including constructivism. Over the last fi fteen years most
constructivists have been primarily concerned with epistemically
objective realities such as norms, epistemes, institutions or collective
identities. Such a focus is well taken as long as it is supplemented
with an equivalent consideration for agent-level ideations. After
all, only practices and the subjective dispositions that inform them
can make the social construction of epistemically objective reali-
ties possible. In Adler’s apt formulation, background knowledge “is
Janus-faced because, in addition to being intersubjective knowledge
embedded in practices, it also includes the subjective representations
of intersubjectivity.”52 As a case in point, Neumann’s research on the
practice of diplomacy poses the under-researched question of what it
means to be a diplomat.53 Through his recollection of meanings from
practitioners’ point of view, he supplies a sophisticated hermeneutics
of diplomacy, a central practice in international politics, and goes a
long way toward understanding its practicality.
There are many useful ethnographic methods for the recovery
of agents’ meanings. One method made famous by Garfi nkel is
49 50 51
Hopf (2002 , 25). Hopf (2002 , 23). Neumann (2008a).
52
Adler (2008, 202); see also Adler (1997).
53
Neumann (2002; 2005a; 2007).
ethnomethodology, which seeks to reach the commonsensical and

the taken-for-granted of daily life in order to report as faithfully as
possible agents’ ways of being in the world.54 A related ethnographic
method is participant observation, which involves the researcher’s
direct participation inside a social setting in order to understand it
from the subjects’ point of view. Geertz’s analysis of Balinese cock-
fights is a famous model of that method, which is very effective for the
recovery of practicality. Diane Vaughn supports this point when she
writes: “Habitus can be known by observing the enactment of dispo-
sitions in practice.”55 In IR, Barnett builds on a posting at the United
States Mission to the UN in 1993 and 1994 to supply an illuminating
“empathetic reconstruction” of the organization’s response (or lack
thereof) to the Rwandan genocide. 56
More often than not, however, participant observation is particu-
larly difficult to perform in international political settings, due to the
secrecy and closed doors of negotiations, the size of organizations,
and the geographical distribution of actors. In his study of nuclear
laboratory facilities in California, for instance, anthropologist Hugh
Gusterson quickly realized that he would not be allowed to access
the premises and perform participant observation. He was conse-
quently forced to “rethink the notion of fieldwork [he] had acquired
as a graduate student so as to subordinate participant observation,
conventionally the bedrock of fieldwork, to formal interviewing and
to the reading of newspapers and official documents.”57 Such is the
tough reality of fieldwork. But as Edward Schatz recalls, ethnography
is not reducible to the method of participant observation; it also is
a “sensibility … to glean the meanings that the people under study
attribute to their social and political reality.”58 In a much celebrated
formulation, Renato Rosaldo boiled down ethnographic research to
“deep hanging out.”59 A study such as Scott’s Seeing Like a State,
Schatz continues, defi nitely rests on a close understanding of practical
logics but without direct participant observation in the field. When
access to the field is denied, as it was with the case study I develop
in this book, Schatz proposes a simple rule of thumb: strive for “the
nearest possible vantage point.”60
54 55 56
Garfi nkel (1967). Vaughn (2008, 70). Barnett (2002).
57 58
Gusterson (1993, 63–4). Schatz (2009a, 5).
59 60
Quoted in Gusterson (2008, 93). Schatz (2009b, 307).
The in-depth or qualitative interview is particularly apt at recon-

structing the practitioners’ point of view. Steinar Kvale defines inter-
views as “attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ point
of view, to unfold the meaning of people’s experiences, to uncover
their lived world to scientific explanations.”61 Qualitative interviews
are specifically devised to reconstruct the practitioners’ point of view
prior to further objectification through interpretation and historici-
zation. According to Herbert and Irene Rubin, the “philosophy” of
interviews is to “[fi nd] out what others think and know, and avoid
dominating your interviewees by imposing your world on theirs.”62
The inductive generation of situated, insider knowledge is the key
principle behind interviews. As conversations generative of subjec-
tive meanings, qualitative interviews provide researchers with an
efficient means to penetrate more or less alien lifeworlds. Of course,
the goal is not to mine for the truth but to hear life stories. In order
to genuinely communicate, the interviewee and the researcher must
come to share a similar language and a commonsensical world: “The
researcher has to figure out the special new vocabulary and the taken-
for-granted understandings within the setting … Part of becoming
a qualitative interviewer is learning to recognise and then explore
words that have rich connotative or symbolic meanings for the people
being studied.”63
As I argued in Chapter 2 , the practical sense is not something that
is readily available for verbalization. So if background knowledge is
typically tacit, how can interviews offer any insight into the logic of
practicality? In other words, how can a conversation throw light on
inarticulate meanings? Clearly, habitus, being mostly unconscious,
cannot be reconstructed through direct questions about it. I pro-
pose two main ways to help recover practical knowledge indirectly
through qualitative interviewing. First, focus less on what interview-
ees talk about than what they talk from – the stock of assumptions
that ought to be presumed in order to say what is being said. Most
often, insider stories are particularly interesting for the myriad of
small things they eschew, which typically belong to the realm of
background knowledge. As a sensitive outsider, the ethnographically
minded interviewer is particularly well equipped to capture these tacit
61 62
Kvale (1996, 1). Rubin and Rubin (1995, 5).
63
Rubin and Rubin (1995, 8 and 21).
assumptions and overcome the “Mauss problem” (see Chapter 2). For
instance, Gusterson fi nds that his interviews “generated articulations
not only of fiercely public ideologies, but also of the private, the whis-
pered, the half crystallized on the edge of consciousness.”64 There
exist several techniques to devise an interview questionnaire so as
to indirectly target and recover inarticulate knowledge. For instance,
one could submit hypothetical scenarios to interviewees and ask how
they would react were they to be put in such a situation (see Chapter
4). Another useful trick pioneered by Garfi nkel is to ask questions that
specifically seek to unsettle taken-for-granted knowledge. His classic
example is the routine question: “How do you feel?” When asked
what that question means, subjects in an ethnomethodological exper-
iment appeared at serious loss: the meaning is so taken for granted
that being interrogated about it is puzzling and even destabilizing.65
Certain questions are simply out of place in terms of practical mean-
ings. Should the interviewee appear disturbed, then chances are that
some form of inarticulate knowledge is at work.
Second, ask interviewees to recount other practitioners’ practices.
As I argued in Chapter 2 , asking interviewees to describe their daily
lives always runs the risk of imposing a scholastic logic on prac-
tices. As Bourdieu notes, “as soon as he reflects on his practice,
adopting a quasi-theoretical posture, the agent loses any chance
of expressing the truth of his practice, and especially the truth of
the practical relation to the practice.”66 Just as chefs do not explain
their recipes the same way they cook them, interviews put social
agents in the reflexive yet problematic position of observing their
own practices. This is obviously not the best way to recover the
inarticulate. The corrective that I propose consists of asking inter-
viewees to retell the practices of others – that is, the activities that
they regularly observe on the part of their fellow practitioners. In
this way, the interviewee becomes a kind of participant observer
of everyday interactions. What I have in mind here is not so dis-
tant from what has been called “hearsay ethnography,”67 a method
which consists of asking insiders to recount the practices and inter-
actions that they can observe in their everyday lives (from which
outsiders are excluded).
64 65
Gusterson (2008, 106). Garfi nkel (1967, 42–3).
66 67
Bourdieu (1990a, 91). Watkins and Swidler (2006).
The analysis of interview transcripts can also be focused on the

practical assumptions that make the interviewee’s discourse possible.
Again, the point is that anytime interviewees discuss about some-
thing, they have to think from something else – islands of background
knowledge that can be mapped by the attentive interviewer. To quote
Gusterson once more, “the way to understand lab employees was not
to ask a series of abstract questions about their ideological beliefs
but to elicit life histories that crystallized their commitments in nar-
ratives of the events through which they were enacted.”68 Speaking
often reveals more than the words uttered.
In sum, qualitative interviews can be performed in such a way
that they (imperfectly) make up for the impossibility of participant
observation in certain settings. The method is no panacea, yet as a
surrogate it does go some distance in recovering practical logics. It
is worth recalling that in one of his most famous studies about the
poor, Bourdieu himself makes extensive use of interviews in order
to reconstruct the world of poverty in French suburbs.69 Similarly,
Loïc Wacquant reconstructs the “pugilistic point of view” mainly
through fifty semi-structured interviews with amateur fighters.70 In
their study of knowledge diffusion, Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth
also build on “lengthy personal interviews” with “brokers, courtiers,
and learned compradors who are key actors in the import and export
of expertises.”71 Their method of “relational biography” follows a
key principle of reflexivity, which is to inquire into “who these indi-
viduals are and where they come from in order to see the relationship
between what they say and their own strategic positions.” By being
particularly attentive to dispositions and positions, a practice-centric
analysis based on qualitative interviews is quite different from tradi-
tional discourse analysis.
The method of qualitative interview assumes that relevant agents
are alive and willing to discuss their experience with the researcher.
This, of course, is not always the case. There are a host of written
sources that can also convey subjective meanings without requiring
living subjects, including personal diaries, memoirs, correspondence,
interview and press conference transcripts, or tapes. The important
step in using these documents is to go beyond traditional discourse
68 69
Gusterson (2008, 98). Bourdieu et al. (1993).
70 71
Wacquant (1995). Dezalay and Garth (2002 , 9).
analysis in order to reconstruct the world from the practitioners’ point

of view. Vaughn’s “historical ethnography” – “an attempt to recon-
struct structure and culture from archival documents and interviews
to see how people in a different time and place made sense of things” –
is particularly illuminating.72 Her application of this method to the
case of the Columbia disaster goes a long way toward reconstruct-
ing practices that were never observed directly by the researcher. In
IR, Jackson proposes “textual ethnography” – “a form of disciplined
reading in which one engages in a kind of ‘participant observation’ of
the textual records … jotting ‘field notes’ as one reads.”73 Roxanne
Doty’s study of colonial practices also performs this kind of prac-
tice-centered analysis of historical documents with great analytical
payoffs.74
Generally speaking, the recovery of practical logics from textual
sources requires selecting a particular genre that offers a window on
enacted practices.75 For instance, memoirs offer derivative accounts
of practices that, as reconstructed as they may be, give a situated
(and to an extent objectifiable) viewpoint on performed interactions.
Court cases also contain very rich data about unobserved practices.
In a slightly different logic, handbooks contain prescriptions about
what should be done in a given context. As such, they help infer back-
ground knowledge from which practices become possible. Again,
these written descriptions or prescriptions may not yield exactly the
same interpretations as direct observation on the field. As usual, the
interpreter should account for these differences by reflexively analyz-
ing the epistemic relationship between the observer and the social
settings under study.
In sum, the recovery of practical logics faces considerable chal-
lenges, including the lack of access, the epistemic distance between
the subjects and the researcher, the inarticulate nature of background
knowledge, and the possibility of self-delusion or voluntary decep-
tion. These challenges point to a vital aspect of sobjective methodo-
logy: the need for triangulation. Recall that, in the end, interviews are
not meant to report personal views, but to reconstruct and aggregate
a lambda habitus in a given collective. It is therefore necessary to
72 73 74
Vaughn (2008, 71). Jackson (2006b, 273). Doty (1996).
75
Many thanks to Iver Neumann and Halvard Leira for sharing their thoughts
on the matter.
combine a variety of inductive methods and sources in order to check

against the challenges of interpretation. Furthermore, the recovery of
subjective meanings should always be supplemented with objectify-
ing methods, both intersubjectively and historically: inductive meth-
ods designed for the recovery of subjective meanings are usually not
attentive enough to the larger intersubjective and relational context,
and the history of practicality. As such, these methods tend to miss
crucial social structures such as distributions of power. Experience-
near concepts need to be put under the light of experience-distant
contextualization.
Putting meanings and practices in context

The second step of the sobjective method seeks to objectify meanings
by putting them in their wider intersubjective context. In accordance
with the hermeneutic circle, the goal here is to understand specific bits
of intersubjectivity in terms of a larger whole. Poststructuralists usu-
ally refer to this relationality as “intertextuality” – the fact that any
text (or meaning) stands only in reference to others. There cannot be
isolated meanings, only webs of them. Webs of meaning are usually
interpreted through discourse analysis, a broad methodological cat-
egory that in fact encompasses a variety of more specific methods. In
general terms, by putting meanings in their wider context, discourse
analysis takes them out of people’s heads to place them inside an inter-
subjective structure. As Jennifer Milliken explains, discourse analysis
rests on three analytical principles.76 First, discourses are systems of
significations that construct social realities. This tenet emphasizes the
dialectic between meaning and reality. Second, discourses are pro-
ductive of the social realities they defi ne. They construct legitimate
speakers and authorized practices, as well as common sense. Third,
and fi nally, discourses are articulated through the play of practice.
Discursive intersubjective structures falter unless constantly instanti-
ated and re-instantiated through agents’ practices.
There exist a number of specific methods of discourse analysis,
some more formal than others. “Dialogical analysis,” for instance,
formalizes the Wittgensteinian notion of “language games.”77 On the
less formal side, a popular method in IR is metaphorical analysis.
76 77
Milliken (1999). Duffy, Frederking and Tucker (1998).
Metaphors – “conventional ways of conceptualizing one domain in

terms of another … as structuring possibilities for human reasoning
and action”78 – are micro-instances of the hermeneutic circle, as they
put one meaning in the context of a larger discourse, culture, and set
of practices. In IR, metaphorical analysis helps interpret crucibles of
intersubjectivity such as globalization.79 For Habermasian construc-
tivists who study communicative action, Neta Crawford’s method
of “informal argument analysis” seems especially well suited.80 The
method contains five steps. The researcher fi rst identifies the argu-
ments that are on the table and then seeks to grasp the topoi or com-
monplaces that inform them. Third, the researcher maps background
beliefs. The fourth step consists of tracing the “form and fate” of
arguments, especially whether they are replacing dominant beliefs
and becoming institutionalized. The fifth stage assesses the causal
force of arguments. Crawford suggests a set of “tests” of argumenta-
tive causal efficacy such as temporal ordering, congruence between
beliefs and behavior, the justification or sanction of deviation and the
reframing of interests.
From a poststructuralist perspective, Lene Hansen questions the
possibility of discursive causality and opts instead to develop research
models centered on intertextuality. Her four models are based on an
increasingly large pool of intertextual references, from official dis-
course narrowly conceived to wider political debates, media, corpo-
rate institutions and marginal voices. Hansen efficiently puts to work
poststructuralist discourse analysis by outlining a variety of possi-
ble research designs that draw attention to central issues of temporal
perspective and comparative focus.81 A similar rigor informs Janice
Bially Mattern’s mapping of language-power utterances inside secu-
rity communities in crisis.82 Karin Fierke’s work on Wittgensteinian
language games also insightfully highlights the intertextuality of
international “grammars.”83
As the second sobjective step following the inductive acquisition of
cultural competence, discourse analysis needs to overcome a thorny
methodological dilemma to which there is no clear-cut answer: what
78
Milliken (1999, 235).
79
Kornprobst, Pouliot, Shah and Zaiotti (2008).
80 81
Crawford (2002). Hansen (2006, 73–92).
82 83
Mattern (2005). Fierke (1998).
are the boundaries of relevant discourses? There are a number of

possible delimiting criteria, including time, space, genre and author-
ship. Some discourse analysts go even further by looking for specific
linguistic practices (predicates, metaphors, commonplaces, argu-
ments, etc.). The Copenhagen School, for instance, looks for “secu-
ritizing moves” in official discourse.84 The general point here is that
a discourse analysis should, and indeed can, focus on a number of
specific elements rather than try to explain everything at once. To be
sure, it would be nonsense to abstractly establish uniform criteria for
what (and how much) needs to be read. Such criteria should derive
from the context: that is, from examining the political and analytical
importance of any given discourse. The quality of a discourse analy-
sis partly hinges on its empirical breadth, and achieving this requires
the researcher to make explicit, and justify, the reasons behind spe-
cific boundaries of intertextuality. Beyond discourse in strict textual
form, the analysis of practices as meaningful actions is another way
to put meanings in context. After the recovery of practical logics, it
is important to put these in a larger context of intersubjectivity and
power dynamics. This is where political sociology can improve on
intertextual analysis, by locating meanings inside a structure of posi-
tions (see Chapter 5 and 6 for examples). In IR, Anna Leander also
builds on Bourdieu’s social theory to offer much needed guidance on
how to methodically contextualize practice, thanks to a variety of
“thinking tools.”85 Williams also takes inspiration from Bourdieu to
trace cultural strategies in the field of international security, while
Neumann studies the evolution of diplomacy from a centralized to
a multibased practice.86 These works share a similar concern for
putting practices and their meanings in their intersubjective context.
In so doing, they move beyond the search for subjective meanings
to an objectified form of interpretation. As in discourse analysis,
meanings do not belong to a subject anymore; they become truly
intersubjective.
On top of discourse and practice analysis, meanings can be objec-
tified through spatial or topographical analysis. Bourdieu’s field the-
ory is an efficient way to map the distribution of different forms of
valued capital (see Chapter 2). Alternatively, social network analysis
84 85
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). Leander (2008).
86
Williams (2007); Neumann (2002).
provides powerful tools to map the structure of social relations: Emilie

Hafner-Burton and Alexander Montgomery, for instance, exam-
ine how a state’s position in an international organization network
shapes its actions.87 Taking his cue from Charles Tilly’s sociology,
Nexon maps institutional structures so as to understand how net-
works and meanings interact.88 Using a different relational approach,
Jackson draws the topography of postwar debates about “the West”
by mapping the deployment of cultural resources in the form of rhe-
torical commonplaces.89 All these methods seek to objectify meanings
by locating them inside a structure. At the end of the day, though,
objectifying meanings in their context produces a fairly static form
of knowledge. How then is it possible, methodologically, to account
for the dialectics of the social construction of knowledge and the con-
struction of social reality?
Setting meanings and practices in motion

The third step of sobjective methodology aims at setting meanings and
practices in motion: that is, at further objectifying intersubjectivity by
introducing time and history. The objective is more than a study of
path dependence. It is also, and in fact primarily, to historicize knowl-
edge and practical logics so as to account for the temporal dimen-
sion in the mutual constitution of social reality and knowledge. The
logic of practicality is inherently temporal thanks to its intimate con-
nection to action as it happens. Meanings are not reified substances
but dynamic processes with a past, a present and a future. Historical
analysis reveals these dynamics, especially the political contestation
that necessarily surrounds any form of knowledge that makes claims
to reality. Since constructivism adheres to a constitutive (as opposed
to instrumental) reading of history, a sobjective methodology must
explore the historicity of practical sense and the social struggles that
make it possible.
Constructivists make use of a variety of methods that allow for dia-
chronic interpretation.90 On the more formal side, Lars-Erik Cederman’s
pioneering work on “complex adaptive systems” is based on sophis-
ticated computer simulation that introduces notions such as path
87 88
Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006). Nexon (2009).
89 90
Jackson (2006a). On historical methods, see Trachtenberg (2006).
dependence and contingency.91 It then becomes possible to “re-run”

the tape of history thousands of time in order to model intersubjec-
tive evolution over time. On the poststructuralist side, Jens Bartelson’s
study of sovereignty is based on Foucault’s genealogical method, “a
history of logical spaces and their succession in time.”92 As a historiciz-
ing method, genealogy is especially efficient in demonstrating ruptures
and leaps in the evolution of meanings and practices. The construction
of narratives is also widely used by IR constructivists. Erik Ringmar,
for instance, builds a historical account of Sweden’s changing identities
and interests in the seventeenth century on the premise that “[t]he past
is no longer fixed and no longer stable, but instead at the mercy of the
stories historians tell. The events of the past are nothing in themselves
and only something when inserted into the context of a narrative.”93
Historicization, in other words, brings about a new, objectified form
of knowledge about the past and the present. Alternatively, other
constructivists build dialogical narratives that trace the evolution of
debates in history; analyses centered on the Self–Other distinction and
its changing boundaries build on such a historical logic.94
A more common historicizing method is process-tracing, which
“attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed
outcomes.”95 How does X cause Y ? The focus is on chains of cause–
effect relations: that is, on the causal mechanisms that lead from X to
Y. For mainstream social science, the ascendance of process-tracing
led to something of a methodological revolution, as the method is
informed by a processual (instead of correlational) understanding of
causality. As Checkel admits, however, in its positivistic conceptu-
alization process-tracing is incompatible with interpretivism.96 I pro-
pose, however, that process-tracing is amenable to the constructivist
style of reasoning with two amendments. First, the scientific realist
assumption that mechanisms exist “out there” should be replaced
with the postfoundationalist notion that mechanisms are theoretical
constructs or heuristic devices which social scientists apply to their
observations in order to classify them. Second, the exclusive focus
on causation needs to be enlarged to what can be called constitu-
tive mechanisms. Constitutive analysis – the study of how social facts
come into being – is the research domain where constructivism is the
91 92 93
Cederman (1997). Bartelson (1995, 7). Ringmar (1996, 28).
94 95 96
Neumann (1999). George and Bennett (2005, 6). Checkel (2008).
most innovative, if only because it is left unaddressed by contending

styles of reasoning such as rationalism. According to Searle, a con-
stitutive relation works by the following formula: X counts as Y in
context C. For example: “Bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing (X) count as money (Y ) in the United States (C).”97 C stands
for the evolving context that makes it possible for social facts to be
socially constructed. In order to provide a dynamic account of the
social processes that lead to C , one must identify constitutive mecha-
nisms – heuristic devices about the social processes that lead to the
constitution of Y by X. Theorizing constitutive mechanisms allows
for a better understanding of how the historical conditions of pos-
sibility of any social facts and/or practical logics are generated, and it
also opens the door to cross-case analogies.
But contrary to scientific realism, and pace Searle, mechanisms
are not “real” or “out there” from a postfoundationalist perspec-
tive. Instead, they are mental constructs devised to make sense of
our interpretations and which belong to the realm of social scientific
knowledge. As I argued above, language (vernacular and scientific)
cannot simply mirror reality; one cannot stand behind concepts and
words in order to know what is there. As a result, theoretical notions
such as mechanisms are part of a socially constructed interpretation
that further constructs reality. Narratives, categories, concepts and
theories are not out there as part of an external reality, but in there,
inside the web of scientific constructs that is collectively developed in
order to make sense of our interpretations. Just like causes, mecha-
nisms are heuristic devices, not substances. They make sense of his-
tory but do not drive it.
To sum up this section, the methodical practice of sobjectiv-
ism entices the analyst to do research moving along an induction–
deduction continuum, with an explicit awareness of the gains and
tradeoffs associated with each movement. In its fi rst phase, research
is conducted as inductively as possible, bearing in mind of course that
perfect induction is impossible. The objective is to recover agents’
understandings in order to apprehend the insider’s perspective on
social life. At this point, practical logics are especially well recov-
ered and meanings are interpreted bottom-up. But inductive analysis
97
Searle (1995, 28).
is often embroiled in commonsense and misses the larger picture of

social life – intersubjectively, relationally and historically. In a second
step, research moves away from practical logics and subjective mean-
ings in an attempt to objectify it. The goal is to put meanings in their
intersubjective context – cultural, intertextual and practical. While
this interpretive operation inevitably distorts practical logics, it also
offers tremendous gains: meanings do not belong to anyone anymore,
but become part of an intersubjective web inside which every text or
practice refers and stands in relation to others. The whole of mean-
ing begins to make sense. Third, research introduces time in order to
historicize meanings. The theoretical narratives and conceptual cat-
egories that are used to make sense of history yield a certain degree of
abstraction and even generalization. At that stage of research, prac-
tical logics have been rationalized and sometimes even bent out of
shape. But such is the price to pay for standing back from common-
sense and denaturalizing it. Although objectified knowledge is partly
out of sync with agents’ worlds, it allows the researcher to learn some-
thing other than what agents already know by connecting subjective
meanings with context and history. The social construction of reality
is carried out under structural and historical constraints that often
remain invisible from the practitioners’ point of view.
Again, the methodical practice of sobjectivism does not necessi-
tate following the three steps in strict order. Instead, each step should
mutually enlighten the others, leading the researcher to move back
and forth between them. For instance, while recovering the logic of
practicality (step 1) clearly helps put them in context (step 2), it can be
just as useful to set meanings and practices in motion (step 3) in order
to better understand contemporary practical logics (step 1). Research
may benefit a lot from moving back and forth between the level of
action and that of observation. In this spirit, sobjective research com-
bines, in an abductive and systematic manner, the recovery of sub-
jective meanings with contextualization and historicization so that
practical logics and social structures – intersubjective, relational, his-
torical or otherwise – can enlighten one another.
On validity: engaging mainstream methodology

The objective of a sobjective methodology is not only to systematize
and lend coherence to the practice of constructivist research but also
to foster dialogue with other IR perspectives. Arguably, the develop-

ment of a consistent research modus operandi is a necessary step for
constructivists and practice theorists to be able to engage mainstream
IR works. This chapter seeks to clarify constructivism’s methodologi-
cal requirements – induction, interpretation and historicization – in
order to make a comparative assessment with non-constructivist
studies easier. To be sure, there will always remain an element of
incommensurability in interparadigmatic conversations: positivism
and its subject–object distinction, for instance, cannot accommodate
the postfoundationalist premise that reality and knowledge are mutu-
ally constitutive. Yet, methodology and the actual practice of research
offer promising ways to move beyond metaphysical debates in IR in
order to attain not synthesis but what Susan Rudolph calls “mutual
epistemic legibility.”98
Contrasting the meanings that constructivists and mainstream
social scientists attribute to a number of methodological standards
that they share may enhance mutual epistemic legibility. Certainly,
the most important standard is validity: what makes a given social
scientific work more valid than others? Many positivists rely on a
correspondence theory of truth according to which the validity of an
explanation derives from matching reality in words. However, this
mirror view of social science is unacceptable from a constructivist
perspective: if reality and the knowledge that constitutes it are both
socially constructed, then it makes no sense to contrast a supposedly
independent reality with scientific knowledge. Instead, several con-
structivists conceive of validity as an intersubjective category defi ned
and contested inside a style of reasoning without the arbitration of
Nature or reality. As a result, validity in social sciences is assessed
in a similar way to establishing “truth” and “facts” in a courtroom.
This understanding of validity is at the very heart of interpretivism, as
Ricoeur explains: “Validation is an argumentative discipline compa-
rable to the juridical procedures of legal interpretation. It is a logic of
uncertainty and of qualitative probability.”99 To this, positivists may
be inclined to reply that in a court, “objective facts” ultimately settle
the truth from false accounts.100 But that is precisely the point: what
counts as an objective fact, and what does not, depends very much
98
Rudolph (2004). 99 Ricoeur (1977, 330).
100
Wendt (2006, 215).
upon reasoning along the legalistic style into which lawyers and judges
are socialized. Objectivity and validity are not the primordial proper-
ties of certain facts or theories: they are socially devised criteria upon
which practice communities of social scientists happen to agree.101
Positivists also link validity to the issue of falsification. In Karl
Popper’s famous argument, a theoretical statement is valid insofar as
it can be shown to be wrong. The assertion “all swans are white,” for
instance, can be falsified by the discovery of a black swan. But this
stylized model idealizes the practice of academic research. In the IR
discipline, very few theories (if any) have been discarded in the face
of discrepant evidence. This is due to what Willard Quine dubbed the
under-determination of theory by facts: “Since theory is involved in
deciding what the facts are, there is room for choice when deciding
whether the theory at stake is consistent with them.”102 Whether one
deals with discourses or with coefficients, interpretation and infer-
ence are irreducibly part of social science, rendering Popperian falsifi-
cation impossible. Nonetheless, many constructivists still believe that
a scientific explanation can be shown to be wrong (in relative terms)
in the course of academic debate and reinterpretation. The Rashomon
effect notwithstanding, constructivist studies are to an extent replica-
ble, insofar as the data that is used for research (interview transcripts,
policy documents, official speeches, etc.) can and should be made
available for reinterpretation by others. Therefore, it is academic com-
petition, not dialogue with Nature, that helps refi ne our knowledge
about the world: “The fact that scientific producers have as their only
clients their most rigorous and vigorous competitors – and hence those
most inclined and able to lend to their critique their full strength – is
the one Archimedean point upon which scientifically to see reason in
scientific reason, to rescue scientific reason from relativistic reduction
without having to call in a founding miracle.”103 Informed critical
debate is the foundation of scientific knowledge and refi nement.
Another traditional way to assess validity is generalizability: can the
findings travel from one case to another? From a constructivist perspec-
tive, the time is ripe to abandon the old dream of discovering nomoth-
etic laws in social sciences: human beings are reflexive and intentional
101
For variants of this pragmatist understanding of validity claims in IR, see
among others Kratochwil (2007) and Haas and Haas (2002).
102 103
Hollis and Smith (1990, 55). Bourdieu (2001b, 108).
creatures who do not simply obey external laws. Nonetheless, there

exist certain patterns and regularities in social life that many con-
structivists are keen to analyze. As Richard Price and Christian
Reus-Smit correctly point out, “rejecting the pursuit of law-like gener-
alizations does not entail a simultaneous rejection of more contingent
generalizations.”104 Such contingent generalizations usually derive
from the abstracting power of concepts: by simplifying reality through
idealization, concepts such as constitutive mechanisms, for example,
allow for analogies across cases. By definition, conceptual analogies
are underspecified because they cannot fully put up with contingency.
Consequently, the crucial point in drawing contingent generalizations
is to be explicit about their boundaries of applicability.
Contrary to positivism, from a constructivist point of view there
cannot be such a thing as the valid interpretation or theory. Since
there is no transcendental way to adjudicate between competing inter-
pretations, validity is never a black-or-white matter; it is all shades of
gray. Inside a style of reasoning, validation is a deliberative activity
whereby judgments evolve in combination with (though on a differ-
ent level than) their own criteria. In order to convey the historicity
of scientific reason, the best criterion to assess the relative validity
of an interpretation is its incisiveness: that is, its capacity to “see
further” than previous interpretations. As Geertz explains: “A study
is an advance if it is more incisive – whatever that may mean – than
those that preceded it; but it less stands on their shoulders than,
challenged and challenging, runs by their side.”105 He thus makes
clear that incisiveness is neither a primordial nor a universal crite-
rion; it is both space- and time-dependent. Indeed, the degree of inci-
siveness of an interpretation hinges not only on its substance but
also on its audience. In this regard, this chapter argues that it is the
appropriate combination of experience-near and experience-distant
concepts that generates interpretations that not only make sense to
people, scientists and laypeople alike, but also add sense to already
held interpretations. It is this supplementary meaning, due to the
objectification of practical logics, that leads to an increased degree of
incisiveness. An interpretation is all the more incisive (and therefore
valid) when it strikes the fi ne balance between practical and objec-
tified knowledge.
104 105
Price and Reus-Smit (1998, 275). Geertz (1973, 25).
Overall, the constructivist style of reasoning and sobjective meth-

odology in particular are animated by a logic of discovery that is
not completely different from the one that drives positivistic meth-
odologies. In Imre Lakatos’s famous argument, progressive research
programs are those that lead to the discovery of “novel facts.”106 A
faithful positivist, Lakatos probably had in mind hard facts that lead
to universal Truth. I propose adopting a more circumspect attitude
with regards to scientific discovery. A refi ned level of incisiveness and
the methodical practice of sobjective research helps discover, quite
simply, a combination of subjective/practical and objectified/theoreti-
cal knowledge that makes more sense of international politics than
previous interpretations. That validity, however, is situated intersub-
jectively: it is judged by a given community of (scientific) practice in a
particular epoch. Social science is not as universal as eulogists of the
Enlightenment would like it to be, but it is no less worth pursuing to
better understand the pressing matters of world politics. It is precisely
to that world that I now turn.
Case study: methodological underpinnings

How does my sobjective methodology help grasp the logic of practi-
cality inside security communities? As I argued in Chapters 1 and 2 ,
students of security communities have yet to understand the modus
operandi of interstate peace; that is, its practical logic as it unfolds
on the ground of diplomacy. In the second part of this study, I apply
the theoretical and methodological frameworks elaborated in the
two previous chapters to the case of NATO–Russia relations after
the end of the Cold War. Chapter 4 seeks to recover practical log-
ics (the fi rst sobjective step) and begins a micro-analysis of security
practices (step 2). Chapters 5 and 6 further contextualize the mean-
ings and practices of NATO – Russia interactions (step 2) and set them
in motion over the post-Cold War era (step 3). In keeping with my
sobjective research design, chapter 4 leans toward the subjective and
synchronic side of social life, whereas Chapters 5 and 6 belong to
objectification and diachrony. In the spirit of abduction, however,
in Chapters 5 and 6 I put practical logics in dialogue with objec-
tified knowledge. For instance, my discussion of hysteresis effects in
106
Lakatos (1970).
Chapters 5 and 6 should be read as an objectification exercise based

in part on dispositions and practical logics.
A key premise of sobjective research and practice theory in general
is that in order to understand a different lifeworld, one must “go to
the village” so as to immerse oneself directly and interact with those
who inhabit this world. Induction and the recovery of practical log-
ics (or background knowledge) is thus the required fi rst step in social
scientific research. In an ideal world, my research design would have
relied on participant observation in order to recover practical logics
at the NRC. Unfortunately, the field of international security retains a
unique aura of secrecy that is rarely matched in social life. Diplomacy
may have gone public since the days of Metternich, but most deci-
sions related to “high politics” are still taken behind closed (and usu-
ally well-guarded) doors. NATO’s military committee, for instance,
is not ready to welcome a participant observer to its ranks. And yet
my fi rst intention was precisely to be able to integrate myself into the
NATO organization for a few months and attend the key meetings
with Russian diplomats. Since the content of NRC meetings is kept
scrupulously secret, however, I quickly realized that this road was not
practicable.
As a second-best alternative, I made use of qualitative interviewing.
This method is obviously excellent for recovering subjective meanings
and reconstructing the world as it exists from the practitioners’ point
of view. In order to study practicality, I put my ethnographic sensibil-
ity to work and sought to distill inarticulate knowledge from between
the lines of verbal accounts. As I explained above, I devised my semi-
directed questionnaire so as to indirectly explore the background
knowledge of NATO–Russia relations. For instance, I would sub-
mit various scenarios to interviewees and ask them how they would
react to such a situation. From their answers, I could often infer tacit
assumptions and practical logics. Second, in my interviews I devoted
much attention to the practical activities performed on an everyday
basis by my interviewees. I would subtly instigate thick descriptions
of daily interactions with their Russian or NATO counterparts, NRC
diplomatic negotiations, military-to-military cooperation, and all
sorts of innocuous activities that fill their daily lives as security prac-
titioners. In this way, I was able to learn a great deal about what
NRC practitioners do in and through practice, even though I could
not attend their meetings.
My interview questionnaire was semi-directed; although I had a list

of issues I wanted to touch on, I was prepared to follow interviewees
in whatever direction they might want to take. Most of the time, inter-
views consisted of informal conversations articulated around a set of
core questions. These questions evolved slightly through the interview
process, which stretched over fifteen months. In total, I conducted
sixty-nine interviews with security officials and experts in Moscow,
Brussels, Washington, London, Berlin and Ottawa between February
2006 and May 2007.107 In each of these locations, I made use of what
ethnographers call the snowball method to meet with a variety of prac-
titioners, a technique that worked quite well in Western organizations.
In Russia, however, conducting interviews proved a lot more difficult,
not because of linguistic barriers (I spoke a bit of Russian) but due to
a very low proclivity, on the part of Russian officials, to meet with
foreign specialists: “They will not talk to you,” the Deputy Director
of the Moscow Institute for the Study of Canada and the US told me,
“because from the point of view of communications with the West, we
are back almost in the Soviet times.” In light of this obstacle, I found
a number of “proxies” for Russian officials, in the form of think-tank
directors, academic institute members and senior consultants who
take part in Russian foreign policymaking at some distance.
In deciding on the number of interviews that I should do, I used two
methods. First, on the Western side I selected a representative sample
of countries and organizations. To begin with, I centered on the four
core NATO countries whose voices are louder than any other at the
North Atlantic Council (NAC) table: the US, the United Kingdom,
France and Germany. I also wanted to include less powerful coun-
tries, which led me to choose Canada as a representative of smaller
founding members, and Poland and Lithuania as newer members of
both large and small size. I visited most of these countries’ capitals or
met with their representatives in Brussels. At NATO headquarters,
I also met with several international civil servants and military officers
from a variety of departments so as to better understand the organi-
zational perspective. Finally, in order to grasp the specificities of the
107
In the post-Cold War history of NATO–Russia relations, this period
corresponds to a fairly difficult one, in the wake of the American
intervention in Iraq. The year 2006 was certainly not as tense as during
the Kosovo or Georgia crises, but it remained a rough patch at the
political level.
NATO point of view, I also met with a few international civil serv-
ants from the EU (on EU–Russia relations) and the State Department
(on US–Russia cooperation in disarmament). Admittedly, this sample
does not add up to the exhaustive political sociology of the field of
security that Didier Bigo recommends;108 I will leave it to others to
study in more depth the practices of “security professionals,” to ana-
lyze their genealogy and to map the overall field of international secu-
rity. In the more limited framework of this book, my use of Bourdieu
is meant not to inventory the field but to fi nd in it what explains the
evolution of NATO–Russia diplomacy. And although my sample is
not exhaustive, it is representative in terms of including a variety of
countries and organizations.
In order to get as exhaustive a picture as possible, I employed a
second method based on what ethnographers call the saturation
point – basically, the moment when additional interviews do not yield
significantly new insights compared to what was learned in previous
meetings. After a number of interviews, I would usually conclude that
I had grasped an important chunk of the shared background knowl-
edge I was looking for. Of course, as will become clear in Chapter 4,
in doing interviews I was not looking for big-T truth but for practical
logics. My objective was to reconstruct NATO–Russia dealings as
they exist from the practitioners’ point of view – not from some god’s-
eye perspective. This raises different kinds of validity issues than in
positivism. Generally speaking, I tried to probe discrepant views
across my interviews but did not discount any as simply false. In what
follows I do emphasize those story lines that I heard more often than
others, but I also note more heterodox views. In fact, at times I would
even hear different versions from inside the same building, just walk-
ing from one door to the next. Such, indeed, is the messiness and
fluidity of intersubjectivity in social and political life.
Given that my focus in this study is on background knowledge,
however, it is clear that my interviews served to record shared
assumptions more than idiosyncratic opinions. What follows
is not a study of partisan politics and I did not interview politi-
cians from opposing factions in order to understand ideological
debates. As interesting as this approach might have been, in this
book I attempt to study the unsaid and the tacit – the groundswell
108
Bigo (2000).
of Russian–Atlantic relations, so to speak; the deeper trends that

inform its evolution underneath the sea foam of high politics and
rhetorical skirmishes. Of course, even those rare senior diplomats
who benefit from more autonomy are still quite heavily constrained
by specific policy directions from their capital. But while a focus on
decisionmakers is useful, as decades of IR scholarship have shown,
in this book I make the wager that looking at those who implement
these decisions is also worthwhile – if only because few studies have
done so. This approach derives from my focus on the logic of practi-
cality. In that context, interviewing international organization and
foreign ministry officials as well as defense officers appeared the
best way to capture the practical logics that cement practitioners
across the board. After all, it is the gist of this research project to
reconstruct a common stock of background knowledge from which
differences become possible.
The task of recovering the lambda habitus of a collective raises a
number of methodological issues. What does it mean, ontologically,
to talk of a “Russian habitus”? Are states people too? It should be
clear that there is nothing in this book that supports Wendt’s claim
that “states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute
anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality.”109
To the contrary, and partly against Bourdieu, in what follows the only
actors worthy of that name are made of flesh. In making this assump-
tion, however, how can we make sense of the fact that the people who
belong to the same group or organization, for instance the Russian
state, tend to act as if they formed a corporate agent?
The methodological issue is “how to operationalize the habitus.”110
Ultimately, habitus is individual insofar as it describes inclinations
inscribed in bodies. But as Wacquant recalls, “our categories of judg-
ment and action, coming from society, are shared by all those who
were subjected to similar social conditions and conditionings.”111
This means that collectives enter the picture in the form not of corpo-
rate agents, but of dispositional deposits that mark participant bodies
with intersubjective traces. As subjectivized intersubjectivity, habitus
makes the society present in each and every one of its members in the
form of more or less conscious dispositions. In any groupings, there
109
Wendt (1999, 197); see also Wendt (2004).
110 111
Leander (2008, 21). Quoted in Vaughn (2008, 73).
typically exists a body of dispositions that similarly characterizes

members due to their shared history.112 In fine, it is through this dispo-
sitional mechanism that the illusion of corporate agency – that states
are people too – becomes possible. That different agents belonging to
the same collective tend to develop a similar habitus means that the
orchestra of the state, to paraphrase Bourdieu, is able to play with-
out a conductor, leaving the impression of a “superorganism” to the
observer.
From a Bourdieusian point of view, the state is not an actor but
a field: that is, a social configuration with a structure of positions
inhabited by various actors that play by certain rules and compete
over resources. Exposure to this game tends to reinforce certain dis-
positions among players; that is one reason why state elites, despite
partisan politics, usually tend to think from a number of shared
premises. But there is an even deeper reason why one can hypothesize
that the citizens of a state will exhibit a limited number of shared
dispositions. Because as a field the state is characterized by very high
concentration of symbolic capital, it “possesses the means of imposi-
tion and inculcation of durable principles of vision and division that
conform to its own structure.”113 The education system is the primary
vehicle of this transmission, although the media and others also con-
tribute to this symbolic domination. Given these processes, I speak
of a “Russian habitus” not to suppress differences between Russian
practitioners, but to map the dispositional similarities that a joint his-
tory inevitably brings about.
The illusion of state corporate agency is further reinforced by a
peculiar process that Bourdieu calls the “mystery of the ministry.”114
In the state field, certain agents are endowed with enough symbolic
capital to speak in the name of the masses. The mass becomes what
the authorized speakers say, representing it as a corporate body. As
Niilo Kauppi notes, for Bourdieu “the process of delegation becomes a
case of social magic in which a person such as a minister, a priest or a
deputy is identified with a group of people [which] no longer exists as
112
In his study of the European Court of Human Rights, for example, Mikael
Rask Madsen notes that due to their “collective habitus,” Cold-War
jurists “were generally inclined to deploy an approach consisting of both
a diplomatic understanding of European human rights with a more or less
self-sustainable and conceptual Professorenrecht” (Madsen 2007, 149).
113 114
Bourdieu (1994, 9). Bourdieu (2001a).
a collection of individuals but rather, through this representative, as a

social agent.”115 As a result, diplomats and state representatives come
to embody the state in practice and give it a “narrative Self.”116 As a
social scientist, my task is not to reify these narratives, however, but
to contextualize and historicize them so as to explain their condi-
tions of possibility.117 By looking into the shared dispositions of given
members of collectives, I acknowledge the importance of collectives
as structures but also their fluidity at the level of agency. People act
as if there were a corporate state and it is precisely this performativity
that makes the state look like a reified thing.
I now want to turn to Chapters 5 and 6 (steps 2 and 3 of my sobjec-
tive methodology) and the peculiar methodological challenges that
they raise. In my attempt to historicize Russian–Atlantic relations,
I had to narrow down my research and pick a specific issue area of
interaction. Because it constitutes one of the key structuring axes of
contemporary world politics, the post-Cold War relationship between
Russia and the transatlantic security community is too vast and mul-
tidimensional to be entirely covered in one single study. Even after the
end of the Cold War, this relationship remains unique in ranging from
the Group of Eight’s (G8) nuclear disarmament program to World
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations through global governance
at the UN Security Council. Whether it is the Middle East peace
process or the Kyoto Protocol, Russian-Atlantic political dynamics
are part and parcel of almost any issue of interest on the global stage.
Consequently, I had no choice but to narrow down the domain of
inquiry, without of course losing sight of the bigger picture. The chal-
lenge was to select an issue area that is both theoretically and empiri-
cally pregnant.
Divided along a chronological logic, Chapters 5 and 6 trace the evo-
lution of practices among Russian and NATO security elites around
the question of the Alliance’s “double enlargement.”118 Starting in
1994, faced with demands from democratizing central European
governments and with the bloodshed in Yugoslavia, NATO under-
took a series of unprecedented institutional transformations that were
115
Kauppi (2005, 26). This process is akin to what Jackson calls “personation,”
“the social process by which someone is empowered to speak on behalf
of (or ‘in the name of’) an entity, thereby making that entity an actor”
(Jackson 2004, 286–7).
116 117 118
Neumann (2004). Pouliot (2004). Asmus (2002).
to expand both its membership (geographical enlargement) and its

missions (functional enlargement). Significantly, over the last fifteen
years, NATO’s double enlargement has consistently been the most
difficult bone of contention between Russia and the Alliance. It has
never left the agenda and has been the key driving force behind the
many ups and downs of the relationship. At the time of writing, the
double enlargement remains one of the thorniest problems between
the former enemies. In other words, having occupied the center
stage of the relationship for the entire post-Cold War era, the double
enlargement is both a fruitful locus for understanding larger political
dynamics and an area of particular policy relevance.
In terms of research design, Russian–Atlantic dealings over
NATO’s double enlargement constitute a hard case for the theory of
practice of security communities that I outlined in Chapter 2 . Similar
to Harry Eckstein’s notion of “least-likely case,”119 a hard case is a
series of interconnected practices that should, in principle, be diffi-
cult to account for within the rubric of a given theoretical narrative.
While Eckstein and others120 conceive of least-likely cases as means
to validate theories, however, in my non-positivistic research design
selecting a hard case is simply meant to demonstrate the incisiveness
of the theory as convincingly as possible. Put differently, by selecting
a case study on the basis of its counterintuitiveness, the researcher
can illuminate new or at least under-researched aspects of world
politics. In the Russian–Atlantic case, my attempt to recover practi-
cal logics in 2006 makes for a hard case because so many thorny
disagreements plagued the relationship at the time. One can think
of the fallout from the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, the color
revolutions in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
American ballistic missile defense project in central Europe, the row
over the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, Kosovo’s future
and Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions. To probe the self-evidence of
diplomacy in such a difficult political context is, I hope, more con-
vincing than picking an easy case.
As far as contextualization is concerned, in Chapters 5 and 6
I combine discourse and practice analysis to study the evolution of
Russian–Atlantic power relations over the post-Cold War era. In the
Foucauldian tradition, I treat discourse as practice: that is, as a social
119 120
Eckstein (1975). See George and Bennett (2005).
performance. Since I am primarily interested in intersubjectivity

