Is The Lot Which Talks About Conjugal Partnership of Gains) : Alinas Vs Alinas Facts
Is The Lot Which Talks About Conjugal Partnership of Gains) : Alinas Vs Alinas Facts
Is The Lot Which Talks About Conjugal Partnership of Gains) : Alinas Vs Alinas Facts
GR No 158040, April 14, 2008 needed to be paid, hence the need to sell
Facts: - RTC awards petition to Gilda, pursuant to FC Art. 124
- Petitioners separated in 1982 leaving behind two lots: and governed by the rules on summary proceedings of Art.
- Lot 896-B-9-A with a bodega (LOT A) 253
- Lot 896-B-9-B with the petitioners' house (LOT B) (This - Teodoro files for Motion of Reconsideration
is the Lot which talks about conjugal partnership of gains) - While above case was pending, Gilda sells the property
- Petitioners entrusted both properties to Respondents with to Jose and Glenda Uy
the agreement that any income from rentals should be - Teodoro files opposition to the motion for approval of the
remitted to the SSS and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta deed of sale
City (RBO) as the rentals would be for payment of - TC approves sale / CA reverses the decision ordering the
petitioners' loans. TC to dismiss the proceedings to approve the deed of sale
- Sometime in 1993, petitioners find out that both lots were
titled in respondents' name ISSUE: WON Gilda Jardelez may assume sole powers of
- Apparently both LOTS were foreclosed, and reacquired administration of conjugal property and sell land since her
by respondents husband is incapacitated with a stroke to do so.
- Furthermore, records show that Onesiforo executed HELD: NO
Absolute Deed of Sale, dated March 10 1989, selling LOT - Art 124 contemplates a situation where spouse is absent,
B to Victor. separated, or abandoned the other or where consent is
- Petitioners file for recovery of lots withheld of cannot be obtained. Such rules don‘t apply
- RTC renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. The sale of to cases where non-consenting spouse is incapacitated.
LOT B, is null and void, since Onesiforo sold w/o wife's - Rule 93 of 1964 Revised Rules of Court is the proper
consent remedy in judicial guardianship proceedings. Also, FC
- Respondents file with CA also recognizes that for the wife to assume power of
- CA renders decision: Lot A is respondents'. LOT B's sale administration it has the same powers and duties as a
in so far as Rosario's share of 1/2 is concerned is of no guardian under rules of court
force and effect. o THUS, they must still observe rules of sale of ward‘s
estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
- ISSUE: WON sale conducted by husband without Revised Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings
consent of wife to whom he is separated with is void
In this case, TC did not comply with procedure in Revised
HELD: YES Rules of Court and did not serve notice of petition to
- Art 124 of FC says that the absence of authority or incapacitated spouse and require him to show
consent of wife shall make the disposition or
encumberance void. Costuna vs. Domondon
- Respondent spouses who bought land (1) knew that it 180 SCRA 333
was conjugal property (2) knew that the wife did not know Sps. Amadeo and Estela Costuna bought 3 parcels of land
of the selling since they were separated (3) sale documents during their marriage and registered the same in the name
do not bear the wife‘s signature, thus they are seen as of Amadeo. Amadeo was later hospitalized (on different
buyers of bad faith dates) for 3rd degree burns on his legs. While already ill
due to old age, he went to his relatives in Samar to settle
However, petitioners are still ordered by court to his property documents. Because of his failure to return,
reimburse them with interest. Estela refused to give her consent to the action of partition
of their conjugal partnership and the deed of sale allegedly
Uy vs. CA filed by Amadeo in Samar for the purpose of financing his
346 SCRA 246 medical needs. Hence, Amadeo executed the mentioned
Facts: deed of sale, which sold his ½ indeterminate share on the
- Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffers a stroke on March 25, 1991 3-parcel property, in favour of Laureana Domondon.
- A piece of property was planned on being sold When Amadeo died, Estela sought the execution of
- Upon knowledge of the planned selling, Teodoro Amadeo‘s will, executed prior to his trip to Samar, which
(Ernesto's son) files for petition praying for a court named her as sole. Laureana opposed the motion, claimed
appointed guardian to administer the property given the her share in the property and sought to have Estela give
present physical and mental incapacity of Ernesto consent to the deed of sale.
- Gilda (Ernesto's wife) files for petition praying for sole CA:
powers of administration of conjugal properties and - husband may not sell real estate without consent unless
authorization to sell the same (1) sale of personal properties (2) real properties acquired
before NCC (3) real properties acquired after NCC but denied because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition
wife is in a leprosarium, declared spendthrift or under civil filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the
interdiction, (4) purpose is to pay conjugal liabilities (5) properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he
purpose is to secure future of children or finishing a career. would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a
- Support of spouse by conjugal property is not relieved bigamy case against Ederlina
when they do not live on the same roof. - Alfred and Ederlina‘s relationship started deteriorating.
He demanded the return of all the properties acquired by
ISSUE: him and Ederlina during their coverture.
