FR. Robert Reyes v.

CA
GR No. 182161
December 3, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner and 49 others were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel Seige and were
charged of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. DILG issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 13, 2007, RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against the
petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. That petitioners and other accused civilians
were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to
come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities.
Counsel for petitioner file thru the DOJ for the lifting of the HDO since despite the dismissal of
the crime of rebellion, he was held by the BID officials at NAIA as his name is included in the Hold
Departure List. This happens every time he left for abroad.
Writ of Amparo was filed on the ground that the respondents violated the petitioner’s
constitutional right to travel.
ISSUE: W/N Whether or not the petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with
violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
RULING: NO. The writ is a remedy for any person whose wright to life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private person or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearance or threats thereof.
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency
of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that
his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy.
Ferdinand Marcos v. Hon. Raul Manglapus
177 SCRA 668
September 15, 1989

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE: W/N in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: YES. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat
to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few
years after the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines.
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14639
March 25, 1919

FACTS: Justo Lukban, respondent and then Mayor of Manila, sent 170 women to Davao. The
women were confined to their houses in the district by the police from October 16 to October
25, 1918. The vessels reached their destination at Davao only on October 29, 1918. Lukban claims
that the women were to be laborers and was received by Feliciano Yñigo (a haciendero), Rafael
Castillo, and Francisco Sales, the governor of Davao. The women thought that they were being
transported to another police station, while Yñigo had no idea that the women being sent to
them as laborers were actually prostitutes.
The families of the prostitutes then filed charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of
Police, and Sales. They prayed for a writ for habeas corpus to a member of the SC to be issued
against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to
Mindanao against their will. The stipulation of the parties was made to include all of the women
who were sent away from Manila to Davao and. The SC granted the writ, however, the mayor
was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
ISSUE: W/N the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of
exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force Filipino
women to change their domicile from Manila to another place. The women, said the court,
although in a sense "lepers of society" were still Filipino citizens and such they were entitled to
the same constitutional right enjoyed by all other Filipino citizens. The right to freedom of
domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could be considered tantamount to
slavery.
The Supreme Court upheld the right of Filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of
abode.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Facts:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain
there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and
was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application
for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that
by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had
been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which
non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board was challenged.

Issue: W/N the Manguianes were deprived of their liberty of abode.

Ruling: No.

Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-
Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the Manguianes
were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic
lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the
liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process
of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a
class.”
SILVERIO VS CA

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed
an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against
accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court
approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign
Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the
Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is
evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.

Issue: W/N the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court

Ruling: Yes.

The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving
the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without
prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Santiago vs. Vasquez

Facts:
Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.

An order of arrest was issued against her with bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent
Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the
Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of P15,000.00.

Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a
hold departure order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was widely
publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at
Harvard University.

She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC. She
argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered.

The hold departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She likewise argued that the
hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of speech.

Issue: W/N Santiago’s right to travel was unlawfully impaired.

Ruling: No.

By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, thus,
he may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to
the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the
pendency of the case. Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to
impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof.
247 SCRA 127 Aug. 9, 1995
Imelda R. Marcos v. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Petitioner is the defendant in several pending criminal cases for violations of RA 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She was found guilty for 2 of these cases,
after conviction in the 2 cases, she filed a Motion to Leave Abroad to seek diagnostic tests &
treatment in China, allegedly because of a serious & life-threatening condition which required
facilities not found in PH. The motion was denied because the petitioner failed to give notice to
the prosecution.
Later, Marcos filed another Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad," to places including the United
States and Europe, for treatment of various heart ailments. It was alleged that the tests needed
were not available in the Philippines. Petitioner presented Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio. After the
hearing, the Sandiganbayan informed the parties that a copy of petitioner's first motion and its
supporting documents had been sent to Dr. Patacsil for study and comment by a committee of
cardiologists. The Sandiganbayan thereafter received a report from the committee containing
findings which were contrary to the conclusions of petitioner’s physicians. The Court denied the
petitioner’s motion on the ground that the necessity to travel abroad for diagnosis and treatment
has not been established.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan violated petitioner’s right to travel in denying her motion.
HELD: No. Petitioner had undergone electrocardiogram tests at the Makati Medical Center in
which cardiologists are rotated to do the readings. Dr. Esperanza Cabral found the
electrocardiogram results to be "Normal." The results of the echocardiogram were read by
another cardiologist, Dr. Adoracion Nambuyan-Abad, and her finding was approved by Dr.
Benjamin N. Alimurong. The results were also "Normal."
Although Dr. Anastacio subsequently conducted another electrocardiogram test on petitioner and
found the existence of myocardial infarction (risk of heart attack), as the Sandiganbayan noted,
Dr. Anastacio's finding was not read or concurred in by another cardiologist, contrary to the
procedure followed at the Makati Medical Center. It is, therefore, also questionable.
In this case, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel was a lawful order of the court, since it
reasonably found that there was no necessity for petitioner to seek treatment for her heart
ailments abroad.
G.R. 141529 June 6, 2001
Francisco Yap, Jr., a.k.a Edwin Yap v. CA
FACTS:
RTC convicted petitioner of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent of P5.5m. After the
records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the said court a
Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional Liberty of Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal. The
Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount of P5.5m and
be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he
is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment is rendered or in
case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private complainant.
Yap alleged that the bail in the amount of P5.5m was excessive and that CA unduly restricted his
constitutional liberty of abode and travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
ISSUE: WON the CA violated the petitioner’s constitutional right of liberty of abode and travel.
HELD: No. The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by
petitioner, are not absolute rights. Sec. 6, Art. 3 of the Constitution provides that: “The liberty of
abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.”
The condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail
bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence. Also, a closer look at the questioned condition will show that
petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required to inform the court in case
he does so.
490 SCRA 318 June 8, 2006
James Mirasol, et al., v. DPWH
FACTS:
Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the AO 1 and DO 74 issued by the DPWH.
Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of
North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite. RTC dismissed the petition and
maintained the validity of the assailed administrative issuances. Petitioners assail the DPWH’s
failure to provide scientific an objective data on the danger of having motorcycles travel in the
highways. Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly
deprive them of their right to travel.
ISSUE: WON the assailed administrative should be held unconstitutional for the violation of the
petitioners’ right to liberty of abode and travel.
HELD: No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners
can traverse the toll way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles.
Petitioners are free to access the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which
petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll way, is a subject that can be
validly limited by regulation.
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that
these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies
as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not
entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination.
The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of are not suffered by them
alone.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain
destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. As a special kind of
road, it is reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
OCA vs Judge Macarine