(sobjectivism’s step 2), the beliefs or intentions behind discourse are
less important, analytically, than the public utterance itself (although
the intentions ascribed by others do matter as part of the social con-
struction of reality121). In addition to discourse as practice, I also
center my analytical focus on the various actions taken by NATO
(and its member states) and Russia with regard to the double enlarge-
ment. I interpret these practices at the intersubjective level: that is,
as part of a larger web of meaningful action that is spun over time
by the agents involved. Since I am interested in official diplomatic
interaction between the Russian state and NATO, I circumscribed my
analysis to high-level officials (i.e. senior government or organization
members).122 Because my analysis primarily focuses on Russian reac-
tions, I supplemented these data with a discourse analysis of the most
important op-ed pieces by foreign policy experts and opinion-makers
in Moscow. To access the data, I used official portals on the internet
as well as the search engines of key newspapers’ archives. For the
Russian side, I primarily used the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press (which contains exhaustive digests of Russian-language news-
papers translated into English by Eastview experts) and, subsidiarily,
the Moscow Times. These sources cover all the most important
Russian daily publications, including Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Izvestia,
Kommersant, Sevodnia, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Moskovskiye Novostei
and Trud. Overall, I collected a few thousand Russian articles in order
to get as incisive a grasp as possible of Russian practical and discur-
sive reactions to NATO’s double enlargement. The result is a sobjec-
tive account of the NATO–Russia power politics of diplomacy that
sheds new light on its practical logics and relations of domination.
In terms of historicization, fi nally, in Chapters 5 and 6 I focus on
the period ranging from the birth of post-Soviet Russia, in January
1992, to the Georgia War of summer 2008. Because my narrative
seeks to explain the NRC practical logics as I recorded them through
interviews in 2006, I mainly concentrate on the preceding decade and
a half. The final section of Chapter 6 succinctly extends this analysis
121
Goffman (1959).
122
In Hansen’s framework, my discourse analysis conforms to model 1
(analytical focus: official discourse; object of analysis: official texts and
direct and secondary intertextual links) (Hansen 2006, 64).
beyond 2006 in order to show the continuity of recent NATO–Russia

diplomacy. In both chapters, I trace one key constitutive mechanism
over time: the aligning and misaligning of positions and dispositions
in NATO–Russia diplomacy. This process-tracing entails, fi rst, that
I brush in broad strokes the evolution of capital and doxa in the field
of international security. In this way, I am able to map the distribu-
tion of capital in the field from a structural point of view. I com-
bine this positional analysis with a more dispositional one centered
on changing dispositions on both the NATO and the Russian sides.
Taken together, these two analytical focuses allow me to apprehend
the degree of hysteresis in the Russian–Atlantic relationship, which is
the key determinant, this book argues, of the limited development of
a security community in the post-Cold War era.
Pa rt I I
The symbolic power politics

of NATO–Russia diplomacy
4 The logic of practicality at the
NATO–Russia Council
Approaching Russian–Atlantic security relations from the

practitioners’ point of view, this chapter reconstructs insider knowl-
edge at the NRC and its surroundings in 2006. By grasping the practi-
cal logics as they play themselves out during Russian–Atlantic security
interactions on the ground, I seek to counter the representational bias
(see Chapter 2). In terms of the sobjectivist methodology outlined
in Chapter 3, I mainly perform the fi rst step, which consists of the
recovery of subjective meanings that comprise the logic of practical-
ity. I proceed as atheoretically as possible and refrain from superim-
posing an analytical framework onto interview data. The theoretical
narrative based on field analysis and the concept of hysteresis will
become much more prominent in Chapters 5 and 6; for the moment
I want to let practitioners speak for themselves with as little interfer-
ence as possible.
In order to do this, I use two main methods. First, the chapter
builds on sixty-nine qualitative interviews with security practitioners
and experts in Ottawa, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, London and
Berlin. These very rich data, comprised of hundreds of transcript pages
and ethnographic notes, are complemented with a second method that
can conveniently be called practice analysis. In the spirit of participant
observation, I use a micro-focus on what Russian and NATO security
officials do together at the NRC, in order to distil background knowl-
edge from joint actions and respective practices. Where warranted, I
also consider official declarations as discursive practices and add them
to the data gathered in the field and through practice analysis. In order
to evaluate the extent to which security practitioners at the NRC embod-
ied diplomacy in 2006, I devise a set of three empirical indicators (see
Table 4.1). These indicators are not mutually exclusive; their heuristic
value is in organizing the vast amount of information collected across
my several dozen interviews. Taken together, the indicators reveal the
degree of self-evidence of the non-violent settlement of disputes.
95
Table 4.1 Three indicators of the embodiment of diplomacy
Indicator Assessment questions
(1) Disappearance of the How present is organized violence on

possibility of using force the security practitioners’ horizon of
possibility? Do practitioners entertain
scenarios of mutual confrontation? Are
there mutual perceptions of threat? What
means could practitioners conceivably use
to alter the other party’s course?
(2) Normalization of What is the nature of disputes? Do
disputes practitioners have dependable expectations
that future disagreements can be solved
peacefully? What lessons do practitioners
draw from past and present disputes? How
do practitioners handle disagreements and
search for their resolution?
(3) Daily cooperation on What is the nature and focus of practitioners’
the ground daily interactions? What kind of
background knowledge do routine practices
embody? Do enacted practices foreclose
certain courses of interaction? What
institutional forms or routines do daily
interactions take?
The chapter’s main fi nding is that in 2006 diplomacy was a nor-

mal but not a self-evident way to solve disputes in Russian–Atlantic
dealings. In other words, security practitioners on both sides had
embodied the non-violent settlement of disputes as “the way to go” –
although not the only possible way to go. In terms of a security com-
munity in and through practice, then, the evidence is mixed. On
the one hand, most of the time security officials at (and around) the
NRC thought from diplomacy instead of about its opportunity. My
data confi rm that there has been a sea change since the Cold War
era, clearly in the direction of pacification. I provide ample evidence
that diplomacy was something of a normal or ordinary practice in
NATO–Russia relations, in the sense that it did not stand out as unu-
sual in any way. But, on the other hand, a number of dispositions
mitigated the embodiment of the non-violent settlement of disputes
The logic of practicality at the NRC 97
in 2006. Applying the three indicators in turn, I discover that the

disappearance of the possibility of mutual force was countered by
latent mistrust, the normalization of disputes was stymied by the elu-
siveness of the NRC diplomatic momentum and daily cooperation on
the ground was thwarted by clashing organizational cultures. All in
all, although Russia and NATO have undeniably moved away from
the insecurity community of the Cold War, my analysis shows that
the 2006 Russian–Atlantic relationship fell short of a security com-
munity in and through practice. Though normalized, the diplomatic
practice was not self-evident at the NRC in 2006 – a fi nding later
substantiated with the temporary suspension of the NRC’s activities
in the wake of the Georgia War in 2008.
I want to defuse three potential criticisms from the outset. First, it is
clear that Russian–Atlantic security relations are much more complex
than diplomatic interaction at the NRC will ever cover. This chapter
makes no claim to present an exhaustive portrait of the relationship
between Moscow and NATO member states. Diplomatic dealings
at the NRC are not fully representative of overall Russian–Atlantic
relations because central issues such as Iran, Iraq or North Korea,
for example, are not typically addressed in this forum. Despite their
obvious importance, these topics fall beyond this study’s scope. That
said, because this book deals with security community development
in and through practice, a focus on the NRC is warranted insofar as it
is a prime locus of diplomacy and dispute settlement. The NRC offers
an exceptional vantage point on the logic of practicality in NATO–
Russia politics.
Second, it is true that the very existence of the NRC already indi-
cates that both Russia and NATO member states have at least a will-
ingness to manage their relationship through diplomatic means. It
does not, however, demonstrate in and of itself how diplomacy is
becoming an ordinary practice in NATO–Russia dealings. After all,
innumerable international forums have evolved into empty shells that
fail to advance peace in any significant way. Alternatively, organiza-
tions such the UN host a diplomatic dialogue that does not always
preclude the eruption of violent conflicts among its members. During
the 1999 Kosovo confl ict, for instance, the Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) was sidelined and eventually suspended, as was the NRC in
the wake of the Georgia War in 2008 (see Chapter 6). Clearly, the
existence of a multilateral forum does not normalize diplomacy in
and of itself. Formal diplomatic channels such as the NRC cannot be

presumed to rest on the embodiment of diplomacy: this political proc-
ess must be empirically demonstrated and documented.
Third, one could argue that diplomacy had already been normalized
between the East and the West during the Cold War. But even though
its roots can be traced back in history, the routinization of diplomacy
and its enactment outside the shadow of a nuclear Armageddon is
a new phenomenon in NATO–Russia relations. Of course, Alliance
members and the Soviet Union repeatedly relied on diplomacy to
resolve their disputes during the Cold War. There were even attempts
at institutionalizing the practice, for instance through the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The existence of a
Soviet–American “condominium,” based on a shared preference in
Washington and Moscow for the bipolar status quo, also created fer-
tile grounds for diplomatic negotiations. But, contrary to the current
era, during the Cold War decades diplomacy took place in the ever-
present shadow of nuclear and conventional deterrence. In the back of
the minds of the negotiating diplomats loomed the very real possibil-
ity of a violent confrontation, a possibility that never receded for forty
years. Threats of force were regularly issued on both sides even as
diplomacy was practiced. In sum, the Cold War agreements that were
reached may have been peaceful in nature but the political processes
that made them possible, despite diplomatic appearances, remained
grounded in a fundamentally violent landscape of interaction. Such
was not the case in 2006, as the following pages demonstrate.
Indicator 1: the disappearance of the

possibility of using force
Interview data and practice analysis demonstrate that in 2006 the
possibility of violent confrontation was not part of Russian and
Atlantic security practitioners’ dispositions. This points in a par-
ticularly clear fashion to a partial embodiment of the diplomatic
practice at the NRC. Generally speaking, security practitioners were
not inclined toward the use of force, or threats thereof, in mutual
dealings. They did not entertain scenarios of mutual violence either.
That said, this peaceful habitus often coexisted with a fairly wide-
spread mistrust on both the Russian and the NATO sides. One
Turkish officer at NATO, for example, insisted that “the capabilities
are still there,” unwilling to take Russian cooperation for granted.

Such suspicions suggest that fi fteen years after the end of the Cold
War, the possibility of force had not completely disappeared from
Russian-Atlantic dealings.
“Gone are the days of nuclear threats and blackmail”1

Out of sixty-nine interviews with Atlantic and Russian security
practitioners and experts, I heard only four officials affi rm that they
could not fully exclude the possibility of physical violence in Russian–
Atlantic dealings. The overwhelming majority simply ruled out the
possibility of a Russian–Atlantic military confrontation, whether
asked explicitly or implicitly. “Not a possibility,” “completely” or
“categorically inconceivable,” “never,” “absolutely impossible”: these
are some of the ways to put it that I have heard most frequently from
national delegations and international civil servants. “I can’t see a rise
of military violence at all at the moment,” one top-level NATO offi-
cial confidently asserted. “We have proceeded from the assumption
that we don’t have anything to fear from the Russian side,” concurred
a senior German diplomat. In several interviews, in fact, I gathered
the impression that considering whether a Russian–Atlantic military
clash could still be possible was perceived as out of place if not irrel-
evant. Many interviewees seemed to wonder just why I was asking
about Russian–Atlantic military violence in the fi rst place; it seemed
as though the issue was not even worth considering. As Garfi nkel
showed, certain questions are simply out of place in terms of practical
meanings (see Chapter 3). That the notion of Russian–Atlantic vio-
lence would appear displaced speaks volumes about the embodiment
of diplomatic background knowledge at the NRC.
Most practitioners with insider knowledge maintained that scenar-
ios of mutual violence were simply “not part of military and strate-
gic planning and thinking anymore.” On the Atlantic side, a senior
NATO policymaker with direct connections to the Secretary-General
assured me that “[t]here is no planning in NATO, of any kind, that
engages Russia as a threat … We don’t get along with the Russians
all that well, but it’s not a problem.” On the Russian side, he added,
1
US State Department Chief for Russian affairs quoted in US Department of
State (2006).
“I’m quite sure that none of their planning involves defending against
a NATO attack.” As one German official pointed out, since the early
1990s the Alliance’s forces have been converted into deployable bri-
gades (for peacekeeping purposes, mainly) that would be of limited
use in case of a Russian conventional attack. This practice suggests
that the Russian threat had receded from military planning. One
State Department official observed a similar move on the Russian
side: “Look at their military forces. If they thought the United States
was a military threat, they wouldn’t be focusing their military forces
on how to win the Chechen war … From our perspective, the rela-
tionship is demilitarized.” Throughout my interviews in Brussels,
I was struck by how widespread this assurance was, as well as by
the fact that it reached the highest echelons of the NATO hierarchy.
For instance, several national delegates ruled out any sort of mili-
tary planning targeted against Russia, as did a top general from the
NATO military committee. Most strikingly, a senior member of the
Secretary-General’s office went as far as to say that “Russia nowadays
looks to the West rather the same way that the United States looks to
Mexico or Canada. There are some issues, like soft lumber trade, but
it’s basically a very predictable environment.”
Some Atlantic policymakers could still associate a number of
potential threats with Russia, but none was of a military nature.
In Washington, a senior policymaker could imagine Russia turning
into a threat in any of three ways: by “using energy as a political
weapon”; by giving rise to “instability and chaos should the gov-
ernment implode”; and through acts of mischief – “Russia’s newly
found assertiveness and post-imperial angst means it can cause a lot
of problems as we try to solve things in the international commu-
nity.” He concluded: “Notice that military aggression or confl ict is
not one of the threats. I think Russians would be shocked if they
could see inside our minds and NATO planning and realize how
little we think about Russia.” A member of the French delegation to
NATO similarly affi rmed that the only threat he could see coming
from Moscow was the implosion of the state. According to a senior
official at NATO’s Moscow bureau, talk of military confrontation
was nothing but “hogwash.” On the Atlantic side, it seems as though
the possibility of a military confrontation with Russia was simply not
part of the possibilities entertained on a daily basis by 2006 security
practitioners.
A similar picture emerged from Moscow. For instance, one former

military officer asserted that “Russia’s relations with its NATO neigh-
bours are becoming demilitarized. A war between Russia and Germany
is as unthinkable today as one between Germany and France.” In
the words of a well-known Russian academic, “negative feelings with
respect to the Atlantic community are generated not by apprehensions
of hostility or big confl ict or nuclear war or whatever. There is noth-
ing or almost nothing of this kind nowadays.” Especially interesting
was the recourse to Russian history to explain this certainty: “There
could never be a return to confrontation. Historical experience shows
it doesn’t work. Russia has learned the lesson.” In order to illustrate
the impossibility of military confrontation, a senior Russian diplomat
used the example of the very serious row over the American project to
deploy ballistic missile defense components on Czech and Polish ter-
ritory. During the Cold War, he argued, similar initiatives such as the
American deployment of cruise missiles in the early 1980s would have
caused further confrontation; but not anymore in 2006. “Now we
will sit down, next week, and discuss the issue,” the Russian official
said. “We may disagree. We may get sore, both sides, but we are not
afraid of war. Nobody’s afraid. If somebody tells you he’s afraid, he’s
either lying or he needs to see a head shrink. [Laughter.] I am dead
serious. It was my business to know my guys on the left and my guys
on the right.”
But if this is indeed the case, why did certain segments of the mili-
tary establishment still use confrontational language at times? One
Russian expert proposed that military officers “don’t perceive NATO
as a threat, they just say it. They make scandals and declarations and
noise.” With her voice lowered, she continued that the Russian Chief
of General Staff had recently confided to her: “Of course, I understand
that no threat is coming from the West. But how could we explain
this to our population?” Atlantic practitioners agreed that remnants
of confrontational rhetoric among the Russian military could be
explained by organizational logics instead of genuine apprehensions.
A senior NATO official posted in Moscow opined that “remaining
suspicions on the Russian side are rhetorical. It is a discourse that
aims to value the army, just as it is the case in the United States with
the military-industrial complex. Fundamentally a confl ict with the
West is inconceivable.” For Atlantic practitioners, sticking to the tra-
ditional enemy sounded easier and more efficient in a dramatically
underfunded military. Russia’s continuing preoccupation with NATO

was considered “a matter of political convenience. They focus on
the familiar, old threat … the bogeyman. It marshals political sup-
port among society and justifies expensive weapons procurement,”
in the mind of a State Department official. There was a dependable
belief that the possibility of using force did not actively factor into
both sides’ military planning. For example, a German colonel who
had spent years in Moscow confi rmed that “the Russian military
is not considering having a clash with NATO. They excluded it for
the time being.” This view was confi rmed by a prominent Russian
expert: “Even the most conservative, backward-oriented political
forces in Russia could hardly consider ‘Western aggression’ a viable
aggression, at least for the immediate and medium-term future.” All
in all, it is safe to conclude that in 2006 the possibility of a mili-
tary clash with NATO member states had considerably receded from
Russian practitioners’ horizon of possibility.
Because background knowledge ought to be read between the
lines, I also ascertained whether mutual confrontation was part of
the Russian-Atlantic habitus through a variety of indirect means.
For instance, I would introduce to the interviewees the scenario, very
much topical in 2006, that a new color revolution had taken place
in Belarus following the elections: could Russia possibly intervene
militarily to defend the Lukashenko regime, and if so, would NATO
take steps to defend demonstrators? Interestingly, a number of offi-
cials were convinced that Russia would not use force in such a case
in order to avoid confronting the West. A Canadian official was a
little more careful: “I think you can never dismiss the Russian poten-
tial for the use of force, but the parameters, the limits of Russian
policy options are much narrower than they used to be; which is a
good thing.” According to another practitioner, even if Russia were
to make a move, it would not elicit a response of force in return. But
would NATO not intervene to stop Russia in the event of external
mingling? “No. Frankly, no.” Other solutions would be found outside
the realm of military threats or violence, he thought. A senior NATO
policymaker was more ambivalent: “What the reaction would have
been I don’t know, but it would have been negative and concrete.
Nobody would have let this go.” Noticeably, even this more forceful
response stopped short of raising the possibility of a military clash.
On the Russian side, I probed the receding of military scenarios

from practitioners’ background knowledge by asking a number of
observers what policies their state could implement in reaction to
NATO’s open-door policy toward Ukraine – clearly the most serious
disagreement at the time of the interview (see Chapter 6). A Russian
expert who was fiercely opposed to the Alliance’s policy listed a vari-
ety of possible reactions, from anti-NATO demonstrations to energy
pressures through meddling with Iran. He never mentioned threats of
force; this seemed to be just beyond his otherwise suspicious mind.
Even pondering such a fundamental dispute, which reaches extremely
deep in the Russian psyche, Russian practitioners started their reflec-
tion from the assumption of non-violence. Similarly, when asked what
tools Russia possessed to oppose the Alliance’s decisions that went
against his country’s interest, a Russian official posted in Brussels
responded “political dialogue” and “being a reliable partner.” As he
put it: “The only way for Russia to influence NATO is to be within
[the NRC].” Overall, the diplomatic practice seemed to be in the proc-
ess of becoming increasingly axiomatic.
This evolution fi nds its roots in the fifteen-year-long post-Cold War
era, which was characterized by the absence of military confronta-
tion between Russia and NATO. Even the one episode during which
conditions were met for a potential clash – the Pristina airport inci-
dent in June 1999 (see Chapter 5) – was dismissed as insignificant by
one senior Russian diplomat who was directly involved at the highest
level: “That can happen, I don’t know, between Great Britain and
France. It wasn’t anything dramatic … You shouldn’t disregard us if
you want us to play along, like with Belgrade and others, like today
with Kosovo. But we weren’t close to war over Pristina. It wasn’t
the best point in our relationship, but it wasn’t dangerous.” When
asked whether the specter of force ever appeared during that period,
a Canadian official responded straightforwardly:
No, never; never threats of force. No, never even contemplated … I think
that the pattern has now been set with Russia – that you deal with each
other through negotiation. You deal with each other through bringing
the Russians into a system of rules and regulations and laws … That’s
the way you deal with it and so, force, that’s pretty well out of the
question.
An American policymaker concurred: “There’s no perception that

there’s been any threat to use force on either side.” One senior
British official in charge of defense policy put the matter in a very
telling way:
If you want a really good idea of how in my view the world has changed
for the better, it is that my predecessors would’ve spent one way or another
somewhere in the seventy percent of their time thinking about Russia.
I spend less than five percent of my time thinking about Russia. That’s
sixty-five percent different – it’s representative of energy put to providing
security goods in a more proactive way, in a more beneficial way and not
in a senseless way … I do not spend my time by and large worrying about
a Russian threat.
On the Russian side, an in-depth study of Moscow’s foreign policy

similarly concludes that since the end of the Cold War, “[a]t no stage
did it countenance armed confl ict with the West.”2 By 2006 the possi-
bility of using force against each other had considerably receded from
the practitioners’ point of view.
A latent mistrust
Despite this sea change, interview data and practice analysis also
reveal that a non-negligible level of latent mistrust of mutual intentions
remained in Russian–Atlantic relations in 2006. For instance, one
German colonel believed that through its participation in Operation
Active Endeavour (see below), Russia primarily “wants to gain intel-
ligence” on NATO. Another Alliance official concurred: “Let’s face
it: it gives them a great insight into how we do business, a great intel-
ligence gathering. They now have NATO secret communications on
their ships, they see our standard operating procedures, they have our
doctrine … That’s good stuff if you’re Russia!”3 This mistrust was
undoubtedly reciprocal: for instance, one American officer confided
2
Lo (2002 , 154).
3
Another NATO official would recognize the situation but without taking
offence: “[The Russians] use NATO simply to know what’s happening. So
they’re here, they’re everywhere. They are represented with a lot of diplomats.
They try to proliferate meetings. They meet with a lot of people. So what?
This is basically information and intelligence gathering that they’re doing
here. Which is fi ne.”
that “in private, many Russian officials ask about hidden motives
behind NATO’s willingness to cooperate.” Trust, which stems from
practical sense, formed a thin intersubjective basis for interaction at
the 2006 NRC.
According to interview data, there seemed to be four main sources
of mistrust at the NRC. First (and not limited to this case), it is an
inherent part of the military habitus to plan for the worst contin-
gencies.4 Generally speaking, the military officers I interviewed were
more careful than civilians in their assessment of the possibility of
force in Russian–Atlantic relations. Entertaining worst-case scenar-
ios, after all, is a habit that comes with their job. As a result, they
were less prone to forget about the possibility of military confronta-
tion. A British military officer, now a speechwriter at NATO head-
quarters, put the matter in perspective:
I think one has to differentiate between what is a threat and what is a risk.
If you say a threat is more immediate, a threat is a combination of capa-
bility and intent. Now I would argue that at the moment, Russia still has
the capability but not the intent. That is not to say that changes within the
Russian Federation, in the future years, might not change this and that the
intent would be there as well. But I reckon we would get enough indica-
tors of that to be able to reorient ourselves as necessary … If the threat is
capability and intent, we are not there at the moment. I would say we are at
a risk, which is where the capability exists, but the intent – there’s always
the potential for it to be re-instantiated, to reappear. But I do not think it
will happen and I hope it won’t happen, but as long as there’s the possibility
there, one has to protect.
This quote suggests a lower proclivity, from a military point of view,

to take anything for granted beyond material capabilities. For the
military officers with whom I met, there was no problem whatsoever
in acknowledging that, in the short term, Russian–Atlantic relations
seemed stable: but what about the long term? As a consequence of this
professional disposition, the embodiment of diplomacy in military cir-
cles is bound to be slower. This is not to say that military officers do
not actively cooperate on the ground, however. In fact, as will become
clear below, in practice, military officers tended to establish working
4
See, e.g., the debate on military planning during the Cold War in Heuser
(1991); and Cox (1992).
relations more easily than civil servants. Military officers dislike the
ups and downs of politics and they consequently adopt a much more
down-to-earth attitude. For instance, one American NATO officer
turned my question about the possibility of violence on its head in an
attempt to temper his mistrust: “On the possibility of Cold War-like
confrontation, one needs to be cautious. But what really is unthink-
able is the fact that Russia is now at NATO headquarters!”
A second source of Russian–Atlantic latent mistrust is, quite obvi-
ously, the decades of Cold War confrontation. To be sure, lasting rivalry
cannot but leave traces in habitus. These marks appeared especially
pronounced among Eastern European security practitioners: “we still
struggle with the question of whether Russia and the Soviet Union
are two different terms or not.” But remnants of confrontation were
also widespread in other NATO countries: “Old habits die hard,”
as one State Department practitioner readily conceded. One of his
colleagues was equally realistic: “I was brought up during the Cold
War so I’m still skeptical of the Russians. Russia wants to influence
NATO, and the NRC makes mischief making easier. Russia looks for
opportunities to exploit differences among allies.” Significantly, on
the Alliance’s side, this fear that Moscow could “exploit cracks” was
in line with what was probably the most pervasive concern in Brussels
during the Cold War. According to Ira Straus, in the post-Cold War
era this fear for Alliance consensus has been the foremost stumbling
block in creating a new NATO–Russia relationship.5 My interview
data suggest that this point is well taken.
Reciprocally, the Russians also inherited deeply ingrained disposi-
tions of mistrust towards NATO. A middle-aged professor from one
of Moscow’s most prestigious schools told me, as if stating the obvi-
ous: “Of course NATO’s main duty is to plan war against Russia.
This is a well-known fact.” Another security official depicted Cold
War stereotypes in Russia “like the dead holding the living.” To be
sure, Russia’s history of invasions from its western borders has left
an important imprint on strategic thinking. On both sides, accusa-
tions of “outdated, Cold War-like thinking” abound – a practice that
is clearly part of symbolic power struggles (see Chapters 5 and 6).
During his tenure as American permanent representative to NATO,
Nicholas Burns regretted that “[o]ne abiding legacy of the Cold
5
Straus (2003, 234).
War has been a deeply entrenched suspicion of NATO’s intentions,

especially as the alliance has expanded eastward and struggled to
redefi ne its mission in the post-Soviet world. This feeling of distrust
might be best summed up by the idea that, if it is good for NATO,
it must be bad for Russia.”6 Although mistrustful dispositions were
found in just about a third of my interviews, they nonetheless add
nuance to the fi nding that the recourse to force may be receding from
practitioners’ horizons of possibility.
Third, and contrary to what is often assumed, contemporary mis-
trust among NATO and Russian practitioners is not simply a remnant
of the Cold War but also the result of post-Cold War interactions. In
fact, today’s mistrust in many ways runs deeper than during most
of the 1990s. Throughout the post-Cold War era, both NATO and
Russia have conducted a number of military interventions or deploy-
ments that have heavily affected the quality of the relationship (see
Chapters 5 and 6). These practices sparked fears on both sides that
the relationship might not be as demilitarized as had been thought.
On the Russian side, two such NATO practices have especially curbed
the embodiment of diplomacy. First, NATO’s advances towards the
east through successive waves of enlargement constituted at least an
indirect threat for most Russians. “Without the enlargements the rela-
tions would be much better,” argued one official posted in Brussels.
Importantly, most Russians believed that enlarging NATO broke a
promise made to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 over German reuni-
fication. An official from the Russian Mission to NATO in Brussels
insisted that “Russia assesses capabilities, not intentions. If there
is a deployment to the East, it arouses suspicions.” According to a
German delegate, the American announcement in 2005 of a deploy-
ment in Bulgaria and Romania was seen as another broken promise,
as was the air policing of the Baltic countries’ border on the very day
after they became NATO members. The possibility that Georgia and
Ukraine might follow in their footsteps sparked in Russia intense feel-
ings of exclusion, humiliation and incomprehension (see Chapter 6).
Second, several experts in Moscow believed that NATO’s interven-
tion in Kosovo shattered Russians’ confidence in the demilitarization
of the NATO–Russia relationship. Operation Allied Force convinced
most Russian practitioners that the Alliance was still ready to use
6
Quoted in US Department of State (2004).
force to solve international confl icts and that Russia could eventually
become the next target. In the words of a very moderate Russian
expert:
Before Kosovo, ideas of confrontation were considered “vestige,” remnants

of Soviet propaganda … In 1998, there opened an ideological struggle
within the Russian society and those who predominated were anti-Western
views and mentality. They were able to say: “Listen, you were telling us
that the West is so nice and unable to do anything wrong. Now, look at
Yugoslavia! … They’re delivering bombs on peaceful people!” This was a
very serious fracture of Russian mentality. It reversed the burden of proof.
Among other things, NATO’s intervention convinced the Russian

military of the continuing relevance of a nuclear deterrent: “The dif-
ference between Russia and Serbia is that Serbia doesn’t have nuclear
weapons,” according to a former officer. The fear that Russia could
become NATO’s target in the future deepened with the American-
led intervention in Iraq. In the words of a Russian expert, “recently
we discovered that [in the US] war is considered a rational tool in
promoting home interests. It considerably undermined the authority
of the West.” In 2006, 40–45 percent of the Russian population har-
bored negative feelings toward NATO, primarily because of its per-
ceived aggressiveness.7
On the Atlantic side, two sets of Russian military practices left offi-
cials under the impression that the new Russia may not be that much
different from the Soviet Union regarding the use of force. First, from
a Western perspective the Chechen wars confi rmed as early as 1994
(and again in 1999) that the Russian military retained a lot of influ-
ence over the Kremlin’s policies. According to a Russian observer, the
speeding up of the enlargement process beginning in 1994 was a direct
reaction to the fi rst invasion of Chechnya: “For people suspicious of
Russia’s developments, this was a signal: Russia has not changed. It
still prefers military solutions to political problems.” Second, sev-
eral Atlantic practitioners were discouraged by Russia’s continuing
use of arm-twisting tactics (often bordering on outright force) in its
7
All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) poll quoted
in NATO (2006, 2). See also White (2006, 144–6); and White, Korosteleva
and Allison (2006).
“near abroad”: “Russia does have a more aggressive policy toward

its neighbours, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,” said a State Department
senior policymaker. “And it’s inclined to think in military terms
to preserve its influence and status in that part of the world.” For
instance, NATO expressed concern over Russian troops stationed
in both Moldova and Georgia despite repeated demands by these
countries for their withdrawal (see Chapter 6). By 2006, officials were
already expressing concern over Russia’s forceful tactics in dealing
with Georgia. While the odds of Russia using force against NATO
members were generally non-existent, the opposite was true when it
came to the ex-Soviet republics. As a senior American policymaker
remarked, portending the Georgia War of 2008: “can we completely
rule out that Russia can use force? Of course not: look at what they’re
doing in Georgia.” Other officials also raised the possibility that force
was still considered by Moscow in its “near abroad.” All in all, a
number of military practices on both sides significantly thwarted pac-
ification in and through practice by raising doubts about the demili-
tarization of future joint dealings.
A fourth crucial factor in sparking mistrust and slowing down the
embodiment of diplomacy at the NRC was the arrival of a dozen
former Soviet satellites as new NATO members. In hindsight, it should
be obvious that enlarging the Alliance to post-communist states
would put a brake on the NATO–Russia pacification process: how
could the possibility of using military force recede from practitioners’
mindsets when the newcomers joined NATO precisely out of a fear
of Russia? Eastern European and Baltic countries have a troubled his-
tory of relations with Moscow, including military occupation, which
leads them to stay on guard, if not to be outrightly anti-Russian. In
fact, as an Alliance diplomat recalled, these countries joined NATO
precisely so as not to have to deal with the Russians – certainly not
to be told almost on a daily basis, as they were to be by older Allies,
that they ought to cooperate with Russia. The net result, in 2006,
was that NATO’s Russia policy was “frozen,” in the words of a senior
policymaker in Brussels: “There is no consensus inside NATO as to
the future of the relationship with Russia. As a consensual organiza-
tion it cannot move.”
The habitus of practitioners from former Soviet satellites was char-
acterized by a high level of mistrust toward Russia. A Polish repre-
sentative bluntly recognized that her country’s willingness to join
NATO came out of fear of another Russian invasion. As a result,

one American official conceded, Eastern Europeans tend to focus on
Article Five of the Washington treaty about collective defense. Once
inside, the Polish representative continued, Poles have become “less
allergic to Russia.” Nonetheless, “[n]ot to take what Russians say at
face value is a Polish habit.” Officials from the Baltic countries shared
a similar level of mistrust. Freshly confi rmed as the new Commander
in Chief of Estonia, Major General Ants Laaneots declared that “rela-
tions with Russia are indeed our biggest security problem.”8 Among
NATO’s international military personnel, I met a Lithuanian colo-
nel who was a Red Army conscript in 1987; his dispositions were
obviously heavily influenced by that experience. In a meeting with
another Lithuanian delegate, I was told that “Lithuanians can read
through the Russian mind.” In general, the Balts felt that they were
the ones inside NATO who could provide the most accurate picture of
the Russians. It seemed clear to them that “Russia doesn’t cooperate
genuinely; they are just manoeuvering.” Such dispositions inherited
from history made the embodiment of diplomacy quite difficult at
the NRC.
NATO staff and older members’ delegations were acutely aware
of this problem. One senior policymaker bluntly admitted that “the
Balts and the Poles are less enthusiastic. They bring with them knowl-
edge and a suspicion of Russian motives … They don’t get along: they
bicker and fight all the time.” A top military officer concurred that the
Balts put “no trust at all” in the Russians, while a senior policymaker
in Berlin observed that they “instinctively applaud everything, every
signal, every move coming from the United States that takes a criti-
cal view on Russia.” In fact, a number of delegations from founding
members insisted that “new members have to evolve” because “their
arrival in NATO has put a brake on NATO–Russia cooperation.”
Worse, argued a Canadian delegate, “upon their arrival new members
such as Poland and the Baltic countries openly questioned the oppor-
tunity of a NATO–Russia dialogue.” In view of this fundamental dif-
ference of approach, a German delegate conceived his country’s role
as that of “a bridge between these new members and the Russians.”
But it appeared very hard for new member states to get rid of their
Soviet-era military establishment – “to weed out hardliners,” as one
8
Quoted in Shegedin and Zygar (2006).
top NATO military officer put it. Against that inertia, older European
members “have to have [the new members] mature and go beyond
that. This will play a very important part in the future” of Russian–
Atlantic relations.
Because the new members’ suspicions are often echoed by the US, in
2006 NATO’s policy toward Russia boiled down to the lowest com-
mon denominator. As one senior NATO official summarized, “the
span of policies toward Russia has enlarged. There was a time where
the ease to reach a consensus was better. [But now] we don’t really
have an active Russian policy. We do things with Russia, we cooper-
ate, but in terms of steering a course, it is very difficult because the
span has widened so much. [It was] absolutely easier in the 1990s.”
On that basis, it seems appropriate to conclude that the entry into
NATO of former Soviet satellites has put a strong brake on the post-
Cold War Russian–Atlantic pacification process. So much so, said
one senior NATO official, that “[i]t’s hard to characterize NATO’s
approach to the Russians on a continuum because the change in mem-
bership has changed the character of the Alliance.”
Several practitioners reported that there were “two factions inside
NATO” as far as its Russia policy was concerned: on one side
were countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Norway and
Belgium, which exhibited a higher level of trust toward Russia; and
on the other side clustered the US, the United Kingdom, Poland and
the Baltic countries, which remained more mistrustful of Moscow.
According to a Russian delegate who had been posted to Brussels
for more than a decade, the new NATO members “simply do what
‘Master’ says,” while countries from Old Europe are “more reason-
able.” I too could ascertain a division in my interviews, although I
observed a particularly high level of variance among American and
British practitioners. Generally speaking, however, London and
Washington took a more cautious stance toward Moscow than other
Western European capitals. All in all, in 2006 everything took place
as if relations with Russia divided NATO member states a lot more
than they cemented them.
Indicator 2: the normalization of disputes

The interview data gathered in the field reveal that in 2006 both
parties to the NRC relationship appeared inclined to treat mutual
disputes almost as business-as-usual. An American policymaker

summarized this feeling well: “Yes, we still have disagreements, quite
a few, but certainly nothing like the Cold War.” A Russian counter-
part reciprocated: “We do have disagreements today, all countries
have. But we’re not in the confrontational situation as prior to 1991.”
No doubt political leaders sometimes used abrasive language and
heated rhetoric that suggested aggravated tensions. But in contrast
to this political discourse, security practitioners adopted a more
down-to-earth attitude and tended to play down antagonisms in the
relationship. This normalization of confl icts reinforces the embodi-
ment of diplomacy because it turns disputes into matters of routine.
According to a seasoned American diplomat whose career spanned
both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras: “Disagreements civil in
nature and tone are far more possible. They don’t put us on the brink
of war.”
Of cycles and sine waves

Russian–Atlantic relations have gone through a series of highs and
lows over the last decade and a half, in which honeymoons (e.g.,
1992–3, 2001–3) have been followed by rough patches (e.g., 1998–9,
2004–6) and vice versa. Interestingly, practitioners tended to under-
stand this evolution in “cycles” (or “waves” or “stages”) – an appraisal
that led them to entertain dependable expectations that a low would
inevitably give way to another high, and so forth. As one American
policymaker put it: “The long term is not bleak; it’s just we’re in a
rough patch now.” From a wider perspective, one NATO official in
charge of the Russia policy stated that:
the relationship has become much more stable and pragmatic. If I take a
fi fteen-year window, that was obviously a period of dramatic highs and
lows. We got to know each other to an extent where we managed to rein
that in a little bit and keep expectations real, maintain a level of transpar-
ency to ensure that nobody gets surprised by what the other side does.
In fact, from the practitioners’ point of view, it seemed as though

the inconsistent quality of Russian–Atlantic cooperation was quite
normal in the everyday life of international security. As one NATO
official put it:
You have these honeymoon periods where you ask, “how are you going to
do this together?” I’d actually – let’s be honest: after about six months you
decide you’ve done as much as you can in that particular field and you sit
back and twiddle your thumbs. And say “what else can we do?” You hit
another sort of flat period where nothing is happening – then something
else will happen and you’ll say, “oh, we can do that together,” and you
go off again on another of your honeymoon periods where everything is
hunky-dory and you’re working closely together.
From the practitioners’ point of view, then, a slowdown in coopera-

tion was no tragedy but rather normal and even an inevitable conse-
quence of a past surge.
In the same spirit, a handful of NATO officials described the rela-
tionship with Russia as a “sine wave.” Despite highs and lows, they
found that the relationship was becoming more stable over time.
Engagement persisted in rough patches so that overall the lows were
decreasingly low, so to speak. In fact, because the sine wave’s ampli-
tude decreased over the post-Cold War era, “a complete cut-off of
relations is now less possible.” Overall, NATO practitioners’ under-
standing of the relationship as a cycle allowed them to normalize the
“succession of upsurge and downsurge” in the relationship. Just like
a “wave” on the seashore, argued one NATO official, “sometimes
it’s getting better, sometimes it’s getting worse.” The important point
here is that solving disputes peacefully had entered the realm of prac-
tical sense: “We spent a lot of time in negotiations that set up the
NRC, trying to imagine scenarios, and what we would do under this
and that circumstance,” argued an Alliance policymaker. “In practice
it’s been very pragmatic – we just know what it is when we see it,
when a specific question comes up.” Solving disputes at the NRC had
become a routine matter in 2006.
In order to probe this view, I asked several officials whether they
thought that another rupture of NATO–Russia relations (such as dur-
ing and after Operation Allied Force in 1999; see Chapter 6) was
currently possible. The general feeling was optimistic.9 While the
Georgia War and the ensuing suspension of NRC activities proved
9
One interesting exception, however, was a State Department official
who responded: “You always have to imagine such ruptures, because in
diplomacy when there is a big crisis the response is often a rupture of
relations. Look at Pyongyang, or Tehran: our embassies disappeared when
that expectation wrong, it is nonetheless striking that it was so

widespread in 2006. For example, one NATO senior official replied
that “that sort of spontaneous move is less likely today. You wouldn’t
hype a crisis into a rupture of NATO–Russia relations.” One of his
colleagues was equally convinced that today a rupture of relations
“would be much more difficult to imagine.” The capacity of the NRC
forum to take the heat out of disputes – to provide a “safety valve,” as
one practitioner put it – had been proven in practice. Since 2002 NRC
participants had discussed a number of contentious issues, including
the Balkans, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle
East, NATO’s transformation, energy security and missile defense. By
a Canadian delegate’s account, these issues were reportedly put on the
agenda in a tit-for-tat fashion – Russia accepted an NRC discussion
on Georgia so long as the US assented to discuss Iraq, and so on. As
a result, “[t]he dialogue at the NRC has become more entrenched.
We’ve moved from all-out enthusiasm to more concrete progress …
There are no routines yet, but cooperation principles are emerging.
Before we would not discuss controversial topics; now there is a
willingness to do so,” affi rmed a NATO official. The same viewpoint
could be heard on the Russian side: “The balance of the relationship
is positive. We’re now discussing things for which there was no will
to discuss before. The political dialogue touches on any issues except
internal matters.” Significantly, a German delegate told me that, in
the spring of 2006, the possibility of an NRC peacekeeping mission
in the south Caucasus had even been raised – something the Russians
had always refused to consider in the past. All in all, concluded the
chairman of the NRC preparatory committee, “the NRC has evolved
into a forum for serious dialogue on those issues where we do not see
eye-to-eye.”10
By far “the biggest gap the NRC managed to bridge,” in a NATO
senior official’s words, had to do with the 2004 Orange Revolution in
Ukraine. Significantly, in the post-Cold War era this event presented
the highest risk of “evolv[ing] into a West vs. Russia, proxy type of
conflict.” Yet the NRC managed to solve the issue peacefully with a
things get too hostile. So yes it’s possible, for instance if Russia takes military
action against Georgia or something like that.” The events of summer 2008
obviously proved him right.
10
Fritch (2007, 2).
joint communiqué, on December 9, 2004, which “appeal[ed] to all

parties to continue to avoid the use or instigation of violence, to refrain
from intimidation of voters, and to work to ensure a free, fair elec-
toral process that reflects the will of the Ukrainian people.”11 Given
the stakes at play, this dispute constitutes a compelling counterfactual
(but for X, then Y ) that diplomacy had previously been normalized
at the NRC. But for the prior embodiment of the peaceful resolution
of disputes (X), the Orange Revolution could have led to a military
standoff (or threats thereof) between Russia and NATO’s member
states (Y ). At the NRC (and, notably, neither at the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] nor through the
EU–Russia mechanism), Russia and NATO member states played
down this deep-rooted conflict, agreeing to disagree. From the practi-
tioners’ point of view, what mattered was not so much the substance
of the communiqué but “the fact that they actually managed to deal
with” that issue. “We came to a common language, which proves that
this framework works,” concluded a German delegate.
The head of NATO’s Russia policy explained this success by the
fact that the NRC has turned Russia into a “stakeholder”:
Look at the agenda of that meeting [December 9, 2004]: we agreed not

only on that, but also on a very ambitious NATO–Russia Action Plan on
Terrorism and the three big elements of prevention, combating, and conse-
quence management; and we agreed on an exchange of letters for Russian
participation in Operation Active Endeavour. These were deliverables that
Russia was very interested in. We’ve managed to be successful, when we
have, when we maintained enough substance to keep Russia engaged. It’s
not as easy as in Spring 99 to say: “the hell with all of you, we’re walking
away.”
As another NATO diplomat continued, the Russians “have a very

vested interest in making [the NRC] work … they’d never go along
and do something like that unless they felt it was in their best interest
to engage on such a difficult topic. So I think [the communiqué on
Ukraine is] a very revealing incident.” In 2006, American and NATO
practitioners considered that the NRC was Russia’s “favorite forum”
and that its officials “work[ed] seriously” there. As one British official
11
NATO (2004a).
put it: “Russia actually likes its position of preference in relation to

NATO. They like to have these discussions. They like to have this
engagement and they like to be involved. [The relationship] has been
wading through very, very deep mud and we’re getting things out of
the way [thanks to the NRC].”
In most (though not all) of my interviews, I had the feeling that
practitioners strongly believed in the virtue of talking, whether that
led to an agreement or not. Dialogue would not necessarily lead to a
change of mind but it was worthy nonetheless, according to a NATO
diplomat:
Does it mean that having that forum with them is going to sway their
mind on certain issues? Any country is going to say, “No, we have our
national interests and we’re going to stick with them.” But the chances are
you’re going to see it coming. You can work to get around it and talk to
them about it but at the end of the day … you’re not going to sway them
from that.
Talking eased the everyday life of security officials no matter what

results it delivered. In the blunt words of a seasoned Canadian dip-
lomat: “The idea that you always solve differences of views is dead
wrong. Very often you paper over differences.”
Contrary to the Cold War era, when both sides had to live perma-
nently on the brink of nuclear confrontation, in 2006 disputes had
become at least less alarming and at best normalized, by a senior
Alliance practitioner’s account. Russian and Atlantic officials felt much
freer to discuss a variety of topics and express frank opinions: “There
are disagreements, obviously, because we’re talking about more
things,” confi rmed a senior member of the Secretary-General’s office.
“Both sides are much freer to talk about what’s on their mind. In the
Cold War it was simply impossible to go there.” Behind this evolution,
Alliance practitioners perceived a new “degree of honesty” as well as
an unprecedented “familiarity” in the relationship. Russian practi-
tioners also believed that disputes were inevitable: “the common thing
in international politics is not to be able to agree on everything. It’s
normal to disagree.” Russian–Atlantic divergences, according to one
Russian expert, were in that sense not so different from intra-Alliance
disagreements. In this context, practitioners valued the possibility of
sitting together around the same table and “talk, talk, talk,” because
“talking gets into habit.”
In 2006, numerous tensions continued to surface and significant

differences of international outlook remained. But a number of secu-
rity officials emphasized that it often was just the same between
France and the United Kingdom, for instance. The important thing,
from the practitioners’ point of view, was to be able to “air” differ-
ences and “talk [them] through.” Thus it was the way in which these
differences were bridged that made the relationship qualitatively dif-
ferent, not their number: “It doesn’t always go very well, but at least
we talk about it,” summed up a senior NATO policymaker. To be
sure, because the NRC was often used to “air the dirty laundry,”
there was a dramatic element to it, but it was judged useful as a sort
of therapy. For instance, one British diplomat suggested that:
it’s actually useful that we have a forum to have these arguments. If we

weren’t having these arguments in the NATO–Russia Council, where would
we be having them? If we didn’t have a means of Russia airing its concerns,
what would we have instead? So it does feel difficult and destructive a lot of
the time, but I think it’s important for everyone that actually it’s construc-
tive to have these debates and it’s constructive to air these problems.
In addition, several practitioners stressed the importance of the