- (1) WON deed of sale should be nullified since it waas - Alfred filed a Complaint on October 28, 1985 with the
without the consent of the wife Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real
- (2) WON conjugal partnership should be made liable for and personal
payment of hospital and properties located in Quezon City and Manila. For
medical expenses of Amadeo who allegedly abandoned Ederlina transfered funds from their joint account in HSBC
conjugal home and wife Hong Kong, to her own account without his knowledge
and consent. Using the said funds, Ederlina was able to
HELD: purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also
(1) NO alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established
- Amadeo sought the petitoner‘s consent but petitioner with his own funds, and that the Quezon City property was
withheld it. However when deed of sale was made, she did likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.
nothing to impugn it and assailed it for the first time when - Alfred also filed a complaint against Ederlina with the
Respondent filed a case in RTC-QC. Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific
- Amadeo only sold his ½ share of community property. performance, declaration of ownership of real and personal
Her share in the property is intact. properties, sum of money, and damages. (RTC Davao in
- When consent is unreasonably withheld, one should favor of Ederlina, case dismissed)
consider law as falling within the recognized exceptions - RTC of QC: the purchaser of land is Ederlina (Alfred as
- (2) YES an alien was precluded from recovering the properties
from the respondent)
it falls under the obligations protected by Art 161 of CC - CA: upheld RTC (the petitioner knowingly violated the
since it gives a discernible advantage or good to the Constitution; hence, was barred from recovering the
conjugal partnership, directly or indirectly. Health would money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land. It
held that to allow the petitioner to recover the money used
obviously benefit their conjugal partnership
for the purchase of the properties would embolden aliens
Frenzel vs. Catito to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance,
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003 the public policy)
- Facts: - Pertinent Issues: whether or not the land belongs to
- Alfred (Australian, German descent) pilot with New Alfred
Guinea airlines. Started business in Philippines in 1974 - Held/Ratio- No. It belongs to Ederlina.
and married Teresita Santos (Fil). They separated without
divorce in 1981. The constitution prohibits Alfred from owning lands. He
- 1983 He met Ederlina Catito (Fil) a masseuse in cannot recover the money used to buy the properties.
Australia. Unknown to him she is married to Klaus Muller
(German) and lived in Germany for a while. She is fluent Ayuste vs.CA
in German and Alfred enjoyed talking to her. GR no. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999
- Alfred offered Ederlina to stay in Phil and engage in - Facts:
business. She put up a beauty parlor. Alfred decided to - Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on September
stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. 24, 1961. They bought a machine shop (managed by
They acquired properties in the name of Ederlina which Rafael) in Lucena and bought a parcel
Alfred consented to since he plans on marrying Ederlina. of land also in Lucena. The title of land was in the name of
Klaus wrote Alfred about his marriage with Ederlina and Rafael married to Christina.
begged Alfred to return Ederlina. When Alfred confronted - In 1987, Rafael sold the land in favor of private
Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were married but respondent. The
she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. He deed of sale was signed by Rafael and Christina. In 1990
agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for Christina filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale.
the outcome of Ederlina‘s petition for divorce. Alfred She claims that her signature was forged and the sale was
hired the lawyer. Alfred acquired more properties in the without her knowledge of consent.
name of Ederlina. Ederlina‘s petition for divorce was
- RTC: sale is null and void - The CA further found that Ana was aware of the
- CA: sale is valid, the annulment was instituted after execution of the Deed, and yet she brought no action for its
Rafael died (the deed is voidable but complaint should be annulment within ten (10) years from its execution.
raised during the marriage as required by Art. 173.) - Pertinent Issues: Whether there was a perfected and
- Pertinent Issues: whether or not the sale is valid consummated deed of exchange
- -Held/Ratio- Yes. The sale is valid. - Whether the Deed of Exchange which was not signed by
- Art. 173 The wife may, during the marriage, and within the wife of Respondent Honorio G. Villaranda is valid and
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the enforceable.
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband - Held/Ratio- Yes. The deed is valid.
entered into without her consent, when such consent is - The absence of the signature of Ana on the Deed does not
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends prove lack of her consent thereto, because a contract may
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal validly exist even if the parties have not reduced their
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this stipulations to writing. Too, assuming that her consent to
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, the Deed is lacking, such fact would not render the
may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated agreement void, but merely voidable.
by the husband. - There is no evidence that any action to annul the transfer
made by Honorio was ever brought by Ana within ten
Registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds years from "the transaction questioned." Her right to bring
constitutes a notice to the whole world. Since the deed of an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed.
sale was registered on March 5, 1987, Christina Ayuste is Hence, the assailed Deed is still valid and enforceable.
presumed to have constructive notice of the sale from such
date. The legal prohibition against the disposition of conjugal
property by one spouse without consent of the other has
Villaranda vs. Spouses Villaranda been established for the benefit, not of third persons, but
G.R. No. 153447, Feb,23, 2004 only of the other spouse for whom the law desires to save
- Facts: the conjugal partnership from damages that might be
- Land was left to Vicente Villaranda and Honorio caused. Not being the proper party, Vicente cannot avail
Villaranda and their siblings by their parents. In 1976 himself of the remedy prescribed by Article 173.
Honorio and Vicente executed the deed of exchange where
Vicente agreed to convey his 64.22-square-meter portion Ainza vs.CA
to Honorio, in exchange for a property in Macasandig, G.R. No. 165420. June 30, 2005
Cagayan de Oro City. After the execution of the Deed, - Facts:
Honorio took possession of the 64.22-square-meter lot and - Antonio and Eugenia owned a lot with an unfinished
constructed a building thereon. residential house located in Quezon City. In April
- On April 6, 1992, a subdivision plan was completed, in 1987Concepcion bought one-half of an undivided portion
pursuit of which TCT No. T-65893 for the 64.22 square- of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latter‘s
meter share of Vicente was issued in his name. husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
- Honorio and Ana brought an action before the RTC to (P100,000.00).
compel Vicente to comply with his obligations under the - No Deed of Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the
Deed of Exchange. They want Vicente to identify and transaction, but cash payment was received by the
delineate his undivided portion of the property and convey respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion
to them the 64.22-square-meter Divisoria lot, in through physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and
compliance with his obligations under the Deed. daughter, Natividad Tuliao (Natividad). Concepcion
- During the pendency of the case, Honorio conditionally authorized Natividad and the latter‘s husband, Ceferino
sold the Divisoria lot to Colorhouse Laboratories, Inc. Tuliao (Ceferino) to occupy the premises, and make
- Vicente contends that because the property had not been improvements on the unfinished building.