Facts: On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now Associate
Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family
for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The
respondent stated that his travel abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave.
However, he did not submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to
submit the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained unacted
upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel
authority from the OCA. On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA
that his leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been disapproved and
his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from
his leave credits but from his salary corresponding to the seven days that he was absent,
pursuant to Section 50 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. The respondent was also required
to submit his explanation on his failure to comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.

Issue: W/N there exists a violation to the right to travel.

Ruling: No.

There is no violation on the right to travel. True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel provided that such
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s
inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003
does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges
and court personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to
restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct
according to rule.
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs.JUDGE IGNACIO B. MACARINE, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte, Respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770 July 18, 2012
FACTS:
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued the Circular No. 49- 2003 requiring all foreign
travels of judges and court personnel to be with prior permission from the Court. Moreover, a travel
authority must first be secured from the OCA. Accordingly, Judges must submit the complete
requirements to the OCA at least two weeks before the intended time of travel.

Judge Ignacio Macarine requested for authority to travel to Hongkong with his family. Said travel
was to be charged to Judge Macarine’s annual forced leave. However, Judge Macarine did not submit the
complete requirements so his request for authority to travel remained unacted upon. Judge Macarine
proceeded with his travel abroad without the required travel authority. Judge Macarine was informed by
the OCA that his leave of absence had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the
Court. Accordingly, the absences of Judge Macarine shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from
his salary. The OCA found Judge Macarine guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 for traveling
out of the country without filing the necessary application for leave and without first securing a travel
authority from the Court.

ISSUE: WON Judge Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003

HELD:
Yes. The right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the exercise of such
right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right
to travel provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health as may be provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting the
Court’s inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts. OCA Circular No. 49-2003
does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by judges and court
personnel, before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is to restrain or prohibit a person
from doing something; to “regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule. To ensure management
of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003
requires a judge who wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a certification from the Statistics
Division, Court Management Office of the OCA. The said certification shall state the condition of his
docket based on his Certificate of Service for the month immediately preceding the date of his
intended travel, that he has decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from
date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The constitutional right to travel is not absolute since the OCA may regulate the travels of
Judges and personnel to avoid disruption in the administration of justice. Thus, for traveling abroad
without having been officially allowed by the Court, Justice Macarine is guilty of violation of OCA
Circular No. 49-2003.
Chavez vs PEA

Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA.

PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop,
improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands.”
President Marcos also issued PD No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

Later, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the
parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)."
Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Titles
in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
The Senate Committees reported that: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force
to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report. The Legal Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA.

Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the
sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern.

Issue: W/N the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations BEFORE a
final agreement.

Ruling: No.

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that
the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents and papers,
which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to
protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.
Chavez vs PCGG

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to defne the nature and the extent of the people’sconstitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to
information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the
national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: W/N the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the
scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information.

Ruling: Yes.

“Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”

The “information” and the “transactions” referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution
have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4)
other confidential information.

Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February 1986, the
new government headed by President Aquino was specifically mandated to “recover ill-gotten
properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to] protect the
interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.”

There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of
public concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that “ill-gotten wealth,” by
its very nature, assumes a public character. “Ill-gotten wealth” refers to assets and properties
purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government
funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of
powers, influences or relationships, “resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage
and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.” Clearly, the assets and
properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people.

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain
to definite propositions of the government.

There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in

general, as discussed earlier -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
Legaspi vs CSC
Facts:
Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi files for Mandamus to compel respondent Civil Service
Commission to release information on the civil service eligibilities of persons employed as
sanitarians (Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas) in the Health Department of Cebu City.

The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities
of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
OSG contends that petitioner has no locus standing as he failed to show his actual interest. The
Court ruled however that the petition on mandamus is anchored upon the right of the people for
information on matters of public concern which is a public right.

Issue:
Whether or not Civil Service Commission should release the information
Held:
Yes.
The constitutional right to information on matters of public information is grounded on
Sec. 7, Article III and Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These are self-executory.
In the case at bar, the government agency Civil Service Commission does not have the discretion
to prohibit the access to information sought. It only has the authority to regulate the manner of
examination (e.g. ensuring that the records are not damaged or destroyed).
These constitutional guarantees, however, are not absolute as they are “subject to the limitations
as may be provided by law” (Art. III Sec. 7 2nd sentence). The information sought must be not be
exempted by law.
In the case at bar, the information is within the enumerations provided by law. Why/ How?
The information sought relates to a public office which can be considered as a legitimate
concern of citizens (public office as public trust);
Respondent failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner’s
right to know who are, and who are not civil service eligible; and
Civil service exams results are released in the public.
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
There are two consolidated cases:
(G.R. 177271) Petitioner Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) assails various COMELEC Resolutions accrediting Biyaheng Pinoy et. al to
participate in the elections without determining if their nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
(G.R. 177314) Petitioner Rosales impugn COMELEC Resolution 07-0724 effectively denying
their request for the release of the names of the nominees of the 14 accredited party-lists mention
in Rep. Loreta Rosales’ (Kilosbayan Foundation) letter-request.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 which prescribed the rules and regulations to govern the
filing and submission of names under the party-list list of representation
Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the
COMELEC an urgent petition to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organization
COMELEC issued an en banc Resolution declaring the names as confidential
Petitioners BA-RA 7941s and UP-LRs posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without determining the qualifications of
their nominees is without basis.