“boring” aspects of the NRC, such as a fi rm “timetable and a regular
meeting schedule,” which forced NATO and Russia to confront tough
issues regularly. The NRC “provides a structure” to the diplomatic
resolution of disputes, in an American practitioner’s words.
At the institutional level, in 2006 the NRC comprised more than
twenty-five working groups carrying forward concrete projects on
security cooperation. Such a wide array of issue areas led the NATO
bureaucracy to develop ties not only with the Kremlin and the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also with the Russian Ministry of
Emergency Situations, the Border Guards, the Interior Ministry, the
Academy of Sciences, etc. “There are probably ten to fi fteen thou-
sand people within various parts of the Russian bureaucracy who
are involved in one way or another in some NATO–Russia coopera-
tive effort,” reported one NATO official closely involved in relations
with Russia. “That’s a constituency.” As they widened in scope and
depth, relations between Moscow and the Alliance could not be dis-
rupted as easily as in the past, he thought. Conflicts had to be solved
through “normal” diplomatic channels. NATO prides itself on the
fact that “[h]ardly a day goes by without an NRC meeting at one
level or another, which has led to an unprecedented intensity of con-

tacts and informal consultations in many different fields.”12 As they
daily interact with foreign counterparts, practitioners bear in mind
that conflicts will not wither away overnight and that disputes cannot
be solved instantly. As one NATO military officer who spent years
working with the Russians insisted: “We need to continue and tem-
per our expectations. We can only reach out through a step-by-step
approach. It will take a long time. It’s better than doing nothing.”
As they were going through cycles and advancing with small steps,
practitioners valued the NRC structure especially because it “[froze]
in time one of the high periods and institutionalize[d] enough of the
cooperative atmosphere that we can ride out the lows. We’ll continue
in the behind-the-scene, low-profile way that doesn’t always make the
headlines,” insisted one NATO diplomat. Pacification in and through
practice has a different logic than an exclusive focus on high politics
would suggest: from the practitioners’ point of view, what mattered
was that “[t]here is a de-dramatization of the whole NATO–Russia
relationship.”
Although one should not overstate this evolution in light of the
Georgia War of 2008, in 2006 the NRC’s working atmosphere
appeared less at the mercy of the overall quality of Russia–West rela-
tions than it used to be during the 1990s. In the words of an American
official: “The NRC is a hugely valuable tool to keep engaging the
Russians in dialogue, to keep working on practical projects where
our interests coincide, to keep a certain degree of momentum and
practical cooperation regardless of what is going on in the bilateral
political relation.” These joint projects, according to a British diplo-
mat, “progress quite well … regardless of the difficulties we’re having
in our strategic dialogue with Russia.” A member of the Canadian
delegation to NATO similarly believed that “among the things that
were gained is that it has become impossible to lose the entire rela-
tionship all of a sudden. Sometimes the relationship is so banal and
normal that it looks just like relations with any other country.” This
trivialization of Russian–Atlantic cooperation seemed quite signifi-
cant in terms of pacification in and through practice – as were the
limits it faced in 2006.
12
NATO (2007, 6).
An elusive momentum
As considerable as it may look from my interview data, the normali-
zation of disputes at the NRC was considerably thwarted in 2006 by
the fact that it remained partly hostage to the larger political relation-
ship between Moscow and the West. The momentum described by a
handful of practitioners appeared quite elusive to many others. As a
NATO military officer posted in Moscow described the NRC diplo-
macy: “It’s not a process that’s self-propelling, with its own momen-
tum. We really have to be creative … you always need new impetus.”
Relatedly, certain practitioners expressed skepticism as to the capacity
of the NRC to work in the absence of political will. While in 2006 the
NRC still benefited from the “highest support” of key governments,
it remained to be seen how much momentum the NRC practitioners’
could keep going, and for how long, should political will falter. One
imaginative interviewee in Washington elaborated: “I don’t think one
ever assumes that institutions and mechanisms can weather any and
all storms … You try to build the building to withstand the force of
the vast majority of storms, but the exception may blow it down.”
With the benefit of hindsight, the Georgia War turned out to be such
an exception, at least temporarily (see Chapter 6). A NATO diplomat
in Moscow also perceived the two upcoming presidential elections in
the US and Russia in 2008 as “clouding” the relationship. Change in
political leadership, especially in the main countries represented at
the NRC, mattered a lot from the practitioners’ point of view. One
NATO official recalled, for instance, that “you will see a particular
country that is particularly pro-Russia one day after a set of elections
and particularly anti the next – Germany being one.” The reverse
could now be said of the Obama administration as compared to the
Bush years.
In addition, practitioners pointed out two other factors that exog-
enously determined the quality of the NRC relationship. The fi rst
was NATO’s own process of transformation, which had been unfold-
ing for a decade and a half and whose endpoint remained far from
clear even to its own civil servants. When asked where they thought
the NATO–Russia relationship would be in twenty years, several
Alliance officials answered that the main difficulty was that “it’s dif-
ficult to say what NATO will be in ten or twenty years.” Because of
its ever-changing mission, “NATO can’t do that much [with Moscow]
because it is so absorbed in its own crisis. NATO will not do anything

because it lacks the capacity to institutionalize the relationship with
Russia beyond what it already is. NATO considers that if Russia is
interested, it is up to them to do something,” affi rmed a senior official
posted in Moscow. The second external factor upon which the NRC
diplomatic process depends is the future of Russia itself. In 2006,
almost all practitioners would not venture to predict how democratic
Moscow would be in the middle term. This created difficulties in day-
to-day interaction, believed a NATO diplomat, because the Russians
“haven’t found an equilibrium in which they could say, ‘OK, this is
not Russia becoming something, this is Russia that is.’”
In terms of practical logics, a regular participant on the NRC pre-
paratory committee evaluated that “we still don’t have that inher-
ent feel for political partnership.” A number of NATO practitioners
blamed the politicization of the NRC on the Russians, who, by a British
official’s account, “hold the practical agenda hostage to the strategic
agenda.” According to a senior official at the State Department: “The
Russians make the NRC political. They want it to be a Foreign
Ministry- and policy-driven thing. They’re reluctant to let the mili-
tary cooperation go. When they talk about [the NRC] and measure
it, it’s always in terms of the political relationship.” The official illus-
trated his point with the discussions that were held in 2006 on the
future status of Kosovo. In view of the difficulty of reaching an agree-
ment, he lamented: “Half of what motivates the Russians on Kosovo
is if the international community [meaning NATO] says Kosovo is
going to be independent, then why not Abkhazia and Transdniestria?
This is a self-interested concern we’re not going to agree on. We won’t
solve that at the NRC. It hasn’t gained any momentum of its own. It
would be very nice it did!” Another example of the politicized nature
of Russia’s cooperation with NATO, supplied by a British officer from
the Ministry of Defense, was an NRC exercise that was supposed to be
held on British soil but was later moved to France, allegedly because
of soured relations between London and Moscow at the time.
In this context, practitioners expressed regret at the inflammatory
rhetoric often uttered at the highest political levels. As one NATO
official complained: “One of the problems that I find, from a policy
professional who’s been dealing with Russia for several years, is that
Western policy toward Russia tends to swing widely between unreal-
istic euphoria and utter desperation. Those wide mood swings are not
justified by facts.” Similarly, on the Russian side, the political rhetoric

about NATO was often not representative of the actual cooperation
that was taking place on the ground at the NRC, according to a diplo-
mat posted in Moscow: “The language that Russian authorities use at
NATO and here is not coherent, which gives a completely schizophrenic
impression. I live this daily. Whether this double language will con-
tinue depends on the overall relationship Russia has with the West.” In
her opinion, while NATO allies make the difference between Alliance
issues and larger transatlantic or EU relations, Moscow does not: “For
Russia the relationship with NATO is completely dependent – hence
the schizophrenia – on the relationship with the United States and
the West in general. It’s not a different corridor: it’s completely inter-
twined. It makes the relationship very vulnerable.”
In order to lend momentum to NATO–Russia relations, one senior
Russian diplomat emphasized the need to give concrete substance to
NRC discussions by tackling “real challenges, not old myths about
Russia attacking Washington with missiles.” Alluding to the scenario
of a terrorist attack on the London or Moscow subway, he contin-
ued: “This is something to deal with together. When we will resume
this very serious and central dialogue, then I think we will have a
certain security against rupture of relations.” However, the same
Russian practitioners argued that what ultimately prevents the NRC
from gaining momentum was the fact that Russia remained excluded
from NATO. Asked to explain why, three years after France’s and
Russia’s staunch opposition to the American invasion of Iraq, trust
was restored between Washington and Paris but not with Moscow, he
lucidly answered: “They’re inside the tent and we’re outside. Yes, we
have a mechanism with NATO, but it doesn’t compensate for the feel-
ing that you belong to the collective people.” This profound feeling
of exclusion, which was articulated throughout my interviews with
Russian practitioners, is further discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
The politicized nature of the NRC becomes especially obvious
when it is compared to another example of institutionalized Russian–
American cooperation: the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
(also known as the Global Partnership since the 2002 G8 summit,
and previously called the Nunn-Lugar program in the US). This mul-
tiyear program essentially aims to secure and dismantle weapons of
mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet
Union states. Beyond its success, what was particularly striking
about the Cooperative Threat Reduction program was its complete

depoliticization: the quality of diplomatic interaction and military
cooperation allegedly did not follow the overall mood of Russian–
Western relations. As one State Department official stressed, his team
worked on the program “non-stop through the 1990s. It survived all
of that disruption. In fact, I would say that in general, the disrup-
tion and the instability, at least as a practitioner, drove us harder.”
In effect, he insisted that during crises such as Bosnia or Kosovo the
level of cooperation counterintuitively “went up”; the program was
“insulated” from other problems and consistently “dealt with in a
very workmanlike way.” The chief Canadian negotiator of the Global
Partnership similarly assessed that negotiations with the Russians
went “extraordinarily well” despite the fact that the issues were
“extremely complex” and “most sensitive.” This insulation of day-
to-day interaction from overall politics was not as strong at the NRC
in 2006, according to practitioners. This important fi nding leads me
to explore the third indicator of the embodiment of diplomacy: daily
cooperation on the ground.
Indicator 3: daily cooperation on the ground

Daily cooperation on the ground is an indicator of the embodiment
of diplomacy because the logic of practicality is constituted in and
through practice (see Chapter 2). Within a stable social configuration,
the practical sense reads the way to go in the present and the future
from past relations and practices. In the Russian–Atlantic case, there is
one area in which cooperation has become more self-propelling: prac-
tical military-to-military cooperation. Although the NATO–Russia
relationship was strained to a post-Cold War low at the time of the
interviews, an American Lieutenant-General posted to NATO insisted
that practical cooperation was “the best ever.” A Canadian delegate
agreed that the military-to-military dimension was clearly the NRC’s
“main added value.” On the Russian side, military cooperation was
similarly considered “the fundamental thing” – what supports politi-
cal dialogue. According to a NATO representative in Moscow, practi-
cal cooperation such as counter-narcotics training in Central Asia – a
Russian idea – worked very well because it is precisely what meets
Russian expectations. It commits them to the NRC forum, which is
good news for the Alliance. “The only way you’re going to share a
strategic perspective is if you do stuff together,” observed a senior

NATO policymaker. That said, in 2006 Russian and Atlantic security
practices also embodied contrasting organizational cultures.
Doing stuff together

The very fi rst practical cooperation between Russia and NATO began
in October 1995, when a group of Russian General Staff officers
arrived at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in
order to prepare Russia’s participation in the Implementation Force
(IFOR) and later in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). In total, 1,500
Russian troops with 300 pieces of heavy weaponry went on duty
in early February 1996, officially under the command of American
General George Joulwan, who also happened to be NATO’s Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). As a number of practition-
ers recalled, although not formally integrated, Russian and NATO
troops entered into joint patrolling, combat training, reconnaissance,
etc. In the course of day-to-day work, several mechanisms were
developed to ease communication and interaction on the ground.
General Leonti Shevtsov, who commanded the Russian contingent,
assessed the cooperation in the following way: “It has not been a
smooth ride throughout, of course, but as a result of our joint work
at SHAPE we are gradually learning to work together.”13 A detailed
Russian–American assessment of IFOR gave “high marks” to coop-
eration on the ground, while also noting the need for improvement in
operational coordination, decisionmaking procedures and planning
process.14 Interoperability – the ability of systems, units and forces to
work effectively with others – was also flagged as an area for further
improvement. Despite day-to-day interactions at the tactical level, a
number of NATO officials emphasized that the peacekeeping opera-
tions were not run jointly, as the operational space had been divided
between Russian and Allied forces.
The Kosovo Force (KFOR), which received a Russian contribution
of 1,500 soldiers (the largest non-NATO contingent), was the object
of a similar mix of plaudits and reservations concerning Russian–
Atlantic cooperation on the ground. As Roy Allison reports: “At
the operational level, issues of control in planning and coordination
13 14
Shevtsov (1997, 4). Kipp et al. (2000, 56–9).
between Russia and other NATO participants arose periodically,

although tactical-level cooperation appeared to be excellent, at least
between Russian and US forces. NATO and Russian troops took part
in joint training, joint patrolling, and joint de-mining tasks. Liaison
functions developed on the tactical and strategic levels.”15 However,
Moscow decided to pull out its contingents – both SFOR and KFOR –
in the summer of 2003, thereby losing the opportunity for ground-
level, day-to-day cooperation with NATO. But throughout the eight
years of operational interaction, Russian and Atlantic practitioners
succeeded, at least in part, in turning attention away from mutual
disputes toward common fate and joint ventures. In this context,
military officers were “able to fi nd a common language when faced
with a common mission.”16 To this end, many of the NATO officials
I interviewed in 2006 were actively looking for new peacekeeping
opportunities with the Russians.
Despite the lack of any active Russian–Atlantic peacekeeping oper-
ation in 2006, the NRC worked on a number of initiatives in prepara-
tion for an eventual mission. In September 2002, the NRC approved
a document called “Political Aspects of a Generic Concept for Joint
NATO–Russia Peacekeeping Operations.” In September 2004, the
NRC held a three-day procedural exercise on peacekeeping, in which
the twenty-seven member states were confronted with a fictional
international crisis situation that required the generation of a joint
peacekeeping force to enforce an UN-sponsored peace agreement. In
early 2005, Moscow announced the creation of a peacekeeping bri-
gade comprised of 2,000 soldiers dispatched in three motorized rifle
battalions, a reconnaissance battalion, and various support units.
The brigade is now fully autonomous and has been involved in the
NRC’s operational compatibility program. Although not officially
a peacekeeping operation, in 2006 NATO and Russia also cooper-
ated on small-scale intelligence and defense functions with regard to
Afghanistan (see also Chapter 6). A Canadian policymaker portrayed
Moscow as “actively helpful in Afghanistan, not least in arrang-
ing American basing arrangements.” Finally, the NRC’s Counter-
Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel was
initiated in December 2005 as a pilot project to train 350 officers to
police Afghanistan’s borders.
15 16
Allison (2006, 111–12). Kujat (2002 , 1).
In 2006, Russia and NATO were also participating in Operation

Active Endeavour, a naval counterterrorist operation in the Mediter-
ranean launched by NATO in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.
In September 2006, under its own initiative Russia took part in this
mission with a ship that was fully integrated under NATO command
(another frigate, the Ladnyi, took its turn of duty in September 2007).
Russia’s participation in Active Endeavour is all the more remark-
able in that it is an Article Five mission decided under the collective
defense provision that was historically targeted against Moscow. In
preparation for joining the operation, starting in 2005 the Russian
navy participated in a number of training sessions with NATO mem-
bers’ fleets. By one NATO senior diplomat’s account, the military
integration required by the operation implied sharing secret commu-
nication codes, standard operating procedures, doctrines, and other
information normally restricted to allies only. As an American del-
egate noted: “We’ve already done things we had never done before,
such as exchanging officers between naval commands and sharing
photographic equipment to put on board Russian vessels.” Military
cooperation and information-sharing on such sensitive issues suggest
that the possibility of a mutual attack was not an overwhelming pre-
occupation on either side. In and through practice, the focus was on
a common struggle.
In 2006 the NRC was in charge of a large menu of practical
activities held both in Russia and on NATO countries’ soil, includ-
ing consequence-management exercises, joint responses to terrorist
attacks, missile defense command post exercises and nuclear weapons
accident response, among many other tasks. Russia also took part
in an exercise called Sorbet Royal in 2005 that featured submarine
rescue maneuvers.17 Other examples of military-to-military coopera-
tion included the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, which fosters NRC
cooperation on airspace surveillance and airspace traffic management
with the objective of countering terrorist threats to civil aviation.
A live exercise with military transport aviation was held in Ramstein
in July 2006, and a system of reciprocal exchange of air traffic data
17
In the weeks following this exercise, Moscow requested help from the
British navy in the rescue of one of its submarine crew near the Kamchatka
peninsula. This success was often hailed by NATO officers as a concrete
NRC deliverable from which Russia benefited.
was implemented in March. Other noteworthy initiatives include the

Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, a joint Russian– Ukrainian venture
to give NATO access to six Antonov aircraft, and the launch of a
NATO–Russia Information, Consultation and Training Center for
the Resettlement of Military Personnel Discharged from the Russian
Armed Forces, which was expanded in 2003 to six regional branches
across Russia in addition to its main office in Moscow. These joint
ventures are tangible practices that demonstrate a considerable level
of daily interaction on the ground.
In a similar fashion, Russia and NATO have been working for years
on fostering interoperability among their militaries, which also points
toward the gradual receding of confrontational thinking on both
sides. As a retired American pilot, now part of NATO’s international
staff, optimistically described it: “the very willingness to develop
interoperable forces suggests that mutual armed conflicts are no more
possible.” A German military officer agreed: “It would not be fair to
deal together in these operations and at the same time think about
confrontation in the future. The two cannot go along.” In June 2005,
for instance, the NRC Defense Ministers adopted a document enti-
tled “Political–Military Guidance towards Enhanced Interoperability
between Forces of Russia and NATO Nations,” whose objective was
to ensure that the forces of all services at the three levels of military
command and operation (strategic, operational, and tactical) devel-
oped the ability to operate in synergy. The program led Russia and
NATO to fi nally sign a Status of Forces Agreement in 2005 (rati-
fied by the Duma in May 2007), which established a legal frame-
work for reciprocal military transit over one another’s territory free
from visa regimes and related restrictions. Admittedly, these practical
initiatives required fairly high levels of military transparency. In a
similar vein, in June 2005 all NATO member states together with
Russia published a “NATO–Russia Compendium of Financial and
Economic Data Relating to Defense” listing defense expenditures of
NRC countries since 1980.
In addition to military-to-military cooperation, in 2006 the NRC
also hosted a few dozen workshops, roundtables and seminars on a
variety of topics, ranging from fuels interoperability, terrorist tactics,
defense reform and peacekeeping, to logistics, defense budgeting, area
surveillance and maritime support. Academic exchanges were also
organized at the NATO Defense College in Rome, where a group
of Russian military officers taught for the very fi rst time. The fi rst
academic year of a military-based defense reform course for active-
duty military officers serving at the Russian Ministry of Defense
also came to a successful conclusion in 2006. The course, approved
by the NRC in 2004, had been developed jointly by NATO and a
top-tier Moscow academic institute. During the same year, Mobile
Education Training Teams took part in more than forty events,
including another fi rst: Russian military teaching at the NATO school
in Oberammergau. The NRC’s many working groups of experts also
developed half a dozen detailed glossaries on matters of special opera-
tions forces (2006), peacekeeping (2006), combating terrorism (2006),
defense reform (2005), or nuclear terminology (2004).
The NRC provided a physical locus of face-to-face, daily interac-
tion among Russian and Atlantic security practitioners. In addition
to its mission to the Alliance’s headquarters, in 2004 Moscow also
opened a liaison branch office in Mons as well as a small team within
the Partnership Coordination Cell at SHAPE. As a senior NATO pol-
icymaker put it: “We now have a structural forum … where they meet
all the time on all issues and talk … You start to cycle through offi-
cials who know you, you don’t have such an ignorance of NATO and
suspicion because they know how it works.” The ongoing presence
of Russian officials in Brussels, as well as their almost daily meet-
ings with NATO counterparts, accounted for an important dimen-
sion of the NRC institutionalization. For instance, I was genuinely
astonished to hear a Russian official express the view that “Russia sits
around the table like any other country. It is a member of the family.”
He added that “there is this glue” at the NRC. Interpersonal bonds
seem to work both ways. A British delegate admitted that in prepara-
tion for NRC meetings she would approach her Russian counterparts
the same way she does her French or American ones. A French official
told me a similar story, insisting that he calls his Russian colleagues
in preparation for a meeting, asks for support or draws limits as he
would for inter-Allied negotiations.
Institutionalization at NATO headquarters found its echo in
Russia, though on a much smaller scale. The NRC was represented
in Moscow through an Information Office and a Military Liaison
hosted by the Belgian embassy. A “hotline” was also established in
late 2003 between NATO headquarters and the Russian Defense
Minister. On the civil side, NATO launched a website in Russian in
order to speak directly to people within the country. In spring 2006,

a NATO–Russia Rally was organized across Russia to promote coop-
eration with the Alliance as a key foreign policy interest of the coun-
try. With stops in nine cities from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad, the
objective of the rally was to heighten public awareness of the NRC’s
goals and achievements. When I met with a senior NATO diplomat
involved in the project upon her return to Moscow in May 2006, she
said that although the project would not change Russians’ percep-
tion of NATO overnight (very negative, according to her assessment),
at least it was the fi rst initiative of public diplomacy run jointly by
NATO and the Russian bureaucracy on the Kremlin’s soil. On the
military side, the head of the Military Liaison revealed that in 2005
about 200 events had been organized in Moscow alone. NATO mili-
tary representatives met at least twice a month with their counterparts
at the Russian Ministry of Defense to discuss all sorts of military
issues, including “contentious ones.” Overall, these NRC mechanisms
were perceived by practitioners as “a bridge to Russia” – “the proof
that this Alliance is no longer directed against Russia,” to borrow an
American delegate’s words.
Thanks to the NRC joint programs, hundreds of civilian and mili-
tary personnel from Russia and Allied countries gathered to work
together on a day-to-day basis. An American delegate judged these
interactions on the ground as “very valuable, because they put
us together and we go to the field together with real scenarios …
We’re building trust, which is the fundamental thing … It needs to
be built both in my government and on the Russian side.” From a
British practitioner’s point of view, the main gain earned from joint
exercises was reassurance about intentions. As one German official
confi rmed, “we’re coming together. The more we do it, in working
groups etc., the more we work together on military-to-military level,
have joint exercises on different levels, then the better it works. People
stop thinking about the possible threat of the Russian army.” On the
Russian side, an analyst made a similar evaluation:
When I started in the middle of the 1990s, I couldn’t have imagined that
so soon, in seven to eight years – a very short historical period – NATO–
Russia relations would be characterized by the Russian embassy as the
most successful of all the directions of Russian foreign policy. With NATO
we cooperate. Of course it’s not sufficient, I would like to see more on
the table. But this military-to-military cooperation, joint exercises, special

status of forces, interoperability, all this is very important. These small
steps create a new atmosphere in our relationship.
The net result was, to use the words of another observer in Moscow,
the emergence of a zdravyi smysl (здравый смысл) or a “common
sense” that the current NATO–Russia relationship had become safe
from mutual violence. This was obviously a sea change from the
Cold War.
For NATO practitioners, engaging the Russian army aimed to
debunk certain enduring myths about the Alliance so as to foster a
workmanlike atmosphere: “We made some progress in the Russian
military,” said one NATO official. “They are much more friendly to
us and much more constructive than they were, I don’t know, ten
years ago … You can’t compare [Russia’s Chief of General Staff Yuri]
Baluyevsky with his predecessors, for instance – he’s much better.
Also the guys here at the Russian mission are different from the previ-
ous staff. They’re ready to cooperate.” According to one American
policymaker, the NRC contributed to changing Russia’s perception
of the Alliance: “They’ve been too much around,” he said. Judging
from high-level declarations on Russia’s side, there seemed to be some
truth to these assessments: Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov declared,
for instance, that “the NATO–Russia cooperation has outgrown the
‘adolescence’ age,” hailing practical achievements on theatre missile
defense and others.18 Although these sanguine statements were often
balanced by harsh criticisms of the Alliance, they represented a signif-
icant departure from those made by the otherwise more pro-Western
Kremlin in the 1990s.
Also striking was the fact that discussions at the NRC created what
a French delegate called a “variable geometry” of political coalitions,
with Russia sometimes siding with certain allies and sometimes with
others depending on the issue: “You come to a point at the NRC
where we have lively discussions not only twenty-six plus one, but
also among allies,” confi rmed an official from the German Delegation
to the Alliance. This constituted a very important departure from
the politics of the PJC, in which the NATO members’ positions were
“pre-cooked” in a prior NAC meeting. These Allied positions were
18
Ivanov (2004).
then presented “en bloc” to the Russians, thereby creating a bit of

confrontation. At the NRC, argued a British delegate, there was “very
little coordination among allies.” That said, the very nature of the
Alliance created a very clear limit to the notion that the NRC com-
prises twenty-seven equal partners. In a German delegate’s formula-
tion, “solidarity inside the Alliance is a value we appreciate.” The
partnership with Russia remained subsidiary to collective defense;
there were clear “red lines with Russia.” As a French diplomat posted
in Brussels confi rmed: “Ultimately we are held to allied solidar-
ity. I cannot embarrass my American colleague in order to support
the Russians. Just the same, I can’t say all I want to the Russians in
front of my Allied colleagues. Some things need to be dealt with in
private.”19
Another important effect of day-to-day cooperation on the ground
was the narrowing of NATO’s and Russia’s respective positions on
a number of confl icts in the world. One NATO official insisted that
cooperation on the ground breeds common interests. As an example,
he listed all the ongoing operations that NATO was conducting at the
time of the interview (in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Darfur, Iraq, and
the Mediterranean) to conclude that “Russia in one way or another
is not only smiling benevolently and kissing goodbye, they’re explic-
itly supporting every single one of them to various degrees.” After
September 11, 2001, the convergence became especially significant
(see Chapter 6). 20 That event led Russia and NATO to realize that they
now faced a “common threat,” affi rmed a British diplomat: terrorism.
Interestingly, this convergence was a rare instance of NATO moving
in Russia’s direction and not the other way around. Having advo-
cated a more muscular fight against terrorism for years, the Russians
were obviously happy about this turn of events, added a Canadian
practitioner. That satisfaction seemed to be shared, at least to some
extent, by NATO practitioners: “In general, they’re a Western coun-
try in terms of thinking, in terms of approaching solutions. Especially
after September 11, 2001, they’re on the same side as we are.” That
said, a number of officials insisted on some remaining differences,
19
According to one State Department official, “in theory the NRC works at
twenty-seven and not twenty-six plus one. But in practice, Russia is not part
of NATO. There exists allied solidarity. We can’t let Russia too much in.”
20
Pouliot (2003).
noting for instance that “we will never get them to agree that you
cannot solve terrorism in purely military terms.” For a British official,
deep differences in threat perceptions largely explained contempo-
rary Russian–Atlantic distrust: “The Russians see the war on terror-
ism and the American defi nition as an excuse for American power
to intervene where major oil reserves are.” Equally, many Atlantic
practitioners remained suspicious of “anti-terrorist operations” in
Chechnya. Although in 2006 NATO and Russia were doing a lot of
stuff together, more often than not their respective practices belonged
to contrasting organizational cultures.
Contrasting organizational cultures

As much “stuff on the ground” as NATO and Russian practitioners
may have been doing together in 2006, their prior common experience
with working together remained extremely limited. As a result, the
NRC institutionalization ran into two main obstacles at the practical
level: a lack of substance and a clash of organizational procedures.
To begin with the fi rst problem, a number of officials were not con-
vinced that the NRC was bringing about any tangible results in terms
of Russian–Atlantic cooperation. One senior NATO policymaker put
the matter this way:
My frank and honest feeling is that we’ve quadrupled the amount of

bureaucracy, we’ve probably made the working level of meetings a bit more
informal and relaxed, but in terms of actual effect on the ground – more
cooperation and trust – my own feeling is that I haven’t seen any improve-
ment … What I do see is a group of people who spend a lot of time with the
Russians. People call them the Russian mafia – they’re really into it … But
if you get past the meetings to see what the effect is, maybe they get along
better and have beers, but I still don’t see this great improvement in terms
of more cooperation.
A similar skepticism could be felt on the Russian side: “Russians doubt

the sincerity of NATO in engaging Russia. And they are skeptical
about the results. Are we really doing something serious in this coop-
erative framework? Lots of words and discussions, working groups,
symposia, and so forth; words, words, words. What about something
serious and tangible? I’m not sure we have that.” For another expert
in Moscow, NATO’s engagement with Russia was nothing but “the

medicine for the Russians against NATO enlargement.” The result,
he insisted, is that few Russians believed in the sincerity of NATO
friendship: “There are suspicions.” Many Russians doubted that the
Alliance was willing to do anything concrete with them beyond keep-
ing the conversation going.
A familiar complaint among Atlantic practitioners was that the
Russians are so focused on procedure that it often comes at the
expense of substance. According to a Canadian delegate, the NRC
did not deliver as much as expected because too many discussions
remained embroiled in procedure to be productive. For instance, dur-
ing the spring of 2006, the NRC conducted a stocktaking exercise
in order to decide on its next priorities: “it has quickly turned into a
fastidious exercise, without good news. It was reduced to a wording
negotiation,” complained a Canadian delegate. As one NATO senior
military officer summed up, “rhetoric often trumps substance,” add-
ing that NRC activities belonged as much, if not more, to public diplo-
macy than to concrete achievements. “Events are showpiece, without
real benefits,” said a German colonel. “Take Active Endeavour: three
years of talk for one frigate one week.” Similarly, a senior American
policymaker regretted that Russia asks the Allies to do many things
in the NRC “but in the end you don’t see Russia pursuing all of them.
They’re floating but never put together … I think the Russians would
be happy to say they’re doing something without in fact doing any-
thing.” This concern with formalism also fi nds its expression in the
multiplication of ad hoc committees under the NRC, whose added
value was not always clear from NATO practitioners’ point of view.
“The Russians produce more papers than practices,” complained a
Lithuanian official, who told me of an Estonian joke that the NRC
was becoming Soviet-like because too many people were happy to get
paid without doing much work.
In 2006, the institutionalization of Russian–Atlantic relations at
the NRC left certain officials with an impression of purposelessness.
Some practitioners agreed that what was most direly lacking in the
relationship was a genuine finalité or long-term goal. At the time,
they felt that “staying engaged is the goal.” NATO’s attitude toward
Russia seemed to boil down to “hold to engagement, for engagement’s
own sake,” in an Alliance official’s words. While institutionalizing
engagement certainly has great value for pacification in and through
practice, several practitioners wondered to what extent such a strat-

egy was sustainable over the long run in the absence of any larger
vision for the future. A Canadian delegate, for instance, proposed
that “what’s missing is still this notion of what’s the long term plan.”
One of his colleagues opined that “the NRC doesn’t produce that
much because the Russians are happy with the status quo. They use
the forum to better understand and eventually influence NATO.”
In order to explain the persistence of Soviet-like practices and the
alleged Russian difficulty in establishing transgovernmental relations
with NATO, many Atlantic practitioners pointed to the fact that
there had been no bureaucratic “purge” in Moscow at the end of the
Cold War. After the implosion of the USSR, Russia’s President Yeltsin
quickly embraced the former Soviet Ministry of Defense and General
Staff as the institutions of the new Russia. Still inhabited by the very
same people who used to run the USSR, the Russian bureaucracy
preserved an organizational ethos inherited from the Cold War. For
instance, procedures of decisionmaking remained profoundly opaque.
As one Russian interviewee revealed:
Many of these people are anti-Western by nature, by profession and career.

They made their career out of it. These old stereotypes of the Cold War
are still alive. I graduated from [Moscow State Institute of International
Relations] and many of my former colleagues are now diplomats around
the world. [At that point, the interviewee insisted that the conversation
remained between the two of us as we both lowered our voices.] When we
meet in private, they say: “In our mind, we know that you’re right with
your stance on cooperation, because Russia has no alternative. But in our
heart, our soul, we cannot accept it.”
Significantly, reciprocal ingrained dispositions were also evident on

NATO’s side in 2006, where a sizeable number of officials had been
trained in Cold War thinking for decades – hence, for instance, the
widespread fear of Moscow exploiting cracks in the Alliance.
One may be tempted to think that generational change will pro-
gressively ameliorate the situation, but this may turn out to be
overly optimistic. For instance, a Russian researcher who had
taken part in the NATO rally conferences expressed her confusion
about Russian students’ aggressiveness toward the Alliance. For the
younger generations in Russia, the post-Cold War period has been
one of chaos and humiliation. Unlike their parents, some of whom

had wanted (and acted in favor of) perestroika, younger Russians
only know democratic turmoil associated with (what they perceive
as) Russia’s international weakness and Western arrogance. A senior
German officer who had been dealing with the Russians for many
years explained: “I’m not sure this [generational change] will hap-
pen. There is no big difference in attitudes, because Russians have
not broken with their past. Younger people speak English, but that
doesn’t change their minds. They still feel we don’t understand, we
don’t like whatever they do. They do not feel respected. They have an
outright problem facing reality and a very strong feeling of humili-
ation.” Among Russian students, the objective of returning Russia
to its past greatness on the international stage seemed consensually
shared, another professor stressed.
The second and related obstacle to meaningful interactions on
the ground originated from a mutual perception that Russian and
Atlantic bureaucracies did not do things the same way when it came
to security-related matters. 21 The contrast in organizational cultures
expressed in 2006 was obviously the extension of age-old differences
on both sides. Interestingly, however, it is mostly Atlantic officials
who raised concerns about the Russian bureaucratic habitus, which
they perceived as overly “top-down” and “rigid.”22 One American
diplomat who had negotiated with the Russians for decades noted
that they usually strive for a top-level agreement, whereas Westerners
privilege low-level interactions and trust-building. For instance, a
German officer who was actively involved in the opening of the NATO
Information Office in Moscow in 2001 recounted that his team was
given only one single contact point and telephone number inside the
entire state apparatus. As the German practitioner recalled: “We
told them from the beginning that this is not the way we are work-
ing, that we’d like to talk to the different project officers. But they
have a different system: they still want to control everything.”23 The
same story was heard from another NATO military representative in
Moscow:
21
On bureaucratic culture, see Barnett and Finnemore (2004).
22
Of course, any Western characterization of Russian practitioners reveals as
much, if not more, about the NATO lambda habitus. It is in this spirit that
I record mutual perceptions of daily interactions.
23
See also Williams (2005, 46).
In the military, we have [here in Moscow] a mentality different from what

we normally experience in Western countries. There is a tendency to con-
trol events closely, to centralize everything. They still have a different atti-
tude toward classification of information, taking decisions at the highest
possible level … There is a strong tendency to keep everything under con-
trol. I wouldn’t talk of an obsession, but it’s a very strong attitude inside
the Russian military to execute central control over cooperation activities.
Even a top military officer in the NATO hierarchy complained that he

was able to have very little contacts with the Russian General Staff.
In this context, NATO practitioners perceived that the main driver
of NATO–Russia relations was located not in Brussels but in Moscow.
Instructions were sent directly from the highest echelons and imple-
mented on the ground, often against the will of diplomats. In the
words of a Canadian diplomat:
NATO officials get the impression that the Russians don’t give it their
best energy. They’re very rigid in meetings and negotiations. We get the
feeling that we’re dealing with an ancient mindset. It is probably instruc-
tions directly from Moscow, where certain people want certain messages
through. But it does not belong to the dialogue we’ve been having over the
last few years. They sometimes come out of the blue with some confronta-
tional language.
As one Russian expert summed up: “if Putin orders, they will do it!”
This obviously left little room for informal compromises and exchanges
at the NRC. For instance, one senior military officer complained that
during NRC meetings, the Russians strictly present national positions
but refuse to exchange ideas in a casual way. Informal discussions
are kept to a minimum. As one British officer illustrated: “Relations
are always cordial. We smile and drink vodka … But the relationship
fi nishes right after the meeting.”
Top-down control of NATO–Russia interaction was portrayed as a
serious brake on practical cooperation on the ground. Even a Russian
professor admitted that “[w]e have a very Byzantine organization.
Routines are not possible! All decisions are taken in the Kremlin and
then sent to the administrative level. [Bureaucrats] cannot push initia-
tives, only follow guidelines.” As a result NATO was unable to reach
a large number of Russian civil servants and militaries, especially
at the lower echelons. As a senior officer posted in Moscow said,
“Russia’s military still considers that the ability of senior officials to

understand NATO policy and tactics could be sufficient to establish
interoperability between our forces. We have a different view. We think
it’s necessary that to develop interoperability, we require an extended
understanding within the officers’ corps.”24 This was especially prob-
lematic because NATO officials “expect a snowball effect … The
more people get involved, the more it will become normality.” More
than this, it was considered a central trait of Russian culture that per-
sonal, friendly contacts are often necessary for anything to be solved,
as one NATO diplomat recalled. Another veteran American envoy
noted that, contrary to institutionalized Western repertoires, many
things within the Russian bureaucracy happen na levo – on the side,
through informal relations. Only a handful of Atlantic practitioners
reported such interpersonal relations.
The second difference in organizational culture deplored by
Atlantic practitioners regarded the formalism and secrecy of the
Russian bureaucracy. A French delegate admitted that “on tough top-
ics Russians get rigid and closed. It’s not informal. They don’t discuss
freely because their system is still very controlled.” He believed that a
key to improving the relationship would be to make it more informal
by organizing luncheons without note-takers, so that ambassadors
could open up and show flexibility. “This is not the case with the
Russians,” he lamented. A Canadian diplomat concurred that NRC
meetings “are not so open and free. It’s very scripted.” Rigidity also
created problems of attitude, according to one NATO official: “Russia
is still seen as a major headache. In my view it’s a country that denies
rather than creates, that tries to thwart what others are doing rather
than coming with new good ideas … Russia has the power to deny,
but not the imagination and the power to create.” This, he insisted,
is “not the way to make friends.” While the NATO organizational
culture rests on informal exchange, transparency and non-confron-
tation, opined an Alliance practitioner, “Russia hasn’t really used the
NRC in a way that would generate understanding. It has been more a
vehicle for complaining than a vehicle for engaging.”
Russian and Atlantic practitioners perceived their respective nego-
tiating cultures as quite different. One American official who had
24
This interviewee added: “We get the impression that people who have taken
courses at [a] NATO school or some Western institutes have not succeeded in
their military as we expected.”
been dealing with the Russians for decades believed that “the only
language the Russians understand is that of strength. Respect comes
with strength.” For a NATO official posted in Moscow, another trait
of the Russian culture was especially striking: “This is a country of
opposites, which never gives in suppleness … It doesn’t support the
middle – it’s all or nothing. This is a socio-cultural trait but it affects
external policies. Russian reactions are generated through this: always
very strong reactions, in favor or not.” Lionel Ponsard supplies a tell-
ing example, which also touches on the importance of language in
diplomatic interaction:
Nyet is a simple Russian word that is often misunderstood. Nyet seems

to be an almost automatic response by officials when asked if something
can be done; what, in the West, is usually perceived as an obvious sign of
unwillingness. One should know that an initial “no” in Russia is never
defi nite. This is rather a simple – but effective – tactic aimed at gradually
coercing the interlocutor to alter his position until the latter fi nally meets
the Russians’ satisfaction. This practice is very much stamped with the
Russian culture. 25
Yet in 2006 few NATO officials had an operational knowledge of the

Russian language and culture, as surprising as this may seem. One
officer regretted “a marked reluctance by individual Allies to pro-
vide suitably qualified Russophone liaison officers.”26 The problem
was compounded by the fact that Moscow kept posting to Brussels
ambassadors that had no knowledge of either French or English.
Coming from a particularly polyglot Foreign Service such as Russia’s,
this situation sounded like bad faith to many NATO practitioners.
At the time of the interviews, any conversation with the Russian
ambassador, General Konstantin Totsky, had to be mediated by an
interpreter, which obviously created serious barriers to communica-
tion and the free exchange of ideas, by a German delegate’s report.
Several practitioners on the Alliance side were under the impression
that the main stumbling block in developing informal ties with their
Russian counterparts had to do with career prospects. As one German
officer put it: “There’s no informality with the Russians, because
25
Ponsard (2007, 155).
26
Williams (2005, 47 fn. 18). Major General Peter Williams was the fi rst head
of the NATO Military Liaison Mission in Moscow from 2002 to 2005.
getting informal with NATO officials means you’re burnt within the
Russian administration. We’ve tracked officers with whom we’ve
been in touch: they’re burnt. The Cold War is not over.” A number
of NATO officials were not comfortable in addressing this sensitive
topic but they could not deny that they too had had that impression.
Oksana Antonenko cites the example of General Shevtsov, who led
the Russian contingent in the Balkans and was widely hailed for his
success in cooperating with NATO’s SACEUR. Upon his return to
Russia, he was met with very little cooperation at the Ministry of
Defense and was ultimately moved to the Interior Ministry. 27
Finally, Atlantic practitioners also apprehended a culture of secrecy
inside the Russian bureaucratic apparatus. A particularly telling
example is Operation Active Endeavour, which gave Russians “a great
insight into how we do business, a great intelligence gathering. They
now have NATO secret communications on their ships, they see our
standard operating procedures, they see our doctrines.” Yet this open-
ness was not reciprocated, according to a senior NATO officer: “They
have a big access. Now the flip side is we get access to theirs too. It
hasn’t been the case yet.” This view was echoed by a NATO military
commander, who estimated that “we don’t get back from Russia the
openness we give. NATO is more forward.” Another example was that
Russian practitioners at the Brussels headquarters had access to the
entire organization’s directory, whereas NATO officials in Moscow
do not benefit from similar conditions. In a similar vein, a British
officer from the Ministry of Defence described the Russian reaction
when given a tour of the building in London: “They’re amazed. This
doesn’t happen in Moscow.”
But Russian practitioners were not outdone when it came to criti-
cizing the other party’s organizational culture. The general feeling in
Moscow was that NATO bureaucratic practices betrayed an insuper-
able hubris – a conviction that the Alliance is right and that Russia can
only nod to it (see Chapters 5 and 6). A Russian official dispatched to
NATO headquarters put it bluntly: “NATO puts a lot of pressure on
Russia and puts her on the defensive. The United States keeps lecturing
Russia. This is not welcome. It looks like diktats for losing the Cold
War. But Russia didn’t lose the Cold War: it was an internal choice.
27
Antonenko (2007, 94).
Russia has no inferiority complex: it hasn’t lost anything.” Another

expert described the American approach in equally harsh words: “If
you only dictate and criticize, you don’t have friends. You’re lonely.”
Under the current NATO approach, she argued, Russia is “rejected”
and subjected to “double standards.” One professor described the
Russian perception of NATO’s practices thus:
The West’s main fault is that, for its own good, it has imposed a choice on
Russia: either the West or the East … I don’t think the West is being sincere
in forcing this choice … The West likes to think of itself as the keeper of
values and as a ruler. It wants everybody to act like it, like a steamroller …
Yeltsin thought of himself as a pupil, but the government and the citizens
felt insulted to be treated as such … The West wants to be a tutor: why? …
What the West mainly lacks is the willingness to understand. It knows how
to impose its own values but it doesn’t want to understand that they are
different in Western and Eastern Europe.
For the Russians, Atlantic diplomats were either unable or unwilling

to take the legitimate interests of their interlocutors into account.
Exaggerated or not, these complaints about respective bureaucratic
practices indicated not only differences in bureaucratic cultures, but
also a kind of mutual resistance to adapt to (or recognize as legiti-
mate) the other’s organizational ways. As will become clear below,
many of the diplomatic difficulties in Russian–Atlantic dealings fi nd
their roots in the intense and persistent symbolic power struggles
between Moscow and Brussels. Take, for instance, this description by
a French delegate of a typical negotiation at the NRC:
On many issues it works the same. They begin by saying they want to do
this and that with us. We respond that such programs already exist in
the larger framework of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. They answer that
they don’t want to do it with the Georgians and everyone. They want an
exclusive relationship with us, so we need to come up with a new docu-
ment. We tell them we already have established this document and we offer
it to Russia so that they can apply it. They reply that they’re not NATO
applicants and that they want a joint program of equals. They come from
the Warsaw Pact where they were the kings. They don’t want to work with
NATO concepts, they want to add something Russian. But we say no.
They are progressively getting to it and mindsets are evolving. They need
time: one does not catch fl ies with vinegar.
This quotation reveals that, well founded or not, Atlantic and Russian
complaints about one another’s ways of “doing stuff” are not absolute
but relational: they emerge from a deeper struggle over who gets to
defi ne the rules of the game at the NRC.
Conclusion: two masters in search of an apprentice

Alexandra Gheciu explains the success of NATO’s socialization strate-
gies toward Eastern European countries in part by the parties’ mutual
recognition of their respective roles as “teachers” and “students.”
Based on extensive fieldwork, Gheciu has discovered that “many pro-
liberal elites in the former Communist bloc recognized NATO as a
key institution of the Western community with which they identi-
fied, and, as such, as an authoritative, trustworthy source of exper-
tise in the area of security.”28 As a result, the Alliance was successful
in imposing its practices on the Czech Republic and Romania. In
Gheciu’s Bourdieusian “competence model of power,” which is close
to the one I outlined in Chapter 2 , “the ability to exercise social influ-
ence is not inherently attributed to the resources possessed by a given
entity. Rather, the power of actors depends on the recognition of their
role of influence by other participants in social interactions.”29 Power
is more than the possession of resources; it requires some sort of rec-
ognition by the dominated. For example, the power relation linking a
master to his apprentice entails that the latter reproduces the former’s
practices because “this is the way the world goes round.” The mas-
ter’s competence is felt by the apprentice, in and through practice, as
a relation of immediate adherence to the nature of things.
Such was defi nitely not the case at the NRC in 2006: neither NATO
nor Russia regarded the other as a master or a model to emulate. The
next two chapters will explain the origins of these complex power
politics by analyzing Russian–Atlantic relations over the post-Cold
War era. In keeping with the logic of practicality, in this conclu-
sion I want to document, with interview data, the awkward situa-
tion in which Russian and NATO practitioners found themselves in
2006: there were two masters but no apprentices around the NRC
table. Across interviews, the notion of Russia as a Great Power had
the most purchase in Moscow. Among NATO officials, there was an
28 29
Gheciu (2005, 13). Gheciu (2005, 16).
equal tendency to associate the perspective of the Alliance with the

“international community” and to naturalize Western values and pol-
icies as universally legitimate. As a result, both Moscow and Brussels
took their teaching (and non-teachable) role for granted. Throughout
my interviews, NATO practitioners were seen to be tired of Russia’s
insistence on Great Power status, while Russian officials took offense
at the Alliance’s condescending approach. The result was unremitting
symbolic struggles over the very terms of the relationship, as well
as an ineffectual power relation precluding the full embodiment of
diplomacy as the self-evident way to go at the NRC.
According to Neumann, “[s]ince the early 1990s, Russia has strug-
gled to fi nd its role in the novel realities of international relations. In the
various dimensions of Russian security policy, the concept of a Great
Power stands out as a unifying formula for the conduct of affairs.”30
In effect, the narrative of Great Power has become the knowledge
base from which security elites think in Moscow: for instance, one
Russian expert argued that Russia “used to be a crucial player in
international relations and so long as it exists, it will continue a grand
strategy, not like small countries. It’s traditional because Russia is
unique. It’s genetic in Russia. Most students – ninety percent, even
more – are supportive of big politics and active involvement of Russia
in world politics.” In 2006, Yevgeny Primakov, who was instrumen-
tal during the 1990s in giving substance to the Russian Great Power
disposition, expressed the notion clearly:
Considering Russia’s history, intellectual resources, size, huge natu-

ral resources and, fi nally, the level of development of its Armed Forces,
this country will not agree to the status of a state that is “led”; it will
seek to establish itself as an independent center of a multipolar world …
Washington, relying on its present superiority, proceeds from the assump-
tion that the United States will hold the central position in a future world
system, while the rest of the world will have to follow the “rules of behavior”
dictated by the Americans. 31
Across my interviews with Russian practitioners and experts, it was

a generally taken-for-granted “fact of life” that Russia belongs to this
small club of nations that are bound to lead in international relations;
such is the destiny of a Great Power.
30 31
Neumann (2005b, 13). Primakov (2006, 2).
On the Atlantic side, the end of the Cold War sparked a widespread
belief that the time had come for the West and its institutions to export
their values to the rest of the world. NATO’s success in socializing
Eastern Europe bolstered this self-understanding as the role model
of democracy, freedom and civilization. This evolution fostered a
preexisting Western disposition towards universalism and bolstered
organizations such as NATO in their role of teacher. In my inter-
views, I was struck by the extent to which many Atlantic practitioners
would equate (unconsciously, for the most part) the peculiar policies
advocated by NATO with the consensus forged in the “international
community.” As the embodiment of the international community, the
Alliance should mold Russia to become a part of it, believed one sen-
ior official from State Department: “The long-term objective has to
be Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, the inter-
national community, on all levels, based on shared values; joining the
international club of democratic, market-oriented countries. There
is no competing model for organizing political and economic life in
the international community aside from liberal democracy, rule of
law and market economics.” The background assumption in these
statements, which has consistently informed the Alliance’s political
discourse since the end of the Cold War, holds that NATO is bound
to be the teacher. It is not Brussels that has to make compromises, but
Moscow.
With Russia qua Great Power and NATO qua international com-
munity, there are two masters but no apprentices at the NRC. The
Atlantic superiority complex is variously demonstrated in practition-
ers’ understanding of Russian–Atlantic relations. For instance, one
NATO official told me that “Russia still hasn’t fully grasped the situa-
tion the world and Russia are in.” Another policymaker in Washington
regretted that “Russia has gone pre-Cold War in its mindset, in a kind
of survival of the fittest.” He continued with a particularly telling
analogy picturing Russia as
this huge, seventeen year old male football player. He’s big and strong and
no adult would presume to force him to do anything … The problem for
everyone around him is that you want him to be a good neighbor and a
productive member of society. You wanna talk him through all this anger
and aggression and resentment. But everything you do and say, he just
turns against you … You have to wait for him to grow.
On many occasions during my interviews, Atlantic practitioners

would depict Russian attitudes as “archaic” or “outdated,” imply-
ing that Western thinking had “moved beyond” that. Some officials
affi rmed that Russians’ “expectations are not in tune with facts and
reality”; others claimed that political elites in Russia and Europe “live
in different time zones,” with Moscow striving “to join the Old World
of fifty or a hundred years ago.”
In 2006, NATO officials were having quite a hard time coming
to grips with Russia’s unrelenting quest for specificity in its dealings
with Brussels. The equality status, for instance, was construed as
“illogical” and “unmerited.” Russia’s self-understanding as a Great
Power was deemed “irrational and emotional.” Another officer in
Berlin expressed puzzlement that at the NRC “the Russians took a
lot of time to understand they had a voice, not a vote. Their feeling
was that the NAC decided everything without them.” Across my
interviews in Brussels and other Western capitals, there seemed to
be a widespread fear that granting Moscow a special status would
only reinforce its quest for Great Power status. One NATO speech-
writer insisted that Russia should “be treated in a slightly different
manner from the way we treat Albania, Azerbaijan.” This is unlikely
to satisfy Russia’s Great Power dispositions, but it looks as though
it is the furthest NATO practitioners think they should go toward
recognition. As one German official put it, NATO is “not willing to
really change but to pay respect.”32 From the Atlantic practitioners’
point of view, Moscow is not worthy of equal consideration: “What
the Russians are doing is creating the image of trying to play in a
game where they’re not players anymore,” concluded a Canadian
diplomat.
Dozens of interviews with Atlantic practitioners left no doubt
that in 2006 NATO member states did not consider Russia to be
an equal, but were instead consistently trying, with limited suc-
cess, to steer Russia’s behavior in NATO’s preferred direction. No
32
At some point during the interview, this representative grabbed
my recorder, shut it down, and lamented grudgingly: “Some say here at
NATO that Germany is Russia’s ‘little friend’: this simply isn’t true.”
This preoccupation with not appearing too pliant with the Russians
in front of NATO allies was shared by all the German officials and officers
I met.
one expressed it better than a senior member of the Secretary-