delivered, the Deed had not been consummated. Moreover, - Respondents caused the subdivision of the property.
he claimed that the Deed had already been revoked by both Antonio said that he bought the property in 1980 and
parties. introduced improvements thereon. That he and his wife
- RTC: in favor of Honorio, contract valid allowed Natividad and Ceferino to occupy the premises
- CA: upheld RTC temporarily. Antonio requested Natividad to vacate the
- The provisions of the Civil Code were applicable to the premises but the latter refused and claimed that
case at bar, since the Deed of Exchange had been entered Concepcion owned the property. Antonio filed an
into prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the ejectment suit on April 1, 1999. Concepcion, represented
absence of the wife‘s signature on the Deed made it only also filed on May 4, 1999 a civil case for partition of real
voidable, not void. property and annulment of titles with damages.
- Antonio claimed that his wife, Eugenia, admitted that - Prima elevated this to CA, CA affirmed judgment on
Concepcion offered to buy one third (1/3) of the property support but dismissed petition for separation of
who gave her small amounts over several years which property for lack merit saying that it was not allowed as
totaled P100,000.00 by 1987 and for which she signed a their separation was due to their agreement rather and
receipt. not because of abandonment
- RTC: Sale is valid. In favor of Concepcion.( sale was
consummated when both contracting parties complied with ISSUES:
their respective obligations. Eugenia transferred possession - W/N the decision of RTC can be questioned given that it
by delivering the property to Concepcion who in turn paid is final and executory
the purchase price. ) - W/N she is entitled to judicial separation of conjugal
- CA: sale is null and void. (Applying Article 124 of the property on the ground of abandonment
Family Code, the Court of
Appeals ruled that since the subject property is conjugal, HELD/RATIO:
the written consent of Antonio must be obtained for the - The RTC failed put judgment on separation of property
sale to be valid. ) in the dispositive portion, BUT it was made in the
- Pertinent Issue: whether there was a valid contract of sale penultimate paragraph reading as follows:
between Eugenia and Concepcion o ―…all the properties in question are considered
- Held/Ratio: properties of Jose Jo, the defendant is subject to separation
- Sc: Valid. of property…‖
- There was a perfected contract of sale between Eugenia - The RTC held that they were legally married and that the
and Concepcion. The records show that Eugenia offered to properties were acquired during coverture although they
sell a portion of the property to Concepcion, who accepted were in the name of a dummy (Chinese national kasi)
the offer and agreed to pay P100,000.00 as consideration.
The contract of sale was consummated when both parties - Prima submits that their agreement was not to be
fully complied with their respective obligations. Eugenia separated but for her to temporarily live with her parents
delivered the property to Concepcion, who in turn, paid during the initial period of her
Eugenia the price of One Hundred Thousand Pesos pregnancy and that he would visit and support her. But
(P100,000.00), as evidenced by the receipt . when she returned to their house in Dumaguete in 1942, he
- The oral contract of sale between Eugenia and refused to accept her.
Concepcion was evidenced by a receipt signed by Eugenia. - She is entitled to separation of property on ground of
Antonio also stated that his wife admitted to him that she abandonment.
sold the property to Concepcion. - Abandonment implies departure of one spouse with
- The action to annul an oral contract must be commenced intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence
within six years from the time the right of action accrued. without just cause and without providing for means
No action was commenced by Antonio to annul the sale, although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation
hence his right to seek its annulment was extinguished by of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
prescription. intention of perpetual separation. The physical
- Under Art. 173 Antonio is still barred from instituting an separation of the parties, coupled by the refusalm by Jose
action to annul the sale because since April 1987, more Jo to give support to Prima, sufficed to constitute
than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such abandonment as a ground for legal separation of their
action being filed. conjugal property. Aside from this, he admittedly
cohabitated with other women and have not established
Antonio failed to exercise his right to ask for the just cause for his refusal to comply with his duties as
annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now husband.
barred from questioning the validity of the sale between - Court ordered for division between the two hal/half. It
his wife and Concepcion. should include properties such as those which were
registered in the name of other persons in violation of the
Partosa-Jo v. CA anti-dummy law.
216 SCRA 693
FACTS: “The past has caught up with the private respondent. After
- 1980, Prima Partosa-Jo filed two complaints against Jose his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate
Jo for a)judicial separation of conjugal property and b) children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful
complaint for support for her and their daughter Monina wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to
- 29 Nov 1983: Negros Oriental RTC rendered judgment her of his eternal love and care.‖
in favor of Prima but failed to include judgment on judicial
separation of property in the dispositive portion Metropolitan Bank vs Pascual
GR No. 163744, Feb. 29, 2008 - Pending its liquidation, the CPG is converted into an
FACTS: implied ordinary co-ownership. What governs the property
- Nicholson Pascual m. Florencia Nevalga on 19Jan1985. relation is Art 493 which says the effect of the alienation
During the union, they bought a 250-square meter lot in or the mortgage… shall be limited to the portion which
Makati from Clarito and Belen Sering. may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
- In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for declaration of nullity of of the co-ownership.
marriage on the ground of psycholohical incapacity. - Florencia has the right to mortgage ½ undivided interest
31July1995, RTC ordered dissolution and liquidation of without consent
ex-spouses‘ conjugal partnership of gains, however, they
failed to liquidate it. Mortgage is valid insofar as the share of Florencia is
- 30April1997, Florencia, with Norberto and Elvira concerned.
