SECOND DIVISION

NOEL B. BAGTAS, G.R. No. 166682

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
HON. RUTH C. SANTOS, BRION,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial DEL CASTILLO, and
Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City, and ABAD, JJ.
ANTONIO and ROSITA
GALLARDO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

November 27, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
[2] [3]
petition challenges the 11 June 2004 Decision and 5 January 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77751. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 9
[4]
December 2002 and 21 April 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial
Region 4, Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Special Proceeding Case No. 02-1128.

The Facts

Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo (Spouses Gallardo) are the parents of Maricel S. Gallardo
(Maricel). Two weeks after graduating from high school in April 2000, Maricel ran away to live
with her boyfriend. Maricel became pregnant and gave birth to Maryl Joy S. Gallardo (Maryl
Joy). Maricels boyfriend left her.

In February 2002, Maricel returned to her parents. On the same day, Maricel ran away again and
lived with Noel B. Bagtas (Bagtas) and Lydia B. Sioson (Sioson) at Ma. Corazon, Unirock,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. Maricel went to Negros Occidental and left Maryl Joy in the
[5]
custody of Bagtas and Sioson. In a letter dated 5 February 2001, Maricel relinquished her
rights over Maryl Joy to Bagtas and his wife. She stated:
Ako po si Maricel S. Gallardo 18 taong gulang ay kusang ipinagkaloob ang aking
anak sa pagkadalaga sa mag-asawang Noel B. Bagtas at Neneth A. Bagtas sa
kadahilanan pong itinakwil ako ng sarili kong mga magulang at hindi ko po kayang
buhayin at dahil po sa tinakbuhan ako ng aking boyfriend kaya wala na pong ibang
paraan para ako makabangon o makapagsimula ng panibagong buhay kaya para
mabigyan ng magandang buhay ang aking anak inisip ko po na ito na ang pinaka
madaling paraan para po sa pagbabago ng aking buhay.
Kaya mula sa araw na ito ay wala na akong karapatan sa aking anak. Sila ang tatayo bilang
magulang ng aking anak.

In April 2002, the Spouses Gallardo tried to obtain the custody of Maryl Joy from Bagtas
and Sioson. Bagtas and Sioson refused. Unable to settle the matter, the Spouses Gallardo
[6]
filed with the RTC a petition for habeas corpus.
[7] [8]
In its Order dated 10 July 2002, the RTC issued a writ of habeas corpus directing the
deputy sheriff to produce Maryl Joy before it and to summon Bagtas and Sioson to explain
why they were withholding the custody of Maryl Joy.

The Spouses Gallardo, Bagtas and Sioson entered into a compromise agreement. In its
[9]
Order dated 13 September 2002, the RTC stated:

In todays hearing, both parties appeared with their respective counsels and
have agreed on the following:
1. that the child should be placed in custody of the petitioners on Friday, Saturday
and Sunday;

2. that the child should be returned to the respondents by the petitioners on Sunday at
8:00 oclock in the evening subject to visitorial rights of the petitioners anytime of the
day; and

3. that the child can be brought by the respondents to Valenzuela but should be
returned to the petitioners on Friday morning.
 The above agreement shall take effect today and parties are ordered to comply strictly with the
said agreement under pain of contempt in case of violation thereof.

On 29 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson learned that Rosita S. Gallardo brought Maryl
[10]
Joy to Samar. In their motion dated 30 September 2002, Bagtas and Sioson prayed that
the Spouses Gallardo be directed to produce Maryl Joy before the RTC, that they be
directed to explain why they violated the RTCs 13 September 2002 Order, and that they be
[11]
cited in contempt. In their motion to dismiss dated 11 October 2002, Bagtas and Sioson
prayed that the Spouses Gallardos action be dismissed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of
the Rules of Court. Section 3 states that If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails x x x
to comply with x x x any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the courts own motion. Bagtas and Sioson claimed that the
Spouses Gallardo failed to comply with the RTCs 13 September 2002 Order.

[12]
In its Order dated 15 October 2002, the RTC cited the Spouses Gallardo in contempt,
fined them P500, and ordered them to produce Maryl Joy before the trial court.

The RTCs Ruling

[13]
In its Order dated 9 December 2002, the RTC dismissed the action for having become
moot. The RTC stated:

In this petition, the prayer of the petitioners is to produce the person of Meryl [sic] Joy S.
Gallardo before this court to be turned over to herein petitioners who are the maternal
[grandparents] of said minor.

Since the person subject of the petition has already produced [sic] to this court and has been turned over
to the petitioners, the issue on the petition for habeas corpus is now moot and academic without prejudice
to the filing of the proper action to determine as to the rightful custody over the minor child.