General’s offi ce:
We want a Russia bound to the international system, that plays by the

rules, that has an interest in upholding the system, not calling it into
question. We want it to be a conservative power in the best sense, that
wants to conserve the order, rather than a power that feels in jeopardy
as it felt before the First World War. It’s not in our interest: we want to
uproot this and have Russia bounded to a network and allow it to express
its Great Power status instead of trying to subvert the Western – [here the
interviewee catches the slip of the tongue] – not Western anymore – the
international democratic order.
From this perspective, he added, the NRC “puts limits on how inde-
pendent its actions can be because it has to go through these multi-
lateral frameworks. We want to make those stronger to get Russia
totally embedded.” One Alliance official posted in Moscow was just
as blunt: “It may be true we impose some stuff, but we do it with
their consent. Otherwise, nothing gets done.” As one German official
who negotiated with the Russians on behalf of NATO throughout the
1990s recognized, “from their point of view, they have lots of reasons
to complain and to say: ‘Well, you do listen to us, but you don’t take
into account our argument.’ That’s what you continuously hear from
them.’” Commenting on Russia’s influence over NATO, he admitted
that it has “[v]ery little, so objectively they have a point. There is very
little that we’ve done in the past to accommodate Russian concerns.”
In their relationship with NATO counterparts, however, the
Russians did not suffer from any kind of reciprocal inferiority com-
plex. In 2006, the dominant narrative of Great Power in Moscow
meant that the partnership should be among “equals.” As a result,
NATO’s self-attributed role as a teacher was not recognized by the
Russians – in fact, it was rather despised. Since the end of the Cold
War, NATO has tried hard to impose its views and steer Russia’s
course, with some success during the 1990s. But these attempts also
fed a backlash, as resentment steadily built up in Moscow. As one
expert observed: “The strong attitude in Moscow is that Russia was
humiliated in the 1990s many times.” For a Russian diplomat in
Brussels, the main policy that the Alliance imposed despite Russia’s
opposition was NATO enlargement (see Chapters 5 and 6): “Russia’s
opinions were not taken into account. Here, actions mean more than
words: NATO puts forward a number of arguments but acts other-

wise. This is not a question of putting soft words in people’s ears. The
question is: why is NATO pushing?” In the words of one of the most
pro-Western experts I met in Moscow, “the West tried to press Russia,
to show that ‘your game is over.’” The result was that ideological con-
frontation gave way to a new kind of competition, full of mistrust and
suspicion, based on a feeling that “Russia is considered as an element
of the international community which should be downplayed and
pushed, not allowed to become a strong international actor.”
In 2006, Russia’s reluctance to recognize NATO’s authority produced
a very limited power relation in and through practice. So much so, in
fact, that in my interviews several Russian elites insisted on the need to
stay clear of a number of Alliance practices. The emphasis was rather
put on sovereignty and strategic independence. As Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov put it: “The foreign policy sovereignty of Russia is an
absolute imperative … Our country is not one [whose] foreign policy
could be directed from the outside. We are not out to be likable to eve-
ryone – we simply proceed from our own, understandable pragmatic
interest. Let us recall that our country particularly strove to be ‘likable’
in the era of Nicholas I and in the last Soviet years: we know where that
led us.”33 Under such circumstances, most Russian experts advocated
a policy of Great Power independence, whether NATO liked it or not.
The post-Cold War terms of partnership, by which Moscow was sub-
servient to Brussels, had to be revised. The need for Western recogni-
tion had almost evaporated by 2006. As one expert put it, “now that
we are strong, the West has to accommodate us. Now we are ready to
compete with the Western states; we will not concede anymore.”
In 2006, several Atlantic practitioners were taking note of their
increasing incapacity to exert authority over Russia’s foreign policy.
One Alliance official expressed his feeling of impotence openly:
[Compared to other partners, Russia] is a tough case because, for instance,

in terms of defense reform, the Russians stated that “of course Russia is a
great country so we are doing our own defense reform. We will not sim-
ply copy what you’re doing because of course we have our own ideas. Of
course we will learn what we want to learn from you but not everything.”
In the case of for instance Ukraine and Georgia or those countries who
33
Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2007a).
become members it’s much easier because we have our standards and we
say, “if you want to become members of NATO you have to do this, this,
and this” and they don’t have a choice. They have a choice but the other
choice is not really an option for them. But there is no leverage basically on
Russia. [All that NATO can use is] well, logic, pure logic. We try to con-
vince them that the way we are doing it is much more effective, much more
efficient, actually affordable, etc. It’s pure logic I think.
He continued: “When Russia was weak they were much more

friendly, frankly, and it was much easier to deal with them. [During
the Kosovo crisis] I don’t think it was very difficult to deal with them
anyway. We simply ignored their views. That wasn’t really very dif-
ficult.” Confronted with interminable arguments and symbolic strug-
gles, however, in 2006 NATO practitioners expressed increasing
disappointment and resignation. In the words of an American poli-
cymaker: “There is a certain feeling of impotence among allies when
it comes to influencing Russian policy.” One Canadian diplomat even
compared Russia to “those big dump trucks [with] a sign at the back
[that reads:] ‘Do Not Push.’” In 2006, it looked as though Russia and
NATO did not inhabit the same world: “Our objective is for Russia
to be a normal country, like any other countries … It’s always frus-
trating that we’re not mentally in the same place. Because the rest of
the world is: China is in many ways more ready to act like that than
Russia.”
The fierce symbolic struggle between NATO and Russia over
their respective status has had negative consequences in terms of the
embodiment of diplomacy. The fact that there were two masters in
search of an apprentice at the NRC rendered any power relation inef-
fectual. As far as the normalization of disputes is concerned, the rise
of Russia’s Great Power dispositions sparks perceptions of assertive-
ness, if not aggressiveness, among NATO’s officials. Furthermore,
the ever fastidious NATO–Russia negotiations over things as simple
and banal as technical rules of military cooperation thwarted plans
for joint exercises or missions between Moscow and Brussels. In the
words of a French diplomat:
The Russians said they wanted to develop new joint procedures for peace-
keeping. The United States and other allies said: “Enough! We draw dif-
ferent lessons and we can do this without these new procedures but by
associating with you when there is a need.” There was reluctance so the
debate stopped. We don’t talk about this anymore. The issue is not dead
but it’s on ice. That’s the problem with Russia: everything that was easy to
do, we’ve done. We’ve eaten all the meat on the bone, and now that we’re
at the bone we feel we’ve eaten enough.
In sum, in 2006 the Russian–Atlantic relationship was best captured,

from the practitioners’ point of view, by its very intense symbolic
power politics. The key question then becomes: what are the histori-
cal origins of the 2006 symbolic struggles between Russia and NATO
over the terms of the relationship? The next two chapters supply an
answer by looking back at the evolution of this complex relationship
over the post-Cold War era.
5 The early steps: NATO,
Russia and the double enlargement,
1992–1997
This chapter and Chapter 6 look back into history and seek to explain
the main fi nding of Chapter 4 – that in 2006, NRC practitioners
embodied diplomacy as a normal though not a self-evident practice in
solving Russian–Atlantic disputes. Recovering the practical logics of
NRC diplomacy raises the question: what made this practical sense
possible in the fi rst place? Since all socially constructed meanings
emerge from past social struggles, one must add a diachronic dimen-
sion to the analysis and set meanings in motion (see Chapter 3). To
do so, I analyze the historical evolution of NATO–Russia interactions
with regards to the double enlargement – a vexing and persistent bone
of contention in the post-Cold War era.
In order to shed light on practices, I combine field analysis with the
interpretive study of habitus. In terms of the former, I locate Russia
and NATO inside the field of international security and describe
the evolving rules of the game in the post-Cold War era, in particu-
lar the changes in the conversion rates between forms of capital.
For the sake of clarity, and in accordance with the recent evolution
of the field’s doxa, I reduce the range of capital in this field to only
two types of resources. First, material-institutional capital refers
to military forces, money and material riches (industrial capac-
ity, demographics, etc.), as well as networks of allies, friends and
other institutional ties. This form of capital was the main currency
of Cold War realpolitik and balancing. Second, cultural-symbolic
capital designates artifacts, narratives and symbols that defi ne
the meaning of the world (what is real, true, etc.) and legitimize it
(what is right, good, etc.). These resources are the staple of the post-
Cold War, democratic peace era. Below I explain this doxic shift in
more detail; the important point, at this stage, is that mapping the
148
NATO, Russia and the double enlargement, 1992–1997 149
distribution of material-institutional and cultural-symbolic forms

of capital paves the way to positional field analysis. In a historical
perspective, I analyze the relative positions of Russia and NATO
and combine this objectified view with a reconstruction of disposi-
tions over time.
My historical narrative hinges on the evolving alignment and
misalignment of positions and dispositions (see Chapter 2) expe-
rienced by NATO and Russia in the post-Cold War international
security field. In the fi rst section, I explain what the new NATO-
imposed rules of the post-Cold War international security game
consist of and how the Russians zealously implemented them until
late 1994. The early post-Cold War years were characterized by an
exceptionally strong homology between the field’s structure and the
players’ habitus, thanks to which Russia accepted its weak position
while NATO was disposed toward assuming the leadership. The
second section then shows how the Alliance’s decision to enlarge
functionally and geographically put an end to this pattern of domi-
nation: in Russian eyes, these practices contravened the new rules
of the international security game. As a result, although mutual
disputes continued to be solved non-violently, Moscow became
decreasingly disposed to accept NATO’s domination in the field
of international security. Russian dispositions were progressively
misaligned with Moscow’s position in the Alliance-dominated
field. In the third section, I explain how the resurgence of the Great
Power habitus in Moscow sparked intense hysteresis effects, which
severely strained negotiations over the 1997 Founding Act between
NATO and Russia.
Overall, while Williams and Neumann are right that, for a time,
NATO was “able drastically to narrow the field of politically viable
options available to Russian policy-makers,”1 by the mid-1990s the
diplomatic order of things was already starting to weaken. Despite
the prevalence of the non-violent settlement of disputes in the post-
Cold War era, security community development stalled early on due
to the increasing mismatch between the positions occupied in the field
by NATO and Russia and their respective dispositions in playing the
international security game.
1
Williams and Neumann (2000, 372).
The new rules of the international security game

In this fi rst section I make two related arguments. First, I character-
ize the new rules of the international security game, in the aftermath
of the Cold War, as a shift from the external to the internal mode
of pursuing security. NATO and its member states were the main
proponents and beneficiaries of this evolution in that it consolidated
their already dominant position in the field. Second, I demonstrate
that from 1992 until mid-1994 Russia very zealously adhered to the
new rules of the game, in its foreign policy discourse as well as in its
actions. During that short-lived period, the strong homology between
positions in the field and dispositions in habitus created fertile condi-
tions for doxa and the self-evident practice of diplomacy in NATO–
Russia dealings.
NATO order: security from the inside out

The end of the Cold War was a watershed in the history of international
security. After decades of bipolar confrontation, the whole structure
of political interaction underwent radical changes prompted in large
part by the demise of the USSR. At the intersubjective level, the rules
of the game of international security were considerably redrawn. As
Gheciu insightfully argues, the principle of sovereignty, which forms
the normative basis of contemporary international society, enables
two distinct modes of pursuing security. 2 The outside mode, which
was prevalent during the Cold War and constitutes the traditional
focus in security studies, is based on geostrategic arrangements such
as alliance-making and power-balancing. In this scheme, the mili-
tary instrument is the main tool to enhance security. Throughout the
Cold War, NATO’s doctrine relied heavily on this approach, empha-
sizing conventional and nuclear deterrence of the Soviet threat. By
contrast, the inside mode of pursuing security proposes that stability
in world politics relies on states’ domestic institutions and order. In
the Kantian tradition, for instance, democratic regimes are valued as
efficient means to achieve international security. To be sure, given its
liberal origins NATO has always espoused this view in its discourse.
However, in the post-Cold War world, security-from-the-inside-out
2
Gheciu (2005, 4–9).
gained an “unprecedented importance” in the field of international

security.3 Traditional realpolitik became secondary to democratic
peace as a means to achieve security. As a result, the capital conversion
rate was basically reversed: in the new rules of the game, cultural-
symbolic not material-institutional resources formed the sinews of
power.4
This intersubjective change became evident in the early 1990s when
the principles that had given birth to the CSCE in the mid-1970s were
consolidated and extended. Mostly under the initiative of Western
countries, the CSCE had been an early proponent of the inside mode
of pursuing security. Its agreed political principles enshrined several
of the basic ideas that still underpin the security-from-the-inside-out
paradigm. Most importantly, the CSCE process is based on a compre-
hensive approach to security in which politico-military issues are only
one dimension along with human rights and freedoms and economic
and environmental well-being. These various dimensions of security
are construed as interconnected and interdependent. Furthermore, in
the CSCE spirit, security is indivisible, mutual and must be pursued
by cooperative means. The tools of cooperative security, including
mutual transparency, accountability and confidence-building, have to
do not only with foreign policy but also, and in fact primarily, with
domestic politics. For instance, traditionally domestic concerns such
as human rights and freedoms have now become part of the interna-
tional security game. In this sense, the CSCE approach constitutes the
opposite of deterrence and balancing – that is, the external mode of
pursuing security.
With the end of the Cold War, the inside mode of pursuing secu-
rity gained even more political prominence within the CSCE process.
The Paris Charter, signed in 1990, proclaimed democracy to be the
only legitimate form of government in Europe, and promulgated the
protection of human rights as the only way to organize the relation-
ship between member states and their citizens. In turning domestic
politics into a central concern for international security, the Charter
was a turning point in the history of international security.5 As part
of the newly constituted OSCE, an Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights was set up and a High Commissioner for National
3 4
Gheciu (2005, 9). Williams (2007).
5
Adler (1998); Flynn and Farrell (1999); Ghebali (1996).
Minorities was nominated with mandates to monitor the internal

political situation of member states. Other similar initiatives were
taken in the following years, including the establishment of a Code
of Conduct on the Role of the Armed Forces in Democratic Societies
or the designation of a Representative on Freedom of the Media.
Adopted in 1999, the Istanbul Charter for European Security went as
far as to recognize human rights not as an end in itself, but as a means
to strengthen member states’ territorial integrity and sovereignty. The
OSCE’s droit de regard in domestic affairs, accompanied with proper
follow-up means, attests to the rise of the inside mode of pursuing
security in post-Cold War international politics.
The OSCE’s practices and its approach to security from the inside
out quickly diffused to other international institutions in the post-Cold
War era.6 They inform, for instance, the agenda of “human security”
promoted by a number of countries as well as by some UN agencies.
The internal mode of pursuing security is also a central component
of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, which puts democracy and human
rights at the forefront of its external relations. As the 2003 European
Security Strategy states: “The quality of international society depends
on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best
protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic
states.”7 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the internal mode of
pursuing security came to constitute the basic rationale for the politi-
cal processes that are the focus of this chapter – NATO’s functional
and geographical enlargements. As Gheciu notes, “at the end of the
Cold War, the international promotion of Western-based liberal dem-
ocratic norms in Central/Eastern Europe was regarded within NATO
as both an important recipe for enhancing Euro-Atlantic security and
as a viable project.”8 NATO’s double enlargement was – and still is –
designed to be part and parcel of the new rules of the game in the
post-Cold War international security field.
From the outset, NATO positioned itself at the forefront of the
“doxic battle” that led to the intersubjective transformation into
security-from-the-inside-out.9 In fact, the Alliance promoted the shift,
6 7 8
Adler (2008). Council of the EU (2003, 10). Gheciu (2005, 5).
9
Villumsen defi nes doxic battles as “basic struggles determining what is valued
in the field and what is considered worthless” and based on the mobilization
of capital (Villumsen 2008, 81).
which significantly contributed to consolidating its dominant position

in the field. For one thing, the demise of communism (both in the USSR
and elsewhere in the world) directly benefited NATO by creating an
opportunity to change the rules of the game toward the internal mode
of pursuing security. In contrast to free-falling post-Soviet countries,
the Alliance stood as an island of stability amidst the structural
shifts of the end of the Cold War. Given its successful history, NATO
imposed itself as a “locus of accumulated [capital]”: “The alliance
provided a uniquely powerful venue in which the new situation could
be defi ned, policies pronounced, forces mobilized.”10 First, despite
important military cuts at the end of the Cold War, NATO benefited
from a growing military superiority, in relative terms, while retaining
a unique institutional strength as a tightly knit alliance that had tri-
umphed, in many Western eyes, over a decades-long rivalry. Second,
the Alliance boasted a new civilizational identity as the spearhead of
democracy and human rights on the international stage. As Williams
explains, “the West appropriated the claim to represent democratic
values, and asserted its own inherent peacefulness. In short, the idea
of the democratic peace allowed the military confl ict of the Cold War
to be transformed into a cultural struggle, thus contributing to the
exercise of specific strategies and forms of cultural power.”11 Third,
and relatedly, in reifying democracy and human rights as natural and
universal, the Alliance concealed its domination under the guise of a
disinterested advocate of universal values. As a result, with unparal-
leled stocks of both material-institutional and cultural-symbolic capi-
tal, NATO enjoyed a strong position of preeminence in the internal
mode of pursuing security.
Positional agency (see Chapter 2) helps us understand why NATO
was bound, in a sense, to push in the direction of the internal mode
of pursuing security. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the organiza-
tion boasted a huge superiority over the rest of the world in terms of
cultural-symbolic capital, representing itself as the standard-bearer
of democracy and human rights. Its relative advantage, in fact, was
probably greater in these resources than it was even in terms of
material-institutional capital. Given its superior position in a field of
international security defi ned in cultural terms, it was only “natural,”
in terms of practical sense, for the Alliance to use its cultural-symbolic
10 11
Williams (2007, 41). Williams (2007, 40–1).
resources to foster its domination. Field analysis helps understand

why, and how, NATO was able to wield so much symbolic power
as to redefi ne the doxic rules of the game toward the internal mode
of pursuing security. It also sheds light on the practice of enlarge-
ment per se, which allowed the organization to become a sort of club
of democracies, thus wielding even more power over its neighbors
and, in general, the many players in the field whose dispositions were
in tune with the security-from-the-inside-out paradigm. The double
enlargement ultimately derives from the liberal habitus embodied by
NATO member states as well as from the Alliance’s cultural-symbolic
domination of the post-Cold War field – a combination that provided
a rare opportunity to exert power and magnetic attraction over
other players by defi ning the very conditions of admission into the
“club.”12
Under the new rules of the international security game, promoted in
large part by NATO itself, talk about power-balancing became passé
and illegitimate. It was replaced by the promotion of democracy and
human rights as the best means of ensuring security. As Williams con-
tinues: “Through an appeal to the centrality of culture in the new
security context – by invoking the triumph of Western culture, the
universality of liberal ideals, values and institutions, and even the end
of history – a new set of power relations became dominant.”13 In this
context, the Alliance legitimated its transformation with the princi-
ples of cooperative security and human rights embodied by the CSCE
process. With the USSR still alive, NATO’s Secretary-General Manfred
Wörner promoted “a more diffuse concept of security in which eco-
nomic integration and assistance and the internal democratization of
states become as important as traditional military defense in main-
taining security.”14 The first push toward transforming NATO came
at the 1990 London summit where Allies explicitly embraced the idea
of indivisible security. The Alliance also enunciated for the first time
what would become one of its fundamental tasks in the post-Cold War
era – partnership: “The Atlantic Community must reach out to the
countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and
extend to them the hand of friendship.”15 At the Rome summit, one
year later, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
12
I am indebted to Michael Williams for helping me formulate this argument.
13 14 15
Williams (2007, 40). Wörner (1991, 8). NATO (1990).
(NACC), a forum designed to make partners of former enemies and

foster transparency, confidence and inclusiveness.
After the demise of the USSR, several American pundits and poli-
ticians began to chant a new slogan: “NATO must go out of area
or it will go out of business.”16 In 1993, the geographical dimension
of enlargement was only just beginning to receive public scrutiny.
The attention was focused on the Alliance’s mandate, which some
proposed should expand in two main directions: partnership and
peacekeeping. With regard to partnerships, noticeable initiatives
include the NACC, the Partnership for Peace (PfP, launched in 1994),
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, founded in 1997
to replace the NACC). Several of the PfP’s objectives are directly in
line with the internal mode of pursuing security (e.g. increasing trans-
parency in defense planning and budgeting or fostering democratic
control of the military). As for peacekeeping, at the 1991 Rome sum-
mit, Allied member states mentioned for the fi rst time the possibility
of deploying forces for “crisis management” in addition to collective
defense missions. Six months later, in Oslo, the NAC formalized this
functional turn by stating its readiness to support peacekeeping activ-
ities under the responsibility of the CSCE. Within a year of the demise
of the Soviet threat, NATO had already taken on a new lease on life
while progressively imposing itself as the dominant organization in
the field of international security.
The junior partner: Russia’s early embrace

of the new rules of the game
In its fi rst few years as an independent country, Russia enthusiasti-
cally embraced the internal mode of pursuing security, even to the
point of supporting NATO’s transformation in that direction. When
in 1992 the Alliance proposed establishing military contacts with
former Warsaw Pact countries, reactions in Moscow were initially
positive. In a similar way, at fi rst the Russians were quite support-
ive of NATO’s functional transformation toward peacekeeping. The
Charter of Russian–American Partnership and Friendship, signed in
October 1992, called for the creation of a Euro-Atlantic peacekeep-
ing force under the political authority of the CSCE and the NACC.
16
Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee (1993, 31).
While some Russian officials expressed concern that the Oslo summit
could reinforce NATO’s position of strength in European security,
these fears concerned the Alliance per se, not the internal mode of
pursuing security that the organization had come to profess. Clearly,
the new Russian elites who came to power in 1992 arrived at the
Kremlin strongly disposed to support the new rules of the interna-
tional security game.
These proto-liberal dispositions were largely inherited from
Gorbachev’s “New Thinking.” Heavily inspired by the CSCE process,
the New Thinking was premised on the notion that security ought to
be mutual or common.17 According to the doctrine of cooperative
security, the existence of the security dilemma means that security
cannot be pursued unilaterally. In addition, resorting to force was
deemed neither legitimate nor effective as a means of solving interna-
tional disputes. These principles were in line with the internal mode
of pursuing security by repudiating force and encouraging domestic
reforms. Several actions taken by Moscow in the late 1980s, includ-
ing asymmetric and unilateral reductions in nuclear and conventional
forces, as well as the surrender of the Soviet glacis in Eastern Europe,
were obvious manifestations of these ideas. This is not to say that
Gorbachev was an idealist politician who weakly surrendered to the
West: there is no doubt that the New Thinking was an attempt to
renew communism at a time of severe domestic and international
crisis and give Moscow a higher moral ground vis-à-vis the West.18
Breaking with the Cold War logic, Gorbachev and his team began
pursuing security by other means – eventually losing control over the
new dynamic they had unleashed.
After the implosion of the USSR in December 1991, the new ruling
elites in Moscow essentially followed the precepts of New Thinking
and the internal mode of pursuing security. In an article published dur-
ing the summer of 1992, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev explained
how the notion of human rights had become the backbone of Russia’s
foreign policy:
The realization of human rights in our country is inseparable from our

policy to integrate Russia into the global family of democratic states. We
17
Checkel (1997); Evangelista (2002); Lévesque (1995); Thomas (2001).
18
Welch Larson and Shevchenko (2003).
will combine our efforts with those taken by all states which recognize
that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an essential
component of peace, justice and well being. This principle has become one
of the mainstays of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation … The
supremacy of human rights is indeed the basis on which states should seek
to discover a common language, a sort of “humanitarian Esperanto.”19
Kozyrev took special pride in the fact that at a recent meeting in

Moscow, the CSCE’s Commission on the Human Dimension had
approved a provision to the effect that concern for human rights
did not amount to interference in the internal affairs of states. He
also recalled that in January 1992 the CSCE had taken as its main
objectives the protection of human rights and democracy and the
promulgation of the rule of law. In order to show that this policy
was being implemented, the Russian Foreign Minister explained how
the Russian delegation advocated more effective mechanisms for
introducing standards of democratic human rights into the internal
political life of individual states during the forty-eighth session of the
UN Commission on Human Rights. “Progress in human rights is a
precondition for creating an atmosphere of stability, justice, security,
cooperation and lasting peace,” Kozyrev concluded passionately. 20
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Russian statespeople
spoke and behaved like very strong advocates of the internal mode of
pursuing security. The team in power at the Kremlin, personified by
Yeltsin and Kozyrev, was disposed to recognize the new order of things
imposed by NATO. In the post-Cold War era, democratization was to
replace power-balancing as the primary means of achieving security.
According to Robert English’s in-depth study of the origins of the end
of the Cold War, these dispositions had historically formed in Russia
during the Nikita Khrushchev “thaw” in the 1960s, when a group of
young apparatchiks were socialized into a different way of looking at
the world. 21 Clearly, these democratic inclinations remained the pre-
serve of a small elite in Moscow under Gorbachev and later Yeltsin,
19
Kozyrev (1992 , 289). Note that my discourse analysis does not presume that
speakers necessarily believe what they say; there is no way to probe what is
between people’s ears. However, the very performance of this discourse in
public speaks volumes about the Russian elites’ “sense of their place” in the
early 1990s.
20
Kozyrev (1992 , 290). 21 English (2000).
although an increasing proportion of the Russian population seemed

disposed toward them in the early 1990s. Institutionally empowered
in the new Russia, it is this liberal habitus that led to a striking homol-
ogy between Russian dispositions and the country’s weakened posi-
tion in the new field of international security.
In the absence of hysteresis effects, NATO’s domination over
Moscow went unchecked. Because of the homology between their
habitus and the field’s new doxa, the Russian elites were disposed to
play the Alliance’s game of security-from-the-inside-out. For almost
two years, from 1992 to mid-1994, NATO was able to steer Russian
foreign policy in a way reminiscent of the archetypical master–
apprentice relationship. Two sets of issues show especially clearly how
much the Russians emulated NATO practices in a consistent way.
The fi rst is the Alliance’s functional transformation from collective
defense stricto sensu to collective security, of which the Russians were
so supportive that at fi rst they even showed interest in joining the
organization. At the very fi rst meeting of the NACC, in late December
1991, Yeltsin wrote a letter declaring his country’s readiness to exam-
ine the issue of Russia’s membership of NATO in the long term.
Because NATO officials never responded to this gesture, Moscow
had to retract and claim that Yeltsin’s letter had been mistranslated.
But throughout 1992 and into the fi rst half of 1993, several Russian
officials informally tested the grounds for membership. The NATO
answer, however, was negative, reportedly because of American res-
ervations. That did not prevent several pundits from arguing that in
the post-Cold War era, Russia fi rmly belonged to NATO, its “natural
ally.”22 Writing in the NATO Review in early 1993, Kozyrev argued
that his main foreign policy guideline was to “join the club of recog-
nized democratic states.”23
Equally striking is the fact that Russia’s sanguine attitude toward
NATO’s functional transformation did not harden when it became
obvious that, by taking up new functions of partnership and peace-
keeping, the Alliance was giving itself a new lease of life. Of course,
most Russian specialists and politicians had fi rst expected NATO to
disband just as the Warsaw Pact had done, and be replaced with the
OSCE as a pan-European security institution. The Alliance dissipated
all doubts, however, when in 1991 it stated its objective of remaining
22 23
Sergei Blagovolin quoted in Guk (1992). Kozyrev (1993, 3).
the essential forum for consultation among the Allies. While this
should have logically tempered Moscow’s enthusiasm, for a time the
enlargement of NATO’s functions to peacekeeping and partnership
was still considered by the new Russian elite as fitting the security-
from-the-inside-out approach. For instance, the inclusive and coop-
erative spirit of the NACC was in line with the CSCE’s cooperative
security approach and seemed to suit Russian interests quite well. In
October 1993, when the Americans fi rst floated the idea of the PfP
with the Russians, the initial reaction was still quite favorable. Yeltsin
was reported to approve the outreach initiative toward the post-
communist world insofar as it included Russia. Everything took place
as though the Russian apprentice would nod in response to whatever
the Atlantic master said or did.
NATO’s domination over Russia was also obvious in Moscow’s
early actions with respect to the civil war in Yugoslavia, as the Alliance
did not lose much time in putting its new peacekeeping function into
practice. The Bosnian civil war provided Brussels with its fi rst test
case of the collective security doctrine. NATO became involved in
the conflict very gradually. During the summer of 1992, presidential
candidate Bill Clinton was the fi rst to mention the possibility of Allied
air strikes against Bosnian Serbs in combination with the lifting of
UN sanctions against the Bosnian government (the “lift and strike”
strategy). European allies, however, were not convinced and favored
the UN-sponsored Vance–Owen plan, which fi nally faltered in mid-
1993. NATO then undertook two operations intended to support UN
Security Council resolutions on the deployment of the UN Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. After the bombing of Sarajevo’s mar-
ket in February 1994, the UN Secretary-General asked the Security
Council to mandate NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions.
Starting in April, Alliance forces led by the Americans intensified
their bombing of Bosnian Serb forces until the Srebrenica massacre,
during the summer of 1995, which led to Operation Deliberate Force
and a total of about 3,500 sorties. The Dayton Accord was finally
concluded later that fall under strong American leadership.
The most striking aspect in NATO–Russia dealings over the
Alliance’s involvement in the Bosnian civil war is the explicit sup-
port that the Russian government offered in the beginning. Until
February 1994, Russia shared “the predominant Western interpre-
tation of events in Bosnia: that Serb expansionism and aggressive
ethnic nationalism was directed against the legitimate government

of a sovereign and independent state.”24 Significantly, this support-
ive approach was translated into deeds, as demonstrated by Russia’s
alignment with the Western members of the UN Security Council.
Recall that in September 1991 Gorbachev’s Soviet Union had voted
in favor of Resolution 713 imposing an arms embargo on all war-
ring parties. That was already a tangible demonstration of the new
strength of cooperative security. In the fi rst months of 1992 the new
Russian government pursued this alignment by voting in favor of
Resolutions 727, 740 and 743, among others. The Russians also sup-
ported the Vance–Owen plan, whose key effect would have been the
partition of Yugoslavia against the will of the Serbs. In May 1992,
Moscow went further in agreeing to Resolution 757, which imposed
sanctions on Belgrade. But the most significant gesture demonstrating
Moscow’s support for the Atlantic approach came in early June, when
Russia agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 836 authorizing the
deployment of peacekeepers to protect Bosnian safe areas and threat-
ening Serbia with “tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or
excluded from consideration.”25 This crucial vote indirectly backed
NATO’s repeated threats to strike if violations continued. In total,
throughout 1992 and 1993, Russia and the NATO countries at the
UN Security Council jointly adopted more than fifty resolutions on
Yugoslavia. That said, Russia’s support was not unequivocal and some
differences remained: for instance, Moscow systematically opposed
the use of force and was critical, at times, of what it perceived as the
West’s anti-Serb bias. But overall the alignment remains striking.
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there was a very strong
homology between Russia’s position in the new field of international
security and the empowered dispositions at the Kremlin. The new
elites’ disposition toward the internal mode of pursuing security and
their readiness to play the junior partner were in tune with Russia’s
diminished status in the NATO-imposed order of things. In terms of
capital, Russia’s position in the newly defi ned field of international
security had severely weakened in the early post-Cold War era. At the
material-institutional level, with its economy in total disarray and its
industrial basis seriously undermined, the country went through one
of the most dramatic material declines in recent human history. The
24 25
Headley (2003, 211). UN Security Council (1993).
entire institutional network built by the USSR also crumbled within

a few years, which placed Moscow in a friendless situation. Its army
was also left to decay for at least ten years; the Russian nuclear deter-
rent was actually the only significant “hard” resource remaining. As
for cultural-symbolic capital, in the new game of international secu-
rity premised on democracy and human rights, Russia could not but
be a pupil, given its authoritarian past. The new Russian government
had everything to prove and it did not benefit from any significant
symbolic resources to legitimize its practices. Instead it had to look
for external legitimacy. Kozyrev’s disposition to play the junior part-
ner was thus in tune with the country’s position in the field, which
favored the doxic enactment of diplomacy. Until early 1994, the
Alliance symbolically dominated Russia to the point of obtaining its
support on a number of practices that would otherwise have aroused
frustration. This pattern was to change rather abruptly at the turning
point of 1994.
Critical juncture: the Russian pupil goes awry

The year 1994 was a turning point in post-Cold War Russian–
Atlantic security relations: thereafter, NATO and Russia progres-
sively embarked on the uneasy path of symbolic power struggles that
continues to this day. The window of opportunity opened by NATO’s
unprecedented domination and Russia’s acquiescence, between 1992
and 1994, was abruptly shut when the Alliance launched its geographi-
cal enlargement and implemented its new collective security functions
in Bosnia. Taking the Russian perspective, I will demonstrate that
NATO’s unilateral decisions to bomb Yugoslavia and to take on new
members were construed as contradicting the professed new rules of
the international security game. In the next section, I will show how
these practices helped revive Russian Great Power dispositions and
sparked hysteresis effects in the relationship.
The double enlargement takes off

The fi rst major crisis in post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic relations
occurred in February 1994, after a Sarajevo market was shelled,
presumably by Bosnian Serb forces. In reaction, the UN Secretary-
General called for NATO air strikes, a move that was rejected by
the Russians. When NATO officially accepted the request, the

Russians expressed outrage at being sidelined and refused to accept
the Alliance’s interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 836,
which had threatened “tougher measures.” They also warned that
they would veto any further resolution at the UN Security Council. In
a phone call to President Clinton, Boris Yeltsin reportedly said that the
crisis could worsen to the point of involving nuclear weapons – a clear
signal that Moscow would not stand being ignored. Indeed, when
the UNPROFOR command ordered a Russian battalion to move into
Bosnia on February 14, the Ministry of Defense in Moscow refused
the order on the grounds that Russia had not been consulted in the
management of the crisis. In order for Russia to recover its position
in Balkans diplomacy, Yeltsin fi nally proposed to Belgrade that the
Bosnian Serbs should withdraw as requested by NATO in order to let
the Russian battalion in. When the crisis fi nally defused, the Russians
celebrated a diplomatic victory, while NATO gloated that the threat
of force had been decisive in obtaining the Serbian pullout.
In pursuit of diplomatic relevance, in April 1994 Yeltsin pushed for
the creation of the Contact Group with France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, the US and later Italy. Although coldly received at fi rst,
the initiative eventually guaranteed Moscow’s inclusion in key dip-
lomatic negotiations, temporarily softening tensions over Bosnia and
leading to a few diplomatic successes. For instance, Russia did not
formally protest when NATO bombed a Serbian airfield in Croatia
in November 1994. In fact, on that occasion Yeltsin categorically
condemned the Krajina Serbs’ bombing of Bihać while instructing
his representative at the UN Security Council to vote with NATO
countries. But evidence suggests that NATO countries had accepted
the idea of the Contact Group because it conveniently provided a
facade of inclusion. As US Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott
remembers: “its real purpose, in the mind of the Allied foreign min-
isters, was to keep Russia, as they variously put it, inside the tent,
on the reservation or, in [Warren Christopher’s] phrase, sullen but
not obstructionist.”26 Ultimately, then, including Russia worked only
26
Talbott (2002 , 123). Equally telling is the conclusion drawn by James
Goldgeier and Michael McFaul on the basis of dozens of interviews with
American officials: “On Bosnia, most officials in the U.S. government just
did not want to have to worry about the Russian angle” (Goldgeier and
McFaul 2003, 199).
to the point that effective decisionmaking remained fi rmly in the

Alliance’s hands. For instance, when Serbian forces surrounded the
town of Gorazde in early April 1994, NATO carried out its threats
and used force for the very fi rst time in its history. Alliance members
justified the bombing on the grounds of Resolution 836, to which
Russia had previously acquiesced. Informed after the fact, Russia pro-
tested loudly, but in vain.
After a year-long lull, in July 1995 the Bosnian civil war came
back to haunt NATO–Russia relations when Bosnian Serb forces
took Dutch peacekeepers hostage and encircled Srebrenica. At a
London meeting of the Contact Group, Russian Defense Minister
Pavel Grachev signed up to an American proposal to give NATO
the authority to bomb Serbs if they attacked Gorazde again, while
Kozyrev declared that Russia would not veto a resolution reinforcing
UNPROFOR. As Talbott remembers: “Key to [William] Perry’s argu-
ment was a promise that Russia would have a ‘dignified and mean-
ingful’ role in the peacekeeping operation that would take over once
NATO had forced the Serbians into negotiations.”27 But during the
negotiations with the warring parties, the Americans insisted that the
Alliance, not the UN, would lead the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
Russia’s opposition could only deliver a minor concession: by a com-
plex command chain arrangement, the Russian troops in Bosnia
would be put under the orders of American General Joulwan, acting
not as NATO’s SACEUR, but as the American Commander in Chief
in Europe (Joulwan formally wore both hats). “On matters of peace-
keeping and virtually everything else,” concluded Talbott, “Russia
wanted inclusion but not subordination.”28 At the time, though, the
Russians felt they were given the latter, not the former; and these
feelings continued to grow in the wake of Operation Deliberate Force
during the summer of 1995.
As to geographical enlargement, the impetus originally came
from a number of former members of the Warsaw Pact shortly after
the implosion of the USSR. In mid-October 1992, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland formed the Visegrad Group with the aim of
speeding up their integration into Western institutions, including
NATO. At the time, however, the George H. W. Bush administra-
tion made clear that it had no intention of moving NATO eastward.
27 28
Talbott (2002 , 170). Talbott (2002 , 186).
In December 1992, the NAC closed the door to Eastern enlargement

by praising the NACC as the proper forum for consultations on
security matters. Consequently, NATO officials initially remained
careful in reaching out to Eastern European countries, an approach
that was praised in Moscow. But the mere possibility of enlarging
NATO was enough to spark doubts. When officials from the Baltic
countries joined the fray in the ensuing weeks, the Kremlin expressed
concern. Sergei Stankevich, a political adviser to Yeltsin, wrote
that “maintaining the status of a Western outpost called upon to
restrain Russia’s ‘aggressive aspirations’ would enable the architects
of a Baltic ‘cordon sanitaire’ to count on substantial long-term aid
from the Atlantic community.”29 For the Russians, enlarging NATO
would revive Cold War logics of confrontation and represent a step
backward from the internal mode of pursuing security heralded in
the early 1990s.
As early as the spring of 1993, a number of high-profile politicians
in the West, including US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and German
Defense Minister Volker Rühe, began to publicly advocate NATO’s
enlargement to the Visegrad states. Within the newly elected Clinton
team, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake quickly emerged
as the main advocate of enlargement as part of his philosophy of
democracy promotion. The proponents of enlargement presented the
issue as one of survival for NATO. The Alliance was portrayed as a
community of states bound by a liberal identity, values and norms,
which “naturally” had to expand to like-minded countries. As
Schimmelfennig observes: “By presenting the policy of enlargement as
a policy that was based on the fundamental values of NATO member
states and on the membership rules of the Alliance, the proponents of
enlargement made it difficult for the ‘brakemen’ to openly oppose this
policy without harming their credibility as community members.”30
For some months, the debate was fierce as a number of officials in the
US and abroad harbored reservations about the policy. In late 1993,
Clinton decided to put enlargement on temporary hold and instead to
launch the PfP in order to reach out to potential future candidates.
On their side, the Russians consistently opposed the Alliance’s
expansion save for one occasion, when Yeltsin declared during an
official visit to Poland in late August 1993 that Warsaw joining the
29 30
Stankevich (1992 , 5). Schimmelfennig (2003, 244).
Alliance “would not be in confl ict with the process of European inte-
gration, including the interests of Russia.”31 In the next few days,
the Russian Foreign Ministry tempered the president’s declaration,
adding that expanding NATO would be counterproductive while
acknowledging the sovereign right of every state to choose means of
ensuring its security. In an obvious act of retraction, in September
Yeltsin wrote a letter to the main Western capitals warning against a
mechanical expansion of the North Atlantic bloc and instead propos-
ing that NATO and Moscow jointly guarantee the security of Eastern
European countries. The Russian president also argued that enlarge-
ment would be illegal in view of the terms of German unification
and that relations between Russia and NATO should always be “a
few degrees warmer” than those between Brussels and ex-Soviet sat-
ellites.32 Yet the damage was apparently done: Yeltsin’s declaration
in Warsaw had opened a window of opportunity for the proponents
of enlargement. For instance, Secretary-General Wörner, who had
been a timid supporter until then, began to endorse the policy more
openly.
Russian diplomats tried hard to back-pedal and state Moscow’s
strong opposition to the Alliance’s expansion as clearly as possible.
In November 1993, the Federal Security Service released an impor-
tant report on NATO enlargement. Written under Primakov’s lead-
ership, it epitomized the dominant thinking in ruling circles at the
time. First, the report noted that “many of Russia’s apprehensions
associated with NATO’s entry into the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe would be removed or eased if there were guaran-
tees of priority development for the process of changing the alli-
ance’s functions.” In the report’s analysis, not only were such
guarantees never given, the Alliance’s threats of force with regards
to the Bosnian civil war only compounded Russian concerns about
NATO’s functional evolution. Second, the report regretted the
“fi xed nature of stereotypes of bloc thinking, which is especially
characteristic of a number of representatives of the military leader-
ship in the Western countries.” Third, while acknowledging that
it would be “incorrect to proceed from [the premise] that NATO’s
geographic expansion would serve to create a staging ground for
infl icting a strike on Russia,” the report emphasized the “objective
31 32
Quoted in Parkhomenko (1993). Quoted in Asmus (2002 , 47).
necessity” for Russia to review its defense posture as a result of it