Oliveros obtained a 58 Million Peso loan from Metrobank.
To secure obligation, they mortgaged their properties, Santero v. CFI
including the lot in Makati. Florencia gave Metrobank a 153 SCRA 728
copy of the RTC decision and a waiver allegedly executed Facts:
on 9Apr1995 by Nicholson in favor of Florencia covering Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for
conjugal properties that were listed therein but did not Allowance from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual
include the Makati property. (legitimate father of private respondents) which was
- They failed to pay their obligation so Metrobank initiated granted by the CFI.
foreclosure proceedings and at the auction sale emerged as Petitioners (also legitimate children of Pascual with
the highest bidder. another woman) oppose the motion on the grounds that
- 28June2000, Nicholson filed for nullity of marriage most of the private respondents are already of age.
alleging that the property was conjugal and was mortgaged NOTE: neither of the women are legally married to Pablo
without his consent Pascual.
- RTC declared the mortgages invalid and ordered Issue:
Metrobank and Florencia to pay Nicholson P100,000.00 W/N court acted with grave abuse of discretion by
moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney‘s fees. granting the motion for allowance.
- CA affirmed with modification, deleting the fees Held: NO
imposed Ratio:
Petition lacks merit.
ISSUE/S: Art. 290 (support for children can apply even beyond the
- W/N the property is conjugal age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It
- W/N the Mortgage was valid doesn‘t matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and
married. The New Civil Code entitles the children to
HELD:
allowance as advances of their shares in the inheritance
- The disputed property is conjugal.
- Metrobank virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the from their father, Pablo. A substantive right cannot be
property when it refered to them as ―spouses‖, ―co- impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules
mortgagor‖ in a)the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure b) of Court)
published notice for foreclosure and c) demand letter to
vacate premises of the property. Maquilan vs Maquilan June 8, 2007
- Contrarty to Metrobank‘s submission, the matter of the Facts:
use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for Spouses Maquilan were happily married until Virgilio
the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise is discovered that Dita was having an affair.
WRONG. only proof acquisition during the He filed a complaint for adultery in which Dita and her
marriage is needed to raise presumption. paramour were found guilty.
- The declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, June 15 2001: Private respondent filed a Petition for
does not Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
automatically result in the regime of complete Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
separation when it is shown that there was no Damages.
liquidation of the conjugal assets. During pre-trial of case, spouses created a COMPROMISE
- While the declaration of nullity severed the marital bond AGREEMENT.
and dissolved conjugal partnership, the character of the This is with regard to some particular properties that they
properties acquired continues to subsist as conjugal either decided to divide between them or give to their
property until and after the liquidation and partition of common child, Neil.
the partnership.
Compromise agreement was given judicial imprimatur by 1919 – when they married in church and when 1st wife
respondent RTC Judge. died.
Jan. 15, 2002: Petitioner files an Omnibus Motion saying 1953- husband remarried, when 2nd wife sold the land.
that his lawyer did not ―intelligently and judiciously 1961 – when children discovered sale
apprise him of the consequential effects of the Agreement.‖ Plaintiffs are currently praying for the annulment of the
Respondent Judge denied Motion. documents of sale over particular lands that were sold to
Aug. 30, 2002: CA also dismissed petition for lack of private respondent couple by their father‘s 2nd wife.
merit. They allege that common properties belonged to their
The conviction of the crime of adultery of Dita does not parents who acquired the lands during their lifetime and
ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal through their joint effort and capital. Sales of land by their
property. father were done without their knowledge and consent and
She was only sentenced with the penalty of prision only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
correccional, without civil interdiction, which would have Children discovered sale in 1961.
deprived her of the right to manage her property. Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good
Since petition for declaration of nullity was not yet faith and they believed that the Melbourne was the sole
decided, it would be premature to apply Art. 43 and 63 of owner of the parcels of land.
FC (re: effects of nullified marriage or LS) Melbourne and maxey started living together in 1903. That
The spouses also VOLUNTARILY agreed to a separation same year, the children allege that they got married ―in
of their property which was approved of by law, in the military fashion‖. They acquired properties in 1911 and
accordance with FC 134. It is the petitioner and his 1912. They got married in 1919.
lawyer‘s fault for not checking nor objecting to this right Regina died sometime in 1919, soon after the church
away before it was approved of. marriage.
Main Issue: 1953: husband remarried.
Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made Issue:
by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of W/N spouses Maxey were married as early as 1903 ―in
nullity of marriage is valid. a military fashion‖ as alleged by the children
HELD: NO. The CFI and the CA were correct in rejecting this
YES. The court fully concurs with the CA since the Act No. 3613 a.k.a. the Revised Marriage Law
Ratio: was approved much later (Dec. 4, 1929). It could not apply
Art. 134 of the FC says that separation of property may be to a 1903 marriage.
effected and is subject to judicial approval. In the case at W/N common law spouses, prior to marriage, share
bar, this was clearly allowed by the RTC so it holds. conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912.
Obiter: voluntary separation of property is subject to rights RTC: applied Art. 144 that states that in common law
of all creditors of CPG and other persons with pecuniary marriages, the property acquired by both through
interest (Art 136 FC) work, industry, wages, salaries are governed by the
Re: Dita being a guilty spouse: ―…the contention that the rules of co-ownership.
Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention CA: Ruled otherwise, they believed that the land was
of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the exclusive property of Melbourne Maxey. Art. 144 should
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and not have applied because the Regina did not contribute to
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.‖ the acquisition of the profit. She had no income of her
Conviction of adultery does NOT carry the accessory of own. Cannot consider this a ―joint‖ effort.
civil interdiction, rendering the agreement still valid, as SC: YES. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there
opposed to what the petitioner believes. (Look at ratio of being no showing that vested rights would be impaired or
CA) prejudiced through its application.