ISSUES:
WON Comelec is mandated by Constitution to disclose the public names of said nominees

HELD:
YES.
Article 3, Sec. 7 of the Bill of Rights is self-executory.
COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of
the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where
the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records
are not absolute. The people’s right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands
of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective
petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE

Facts:

Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting to

be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10)

opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

And if such is not possible, an access to those said documents. Apart from Valmonte’s letter, he stressed the premise

of the request on the present provision of the Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6 that

emphasizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such

request contains serious legal implications, sought the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In

Mr. Tiro’s reply letter, a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,

whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not

be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

Issue:

Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, is entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of

their constitutional right to information.

Ruling:

Yes, they are entitled to the access of such documents. Government-owned and controlled corporations, whether

performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that

transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are

within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in

government dealings. However, although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,

are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians

of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on

matters of public concern.

Note: Magkaiba yung “entitled to access of the documents” pati “right to COMPEL TO PREPARE LIST xxx..”
16. Aquino-Sarmiento vs. Morato

Facts: Petitioner, a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB), requested that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to
the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies
and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are banned, cut, or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent on the
ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions
as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and thus
are purely and completely private and personal. However, respondent Board later on issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private, and personal the decision of
the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

Issue: Whether citizen’s right of access to official records is violated.

Ruling: Yes. The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an
individual person, company, or interest", whereas public means "pertaining to, or belonging
to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large.” As may be gleaned from the decree
creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is
public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual
acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and
acting in, the discharge of public duties. The decisions of the Board and the individual
voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their
official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public
in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the
citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
17. Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice

Facts: Petitioner was convicted for rape and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the
first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 or the Death Penalty Law and the imposition of
death penalty for the crime of rape; motions were denied by the court. RA 8177 was passed
and the mode of execution was changed to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement RA 8177 and directed the Director of
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of
Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing
rules are unconstitutional and void.

Issue: Whether Section 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement RA 8177 is valid.

Ruling: No. Section 19 of the implementing rules provides:

Section 19. Execution Procedure. - Details of the procedure prior to, during and
after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by
the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the sequence of events
before and after execution; procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of death; and the removal of the
intravenous system.

Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to

authorized prison personnel.

As to the second paragraph of Section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality
of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees
no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The
contents of the manual are matters of public concern "which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen," backed up by Section 7, of Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public

concern is recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with
the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation.
18. Gonzales vs. Narvasa

Facts: Petitioner wrote a letter to the Executive Secretary requesting for information with
respect to the names of executive officials holding multiple positions, copies of their
appointments, and a list of recipients of luxury vehicles previously seized by the Bureau of
Customs and turned over to the Office of the President. Petitioner filed this petition to
compel the Executive Secretary to answer his letter.

Issue: Whether the Executive Secretary should answer the letter.

Ruling: Yes. Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision
which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public
right and when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However, Congress may
provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were
embodied in RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties,
all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within
15 working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents
for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable
claims of confidentiality.

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent has a constitutional and statutory duty to
answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern
that is, appointments made to public offices and the utilization of public property. With
regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials,
respondent Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the
reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of official business.
Art 3 Sec 7
In General: Access to court records, Government contract negotiations, Diplomatic
negotiations, etc.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE

PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
JUNE 2001

FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the SC to allow the
live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
Pres. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan “to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of
an unprecedented case in our history.”

The petition averred that public interest should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation. In effect, the petition seeks the re-examination of the October 23,
1991 resolution of the SC in a case for libel filed by then President Aquino. The said resolution resolved
to prohibit live radio and television coverage of court proceedings, in view order to protect the parties’
right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and to avoid
miscarriage of justice. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
restricted.

ISSUE: W/N live radio and TV coverage of the court proceedings should be allowed.

RULING: No. The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand,
and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a
court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one
another, the right of the accused must be preferred to win.

With the possibility of losing not only liberty but also the very life of the accused, it behooves all to make
absolutely certain than an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate
judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by
unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are
devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper
influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprecedented mind, unbridled by running emotions or
passions.

Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them
directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so
many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have
on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be
said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. To say that actual prejudice
should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the
mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create.

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it
only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process.
Art 3 Sec 7
In General: Access to court records, Government contract negotiations, Diplomatic
negotiations, etc.

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE

PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (SEPT 2001)

FACTS: The Secretary of Justice filed a MR arguing that there is really no conflict between the right of
the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and the right of the
accused to a fair trial, on the other hand; that if there is a clash, it must be resolved in favor of the right
of the people and the press because the people are entitled to information.

ISSUE: W/N live radio and TV coverage of the court proceedings should be allowed.

RULING: Yes. In lieu of live TC and radio coverage of the trial, the Court resolved to order the audio-
visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, considering the significance of the trial before
the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof.

There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic
significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but
he is under God and the law." Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people
who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced
by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic
training of the people. Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a
way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events. They
will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or
decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in
the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance
of their roles – whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges – will be allayed. The
possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or
even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility that judgment will
be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.

The right of privacy of the accused is not a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, the Court held that "a limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long
been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character."

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following
conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the
Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of TV
crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-
visual recordings shall be made for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment
except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live
broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases
against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in
case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or
its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with
the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition
in accordance with law.
Art 3 Sec 7
In General: Access to court records, Government contract negotiations, Diplomatic
negotiations, etc.

