1 Pantranco Vs Baesa

9/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 179
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa
*
G.R. Nos. 79050-51. November 14, 1989.
PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. petitioner, vs.

MARICAR BASCOS BAESA, thru her personal guardian
FRANCISCA O. BASCOS, FE O. ICO, in her behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, namely ERWIN, OLIVE,
EDMUNDO and SHARON ICO, respondents.
Torts and Damages; Last Clear Chance; The doctrine applies

only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last clear
chance to avoid the injury and failed to do so is made liable for all
the consequences of the accident.—The doctrine applies only in a
situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for
all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior
negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918);
Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to
plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the
accident which intervenes between the accident and the more
remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra]. Generally, the last
clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim for damages.
Same; Same; The doctrine does not apply where the person
who allegedly had the last opportunity to avoid the accident was
not aware
_________________
* THIRD DIVISION.
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015e559a1091d48c1439003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/14
385
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 385
of the existence of the peril.—Contrary to the petitioner’s

contention, the doctrine of “last clear chance” finds no application
in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to
show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or
should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One
cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not
know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this
case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico
knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that
the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not
immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right
since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the
bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the
opposite direction.
Same; Same; Doctrine not applicable where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously.—The speed at which the
approaching bus was running prevented David Ico from swerving
the jeepney to the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the
collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived
the danger a few seconds before the actual collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last clear
chance doctrine “can never apply where the party charged is
required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be
avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered” [Ong v. Metropolitan Water
District, supra].
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Negligence of petitioner’s
driver was the proximate cause of the injury without which the
accident would not have occurred.—Considering the foregoing, the
Court finds that the negligence of petitioner’s driver in
encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to
return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the
jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would
not have occurred. There was no supervening or intervening
negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have
made the prior negligence of petitioner’s driver a mere remote
cause of the accident.
Same; Quasi-Delict; After negligence of an employee has been

established, burden of proof is on the employer to show that he
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees.—The finding of negligence on the part of its driver
Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of petitioner and the
386
burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the

selection of its employees but also in adequately supervising their
work rests with the petitioner [Lilius v. Manila Railroad
Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934), Umali v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570,
June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623]. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there
is no presumption that the usual recruitment procedures and
safety standards were observed. The mere issuance of rules and
regulations and the formulation of various company policies on
safety, without showing that they are being complied with, are
not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from the
negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon petitioner to
show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver, the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed.
Same; Absence of documentary evidence does not bar recovery
of damages for loss of earning capacity.—The Court finds that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in fixing the
amount of damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased victims. While it is true that private respondents should
have presented documentary evidence to support their claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the
absence thereof does not necessarily bar the recovery of the
damages in question. The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca
Bascos as to the earning capacity of David Ico and the spouses
Baesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from which
the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the damages
for the loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victims.
PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Efren N. Ambrosio & Associates for petitioner PNEI.
Emiliano S. Micu for respondents.
CORTÉS, J.:
In this Petition, Pantranco North Express Inc.

(PANTRANCO), asks the Court to review the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05494-95 which
affirmed the decisions of the then Court of First Instance of
Rosales, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 561-R and Civil
Case No. 589-R wherein PANTRANCO was ordered to pay
damages and attorney’s fees to herein private respondents.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
387
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 387

At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the

spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children
Harold Jim, Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses
David Ico and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven
other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their
way to a picnic at Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to
celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar and
Marilyn Baesa.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the
passenger jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the
registered owner thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they
proceeded to Barrio Capayacan to deliver some viands to
one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San Felipe, taking the
highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching the
highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to
Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were
proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to
Manila, encroached on the jeepney’s lane while negotiating
a curve, and collided with it.
As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar
Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim
and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers
suffered injuries. The jeepney was extensively damaged.
After the accident the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus,
Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and proceeded to
Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the present,
Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently remained
in hiding.
All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein
private respondents settled the case amicably under the
“No Fault” insurance coverage of PANTRANCO.
Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O.

Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor children,
filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict
against PANTRANCO, respectively docketed as Civil Case
No. 561-R and 589-R of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the
late David Ico’s alleged negligence as the proximate cause
of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a
decision against PANTRANCO awarding the total amount
of Two Mil-
388

lion Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-

Seven (P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees and costs to Maricar Baesa in Civil Case No.
561-R, and the total amount of Six Hundred Fifty Two
Thousand Six Hundred Seventy-Two Pesos (P652,672.00)
as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorney’s fees and costs
to Fe Ico and her children in Civil Case No. 589-R. On
appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the trial court by ordering
PANTRANCO to pay the total amount of One Million One
Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-
Seven Pesos (P1,189,927.00) as damages, plus Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Maricar
Baesa, and the total amount of Three Hundred Forty-Four
Thousand Pesos (P344,000.00) plus Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorney’s fees to Fe Ico and her children,
and to pay the costs in both cases. The dispositive portion
of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by

ordering the defendant PANTRANCO North Express, Inc. to pay:
I. The plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos Baesa,
the following damages:
A) As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa—

P30,000.00;
B) As compensatory damages for the death of Marilyn Baesa
—P30,000.00;
C) As compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim

Baesa and Marcelino Baesa—P30,000.00;
D) For the loss of earnings of Ceasar Baesa—P630,000.00;
E) For the loss of earnings of Marilyn Bascos Baesa—
P375,000.00;
F) For the burial expenses of the deceased Ceasar and
Marilyn Baesa—P41,200.00;
G) For hospitalization expenses of Maricar Baesa—
P3,727.00;
H) As moral damages—P50,000.00;
I) As attorney’s fees—P20,000.00;
II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following

damages:
A) As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico—

P30,000.00;
B) For loss of earning capacity of David Ico—P252,000.00;
389
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 389

C) As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the

injury of Fe Ico—P30,000.00;
D) As payment for the jeepney—P20,000.00;
E) For the hospitalization of Fe Ico—P12,000.00;
F) And for attorney’s fees—P10,000.00; and to pay the costs
in both cases.
The amount of P25,000 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in

Civil Case No. 561-R, and the medical expenses in the sum of
P3,273.55, should be deducted from the award in her favor.
All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs
shall earn interest at the legal rate from date of this decision until
fully paid. [CA Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 57-58.]
PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Court of Appeal’s decision, but on June 26, 1987, it denied
the same for lack of merit. PANTRANCO then filed the
instant petition for review.
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the

doctrine of the “last clear chance” against the jeepney
driver. Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of
the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who
had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was
therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the
harm.
The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this
Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, 104
Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:
The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff

was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all
the consequences of the
390

accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the

plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People’s
Lumber and Hardware, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al., G.R. No.
70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent negligence of the
defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid
injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate
cause of the accident which intervenes between the
accident and the more remote negligence of the plaintiff,
thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, supra].
Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for
the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it
may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for
damages.
To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver,
petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver
was not the proximate cause of the accident and that the
sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident. It
is petitioner’s position that even assuming arguendo, that
the bus encroached into the lane of the jeepney, the driver
of the latter could have swerved the jeepney towards the
spacious dirt shoulder on his right without danger to
himself or his passengers.
The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid
of merit.
Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the doctrine of
“last clear chance” finds no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the
accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot
be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not
know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In
this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver
David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a
distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the
bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing
the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As
held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v.
391
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 391

BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a

motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the
highway is generally entitled to assume that an
approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side,
will return to his proper lane of traffic. There was nothing
to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its
own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper
lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo
Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who
was seated beside the driver Ramirez at the time of the
accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve
the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney’s
lane because there was a steep precipice on the right [CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied by the
evidence on record which clearly shows that there was
enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane

without any danger [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50].
Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus
was speeding towards Manila [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.
45]. By the time David Ico must have realized that the bus
was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late to
swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The
speed at which the approaching bus was running prevented
David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right shoulder
of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even
assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a
few seconds before the actual collision, he had no
opportunity to avoid it. This Court has held that the last
clear chance doctrine “can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand
after the peril is or should have been discovered” [Ong v.
Metropolitan Water District, supra].
Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent
in failing to observe Section
**
43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of
Republic Act No. 4136 which provides that the driver of a
vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection
shall
________________
** R.A. 4136 is entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land
Transportation and Traffic Rules, To Create A Land Transportation
Commission and other Purposes.”
392

yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either

direction on such through highway.
Petitioner’s misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is
readily apparent in this case. The cited law itself provides
that it applies only to vehicles entering a through highway
or a stop intersection. At the time of the accident, the
jeepney had already crossed the intersection and was on its
way to Malalam River. Petitioner itself cited Fe Ico’s
testimony that the accident occurred after the jeepney had
travelled a distance of about two (2) meters from the point
of intersection [Petition p. 10; Rollo, p. 27]. In fact, even the
witness for the petitioner, Leo Marantan, testified that
both vehicles were coming from opposite directions [CA

Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50], clearly indicating that the
jeepney had already crossed the intersection.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the
negligence of petitioner’s driver in encroaching into the
lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the
bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney
coming from the opposite direction was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident without which the collision
would not have occurred. There was no supervening or
intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver
which would have made the prior negligence of petitioner’s
driver a mere remote cause of the accident.
II
On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner

claims that it had observed the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage, conformably to the last
paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Petitioner
adduced evidence to show that in hiring its drivers, the
latter are required to have professional driver’s license and
police clearance. The drivers must also pass written
examinations, interviews and practical driving tests, and
are required to undergo a six-month training period.
Rodrigo San Pedro, petitioner’s Training Coordinator,
testified on petitioner’s policy of conducting regular and
continuing training programs and safety seminars for its
drivers, conductors, inspectors and supervisors at a
frequency rate of at least two (2) seminars a month.
On this point, the Court quotes with approval the
following
393
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 393

findings of the trial court which was adopted by the Court

of Appeals in its challenged decision:
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there

instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been
negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the
supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is only a
disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of
diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a

company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has
been adduced. The professional driver’s license of Ramirez has not
been produced. There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years
old. There is also no proof as to his educational attainment, his
age, his weight and the fact that he is married or not. Neither are
the result of the written test, psychological and physical test,
among other tests, have been submitted in evidence [sic]. His NBI
or police clearances and clearances from previous employment
were not marked in evidence. No evidence was presented that
Ramirez actually and really attended the seminars. Vital evidence
should have been the certificate of attendance or certificate of
participation or evidence of such participation like a logbook
signed by the trainees when they attended the seminars. If such
records are not available, the testimony of the classmates that
Ramirez was their classmate in said seminar (should have been
presented) [CA Decision, pp. 8-9; Rollo, pp. 51-52].
Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez

was employed and remained as its driver only means that
he underwent the same rigid selection process and was
subjected to the same strict supervision imposed by
petitioner on all applicants and employees. It is argued by
the petitioner that unless proven otherwise, it is presumed
that petitioner observed its usual recruitment procedure
and company polices on safety and efficiency [Petition, p.
20; Rollo, p. 37].
The Court finds the above contention unmeritorious.
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver
Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of petitioner and the burden of
proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the
selection of its employees but also in adequately
supervising their work rests with the petitioner [Lilius v.
Manila Railroad Company, 59 Phil. 758 (1934); Umali
394

v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623].

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no presumption that
the usual recruitment procedures and safety standards
were observed. The mere issuance of rules and regulations
and the formulation of various company policies on safety,
without showing that they are being complied with, are not
sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
the negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon

petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the
erring driver, the recruitment procedures and company
policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Petitioner
failed to do this. Hence, the Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the evidence presented by the petitioner,
which consists mainly of the uncorroborated testimony of
its Training Coordinator, is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence against petitioner.
III
On the question of damages, petitioner claims that the

Court of Appeals erred in fixing the damages for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased victims. Petitioner assails
respondent court’s findings because no documentary
evidence in support thereof, such as income tax returns,
pay-rolls, pay slips or invoices obtained in the usual course
of business, were presented [Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 39].
Petitioner argues that the “bare and self-serving
testimonies of the wife of the deceased David Ico and the
mother of the deceased Marilyn Baesa . . . have no
probative value to sustain in law the Court of Appeals’
conclusion on the respective earnings of the deceased
victims.” [Petition, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 38-39.] It is
petitioner’s contention that the evidence presented by the
private respondent does not meet the requirements of clear
and satisfactory evidence to prove actual and compensatory
damages.
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in fixing the amount of damages for the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims. While it is
true that private respondents should have presented
documentary evidence to support their claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity of the deceased victims, the
absence thereof does not
395
VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 395

necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question.