Again, the petitioner cannot use the excuse that he was Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not
misinformed by his previous counsel. ―Negligence of the prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right.
counsel binds the client.‖ (Salonga vs. CA) Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August
30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership
Maxey v. CA between a man and wife not legally married and their
129 SCRA 187 cf. NCC 144 corresponding right to an equal share in properties
Facts: acquired through their joint efforts and industry during
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this
lived as husband and wife in Davao, out of this common Court. (Aznar et al. vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055; Flores vs.
law marriage, they had 6 children (petitioners) Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil. 451; Marata
1903 – when they started living together 1911-1912 – vs. Dionio, L-24449, December 31, 1925; Lesaca v.
when Melbourne bought the lands Lesaca, 91 Phil. 135.)
Under this new code, it is believed that even if it is only
the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of Civil code provisions on co-ownership should thus should
property acquired during their cohabitation together. thus apply to answer property regime of the parties.
The woman runs the household:
"in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands Gonzales vs Gonzales
hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return 478 SCRA 327
and the wife manages the affairs of the household. . . .” Facts: Before they started living together on March 1977,
(Dean Cortes) Francisco Gonzales offered Erminda Gonzales to be his
“In the Philippines, the best man is the woman." (Gov-Gen partner in Fiesta Pizza, his pizza business, and to take over
Leonard Wood) its operations. She accepted the offer and took care of the
Ruling: business‘ daily operations, personnel management, outlets
―the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 supervision, and met people during inspections.
purchase price of the land while the private respondents - Despite their marriage on Feb. 4, 1979, the same was
should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half declared void under FC 36 on Feb. 12, 1997. Erminda then
of the properties. Equitable considerations, however, lead sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
claimed the pizza business to be conjugal property where
us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on
she contributed to 80% of the total management.
the other.‖ Francisco, however, claimed that it was exclusive.
Issue: WON properties should be divided equally between
Fehr vs. Fehr husband and wife
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003 Held: YES
Facts: because the marriage was declared void, the property
- March 1983 – petitioner and respondent moved in regime that applies is co-ownership under FC 147. Under
together in Manila. the rules of co-ownership, properties acquired by both
- July 1983 – bought Suite 204 of LGC condominium. parties during their union (under a void marriage) are
Deal was executed by respondent and was issued under presumed to have been obtained through joint efforts and
petitioner‘s name will be owned by them in equal shares absent proof of the
- 1985 – got married contrary. Francisco admitted in a handwritten letter dated
- 1997 – marriage was declared void under FC 36 Sept. 6, 1989 that Erminda had helped in the management
- 1999 – RTC issued order resolving their property. This of the business and was not a mere housewife. Hence, the
was contested by petitioner adducing that Suite 204, LGC business is co-owned and both Francisco and Erminda are
condominium was purchased on installment basis when presumed to have contributed jointly.
they were living exclusively as husband and wife without - Art 147 applies when )1) when man and woman
benefit of marriage thus rules on co-ownership should capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
apply (FC Art 147) other without benefit of marriage (2) when man and
- TC: affirmed ruling that condo unit was acquired before woman live together under void marriage
marriage thus is solely respondent‘s property o Presumption is anything acquired during both instances
- CA: dismissed petition for lack of merit. Thus the present are obtained through joint efforts and shall be divided
petition. equally.
ISSUE: WON Suite 204 is solely respondent‘s property Party who didn‘t participate in acquisition by other party
HELD: NO
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly
- FC Art 147 – applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to marry but in acquisition if former‘s efforts consisted of care and
whose marriage is still void. maintenance of family and household.
o Elements: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife Juaniza v. Jose
(3) union is without benefit of marriage or their marriage is 89 SCRA 306
void = all 3 elements are present in this case FACTS:
o ―Capacitated‖ – legal capacity of party to contract Passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
marriage with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways
o presumed that property was obtained through joint (Nov. 23, 1969) which resulted in the death to 7 and
efforts. physical injuries to 5 of its passengers
- Evidence clearly shows that condo unit was obtained Eugenio Jose – registered owner and operator of the
when they were living exclusively together thus is passenger jeepney
considered COMMON PROPERTY of petitioner and
respondent
At the time of the accident, Eugenio Jose was legally agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six
married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang
defendant-appellant Rosalia Arroyo for 16 years 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
CFI decision on resulting cases for damages: Concubinage upon Carlina‘s complaint. Two years later,
o Ordered Jose and Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally to on February 15, 1981, Miguel died
pay July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter
Rosalia Arroyo filed for Motion for Reconsideration Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents,
denied instituted the case at bar, an action for recovery of
o Lower court based her liability on Art. 144 of the Civil ownership and possession with damages of the house and
Code lot together with the riceland
CA certified question to SC
Issue
ISSUES: Who is the owner of the two pieces of property
WON Art. 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case Held: Carlina, the first wife
where one of the Under FC Article 148, only the properties acquired by
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
marry of money, property or
WON Rosalia who isn‘t a registered owner of the jeep industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
can be held solidarily liable for damages with the to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that
registered owner of the same actual contribution is required by this provision since it for
relationships that have legal impediments
HELD: o Art 147 is the law that recognizes relationships without
NO legal impediment and proof of care and maintenance of
o Co-ownership contemplated in Art. 144 of the Civil family and household equates to joint effort.