ALFRED HILADO et al. v. JUDGE AMOR REYES

496 SCRA 282(2006)

FACTS:

Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration for the Intestate
Estate of Roberto S. Benedicto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was
raffled to Judge Amor Reyes, in whose court such a petition was approved. Alfred Hilado, on the
other hand, filed a civil case against the estate of Roberto. For a period of time, the counsel of
Hilado was allowed to examine the records of the case and secure certified true copies thereof.
However, one of Hilado‘s counsels was denied access to records of the estate by Judge Reyes
ratiocinating that only parties or those with authority from the parties are allowed to inquire or
verify the status of the case as the counsel was not under that instance. Hilado filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for mandamus to compel Judge Reyes to allow them to access,
examine and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of the record of the Hilado‘s
case contending that these records are public, and which the public can freely access.

ISSUE:

W/N the records are of public concern. or W/N denying the complainants access to court
records is a violation Sec 7 of Art 3.

RULING:

Yes. The presumption that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records attaches to
those documents which properly come before the court in the course of an adjudicatory
proceeding and which are relevant to the adjudication. Hence, relevant documents which are
submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory
proceedings, become documents to which the presumption of public access applies. The policy
reasons for granting public access to criminal proceedings include the publics right to monitor
the functioning of our courts, thereby ensuring quality, honesty and respect for our legal system.
Such policy reasons apply to the grant of public access to civil cases as well.

The importance of access to public records, court records more particularly, was explained in
Lantaco, Sr. v. Llamas, where the respondent Judge therein refused to furnish the complainants
a copy of his decision. According to the Court, the importance of this right to access to court
records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public
concern in which the public has a legitimate interest. It was further explained that while the
public officers in custody of control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner
in which such records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such
discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit such access, inspection, examination or
copying. To drive home the point, the Court cited its pronouncement in Baldoza v. Dimaano, to
wit:

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of
the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. However, restrictions on access to certain
records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection
have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary
means of control inadequate to maintain order.
63. Art. 3. Sec. 4 - SABIO VS GORDON

FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the
Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked
Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG
members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING: No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there
is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where
it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being
a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot
be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The
Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it
creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect
violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with
the constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to
public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the
absence of any constitutional basis.
64. Art. 3. Sec. 7 - Bantay vs COMELEC

Facts:

There were two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside certain
issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested
their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for
short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR, for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective
nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent.

In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively
denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)
accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-request

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be “declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

Issues:

Whether respondent COMELEC, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-
list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and Whether respondent COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the
public the names of said nominees.

Ruling:

• COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list
groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: “[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall
not be shown on the certified list” is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the “Certified List” of the names.

Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self-executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision
enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article
II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their
representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about
matters that have a bearing on their choice While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a
party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or
rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election.

• COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real
parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees,
however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute.
The people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of
the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions

The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named
therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.
65. Art. 3. Sec. 7 - BERDIN VS. MASCARINAS
Article III, Section 7 – Information and Access to Official Records

FACTS:
Petitioners Berdin, Alegarbes, and de Vera are the President, Vice-President, and Adviser,
respectively, of the Tubigon Market Vendors Association (Association) in Bohol. Respondent Mascarinas
on the other hand is the Municipal Mayor of Tubigon, Bohol.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Tubigon enacted Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 increasing the tax and
fees of the municipality. Berdin requested a copy of the tax ordinance from the Municipal Treasurer.
The request was followed by a protest before the Mayor and the Treasurer. The Association also
requested the suspension of the implementation of the ordinance pending final determination of its
legality by the appropriate authorities. The petitioners elevated their request for review and suspension
of the ordinance to the Provincial Treasurer. Acting on their request, the Provincial Treasurer requested
the Municipal Treasurer to send a copy of the tax ordinance to the Department of Finance (DOF) for
review and approval.
The Municipal Treasurer then sent final demand letters to Berdin and de Vera for payment of
outstanding rental fees and municipal business taxes under the new ordinance with the warning that if
they do not pay, their stores will be closed and padlocked. The petitioners said that the Municipal
Treasurer should wait for the official resolution of their protest before taking action on the final demand
letters. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Complaint with RTC of Bohol against the Mayor and the Municipal
Treasurer to enjoin respondents from enforcing Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36. In the event that it is
found invalid, petitioners request for reimbursement of excess taxes.
Tax Ordinance 88-11-36 underwent an amendment which became Tax Ordinance 89-10-49 and
was approved by the Provincial Treasurer. Furthermore, Municipal Ordinance Revenue No. 90-01-54
amended suspended provisions of Tax Ordinance 88-11-36 to make it conform with the rates under the
Local Tax Code.
Given the amendment, the Provincial Treasurer wrote petitioners informing the latter of his
findings that Tax Ordinance Nos. 88-11-36 and 89-10-49 were both in order. Petitioners requested the
Provincial Treasurer to transmit all records to the Department of Finance for purposes of appealing the
ruling and reviewing of the questioned ordinances by a higher authority. However, said department
refused to rule on the matter since the Provincial Treasurer is vested the power to review and suspend
tax ordinances.
4 years after filing the case before RTC Bohol, said court upheld the validity of the tax
ordinance.
Petitioners presented 3 arguments with regard to the validity and enforceability of Tax
Ordinance No. 88-11-36, one of which is that the ordinance does not exist by virtue of respondents’
officials delay in furnishing them with a copy of the questioned ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid and enforceable given the argument of the petitioner.