“regardless of the fact that in a political sense NATO is no longer
regarded as an adversary.” Fourth, the report alluded to the pos-
sibility that enlargement could play into the hands of anti-Western
forces inside Russia and curb democratic reforms. Fifth and fi nally,
Primakov’s report acknowledged that “Russia has no right to dictate
to the sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe whether or not
they should join NATO.”33 All in all, while many NATO officials
construed Russia’s opposition as “outdated Cold War thinking,” for
the Russians it was rather premised on a rejection of such a confron-
tational mentality.
In late 1993 and early 1994, NATO’s stance regarding enlarge-
ment was left ambiguous. When enlargement was officially taken off
the agenda in favor of the PfP in December 1993, Kozyrev and his
team celebrated the launch of this vast program of partnership and
cooperation. Yet only days later, Germany’s Defense Minister Rühe
declared at the opening of a meeting of the NATO Defense Planning
Committee: “There is no question as to the advisability of expanding
NATO. We have only to determine when this will happen and whom
it will involve.”34 A similar ambiguity surrounded the Brussels sum-
mit of January 1994, where heads of state and government agreed “to
reaffi rm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other
European countries.” The bulk of the summit, however, was devoted
to the PfP, an initiative enticing partners to “work alongside the
Alliance.”35 For the Russians, expansion and the PfP were opposite
initiatives because one was exclusive and the other inclusive. NATO
could take one or the other direction, but not both at once. In a press
conference with Clinton, Yeltsin emphasized that “all those countries
must be integrated together, in just one package. This will make eve-
ryone more secure. If, however, you try to dismember us, accepting us
and admitting us one by one – that will be no good. I’m against that;
I’m absolutely opposed to it. That’s why I support the president’s ini-
tiative for Partnership for Peace.”36 In the same spirit, Kozyrev signed
the PfP framework document in June 1994 and agreed with NATO
member states to engage in a discussion about a special partnership
with Russia “corresponding to its size, importance, capabilities and
33 34
Quoted in Poleshchuk (1993). Quoted in Yusin (1993).
35 36
NATO (1994a) (emphasis added). Quoted in Talbott (2002 , 115).
willingness to contribute to the pursuit of shared objectives.”37 When

the American and Russian armies held their fi rst ever joint peace-
keeping exercises on Russian soil in September, everything was taking
place as though a cooperative Russian–Atlantic modus vivendi was
developing.
And yet, a series of events in December 1994 showed this to be a
cruel illusion. On the fi rst day of that month, the NAC issued a com-
muniqué initiating “a process of examination inside the Alliance to
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this proc-
ess and the implications of membership.”38 This decision, which took
many senior officials by surprise including the American Secretary
of Defense, came as a huge blow to the Russians. For one thing,
Clinton had promised Yeltsin that American policy with respect to
enlargement would be guided by three noes: no surprises, no rush,
and no exclusion. For another, the internal deliberations inside the
Alliance had led most observers to conclude that enlargement was
still off the agenda: the “Russians had good reasons to be confused
about America’s real intentions,” conclude Goldgeier and McFaul. 39
Coincidentally or not, on the day of NATO’s announcement, Kozyrev
was in Brussels to sign an Individual Partnership Program as well as a
document fostering NATO–Russia dialogue. Claiming that no one in
Brussels had forewarned Moscow of this upcoming decision, Kozyrev
fi nally declined to sign any document and, under Yeltsin’s direct
instructions, froze all further progress in institutionalizing coopera-
tion with the Alliance. For the Russians, the unilateral decision to
expand reflected a NATO pattern of offering “Russia a fait accompli,
a fi nal position of the ‘take it or leave it’ type.”40
Within a few days, this about-face led to one of the most emblematic
moments of post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic relations: the Budapest
CSCE/OSCE summit. The Russians had hoped that this summit would
consecrate an inclusive European security architecture based on a
strong pan-European organization – the strengthened OSCE. Their
hopes had just been shattered by NATO’s December 1, 1994 commu-
niqué. The new security order premised on the Alliance’s functional
and geographical enlargement seemed bound to relegate Russia to
the margins of Europe. Despite all the NATO talk of partnership,
37
NATO (1994b). 38 NATO (1994c).
39 40
Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 184). Kozyrev (1995, 9).
Alliance practices in late 1994 appeared, for Moscow, to go against

the professed cooperative security order of the post-Cold War era. In
Budapest, lamenting the rise of a “cold peace,” Yeltsin denounced the
exclusionary consequences of the Alliance’s double enlargement:
Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold
War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace … NATO was created
in Cold War times. Today, it is trying to fi nd its place in Europe, not with-
out difficulty. It is important that this search not create new divisions, but
promote European unity. We believe that the plans of expanding NATO
are contrary to this logic. Why sow the seeds of distrust? After all, we are
no longer adversaries, we are partners. Some explanations that we hear
imply that this is “expansion of stability,” just in case developments in
Russia go the undesirable way. If this is the reason why some want to move
the NATO area of responsibility closer to the Russian borders, let me say
this: it is too early to give up on democracy in Russia!41
For the fi rst time, the Russian frustration with the Alliance’s activi-
ties was stated at the highest level. On the plane to Washington from
Budapest, the Clinton team tried “to figure out if [Yeltsin’s speech]
was a long-term change or a brief interruption in what had been very
close and friendly relations between Washington and Moscow.”42
With the benefit of hindsight, December 1994 constitutes the cru-
cial point when Russian–Atlantic relations became a lot more uneasy.
Only days after the OSCE summit, Russian troops began invading
Chechnya.
Breaking the rules: Russian interpretations of

the double enlargement
Why did Russia, despite its acceptance of the new rules of the inter-
national security game, react so negatively to NATO’s double enlarge-
ment policy? Clearly, NATO’s practices were not received in Russia
with the same spirit in which Brussels enacted them. For the Alliance,
geographical and functional enlargement was in line with the new
rules of the game it was imposing after the end of the Cold War – the
security-from-the-inside-out paradigm. For the Russians, however,
41
Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 191).
42
Interview with Burns quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 192).
NATO’s dual expansion meant exclusion and humiliation; such prac-

tices were reminiscent of Cold War realpolitik far more than of a new
world order allegedly premised on cooperative security.
From a Russian point of view, NATO’s February 1994 ultimatum
to Bosnian Serbs contradicted the very essence of the new rules of the
international security game premised on inclusiveness and mutuality.
As Gorbachev, certainly no hawk, complained: “Russia was con-
fronted with a fait accompli. It was treated as a junior partner that is
expected only to nod its head and support the choice made by others,
contenting itself with a pat on the shoulder.”43 While NATO thought
it had a free hand in the Balkans, the Russians could not countenance
being sidelined from solving a problem of European security when
they felt they had been promised just the opposite with the NACC,
the PfP and other allegedly inclusive Atlantic initiatives. It thus came
as a shock to the Russians that NATO’s functional enlargement to
embrace peacekeeping, which they had been supporting in 1992 and
1993, in fact turned out to be conducive to Moscow’s exclusion from
the management of European security. The new rules of the interna-
tional security game, heralded by the Alliance and the Russians alike,
were supposedly premised on inclusion and cooperation. Starting in
February 1994, however, NATO’s own practices in the Balkans did
not seem to match the internal mode of pursuing security to which the
new Russia had subscribed. No one has better expressed the change of
attitude in Moscow than Kozyrev in a spring 1994 article in Foreign
Affairs. It is worth quoting at length in order to compare it with the
views he had defended in 1992:
If a partnership is built on mutual trust, then it is natural to recognize

other rules as well: the need not only to inform one another of decisions
made, but also to agree on approaches beforehand. It would be hard to
accept an interpretation of partnership in which one side demands that the
other coordinate its every step with it while the former retains complete
freedom for itself. Partners must have mutual respect for each other’s inter-
ests and concerns.
This is a key lesson from the decision-making process that led to the lift-
ing of the siege of Sarajevo in February. NATO’s threat to bomb Bosnian
Serb positions if the siege was not lifted by a certain date was made without
Russian participation. It immediately became apparent that Russia could
43
Gorbachev (1994).
not and should not be excluded from the common efforts to regulate the
confl ict in the Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and
influence. Ultimately the advantages of partnership were illustrated when
Russia and the West coordinated their efforts to persuade the warring
parties to make peace. But the initial lack of consultation and coordina-
tion meant that fi rst both sides had to run the risk of returning to the old
benefactor–client relationship that had played such a pernicious role in the
regional confl icts of the Cold War era.44
For the Russians, the fact that NATO took it upon itself to decide on
the use of force in Bosnia went against the grain of the new rules of
the international security game based on inclusive partnership.
In late August 1995, when NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force
began, Russian officials similarly decried their exclusion from prior
consultations. Yeltsin denounced the Alliance for breaking with the
cooperative security discourse it was simultaneously preaching: “In
proclaiming its ‘peacekeeping mission,’ the North Atlantic alliance
has essentially taken upon itself the role of both judge and jury.”45
For the Russians, NATO was guilty of duplicity: while claiming to
include Russia in diplomatic talks through the Contact Group, it
was simultaneously making unilateral decisions to use force without
Russia’s participation. As a result, many in Moscow came to construe
NATO’s functional enlargement not in terms of the internal mode of
pursuing security, but as a shrewd strategy intended to strengthen the
Alliance’s profile in the post-Cold War era. Even the father of New
Thinking protested “a desire to expand de facto NATO’s sphere of
operation far beyond its historical borders. All this has very little in
common with humanitarian ideals of restoring peace in Bosnia.”46
Doubts about NATO’s promise of an inclusive security order began to
emerge – to be compounded by NATO’s decision to enlarge.
Despite all the Alliance talk to the contrary, the December 1994
decision to enlarge seemed to Moscow to breach the three basic
CSCE principles that had been so fundamental after the end of the
Cold War – that security is indivisible, mutual, and cooperative. It
looked as though the NATO-professed rules of the post-Cold War
international security game were scorned by the Alliance itself, whose
actions, as Moscow understood them, smacked more of realpolitik
44 45
Kozyrev (1994a, 66). Quoted in Rossiiskiye Vesti (1995).
46
Gorbachev (1994).
than cooperative security. For one thing, from a Russian perspective

expanding NATO created new dividing lines in the European secu-
rity system. NATO’s claim that an enlarged alliance would not lead
to new demarcations in Europe made little sense for Moscow: one is
either inside the tent, or outside. Russia remaining on the margins of a
tightly knit alliance that arrogated to itself the central role in European
security could not but lead to its exclusion. The Russians felt they
were unfairly excluded from a place they thought they belonged to.
In a similar vein, expansion seriously undermined the chances of
developing a pan-European security institution with teeth, in which
Russia could exert influence. To counter this view, many Atlantic offi-
cials insisted that the door would always remain open for Russia to
eventually join NATO. Clinton repeatedly told Yeltsin that enlarge-
ment could, in theory, also embrace Russia. Yet there are grounds
to doubt that such a policy could have been implemented – not least
because Brussels turned down all Moscow’s declarations of interest
in 1992, 1996 and 2002. The German Defense Minister offered a
more accurate expression of the dominant view in the Atlantic world
in September 1994: “Russia cannot be integrated, neither into the
European Union nor in NATO … if Russia were to become a member
of NATO it would blow NATO apart … It would be like the United
Nations of Europe – it wouldn’t work.”47 Inside the Alliance, most
member states feared that involving Russia could only mean the end
of the transatlantic consensus. In any event, Russian officials con-
cluded that their country was excluded from NATO’s geographical
enlargement in contravention of the principle of indivisible security.
Moreover, the Alliance’s expansion defeated the principle of mutual
security. For the Russians, the move sparked new security dilemmas
regardless of the overall quality of their relationship with member
states. If Moscow was not part of the Alliance, then it was inevitably
relegated to its external periphery. The main fear was that, in gain-
ing even more strength, NATO would be able to force any and all
policies on Russia. In Defense Minister Igor Rodionov’s words: “I do
not think that NATO is expanding to start a war, but it is becoming
a military alliance whose power cannot be matched by anybody. We
fear that as it gains strength and moves closer to Russian borders,
NATO will try to impose on us its conditions – political, economic
47
Volker Rühe quoted in Yost (1998, 139).
and others.”48 Instead, mutual security implies that one country’s secu-
rity cannot be enhanced at the expense of others’. For the Russians,
NATO’s unilateral decision to enlarge plainly contravened this prin-
ciple. As Primakov explained: “we don’t need to be convinced that
NATO is not preparing to attack us. We do not intend to attack the
United States, either. But let us suppose, purely hypothetically, that
we were to conclude a military alliance with Mexico, Venezuela and
Cuba. Surely that would elicit a negative reaction from the United
States.”49 At issue were not intentions but the fact that increasing one
side’s forces necessarily has consequences for the other. If security is
mutual, according to Russian officials, then the Alliance cannot be
strengthened without affecting the security of its neighbors.
Despite all NATO claims to the contrary, for Moscow expansion
retained an insuperable anti-Russian flavor. In fact, many officials in
Washington did not hide their suspicions about the new Russia under
Yeltsin. In a 1995 op-ed, Strobe Talbott wrote that “among the con-
tingencies for which NATO must be prepared is that Russia will aban-
don democracy and return to the threatening patterns of international
behavior that have sometimes characterized its history.”50 Turning
NATO into the central security pillar of the new architecture appeared
to be an efficient means of blocking any return to Russia’s past impe-
rialism. This rationale also informed the strong Republican support
for enlargement in the US: Senator Richard Lugar, for instance, “was
convinced that the West had to lock in the gains of the end of the
Cold War before they were frittered away.”51 In a similar vein, the
main reason why post-communist countries were so eagerly begging
for admission was indubitably their fear of Russia. Fully aware of this,
the Russians tried to convince Atlantic officials that in this context
expansion amounted to setting in motion a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Finally, in Russian eyes NATO expansion contradicted the very
principle of cooperative security by which international order could
be achieved only through negotiated settlement. Russian officials
felt that the decision to enlarge was imposed on them and that the
policy failed to take their country’s legitimate security interests
into account. Most strikingly, the 1995 “Study on Enlargement”
appeared “deliberately provocative in offering almost no concessions
48 49
Quoted in Black (1997). Quoted in Kondrashov (1996).
50
Talbott (1995, 6). 51 Asmus (2002 , 32).
to Russian interests. Enlargement was confi rmed as an open-ended

process; nothing but full membership was countenanced for applicant
countries; and these applicants were also expected not to ‘foreclose
the option’ of foreign troops and nuclear weapons being stationed on
their territory.”52 Seen from Moscow, the Alliance’s refusal to alter its
policy based on Russian concerns meant that “a new world order was
emerging while their country stood by as helpless observer.”53 In his
memoirs, Yevgeny Primakov recounts a one-on-one conversation with
Warren Christopher in early 1996: “My discussion with Christopher
left no doubt that our opinion would be ignored during the expansion
of NATO. It was not the process of expansion that would have to take
Russia’s position into account but Russia that would have to adapt to
the process.”54 The symbolic inequality of NATO–Russia diplomacy
became increasingly hard to accept for Moscow.
NATO’s proactive approach was driven in large part by the con-
viction that any concession to the Russians on the issue of enlarge-
ment would amount to showing weakness. As Talbott recalls: “if the
Russians knew that the prospect of a collision would cause us to hit
the brakes on enlargement, they’d have no incentive to acquiesce in
our going forward.”55 Contrary to the spirit of cooperative security,
any substantive compromise with Russia to accommodate its concerns
was excluded from the outset. The net result was that, throughout the
enlargement row, Russia basically faced the facts as NATO laid them
out. Resentment started to increase among Russian elites: Andranik
Migranyan, a Yeltsin adviser, regretted that “Russia’s reward for
destroying the totalitarian Soviet empire is not a return to civilization
as a respected and equal partner, but the isolation and serious weak-
ening of the country.”56 Instead of cooperating, NATO appeared to be
exploiting its partner’s difficulties to secure cheap gains.
Moscow elites have always rejected the notion, particularly popular
in Western conservative circles, that NATO had won the Cold War.
From the Russian point of view, the Alliance did not defeat them; it
was their own rulers who brought the USSR down. As Kozyrev wrote
in March 1994: “Victory in the cold war was won not by NATO’s
military machine but by the CSCE’s democratic principles.”57 In a
52 53
Dannreuther (1999 –2000, 152). Ponsard (2007, 91).
54 55
Primakov (2004, 135). Talbott (2002 , 99).
56 57
Migranyan (1994). Kozyrev (1994b).
similar fashion, Primakov affi rmed in 1996: “Peoples on both sides

of the Iron Curtain rid themselves of the policy of confrontation
through joint effort.”58 Consequently, post-communist elites expected
to be welcomed as equals by the Alliance. The expansion of NATO
sent them the exact opposite message, reminiscent of the Cold War’s
“containment” policy.59 The promises of cooperative security were
left unfulfilled, the diplomatic order of things was shaken, and the
trend toward a security community started to weaken.
All in all, seen from Moscow, NATO’s double enlargement seemed
to contradict the very premises by which the Alliance sought to justify
the practice. Several Western pundits echoed Russian criticisms of the
exclusionary dynamics engendered by NATO’s enlargement. In an open
letter to Clinton in June 1997, fifty former American senators, cabinet
secretaries, ambassadors and foreign policy specialists denounced “a
policy error of historic importance.” The process is plagued with a
“central contradiction,” argued one pundit, because it “emphasize[s]
cooperative security in Europe as a whole, but insist[s] on the right to
enlarge an organization designed for the collective defense of one part
of Europe against the other.”60 In reality, expansion would “resurrect
Europe’s dividing lines” and bypass the “chance to build a European
security community that included Russia.”61 A New York Times edi-
torial went so far as to call for Russian membership in NATO in order
to avoid such a stalemate in European security.62
But NATO did not alter its course – quite the contrary. In September
1995, the “Study on NATO Enlargement” confi rmed the “open
door” policy, adding: “No country outside the Alliance should be
given a veto or droit de regard over the process” of enlargement.63
Coincidentally, the study was published at about the same time as
NATO was conducting its air strikes on Bosnia. Starting from 1994,
NATO’s double enlargement practices were to leave an indelible mark
on the Russian habitus – one that persists to this day.
Hysteresis: NATO and the Russian “Great Power”

Starting in the mid-1990s, age-old Russian Great Power dispositions
resurfaced among policymakers in Moscow, prompting a misalignment
58 59
Quoted in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (1996). Kozyrev (1995, 13).
60 61
MccGwire (1998, 34–5). Kupchan (1994).
62 63
New York Times (1994). NATO (1995).
with the lower position occupied by the country inside the Alliance-
dominated field of international security. While in 1992–4, Yeltsin,
Kozyrev and other members of the Russian government had incor-
porated the new rules of the international security game, acting and
thinking from Russia’s weakened status, later the situation began to
change in part as a result of NATO’s practices of double enlargement.
Despite its verbal promotion of the internal mode of pursuing secu-
rity, in reality NATO appeared to follow a different logic, especially
because of the exclusionary consequences of the double enlargement
for Russia. As a result, the Russian proto-liberal habitus that had ren-
dered possible the Alliance’s domination in the immediate aftermath
of the Cold War gradually gave way to deeply embodied Great Power
dispositions.
The Russian Great Power habitus was never too far from the sur-
face, even during the 1992–4 honeymoon. For more than forty years,
Moscow had been the center of a huge empire and enjoyed a privileged
dialogue with its superpower counterpart in Washington. Such an
enduring position of domination in the international security field left
deeply ingrained dispositions among Russian policymakers. Despite
New Thinking policies and post-communist Russia’s early embrace of
the NATO order, the Great Power habitus has deeper historical roots
than any other in the Russian political soil. Nonetheless, for about a
decade, from Gorbachev to Kozyrev, Great Power dispositions were
remarkably muted inside the Kremlin. This raises the important ques-
tion: what explains the fact that in the mid-1990s the dispositional
balance in Moscow was tipped in favor of the Great Power habitus?
I argue that NATO’s practices with regard to the double enlargement
played an important role in this change.
This is not to say that the Alliance bears sole responsibility for the
resurgence of Great Power attitudes in Russia; several other factors
contributed to this evolution. First, as I just explained, for historical
reasons Russian soil is uniquely fertile for this habitus of grandeur.64
Second, NATO is only one among many international interlocutors
64
An eminent group of scholars identifies a number of other “historical
patterns marking the long haul of Russian foreign policy,” including “the
powerful but often perverse impact of absolutism, the impulse and burden
of shapeless borders, the effect of perennial economic backwardness, the
consequences of empire in lieu of more modern national forms, and the allied
and ultimately most poignant influence, Russia’s permanent and sometimes
agonizing quest for identity” (Legvold 2007, 20).
for Russia (although it is a particularly important one in Self and

Other dynamics). Furthermore, NATO–Russia relations are heav-
ily influenced by the larger dynamics between the West and “the
rest” at the systemic level. Finally, domestic politics – both in Russia
and in NATO countries – have certainly played an important role.
Throughout the 1990s, Russian society went through unprecedented
economic and political turmoil and its political institutions were
often taken over by corrupt elites. In sum, several factors combined
to prompt the reemergence of the Russian Great Power habitus. I con-
tend that NATO–Russia dealings with regard to the double enlarge-
ment significantly contributed to tipping the balance in favor of Great
Power disposition in Moscow.
How can we ascertain that the brunt of the change was not of
domestic origin, especially given the consecutive victories of nation-
alistic forces in the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections? New elites did
come to power in Moscow in the mid-1990s: in foreign policy, for
instance, Primakov came to typify the Russian Great Power habitus.
But a closer look at timing and the precise sequence of events in the
mid-1990s suggests that much of Russian domestic change followed
(instead of preceded) the events described in the previous section. Two
examples should drive this point home. First, Moscow did not become
more assertive immediately after the 1993 elections and the arrival in
force of nationalistic deputies in the Duma. During the fi rst half of
1994, Russian officials were still taking a conciliatory tone toward
NATO, supporting much of its diplomacy in the Balkans as well as
its partnership initiatives. The real change in Russian foreign pol-
icy came only after December 1994, once NATO had announced its
enlargement and as it prepared for its large-scale military intervention
in Bosnia. The second example that demonstrates that elite change in
Moscow was in part a reaction to Russian–Atlantic dealings is the
Russian invasion of Chechnya – the fi rst genuinely praetorian practice
of the post-communist Kremlin. Again, Moscow’s decision was taken
after the Alliance had officially kicked off the enlargement process.
While there is no doubt that Moscow’s behavior in the Caucasus
sparked fears in the West, it cannot be said to have been the catalyst
of the enlargement process because military orders were given after
NATO’s decision had been publicly announced.
Looking at the double enlargement from Russia’s perspective does
not mean that NATO’s point of view is of less value. For instance,
a number of Russian practices, from Yeltsin’s shelling of the White

House in October 1993 to the invasion of Chechnya in December
1994, revived Western fears that Russia’s democratic transition might
be very fragile after all. In this context, enlarging NATO appeared
to be a sound policy. This may very well have been the case. I focus
on the Russian perspective for analytical, not normative reasons –
because this is the best way to trace the origins of hysteresis in post-
Cold War Russian–Atlantic security relations. Looking at the double
enlargement through Moscow’s eyes helps better understand how and
why NATO’s own practices have been particularly deleterious to its
dominant position in relation to Russia. I leave it to others to account
more extensively for the Alliance’s point of view.65
Russia’s Great Power habitus

In concluding Chapter 4, I argued that in 2006 Russian practition-
ers took for granted the Great Power status of their country. At the
intersubjective level foreign policy discourse similarly assumed that
Moscow belonged to a small club of the most powerful nations.
Across the political spectrum, Russian elites generally thought from
their country’s Great Power status: it formed a Russian common-
place. To be sure, this disposition is primarily a historical substrate.
For the last three centuries at least, Russia has constituted a pole
of power in international politics. From Peter the Great’s arrival in
European society to the Soviet superpower, the Russian habitus is
imprinted with a sense of belonging to the restricted circle of Great
Powers.66 Historians also note that this narrative has often played
the role of a fallback position in Moscow: “The breadth of popular
and elite consensus on Russia’s ‘greatness’ as a sine qua non of its
identity as a state appears clearly in the crises that have arisen from
international failures.”67 Until the end of 1991, Moscow remained the
premier center of the communist world. Remarkably, this disposition
did not completely wither away with the fall of the USSR, despite the
fact that, thereafter, Moscow occupied a much lower position in the
new field premised on the internal mode of pursuing security. With
65
For Bourdieu-inspired explanations of NATO’s transformation in the post-
Cold War era, see Gheciu (2005); Villumsen (2008); and Williams (2007).
66 67
Neumann (2008b). McDonald (2007, 163).
New Thinking falling into disrepute, this disconnect between Russian

dispositions and the country’s weakened position was bound to spark
hysteresis effects. Starting in the mid-1990s and increasingly so to
this day, the Russian habitus appeared better attuned to the domi-
nant position that the country enjoyed in the past than to the post-
Cold War configuration defi ned along lines of democracy and human
rights. The Russian Great Power habitus is attuned to the external
mode of pursuing security – that is, the traditional rules of the game
in the field of international security centered on power-balancing and
alliance-making. In the early 1990s as Russian dispositions lost touch
with the country’s low position in the hierarchy, this misalignment led
Russian officials to decreasingly recognize the order of things in inter-
national society imposed by NATO. This hysteresis lies at the root of
today’s intense symbolic struggles and seriously undermined security
community development.
Despite its long history, the Russian Great Power habitus had
mostly disappeared from foreign policy discourse and practice in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War. It was only in the ensuing
years that it made a progressive comeback. In March 1994, for exam-
ple, Kozyrev adopted a new tone with NATO member states: “Some
people in the West have actually succumbed to the fantasy that a part-
nership can be built with Russia on the principle of ‘if the Russians
are good guys now, they should follow us in every way’ … [But] the
Russian Federation is doomed to being a Great Power … it can only
be an equal partner, not a junior one.”68 Starting in the mid-1990s,
the assertion and reassertion of the country’s Great Power status
became a mantra among Moscow’s elites – a discursive practice
that arguably revealed a lack of self-confidence in the status being
deserved and recognized. In this connection, Bobo Lo describes “the
Potemkinization of Russian foreign policy,” arguing that the Great
Power discourse was part of Moscow’s “mythmaking” after the end
of the Cold War.69
Nothing better illustrates the resurgence of Russia’s age-old Great
Power disposition than the nomination, in January 1996, of Primakov
as Foreign Minister in replacement of Kozyrev. At his very fi rst press
conference in his new capacity, Primakov expressed the attitude quite
68 69
Kozyrev (1994b). Lo (2002 , 5 and 7).
clearly: “Despite the current difficulties, Russia has been and remains
a Great Power, and its policy toward the outside world should cor-
respond to that status.”70 He also insisted on the need for equitable
partnership with the West and reasserted that there was no victor in
the Cold War, as overcoming it had been a joint victory. Starting with
Primakov, Russian foreign policymakers appealed to the historical
notion of derzhava, which Andrei Tsygankov translates as “the holder
of international equilibrium of power.”71 Accordingly, the main con-
stitutive elements of the Russian narrative of Great Power are calls
for equality, multipolarity, spheres of interest and balance of power.
Geopolitical thinking also plays a prominent role in this habitus.72
The gist of my argument consists of linking the revival of Great
Power dispositions in Russia to NATO’s practices with regard to the
double enlargement. I want to substantiate this correlation with four
interrelated arguments. First, NATO’s double enlargement led to an
unprecedented foreign policy consensus in post-communist Russia
around 1995. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, there was
a lot of debate on Russia’s new identity. Starting in 1994, however,
these different foreign policy opinions gave way to a broad-based
agreement based on the notion of derzhava. Thereafter, the Russian
elite struck a position that repudiated much of the New Thinking of
the early 1990s and instead integrated several items from the age-old
Russian habitus of Great Power. An insider to these debates, Dmitri
Trenin confi rms that “the turning point came in 1994 with the deci-
sion in principle by NATO to admit new members. Most groups
within the Russian elite, otherwise deeply divided on the issues of
policy, were suddenly united in portraying this decision as essentially
anti-Russian.”73 Crucially, the consensus around the notion of Great
Power emerged after NATO’s official launch of the process of geo-
graphical enlargement.
Second, NATO’s practices regarding its double enlargement played
a significant role in disempowering those elites that had been disposed
to follow Western leadership and recognize its cultural-symbolic
superiority. Epitomized by Primakov’s nomination as Foreign Minister,
the institutional empowerment of the Great Power habitus that took
place in the mid-1990s was accompanied neither by any significant
70 71
Quoted in Moskovskiye Novosti (1996). Tsygankov (2004, 93).
72 73
Tsygankov (2003). Trenin (2000, 13–14).
changes in the material conditions of the Russian population, nor by

any obvious upheaval of the international structure. What, then, could
have led to this foreign policy shift? In a detailed study of elite and
mass opinions about foreign policy in Russia, William Zimmerman
observes: “Russia’s orientation to the world had changed consider-
ably in the two years between 1993 and 1995. The era dominated
by those sometimes termed the Atlanticists in Russian foreign policy
had passed.”74 The author makes a link between this fi nding and the
decision to enlarge: “NATO expansion both in numbers and in role
has very likely deterred those Russian elites who from a Western per-
spective warranted being deterred and has disabused Russian elites
who would have been likely to respond favorably to policies designed
to reassure.”75
Western practitioners’ recollections of events also provide evidence
that NATO’s double enlargement contributed to reviving Great Power
dispositions. For instance, one insider of the Clinton White House
believes that the policy has been “the real culprit” in the deteriora-
tion of Russian–Atlantic relations.76 Building on dozens of interviews
with American diplomats and politicians, Goldgeier and McFaul
similarly conclude that “[while] it is hard to measure the negative
impact of NATO enlargement for US–Russian relations on other
security concerns … it is true that the cooperative pattern of problem
solving on issues like Baltic troop withdrawal and the India rocket
deal established in 1993–94 were [sic] not repeated after the NATO
enlargement process began to move forward.”77 With the benefit of
hindsight, then, several practitioners on the NATO side realized that
something had changed in Russian dispositions after 1994; and they
identified enlargement as the probable trigger of that change.
Third, because of its belittling consequences, the Alliance’s dou-
ble enlargement contributed to a return to Russia’s Great Power nar-
rative. As Talbott was selling the case for a NATO intervention in
Yugoslavia, Kozyrev responded: “it’s bad enough having you people
tell us what you’re going to do whether we like it or not. Don’t add
insult to injury by also telling us that it’s in our interests to obey your
orders.”78 Playing the junior partner turned out to be unbearable for
74 75
Zimmerman (2002 , 93). Zimmerman (2002 , 206).
76 77
Blacker (1998, 179). Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 355–6).
78
Quoted in Talbott (2002 , 76).
Moscow given NATO’s inclination to further reinforce its dominant

position. To make matters worse, the Russians felt that as soon as they
did not agree with Allied member states’ policies, they were accused
of reverting to Russia’s imperial past. In 1995, Kozyrev expressed his
irritation:
the fi rm, sometimes tough protection of [national] interests by Russian

diplomacy should not be seen as an exercise in superpower rhetoric. When
the United States and its allies in Western Europe or Japan have politi-
cal differences or even trade wars, no one thinks of accusing this or that
country of having imperial ambitions or of giving up on democracy. Why
is it, then, that when Russia disagrees on something with its Western part-
ners, the alarm is immediately sounded and partnership with the West is
declared to be either falling apart or totally impossible?79
All in all, the double enlargement left the Russians under the impres-
sion that playing by the new rules of the international security game
was bound to make Russia’s position weaker while NATO’s grew
stronger.
Fourth, from the Russian point of view NATO’s practices of func-
tional and geographical enlargement were reminiscent of the Cold
War game. Progressively, many Russian elites came to feel that
NATO’s discourse of democracy and cooperative security was in fact
a cover-up for collecting its geopolitical trophies. In other words, the
Alliance seemed to use a double language, advocating idealpolitik in
words but implementing realpolitik in deeds. In reaction, ingrained
realpolitik dispositions took precedence over the thinner habitus
that had flourished from Gorbachev to Kozyrev. The double enlarge-
ment policy, in other words, triggered Great Power dispositions at
the expense of those that had informed Russia’s foreign policy in
1992–4. As Vladimir Baranovsky remarks: “The predominant feel-
ing is that even if Russia could not retain its position in Europe, it
certainly did not deserve to be forced out ruthlessly and treated as a
defeated country.”80 Under such circumstances, Great Power disposi-
tions appeared better adapted to playing the game of international
security with NATO member states. When one adds to these proc-
esses the practical imperatives of positional agency, by which Russian
79 80
Kozyrev (1995, 8). Baranovsky (2000, 449).
elites were structurally oriented toward making use of the resources

at hand (military capital but very few cultural-symbolic resources),
then clearly practices associated with the external mode of pursuing
security had a better chance of prevailing over the medium term.
The resurgence of the Russian Great Power habitus was gradual
throughout the 1990s. It was only with the Kosovo crisis and the
ensuing resignation of Yeltsin that it became wholly dominant among
decisionmakers (see Chapter 6). In the meantime, the coexistence of
Great Power dispositions and of cooperative security inclinations
created intriguing tensions in Russian foreign policy, between the
desire to integrate Atlantic structures and a drive to retain as much
independence as possible. On the one hand, as a Great Power Russia
should be an autonomous pole of the international system; on the
other hand, as a weak player in the post-Cold War international
security game, Moscow continued to value democratic norms and
cooperation as means of pursuing security. Positional and disposi-
tional effects pushed diplomatic practices in different directions. To
an extent, this puzzling ambivalence characterizes Russia’s external
relations with the West to this day.
Mind the gap? Institutionalizing NATO–Russia ties

The diplomatic interactions that led to the NATO-Russia Founding
Act, signed in May 1997, illustrate particularly well the intense hys-
teresis effects that started to grip Russian–Atlantic relations in the
mid-1990s. Throughout the negotiations, NATO practitioners con-
sidered Russia’s assumption of Great Power status nonsensical, while
Russian officials could hardly bear the Alliance’s condescending
approach. The mismatch between positions in the field and each par-
ty’s dispositions was striking – almost as much as at the NRC in 2006
(see Chapter 4). The following pages identify two concrete hysteresis
effects on Russian-Atlantic interactions. First, the negotiations turned
out to be much more tense and difficult than they had been earlier
in the post-Cold War era. By both sides’ accounts, the dialogue was
characterized by fierce symbolic power struggles. In particular, the
Russians turned out to be far more difficult partners than NATO had
imagined because they consistently insisted on the need for equality.
Second, given its disconnect from the structure of the international
security field, the Russian Great Power habitus sparked “Don Quixote
effects” in the form of a series of diplomatic initiatives that seemed

out of touch with the reality of the international security field.
Starting in the mid-1990s, hysteresis effects showed up in Russia’s
determined quest for NATO’s recognition of its equality and in
the Alliance’s blunt dismissal of that claim. Viewed from Brussels,
Moscow’s weakness was plain; as a result, Atlantic diplomats
expected the Russians to be happy to defer to NATO’s lead in the field
of international security. But such was not the Russian perspective
after the Great Power habitus began to resurface in the mid-1990s. As
Trenin notes, Moscow’s objective in institutionalizing relations with
the Alliance was crystal clear: it never aspired to be a normal partner
and not even a normal ally, but rather the “fi rst among equals, with
the only possible exception of the United States.”81 This was plainly
out of the question for NATO officials. The Russians had simply lost
the sense of their place, it appeared, rendering them impossible inter-
locutors. Officials in Moscow harbored reciprocal feelings about their
NATO counterparts.
Already in 1994, when NATO invited Russia to join the PfP, the
Duma Committee on Defense recommended joining “only if consid-
eration is given to [Russia’s] special status.”82 President Yeltsin quickly
added his voice to the chorus, declaring that “by virtue of its scope
and substance,” Russia deserved a partnership with NATO “differ-
ent from relationships with other countries. The idea is to conclude
a special agreement with NATO in keeping with Russia’s place and
role in world and European affairs and with our country’s military
power and nuclear status.”83 During the very fi rst ministerial meet-
ing of 16 + 1, in May 1994, Defense Minister Grachev handed to his
NATO counterparts a list of proposals for institutionalizing their ties,
including a consultation mechanism. In his private meeting with the
American Secretary of Defense, however, he was told that no special
conditions would be given to Russia. Put back in his place, Grachev
reportedly answered: “It wouldn’t be correct for Russia to set forth
special conditions [or ask for] a warmer place in the sun. A civilized
nation would never set such conditions.”84 In early 1994, Russia was
still willing to play the junior partner, although Great Power disposi-
tions were clearly on the rise.
81 82
Trenin (2005, 282). Rodin (1994).
83 84
Quoted in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (1994). Quoted in Schmidt (1994).
The Russian–Atlantic negotiations over the Founding Act took

place against the background of NATO’s geographical enlargement.
For the Russians, this was a damage-limitation exercise, whereas
for the Alliance it was a way to have the Kremlin swallow the pill
without balking. The main strategy adopted by the Alliance was
to grant Russia some of the symbolic pomp of equality but without
the substance. After much hesitation, and only once it became clear
that Moscow would not sign the PfP otherwise, the Alliance fi nally
accepted the beginning of formal negotiations on an individual part-
nership program with Russia in June 1994. In May 1995, NATO
and Russia agreed on a document called “Areas for Pursuance of a
Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation,” which
envisioned “dialogue through ad hoc 16 + 1 meetings” on matters of
peacekeeping, nuclear weapons and crisis management. At the fi rst
16 + 1 meeting between Foreign Minister Primakov and his NATO
counterparts, held in Berlin in early June 1996, the Alliance made its
fi rst significant concession by granting Russia a further three years in
meeting the CFE flank limits.
Throughout the negotiations, NATO officials appeared willing
to concede some ground to the Russians, but never at the expense
of the Alliance’s freedom. More often than not, accommodations
were symbolic and non-binding. As Talbott recalls, during spring
1996 “Primakov began dropping hints about three conditions that,
if accepted by NATO, might make enlargement palatable to Russia: a
prohibition against stationing nuclear weaponry on the territory of
new member-states; a requirement for ‘co-decision-making’ between
Russia and NATO on any issue of European security; and codifica-
tion of these and other restrictions on NATO and rights for Russia
in a legally binding treaty.”85 But the Founding Act fulfilled none of
these conditions (except perhaps the fi rst one, which the Alliance
conceded in a unilateral declaration). Given hysteresis effects, NATO
officials considered these demands “out of place”; for the Russians
they were simply the logical consequence of their country’s status. In
the mid-1990s the Alliance still enjoyed enough authority over Russia
to discipline its expectations and grant it seeming concessions that
in fact only reinforced domination. This is especially clear when one
examines the fate of Primakov’s three demands in the negotiating
process of the Founding Act.
85
Talbott (2002 , 218).
First, as regards nuclear weaponry, one of the key accommodations

granted to Russia was a NATO declaration made at the opening of a
16 + 1 Defense Ministers meeting in December 1996. On that occa-
sion, US Secretary of Defense Christopher declared that “in today’s
Europe, NATO has no intention, no plan, and no need to station
nuclear weapons on the territory of any new members, and we are
affi rming that no NATO nuclear forces are presently on alert.”86
This political commitment obviously had no legal force. In addition
to its non-binding character, the Alliance’s declaration was seriously
restricted by its contextual clause (“in today’s Europe”). The implicit
restriction here is that any change in current circumstances would
license NATO to renege on its pledge if needed. The move was all the
more dubious for the Russians since they had had their fingers burnt
after Gorbachev had similarly been promised in 1990 that NATO
would not enlarge to the east. This time, the Russians wanted more
than verbal promises and good intentions; yet that was all the Alliance
was ready to offer.
The Alliance dealt with Primakov’s second request (co-
decisionmaking) in a similar way. During a tour of Europe’s main
capitals, including Moscow, in February 1997, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright fi nally agreed to the creation of a consultative
council with Russia. She made clear from the outset, however, that
this mechanism would provide Moscow with a voice, not a veto.
Recall that throughout the post-Cold War era, NATO’s worst fear
in dealing with the Russians had always been a weakening of the
transatlantic consensus. Created by the Founding Act, the PJC was
to provide for consultation and, “where appropriate,” for joint deci-
sions. In practice, however, the PJC allowed any member at the table
to withdraw any topic from discussion. Consequently, even NATO’s
pledge to consult with Russia was seriously blunted by restrictive
clauses. This limit was highlighted less than two years later, when
the PJC proved incapable of hosting effective negotiations between
NATO and Russia in the run-up to the Kosovo crisis.
Primakov’s third demand – that the content of the NATO–Russia
agreement be codified in a legally binding treaty – proved to be the
toughest one. For reasons already mentioned, the Russians were
not willing to rely only upon the Alliance’s political guarantees. In
Yeltsin’s opinion: “A document on the parameters of NATO–Russia
86
Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 203).
relations must be binding. We intend to submit it for ratification, since

we cannot, in view of past experience, be content with nonbinding
assurances.”87 NATO diplomats proved unmoved, however: time was
on their side after Russia had been put on notice, in December 1996,
that the enlargement would proceed, with or without a prior agree-
ment with Moscow. By mid-March, Russia had dropped several of
its key demands in light of NATO’s inflexibility, including political
membership for new members and the legally binding nature of the
agreement. In exchange, NATO offered a fourth “no,” to the effect
that “NATO had no intention, plan or need to introduce substan-
tial forces onto the territory of the new members.”88 As with ear-
lier commitments, the Alliance limited its application to “the current
and foreseeable security environment.” Again, the pledge would be
valid only so long as member states wanted it to be. In the colorful
words of Migranyan: “The West made a fi rm commitment to just one
thing: not to make, on any question, any commitments that in the
future might tie its hands in relations with Russia.”89
During NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana’s next visit to
Moscow, in mid-April, Primakov insisted on his demand that NATO
should not expand infrastructure, including lines of communication,
airfields, military bases and stockpiles of weapons, onto new mem-
bers’ territories. With US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in
the Russian capital, Primakov proposed placing limits on the number
of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery that an expanded
NATO would be allowed to possess. The proposal was once again
turned down by Alliance officials, who also rejected Russia’s demand
for a ban on force deployment on new member states’ territories and
of limitations on military infrastructure. Two more rounds of nego-
tiations in Luxembourg and Moscow did not bear fruit and Russia
withdrew its demands when told by NATO that there would be no
more concessions.90
The negotiation of the Founding Act illustrates hysteresis effects
in international relations particularly well. From the Alliance point
87
Quoted in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (1997).
88 89
Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 205). Migranyan (1997).
90
It is worth noting that this unresolved issue of armament ceilings for new
members still haunts Russian–Atlantic relations, and it helps explain
Moscow’s moratorium on the implementation of the treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE); see Chapter 6.
of view, Russia was attempting to punch well above its weight with
its extensive and legally binding demands. Moscow was in no posi-
tion to dictate any provision and should have been happy that NATO
opened a diplomatic negotiation with it in the fi rst place. The Atlantic
compromises granted to the Russians were mostly symbolic in nature
and they did not restrict the Alliance’s freedom whatsoever. From the
Russian perspective, as a Great Power what mattered most was to
be treated as NATO’s equal. This imperative at times appeared even
more important than obtaining genuine concessions from Brussels.
Particularly striking is the emphasis that Russian elites consistently
put on the need to save face. For instance, Primakov regularly had to
defend himself against accusations of watering down Russia’s position
in the hope of achieving an agreement with NATO. More than any-
thing else, for Moscow the Founding Act was meant to get Russia’s
Great Power status publicly recognized.
In addition, Russia’s practices illustrate quite well positional agency
in international diplomacy. Where you sit is what you do: given that
post-communist Russia had very little cultural-symbolic capital – the
resources that had become the prime currency in the internal mode
of pursuing security – it was structurally inclined to resort to the
means at hand, which were mostly military. In the new rules imposed
by NATO, however, military capital had been considerably devalued
and even deemed passé. As a junior player in terms of democracy
and human rights, Moscow could only have a losing hand in this
security-from-the-inside-out game. However, despite all its problems
in the 1990s, given its thousands of nuclear weapons the Russian
army retained a strength superior to almost any non-Western coun-
try in the world. It was thus the country’s position in the field (low
cultural-symbolic capital, fairly high military resources), in addition
to resurging Great Power dispositions, that drove Russia’s response to
the double enlargement, which often appeared ill-adapted from the
standpoint of the dominant players. By the new doxa, reliance on out-
moded and even illegitimate military resources in the international
security field was deemed awkward if not altogether disingenuous by
the Alliance. As a result, Russia’s positional agency appeared all the
more hysteretic to those players whose habitus and resources were
better aligned with the field’s structure.
The Founding Act negotiations gave birth to a number of quixotic
practices on Russia’s part. Because of hysteresis, the Russians had
to publicly prove their status and avoid as much as possible backing

down in front of NATO. The Russian stance was all the more difficult
because diplomatic interactions were taking place against the back-
ground of the Alliance’s enlargement. Even before the negotiations
formally opened in December 1996, the Russian government had
listed five countermeasures that it was prepared to implement should
enlargement proceed: (1) the revision of military doctrine; (2) the cre-
ation of a defensive alliance, within and beyond the CIS framework;
(3) a significant build-up of the southern, western and northwestern
groups of force, the CFE treaty notwithstanding; (4) a build-up of
new tactical nuclear weapons to be retargeted against new NATO
members; (5) the withdrawal from START I and II.91 There was an
obvious tension – very much characteristic of hysteresis – between this
tough approach (and its heavy reliance on military resources) and the
negotiations that were taking place on the ground, where Russia was
playing with a losing hand. Overall, Russia undertook four main sets
of quixotic practices that were doomed to fail given the field’s struc-
ture: counterproposals, hindrance, soft balancing and veiled threats.
Throughout the negotiation process, the Russians made a number
of counterproposals so as to keep the initiative and obtain conces-
sions from NATO. For example, in March 1996 Primakov proposed
to Poland that NATO give it security guarantees that would stop
short of full-fledged membership. In April, the Kremlin suggested the
establishment of a Baltic–Black Sea Nuclear-Free Zone, to be codified
legally and comprised of the Baltic states, the Visegrad Four, Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. Shortly thereafter, Yeltsin
put forward a “French scenario” providing for the admission of new
members to the bloc’s political structures only without their joining
military structures. Primakov even visited Norway and Denmark to
demonstrate how some established NATO member states had never
allowed bases or troop deployments on their territories. In July 1996,
Yeltsin wrote a letter to Clinton consenting to NATO enlargement to
Poland on the condition that Baltic states would be excluded from any
future enlargement. Several months later, in his summit with Clinton
in Helsinki, the Russian president tried that line again as part of a
gentleman’s agreement. Ultimately, NATO and its member states did
not seriously consider any of these Russian counterproposals.
91
Rodionov (1996).
The second strategy that Russia followed was one of hindrance, at

times bordering on obstruction. Under Kozyrev, Moscow had often
sought NATO’s cooperation by underlining how Russia’s political and
economic weakness could become a potential threat. In the mid-1990s,
the Russians went further and took measures intended to hinder cer-
tain Allied member states’ initiatives. In January 1996, for instance,
the Duma delayed ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) II, invoking the problem of NATO expansion. In September
1996, at the very last minute, Russia refused to participate in PfP
Black Sea exercises with Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. In October
1996, the Duma adopted one of several resolutions against NATO
expansion, warning that an enlarged NATO would undermine the
validity of the CFE treaty. Again in February 1997, the Duma refused
to ratify START II because of enlargement. Even after Yeltsin had
confi rmed that he would sign the Founding Act at the Paris summit in
May, the Duma passed two resolutions strongly condemning NATO’s
planned expansion.
In this connection, the new National Security Concept adopted in
early May 1997 registered a fundamental change of tone in Russian
foreign policy doctrine toward NATO. In the 1993 Foreign Policy
Concept, Russia had been faced with only internal threats, from sepa-
ratism to drug trafficking. The document downplayed military fac-
tors and assumed “the end of the East–West confrontation.”92 Where
NATO was mentioned, it was only in the positive context of setting
objectives for cooperation. By 1997, Russia’s official security doctrines
incorporated two new long-term threats absent from previous docu-
ments: interference in internal Russian affairs (a reference to Western
criticism of the Chechnya intervention, certainly, but also to NATO’s
functional enlargement); and expansion of military blocs and alli-
ances. In fact, the 1997 document stated that “the NATO expansion
to the east and its becoming a dominant military and political force in
Europe [is] extremely dangerous.”93 Significantly, the fi rst four threats
to Russian security listed in the Concept were all directly related to
NATO’s practices with regard to the double enlargement: the mar-
ginalization of the UN and the OSCE, the weakening of Russia’s
influence in the world, the strengthening of military blocs, and the
appearance of military bases on Russia’s borders.
92 93
Quoted in Kassianova (2001, 830). Quoted in Kassianova (2001, 832).
Third, Russia also took a number of foreign policy initiatives akin

to what realists call “soft balancing” – limited and indirect balanc-
ing strategies of coalition-building and diplomatic bargaining within
international institutions, short of formal alliances.94 In April 1996,
during a Sino-Russian summit in Beijing, the parties adopted a dec-
laration premised on the notion of strategic partnership. A year later,
Moscow and Beijing adopted a Joint Russian–Chinese Declaration
about a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New World Order.
Interestingly, the text emphasized sovereignty and non-intervention
as the key principles of international relations, while dismissing
universal standards of human rights. That was the fi rst time Moscow
openly contested the NATO rules of the international security game –
a trend that accentuated sharply in the wake of the Kosovo crisis.
In addition to China, Russia also joined with Belarus to contest
the Alliance’s practices. In March 1997, the two countries declared
themselves united in their unwillingness to accept NATO’s plans to
advance eastward, and even took steps to plan joint military exer-
cises. In yet another display of hysteresis, NATO officials immediately
dismissed these maneuvers as not credible – once again Russia was
tilting at windmills.
Fourth and fi nally, Russian officials also issued a handful of veiled
threats that were, in hindsight, nothing but trial balloons – typical
behavior from agents trying to punch above their weight. For example,
in February 1996 an unidentified official from the Ministry of Atomic
Energy was quoted as saying that Russia could target nuclear weap-
ons against NATO military bases set up on the territory of East
European countries. In a similar bullying tactic, Primakov threatened
to cut off all relations with NATO if any country from the former
Soviet Union was invited to join. Again, at the time none of this could
have deterred NATO from proceeding with enlargement as planned
because Moscow’s moves appeared simply out of place. What must
be emphasized, however, is that Russia’s newly found assertiveness –
at the time in words if not in deeds – was strong testimony to the
resurgence of the Great Power habitus and the resulting decline in
the Alliance’s domination of the international security field. This new
dynamic, however, was fully displayed only a few years later in the
wake of the Kosovo crisis.
94
Paul (2005).
In the meantime, in Paris in late May 1997, NATO member states

and Russia gathered with much pomp to sign the Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation. By the agreement, the parties solemnly pledged
to “build together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic
area on the principles of democracy and cooperative security. NATO
and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the
goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competi-
tion and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.”95 Despite
the symbolic talk and ceremony, however, hints of hysteresis could be
gleaned during the summit. In his declaration, Yeltsin emphatically
insisted on the need to act as equals at the PJC just created. On their
part, NATO leaders took great pains to show how much of a gain
the agreement was for Russia, with Clinton stressing his determina-
tion “to create a future in which European security is not a zero-sum
game – where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss, and Russia’s strength is
our alliance’s weakness. That is old thinking.”96 The performative
social magic that allowed this celebration to happen quickly ceased to
operate, however, when Kosovo took center stage in Russian-Atlantic
relations, a topic to which I turn in the next chapter.
Conclusion: a stillborn security community?