Code requires that the man and the woman living together Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage contributed money to buy the subject Riceland hence the
NO riceland reverts to the first marriage
o Rosalia Arroyo cannot e a co-owner of the jeepney
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly
o Jeep belongs to the conjugal partnership of Jose and his
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975
legal wife
when she was only 22 years old- however the notary
o No basis for the liability of Rosalia Arroyo for damages
testified that the property was purchased by Miguel but put
in the name of Erlinda- the transaction was essentially a
Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is
void donation
responsible for damages that may arise from consequences
Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that
incident to its operation or maybe caused to any of the the prohibition against donations between spouses now
passengers therein applies to donations between persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage
Agapay vs Agapay
276 SCRA 340 Compromise agreement entered into by Carliana and late
Facts: Miguel is not a separation of property and should not be
Miguel Palang married Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol
on July 16, 1949 inferred as such. NO LIQUIDATION WAS MADE.
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii Domingo v. CA
as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce 226 SCRA 572 (All Opinions)
Carlina in Hawaii Facts:
July 15, 1973 Miguel married with nineteen-year-old - 1969 – previous marriage of Roberto Domingo and
Erlinda Agapay Emerlina dela Paz
May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, jointly purchased a - 1976 – married Delia Soledad Domingo
parcel of rice land. Transfer Certificate of Title No. - 1979 – present – Delia was working in Saudi Arabia
101736 issued in their names while husband has remained unemployed (1983-present)
o was the supporter of the family and purchased real and
September 23, 1975 Erlinda allegedly purchased a
personal properties out of her personal earnings.
house and lot and title was issued in her name
Roberto was the administrator
October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed - 1983 – when Delia knew of first marriage
a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement to
settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein
- 1989 – when she discovered he had another woman and Guillerma administered the property, until she
was also selling her property without her consent. discovered that Mario deceived her as to the annulment of
o Thus asked lower court for his marriage. It was also during the early part of 1996
(1) a temporary restraining order stopping Roberto from when Mario accused her of being unfaithful and
exercising any demonstrated his baseless jealousy
act of administration and ownership over the properties Petitioner‘s central theory and main defense against
(2) fomarriage to be declared null and void respondents‘ action for ejectment is her claim of co-
(3) Delia Domingo be declared sole and exclusive ownership over the property with Respondent Mario
owner of all properties acquired at time of their void Fernandez. At the first instance before the MTC, she
marriage. presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his
- RTC – denied for lack of merit since marriage is seen as spouse
void in the first place thus steps aren‘t necessary CA rejected petitioner‘s claim that she and Respondent
- CA: held that prayer for nullity along with separation of Mario Fernandez were co-owners of the disputed property
properties may be raised however they were still denied
for lack of merit. Thus case is in SC Issue:
A. Is the petitioner a co-owner of the property?
ISSUE: WON respondent may recover certain real and
B. Can the claim for support bar this ejectment suit?
personal property exclusively belonging to her
HELD: YES
- Distribution and separation of property of spouses is one Held:
the applicable law is not Article 144 of the Civil Code,
of the reasons why there‘s a need to judicially declare that
but Article 148 of the Family Code which provides
a marriage is void.
- Court that declares a marriage void will also provide for Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
the liquidation, partition, and distribution of properties of relationship between a man and a woman who are not
spouses. It is a necessary consequence of judicial incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does
o Rules that apply: FC Art 43 and 44 not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
o Separation of property will be according to regime of concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-
property relations governing them. ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership
or absolute community between the man and his lawful
CONCURRING BY VITUG wife
When a void marriage is still in existence (without judical Based on evidence presented by respondents, as well as
declaration of nullity) neither the CPG or ACP will apply those submitted by petitioner herself before the RTC, it is
instead, property relations shall be governed by co- clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry
petitioner because he was legally married to Lourdes
ownership rules under Art 147 or Art 148 of FC.
Fernandez. It is also clear that, as readily admitted by
petitioner, she cohabited with Mario in a state of
Tumlos vs. Sps. Fernandez
concubinage. Therefore, Article 144 of the Civil Code is
G.R. No. 137650, Apr 12, 2000
inapplicable
Facts:
Spouses alleged that they are the absolute owners of an Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
apartment preceding Article,[21] only the properties acquired by both
building and that they had allowed the defendants-private of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
respondents to occupy the apartment building for the last money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
seven (7) years, since 1989 without the payment of any common in proportion to their respective contributions. In
rent. They agreed that after a few months guillerma tumlos the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
would start paying rent but she failed to pay after repeated and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
demands. They prayed that defendants be ejected same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
Guillerma Tumlos averred therein that the Fernandez
spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a
"If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or
co-owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a
her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is a co-
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
vendee of the property in question together with
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
[Respondent] Mario Fernandez
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
Defendants alleged Mario Fernandez and Guillerma had manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
an amorous relationship, and that they acquired the Article.
property in question as their ‗love nest‘
"The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply ISSUE: Can plaintiff validly claim the partition and/or
even if both parties are in bad faith payment of co-ownership share, accounting and
Petitioner‘s argument -- that the Family Code is damages, considering that plaintiff and defendant are
inapplicable because the cohabitation and the acquisition admittedly both married to their respective spouses
of the property occurred before its effectivity -- deserves under still valid and subsisting marriages, even
scant consideration. Suffice it to say that the law itself assuming as claimed by plaintiff, that they lived together
states that it can be applied retroactively if it does not as husband and wife without benefit of marriage? In other
prejudice vested or acquired rights. In this case, petitioner words, can the parties be considered as co-owners of the
failed to show any vested right over the property in properties, under the law, considering the present status of
question. Moreover, to resolve similar issues, the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each
we have applied Article 148 of the Family Code other, even assuming that they lived together as husband
retroactively and wife (?)