HELD/RULING:
Petitioners’ misgivings on the existence of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36 are baseless. The reason
for the delay was adequately explained and was even attributed to petitioners’ failure to pay for the
cost of reproduction of the ordinance.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern is recognized under Section
7 Article III of the Constitution. However, such right is not absolute and is subject to limitations as may
be provided by law. Thus, while access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated. The regulation may come either from statutory law and from the inherent power of an
officer to control his office and the records under his custody and to exercise some discretion as to the
manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the record may exercise their rights.
 The Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar exercised this discretion by requiring petitioners to
pay for the cost of reproduction of the tax ordinance. Such a requirement is reasonable under the
circumstances considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous consisting of more than a hundred
pages.
Chavez vs NHA

Facts: In his capacity as taxpayer, Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for, among
other things, access to all documents and information relating to the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (the “Project”), including its underlying Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government body, and R-II
Builders, Inc. (RBI) ( pg. 1-3).

With Congress having approved the Project as a boost to infrastructure through its development
of low-cost housing projects, a private sector joint venture scheme was pursued in accordance
with the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law whereby “the contractor undertakes the construction . .
. [for] the government agency or local government unit concerned which shall pay the contractor
its total investment expended on the project, plus reasonable rate of return” (pg. 5-10). After
multiple design changes, cost overruns, and corresponding amendments to the JVA, the Project
was ultimately suspended, and RBI made demands for payment. A few years later, the Housing
and Urban Development Coordinating Council initiated a bidding process for the work
remaining on the Project, and the NHA reached a settlement with RBI to terminate the original
JVA (pg.39-47). Raising constitutional issues and asserting his right to all information related to
the Project, Mr. Chavez filed a petition directly with the Court.

Issue: Whether or respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the project

Ruling: Yes, the Court ruled that relief must be granted because the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern is enshrined in our 1987 Constitution. Specifically,
Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution, taken together as “twin
provisions,” adopt a policy of full public disclosure on all transactions involving public
interest and acknowledge the people’s right to information.
Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777)

Facts:
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the
ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and
AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived,
Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of
the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and
prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others,
mandated that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this
Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite
the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited,
attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 violates the right to information granted in art 3 sec. 7 of the constitution

Ruling:. Yes, E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of
executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for
information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are
not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the
legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. The impairment of
the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is just as direct as its
violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
Rolex Suplico v National Economic and Development Authority

G.R. No. 178830 July 14, 2008

Facts: In this consolidated case, the following are prayed for by the respective petitioners:

G.R. No. 178830 -> Compel respondents to produce and furnish petitioner/ his undersigned
counsel a certified true copy of the contract/agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon
with ZTE Corporation;

G.R. No. 179317 -> To allow herein petitioners access to all agreements entered into with the
Government of China, the ZTE Corporation, other entities, government instrumentalities,
individuals with regard to the National Broadband Network Project.;

G.R. No. 179613-> To produce and furnish petitioner/his undersigned counsel a certified true
copy of the contract or agreement covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE
Corporation

Central to petitioner’s cause is their right to information, which they contend is an absolute right.

Respondents contend that the matters raise concerns an executive policy, a political question.

Issue: WON petitioner’s prayers, premised on the right to information, should be granted.

Ruling: No, it appears that during one of the Senate hearings on the NBN project, copies of the
supply contract were readily made available to petitioners. Evidently, the said prayer has been
complied with and is, thus, mooted

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an
actual case or controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights; the case must not be
moot or academic. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging.
Neri vs. Senate

Facts:

On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by
the Department of Transportation and Communications to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him
P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner
refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.6

Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring
him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.

Respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration alleging that the constitutional right
of the people to right of information and constitutional policy on public accountability and transparency
outweighs the claim of executive privilege.

Issue: Whether or not the claim for executive privilege is prejudices the right to information?

Ruling:

No. With respect to respondent Committees’ invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right
of the people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these
arguments to support respondent Committees’ case.

The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government
may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";and that "the
right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings

In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions,
did not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public
accountability and transparency.
Akbayan vs. Aquino

(Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations)

Facts:

Petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – seek via the
present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Tañada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed on January 25, 2005 House
Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the
Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA. The Resolution became the basis of an inquiry
subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into
the negotiations of the JPEPA.

In its letter dated 15 June 2005 the DFA explains that the Committee’s request to be furnished all
documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has
been a work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to
the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete.

Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the
JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern and contravenes other
constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.

Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure of the full text of JPEPA constitute a violation on the right to
information?

Ruling:

No. The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal
review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public
concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the
time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as
they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering
the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege
consistent with existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.

Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the "rolling texts" which
may undergo radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the
negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore
alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working
drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP

Facts:

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition,
for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of
the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Issue: Whether or not the contents of MOA-AD are within the purview of the people’s right to
information?

Ruling:

Yes. Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
"[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on
the progress of the comprehensive peace process." E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to
be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advice from the peace advocates, peace
partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for government and civil society dialogue and consensus-
building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted
on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision
on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is
absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable
while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

The right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one
is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
HAZEL MA. C. Antolin v ABELARDO T. Domondon

FACTS: Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations in October 1997. The examination results
were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did
not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon
(Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-
corrected.[3] On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely of
shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam.[4] Thus, on November 10, 1997, she
again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her
answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in
each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioners request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III of
the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, only permitted access to
the petitioners answer sheet.

Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination
Papers (other than petitioners answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of
1994, which provides:

Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts The hereunder acts shall constitute prejudicial,
illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct:

A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions

3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the subject has on deposit at least two
thousand (2,000) questions.

After a further exchange of correspondence,[8] the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was
conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.

On June 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition had already become
moot, since petitioner managed to pass the 1998 CPA Board examinations.

ISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can determine for
herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties; that the
Constitution support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers.

RULING: since every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship, we
find that petitioners belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in
the Examination Papers has become mere superfluity.

