Position Paper FAM
Position Paper FAM
Position Paper FAM
ENRIQUE G. DE LEON
Complainant,
POSITION PAPER
1. On the morning of February 27, 2006 when De Leon, with his son
John, while having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National
Railroad-Tutuban Station, were approa ched by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his
scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at
a distance of two meters, more or less, he said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky
Boy, referring to De Leon." He pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he
was to strike again, De Leon was able to escape with the help of John.
5. Also on April 17, 2006, De Leon utilized the police blotter to file a
case against SPO3 Leonardo in Camp Crame. He filed the said case only after he
received the subpoena from the OCP for the case filed against him by SPO3
Leonardo. Although he was with his lawyer when he went to Camp Crame, the
latter did not advise him to file a complaint in the OCP right away. According to
De Leon, he also saw SPO3 Leonardo deposit his service firearm while at the
PLEB office.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSION
The MeTC Decision clearly
stated the facts and the law
on which it was based
10. In this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that
decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they
are based. The CA correctly stated that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its
decision, the factual findings, as well as the credibility and the probative weight of
the evidence for the defense vis-a-vis the evidence of the prosecution. The MeTC
presented both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense. De Leon was
not left in the dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC. The
RTC, as an appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.
12. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in
the proceedings and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court
shall always presume that a magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.33 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light
especially of a judge's sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice with impartiality. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.
13. De Leon posits that Judge Soriaso harbored ill feelings towards him
which eventually resulted in his conviction. No evidence, however, was ever
adduced to justify such allegation. Thus, such argument must also fail.
16. In this case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were
defamatory in nature. It is, however, of the view that the same only constituted
simple oral defamation.
Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not
only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of
the offended party.38 "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the
personal relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special
circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the offended
party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the
time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger,
with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light
felony..
17. Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced
that the crime committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the
following reasons:
b.) Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during
the first hearing on the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing
incident. The gap between the gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was
relatively short, a span of time within which the wounded feelings could not have
been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a mere product of emotional
outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their encounter.
c.)Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident
intent to strike deep into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between
the parties should have been considered. It was because of the purported gun-
pointing incident that De Leon hurled those words. There was no intention to
ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De Leon's utterance could simply be
construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions as his friend and member
of the community.
18. Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police
officer by profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still
prosper. It has been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and
should be tolerant of criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the
defamatory statement was uttered in connection with the public officer's duty. The
following cases are
This shocking, colossal blunder deserves condemnation no end and cries for
immediate relief in order to avoid repetitions of miscarriages of justice.
19. One of man's most prized possessions is his integrity. There lies a thin
line between criticism and outright defamation. When one makes commentaries
about the other's performance of official duties, the criticism is
considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his or her service to the
public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the part of the public officer to make room
for improvement on the basis of this constructive criticism in as much as it is
imperative on the part of the general public to make the necessary commentaries
should they see any lapses on the part of the public officer. In this case, however,
the criticism was more destructive than constructive and, worse, it was directed
towards the personal relations of the parties.
Accordingly, De Leon should be meted out only the penalty of arresto mayor or a
fine not exceeding P200.00 pesos, for committing slight oral defamation as
prescribed under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code
Service by Post
RELIEF
MELCHOR C. VILLALOBOSA
PTR No. 0349017/01-05-15/Butuan City
IBP No. LRN-0981340/01-05-2015/ Butuan City
Attorney’s Roll No. 61783
(Admitted to BAR in 2013; exempted until next compliance period)