HELD: Yes
Petitioner failed to present any evidence that she had made -Article 148 shall apply in this case. If the parties are
an actual contribution to purchase the subject property. incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by
She anchors her claim of co-ownership merely on her them through their joint contribution of money, property or
cohabitation with Respondent Mario Fernandez industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the
Malilin vs Castillo contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus co-
333 SCRA 628 ownership even though the couple are not capacitated to
Facts: marry each other.
-Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint for "Partition -Petitioner sought partition of real properties and a
and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and substantial amount of personal properties consisting of
Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo motor vehicles and several pieces of jewelry. By
-petitioner and respondent, both married and with dismissing petitioner‘s complaint for partition on grounds
children, but separated from their respective spouses, of due process and equity, the appellate court unwittingly
cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while denied petitioner his right to prove ownership over the
their respective marriages still subsisted. claimed real and personal properties.
-during their union, they set up the Superfreight
Customs brokerage corporation and also acquired The amended decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May
properties which were registered solely in Elvira‘s name. 7, 1998, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to
-In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City for
separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share further proceedings on the merits.
in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging
that said properties had been registered solely in her name. Saguid vs. CA
-She denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003 Facts:
wife because the fact was that they were still legally -Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married but
married to their respective spouses. She claimed to be the separated de facto from her husband, when she met
exclusive owner of all real and personal properties petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July
involved in petitioner‘s action for partition on the ground 1987
that they were acquired entirely out of her own money and -the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house
registered solely in her name. built on a lot owned by Jacinto‘s father.
-RTC dismissed case. It also ruled that it is immaterial -In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their
whether the parties actually lived together as husband and 9-year cohabitation.
wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code can not be made -On January 9, 1997, private respondent Gina Rey filed a
to apply to them as they were both incapacitated to marry complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property
each other. Hence, it was impossible for a co-ownership to with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional
exist between them. Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque
-CA granted respondent‘s motion. It said in its decision -She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as
that the desired declaration of co-ownership and eventual entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00
partition will utterly be an indirect or collateral attack on in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her
the subject titles in this suit. Verily, plaintiff-appellant own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was
should have first pursued such remedy or any other relief able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of
directly attacking the subject titles before instituting the furniture and household effects, with a total value of
present partition suit. Apropos, the case at P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole
bench appears to have been prematurely filed. owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the Francisco vs Master Iron Works
construction of their house, be reimbursed to her. 451 SCRA 494
-Petitioner Jacinto Saguid claims that expenses for the Facts:
construction of their house were defrayed solely from his - Josefina Castillo was only 24 when she married Eduardo
income as a captain of their fishing vessel. He averred that Francisco in 1983.
private respondent‘s meager income as fish dealer - Imus Rural Bank then executed a deed of sale for
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of 320,000 in favor of Josefina married to Eduardo.
said house; Gina did not work continuously in Japan from - Eduardo then, on 1985, executed an affidavit of waiver
1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration each year. where he declared that Josefina purchased two parcels of
When their house was repaired and improved sometime in land including a house before their marriage.
1995-1996, private respondent did not share in the
- In 1986, Josefina mortageged the said property to Leonila
expenses because her earnings as entertainer were spent on
Cando for a loan of 157K
the daily needs and business of her parents
- 1990 Eduardo bought 7500 bags of cement from Master
-RTC rendered judgment in favor of Gina Rey
Iron Works but failed tp pay.
-CA affirmed RTC ruling
ISSUE: whether or not the parties can be considered as co- - MIW filed a complaint against him, and the trial court
owners of the properties sided with MIW on 1992.
Held: YES - Sheriff Alejo levied on the property of Josefina which
- it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not made her execute an affidavit of third party claim saying
capacitated to marry each other because the former was that the two parcels of land were paraphernal.
validly married to another man at the time of her - The property was sold in an auction for 1,350,000
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime - Josefina amended her complaint, to reconvey the
therefore is governed by Article 14830 of the Family property with moral damages.
Code. In this case, the proof of actual contribution in the - Josefina then filed a petition to annul her marriage with
acquisition of the property is essential. Eduardo on the grounds of bigamy.
- Art 148 applies even if cohabitation or acquisition of - RTC of Paranaque granted her plea.
property occurred before FC took effect since no law
- RTC 1997 found also the sale of the two parcels of land
before it answers cohabitation of couples living in adultery
were null and void
or concubiange
- The controversy centers on the house and personal - BUT the CA reversed the RTC‘s decision! Saying that
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her the property was conjugal in nature.
complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 for the
completion of their house. However, nowhere in her Issues: WON the said property is the paraphernal property
testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. of Josefina
What appears in the record are receipts in her name for the Held: No
purchase of construction materials on November 17, 1995 Ratio: They are not paraphernal since she wasn‘t able to
and December 23, 1995, in the total amount of P11,413.00. prove that she bought the said land with her funds before
-Both parties claim that the money used to purchase the the marriage. There is no proof that she contributed money
disputed personal properties came partly from their joint on the acquisition of the said property. The presumption of
account with First Allied Development Bank. There is no conjugality was not overcome.
sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective - evidence lacking: no proof to show that she borrowed
shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family money to buy land from mother and sister and also failed
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties‘ to divulge their names.
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to be o 3rd claim party affidavit claiming that properties are
equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued exclusively from the fruits of own labor negates what she
at P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not said that she borrowed the money
questioned by the petitioner. Hence, their share therein is o failed to testify against whose account the check was
equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each. drawn and issued and whose account it was
- Private respondent Gina S. Rey is declared co-owner of o was 23 when she married so doubtful that she‘d have
petitioner Jacinto Saguid in the controverted house to the money before to buy such property
extent of P11,413.00 and personal properties to the extent o bought the property 1 year and 7 months after marriage
of P55,687.50. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the
amount of P67,100.50 to private respondent, failing which AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER – executed by Eduardo to
the house shall be sold at public auction to satisfy private protect property against third party claims against him.
respondent‘s claim. Also significant is he still attached his marital conformity
to the land‘s mortgage.