The right to information is not absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public
concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." We are prepared to concede
that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace
in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the
Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam.
G.R. No. 189546 September 21, 2010

CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent

Facts: Petitioner wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the source code of the
PCOS programs, BOC CCS programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional
canvass, the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC
programs called the DCS utilities. CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12
of Republic Act (R.A.) 9369, COMELEC granted the request for the source code of the PCOS
and the CCS, but denied that for the DCS because if the source code were to be divulged,
unscrupulous individuals might change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit
certain candidates or parties, COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source
code that it said it was approving for release. CenPEG once more asked COMELEC for the
source code of the PCOS, together with other documents, programs, and diagrams related to the
AES. COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist, rejecting
COMELEC’s excuse, CenPEG filed the present petition for mandamus, seeking to compel
COMELEC to immediately make its source codes available to CenPEG and other interested
parties.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has the duty to disclose the information and furnish copies to
Petioner.

Ruling: Yes, The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that "once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code
of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may
conduct their own review thereof." The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with
this requirement of the law.

Precinct Count Optical Scan(PCOS)

Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS)

Data Capturing System (DCS)

Automated Election System (AES)

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. and JOSE MA. O. HIZON, Petitioners,- versus - TOLL
REGULATORY BOARD, et al., Respondent

Facts: Petitioners, as taxpayers and expressway users, seek to nullify the various STOAs, to the
petitioners, the STOAs and the toll rate-fixing resolutions violate the Constitution in that they
veritably impose on the public the burden of financing tollways by way of exorbitant fees and
thus depriving the public of property without due process. These STOAs are also alleged to be
infirm as they effectively awarded purported build-operate-transfer (BOT) projects without
public bidding in violation of the BOT Law. Petitioners likewise assail the constitutionality of
P.D. 1112 in relation to P.D. 1894 insofar as they vested the TRB, on one hand, toll operation
awarding power while, on the other hand, granting it also the power to issue, modify and
promulgate toll rate charges. The TRB cannot be an awarding party of a TOA and, at the same
time, be the regulator of the tollway industry and an adjudicator of rate exactions disputes.

Issue: Whether or not a public bidding is required or mandatory for these tollway projects.

Ruling: No, The tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking.
However, given that the projects in the instant case have been undertaken by PNCC in the
exercise of its franchise under P.D. Nos. 1113 and 1894, in joint partnership with its chosen
partners at the time when it was held valid to do so by the OGCC and the DOJ, the public
bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. In the instant case, a franchisee
undertakes the tollway projects of construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways
under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding. In pursuing the projects with the vast
resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in
the exercise of its management prerogatives. In this case, no public bidding is required upon the
franchisee in choosing its partners as such process was done in the exercise of management
prerogatives and in pursuit of its right of delectus personae.

 Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA)

 Toll Operation Agreement (TOA)
 Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC)
Initiatives v PSALM, 682 SCRA 602

Facts: PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage
privatization of NPC. When PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was published and the
highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by
petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the
bidding it violated the people’s right to information without having previously released to the public critical
information about the sale

Issue: Whether or not the duty to disclose information is the same with the duty to permit access
to information on matters of public concern.

Ruling: No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the
other aspect of the people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents
and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information
which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained in official
communications andpublic documents of thegovernment agency
76. Art. 3. Sec. 7 – Belgica vs. Executive Secretary

Facts: Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of
which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” has
been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although,
its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund.

The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.

The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCORthrough which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget.

In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that
huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks.

In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was
dismissed.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the
swindling of billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy
non-government organizations for an entire decade.

In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the
disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.

As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in
the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform
beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared
unconstitutional.

Issue: W/N the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.

Ruling: Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the
right to information does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a
particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are hereunder quoted:258

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.

Aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished
by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential
Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that
said information be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been
impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed access to
or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern,
however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly
hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to
pursue through a separate petition.
Gov. Villafuerte v Jesse Robredo DILG secretary

Facts:

Gov. Villafuerte herein petitioner filled a petition assailing the 3 memorandum circulars ordered
by Robredo which pertains to the full disclosure of local budget and finances and other guidelines
regarding the budget. COA audited a loss of 20 percent usage of IRA. On August 31, 2010, the
respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed MC No. 2010-83, entitled "Full
Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good
governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. Petitioner argues that such
violates the principles of fiscal autonomy of the LGU. Court ruled in favor of Robredo.

Issue:

Whether or not such circulars of access are valid, pursuant to art 7 of sec 3 (Right to Information)

Ruling:

Yes. In the instant case, the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting
good governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The action of the respondent
is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as alter ego of the President. It is needless to
say that the power to govern is a delegated authority from the people who hailed the public official to
office through the democratic process of election. His stay in office remains a privilege which may be
withdrawn by the people should he betray his oath of office. Thus, he must not frown upon
accountability checks which aim to show how well he is performing his delegated power. For, it is
through these mechanisms of transparency and accountability that he is able to prove to his
constituency that he is worthy of the continued privilege.

The Constitution is now replete with numerous provisions directing the adoption of measures to uphold
transparency and accountability in the Government with a view of protecting the nations from repeating
its atrocious past. It commands a strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all matters relating
to official transactions and those involving public interest.
Sereno v CTRM of NEDA

Facts:

On May 23, 2005, the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM), an office under the
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend
to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July
2005. On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical
Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector,
wrote to the CTRM Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a
copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005. Director Mendoza denied the request
through her letter of June 20, 2005.

The APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM through Director
Mendoza reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in
violation of the petitioner's Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern.
However, the CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by the APMP The attitude of
the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the petition for mandamus in the RTC to
compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes. The
respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as a closed-
door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee's composition and the nature of its mandate dealing
with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. RTC declared that the "CTRM is an advisory
body composed of various department heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and
inter-agency communications;" and that the record of the communications of such body "falls under the
category of privileged information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously affect
public interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the CTRM’s record of its meeting is an exemption from public disclosure

Ruling:

Yes. Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ of
mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as
well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court
has ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged
information under the separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings."
VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS Scope (Right to Association)

FACTS:

Volkschel Labor Union was once affiliated with ALUMETAL, their previous mother union. Both
Volkschel and Alumetal entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and they agreed that
ALUMETAL will apply payroll deductions twice a month on the members of the UNION as membership
dues and other fees/fines, as may be duly authorized by the UNION AND ITS MEMBERS. They called this
check-off authorization. Subsequently, a majority of Volkschel’s members decided to disaffiliate from
ALUMETAL in order to operate on its own as an independent labor group, pursuant to Article 241 of the
Labor Code. Moreover, the same want to revoke their check-off authorization in favour of ALUMETAL.
On the other hand, ALUMETAL assailed that the disaffiliation is contrary to law and the members are still
obliged to pay their dues.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a local union like Volkschel disaffiliate from its mother union like ALUMETAL.

HELD:

YES. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is well-settled. In previous
cases, it has been repeatedly held that a local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free
to serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances
warrant. This right is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association and still
within the scope of the right contemplated in (Article III, Section 8, 1987 Philippine Constitution)

Natchura: The right of a labor union to disaffiliate from a labor federation was held to be part of the
right to association.
Sec. 8. Art. 3. Right to Association
Samuel Occeña v COMELEC
127 SCRA 404

FACTS: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of some sections of the

Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222) which prohibits any political party,
political group, political committee from intervening in the barangay election.

This petition for prohibition seeks the declaration as unconstitutional of Sections 4 and
22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982,
insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 "from
representing or allowing himself to be represented as a candidate of any political party
... or prohibits a political party, political group, political committee ... from intervening
in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election or in the filing of his certificate
of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise,
favorable to or against his campaign for election."

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on the intervention of political parties in the
barangay election violates the right to form associations.

RULING: NO. The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary
to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and
dominant police power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to
serve appropriate and important public interests. Political parties may freely be formed
although there is a restriction on their activities. But the ban is narrow, not total. It
operates only on concerted or group action of political parties. Members of political and
kindred organizations, acting individually, may intervene in the barangay election.
Petition is DENIED.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPCSU) vs. HON.
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 122226
March 25, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March

20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by
the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the
ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for
union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which
provides:

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of

supervisory employees. — Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form
any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.

Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order,

dismissed. Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first
sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution
which provides:

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.

ISSUES: Whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees

from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, Sec. 8 of the
Constitution.

HELD: NO. The right of association of managerial employees is denied because

of Article 245 of the Labor Code which provides that managerial employees are not
eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. This is because Art III Sec 8 is
subject to the condition that its exercise is for the purposes not contrary to law. Those
who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their
employers’ information that is not only confidential but also not generally available to
the public, or to their competitors, or to other employees. Therefore, eligibility to join,
assist or form union is expressly denied by law. Petition is Dismissed.
Sec. 8. Art. 3. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, Inc. vs VIRGILIO
DIONISIO
G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989

FACTS: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in
the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that
the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the
respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association
in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. The
petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned
assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of the association; the
association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of
privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being
unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent
association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bel-Air Village Association can lawfully collect dues.

RULING: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the
purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the
certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioner’s contention that he
has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner
voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same
free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among
them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the
obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the
association. The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are
intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as
claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary
services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis
of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of
the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and
maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all
residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and
reasonable for the particular community involved. The limitations upon the ownership
of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled
to be a member of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and
not to private transactions like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally
maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because
the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to
comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable
freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a
member of the association.
Padcom Condominium Association v. Ortigas Center Association, Inc
382 SCRA 222

FACTS
Petitioner owns and manages the Padilla Office Condominium Building. Among the terms and
conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest must
become members of an association for realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as
the Ortigas Center.
In view of PADCOMs failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues, including interests and
penalties thereon, the Respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the trial
court. The Respondent averred that purchasers of lands within the Ortigas Center complex from OCLP
are obligated under their contracts of sale to become members of the Respondent. In its answer,
PADCOM contended that it is a non-stock, non-profit respondent, and for it to become a special
member of the Respondent, it should first apply for and be accepted for membership by the latters
Board of Directors. No automatic membership was apparently contemplated in the Respondents By-
laws. PADCOM added that it could not be compelled to become a member without violating its right to
freedom of respondent. And since it was not a member of the Respondent, it was not liable for
membership dues, interests and penalties.

ISSUE
Whether or not PADCOM’s right to association was violated

RULING
NO

A lessee shall be considered a long-term lessee if his lease is in writing and for a period of two (2) years
or more. Membership of a long-term lessee in the Association shall be co-terminus with his legal
possession (or his lease) of the lot/s in the area. Upon the lessees cessation of membership in the
Association, the owner shall automatically succeed the lessee as member thereat.

As lot owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for membership is
necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a ministerial function considering that
PADCOM is deemed to be a regular member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the automatic
membership clause annotated in the Certificate of Title of the property and the Deed of Transfer.
Neither are we convinced by PADCOMs contention that the automatic membership clause is a
violation of its freedom of association. PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could have
avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land when it
bought the building with the annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and
accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus to
join the Association.
Quezon City PTCA Federation, Inc. v. Department of Education
G.R. No. 188720, February 23, 2016

FACTS

DepEd issued Department Order No. 54, DO 54 aimed to address the "increasing reports of malpractices
[of] officers or members of the PTAs, such as but not limited to (1) [the absconding of officers] with
contributions and membership fees; (2) [the] nondisclosure of the status of funds and [the] non-
submission of financial statements; and (3) [the] misuse of funds." To address these issues, DO 54
required that before any PTA may be organized, the school head's approval must first be
secured. Arguing that this prerequisite undermines the independence of the PT. petitioner asserts that
PTCAs are "independent voluntary organization[s]"enjoying constitutional protection.