In view thereof, x x x the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted but without prejudice on the petitioners to file
proper action for custody of the minor. (Emphasis supplied)

[14]
In their motion for reconsideration dated 27 December 2002, Bagtas and Sioson alleged that
the ground for the dismissal of the action was erroneous. The action should have been dismissed
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court. They prayed that Maryl Joy be returned to
them to preserve the status quo ante. Bagtas and Sioson stated:

5. Thus, the Honorable Court very clearly issued a conflicting Order because It has cited the
[Spouses Gallardo] in contempt of court for violating the previous September 13, 2002 Order
that the child should be returned to the respondents in the evening of September 29, 2002
(Sunday), and yet the Honorable Court has dismissed the petition for being moot and
academic. This is in effect giving premium to the act of the petitioners of not turning over the
child to respondents on September 29, 2002. Likewise, this is tantamount to rewarding them
for not producing the child in court in violation of the aforesaid September 13, 2002 Order;

6. Moreover, the Honorable Court has issued an unreasonable Order by stating that the
dismissal of the instant case is without prejudice to the filing of the proper action for custody
of the minor by the petitioners. Why would the petitioners still file the proper action for
custody if they now have the custody of the minor?

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the December 9,

2002 Order of the Honorable Court be partially reconsidered so that the dismissal of the case will
not be based on the ground of being moot and academic but based on failure to comply with the
September 13, 2002 pursuant [sic] to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
that petitioners be consequently directed to return the person subject of the petition to the
respondents to preserve the status quo ante.

[15]
In its Order dated 21 April 2003, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. The RTC
held that the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus was the production of Maryl Joy and
that the Spouses Gallardo exercised substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy. The RTC stated
that:

The allegations in the Petition show that the sole purpose for the filing of the Petition
is to cause the production before the Court of the person of minor Meryl [sic] Joy S.
Gallardo, not a determination of the legality or illegality of respondents custody of the child,
petitioners being aware of the fact that the child was left by their (petitioners) daughter to [sic] the
custody of the respondents, as stated in par. no. 10 of the Petition.

The instant Petition is therefore, essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as contemplated in Rule 102,
Revised Rules of Court which is resorted to in all cases of illegal confinement by which any person is deprived
of his liberty (Cruz vs. CA, 322 SCRA 518), but is resorted to also where the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto as contemplated in Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court. In order that the
special remedy of Habeas Corpus maybe [sic] invoked, it is necessary that there should be an actual and
effective restraint or deprivation of liberty. A nominal or moral restraint is not sufficient (Gonzales vs. Viola, et
al., 61 Phil 824).

Since therefore, the purpose of the instant Petition has already been served, as the child has been
produced and delivered to the petitioners, the instant Petition logically has become moot and academic.
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to the
legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or enable the petitioners
to discharge their duties as substitute parents.

There is no inconsistency between the Order dated December 9, 2002 sought to be reconsidered, and the Order
dated October 15, 2002, as the latter was issued pursuant to an incident, an interlocutory matter, that is, the
failure of the petitioners to comply with the agreement reached between the parties in open court on September
13, 2002. The said Order dated October 15, 2002 is not a resolution of the case in the main, as it did not
terminate the case. The Order dated December 9, 2002, on the other hand, terminated the case, and considering
that the dismissal of the case was unqualified, the same amounted to an adjudication on the merits pursuant to
Sec. 3, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court Procedure, therefore, the agreement earlier entered by and
between the herein parties is deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

[16]
Bagtas filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. Bagtas alleged that (1) the RTC erred when it ruled that the sole purpose of the 1
August 2002 petition was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, (2) the RTC erred
when it ruled that the petition was essentially not a petition for Habeas Corpus as contemplated
in Rule 102, (3) the RTC erred when it ruled that there must be actual and effective deprivation
of liberty, (4) the RTC erred when it ruled that the action had become moot, (5) the RTC erred
when it ruled that the Spouses Gallardo had substitute parental authority over Maryl Joy, and (6)
the RTC erred when it ruled that there was no inconsistency between the 15 October and 9
December 2002 Orders.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

In its Decision dated 11 June 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the
9 December 2002 and 23 April 2003 Orders of the RTC. The Court of Appeals held that:
In the second part of [Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court], x x x habeas corpus may be
resorted to in cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. Accordingly, the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to enable herein private
respondents to regain the custody of their minor grand daughter Maryl Joy who was admittedly
left by her natural mother in the care of petitioner and Lydia Sioson.

Significantly, in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal or involuntary restraint is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy; rather, the writ is prosecuted
for the purpose of determining the right of custody of a child. By dismissing the petition a quo, the trial court in
effect upheld private respondents right of custody over the minor involved as against that of petitioner.