Atienza vs.de Castro - During respondent‘s marriage with Sofronio they
G.R. No. 1695698, Nov. 29, 2006 acquired properties, one registered to ―Evangeline Acre
Facts: married to Sofronio Acre‖ another to ―E. Acre, married to
- Lupo Atienza hired De Castro as accountant for his two S. Acre and N. del Mar, married to Jose del Mar‖ (Nellie is
corporations (Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Evangeline‘s sister)
Maritime Corporation) in 1983 - Petitioners file with RTC for recovery of properties,
- Then their relationship became intimate despite Lupo saying Sofronio acquired it w/ his own funds
being a married man! They lived together in the later part - TC dismisses, saying that the properties are owned in
of 1983. They had 2 children, after the second child they common by Evangeline and Sofronio
parted ways. - CA dismisses appeal as well, declaring defendant-
- Then Lupo filed a complaint against Yolanda for a appellee exclusive owner
judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air
subdivision Issue: W/n the CA erred in declaring Evangeline the owner
- Lupo said Yolanda bought the said property with his own of the contested properties?
funds. Held: No. Petition denied, CA decision AFFIRMED.
- The marriage between Evangeline and Sofronio is indeed
- Yolanda on the otherhand said she bought it with her
bigamous, as such their property regime is under FC – 148
own funds.
o Properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint
- Trial Court said that the contested property is owned contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
common by him and Yolanda and ordered the partition governed by the rules on co-ownership
into two equal parts. o If there is no contribution from either or both of the
- CA reversed the TC! Saying that it was the exclusive spouses, clearly there can be no co-ownership
property of Yolanda. - Petitioners did not present any evidence that shows
Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the
Issues: WON the disputed property is the exclusive said properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not exist
property of Yolanda here.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Since they are not capacitated to marry each other CA correct in saying that the first land in question was
in their cohabitation, FC 148 applies. Under this regime registered under ―Evangeline Acre married to Sofronio
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through Acre, the second land in question under ―Evangeline
their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in Acre married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Del Mar,
proportion to their contributions. Absent of proof of married to Jose Del Mar‖ – rule well settled that the words
contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did not ―married to‖ preceding Sofronio Acre Jr. are merely
show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land descriptive of the status of Evangeline.
while the accountant showed bank accounts which
apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the said Signey v SSS
land. GR No. 173582, Jan. 28, 2008
- evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and Facts:
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, - Rodolfo Signey, SSS member, died on May 21 2001, in
money lending, and jewelry retail, promisorry notes of the records he had designated Yolanda as primary
dealings with clients, bank account statements, and beneficiary and his 4 children with her as secondary
business transactions = had financial capacity beneficiaries.
- 3 women started claiming his death benefits from SSS (in
on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that order)
Yolanda had no such sufficient funds and didn‘t provide 1. Yolanda Signey (petitioner)
for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for such o Claimed death benefits first (July 6 2001)
property. 2. Gina Servano (respondent)
o Claimed death benefits (July 13 2001)
Acre vs Yutikki o Has 2 minor children with Rodolfo
2007 o Claims that she and Yolanda were common law-wives,
- Beatriz Acre and Sofronio Acre, Jr. married on while Editha is the legal wife.
November 8, 1957. Have 6 children (petitioners) 3. Editha Espinosa (respondent)
- 1972 – Sofronio left conjugal dwelling o Claimed death benefits (Oct 2001)
- Petitioners find out that Sofronio married Evangeline o Claims that she is the legal wife
Yuttikki May 18, 1972, while still married to Beatriz - SSS denies Yolanda, saying Gina‘s 2 children are the
- Sofronio dies Nov 16, 1996 primary beneficiaries under the SSS Law
- Says also that the marriage between Yolanda and
Rodolfo is null and void because Rodolfo was still married Issue:
with Editha 3. W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid?
- Yolanda files a petition with Social Security Commission 4. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the
(SSC) along with a waiver of rights by Editha wherein illegitimate children?
Editha waived all claims of benefits from SSS because she
(Editha) was married to a diff person Held: No. There is no merit to the petition
- SSC affirms the SSS Decision 3. The existence of a prior marriage between Editha and
o Despite the new waiver by Editha, SSC gave more Rodolfa is supported by evidence
weight to the confirmed marriage of Rodolfo and Editha 4. Section 8(e) and (k) of RA 8282 is very clear (found in
o SSC: Mere designation by Rodolfo in the records of who the case pg. 638):
his beneficiaries were is not a controlling factor o It defines who are dependents:
- SSC then applies SSS Law (RA 8282) where it says that Legal Spouse
dependent legit / illegit children may be primary Legitimate, adopted, and illegitimate child who is
beneficiaries, and they have to be minors. unmarried, not employed and is under 21 years old
o Rodolfo had one legitimate child who died earlier than o Whoever claims entitlement benefits should establish
he did his/her right by substantial evidence
o His children with Yolanda are all over 21 years old o Since petitioner is disqualified to be a beneficiary and
o His children with Gina are qualified (them being minors) bec the deceased has no legitimate child, it follows that the
dependent illegitimate minor children of the deceased shall
Issue: be entitled to the death benefits as primary beneficiaries.
1. W/n petitioner‘s marriage with the deceased is valid?
2. W/n petitioner has the right to the benefits against the Gina‘s 2 minor children are entitled to 100% of the
illegitimate children? benefits