ISSUE
Whether the Department Order contravenes Section 8 of the Bill of Rights.

RULING

NO.

The right to organize does not equate to the state's obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as a
collective, but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be formally recognized by the
state, but also bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. In
pursuit of public interest, the state can set reasonable regulations—procedural, formal, and
substantive—with which organizations seeking state imprimatur must comply.
TUPAS v. NHC
Facts: TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of the
Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in
NHC. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. The
petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez, holding that NHC "being a government-
owned and/or controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any
labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code." In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the
reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file
employees of NHC.
Issue: Do government employees have the right to form unions?
Ruling: Yes. This right is guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 8, Art. IX, B, Section 2 (5) and Art. XIII Sec. 3 of the
Constitution.

SSS Employees v. CA – (supra, Right to Form Association)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands on the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed action for damages for staging an illegal strike. Contending that
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.

Issue: Whether the SSS employees have the right to strike

Ruling: While the Constitution (Art. XIII, Section 3; Art. IX, B, Section 2(1); Art. III, Section 8) recognizes
the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as t whether such reconition also includes the
right to strike. Resort to the intent of the framers points to the understanding that the right to organize
does not include the right to strike. The Constitution, however, does not say that government employees
may not be given the statutory right to strike. On this poit, the SSS case is vague.

MPSTA v. Laguio (supra, Right to Form Association)

Facts: The series of events that touched off these cases started with the so-called "mass action"
undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the petitioning associations
in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and highlight" 1 the teachers' plight resulting from
the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention.

Issue: Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?

Ruling: “these ‘mass actions’ were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers’ duty to perform, undertaken
for essentially economic reasons,” should not principally resolve the present case, as the underlying facts
are allegedly not identical.
SSS Employees v. CA, 175 SCRA 686
FACTS
The SSS filed a complaint against petitioners, alleging that, the officers and members of Social
Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to
the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS. It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues. The SSS advances, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over
the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.

ISSUE
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

RUILING
NO
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where
the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November
24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being
the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the
Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to
pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands.
MPSTA v. Secretary of Education, GR 95445, August 6, 1991
Facts
The so-called "mass action" undertaken by some 800 public school teachers, among them
members of the petitioning associations in both cases, on September 17, 1990 to "dramatize and
highlight" the teachers' plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. There is no question that the
some 800 teachers who joined the mass action did not conduct their classes on that day.

Three representatives of the group were allowed to see the respondent Secretary of Education
who "brushed aside their grievances," warned them that they would lose their jobs for going on illegal
and unauthorized mass leave. Upon leaving said respondent's presence, they were handed an order
directing all participants in the mass action to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements.

Issue:

Are employees in the public service prohibited from forming unions and holding strikes?

Held:
YES
These "mass actions" were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform,
undertaken for essentially economic reasons;

Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have the right to
strike, although guaranteed the right to self-organization, to petition Congress for the betterment of
employment terms and conditions and to negotiate with appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of such working conditions as are not fixed by law;
Jacinto v. CA, GR 124540, November 4, 1997
Facts:

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila who
incurred unauthorized absences in connection with the mass actions then staged; and a return-to-work
order was issued leading otherwise dismissal proceedings shall be instituted against the teacher,

The directive was ignored by petitioners. Consequently, on separate dates, Secretary Cario
issued formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively
charged with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. The Civil Service Commission, in separate
resolutions, found the petitioners (except Merlinda Jacinto) guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. Petitioners initially questioned the CSC resolutions.

Respondent Court found that the petitioners absented themselves from their classes in
furtherance of or in connection with the mass action for the purpose of pressuring the government to
grant their demands. They tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in September 1990
were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.

Issue
Whether or not the said teachers had the right to strike

Held
NO

The Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso in accordance with law. This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such
right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service, by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in the government service shall be observed.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that, in general, workers in the public sector do not enjoy the right
to strike
While we recognize and appreciate the toil and hardship of our public schoolteachers in fulfilling
the states responsibility of educating our children, and realize their inadequately addressed plight as
compared to other professionals, we have the equal task of promoting the larger public interest which
withholds from them and other similarly situated government workers the right to engage in mass
actions resulting in work stoppages for any purpose. Although the Constitution vests in them the right to
organize, to assemble peaceably and to petition the government for a redress of grievances, there is no
like express provision granting them the right to strike. Rather, the constitutional grant of the right to
strike is restrained by the proviso that its exercise shall be done in accordance with law.
GSIS and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General Manager
vs.KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006
FACTS:
A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout waged/held in
front of the GSIS main office. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action
participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his
management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the
participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.

The manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-
union members to show cause why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in
said rally. In reaction, KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on
the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in obedience to
the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the
filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted the
petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and from issuing other
formal charges arising from the same facts and events. CA equated the right to form associations with the
right to engage in strike and similar activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete,
the appellate court concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or
assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges against GSIS
employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of
such mass action.

ISSUE: WON the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

HELD:
No. the 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right to engage in
"peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law." It was against the
backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court
of Appeals. In it, we held, citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, the court explained: Specifically, the right of civil servants to
organize themselves was positively recognized but, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the
association, [and] the overriding considerations of national security. As regards the right to strike, the
Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the provision "in accordance with law." This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such
right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations,
mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service" by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities
and strikes in government service shall be observed.
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1) A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
FACTS:
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case
No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice. The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the
IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section
10 of the Court Rule.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: WON The assailed provisions constitute a violation of respondent’s constitutional rights?

HELD:
No. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is
voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee
for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No.
6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court
the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests
the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the
body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not
wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the
public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.