While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor in
violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition
and validating such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are the
grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise substitute parental authority
over her in the absence of her parents. What is more, in awarding custody to private respondents,
the best welfare of the child was taken into consideration inasmuch as, per report of the Court
Social Worker, the implementation of the parties agreement would cause more psychological
damage and traumatic experience to Maryl Joy. To our mind, therefore, the violation of a court
 order pales in significance when considered alongside the best interest of the minor whose
welfare requires that she be in the custody of her grandparents rather than petitioners. x x x

Under the factual and legal milieux of the case, there is no question that as grandparents of the
minor, Maryl Joy, private respondents have a far superior right of custody over her than petitioner.
[17]

The Issues

In his petition dated 1 February 2005, Bagtas raised as issues that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT
FINDING THAT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THE ALLEGATION IN
THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS SHOW THAT THE SOLE PURPOSE FOR THE
FILING THEREOF IS TO CAUSE THE PRODUCTION BEFORE THE COURT OF THE
PERSON IN WHOSE FAVOR IT WAS FILED.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE CHILD FOR WHOM THE PETITION
WAS FILED, THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

The Courts Ruling

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the RTCs 9 December 2002 and 21 April 2003
Orders. In its Orders, the RTC ruled that, since the sole purpose of the petition for habeas corpus
was the production of Maryl Joy before the trial court, the action became moot when Maryl Joy
was produced. The Court disagrees.

Section 1, Rule 102, of the Rules of Court states that the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the persons entitled thereto. In
cases involving minors, the purpose of a petition for habeas corpus is not limited to the
production of the child before the court. The main purpose of the petition for habeas corpus is to
[18]
determine who has the rightful custody over the child. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that:
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, it is the proper legal
 remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be
in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in
custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of
liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.
Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over
a child. (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC erred when it hastily dismissed the action for having become moot after Maryl Joy was
produced before the trial court. It should have conducted a trial to determine who had the
rightful custody over Maryl Joy. In dismissing the action, the RTC, in effect, granted the petition
for habeas corpus and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the Spouses Gallardo without
[19]
sufficient basis. In Laxamana v. Laxamana, the Court held that:

Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted
a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for
resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus,
petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering
that said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in awarding
custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental
policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and
the youth. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 214 of the Civil Code states that in case of absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. Article 216 states
that in default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the surviving grandparent shall
exercise substitute parental authority over the child. Accordingly, in its 21 April 2003 Order, the
RTC held that:
Petitioners are, under the law (Art. 214, Family Code), authorized to exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, the entitlement to
the legal custody of the child being necessarily included therein to make possible and/or enable
[20]
the petitioners to discharge their duties as substitute parents.

In its 11 June 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals held that:

While it cannot be gainsaid that private respondents obtained initial custody of the minor in
violation of a valid court order, we nonetheless sustain the judgment a quo dismissing the petition
and validating such rightful custody over Maryl Joy. This is because private respondents are the
 grandparents of Maryl Joy, hence, lawfully authorized to exercise substitute parental authority
[21]
over her in the absence of her parents.

In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare is the most
important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. In
[22]
Sombong v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:

The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an
infant is presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In
passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an
equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent or guardian, the
court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as a claim
founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be
relieved from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on
the courts view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in
custody of one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child
into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the
consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time
appears to require. In short, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.
Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and Youth Welfare Code
unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same vein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to,
if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the parents concerned of parental authority over the child
or adopt such measures as may be proper under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)

[23]
In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding
the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she
be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established
because the RTC hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the
Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.

The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the case would
mean further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands that proper proceedings be conducted to
determine the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of her.

WHEREFORE, the Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Judicial Region 4,
Branch 72, Antipolo City, for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of the
Spouses Antonio and Rosita S. Gallardo to have custody of Maryl Joy Gallardo.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CHAIRPERSON

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 13, ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
DIVISION CHAIRPERSONS ATTESTATION, I CERTIFY THAT THE CONCLUSIONS
IN THE ABOVE DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED IN CONSULTATION BEFORE THE
CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE WRITER OF THE OPINION OF THE COURTS
DIVISION.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 776.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-15.
[2]
Id. at 19-27. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 29.
[4]
Id. at 85-86. Penned by Judge Ruth Cruz-Santos.
[5]
Id. at 39.
[6]
Id. at 42-44.
[7]
Id. at 45.
[8]
Id. at 46.
[9]
Id. at 60.
[10]
Id. at 63-65.
[11]
Id. at 67-71.
[12]
Id. at 74-76.
[13]
Id. at 85-86.
[14]
Id. at 87-90.
[15]
Id. at 98-99.
[16]
CA rollo, pp. 2-55.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[18]
406 Phil. 449, 458 (2001).
[19]
437 Phil. 104, 114-115 (2002).
[20]
Rollo, p. 99.
[21]
Id. at 25.
[22]
322 Phil. 737, 750-751 (1996).
[23]
Id. at 751.