The testimony of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos as to the
earning capacity of David Ico, and the spouses Baesa,
respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis from which
the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the

damages for the loss of earning capacity of the three
deceased victims. Moreover, in fixing the damages for loss
of earning capacity of a deceased victim, the court can
consider the nature of his occupation, his educational
attainment and the state of his health at the time of death.
In the instant case, David Ico was thirty eight (38) years
old at the time of his death in 1981 and was driving his
own passenger jeepney. The spouses Ceasar and Marilyn
Baesa were both thirty (30) years old at the time of their
death. Ceasar Baesa was a commerce degree holder and
the proprietor of the Cauayan Press, printer of the
Cauayan Valley Newspaper and the Valley Times at
Cauayan, Isabela. Marilyn Baesa graduated as a nurse in
1976 and at the time of her death, was the company nurse,
personnel manager, treasurer and cashier of the Ilagan
Press at Ilagan, Isabela. Respondent court duly considered
these factors, together with the uncontradicted testimonies
of Fe Ico and Francisca Bascos, in fixing the amount of
damages for the loss of earning capacity of David Ico and
the spouses Baesa.
However, it should be pointed out that the Court of
Appeals committed error in fixing the compensatory
damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino
Baesa. Respondent court awarded to plaintiff (private
respondent) Maricar Baesa Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) as “compensatory damages for the death of
Harold Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa.” [CA Decision, p.
14; Rollo, 57]. In other words, the Court of Appeals
awarded only Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as
indemnity for the death of Harold Jim Baesa and another
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) for the death of
Marcelino Baesa. This is clearly erroneous. In the case of
People v. de la Fuente, G.R. Nos. 63251-52, December 29,
1983, 126 SCRA 518, the indemnity for the death of a
person was fixed by this Court at Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00). Plaintiff Maricar Baesa should therefore be
awarded Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as indemnity
for the death of her brothers, Harold Jim Baesa
396

People vs. Asuncion
and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos

(P30,000.00) for the death of each brother.
The other items of damages awarded by respondent

court which were not challenged by the petitioner are
hereby affirmed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED, and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
amount of compensatory damages for the death of Harold
Jim Baesa and Marcelino Baesa are increased to Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,

JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed with modification.
Note.—It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome

the presumption of negligence that accrues once its
passenger dies of an accident. (Philippine National
Railways vs. CA, 139 SCRA 87)
——o0o——
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9/6/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 179

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. petitioner, vs.

Torts and Damages; Last Clear Chance; The doctrine applies

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 385

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa

of the existence of the peril.—Contrary to the petitioner’s

Same; Quasi-Delict; After negligence of an employee has been

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Baesa

burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the

PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In this Petition, Pantranco North Express Inc.

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 387

At about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the

Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O.

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lion Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by

A) As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa—

C) As compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim

II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following

A) As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico—

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 389

C) As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the

The amount of P25,000 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in

PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the

Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 391

BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618, a

enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either

both vehicles were coming from opposite directions [CA

On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 393

findings of the trial court which was adopted by the Court

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there

diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a

Petitioner contends that the fact that Ambrosio Ramirez

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

v. Bacani, G.R. No. L-40570, June 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 623].

the negligence of its employee. It is incumbent upon

On the question of damages, petitioner claims that the

VOL. 179, NOVEMBER 14, 1989 395

necessarily bar the recovery of the damages in question.

the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of the

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and Marcelino Baesa or Thirty Thousand Pesos

The other items of damages awarded by respondent

Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin,

Petition denied. Decision affirmed with modification.

Note.—It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome

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