The limited development of a Russian–Atlantic security community
owes much to the critical juncture of late 1994, when NATO launched
its double enlargement policy. Given the dire effects that this turn of
events had on the development of diplomatic doxa, the probability that
a genuine pacification process could ensue, in and through practice,
was seriously undermined. Starting in the mid-1990s, Russian elites
stopped being well disposed toward the NATO order of international
security. With the resurgence of the Great Power habitus in Moscow,
the domination pattern that is necessary to turn diplomacy into a
doxic practice started to crumble. To be sure, disputes continued to be
solved peacefully; but in the longer run, even “successful” diplomacy
contributed to weakening the homology between Russian dispositions
and the country’s position in the new field of international security.
Field analysis, which looks not only at what players say and do, but
95 96
NATO (1997). Quoted in New York Times (1997).
also at the structural location from which they do so, suggests that
with its very limited resources, Russia was in no position to play the
Great Power game in NATO’s eyes. Likewise, NATO’s practices of
double enlargement, largely the result of the organization’s unchecked
domination of the field of international security, were bound to arouse
the Russian habitus. Self-evident diplomacy gave way to strong hyster-
esis effects, with two masters but no apprentice in the relationship.
In using the language of critical juncture, I want to emphasize the
path-dependent nature of social and political relations, whose future
depends on their past because history develops like a branching tree.
Because of positive, reinforcing feedback loops, early steps tend to
lock into a certain trajectory and eliminate alternatives that were
originally open. Arguably, the end of the Cold War was one of those
rare historical instances when the world found itself at an intersection
where several paths were available. As Kissinger writes: “When an
international order fi rst comes into being, many choices may be open
to it. But each choice constricts the universe of remaining options.
Because complexity inhibits flexibility, early choices are especially
crucial.”97
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, for a short
time between 1992 and 1994, everything took place as if Russia was
going to integrate into the new NATO world order. At that point,
“[t]he ideas of Russian messianism and the pursuit of an independ-
ent role in line with its Great Power heritage were either understated
or even denied.”98 Many paths were therefore possible, including the
one toward a security community. Things abruptly changed in 1994
when NATO took two initiatives that set its relations with Russia
on the bumpy track that continues to this day. For the Russians, the
double enlargement amounted to NATO reneging, in practice, on its
own discourse of inclusive, mutual and cooperative security. Because
the move was reminiscent more of realpolitik than of the professed
internal mode of pursuing security, Russian Great Power disposi-
tions gradually resurfaced. With rising hysteresis and symbolic power
struggles, the policy amounted to signing the nascent security com-
munity’s death warrant.
Using a Bourdieu-inspired theoretical framework gives an important
edge in matters of critical junctures and early steps because it supplies
97 98
Kissinger (1994, 26–7). Ponsard (2007, 62).
not only a structural mechanism for path dependence (the field) but
also an agent-level process: as a historical distillate of embodied dis-
positions, habitus explains self-reinforcing practices. The historical
constitution of habitus, in effect, is characterized by a “relative irre-
versibility”: “all the external stimuli and conditioning experiences are,
at every moment, perceived through categories already constructed by
prior experiences. From that follows an inevitable priority of origi-
nary experiences and consequently a relative closure of the system of
dispositions that constitute habitus.”99 The practical sense, as a result,
builds on past experiences to feel what is to be done. The dispositions
comprised in the habitus, constituted by subjective and intersubjec-
tive past experiences, in part constitute future practices. As a result,
the path taken at certain historical junctures may make other paths
more or less likely in the future. Such has been the case in post-Cold
War Russian–Atlantic relations: partly because of the resiliency of
Russia’s Great Power habitus, which was reactivated by NATO’s dou-
ble enlargement, today’s symbolic power politics are in great measure
the fallout from the early steps of 1992–7.
99
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992 , 133).
6 The fallout: NATO and Russia from
Kosovo to Georgia, 1998–2008
Hysteresis and symbolic power struggles continued to plague NATO–

Russia diplomacy well into the twenty-fi rst century. Pursuing the
historical analysis of practices, in this chapter I focus on the period
stretching from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to the war between
Russia and Georgia. During this decade, the Alliance continued its
double enlargement policy by conducting a range of new military
operations outside the Euro-Atlantic zone and admitting ten new
member states. Because my objective is to trace the roots of the prac-
tical sense of diplomats at the NRC as I recordered it in 2006 (see
Chapter 4), I mainly concentrate on the period up until that year. In
the fi nal section of the chapter, I briefly extend my narrative to more
recent NATO–Russia diplomacy and show that it basically followed
the same pattern of increasing symbolic power struggles that began
back in late 1994.
Despite the fact that Russia and NATO member states successfully
dealt with their fierce disagreements over the double enlargement in
a non-violent manner, hysteresis was compounded between 1998 and
2008 as the disconnect between positions and dispositions increased
consistently. After the Kosovo crisis, Great Power dispositions grew
stronger among the Moscow foreign policy elites, even though the
country’s position remained weak by NATO standards. Then, in the
wake of September 11, 2001, the rules of the international security
game partly shifted back to “hard security,” an evolution that tempo-
rarily played to Russia’s advantage. For a short while, its dispositions
were better aligned with its enhanced position, prompting a short-lived
improvement in the relationship with NATO. But when a new wave
of double enlargement shattered this fragile alignment in the ensuing
year, the road was once again open for the intense symbolic power
politics that still prevails today. It is in this light, I conclude, that we
should understand the Georgia War of summer 2008: as they power-
lessly witnessed Russia’s ruthless actions in South Ossetia, Alliance
194
NATO and Russia from Kosovo to Georgia, 1998–2008 195
members reaped what they had sown. Moscow’s defiant assertiveness

and its new deafness to Western criticism are testimony to the fact
that one generation after the end of the Cold War, the NATO–Russia
relationship is plagued with so much hysteresis that security commu-
nity development now seems remote.
Hitting rock bottom: the Kosovo crisis

During the Kosovo crisis, hysteresis effects reached unprecedented lev-
els in Russian–Atlantic post-Cold War relations. For Alliance officials,
there was simply no question of letting Russia distract the Alliance
from its new collective security tasks. If Moscow did not like NATO’s
actions, it simply had to learn to live with them. On the Russian
side, resurging Great Power dispositions came to drive foreign policy
practices more than at any time since the end of the Cold War. It is
worth recalling that NATO’s double enlargement culminated with the
Kosovo crisis. In geographical terms, the Alliance formally admitted
three new members – Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – in
the middle of its bombing campaign on Serbia. At the functional level,
Operation Allied Force constituted the first attempt by NATO to exert
its new collective security mandate despite external and internal oppo-
sition. Furthermore, during the Washington summit of March 1999,
the Alliance adopted a new Strategic Concept formally enshrining its
out-of-area missions. The Kosovo crisis thus lies at the confluence of
the key tensions in post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic dealings.
Russian–Atlantic diplomacy during the Kosovo crisis was one of
brinkmanship. On top of particularly acrimonious language and an
official cutoff of NATO–Russia relations, the events also led up to the
only moment when there was the possibility of a violent confronta-
tion: the seizure of Pristina airport by Russian paratroopers in a dash
to beat NATO peacekeepers to the Kosovo border. In terms of domi-
nation patterns, this suggests that hysteresis effects gained strength in
1999 compared to the mid-1990s. In effect, NATO’s practices in and
around the Kosovo crisis led the Russians not only to question the
doxic rules of the post-Cold War international security game, but also
to increasingly reject them outright as Great Power dispositions con-
solidated in Moscow. In sum, the Kosovo crisis was both constituted
by, and constitutive of, fast-growing hysteresis effects in post-Cold
War Russian–Atlantic relations.
Worlds apart: NATO–Russia diplomatic

brinkmanship over Kosovo
Although Kosovo had been considered a potential hot spot for years,
armed clashes between the Kosovo Liberation Army and Serbian forces
erupted only in March 1998. On March 31, the UN Security Council
voted, with Moscow’s support, for Resolution 1160 condemning
Serbia’s excessive force and imposing an arms embargo on Belgrade.
By the end of May, NATO had taken up the question and discussions
were held on the possibility of sending peacekeepers to Kosovo. At
a PJC session in late May 1998, Russia was confronted with the fait
accompli of a NAC position issued on the previous day. Even at that
early point, the Russian–Atlantic clash to come was already discern-
ible in Primakov’s ensuing press conference statement: “We must not
set a precedent in which NATO acts outside the territory of the NATO
countries without a decision by the UN Security Council.”1 When, in
late June, NATO sent aircraft to Macedonia and organized (despite
Moscow’s objection) a one-day military exercise on the Kosovo bor-
der, Russia recalled its representative to the Alliance. In Moscow, the
main Defense Ministry official in charge of cooperation with NATO,
General Leonid Ivashov, warned that military intervention without a
UN Security Council resolution would amount to “unleashing a new
cold war in Europe”: “NATO not only is not listening to the views
of its partners, it is unwilling to put the resolution of crisis situations
in Europe into anyone else’s hands.”2 Russia’s uneasiness with the
Alliance’s position of strength was already palpable.
In August 1998, when Moscow agreed to join a NATO exercise
in Albania, it insisted that simulated air strikes be removed from the
scenario. But the Alliance’s plan was made clear when Germany’s
Defence Minister Volker Rühe called for “early NATO military inter-
vention in Kosovo, even if this means acting against Russia’s will.”3
In September, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov delivered a per-
sonal message from President Yeltsin to the White House, threaten-
ing that Russia would “not countenance” air strikes – “a phrase that
in diplomacy goes beyond disapproval and carries with it at least
the option of reprisal.”4 In October, Russia nonetheless joined with
1
Quoted in Gornostayev and Katin (1998).
2 3
Quoted in Mukhin (1998). Quoted in Sysoyev (1998).
4
Talbott (2002 , 300).
NATO members of the UNSC (while China abstained) to call for the
international monitoring of an immediate ceasefi re and to threaten
“to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or
restore peace and stability in the region.”5 In an official comment
on that vote, the Russian representative to the UN Security Council
declared: “there are no provisions in [Resolution 1199] that would
directly or indirectly sanction the automatic use of force.”6 A few days
later, however, NATO representatives argued during a PJC meeting
that the resolution had described the situation in Kosovo as a threat to
regional peace and stability, thus opening the way to military action
based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In a strong rebuff, Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov declared that Moscow would exercise its veto,
while Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev warned that a NATO opera-
tion in Kosovo would signal the start of a new cold war. Sergeyev
also threatened to break relations with NATO and freeze the proc-
ess of START II ratification. Unshaken, NATO issued a new ulti-
matum to Belgrade in mid-October, prompting Moscow to recall its
ambassador once again. Vladimir Lukin, then chairman of the state
Duma’s International Affairs Committee, went as far as to float the
idea that Russia might offer military support to Yugoslavia in case
of an Alliance military operation. With the Alliance systematically
dismissing Russia’s objections, political discourse in Moscow reached
new levels of nervousness.
Looking for ways to regain the initiative, Russian diplomats sup-
ported an agreement between Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević
and the Contact Group on establishing the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission. This mission proved a double-edged sword, however, when,
in mid-January 1999, the discovery of the Račak massacre confi rmed
Atlantic suspicions of Belgrade. Nonetheless, Moscow pushed the
Contact Group to organize a conference in Rambouillet in mid-
February. Given hysteresis, however, diplomatic accommodation
appeared out of reach. According to one Russian insider: “all Western
attempts to establish within the Contact Group a common under-
standing of the concrete parameters of the agreement met with a kind
of slack resistance on the part of Russia.”7 Given its weak position,
obstruction seemed the only way for Moscow to exert some kind of
5 6
UN Security Council (1998a). UN Security Council (1998b, 11).
7
Levitin (2000, 136).
influence on the diplomatic process. Despite Igor Ivanov’s last-minute

push in Belgrade in mid-March, the Milošević regime finally rejected
the Rambouillet agreement. The road was open to NATO bombings,
which formally began on March 24.
Upon learning the news while flying over the Atlantic en route to
Washington, Prime Minister Primakov ordered his plane to turn back
to Moscow. The Russian government immediately recalled its ambas-
sador to NATO, froze all NATO–Russia cooperation under the PfP,
discontinued PJC activities, expelled two NATO information offic-
ers posted in Moscow, and allegedly retargeted its nuclear weapons
toward the NATO members that were taking part in the air strikes.
In a televised statement, Yeltsin fumed with anger:
Russia is deeply outraged by NATO’s military action against sovereign

Yugoslavia, an action that is nothing short of undisguised aggression …
Not only the UN Charter, but also the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security Between Russia and NATO, has been violated.
A dangerous precedent for reviving the policy of diktat based on the use of
force has been set, and the entire modern-day system of international law
and order has been threatened. This essentially amounts to an attempt by
NATO to enter the 21st century wearing the uniform of world policeman.
Russia will never consent to this.8
In a dramatic fashion, Yeltsin added that Russia “has extreme meas-

ures it could take but we have decided not to take them.” That lan-
guage was unequivocally the harshest ever used in post-communist
Russia with regard to the Alliance.
On March 26, Russia introduced to the UN Security Council, with
the support of India and Belarus, a draft resolution calling for an
immediate cessation of the use of force against Belgrade. The result of
the vote was a complete disaster for Moscow’s diplomacy: only three
states (Russia, China and Namibia) supported the text, while twelve
voted against it. A few days later, Moscow sent a high-profi le del-
egation to Belgrade while also dispatching an intelligence-gathering
ship to the Adriatic. In the end, NATO quickly rejected the peace
plan that the Russian delegation negotiated with Miloševič during
the trip. On April 7, the Duma adopted a resolution urging Yeltsin
8
Quoted in Rossiiskaya Gazeta (1999).
to supply Belgrade with weapons, followed by another on April 16

approving the political union of Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia.
Other brinkmanship initiatives on Russia’s part included a special
(Russian) Security Council session to discuss the country’s nuclear-
technical complex, a review of military doctrine, the planning of the
largest military exercises since Soviet times and the reinforcement of
the defensive alliance with Minsk, including the establishment of a
single defense space.
Unprecedented in the post-Cold War era, these Russian gestures
signaled an increasing restlessness as well as the decline of NATO’s
symbolic domination of Moscow. That said, it is equally significant
that Russia did “only” that: despite the escalation of rhetoric and
much domestic criticism, the Yeltsin team stopped short of taking
any significant military measure during the bombings. Instead, it
maintained open its diplomatic channels with Washington and other
Western countries. It also made much use of the Contact Group.
For instance, on April 7, a senior Foreign Ministry officials’ meet-
ing was held in Brussels, and then in Dresden, at the political direc-
tors’ level, on the next two days. On April 14, Yeltsin named former
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin as his presidential envoy – a
clear rebuff to the nationalistic opposition in Moscow as well as to
Prime Minister Primakov. Everything was taking place as if confl ict-
ing dispositions and positions were simultaneously informing Russian
foreign policy, making for an awkward mixture of quixotic rhetoric
but restrained actions.
Chernomyrdin immediately began a diplomatic shuttle that sig-
nificantly contributed to ending the confl ict and moving Russia and
NATO closer together. In Oslo, Albright had communicated to Igor
Ivanov NATO’s three non-negotiable conditions to terminate bomb-
ings: the end of violence in Kosovo, the withdrawal of Serbian forces
and the return of refugees. In preparation for the G8 meeting of Foreign
Ministers, Talbott and Chernomyrdin travelled between Moscow and
Washington to fi nd common ground. In Bonn, the G8 agreed on seven
principles for a political settlement that were to serve as the basis
for a future UN Security Council resolution. One stumbling block,
however, concerned the composition of the peacekeeping force and
whether it would be under NATO or UN leadership. A few days later,
the diplomatic process made headway thanks to the Russian sugges-
tion to involve a neutral third party in the negotiations with Belgrade.
The Americans proposed President Martti Ahtisaari from Finland,

whom Moscow quickly endorsed. The fi rst trilateral Chernomyrdin–
Ahtisaari–Talbott talks were held in Helsinki in mid-May (i.e. a few
days after Yeltsin had fi red Primakov as Prime Minister). As with the
Bonn G8 meeting, the main difficulty was settling NATO’s role in
the future peacekeeping force. The US would not accept anything but
primary command for the Alliance. Flying from Belgrade to Moscow
to meet again with Talbott and Ahtisaari, Chernomyrdin fi nally had
no choice but to concede to NATO’s demand to be “at the core” of
the peacekeeping force. That deal, extracted against the will of many
members of the Russian delegation, effectively put off the most prob-
lematic aspects of the negotiations. In the meantime, Milošević had
come to accept the G8 broad principles and on June 3 the Serbian
parliament voted in favor of the Chernomyrdin–Ahtisaari–Talbott
agreement.
For all that diplomacy, hysteresis did not wane or disappear. When
the G8 Foreign Ministers gathered in early June, Igor Ivanov com-
plained that the draft UN Security Council resolution gave center-
stage to NATO. His reaction was to submit some twenty objections
to a text that was only thirty-three paragraphs long. After two days
of intense negotiations, Moscow fi nally caved in to most of the
NATO demands, including a Chapter VII mandate authorizing the
use of force by peacekeepers. These negotiations paved the way for
Resolution 1244, which the UN Security Council voted for on June
10, with China abstaining but Moscow approving. At the opera-
tional level, however, a wide rift still separated NATO’s military
command from Russia’s. As one Talbott aide recalls: “The Russians
repeatedly objected to the notion that their forces would have to
serve under NATO command and pushed for their own peacekeep-
ing sector, ‘just as is proposed for the big NATO powers.’”9 The
Americans, for their part, favored the Bosnian model by which
Russian contingents operated under indirect Allied command – basi-
cally a technical arrangement that in reality kept the Russians under
a tight leash. This disagreement quickly took on a symbolic dimen-
sion, with the Alliance unwilling to budge and the Russians decid-
ing to have their own way this time. As Talbott recounts: “Ivashov
reacted to that attempt to save Russian face the same way he had
9
Norris (2005, 144).
in the Petersberg talks: It was insulting and unacceptable. Russia

would not ‘take orders’ from NATO; it would not settle for anything
less than its own sector and certainly would not ‘beg for scraps from
NATO’s table.’”10 For Atlantic officials, such demands were simply
out of place.
The following day would see the ultimate demonstration of hys-
teresis in Russian–Atlantic relations – as well as the most dangerous
episode in the post-Cold War era. In a stunning move, a Russian
contingent of 175 SFOR peacekeepers secretly rushed through Serbia
during the night of June 11 en route to Pristina airport in Kosovo.
At the same time, about 800 Russian paratroopers were scheduled
to land there. In so doing, the Russians were able to beat NATO
forces into Kosovo. At the time, confl icting accounts emerged from
Moscow, with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov assuring NATO that
the deployment was a mistake and would be reversed. But reports
from the theatre said otherwise. During the night, NATO SACEUR
General Wesley Clark asked and received permission from the
Pentagon to explore possible military responses to the Russian move.
When he ordered British General Michael Jackson, who was com-
manding the KFOR’s planned deployment, to prepare to seize the
airport, a serious row erupted between the two generals. With the
support of the British Defence Ministry, Jackson refused to execute
the order of the Alliance’s supreme commander. Meanwhile, the
Americans applied enough political pressure on Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria and Ukraine to ensure that they would not clear overfl ight
requests to Moscow (six IL-76 transport planes with 100 troops and
equipment each were scheduled to land in Kosovo by way of Eastern
Europe). As a result, within a few days the Russian contingent was
left without a supply line of food and water and had to be resupplied
by NATO forces.
It later became known that Operation Trojan Horse, as the Russians
codenamed the dash to Pristina, had been planned in the utmost
secrecy by the Russian military with Yeltsin’s approval. Ruffled by
NATO’s intransigence throughout the crisis, the Russian Great Power
habitus made any further capitulation unthinkable. Amidst flurries of
celebration throughout Russia, Duma member Lukin commented on
the Pristina stunt: “The action is also valuable from the standpoint
10
Talbott (2002 , 333).
that the West has fi nally started to realize that it can’t treat Russia like
some lackey. We’re partners, not lackeys.”11 Recall that the Pristina
move happened simultaneously with the extremely tense negotia-
tions on KFOR between Talbott and his team of American generals
and Sergeyev, Ivashov and Chief of General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin.
Under these circumstances, the operation was meant to create a fait
accompli on the ground and offer better leverage to Moscow in its
negotiation with the Alliance. The Russians were pleading for “equal
rights” in the operation like those enjoyed by NATO members, and
for a veto over military operations. In a pattern that continues to
this day, Russian diplomats stubbornly refused to concede any more
to a NATO that would not consider granting Moscow any decision-
making capability. As a result of a very weak position and a habitus
attuned to the external mode of pursuing security, the Russians used
the only resources they had left – the military.
However, with the G8 summit upcoming in Cologne and the need
to get the associated cultural-symbolic recognition, the Russians
needed to reach an agreement with the Alliance. Although NATO’s
domination of Moscow may have been declining, it had certainly not
disappeared by 1999. Russia’s desire for Western recognition was still
strong, particularly on the part of the country’s president. In a phone
call to Clinton, Yeltsin fi nally agreed that Russian troops would
serve under the Bosnia model in Kosovo (with minor modifications).
During a meeting between William Cohen (US Secretary of Defense),
Madeleine Albright, Igor Sergeyev and Igor Ivanov in Helsinki a few
days later, an agreement was reached to the effect that Russian troops
would be scattered across four sectors and would share control of
Pristina airport with NATO. Once again, despite weeks of unprec-
edented outcry, diplomatic brinkmanship and dangerous military
moves, Moscow eventually had to largely cave in to NATO and accept
a formula that gave it, in one insider’s words, “only a paper-thin guise
of military independence.”12 All was now in place for Yeltsin joining
the G8 summit in Cologne in a celebration intended to symbolically
demonstrate the importance of Russia in the world. Days after order-
ing a military stunt that could have degenerated into full-scale con-
frontation, Yeltsin hugged his “friends” from NATO more vigorously
than ever.
11 12
Quoted in Charodeyev (1999). Norris (2005, 290).
Tilting at windmills: the causes and

consequences of hysteresis
Although the Kosovo crisis was solved peacefully, it also led to
unprecedented brinkmanship and came close to provoking a military
standoff at Pristina airport. In 1999 the Russian–Atlantic post-Cold
War track record of non-violent settlement of disputes came close to
an end, largely as a result of hysteresis and the quixotic practices that
it sparked. In this section I explain how and why the Kosovo crisis
further accentuated the mismatch between positions and dispositions
in NATO–Russia diplomacy. By compounding hysteresis effects and
weakening domination patterns in the relationship, the Kosovo epi-
sode also made security community development very unlikely. In its
aftermath, Russia progressively turned into an insubordinate player
in the international game defi ned by NATO-imposed rules.
Hysteresis grew because NATO’s intervention in Kosovo catalyzed
the resurgence of the Russian Great Power habitus while bringing
no significant change to the field’s structure. In his in-depth study of
Russian identity in 1999, Hopf shows how the Kosovo crisis altered the
balance between competing identity narratives in Moscow. Basically,
the Westernizing discourse was discredited once and for all, giving
way to a “liberal essentialist” discourse that remains the predomi-
nant Russian identity today. According to Hopf, this identity does not
rest on any external others (such as the West or China, for instance)
because its basic premise is that Russia is “unique and hence not com-
parable, or opposable, to any other state.”13 The Great Power habitus
is at the forefront of this narrative. Viatcheslav Morozov similarly
argues that the key factor in the rise of “romantic realism” in Moscow
is “the interpretation of NATO’s Kosovo campaign as a cynical geo-
political enterprise, the real aims of which had nothing in common
with the proclaimed wish to protect the Albanian minority.”14 After
Kosovo, the Alliance’s campaign to show its peacefulness fell on deaf
ears in Moscow. With the consolidation of Great Power disposi-
tions, Russian officials became increasingly recalcitrant toward the
Alliance-imposed rules of the international security game.
Despite all talk to the contrary, NATO’s practices during the Kosovo
crisis, apprehended from Moscow, appeared closer to realpolitik than
13 14
Hopf (2002 , 218). Morozov (2002 , 411).
to the internal mode of pursuing security. As Gorbachev wrote: “the

war provided evidence that the United States, which plays a com-
manding role in NATO, is willing not only to disregard the norms
of international law but also to impose on the world its own agenda
in international relations and, in fact, to be guided in these relations
solely by its own ‘national interests.’”15 Consequently, Russian offi-
cials and experts concluded that NATO’s discourse of democracy
and human rights was in fact a convenient facade for cold-blooded,
self-interested realpolitik. In this spirit, the air campaign was con-
strued as a deliberate attempt to consolidate the Alliance’s position
at the very top of the hierarchy of the international security field.
But the Alliance’s authority over Russia, which had been so strong
in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, had almost vanished
by 1999 – even in the eyes of traditionally pro-Western experts. As
Tsygankov aptly concludes: “The irony of the Western intervention
in Yugoslavia is that by trying to solidify the influence of the West in
the world, it in fact undermined their influence.”16 Operation Allied
Force permanently marginalized liberal elites in Moscow and their
dispositions in favor of the internal mode of pursuing security. As
Baranovsky explains, it basically reversed the burden of proof: “if the
thesis of Russia’s opponents to NATO about its ‘aggressive character’
had looked either like pure propaganda or something inherited from
the cold war, the war against Yugoslavia became an impressive mani-
festation of its validity.”17 Starting in 1994, the double enlargement
had sparked fears and aroused doubts in Moscow, gradually tipping
the balance in favor of the Great Power habitus. The Kosovo interven-
tion made any return to the obedient dispositions of the early post-
Cold War years impossible. This time, virtually the entire Russian
foreign policy elite reverted to the Great Power narrative, a disposi-
tional evolution that lasts to this day.
On their side, however, NATO practitioners continued to expect
Moscow to behave more or less in tune with Atlantic policies.
Throughout the Kosovo crisis, Alliance officials construed the NATO
stance as self-evident or naturally legitimate, prompting expectations
that the Russians would “come to understand.” In the words of a State
Department official: “I feel that we overestimated Russia’s strategic
15 16
Gorbachev (1999). Tsygankov (2001, 142).
17
Baranovsky (2003, 279).
competence. It was like playing chess with somebody who doesn’t

know the rules.”18 From the Alliance point of view, it was quite obvi-
ous that Russia’s behavior during the conflict was out of place – so
much so, in fact, that it was not even worthy of full consideration.
As Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg put it, speak-
ing of Kosovo: “The whole security of Europe would be thrown into
question if Russia’s sense of its interest precluded the international
community addressing this serious question.”19 Since the Alliance
embodied the international community in the post-Cold War field
of international security – by occupying the hegemonic position of a
dominant player able to impose the rules of the game – it “naturally”
promoted the only vision that made sense. The Russians had to abide
by it just like any other state.
For the Russians, however, NATO’s actions in Kosovo exposed the
legal fiction of the Founding Act agreed on two years earlier. In 1997,
Alliance member states and Russia had pledged to “[refrain] from the
threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other
state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in
any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.” Parties
had also declared: “If disagreements arise, NATO and Russia will
endeavour to settle them on the basis of goodwill and mutual respect
within the framework of political consultations.” On both accounts,
there was the feeling in Moscow that NATO practices had been
duplicitous. In fact, the Kosovo crisis substantiated everything the
Russians had feared about the doubly enlarged Alliance. It certainly
showed up in a very stark light Moscow’s powerlessness compared to
the Alliance in the field of international security. As pundit Aleksei
Pushkov put it: “What we see is a kind of standard arrangement
for dealing with situations in which we disagree with the US and its
NATO allies. First they admonish us, then they pretend they’re going
to compromise, making some pathetically symbolic concessions to us,
and then they simply stop paying attention to us.”20 On the NATO
side, many officials had counted precisely on Russia’s weakness and
impotence to contain and manage a possible backlash over Kosovo.
For the Russians, however, this heavy-handed strategy was ignoring
and in fact subverting Russia’s claims to Great Power status.
18
Quoted in Norris (2005, 308).
19 20
Quoted in Goldgeier and McFaul (2003, 251). Pushkov (1999).
Because it was performed without a clear UN mandate, the NATO

intervention in Kosovo also sparked fears in Moscow that Russia or its
neighbors could be the next target. With violence gaining strength in
Chechnya, many Russians speculated that the campaign against Serbia
could soon be waged against their own country. The newly appointed
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin commented in 1999: “I was convinced
that if we didn’t stop the extremists right away, we’d be facing a sec-
ond Yugoslavia on the entire territory of the Russian Federation – the
Yugoslavization of Russia.”21 As a result, new security dilemmas con-
cerning an Atlantic intervention in or around Russia arose. Several
practices, premised on positional agency and the availability of mili-
tary capital, attest to the new fears sparked in Moscow. Most strik-
ing is the revived interest in nuclear deterrence. During a (Russian)
Security Council meeting on April 27, 1999, Yeltsin agreed to accel-
erate a number of nuclear programs, including the development of
tactical Iskander missiles up to an arsenal of 10,000, and the deploy-
ment of a new generation of strategic arms (SS-27). Emphasizing the
need for an asymmetrical response to NATO’s build-up, an October
1999 draft of Russia’s military doctrine explicitly raised the possible
use of nuclear weapons to deal with the potential threat of direct
military aggression against Russia. In the official security doctrines
that were adopted by Russia after the Kosovo crisis, three new threat
perceptions surfaced that had never been mentioned in previous docu-
ments: attempts to ignore or infringe Russian interests in resolving
international security problems; attempts to oppose the strengthen-
ing of Russia as one of the global centers of influence; and the intro-
duction of foreign troops, without UN Security Council sanction,
into the territory of contiguous states friendly with Russia. The new
documents also listed destabilizing factors that were all connected to
NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: the dominance in the international
community of developed Western states led by the US; the applying of
military force as a means of humanitarian intervention without UN
Security Council sanction; and unilateral actions. The Russian army
put this new approach into practice shortly thereafter, in late June
1999, with military exercises codenamed Zapad-99 (zapad means
West) – the largest ever organized since the breakup of the USSR.
The scenario envisioned an aerial attack “from the West” on the
21
Quoted in Evangelista (2002 , 2).
Kaliningrad exclave to which Russian and Belarusian forces reacted

with strikes on Poland, the Baltic states, Norway and Turkey. A land
invasion of the Baltic states was also simulated, as well as a series of
preventive nuclear strikes to deter the aggressor. Other smaller-scale
but similar exercises were organized during the summer in the Baltic,
Barents and North Pacific areas. These military rehearsals were a tan-
gible demonstration of new security dilemmas in Moscow.
In confi rming, and in fact worsening, Moscow’s fears that its inter-
ests could not be accommodated in the NATO-dominated field of
international security, the Kosovo crisis had one key effect that lasts
to this day: it helped turn Russia into an insubordinate player of the
post-Cold War rules of the game. In Chapter 5, I argued that Moscow
had been a strong supporter of the internal mode of pursuing security
in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. This support decreased
from 1994; by 1999 it had evaporated altogether. The Kosovo cri-
sis confronted the Russians with the emergence of a “NATO-centric
world” in which their country played only a minor role. In addition
to being marginalized, Russia was also concerned about the attack
on the sovereignty principle as embodied in the UN Charter. Viewed
from Moscow, the Kosovo intervention endangered the international
order built after the Second World War in which, contrary to the inter-
nal mode of pursuing security, the country had occupied a dominant
position. In a striking rebuttal of the Kozyrev doctrine, the Russian
elite began to argue in favor of non-intervention and sovereignty as
the core institutions of an international security system based on the
UN Security Council. In a speech given just after the Kosovo bomb-
ings had begun, Igor Ivanov expressed the notion that Russia had
to actively defend the world against the hypocrisy of the internal
mode of pursuing security: “while defending today Yugoslavia’s right
to sovereignty, we are also defending the future of the world and of
Europe against the most recent form of colonialism – the so-called
natocolonialism.”22 As a Great Power, Russia harked back to sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, and non-intervention as the key rules of
the international security game.
Against this view was the new NATO Strategic Concept adopted
at the Washington summit, which contained a number of revolution-
ary provisions in line with the internal mode of pursuing security,
22
Quoted in Morozov (2002 , 412).
including an emphasis on democracy, human rights and the rule

of law; the characterization of Euro-Atlantic security as based on
democratic institutions; a broad approach to security; and a call for
wide-ranging partnerships. Even more shockingly for the Russians,
the Concept opened the door to out-of-area missions. No geographi-
cal limits were placed on NATO’s competence, and further waves
of enlargement were called for. From the Kosovo crisis on, what the
Alliance saw as a legitimate ground for intervention Moscow offi-
cials construed “as a flagrant violation of international law, as a
heavy blow against the existing UN-based international system, as
an attempt to establish a ‘new world order’ by force, allowing arbi-
trary interference in the internal affairs of states (on ‘humanitarian’
or any other grounds).”23 In sum, for the Russians the Kosovo episode
plainly exposed the extent to which NATO had come to dominate
Russia and ignore its views in the post-Cold War era, especially by
preaching the universal virtues of the internal mode of pursuing secu-
rity in a self-interested manner. Until the end of 1999, the presence of
Yeltsin at the helm seemed to partly hold in check Great Power dis-
positions and the related rejection of the NATO-imposed order. The
turn of the century, however, brought with it a new political context
for Russian–Atlantic relations.
Welcome to the twenty-first century: September 11, 2001

and its aftermath
The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 caused a doxic change in
the field of international security that also affected NATO–Russia
relations. The events were socially and politically constructed in
such a way that the internal and external modes of pursuing security
were brought together: democratic peace remained key, but the use
of force was deemed a legitimate means to achieve that end. This
change in the rules of the game temporarily played to the advantage
of Russia, whose status was upgraded by the creation of the NRC
in 2002. The honeymoon was short-lived, however. From 2002 to
2006, the Alliance admitted seven new member states while simul-
taneously expanding its functional scope to the global scale. In a
23
Baranovsky (2000, 454–5).
replay of the 1990s, NATO’s double enlargement practices sparked

further hysteresis effects in the relationship. All in all, but for the
doxic shifts incurred by September 11, 2001, the political fabric of
Russian–Atlantic relations remained much the same after the turn of
the millennium.
NATO–Russia honeymoon, take two

The terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001 led to
a significant if temporary improvement in NATO–Russia relations,
largely because dominant players interpreted the events in a way that
transformed the rules of the international security game. As the agenda
shifted toward “hard” security, the relative value of force increased as
a means to reach “soft” ends. Most prominently, the American “war
on terrorism” led to the revaluation of the military instrument. As
a result, the field’s doxa partly moved away from the security-from-
the-inside-out paradigm. Of course, the democratization agenda
remained prominent – witness Iraq. But dominant players in the field
of international security imposed a new balance between the internal
and the external mode of pursuing security. As Ivo Daalder and James
Lindsay argue, the belief that the use of force could help bring about a
new world order was at the core of the Bush Doctrine. 24 In this hybrid
set of rules, the means of the external mode, especially military force,
were privileged to achieve the goals of the internal mode, particularly
regime change.
In this new set of rules of the international security game, NATO’s
role shifted accordingly. On September 12, 2001, the Alliance acti-
vated its collective defense clause (Article 5) for the very fi rst time in
its history. Since then, NATO has remained an alliance at war: for
instance, the only Article 5 mission that was launched after the ter-
rorist attacks, Operation Active Endeavour, was still ongoing eight
years later. The Alliance’s military operations in Afghanistan also
flow directly from the September 11, 2001 attacks and the ensuing
American invasion of the country. At the Prague summit in November
2002, NATO adopted a Military Concept for Defense against
Terrorism that has become a cornerstone of its planning and strategy
24
Daalder and Lindsay (2005, 12–14).
to defeat the terrorist enemy. While it is true that the Alliance plays
only a supportive role in the US-led “war on terrorism,” its focus
has nonetheless switched significantly in the wake of September 11,
2001. 25 Issues that were central during the 1990s, such as peacekeep-
ing in the Balkans, gave way to a new security agenda centered on
terrorism and forceful democratization. This reorientation did not go
entirely smoothly, however, as conflicting interpretations of the ter-
rorist attacks emerged on each side of the Atlantic. Many continental
European countries did not agree with the militarized response to the
terrorist threat put forward by Washington: instead of preemption,
deterrence and retribution, they preferred a softer approach based
on regulations, legal and judicial means, and cooperation between
the police and civil authorities. Despite this disagreement, however,
in relative terms European and American security cultures remained
closer to each other than to those of any other parts of the world.
Moreover, even when confronted by a profound rift on the defense
issue, NATO diplomats never stopped thinking from diplomacy in
solving their disputes.26 In the end, though, an Alliance inhabited by
struggles over its own internal rules of the game certainly reveals a
lower capacity to impose doxa in the field of international security.
On their side, the Russians came to embrace the post-September 11
rules of the game in the international security field imposed by the US,
and to a lesser extent, by NATO. As Baranovsky noted: “Gradually,
the fight against terrorism will become the priority task for states …
One can expect that the political and psychological barriers against
using force will be lowered. Force will probably appear ‘less unac-
ceptable’ than before.”27 This vision, widespread among Russian
elites, happened to fit quite nicely with the American reaction to
September 11, 2001. This homology between the new field’s doxa and
the ingrained Russian habitus constituted an unprecedented develop-
ment. From the mid-1990s on, fast-amplifying hysteresis effects had
erupted from the growing misalignment between the security-from-
the-inside-out doxa and the Russian Great Power dispositions. In the
year following Yeltsin’s retirement, the new president Putin contin-
ued to characterize Russia as a Great Power28 and publicly voiced
his irritation with NATO – an “organization [that] often ignores the
25 26
De Nevers (2007). Pouliot (2006).
27 28
Baranovsky (2002 , 14–15). Tsygankov (2005).
opinion of the international community and the provisions of inter-

national legal documents in its decision-making process.”29 The fol-
lowing question thus arises: if the new Moscow administration was
so disposed toward Great Power status, why did it embrace the post-
September 11 rules of the international security game imposed by the
US and the Alliance?
Essentially, the new rules of the game after September 11, 2001
converged toward several dispositions that were already part and par-
cel of the Russian habitus as it had reemerged during the 1990s. In
other words, thanks to this exogenous shock, dominant players met
Moscow on its own ground. As Neumann correctly notes:
One of the reasons why Russia’s visibility was so low during the 1990s
was that the security agenda was to a high degree dominated by develop-
ments in sectors where Russia was peripheral. The “soft security” debate
presupposed a way of framing questions to do with power, and particularly
with appositeness of “soft power,” that did not easily fit in with traditional
Russian ways of framing these questions … The Afghan campaign, on the
other hand, meant that conventional warfare was back at the centre of the
security agenda … Russia has simply harvested what has come its way.30
Three main Russian dispositions appeared better attuned to the post-

September 11 doxa. First, because the new order of things rested on
a conservative understanding of national security, the Russians were
better adapted than they used to be during the 1990s. Second and
relatedly, the post-September 11 doxa revalued the form of capital
that Moscow has traditionally preferred and possessed: military
resources. Its positional agency – that is, its drive to act in certain
ways due to the opportunity structure – was better attuned to the
field’s rules of the game. Third, the securitization of terrorism upon
which the post-September 11 doxa came to rest replicated the extant
political discourse inside Russia. In the preceding years, the Russians
had repeatedly used Chechnya to raise the issue of international terror-
ism as a key new threat to international security. Yet NATO member
states’ reactions were skeptical. After September 11, 2001, Russian
officials were able to portray themselves as being ahead of the twenty-
fi rst-century international security game. In this connection, NATO
29 30
Quoted in President of Russia (2001). Neumann (2005b, 18–19).
officials quickly changed their discourse on the Russian operation in

the Caucasus, toning down their criticisms. In the new century, then,
the real shift in the security discourse came not from Russia but from
the US, and by extension NATO. 31
As a result, in the post-September 11 rules of the game, by which
hard security was to take precedence over the soft agenda of security-
from-the-inside-out, Washington and Brussels became more inclined
to recognize Russia’s improved position. Recall that because NATO
is the dominant player in the post-Cold War field of international
security, the Alliance habitus is “naturally” in tune with the order
of things (see Chapter 2). Compared to 1999, the dominant habitus
in Moscow was better adapted to the post-September 11 rules of
the international security game. In 2002, a new homology between
Russia’s position in the field and its elites’ dispositions seemed to be
emerging. It is particularly striking, for instance, that in the weeks
following September 11, 2001, the influential Council on Foreign and
Defense Policy – a loose network comprised of Moscow’s most influ-
ential security elites – published a report in favor of Russia playing a
junior role in relation to the Alliance. Urging their country to accept
a NATO-based security system, the report argued that “multipolar-
ity games, especially rhetorical ones, which are understood by most
of the world as resistance to the US and indeed to the West, are
too expensive and unpragmatic.”32 Note that this collective report
was signed by dozens of Kremlin-connected officials and specialists
including Primakov, Lukin, and Duma members Alexei Arbatov and
Dmitri Rogozin. Everything took place as if the Russian habitus could
better withstand a domination based on hard security rules than on
the internal mode of pursuing security.
The evolution toward the aligning of positions and dispositions in
Russian–Atlantic relations initiated a honeymoon almost as intense
as that of 1992. In its fi rst ever extraordinary session on September
13, 2001, the PJC “expressed its anger and indignation at the bar-
baric acts committed against the people of the United States of
America … NATO and Russia will intensify their cooperation under
the Founding Act to defeat this scourge.”33 Within a few weeks,
Moscow took several steps to implement this new agreement. First,
31 32
See Pouliot (2003). Quoted in Ambrosio (2005, 140).
33
NATO (2001a).
Russia voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which

effectively endorsed American-led military action against the Taliban.
Second, on national television Putin made a multipronged offer of
assistance, including intelligence-sharing, the opening of Russian
airspace for American planes supplying humanitarian assistance,
help in search-and-rescue operations in Afghanistan, and enhanced
military assistance to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Third,
Russia tacitly endorsed American requests to several Central Asian
states for military basing rights. A few days after George W. Bush’s
September 20 speech announcing the invasion of Afghanistan, the US
had secured flying and basing rights in all the Central Asian states.
Despite much domestic criticism, the Kremlin’s goodwill was later
enlarged to Georgia, where American forces landed in 2002 without
much protest.
NATO–Russia relations acquired a new meaning in the restruc-
tured rules of the international security game. In the weeks following
the attacks, under the leadership of British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
the Alliance set about strengthening its institutional ties with Russia.
Although the PJC had resumed its work in 2000, it was still widely
considered to have failed to live up to expectations, especially in the
wake of the Kosovo crisis. In October and November 2001, Putin and
NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson met twice. In Moscow,
Robertson announced discussions of a new council between NATO
and Russia that “would involve Russia having an equality with the
NATO countries in terms of the subject matter and would be part
of the same compromising trade-offs, give and take, that is involved
in day-to-day NATO business. That is how we do business at 19.”34
In December, the NAC formally endorsed the proposal to give new
impetus and substance to the NATO–Russia partnership. The pro-
posal was also discussed at the PJC when the Foreign Affairs and
Defense Ministers met later that same month.
At that time, however, a few member states started to air concerns
about embracing Russia too quickly, and successfully voiced opposi-
tion to the formula “NATO at twenty.” In its early version, sponsored
especially by the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada, the NRC would
have given Russia a “right of equality.” This proposal was considerably
watered down in the early months of 2002, primarily under pressure
34
NATO (2001c).
from Washington, with the support of Turkey, the Netherlands and the
three new member states. Czech president Vaclav Havel, for instance,
criticized the initiative as a “bureaucratic exercise” and warned
that it could make the Alliance “just as spineless as the UN or the
[OSCE].”35 In a replay of the 1996–7 negotiations over the Founding
Act, the main bone of contention was NATO’s enlargement to the
Baltic states.36 In the end, at the May 2002 Rome summit, Russia and
NATO adopted a declaration stating their “determination to build
together a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area on the
principles of democracy and cooperative security and the principle
that the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indi-
visible … [The NRC] will operate on the principle of consensus.”37
The British Foreign Minister went as far as to declare: “This is the last
rites, the funeral of the cold war … Fifteen years ago, Russia was the
enemy, now Russia becomes our friend and ally.”38 Despite this opti-
mistic language, however, the issue of enlargement had been brushed
under the carpet while Russia’s institutional association with NATO
had been considerably diluted.
In terms of the NRC structure, the most important change from the
original proposal was the addition of a retrieval or safeguard mecha-
nism allowing participants to withdraw any issue from discussion. In
practice, such a mechanism meant that Russia’s inclusion in the settle-
ment of a given security issue remained conditional on the goodwill of
all NRC member states. Vilnius could then withdraw from the NRC
agenda any discussion of NATO forces in Lithuania, for instance.
This obviously poses serious limits on Russia being associated with
NATO on contentious issues. Strikingly, Russian officials appeared
quite happy with the results of the Rome summit nonetheless. For
instance, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov insisted the new Council was
“not a consultative body, it’s an executive body [in which] NATO and
Russia must stand side by side.”39 But Danish Foreign Minister Per
Stig Moeller held a different view: “the text of the agreement with
Moscow includes a provision stating that all of the 19 NATO member
35
Quoted in Yusin (2001).
36
At the time, rumors that the Alliance would invite seven new members for
admission (including the Baltic states) at its upcoming summit in Prague had
already started to circulate.
37 38
NATO (2002). Jack Straw quoted in Traynor (2002).
39
Quoted in Traynor (2002).
countries have veto power. If a single country disagrees on some issue,

the matter will be taken off the agenda for subsequent discussion.”40
Even after the structural shifts of September 11, 2001 and the win-
dow of opportunity that they opened, ambiguity remained in NATO–
Russia institutional ties.
Moscow’s enthusiasm over the watered-down NRC illustrates the
fact that during the short-lived honeymoon that immediately followed
September 11, 2001, Russia was ready to play a lesser role and let the
Alliance take bolder steps to maintain its domination. Moscow took
several initiatives to demonstrate its readiness to tone down Russia’s
Great Power quest. For instance, Putin did not blink when the US
unilaterally withdrew from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in
December 2001; he shut down Russian military bases in Cuba and
Vietnam; and he came to accept the American reluctance to consent
to verification measures in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT) signed in Moscow in spring 2002. Interestingly, Clifford
Kupchan dubbed that meeting “the fi rst asymmetrical summit … the
fi rst time the Russians accepted they’re not equal.”41 That was obvi-
ously a sea change from the obstructive approach that the Russians
had come to adopt in the late 1990s. But when a few months later the
Alliance returned to its double enlargement practices, as if September
11, 2001 had never happened, the same hysteresis effects that had
plagued the relationship during the 1990s put an abrupt end to this
period of renewed cooperation.
NATO goes global

The Russian–Atlantic honeymoon dissipated around 2003, in large
part because NATO moved on with its double enlargement process
pretty much as if nothing had changed after September 11, 2001.
From the Russian perspective, Alliance officials went along with the
heavy-handed approach of the 1990s in which no genuine considera-
tion was given to Moscow’s opinion. This forceful diplomacy shat-
tered the fragile diplomatic momentum that had started to build in
the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. At the geographical
level, seven new member states entered the Alliance in 2004 after a
process that appeared just as exclusionary to Moscow, if not more
40 41
Quoted in Smirnov (2002). Quoted in Ambrosio (2005, 136).
so, than during the 1990s. In functional terms, NATO undertook

an expansion toward a global role that generated growing suspicions
among Russian officials in line with those sparked by the two Balkans
interventions a few years earlier. These practices made little sense to
the Russians, who had reacted to the doxic changes of September 11,
2001 with expectations of a closer integration with NATO. In a strik-
ing replay of the 1990s, Russian Great Power dispositions resurfaced
again, provoking further hysteresis effects and stalling security com-
munity development once again.
A few months after taking office, President Bush fi rmly committed
to a further wave of NATO enlargement, declaring in Warsaw:
Our goal is to erase the false lines that have divided Europe for too long …
The question of “when” may be still up for debate within NATO. The ques-
tion of “whether” should not be. As we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation
should be used as a pawn in the agendas of others. We will not trade away
the fate of free European peoples. No more Munichs, no more Yaltas.42
The American determination to take in new members was not shaken

by September 11, 2001, but rather bolstered. At the Prague summit in
November 2002, the Russian–Atlantic honeymoon was not yet over
when NATO announced its decision to accept seven new member
states by 2004. Consistent with its reaction to the American with-
drawal from the ABM treaty, at the time Moscow remained calm and
circumspect. September 11, 2001 significantly contributed to this new
Russian attitude: while in June 2001 Russia was still making clear its
rigid opposition to enlargement, in October of the same year Putin
confessed he could revise his opinion on the matter should NATO
transform itself into a political organization. Prior to the Prague
summit, Foreign Minister Ivanov similarly explained that although
he considered expansion “a mistake,” “Russia is not planning to get
overly dramatic about the situation.”43 Though the policy was still
opposed, everything took place as though the harsh resistance that
had characterized the previous years had softened.
Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001,
NATO’s functional enlargement was prudently tolerated in Moscow.
42
Quoted in the New York Times (2001).
43
Quoted in Kramer (2002 , 748).
Recall that at the Washington summit in 1999, NATO had adopted a

new Concept providing for out-of-area missions. That trend acceler-
ated in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks. At the Prague summit
in 2002, NATO created the Response Force, a body of approximately
20,000 troops available at short notice for deployment around the
world and across the full spectrum of military operations. Then, at
the 2004 Istanbul summit, the Alliance explicitly granted itself the
right, and even the duty, to intervene anywhere on a global scale,
stating its “determin[ation] to address effectively the threats our terri-
tory, forces and populations face from wherever they may come.”44 It
was also in Istanbul that the Alliance took the decision to expand its
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to the whole
of Afghanistan, after it had taken control of the operation in August
2003. It created a dozen Provincial Reconstruction Teams and gradu-
ally expanded the mission beyond the confi nes of Kabul starting in
2004. Clearly the most militarily challenging mission ever under-
taken by the Alliance, the NATO-led ISAF counted 31,000 troops in
October 2006, coming in unequal proportions from the twenty-six
member states as well as from ten partner countries. The significance
of the Afghan mission for NATO’s functional enlargement was not
only that the country is located far away from the collective defense
theatre (i.e. the North Atlantic area). It was also that the operation
had a clear preventive dimension that was not historically character-
istic of the Alliance’s mandate. The largest deployment ever made by
the Alliance was in line with its new, expanded function to combat
threats wherever they surface in the world.
In this context, a new narrative emerged among Euro-Atlantic
officials and experts to the effect that NATO was now “going
global.”45 In the fi rst few years of the new millennium, the Alliance
lent logistical support to the African Union’s mission in Darfur;
assisted tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia; ferried supplies to vic-
tims of hurricane Katrina in the US; and airlifted food after a mas-
sive earthquake in Kashmir. For many experts, the next logical
step would be to enlarge membership to any democratic state in
the world. Not all countries and officials shared this conclusion,
however. At the time of writing, the issue of the globalization of the
44 45
NATO (2004b, emphasis added). Daalder and Goldgeier (2006).
Alliance remained one of the most hotly debated among its mem-
bers. Nonetheless, since the Istanbul summit there exists a consen-
sus that as transatlantic as the organization may be in membership,
the issues it has to address now play themselves out on a global
scale. In reality, NATO has already gone global, as the ISAF illus-
trates. This evolution was certainly not to Moscow’s liking, where
“a significant segment of the Russian policy-making elite appears
to have concluded that there has been a direct correlation (and for
many, a causal relationship) between NATO enlargement and the
retreat of Russian influence.”46
In addition to continuing its double enlargement, NATO under-
took a number of policies that further alienated Russia. When selling
its new round of enlargement to the Russians, the Alliance essen-
tially used a similar line as during the 1990s: “Enlargement is not –
as outdated perceptions have it – a zero-sum game where NATO
wins and Russia loses … We are aiming at including, not excluding
Russia.”47 But this language was rejected as duplicitous by Moscow
when, in early 2004, NATO began patrolling the Baltic states’
airspace and policing the border with Russia. Even before these
states formally entered the Alliance in late March 2004, Brussels
had dispatched six F-16 fighters from Denmark, Belgium and the
Netherlands. Moscow responded in kind by sending airplanes on
similar reconnaissance missions along its borders with the Baltic
states. This operation confi rmed doubts about the alleged win-win,
inclusive nature of NATO’s expansion in Russia. Recall that in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001 the Alliance subtly turned down
offers from the Russian side for a deeper rapprochement. In March
2000, Putin had already surprised the world by responding “Why
not?” to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) journalist who
was inquiring into the possibility of Russia one day entering NATO.
At the time, the NATO Secretary-General had replied that Russian
membership was not on the agenda. In late September 2001, Putin
was reported as calling on NATO to admit his country, an offer
that was received very coldly. In November, Putin reiterated to
Washington his desire to go “as far as the North Atlantic Alliance
itself is ready to go and as far as it will be able, of course, to take
46 47
Braun (2008, 1). NATO (2001b).
into account the legitimate interests of Russia.”48 The offer again fell
on deaf ears on the Atlantic side.49
Several other practices on the part of certain NATO member
states contributed to resurging hysteresis in the following months.
Obviously, the American invasion of Iraq was a case in point. The
main problem for the Russians was the infringement of the principle
of state sovereignty, which the Russians had come to interpret as the
best safeguard against interference in the wake of the Kosovo crisis.
In addition, in early 2002 the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review was
leaked in the American media, counting Russia as one of seven states
on which nuclear weapons could or should be targeted. During spring
2002, the Bush administration announced that the Transcaucasus
and Central Asia had become areas of interest for the Alliance, while
showing little inclination to remove its newly acquired facilities in
Central Asia and Georgia. Finally, starting in early 2003, persistent
rumors that the Pentagon was working on plans to deploy American
forces in Bulgaria and Romania – in contravention of NATO’s 1997
unilateral pledges – further alarmed the Russians.
The more cooperative tide post-September 11 definitely turned in
the aftermath of the “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet space: the
Rose Revolution in Georgia, in November 2003; the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, in December 2004; and the Yellow or Purple
or Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, in October 2005. From the outset,
Moscow suspected some shady involvement on the part of Western
countries, particularly in fi nancing opposition parties and in organ-
izing demonstrations. Many high-level politicians denounced the
meddling of the US and other Allied countries on behalf of democra-
tization in the CIS area. Where the West applauded democratic revo-
lutions, Moscow condemned the “continuation of the West’s strategic
line of staging a political takeover of the post-Soviet space.”50 To be
48
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2001).
49
Another telling example is NATO’s repeated refusal to establish ties with
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Under Russia’s
initiative, this was proposed several times at NRC meetings and in high-level
communications from 2004 through December 2006. Cooperation in drug
trafficking and the establishment of a “security belt” around Afghanistan
were proposed, among other things. The Alliance did not answer for a year,
before declining the offer.
50
Pushkov (2004).
sure, the new president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, had clearly

stated his intention to move the country closer to, and eventually
inside NATO prior to obtaining the West’s support. In March 2004,
NATO and Ukraine signed a memorandum by which Allied armed
forces were granted the right of rapid access to the country’s territory
should the Alliance deem it necessary. A similar situation happened
in Georgia with President Mikhail Saakashvili, who quickly opened
the country’s doors to American and NATO militaries after his rise to
power. In May 2006, the GUAM, a loose group of post-Soviet states
sponsored by the US, was enlarged and renamed the Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development.
Faced with NATO’s activism in its “near abroad,” Russia reverted
to a number of Great Power tactics, especially that of soft balancing.
In October 2002, the CSTO was created, with a Russian general as
its head, to institutionalize the alliance contracted back in 1992. In
September 2003, Russia signed a deal with Kyrgyzstan to establish
a new airbase in Kant, in the vicinity of an American contingent. A
CSTO Rapid Deployment Force for Central Asia, funded by Moscow,
was deployed there. Moscow also supported Uzbekistan in its decision
to evict American forces from the Khanabad base during the summer
of 2005. At the Minsk summit in June 2006, CSTO member states
pledged to expand the collective forces’ zone of operation beyond the
member states’ territories. In order to balance NATO’s influence in the
CIS, Russia also employed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), which comprises China, Russia and the four Central Asian
states. In August 2005, the SCO organized its fi rst joint maneuvers
intended to rout hypothetical terrorists, extremists and separatists
entrenched in the Shandong peninsula. Since then, further exercises
have been organized.
In sum, the NATO–Russia politics over the double enlargement
that followed September 11, 2001 are in many respects reminiscent
of the events that unfolded in the second half of the 1990s. In admit-
ting seven more Eastern European countries and in expanding its
collective-security mission from the European to the global stage,
the Alliance pursued the same path it had set itself at the critical
juncture of 1994. Unsurprisingly, this new wave of double enlarge-
ment pushed Russia further away from the internal mode of pursuing
security. Once again, NATO’s practices appeared to contradict the
security-from-the-inside-out agenda that the Alliance had continued
to advocate after September 11, 2001. From the Russian point of view,
integrating seven more post-communist states in the Alliance meant
not the consolidation of the democratic community, but the drawing
of new divisions to Russia’s exclusion. Similarly, the globalization of
NATO’s security mandate did not appear to yield more security for
Moscow: given the Kosovo precedent, it rather seemed to undermine
Russia’s capacity to control its own fate and exert influence in world
politics. In enlarging its security mandate as well as its membership,
then, the Alliance played a game with Russia that smacked of real-
politik instead of democracy promotion. As soon as the diplomatic
momentum that immediately followed September 11, 2001 dissipated,
deeply ingrained Great Power dispositions resurfaced among Russian
elites. In a replay of the late twentieth century, the role of junior part-
ner gave way to power balancing.
This time, however, Russia’s insubordination went one step further
with the public rejection of the democratization and human rights
agenda advocated by Allied member states. Nothing better illustrates
this change than mounting Russian criticisms of the OSCE over the
last few years. In July 2004, CIS countries, under Russia’s strong lead-
ership, distributed a statement to the OSCE’s Permanent Council in
Vienna to the effect that the organization was “often failing to observe
such fundamental Helsinki principles as noninterference in internal
affairs and respect for the sovereignty of states.”51 For the first time
in the post-Cold War era, a group of states led by Moscow mounted
an objection opposing the very principles of the OSCE. By that time,
Russia had become “a poster child of resistance to the democratic and
human rights agenda.”52 Clearly, the pattern of domination that had
given NATO so much authority over Moscow had changed; recent
diplomatic interaction, including over Georgia, prove just that.
NATO–Russia diplomacy today: déjà vu all over again?

After 2006, NATO-Russia diplomacy continued on the same path
of persistent symbolic power struggles. In this fi nal section, I briefly
survey key events that took place until the Georgia War of 2008.
Since my historical narrative primarily intends to explain the origins
of NRC practical sense as I recorded it in 2006, I do not go into
51 52
Quoted in Lukyanov (2004). MacFarlane (2008, 41).
as much detail. Nonetheless, for the sake of policy relevance, it is

important to understand how recent interactions and disputes fit the
overall pattern of hysteresis and symbolic power struggles of the past
fifteen years.
This pattern persisted in large part because NATO’s double enlarge-
ment policy remained a central part of the Russian–Atlantic relation-
ship. After the November 2006 Riga summit, the new name of the
game for the Alliance became functional security – meaning that
geography was no longer a constraint on its action. Russian officials
feared that in becoming a global policeman, NATO could eventually
meddle in confl icts that were of direct concern for, or in the close
vicinity of, their country. Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed his con-
cerns in the following way:
The parameters of our interaction largely depend on how the alliance’s

transformation will proceed. There are a number of aspects in this regard
that evoke our concern. For example, it was agreed at the NATO Riga
Summit in what cases military force could be used. The number of such
hypothetical scenarios is increasing. But there is no clarity as to how this is
going to correlate with the rules of international law, in particular, whether
NATO will ask for permission from the United Nations, as it should be
done under the Charter of the Organization. We cannot, of course, watch
impartially the military structure of the alliance moving ever closer to our
borders. 53
Furthermore, the fact that Russia’s material strength has developed

considerably over the last couple of years has solidified the Great
Power habitus in Moscow. Recent rearmament policies as well as
warmer relations with certain post-Soviet neighbors clearly suggest
that material-institutional capital remains the resource of choice for
Russia.
As for geographical enlargement, the Bucharest summit of April
2008 saw two new countries (Albania and Croatia) enter into acces-
sion talks, while “NATO welcome[d] Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that
these countries will become members of NATO.”54 Against the will of
53
Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2007b).
54
NATO (2008a, para. 23).
President Bush and several East European states, a group of members

including France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the Benelux coun-
tries opposed granting a Membership Action Plan to these two coun-
tries, largely in response to Russia’s staunch opposition. As French
Prime Minister François Fillion declared: “We are opposed to the
entry of Georgia and Ukraine because we think that it is not a good
answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe
and Russia.”55 Such circumspection was quite new in NATO–Russia
relations.
It is essential to frame the Georgia War of summer 2008 within
the issue of NATO’s expansion. In 2006 a serious diplomatic row
had already erupted after Tbilisi expelled several Russian officials on
spying accusations. A few days earlier, the Alliance had offered an
Intensified Dialogue preparing Georgia for membership. In the words
of Russia’s Foreign Minister: “The latest escapade involving the sei-
zure of our officers occurred immediately after NATO’s decision to
adopt a plan for intensified cooperation with Georgia and after the
visit that Mikhail Nikolayevich paid to the US … Here’s how it all
unfolded in chronological order: the trip to Washington, the NATO
decision, the taking of hostages.”56 As NATO’s open-door policy
reached the post-Soviet space up to its very borders, Moscow grew
increasingly nervous.
This nervousness turned into outright aggressiveness during the
summer of 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia and recognized South
Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries. On August 7, Tbilisi
launched an aerial bombardment and a ground attack on South
Ossetia, killing civilians as well as a dozen Russian peacekeepers. In
retaliation, in the following days Russian troops captured Tskhinvali,
landed forces in Abkhazia, conducted airstrikes on military and
industrial compounds near Tbilisi and bombed the Georgian seaport
of Poti. Loud protests from the West fell on deaf ears in Moscow.
When the Russians called an NRC meeting to discuss the conflict, the
US blocked the initiative and instead convened a NAC meeting, which
condemned Russia’s use of “disproportionate” force.57 Thereafter, the
Alliance announced the suspension of NRC activities and barred a
Russian ship from joining Operation Active Endeavour. In an attempt
55
Quoted in Myers (2008).
56 57
Lavrov quoted in Solovyov and Sidorov (2006). NATO (2008b).
to save face, Russia also halted cooperation with NATO indefi nitely.
Despite a ceasefi re brokered by French president Nicolas Sarkozy on
August 12, the Russian military remained deep into Georgian terri-
tory for several weeks in order to create “buffer zones.” At the end
of the month, the new president Dmitri Medvedev formally recog-
nized the new political entities, putting them under the “protection”
of about 7,600 Russian soldiers.
The Georgia War gave way to very strong rhetoric on both the
Russian and NATO sides. The new Russian president tried to
downplay the importance of Western criticisms and retaliatory ges-
tures: “We do not need illusions of partnership. When we are being
surrounded by bases on all sides, and a growing number of states
are being drawn into the North Atlantic bloc and we are being told,
‘Don’t worry, everything is all right,’ naturally we do not like it. If they
essentially wreck this [NRC] cooperation, it is nothing horrible for
us. We are prepared to accept any decision, including the termination
of relations.”58 The American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice,
responded by putting Moscow on a “one-way path to self-imposed
isolation and international irrelevance.”59 Tensions mounted particu-
larly high when Georgia officially called on NATO to offer military
assistance during the confl ict. In the end, American planes and ships
supplied aid to Georgia, combined with substantial fi nancial assist-
ance from the US, the EU and the IMF. One senior American offi-
cial was quoted as saying: “Well, maybe we’re learning to shut up
now.”60
Finally, another Russian–Atlantic row that illustrates particularly
well how NATO’s double enlargement has contributed to jeopardize
even the strongest acquis of the end of the Cold War regards the CFE
treaty, which was signed in late 1990 by NATO and Warsaw Pact
countries and sets limits on armaments systems on the European con-
tinent with solid verification and information exchange mechanisms.
At Russia’s request, an adapted version was agreed upon in 1999 in
order to allow more flexibility in Moscow’s deployments, notably
in the Caucasus. In the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Final Act, Russia also
agreed to withdraw its military from bases in Georgia and Moldova.
In the ensuing weeks, NATO countries conditioned the ratification of
58
Dmitri Medvedev quoted in Levy (2008).
59 60
Quoted in BBC (2008). Quoted in Cooper (2008).
the Adapted CFE treaty on Moscow’s fulfillment of what has come to

be known as the “Istanbul commitments.” For its part, the Russian
Duma ratified the treaty in June 2004, while urging those new NATO
member states not covered by the original CFE to sign it. In April
2004, at their very fi rst NRC meeting, Slovenia and the Baltic states
stated their intention to join the arms control regime. That was never
done, however, and Moscow did not fully withdraw its forces from
Georgia and Moldova either. In his presidential address in April 2007,
President Putin proposed to suspend Russia’s commitments under the
CFE, a decision that came into effect in December that year.
From NATO’s perspective, the failure of certain Allied member
states to ratify the Adapted CFE treaty is a response to Moscow’s
refusal to fulfill its so-called Istanbul commitments. These commit-
ments had been made in 1999 as President Yeltsin, on the verge of
leaving office and eager to redeem his reputation in the West after
Kosovo and a second invasion of Chechnya, had agreed to condi-
tions that Russia was apparently not ready to fulfi ll. Under the Putin
administration, Moscow openly contested NATO’s conditioning of
the Adapted CFE ratification to the 1999 pledge. As Lavrov put it
in 2004: “There is no legal connection between these issues. From a
legal standpoint, these demands are improper, since the agreements
on resolving the situation with respect to the bases in Georgia and
withdrawing military equipment from the Dnestr region were politi-
cal, rather than legal, in nature; they are being fulfi lled and are not
bound by any strict deadlines.”61 Whatever reasons Russian officials
may have given for their failure to withdraw on time, one must frame
this policy within NATO’s double enlargement. Georgia had become
the main focus of NATO’s and American political seduction in the
preceding years and its possible membership was (and still is) a source
of deep concern and irritation in Moscow.
In this context, for the Russians there is simply no incentive to con-
tinue to fulfill CFE provisions while several NATO member states
either do not fall under its jurisdiction or do so in an outdated way.
Recall that among the ten most recent allies in 2008, six were part
of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia). The remaining four (the three Baltic
states and Slovenia) were not independent states in 1990 and were
61
Quoted in Sysoyev (2004).
thus not covered by the CFE arms limitations. General Baluyevsky

expressed Moscow’s exasperation quite clearly: “the expansion of
NATO, the changed military and political status of six CFE signatory
countries and the resulting changes in the structure and composition
of the groupings – all these things supposedly have nothing to do
with the CFE Treaty, while Russia’s bilateral relations with Moldova
and Georgia have a direct bearing on the treaty and are preventing
its ratification!”62 With a new phase of enlargement looming, Russia
sees no interest in maintaining the CFE regime. The link between the
moratorium and NATO’s double enlargement was explicitly made by
Putin in early 2007: “It turns out that NATO has put its frontline
forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the [CFE]
treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all … And now
they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us – these
walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut
through our continent.”63
Russia’s suspension of its CFE commitments, which seemed to take
NATO by surprise although the idea had been publicly floated many
times since 2004, illustrates very clearly the loss of symbolic authority
in NATO–Russia diplomacy. In another fascinating hysteresis effect,
Alliance officials greatly overestimated their capacity to force Russia
into complying with the Istanbul agreement by withholding ratifica-
tion of the amended CFE treaty. Even after Russia’s suspension, NATO
countries refused to compromise during ensuing negotiations, and the
Alliance’s calls for more talks did not succeed in getting the Russians
to budge either. For its part, in June 2008 Moscow proposed a new
treaty on European security premised on “the essential principles of
interstate relations” inherited from the Helsinki Accords, including
“the inviolability of borders, the indivisibility of security and the ille-
gitimacy of ensuring [one’s] security at the expense of the security of
other participants in international relations.” As Medvedev optimisti-
cally added: “The fi rst reaction that we received was at least neutral,
and this is in some ways encouraging.”64 The quixotic aspect of this
proposal, confi rmed by NATO’s very reserved reaction, illustrates
quite well the larger hysteresis pattern that plagues NATO–Russia
diplomacy today.
62 63
Quoted in Izvestia (2004). President of Russia (2007).
64
Quoted in President of Russia (2008).
Conclusion: drawing a lesson

The story I have told in this and the preceding chapters is the story of a
missed opportunity. With the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s,
many new paths opened for Moscow and its former Atlantic enemy
to build peace in and through practice. In 1992–3, everything was
taking place as though a new security community was in the making.
All the necessary conditions were in place, including NATO’s strong
domination of the field of international security, to make diplomacy
the self-evident practice of Russian–Atlantic relations.65 That window
of opportunity started to shrink in 1994, when the Alliance decided
to accept new members and to implement its functional expansion in
Bosnia despite Moscow’s objections. Since then, the exclusionary con-
sequences of the double enlargement have led to the reemergence of
Great Power dispositions among Russian officials. This Great Power
habitus later hardened over the Kosovo crisis, the globalization of
NATO and a new wave of enlargement. Today, as the CFE controversy
and the Georgia War demonstrate, the Russian–Atlantic relationship
has embarked upon a path of mild rivalry that, as non-violent as it
may remain, appears to be conducive to security dilemmas more than
to a security community. The relationship is mired in symbolic power
struggles between two masters in search of an apprentice. One gen-
eration later, not only have the promises of the end of the Cold War
failed to materialize – they now seem on the way to oblivion.
Of course, one should not overlook the considerable changes in
Russian–Atlantic relations after the end of the Cold War. Except for a
few exceptions, scenarios of mutual military confrontation have mostly
faded from the intersubjective background. I showed in Chapter 4
that in 2006 the practice of diplomacy was normalized at the NRC,
although it stopped short of self-evidence. In and through practice,
Russia and NATO cannot be said to form a security community, yet
they have certainly moved away from the insecurity community of the
Cold War. Critics may retort that two former enemies who pointed
nuclear missiles at one another for decades should not be expected to
overcome their mutual animosity in just one generation. One should
indeed not hope for miracles in such a short time span. But even with
this caveat in mind, the pace of Russian–Atlantic pacification pales in
65
See Pouliot (2007).
comparison to other historical cases, such as Franco-German recon-

ciliation. Of course, Russia was neither defeated nor occupied the way
Germany was. The political contexts were surely different. However
imperfect, this analogy nonetheless suggests that an opportunity was
missed in the 1990s to construct a durable peace, in and through
practice, between the Alliance and Russia. That this possibility now
appears more and more remote only stresses the pressing need for IR
scholars to understand what went wrong so as to avoid replicating the
same mistakes in the future.
But for NATO’s double enlargement, would the development of
a Russian–Atlantic security community have stalled? Asking coun-
terfactual questions is always a bit tricky because social life is non-
linear, path-dependent and multiply realizable. A macro-pattern such
as NATO–Russia relations may be realized, alternatively, through
several different factors and various processes but with the same
effect. Similarly, a slight and apparently unrelated change in the early
conditions – for instance, higher oil prices in the early 1990s – might
have changed the whole story of post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic
relations. In this context my counterfactual strategy is twofold. On
the one hand, I assert that the development of a Russian–Atlantic
security community would not have slowed down as early and to the
same extent had NATO not decided to enlarge in the mid-1990s. In
Chapter 5, I showed that the Alliance took its crucial decisions before
Moscow reverted to a more assertive foreign policy. In addition, the
double enlargement quickly led to a new consensus among Russian
security elites and the disempowerment of Westernizing elites à la
Kozyrev. But, on the other hand, I acknowledge that the historical
roots of Great Power dispositions, as well as the upheaval of Russian
transition, both of which have nothing to do with the double enlarge-
ment, constituted particularly fertile soil for Moscow to lapse into
quixotic practices in relation to NATO. In the face of their sharp
decline, the Russians failed to adjust their expectations to the inter-
national hierarchy of the post-Cold War era. Positional agency also
directed Russia toward quixotic practices based on military capital.
Even without the double enlargement, then, it is conceivable that
many of the policies of the Bush administration, for example, would
have been just as badly received in Russia.
How did the relationship move from the strong alignment of
1992–3 and later of 2001–2 to today’s growing mismatch? While the
historical roots of the Great Power habitus and the troubles of domes-
tic transition certainly played a role, this and the previous chapter
demonstrated that the NATO policy of double enlargement was pro-
foundly self-defeating and shortsighted as far as pacification with
Russia was concerned. Of course, keeping alive the “most successful
military alliance in history” or “welcoming back to the European
family” countries that had been brutally occupied for decades cannot
be said to be wrong in intent. Nor can Alliance officials be completely
blamed for being prudent with their former enemies in Moscow, who
remained particularly difficult partners and failed to change their
expectations after the implosion of the USSR. Instead, NATO’s fault
rests with its failure to realize that Russia would not, and in fact
could not, understand the double enlargement in the same way as
Westerners. As much as expansion made sense from the NATO point
of view, it made no sense to Moscow: exclusionary and delusionary,
the policy fitted better with the old realpolitik of Cold War contain-
ment than with the new rules of security-from-the-inside-out pro-
fessed by the Alliance.
Worse, NATO officials also failed to come to terms with the fact
that by contributing to the strengthening of Great Power dispositions
in the Kremlin, they were undermining their own dominant posi-
tion at the symbolic level. There seemed to be a naïve but widespread
conviction that whatever policies NATO could impose, ultimately
Moscow officials would always back down without hard feelings. The
pervasive feeling that the Alliance was right and that Russia would
come to realize it precluded compromise and genuine diplomacy, to
Russia’s growing alienation. Everything took place as if the Alliance
was systematically justified in imposing its decisions on its former
Russian enemy. Things happened quite differently, though, as resent-
ment steadily and cumulatively built up in Moscow. The seeds of
today’s aggravating problems were planted back in 1994; since then
they have continued to grow, as habitus is a durable matrix of action.
NATO’s own practices, in many ways, played a key role in consoli-
dating Great Power dispositions among Russian officials, who were
unable to adjust to the new structure of the post-Cold War field of
international security.
At the end of the day, the main brake on security community devel-
opment was not individual but relational. The unremitting bickering
over the terms of interaction that has been plaguing NATO–Russia
relations for the last fifteen years feeds on the growing mismatch
between Russia’s ingrained dispositions and the country’s position in
the field as defi ned by the dominant Atlantic players. NATO officials
consistently behave as if all their policies are inherently right while
the Russians keep asking for a status that the dominant player feels
is out of place. As a result, there are two masters but no appren-
tice in NATO–Russia diplomacy, a symbolic stalemate that consid-
erably undermines security community development in and through
practice.
The tragedy of hysteresis is that there are no absolute grounds from
which to assess who is right and who is wrong in a symbolic power
struggle. From the dominant perspective, it is obviously the domi-
nated players who need to take note of the tough reality and adjust
their practices accordingly. Yet Don Quixote happens to live in a dif-
ferent world, where the imposed order of things makes no sense com-
pared to tilting at windmills. There is no obvious way to reconcile
hysteretic practices and move beyond symbolic stalemate. Argument
and persuasion will probably not do the trick, as players are position-
ally opposed in a struggle that can produce no winners: the dominant
are unable to impose the rules of the game on the dominated, who
in turn are combating a structure which they cannot defeat. And the
struggle goes on and on.
7 Conclusion
The world of international security works quite differently from

the point of view of its practitioners than from that of the distant
observer. As this book has shown, interstate pacification is less about
people representing one another as part of the same “we,” than it is
about joining together in the increasingly commonsense enactment
of diplomacy. Practices always rest on an engagement with the world
inherited from past interactions and framed by social configurations.
By emphasizing practical logics, I certainly do not deny that the theo-
retical point of view also sheds crucial light on political processes, not
least by making sense of practicality in a larger historical and contex-
tual perspective. But this analytical incisiveness requires that social
scientists, and more specifically IR scholars, pay equal attention to
the logic of practicality in world politics.
In this concluding chapter I want to do three main things. First, I
shall wrap up the book’s key arguments and highlight in particular
how my theory of practice of security communities helps understand
the fundamentally hysteretic nature of NATO–Russia diplomacy in
the post-Cold War era. Second, I shall briefly return one last time to
my case study in order to glean a few policy-relevant insights from my
Bourdieu-inspired analytical framework. Third, and finally, I shall
address the implications that practice theory raises for IR theory in
general. Far from a competing paradigm, practice theory actually over-
laps in innovative ways with some essential parts of existing theories. In
this spirit, I treat other IR theories less as alternative explanations than
as pieces of a larger puzzle that practice theory may help assemble.
The incisiveness of the theory of practice

of security communities
This book intends to make two main contributions to IR scholarship.
First, I have developed a theory of practice of security communities
231
that defi nes self-evident diplomacy as the constitutive practice of

security communities. This framework not only restores the practi-
cal logic of peace as a particular way to engage with the world of
diplomacy, it also sheds new light on its ordering mechanisms at both
the micro and macro levels. Second, I develop a sobjective narrative
of post-Cold War NATO–Russia relations that combines practicality,
intersubjectivity and historicity in order to explain and understand
the symbolic power politics of a fundamental axis of contemporary
world politics. In Russian–Atlantic relations, the diplomatic order
remains fragile, largely because of the growing mismatch between
players’ dispositions and their positions in the game of international
security.
Bringing practice theory à la Bourdieu to the study of security com-
munities yields two main theoretical and conceptual gains. First, it
directs attention toward what practitioners do differently, in the field
of diplomacy, when they are at peace. Inside mature security com-
munities, diplomacy – the non-violent settlement of disputes – is the
practical starting point of any and all interaction. When they tackle
their disagreements, practitioners who belong to a security commu-
nity think (talk, judge, reason, act) from diplomacy instead of about
its opportunity. Practitioners do not necessarily start seeing each
other as “one,” nor do they inevitably quibble less or agree more.
What changes is the background knowledge that tacitly informs their
practices: the self-evidence of diplomacy is what differentiates, in a
positive way, a security community from other interstate configu-
rations. By comparison, a non-war community is characterized by
normal diplomacy, a practical relationship with far less immediate
adherence to the non-violent settlement of disputes as the “natural”
order of things.
Second, for a practice to be self-evident – that is, for it to belong to
the doxic and unthought order of things – it must be part of a social
pattern of domination. Therefore, my Bourdieu-inspired theory of
practice of security communities brings symbolic power struggles to
the fore. Doxa stems from the alignment between the dispositions that
are embodied by agents in their habitus and the positions that they
occupy in the field. Under circumstances of homology, the orchestra
can play without a conductor: both dominant and dominated players
behave in tune with commonsense. When habitus loses touch with the
structure of the field, however, hysteresis effects emerge and agents
Conclusion 233
appear to forget the sense of their place. Quixotic practices weaken

the doxic pattern of domination and action, calling its self-evidence
into question. Because of hysteresis, the practical sense of different
agents clash. In sum, the theory of practice of security communities
suggests that, all other things being equal, the stronger the security
community members’ sense of place, the better the chances that the
diplomatic practice may become axiomatic.
The incisiveness of the theory of practice of security communi-
ties can be illustrated by the rift that opened inside the transatlan-
tic security community in the wake of the Iraq War.1 Despite very
intense disputes over sensitive matters of defense, security practi-
tioners inside the transatlantic security community never stopped
using diplomacy as the axiomatic practice for solving mutual dis-
putes. The profound identity crisis did not seem to shake the practi-
cal foundation of the security community. Indeed, the background
knowledge that gives birth to the diplomatic practical sense inside
the transatlantic security community is part of a deeper social pat-
tern of order by which “things fall in their place,” even in case of
an identity struggle. That said, the transatlantic rift also provoked
fairly strong hysteresis effects in the relationship between the USA
and a number of European countries. Jacques Chirac’s admoni-
tion of some new NATO members that they had “missed a great
opportunity to shut up”2 was a stark reminder of the pattern of
domination that usually structures inter-Allied relations. To many
Europeans, the United States lost the sense of its place in the run-up
to the Iraq crisis: perceived as arrogant and bullying, Washington
went further than its own dominant position within the security
community warranted. Conversely, most Americans construed the
actions of several of their European allies as out of touch with the
structure of the transatlantic security community. With Eastern
European apprentices acquiescing to their new master, it seemed
to Washington that Paris, Berlin, and others were unduly trying to
punch above their weight. In the end, though, while the deleterious
effects of hysteresis on peace dynamics were very clear, in the trans-
atlantic case they never gathered enough intensity to jeopardize the
long-embodied diplomatic practical sense upon which the security
community thrives in and through practice.
1 2
See Pouliot (2006). CNN (2003).
How about NATO–Russia diplomacy in the post-Cold War era?

Applying my theory of practice of security communities to this case
helps make sense of the limited pacification of the last twenty years.
In Chapter 4, I used three practical indicators of the self-evidence
of diplomacy to reach a nuanced conclusion: diplomacy is a normal
though not a self-evident practice in NRC dealings. As practitioners
embody somewhat contradictory dispositions with regard to diplo-
matic interaction, it is hard to determine the net effects of background
knowledge on interstate relations. This ambiguity, I concluded, sug-
gests that contemporary Russian–Atlantic diplomatic relations stop
short of a security community in and through practice: normal diplo-
macy rather indicates a non-war community.3
In order to explain the political origins of this limited diplomatic
commonsense, in Chapters 5 and 6 I went back into post-Cold War
history and revealed an intriguing paradox in the Russian–Atlantic
relationship. On the one hand, since 1992 Russia and NATO mem-
ber states have solved each and every one of their disputes, including
fierce ones over the double enlargement, by non-violent means. Such
a track record of peaceful change is a reversal of the situation dur-
ing the Cold War, when force and threats of force were consistently
looming over East–West interactions. By contrast, the post-Cold
War era has been characterized by a handful of “non-wars” –
“confl icts about issues that would typically lead to war, but [that]
were peacefully resolved.”4 Under the conditions that prevailed for
four decades, with thousands of nuclear missiles on high alert and
scores of soldiers standing on both sides of the Iron Curtain or in
proxy theatres, chances are that the Kosovo intervention, Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution or the Georgia War might have led to threats of
force by one side or the other. On the other hand, I have also shown
how NATO’s practices of double enlargement have contributed to
the resurgence of the Russian Great Power habitus and weakened
the symbolic pattern of domination necessary for the diplomatic
commonsense to surface. Disconnected from the field’s structure as
defi ned by NATO, resurging Russian dispositions created growing
hysteresis in the relationship, to the point of inconclusive symbolic
3
On overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance in NATO–Russia
relations, see Adler and Grieve (2009); and Pouliot (n.d.).
4
Wiberg quoted in Wæver (1998, 72).
Conclusion 235
power struggles over the rules of the international security game

and the role of each player. As Table 7.1 shows, the post-Cold War
history of NATO–Russia diplomacy is one of limited security com-
munity development caused by an increasing mismatch between
players’ dispositions and their positions in the game.
Chapter 4 supplied evidence of the deleterious effects that hysteretic
symbolic stalemate can have on the non-violent settlement of disputes
and the normalization of diplomacy. When it comes to organizing
joint peacekeeping operations, for instance, Russian and Alliance
practitioners have a very hard time fi nding a working compromise
on standards and rules of interaction. As the dominant player in the
field, NATO cannot imagine having to negotiate with anybody over
its ways of doing things and especially not with the Russians. On their
side, Russian practitioners take for granted that as a Great Power they
ought not to adopt others’ procedures without a minimal amount of
negotiation and compromise. The concrete result is that the prospects
of a NATO–Russia peacekeeping operation are increasingly remote.
In fact, the last time it happened, during the 1990s, it left wounds
that have yet to heal. During the extremely tense negotiations over
the Kosovo peacekeeping operation, Russia would not sign up to any-
thing short of a sector under its own command, which NATO was
unwilling to grant. The symbolic struggle, which lasted several days,
reached unprecedented levels of intensity and even led to one of the
most dramatic episodes of the post-Cold War Russian–Atlantic rela-
tionship: the Pristina airport incident. Under such acute conditions of
hysteresis, it is doubtful that any pattern of social order can emerge
and turn diplomacy into a self-evident, doxic practice.
A mismatch between dispositions in habitus and positions in the
field, hysteresis trumps practical sense. People cannot behave in tune
with commonsense if they do not agree on what commonsense is in
the fi rst place. In the process of security community development,
hysteresis considerably weakens the diplomatic order. Because it con-
ceived of itself as the undisputed ruler of the field of international
security, NATO felt that it was normal for it to impose its double
enlargement despite Russia’s loud objections. Seen from Moscow,
Alliance practices appeared heavy-handed and uncompromising.
Starting in late 1994, Russian practitioners increasingly felt that their
NATO counterparts were consistently failing to show the kind of
consideration that Russia deserved given its Great Power status. To
Table 7.1 Evolving (mis)match of positions and dispositions in NATO–

Russia relations
Effect on
Sources of (mis)match security
Degree of between positions and community
Dates (mis)match dispositions development
1992–late Very strong Empowered habitus in Strong

1994 match Moscow fits the NATO- dynamics
(homology) imposed rules of the of security
international security community
game; positional agency development
leads to a strong sense of
one’s place
Late Growing Gradual resurfacing of the Security
1994– mismatch Great Power habitus community
1998 (low in Moscow as double development
hysteresis) enlargement kicks off; undermined
Russia’s positional agency
overlooked by a triumphant
NATO
1999–late Strong Great Power habitus becomes Security
2001 mismatch dominant in Moscow; community
(high hysteresis grows as development
hysteresis) Russian dispositions are stalled
out of touch with Russia’s
position as defi ned by
dominant NATO
Late Restored Post September 11 rules Security
2001– match of international security community
2003 (receding defi ned by NATO improves development
hysteresis) Russian position, which is a possibility
better in tune with toned- once again
down Great Power habitus
in Moscow
2003– Growing Hysteresis returns in force Security
2007 mismatch as Great Power habitus community
(high prevails in Moscow, development
hysteresis) clashing with NATO’s stalled
position and dispositions as
dominant player in the field
Conclusion 237
this day, as Russia and NATO do not cast each other in the roles that
they actually play together, each side perceives the other as trying to
punch above its weight. This obviously makes for difficult and tense
diplomacy and it makes the possibility of the development of a secu-
rity community in and through practice seem remote.
A key thread of this book is that in order to understand security
community development and its false starts, it is more productive to
start with practice than with collective identity. Rather than con-
ceiving we-ness as the driver of practice (that is, as a representation
that precedes action), I proposed to construe collective identity as the
result of practice. Collective identification is embedded in practice, as
Adler aptly argues about self-restraint in the spread of security com-
munities: “their engagement in a common practice makes them share
an identity and feel they are a ‘we.’ ”5 As this book’s case study has
demonstrated, for interstate pacification to thrive we-ness must not
only be represented but also enacted in and through practice. This is
certainly one of the key contributions that practice theory can make
to social and IR theories. There are several others, which I will dis-
cuss below. Meanwhile, I want to return to my case study one last
time in order to derive a couple of policy recommendations about the
politics of NATO–Russia diplomacy today.
Shto Delat’?: the practice of NATO–Russia diplomacy today

Faced with growing hysteresis in Russian–Atlantic relations, the old
Russian question arises: shto delat’? – what is to be done? My point
of departure is a simple one: both the Russian Great Power habitus
and the Alliance’s tendency to speak in the name of the “interna-
tional community” are here to stay. These dispositions constitute a
deeply ingrained, historically inherited background that cannot, and
will not, change overnight. As I have demonstrated in this book, prac-
tices and interactions in the fi rst post-Cold War generation hardened
this habitus even further. The coming to power of new presidents
in Washington and Moscow might help push the “reset button” at
the highest level, but in and of itself it will not terminate the power-
ful influence that pervasive dispositions exert on each side’s foreign
policy. Thus it is more productive to start from the assumption that
5
Adler (2008, 201); see Wenger (1998).
habitus will not change in the short or medium term; the challenge is
to craft sound policy based on that social reality.
In order to genuinely pacify its relationship with Russia, NATO
must alter its course. My point is not that the Alliance should give in
to the many whims of Moscow’s Great Power habitus. As symbolic
interactionism indicates, treating somebody as if she were an X gen-
erally reinforces, in and through practice, the X identity.6 Caving in
to Moscow’s self-understanding as a Great Power could potentially
amount to reinforcing this narrative. The problem rather stems from
the fact that over the last twenty years the Alliance has adopted a
very ambivalent, and in fact incoherent, policy on the matter. As I
have demonstrated above, at specific points in time NATO has shown
some willingness to grant the symbolic pomp of equality to Russia in
order to obtain its cooperation. But when the time came to also rec-
ognize the power and influence that generally comes with that status,
the Alliance proved immovable. In the end, this disjointed approach
created enormous frustrations for the Russians, reinforcing their
quest for Great Power status while making the objective more and
more inaccessible.
Of course, sooner or later Russian practitioners will have to face
the fact of their country’s decline in the new rules of the international
security game – something they have consistently proved incapable
of doing hitherto. French and British diplomats, whose countries
went through a similar pattern of decline in the twentieth century,
can tell what a difficult process that is. Time will tell whether the
Russians can successfully go through this experience in the twenty-
fi rst century. At the moment, the only certainty that we can have is
that the Great Power habitus will not disappear in the near future.
From the NATO point of view, Russia will continue to be a particu-
larly vexing partner, one of the few that openly contests the order of
international security. As the Georgia War manifestly showed, the
Alliance’s influence over Moscow has become very limited. Based on
this observation, what can be done to gradually rein in hysteresis in
NATO–Russia diplomacy?
I infer from my theory of practice of security communities two
related policy recommendations. First, if NATO wants Russia to
play by the rules of the security-from-the-inside-out game, it should
6
See Wendt (1999).
Conclusion 239
provide it with enough cultural-symbolic resources to have a minimally

successful hand in the game. Positional field analysis teaches us that
where you sit is what you do: practices tend to derive in large part
from the resources that players possess and can use in their doxic
struggle in the field. The drive to act is strongly determined by the
opportunity structure. It is not only ingrained dispositions that pro-
duce the diplomatic practical sense but also the countries’ positions in
the hierarchy, as determined by their various stocks of capital. So long
as Russia possesses no recognized stock of cultural-symbolic capital,
it has no means with which to play by the rules of the internal mode
of pursuing security. As the post-Cold War era showed, under the
current doxa all that Moscow could do was play a losing hand; and
when it became impossible for the Russians to abide by a security-
from-the-inside-out doxa that had so little to offer them, they called
it quits and turned against the NATO-imposed rules. By comparison,
Russia’s hand was stronger in the old game of power-balancing and
nuclear deterrence, and the country increasingly resorted to similar
practices. Enlightened self-interest suggests that in order to prolong
a game that is to its own benefit, NATO should ensure that enough
players are able to join – even if that means deliberately changing the
distribution of resources to their advantage. Given the dominant posi-
tion it still enjoys, NATO might have the authority to attribute more
cultural-symbolic capital to the Russians and seduce them back into
the internal mode of pursuing security.
Second, the relationship between NATO member states and Russia
should be refocused on the domains where dispositions do not clash
as easily as in the field of international security. Because of past inter-
actions both during and after the Cold War, the field of international
security has become the locus par excellence where the Russian Great
Power habitus and NATO’s embodiment of the “international com-
munity” are expressed. This source of tension can be partly defused
by moving the diplomatic action into different contexts. For example,
when it comes to the field of international trade organized around
the WTO doxa, the Russians tend to tone down their quest for Great
Power status. With a gross domestic product equivalent to only twice
that of the Netherlands, the tough reality of Russia’s commercial mar-
ginality provides an indomitable check to quixotic practices. With fast-
growing powerhouses such as China, India, Brazil and others around
the WTO table, Moscow does not need the West to be put back in
its place. NATO member states would thus have a clear advantage in
multiplying interactions with Russia in those forums where its quest
for status cannot be expressed as strongly as in the realm of nuclear
warheads and geostrategy. This logic works for the Russians as well.
Again, the field of international trade is one in which Western diplo-
mats have recently had to learn the hard way that the “international
community” is not always coterminous with the Quad (made up of
Canada, the EU, Japan and the US). The latter’s incapability to move
the Doha Round forward, in part because of Indian and Chinese res-
ervations, could be the eye-opener required for the West to fi nally
lose the illusion of being the center of the world. The NATO–Russia
relationship would probably benefit from more interactions in multi-
lateral forums where each side’s posturing would be constrained as
much as possible.
As far as NATO– Russia diplomacy per se is concerned, I doubt
that either side would be ready for Moscow’s formal integration in the
Alliance for the time being. The clash of habitus is simply too strong
as things currently stand. That said, I believe that the Alliance should
state openly and unambiguously that it is ready to examine Russia’s
candidacy in due time. While this strategy entails some risks – for
instance, legitimating a troublesome player – it would engage Russia
as a potential member of the club, something that has cruelly been
lacking in the post-Cold War era. This, again, would likely improve
the chances of Moscow being seduced into playing NATO’s game
of security-from-the-inside-out (although probably inelegantly for a
time). The main tradeoff for opening the Alliance’s door to Moscow’s
membership is the potential weakening of the “transatlantic consen-
sus”; but the risk is well worth taking in the currently deteriorating
situation. Preserving the transatlantic consensus at all costs would be
profoundly misguided: in the post-Cold War era, leaving Russia on
the margins of Alliance diplomacy turned out to be a self-reinforcing
dynamic. The transatlantic consensus is useless, and in fact harmful,
if it leads the Alliance to exclude certain states outright and precludes
it from meaningfully engaging with its former enemies. Furthermore,
the risk is all the more worthy of taking because NATO has histori-
cally been a coalition of former enemies.7 A security community com-
prised of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the US
7
Baker (2002).
Conclusion 241
would have sounded unlikely in 1945. It is time for NATO countries

to pluck up the courage to sacrifice certainties in order to turn the
page on Russian–Atlantic rivalry once and for all.
Even in the longer run, though, I seriously doubt that NATO mem-
bers, especially those that have suffered from decades of Soviet occu-
pation, would ever agree to inviting Russia into their ranks. I would
not bet on Moscow begging for membership either. In the meantime,
the choice is not between a NATO that backs down every time that
the Russians express dissent or one that wholly disregards Moscow’s
objections. In the wake of the Georgia War, some Alliance members
have brought back to the fore a seemingly irrefutable yet fallacious
argument: if Russia were to remain cooperative despite NATO’s
expansion, then NATO could overlook Moscow’s objections without
consequences; if, however, Moscow were to revert to praetorian tac-
tics in response, then enlargement makes sense to guard former satel-
lites against Moscow’s wrath. I believe that this is a false alternative,
not least because NATO has fabricated it through its own practices
over the past fifteen years. In a way reminiscent of Charles Tilly’s
“protection racketeer,”8 the Alliance has come to create insecurity
in order to justify the provision of security. Take Georgia: but for
the Alliance’s proactive and sustained courtship of Tbilisi, the ten-
sions with Moscow would have probably not risen to the level that
they reached in 2006. The vicious circle is clear: NATO must enlarge
because Georgia needs more security; Georgia needs more security
because NATO must enlarge. This is the type of self-fulfi lling proph-
ecy that so often spirals out of control, feeding unnecessary rivalries.
The time is ripe for practitioners to learn their way out of that, and
NATO–Russia diplomacy is the right place to start.
Practice theory and IR theories

Bourdieu-inspired practice theory shares a number of assump-
tions with existing IR theories yet it also brings much value added
to the current theoretical landscape. Contrary to the usual take on
the matter, in this fi nal section of the book I conceive of competing
frameworks less as alternative explanations than as different pieces
8
Tilly (1985).
of a larger puzzle that practice theory helps assemble. I want to show

that my analysis of NATO–Russia politics in the post-Cold War era
shares common ground with most IR theories, while also revisiting
some of their assumptions. The goal is neither eclecticism nor synthe-
sis, but the demonstration that practice theory boasts the potential
to move beyond theoretical atomization in IR.9 For demonstration
purposes, I pick one central proposition from six major IR theoreti-
cal frameworks and show how Bourdieu-inspired practice theory not
only builds but also improves on them.
(1) A core assumption of rational choice theory is that people act
rationally on the basis of their interests. As Jon Elster argues: “To act
rationally is to do as well for oneself as one can.”10 Bourdieu-inspired
practice theory is fully compatible with this insight: of course people
seek to foster their interests in and through practice. NATO enlarged
its membership and mandate because it believed this to be in its inter-
ests; Russia opposed the policy for the same reason. However, because
it exogenously assumes preferences, from a practice perspective the
rational choice argument is insufficient. If interests drive the world,
then social scientific theories need to explain not only their enactment
but also their content and origin: why do people want what they want
and why do they pursue their ends the way they do? Constructivists
have long voiced this criticism of rational choice theory; yet by system-
atically emphasizing structural ideations as constitutive of interests,
I believe that several authors have thrown out the baby of strategic
action with the constructivist bathwater.
Practice theory à la Bourdieu reminds us that both interests and
strategies, as pervasive features of political life, have social origins.
Strategic action is not given by human nature; it inheres in a number
of fields and habitus because of history. Instrumental rationality is an
evolutionary disposition that reproduces itself in bodies and things,
becoming increasingly pervasive in our iron-caged world, as Weber
would have it. In Williams’s words: “The universe of potential strat-
egies (and indeed of potential interests) of a given actor is circum-
scribed – though not mechanistically determined – by the structure
of the game and operation of the habitus.”11 Thus the issue is not
9 10
See Adler and Pouliot (n.d.). Elster (1989, 28).
11
Williams (2007, 36). Again, the best explanation for the origins of “focal
points,” for instance, is the logic of practicality – a socially inherited,
context-dependent and intuitive feel that inclines agents toward common
practices.
Conclusion 243
whether people act on the basis of their interest (instrumentality) or

their identity (legitimacy), as many social theorists now have it; it is
always and by necessity both. From a Bourdieu perspective, inter-
ests are constituted in large part by field dynamics in the form of an
inarticulate investment in the game or illusio. To the traditional view
of agents investing in a game to foster their interests, Bourdieu adds
a recursive loop whereby agents become invested by the game: “no
one can take advantage of the game, not even those who dominate it,
without being taken up and taken in by it. Thus there would be no
game without belief in the game and without the wills, intentions and
aspirations which actuate the agents; these impulses, produced by the
game, depend on the agents’ positions in the game.”12 Interests and
strategies fi nd their roots in social games, not in individual agents.
(2) A similar point could be made about IR theories informed by
social psychology. For instance, David Welch argues that “foreign
policy change is most likely when decision-makers perceive that their
current policies are incurring painful costs.”13 This valuable insight
reminds us that practitioners daily go through a series of cognitive
processes that shape their decisions and, by consequence, interna-
tional politics. From a practice theory perspective, however, cogni-
tion is not a purely individual process: the dispositions that comprise
habitus and incline actors toward certain ends and strategies are
social in origins. They are the accumulated deposit of collective
experiences and history. To return to Welch’s quote, the reasons why
leaders “perceive the costs” of their policy the way they do has less
to do with individual cognition (even though it constitutes a neces-
sary transmission belt) than with the embodiment of intersubjective
knowledge. The inclinations that render individual practices possible
are socially constituted: for instance, Russia’s Great Power habitus is
triggered particularly strongly in the context of international secu-
rity, where Moscow has a history of interacting with other dominant
powers such as NATO. Although it also has domestic origins, the
habitus is challenged or reinforced at the relational level.14 In order to
12
Bourdieu (1981, 307–8).
13
Welch (2005, 46).
14
On this point, see Hopf (2002 , 290). I agree with Hopf that identities, and
more especially habitus, are shaped fi rst and foremost at the domestic level
where a number of mimesis mechanisms are in place. As he also notes,
some of these dispositions, for instance the Great Power habitus, are then
challenged or reinforced in and through relations at the systemic level.
understand the specific direction that cognitive processes take, one

needs to look at social relations.
(3) Structural realism rests on the systemic assumption that what
units do is determined by their position in the distribution of material
power. As Kenneth Waltz notes: “The concept of structure is based
on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave
differently.”15 There are two parts to this neorealist insight: a posi-
tional logic, with which practice theory fully concurs, and a mate-
rialistic assumption, which I want to amend. Earlier in the book I
gave numerous illustrations of the operation of positional agency: the
drive to act in certain ways due to the opportunity structure. Russia’s
quixotic practices in response to the double enlargement were largely
due to its low position in the hierarchy of international security, and
more specifically its reliance on a devalued form of military capital.
Likewise, many of NATO’s actions, including the drive to enlarge,
derive from the organization’s dominant position. Bourdieu’s struc-
tural constructivism paves the way to “topological analysis”: “The
political field constitutes a space that is structured such that the value
of each constituent element is formed through the network of relation-
ships this element entertains with the other elements in the field.”16
Positional agency implies that where you sit is what you do, an insight
that structural realists also share.
That said, there is no valid justification for presuming that the only
positional logic that prevails in international security is a material
one. This is not to say that economic riches or military force do not
matter; they clearly do – for instance in explaining one key dimension
of NATO’s domination over Russia in the post-Cold War period. I
explained Moscow’s recourse to its military capital by the fact that
this was pretty much the only resource available to pursue Great
Power status. Material conditions do matter, but as part of a game
that is fundamentally social. The basic issue, in this revised positional
logic, is not only how much power one has, but also what power is in
the fi rst place. Bourdieu’s sociology has an edge over a materialistic
take on structures because it can account for the historical and inter-
actional processes that make certain resources valuable (i.e. powerful)
in certain contexts but not in others. In this spirit, Reus-Smit shows
that Florence’s superior status (and success) in Italian Renaissance
15 16
Waltz (1979, 81). Kauppi (2005, 29).
Conclusion 245
diplomacy was due not to military superiority, which it did not have,
but to its unparalleled competence in ornamental diplomacy premised
on cultural mores and practices.17 The yardstick of power varies over
time and space because the players that occupy any given field defi ne
and struggle over its meaning. The concept of capital, together with
the recovery of the practical point of view, reminds us that resources
have to be recognized as such in order to establish the basis of a power
relation. Not only do players employ capital to get the upper hand in
the field, they also struggle over the meaning and value of resources.
There are a few realists who recognize the importance of “pres-
tige” or “status competition” in international politics; yet ultimately
they too reduce these symbolic power struggles to a material basis.18
Alternatively, Barry O’Neill puts the pursuit of honor, face and pres-
tige at the center of his theory but fi nally concludes that “they are
fought over for the benefits they yield”19 – presumably material. Again,
I do not quibble that material resources have often been highly prized
in human societies, including in international politics; but this is an
empirical observation that cannot be theoretically assumed away.
To reify a contingent observation into a timeless assumption actu-
ally reveals more about the theorist’s own habitus than anything else.
Moreover, the premise that material power is always preponderant
is unwarranted in an increasingly institutionalized world where sur-
vival is only very rarely at stake. As we enter the twenty-fi rst century,
belonging to the club of liberal democracies is often more powerful
a resource than owning a large army. From a Bourdieu-inspired per-
spective, the yardsticks that structure positions in a field are socially
constructed, culturally specific and historically contingent. Structure
too has a practical logic; and its causal efficacy rests with practice.
(4) A similar point applies to the English School, whose greatest
insight probably consists of showing the weight of history on interna-
tional practices. Practices evolve over time through patterns of repro-
duction and contestation, as is the case with diplomacy, for instance. 20
But while the English School is very apt in showing how institutions
17
Reus-Smit (1997, 63–86).
18
Gilpin (1981, 28–31); Wohlforth (2009, 55). The relational competitiveness
for status is generally inspired from Weber’s path-breaking works on
status groups; more recently it has found solid empirical backing in social
identity theory. In IR, see e.g. Mercer (1995); and Lebow (2008).
19 20
O’Neill (1999, 244). Watson (1991).
are historically emergent, it fails to capture the agent-level processes

that carry the past over into the present and the future. Bourdieu-
inspired practice theory palliates this weakness thanks to the concept
of habitus. As Bourdieu contends:
every historical action brings together two states of history: objectified his-
tory, i.e. the history which has accumulated over the passage of time in
things, machines, buildings, monuments, books, theories, customs, law,
etc.; and embodied history, in the form of habitus … The relationship to the
social world is not the mechanical causality that is often assumed between
a “milieu” and a consciousness, but rather a sort of ontological complicity.
When the same history inhabits both habitus and habitat, both dispositions
and position, the king and his court, the employer and his fi rm, the bishop
and his see, history in a sense communicates with itself, is reflected in its
own image … The doxic relation to the native world, a quasi-ontological
commitment flowing from practical experience, is a relationship of belong-
ing and owning in which a body, appropriated by history, absolutely and
immediately appropriates things inhabited by the same history.21
In other words, Bourdieu-inspired practice theory reminds us that

as important as historical processes may be, they require a micro-
mechanism in order to carry on to the present. The embodied disposi-
tions that comprise habitus help make sense of the weight of history
on practices, as my discussion of resurging Great Power dispositions
in Russia has shown.
(5) The pervasiveness of power, competition and struggle is a key
Marxian premise, which also informs brands of realism as well as
poststructuralism. John Mearsheimer writes, in a way reminiscent of
classical figures such as Hans Morgenthau, that in world politics the
“ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others.”22
While poststructuralism rejects the realist and Marxist focus on
material conditions, it also centers on power and explores the nexus
with knowledge in establishing the boundaries of discourse. 23 The
assumption that power cannot be transcended also deeply influenced
Bourdieu. Social struggles and domination are endemic; solving
one conflict will inevitably spark new ones; redressing one imbal-
ance creates another elsewhere. As such, a Bourdieu-inspired theory
21 22
Bourdieu (1981, 305–6). Mearsheimer (2001, xi).
23
Barnett and Duvall (2005).
Conclusion 247
of practice sharply disagrees with liberalism and the possibility of

“win-win compromises,” even under conditions of peace. As Edward
Hallett Carr once noted: “The common interest in peace masks the
fact that some nations desire to maintain the status quo without hav-
ing to fight for it, and others to change the status quo without hav-
ing to fight in order to do so.”24 In this spirit, a practice framework
is more akin to “realist constructivism” and the view that “power
inheres in social practices.”25 Competition and power struggles are
endless features of social relations, including the most peaceful ones.
As this book showed, NATO–Russia diplomacy is plagued with sym-
bolic conflicts; but the particularly mature transatlantic security com-
munity is just as well.
(6) Finally, the dominant constructivist take on structure defi nes it
as the distribution of knowledge. 26 As a result, structure and culture
are coterminous. This analytical focus on ideational structures is cer-
tainly warranted given the traditional bias toward materialism in IR
theory. In terms of Bourdieu’s theoretical apparatus, understanding
intersubjectivity is absolutely crucial in order to grasp, on the one
hand, the dispositions (habitus) on the basis of which agents act and,
on the other hand, the rules of the game (field) under which social
action takes place. That said, dispositional and intersubjective-con-
textual processes are not the sole drivers of social action. My account
of security community development points toward a structural form
of constructivism by which the social construction of reality is carried
out under structural and historical constraints that primarily have
to do with positions, that is, with agents’ relative location in a social
structure.
Constructivism teaches us that the link between resource and power
is intersubjectivity – what power is in a given context. Dispositions and
rules of the game are fundamental determinants of the structure of
positions; yet constructivists need to appreciate that the reverse is also
true. For instance, while it is through social construction that, in our
banking system, people come to attach the value of twenty dollars to
certain bits of paper with specific engravings, the distribution of those
24 25
Carr (1958, 52–3). Jackson and Nexon (2004, 340).
26
Wendt (1999, 141). Wendt does allow for other structures (e.g. material,
interest) but his “primary focus is on a subset of social structure, socially
shared knowledge or ‘culture.’ ”
socially constructed money bills across agents is still very important

to understand the workings of society. Social constructs create struc-
tures of positions, which in turn help determine meaning. In this sense,
Jennifer Sterling-Folker is right that “[t]he proposition that there may
be limitations on how human beings construct their social realities
opens the theoretical space necessary for a potential dialogue with
realists.”27 Positions correlate with position-taking: one’s location in
a field partly determines one’s representations of the world.28 It is
only by integrating dispositional and positional analysis that we can
develop genuinely relational theories that can account for both the
social construction of resources as powerful (dispositions and doxa)
and their distribution across a social configuration (positions).
As Bourdieu argues: “Sociology, in its objectivist moment, is a
social topology … an analysis of relative positions and of the objec-
tive relations between these positions.”29 In this book I have shown
how NATO’s and Russia’s relative stocks of material-institutional
and cultural-symbolic capital explain several of their practices in the
post-Cold War era. Throughout that period, practitioners attempted
to make sense of the world and in so doing participated in its social
construction; yet they did so from a particular position in the field of
international security. Nexon’s “relational institutionalism” presents
a similar combination of structural and constructivist arguments.
His book argues that the Reformations, although intersubjective
in nature, had profound impacts on the institutional structure of
the European composite states of the early modern era. As Nexon
explains in a Tillyesque fashion: “Once we treat structures as net-
works composed of social transactions, it follows that structures exist
by virtue of ongoing processes of interaction but simultaneously posi-
tion actors in various structurally consequential positions relative to
one another.”30 In this framework, international change is not only
intersubjective evolution, but also (primarily) change in patterns of
collective mobilization.
In sum, practice theory combines together, in a refreshing way,
insights from a number of IR theories (see Table 7.2). From rational
choice theory, it accepts the focus on interests and strategies; with
political psychology, it looks into cognitive processes that operate
27
Sterling-Folker (2002 , 76). 28 Bourdieu (2003, 190).
29 30
Bourdieu (1989, 16). Nexon (2009, 14).
Conclusion 249
Table 7.2 Practice theory and IR theories
Practice theory’s added

Common ground value
Rational choice People act rationally Interests and strategies

on the basis of their have social origins
interests
Political psychology Cognitive biases Cognition is rooted
operate in in culturally and
individual historically inherited
decisionmaking habitus
Neorealism Position in structure Structure is defi ned along
determines field-dependent axes
behavior
Marxism Power and Power and domination are
domination cannot primarily symbolic in
be transcended nature
English School History matters History carries over into
the present through field
and habitus
Constructivism People attach Meaning-making depends
meanings to objects in part on position in
and act on their the field
basis
through individuals; practice theory agrees with the neorealist posi-

tional logic as well as with the English School’s appreciation of his-
torical processes; it also shares the Marxian (and derivatively realist
and poststructuralist) premise that power and domination cannot
be transcended; and, fi nally, a Bourdieu-inspired framework follows
constructivism in giving the central position to meaning-making
in politics. Beyond this common ground, however, practice theory
emphasizes the social roots of interests, strategies and cognitive proc-
esses; it revisits materialistic assumptions; and it recalls that although
people socially construct their world, they do so from a specific social
location and under structural constraints. The common thread across
these contributions, which also runs throughout this book, is a con-
cern for practical logics, without which one cannot make sense of
interests, positionality and symbolic struggles as they play themselves

out in and through practice.
A practical ontology that is both positional and dispositional sug-
gests that there can be no end to social struggles over the meaning of
the world, because agents always stand in relation to others as they
engage in practices. This relational dynamic perpetuates symbolic
fights and domination patterns, as the case of NATO–Russia diplo-
macy has demonstrated. Although there may be more peaceful means
to settle conflicts than others, these fundamental features of social life
will not go away, despite technological prowess or increasing commu-
nications. As Neumann insightfully argues about Self–Other dynam-
ics, “since what is at issue in delineation is not ‘objective’ cultural
differences, but the way symbols are activated to become part of the
capital of the identity of a given human collective, it is simply wrong
that global homogenizing trends make it less easy to uphold delinea-
tion. Any difference, no matter how minuscule, may be inscribed by
political importance and serve to delineate identities.”31 That we are
stuck reinstantiating and sometimes even fighting for arbitrary fault
lines is as fatalistic an observation as it is an eye-opener for the theory
and practice of international politics.
31
Neumann (1996, 166).
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Index
Adler, Emanuel 5, 13, 40, 61, 66, 237 Dayton Accord 159
Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett 3, Implementation Force (IFOR) 123
4, 5, 38, 39, 45 Operation Deliberate Force 159,
Afghanistan war 114, 124, 130, 209, 163, 170
211, 213, 217 Sarajevo market bombing 159, 161
basing rights in Central Asia 124, Srebrenica massacre 159, 163
213, 219 Stabilization Force (SFOR) 123, 124
International Security Assistance UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
Force (ISAF) 217, 218 159, 162, 163
agent–structure relationship 20, 32–3; Vance–Owen plan 159, 160
see also practicality, logic of Bourdieu, Pierre 1, 2, 5, 15, 26, 27, 31,
Ahtisaari, Martti 200 32, 34, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52,
Albania 196, 222 60, 69, 70, 74, 85, 86, 87, 140,
Albright, Madeleine 185, 186, 199, 192, 232, 243, 244, 246, 247, 248
202 Bulgaria 107, 188, 189, 201, 219, 225
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty Bush, George W. 119, 213, 216, 219,
215, 216 223
appropriateness, logic of 17–22; Bush Doctrine 209
see also social action, logics of; Bush, George H. W. 163
practicality, logic of
Arbatov, Alexei 212 Canada 84, 100, 213
arguing, logic of 11, 19, 73; capital 33–4, 245
see also social action, logics of; cultural–symbolic 148–53, 161, 182,
practicality, logic of 187, 202, 239
Aspin, Les 164 material–institutional 105, 148,
151, 153, 160–1, 182, 187, 188,
background knowledge see practical 202, 206, 209, 211, 222, 228;
knowledge; habitus see also field
ballistic missile defense 4, 89, 101, Chechnya 100, 108, 131, 168, 176,
114, 125, 129 177, 189, 206, 211, 225
Baltic states 84, 107, 109, 110–11, Chernomyrdin, Viktor 199, 200
164, 188, 207, 214, 218, 225 Chirac, Jacques 233
Baluyevsky, Yuri 129, 226 Christopher, Warren 173, 185
Baranovsky, Vladimir 181, 204, 210 Clark, Wesley 201
Belarus 102, 109, 114, 188, 190, 198, Clinton, Bill 159, 162, 164, 166, 167,
199, 207 168, 171, 174, 188, 191, 202
Belgium 111, 127, 218, 223 cognition 11, 19, 21, 24–6, 28, 49,
Bosnian civil war 174, 122, 159–60, 243, 248, 249
161, 165, 169, 216, 227 Cohen, William 202
275
276 Index
Cold War see NATO–Russia relations 173, 174, 181, 182, 191, 192,
and the Cold War 214; see also mode of pursuing
collective defense see NATO and security, internal
collective defense Cooperative Threat Reduction
collective identification 3, 38, 237; program 121–2
see also security community corporate agency 86–8
collective security 158, 159, 161, 195, critical junctures see path dependence
220; see also NATO enlargement Croatia 162, 222
functional Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic
Collective Security Treaty 101, 140, 163, 195, 214, 225;
Organization (CSTO) 219, 220 see also Visegrad states
color revolutions 89, 102, 219;
see also Ukraine; Orange democratic peace see modes of
Revolution; Georgia; Rose pursuing security, internal
Revolution Denmark 188, 218
commonsense see doxa Deutsch, Karl W. 3, 4, 5, 38, 39
Commonwealth of Independent States diplomacy 11–12, 41
(CIS) 89, 188, 219, 220, 221 as normal practice 42, 232
community of practice 5, 13, 39–40, as self-evident practice 1, 40–4, 50,
45, 80, 82 95
Conference on Security and as skill 12, 16, 30–1, 66
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) embodiment of 42–3, 50, 95–6, 98,
98, 151, 154, 155, 157, 159, 170, 99, 105, 107, 109, 110, 112, 122
173 direction of fit 29–30
Budapest summit (1994) 167 dispositions see habitus
Helsinki principles 221, 226 domination see doxa
Paris Charter 151 doxa 30, 34, 36, 72, 148, 152, 187,
see also Organization for Security 232
and Cooperation in Europe and misrecognition 47–8, 49
(OSCE) and symbolic power 34, 45, 46–7,
consequences, logic of 21, 242; 49, 245, 246–7
see also rational choice see also field
theory; social action, logics of; Durkheim, Émile 60
practicality, logic of
constructivism 11, 18, 242 Elster, Jon 242
and methodology 52, 54, 78–82; English School 245–6, 249
see also Sobjectivism ethnomethodology see Garfinkel,
and practice theory 247–9 Harold
as style of reasoning 54–9 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
postfoundationalist 56–9, 77 (EAPC) 155
representational bias in 17–22, 39 European Union (EU) 44, 85, 121, 224
Contact Group 162, 163, 170, 197, European Neighbourhood Policy
199; see also Bosnian civil war; 152
Kosovo crisis European Security Strategy (2003)
contextualization see interpretation 152
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE),
treaty on 89, 184, 186, 188, 189, field 1, 33, 158
224–6, 227 as social game 34; see also doxa
cooperative security 156, 159, 160, as structure of position 33, 36, 49,
167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 91, 149, 247; see also capital
Index 277
Foucault, Michel 22, 45, 76, 89 process tracing in 76–7, 91–149

France 84, 101, 103, 111, 117, 120, see also sobjectivism
121, 223, 228, 240 homology 46, 47–8, 49, 232;
see also practical sense; hysteresis
Gadamer, Hans-Georg 61 Hopf, Ted 5, 13, 21, 30, 203
Garfinkel, Harold 26, 66, 69, 99 Hungary 163, 195, 201, 223, 225;
Geertz, Clifford 59, 61, 62, 64–5, 67, see also Visegrad states
81 hysteresis 48, 95, 232, 235
Georgia 107, 109, 114, 139, 145, 213, and history 48–9
220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 241 as Don Quixote effect 48
Georgia War 4, 90, 97, 109, 113, see also homology
118, 119, 194, 221, 223, 227,
234, 238, 241 illusio 34, 243
Rose Revolution 219 implicit learning 25, 30–1, 45, 46
possible NATO enlargement to 107, induction 59–60
222–3 and ethnography 66–7
Germany 84, 101, 111, 119, 223, 228, and grounded theory 59
240 and practical logic 66–72, 83, 95;
Unification of 107, 165 see also practice, study of
Giddens, Anthony 20, 26 and qualitative interview 68–70,
Global Partnership see Cooperative 83–6, 95
Threat Reduction and Rashomon effect 60, 80
Goffman, Erving 36, 46 and representational bias 60, 95
Gorbachev, Mikhail 107, 156, 157, see also Sobjectivism
160, 169, 170, 175, 178, 179, instrumental rationality
181, 185, 204 see consequence, logic of; rational
Grachev, Pavel 163, 183 choice theory
Group of Eight (G8) 88, 121, 199, international security, field of 1, 74, 83,
200, 202 85, 149, 150, 151, 183
Guzzini, Stefano 54, 56 evolving rules of the game,
1992–1997 148, 149, 150–5,
Habermas, Jürgen see arguing, 161, 168, 169, 170, 175, 177,
logic of 178, 181, 187, 190, 191;
habit, logic of 13, 21–2, 30; see also modes of pursuing
see also practicality, logic of security
habitus 1, 31 evolving rules of the game,
as art of inventing 33, 44 1998–2008 194, 195, 203, 207,
as embodied knowledge 31–2, 49, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213,
67 216, 229, 244–5; see also modes
as historical sediment 31, 193, 237, of pursuing security
243, 246 NATO’s position in, 1992–1997
as intersubjective subjectivity 32–3, 148, 149, 152–4, 155, 175, 181,
36, 243–4 190, 192
Hacking, Ian 54, 55, 56, 58 NATO’s position in, 1998–2008
Havel, Vaclav 214 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210,
historicization 60 212, 227
and objectification 64, 75 Russia’s position in, 1992–1997
as denaturalization 63 134, 142–4, 148, 149, 153,
constitutive analysis in 76–7, 91 158, 160–1, 175, 177, 178, 181,
narrative causality in 63–4, 76 182, 183, 187, 191
278 Index
international security (cont.) Lavrov, Sergey 145, 222, 225

Russia’s position in, 1998–2008 Lithuania see Baltic states
194, 202, 205, 208, 211–12, 230, Lugar, Richard 172
238; capital cultural–symbolic and Lukin, Vladimir 197, 201, 212
capital material–institutional
interpretation 60, 61–2 Macedonia 196
and discourse analysis 72–4, 89, 90, Marxism 246, 249
157 Mauss problem 51, 69
and hermeneutic circle 62, 72, 73 Medvedev, Dmitri 224, 226
and objectification 61, 62, 72, 74, 75 Merleau Ponty, Maurice 32
and practices see practice; study of Methodology
and thick description see Geertz, and methods 53
Clifford standards of 53, 55–6, 58,
interpretivism 51, 53, 61–2, 66, 78–82
76, 79; see also interpretation; mètis see practical knowledge
sobjectivism Migranyan, Andranik 173, 186
intertextuality 22, 61, 72, 73; Milošević, Slobodan 197, 198, 200
see also interpretation mimesis see implicit learning
Italy 111, 213, 223, 240 misrecognition see doxa
Ivanov, Igor 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, mode of pursuing security 150–5
201, 202, 207, 214, 216 external 150, 151, 178, 179, 182,
Ivanov, Sergei 129 192, 194, 202, 203–4, 208, 209,
Ivashov, Leonid 196, 200, 202 212, 221
internal 150, 152, 153, 154, 155,
Kahneman, Daniel 24 156, 157, 159, 160, 168, 169,
Khrushchev, Nikita 157 170, 175, 177, 181, 187, 192,
Kissinger, Henry 16, 192 204, 207, 208, 209, 212, 238,
know-how see practical knowledge 239, 240; see also international
Kosovo crisis 4, 89, 97, 107–8, 122, security, field of, evolving rules of
146, 182, 185, 190, 191, 194, the game
195–202, 213, 216, 219, 221, Moldova 109, 188, 224, 226
225, 227, 234, 235
Kosovo Force (KFOR) 123–4, 201, NATO
202 and collective defense (Article V)
Operation Allied Force 107, 113, 110, 114–25, 130, 155, 158, 174,
195, 204 209, 217
Pristina airport incident 103–4, 195, bureaucracy 84, 117, 132, 133, 134,
201–2, 203, 235 136, 137, 138–40
Račak massacre 197 double enlargement 88, 89, 90,
Rambouillet conference 197, 198 119–20, 144, 148, 152, 154,
Kozyrev, Andrei 156, 157, 158, 161, 161–8, 174, 175, 176, 177,
163, 166, 167, 169, 173, 175, 179–82, 187, 189, 191, 192,
178, 180, 181, 189, 207, 228 193, 194, 195, 204, 205, 209,
Kratochwil, Friedrich 57 215, 222, 227, 228, 229, 234;
Kuhn, Thomas 54 see also NATO enlargement,
Kvashnin, Anatoly 202 functional; NATO enlargement
Kyrgyzstan 220 geographical
international community habitus
Lakatos, Imre 82 141, 142–3, 154, 164, 183, 205,
Lake, Anthony 164 237, 240
Index 279
NATO (cont.) clashing organizational culture in

Operation Active Endeavour 104–5, 97, 123, 131–40
115, 125, 132, 138, 209, 223 daily cooperation on the ground in
NATO enlargement, functional 107–8, 97, 109, 122–31
149, 152, 155, 158, 159, 161, disappearance of the possibility
165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 176, of mutual force in 2, 4, 97,
181, 189, 194, 195, 208, 216, 98–104, 105, 107, 126, 129,
220, 221, 222 227
global mandate of 216 elusive momentum in 97, 119–22
Istanbul summit (2004) 217, 218 latent mistrust in 97, 98–9, 104–11,
London summit (1990) 154 132
partnership 155, 159, 166, 167, 169, normalization of disputes in 97,
170, 176, 178, 179, 181, 183 111–18, 119, 146
peacekeeping 100, 114, 123, 124, NATO–Russia relations
126, 127, 146, 155, 159, 163, and nuclear deterrence 4, 108, 150,
167, 169, 170, 184, 196, 199, 161, 184, 185, 188, 219, 239
200, 201, 210, 223 and security community
Riga summit (2006) 222 development 2, 4–6, 91, 96, 97,
Rome summit (1991) 154, 155 149, 174, 178, 191, 192, 195,
Strategic Concept (1999) 195, 203, 227, 228, 229, 230, 234,
207–8 235, 236
Washington summit (1999) 195, and the Cold War 2, 41, 98, 106,
207, 217 112, 116, 129, 133, 138, 148,
NATO enlargement, geographical 107, 150, 158, 163, 170, 173, 196,
108, 109–11, 149, 152, 155, 161, 197, 214, 224, 225, 234
163–8, 170–3, 181, 184, 185, Founding Act (1997) 149, 182, 184,
186, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 185, 186, 187, 189, 191, 198,
208, 214, 215–16, 217–18, 220, 205, 212, 214
221, 222–3 homology in 130, 149, 150,
Brussels summit (1994) 166 155–61, 191, 192, 194, 209–15,
possibility of Russia joining 121, 236
158, 171, 218–19, 240–1 hysteresis in 2, 91, 146,
Prague summit (2002) 209, 149, 161, 168, 174–7, 182–91,
216, 217 192, 194, 195, 197, 200, 201,
Study on Enlargement (1995) 172, 203–8, 209, 210, 215–16, 219,
174 222, 226, 229–30, 232, 234,
NATO–Russia Council (NRC) 83, 235–7, 236, 238, 240
90, 95–147, 148, 182, 194, 208, Rome Declaration (2002) 214
213, 214, 215, 221, 223, 224, Netherlands 214, 218, 239
225, 227 Neumann, Iver B. 5, 13, 66, 74, 141,
NATO–Russia diplomacy 149, 211, 250
as normal practice 2, 96, 97, 98, New Thinking see Gorbachev,
103, 117, 148, 191, 194, 203, Mikhail
227, 234 non-war community see diplomacy,
as self-evident practice 141, 150, normal
161, 191, 192 norm 11, 21, 37
as symbolic power struggle 2, 106, internalization 20–1, 31, 44–5
139–40, 161, 178, 182, 192, 193, North Atlantic Cooperation Council
194, 200, 221, 222, 227, 230, (NACC) 154, 155, 156, 158, 159,
232, 234, 235 164, 169
280 Index
North Atlantic Council (NAC) 84, practicality, logic of 6, 13–38, 27, 50,
129, 143, 155, 164, 167, 66, 97, 120, 140, 231, 249
196, 223 and logic of appropriateness 35, 37
Norway 111, 188, 207 and logic of consequence 36–7
Nunn–Lugar program see Cooperative and logic of habit 21–2, 43–4
Threat Reduction ontological priority of 36, 40
see also social action, logics of
Obama, Barack 119 practice 12
objectification see interpretation; constitutive 40, 41;
historicization see also community of practice
ontological security 13 study of 51, 62, 66–72, 74–5,
Organization for Security and 83, 85–6, 95, 102, 104;
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) see also induction; interpretation
115, 151, 152, 158, 167, 168, practice theory 13, 23, 27, 45, 241–50
189, 197, 214, 221 practice turn 5, 13, 21, 22
Istanbul Summit 152, 224 Primakov, Yevgeny 141, 165, 166, 172,
173, 174, 176, 178, 179, 184,
Partnership for Peace (PfP) 155, 159, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 196,
164, 166, 169, 183, 184, 189, 198, 199, 200, 212
198; see also NATO enlargement, Putin, Vladimir 135, 206, 210, 213,
functional 215, 216, 218, 225, 226
path dependence 63, 75, 161, 192–3,
228, 245–6 rational choice theory 11, 16–17, 56,
peace see security community 242, 248, 249
Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 97, realism 244–5, 246, 249
129, 185, 191, 196, 197, 198, realpolitik see modes of pursuing
212, 213; see also NATO–Russia security, external
Council reflexive knowledge
Perry, William 163 see representational knowledge
phenomenology see induction representational bias 13, 14–22, 26,
Poland 84, 101, 109–10, 163, 45, 52
164, 188, 195, 207, 214, 225; epistemological roots of 14–15, 51
see also Visegrad states representational knowledge 11, 14,
Polanyi, Michael 23, 24, 47 28–30
Popper, Karl 80 Rice, Condoleezza 224
positions see field Ricoeur, Paul 61, 62, 79
positional agency 35, 153, 181, 187, Robertson, Lord 213
206, 211, 228, 239, 244, 248; Rodionov, Igor 171
see also field; practical sense Rogozin, Dimitri 212
positivism 53, 58, 79, 80, 81, 85 Romania 107, 140, 188, 189, 201,
postfoundationalism see constructivism 219, 225
power see doxa and symbolic power Rühe, Volker 164, 166, 196
practical knowledge 1, 11, 12, 21, 22, Russia
23–4, 27–31, 51, 66, 68–70, 95, bureaucracy 84, 101–2, 117, 128,
102 132, 133, 134–8, 139–40, 157,
practical sense 35, 68, 105, 113, 122, 165
193, 194, 233 domestic transition in 119, 120,
and agency and structure 35–6, 134, 176, 189, 228, 229
37 Duma 183, 189, 198
see also practicality, logic of elite change in 105, 176, 179, 228
Index 281
Russia (cont.) social action, logics of 11, 14, 36,

Great Power habitus 140, 141, 142, 37–8; see also appropriateness,
143, 144, 146, 149, 161, 174–82, logic of; arguing, logic of;
183, 187, 190, 192, 193, 194, consequences, logic of;
195, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, practicality, logic of
207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 215, social fact 41, 58
216, 220, 221, 222, 227, 228, socialization 11, 21, 26, 31
229, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 243 soft balancing 188, 190
liberal habitus 158, 175, 182 Solana, Javier 186
Ryle, Gilbert 22, 23, 30, 44, 49 sovereignty 145, 150, 190, 207, 219,
221; see also modes of pursuing
Saakashvili, Mikhail 220 security
Sarkozy, Nicolas 224 Soviet Union 98, 106, 108, 121, 133,
Schütz, Alfred 60 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 160,
scientific realism 56, 57, 59, 76, 77 161, 163, 173, 177, 206, 227,
Searle, John 23, 24, 29, 49, 77 229, 241
security community 3 Spain 111
and collective identity 3–4, 5, state, corporate agency of
38–9, 237; see also collective see corporate agency
identification Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties
and hysteresis 1–2, 235 (START) I/II 188, 189, 197
and representational bias 38–40 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
as self-evident diplomacy 1, 40–1, (SORT) 215
43, 50, 232, 233 structuration theory see Giddens,
as doxic order 1, 45–6, 50, 231, Anthony
232 style of reasoning see constructivism
theory of practice of 5–6, 38–50, 82, symbolic power see doxa
89, 231, 232, 234, 238
September 11, 2001 125, 130, tacit knowing see practical
150, 194, 208, 209, 210, 211, knowledge
212, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221; Talbott, Strobe 162, 163, 172, 173,
see also international security 180, 184, 199, 200, 202
field of evolving rules of the game Taylor, Charles 12, 23
1998–2008 Tilly, Charles 75, 241, 248
Serbia 108, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, transatlantic security community 5, 39,
206; see also Kosovo crisis 42–3, 171, 185, 208, 210, 218,
Sergeyev, Igor 197, 202 233, 240, 247
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Turkey 189, 207, 214
(SCO) 220
Shevtsov, Leonti 123, 138 Ukraine 103, 107, 109, 114, 126, 145,
Slovenia 225 188, 201, 220, 222, 223
sobjectivism 64–5, 77–8 Orange Revolution 4, 114, 115, 219,
and abduction 65, 78, 82 234
and falsification 80 possible NATO enlargement to 107,
and generalizability 80–1 222–3
and reflexivity 54, 57, 70, 71 United Kingdom 84, 103, 111, 117,
and validity 79–80, 81–2, 120, 201, 240
85, 89 United Nations 97, 189, 199, 206,
see also induction; interpretation; 208, 214, 222
historicization; methodology Charter 198, 205, 207, 222
282 Index
United Nations (cont.) Wendt, Alexander 21, 57, 86

Chapter VII mandate 197, 200 Williams, Michael C. 13, 74, 149, 153,
Security Council 88, 159, 160, 162, 154, 242
196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 206, Wittgenstein, Ludwig 12, 23, 28, 72,
207, 213 73
United States 84, 100, 101, 107, World Trade Organization (WTO) 88,
108, 110, 111, 114, 115, 121, 239–40
124, 131, 138, 139, 141, 155,
167, 172, 181, 183, 204, 206, Yeltsin, Boris 133, 139, 157, 158, 159,
209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168,
214, 215, 216, 219, 223, 224, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 177,
233, 240 182, 183, 185, 188, 189, 191,
Uzbekistan 220 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202,
206, 208, 210, 225
Visegrad states 163, 164, 188 Yugoslavia 88, 159, 160, 161,
Vygotsky, Lev 33 180, 198, 199, 207;
see also Bosnian civil war;
Waltz, Kenneth 244 Kosovo crisis; Serbia
Weber, Max 63 Yushchenko, Viktor 220
Cambridge Studies in International Relations
101 Colin Wight

Agents, structures and international relations
Politics as ontology
100 Michael C. Williams
The realist tradition and the limits of international relations
99 Ivan Arreguín-Toft
How the weak win wars
A theory of asymmetric confl ict
98 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall
Power in global governance
97 Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach
Remapping global politics
History’s revenge and future shock
96 Christian Reus-Smit
The politics of international law
95 Barry Buzan
From international to world society?
English School theory and the social structure of globalisation
94 K. J. Holsti
Taming the sovereigns
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93 Bruce Cronin
Institutions for the common good
International protection regimes in international security
92 Paul Keal
European conquest and the rights of indigenous peoples
The moral backwardness of international society
91 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver
Regions and powers
The structure of international security
90 A. Claire Cutler
Private power and global authority
Transnational merchant law in the global political economy
89 Patrick M. Morgan
Deterrence now
88 Susan Sell
Private power, public law
The globalization of intellectual property rights
87 Nina Tannenwald
The nuclear taboo
The United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945
86 Linda Weiss
States in the global economy
Bringing domestic institutions back in
85 Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.)
The emergence of private authority in global governance
84 Heather Rae
State identities and the homogenisation of peoples
83 Maja Zehfuss
Constructivism in international relations
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82 Paul K. Ruth and Todd Allee
The democratic peace and territorial confl ict in the
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81 Neta C. Crawford
Argument and change in world politics
Ethics, decolonization and humanitarian intervention
80 Douglas Lemke
Regions of war and peace
79 Richard Shapcott
Justice, community and dialogue in international relations
78 Phil Steinberg
The social construction of the ocean
77 Christine Sylvester
Feminist international relations
An unfi nished journey
76 Kenneth A. Schultz
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75 David Houghton
US foreign policy and the Iran hostage crisis
74 Cecilia Albin
Justice and fairness in international negotiation
73 Martin Shaw
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Globality as an unfi nished revolution
72 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour
Perfect deterrence
71 Robert O’Brien, Anne Marie Goetz , Jan Aart Scholte and Marc
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Contesting global governance
Multilateral economic institutions and global social movements
70 Roland Bleiker
Popular dissent, human agency and global politics
69 Bill McSweeney
Security, identity and interests
A sociology of international relations
68 Molly Cochran
Normative theory in international relations
A pragmatic approach
67 Alexander Wendt
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66 Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.)
The power of human rights
International norms and domestic change
65 Daniel W. Drezner
The sanctions paradox
Economic statecraft and international relations
64 Viva Ona Bartkus
The dynamic of secession
63 John A. Vasquez
The power of power politics
From classical realism to neotraditionalism
62 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.)
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61 Charles Jones
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60 Jeffrey W. Knopf
Domestic society and international cooperation
The impact of protest on US arms control policy
59 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf
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58 Daniel S. Geller and J. David Singer
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57 Randall D. Germain
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56 N. Piers Ludlow
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The Six and the fi rst UK application to the EEC
55 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger
Theories of international regimes
54 Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth C. Economy (eds.)
The internationalization of environmental protection
53 James N. Rosenau
Along the domestic-foreign frontier
Exploring governance in a turbulent world
52 John M. Hobson
The wealth of states
A comparative sociology of international economic and political
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51 Kalevi J. Holsti
The state, war, and the state of war
50 Christopher Clapham
Africa and the international system
The politics of state survival
49 Susan Strange
The retreat of the state
The diffusion of power in the world economy
48 William I. Robinson
Promoting polyarchy
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47 Roger Spegele
Political realism in international theory
46 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.)
State sovereignty as social construct
45 Mervyn Frost
Ethics in international relations
A constitutive theory
44 Mark W. Zacher with Brent A. Sutton
Governing global networks
International regimes for transportation and communications
43 Mark Neufeld
The restructuring of international relations theory
42 Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.)
Bringing transnational relations back in
Non-state actors, domestic structures and international
institutions
41 Hayward R. Alker
Rediscoveries and reformulations
Humanistic methodologies for international studies
40 Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair
Approaches to world order
39 Jens Bartelson
A genealogy of sovereignty
38 Mark Rupert
Producing hegemony
The politics of mass production and American global power
37 Cynthia Weber
Simulating sovereignty
Intervention, the state and symbolic exchange
36 Gary Goertz
Contexts of international politics
35 James L. Richardson
Crisis diplomacy
The Great Powers since the mid-nineteenth century
34 Bradley S. Klein
Strategic studies and world order
The global politics of deterrence
33 T. V. Paul
Asymmetric confl icts: war initiation by weaker powers
32 Christine Sylvester
Feminist theory and international relations in a postmodern era
31 Peter J. Schraeder
US foreign policy toward Africa
Incrementalism, crisis and change
30 Graham Spinardi
From Polaris to Trident: the development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile
technology
29 David A. Welch
Justice and the genesis of war
28 Russell J. Leng
Interstate crisis behavior, 1816–1980: realism versus reciprocity
27 John A. Vasquez
The war puzzle
26 Stephen Gill (ed.)
Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations
25 Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds.)
From cold war to collapse: theory and world politics in the 1980s
24 R. B. J. Walker
Inside/outside: international relations as political theory
23 Edward Reiss
The strategic defense initiative
22 Keith Krause
Arms and the state: patterns of military production and trade
21 Roger Buckley
US-Japan alliance diplomacy 1945–1990
20 James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.)
Governance without government: order and change in world
politics
19 Michael Nicholson
Rationality and the analysis of international confl ict
18 John Stopford and Susan Strange
Rival states, rival fi rms
Competition for world market shares
17 Terry Nardin and David R. Mapel (eds.)
Traditions of international ethics
16 Charles F. Doran
Systems in crisis
New imperatives of high politics at century’s end
15 Deon Geldenhuys
Isolated states: a comparative analysis
14 Kalevi J. Holsti
Peace and war: armed confl icts and international order 1648–1989
13 Saki Dockrill
Britain’s policy for West German rearmament 1950–1955
12 Robert H. Jackson
Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the third
world
11 James Barber and John Barratt
South Africa’s foreign policy
The search for status and security 1945–1988
10 James Mayall
Nationalism and international society
9 William Bloom
Personal identity, national identity and international relations
8 Zeev Maoz
National choices and international processes
7 Ian Clark
The hierarchy of states
Reform and resistance in the international order
6 Hidemi Suganami
The domestic analogy and world order proposals
5 Stephen Gill
American hegemony and the Trilateral Commission
4 Michael C. Pugh
The ANZUS crisis, nuclear visiting and deterrence
3 Michael Nicholson
Formal theories in international relations
2 Friedrich V. Kratochwil
Rules, norms, and decisions
On the conditions of practical and legal reasoning in international
relations and domestic affairs
1 Myles L. C. Robertson
Soviet policy towards Japan
An analysis of trends in the 1970s and 1980s

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Cambridge Studies in International Relations 113 Vincent Pouliot International Security in Practice The Politics of NATO Russia Diplomacy Cambridge University Press 2010

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International Security in Practice

v i n c e n t p ou l io t is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political

International Security in Practice

Cambridge Studies in International Relations is a joint initiative of Cambridge

112 Columba Peoples

© Vincent Pouliot 2010

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 2010

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

ISBN 978-0-521-19916-2 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or

List of figures and tables page x

Part I: Restoring the practical logic of peace 9

Part II: The symbolic power politics of

Figure 2.1 Diplomacy in interstate relations 43

Table 2.1 Constructivist interpretations of the logic of

I have long been convinced that the practice of diplomacy is just as

An impressive number of people have helped with the completion of

I want to thank the editors and publishers of the Journal of Peace

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (treaty)

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

What if we adopted a different perspective on international secu-

chances are that the development of a peaceful order will be under-

Security community development and the

fosters dependable expectations of peaceful change among countries

Paradoxically, however, this process is not accompanied with what

to look into interstate pacification as a modus operandi instead of

Plan of the book

logic from the recovery of subjective meanings to their objectifica-

consolidated in Moscow as NATO’s double enlargement continued

Restoring the practical logic

who rather emphasize the very practical and inarticulate nature of

Some outsider, unfamiliar with the way we do things, might misunder-

Rules do not come with their own instruction manual, concludes

I call this inarticulate sense that allows agents to perform social

dynamics between agency and structure. Overall, the relationship

The representational bias

To return to diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, whose career spanned

As a result, diplomacy is an art, not a science. 24 It is a practice enacted

The problem is deeper than the well-known tautology of revealed

what the model expects). In other words, instrumentalist rational choice

Table 2.1 Constructivist interpretations of the logic

Logic of (1) Externalism (a) Thin rationality within

action constrained by constitutive communitarian norms and rules.

a structural logic devoid of agency or as a form of habituation that

“taken-for-grantedness.” In what he calls “type II socialization,”

invocations.47 Though an important piece of methodological advice,

thought, a situation that lasts to this day.50 In an illuminating critique

To situate our understanding in practices is to see it as implicit in our

Three other disciples of Wittgenstein – Ryle, Michael Polanyi and

know-how Polanyi calls “tacit knowing,” which consists of attending

Table 2.2 Two ways of knowing in psychological theory

Experiential way of knowing Rational way of knowing

Though interactive, System 1 and System 2 in Table 2.2 present

are informed by past experiences and exposure to environmental

literature by focusing on Bourdieu’s attempt to reach the inarticulate

The logic of practicality

Mètis is knowledge-in-context and derives from concrete applications.