ISSUE BRIEF Maritime Defense for

the Baltic States

FEBRUARY 2018 MAGNUS NORDENMAN

N
orthern Europe, and in particular the Baltic Sea region, has
become a critical friction zone between NATO and an assertive
Russia that seeks to alter European security in its favor by
fracturing NATO and dislodging the United States as the
ultimate guarantor of peace and security in the region. Since 2014, the
United States, NATO, and the nations of Europe have made considerable
progress toward bolstering deterrence and defense in the region by,
among other things, allocating additional resources to national defense,
reorienting the armed forces toward territorial defense tasks, stepping
up national and NATO exercises, and by deploying an allied forward
presence through the enhanced forward presence (eFP) groups in
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.

The NATO and national responses to Russia’s continued assertiveness

to date have, however, emphasized the ground domain in terms of the
focus on capabilities, exercises, and structures. Only more recently
have NATO and its members turned their attention to the maritime and
air domains as important components of an effective deterrence and
defense construct for northern Europe. And in this context, most of the
interest has focused on the larger Baltic Sea nations, such as Germany
and Poland, and those NATO members from outside of the region that
The Scowcroft Center’s could bring significant maritime capabilities into the Baltic Sea during
Transatlantic Security a crisis in the region, such as the United States, the United Kingdom
Initiative brings together top
policymakers, government
(UK), and France. But in order to build a comprehensive approach to
and military officials, business deterrence and defense in northern Europe, the maritime threats and
leaders, and experts from challenges to the Baltic states themselves must be carefully considered
Europe and North America along with their maritime interests, and the capabilities and functions
to share insights, strengthen they can, or could, bring both at sea and ashore.
cooperation, and develop
common approaches to
This report provides a specific look at the three Baltic states and the
key transatlantic security
challenges. This issue brief relevance of the maritime domain to their defense, both nationally and
is part of a broader project as members of NATO, and what future capabilities, functions, and forms
with the Ministry of National of cooperation the three countries should consider to further enhance
Defense of Latvia focusing on defense and deterrence in the maritime domain of the Baltic Sea region.
security in northern Europe
and in particular in the Baltic
Sea region. It also builds on the Current State of Baltic Sea Regional Security
Transatlantic Security Initiative’s
long record of work on NATO’s
The Maritime Environment and the importance of the Baltic Sea
current and future role in the The Baltic Sea is a busy maritime domain that carries a significant
maritime domain. volume of trade among the Baltic Sea nations, and between the region,
the rest of Europe, and the broader world; close to 15 percent of the
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

“Over the last three years, been modernized since then. Although the Baltic Sea
fleet is significantly more active today in comparison
the Baltic Sea region to the last decade, concerns remain about readiness

has seen an increase in levels and crew proficiency.

maritime exercises both in Nevertheless, while the Baltic Sea fleet is far from its
strength during the Cold War, it could still play a potent
scope and in number.” sea-denial role as part of a Russian anti-access/area-
denial campaign against NATO and the United States
during a crisis in the region, especially using smaller
world’s maritime cargo traffic is related to the Baltic naval platforms with long-range, anti-ship, and land-
Sea region. The Baltic Sea is also an increasingly attack missiles, a current priority in Russian naval
important route for energy exports and imports and modernization and a capability already demonstrated
includes a substantial commercial fishing fleet. The in the Mediterranean against targets ashore in Syria.1
Baltic Sea region is of vital importance to Russia as well. In addition, naval power is inherently mobile over
It provides an important outlet for Russian exports, strategic distances, and Russia has displayed a pattern
including 50 percent of Russia’s cargo traffic, as well as of moving important naval assets between theaters of
energy exports via pipelines and shipping. The Baltic operation as needs change. Indeed, in late 2016 two
Sea also provides maritime connectivity between the new corvettes from Russia’s Black Sea fleet, capable
Kaliningrad enclave and the rest of Russia. of carrying long-range kalibr cruise missiles, entered
the Baltic Sea as an augmentation to the Baltic Sea
In terms of its operating environment, the Baltic Sea is
fleet. This adds further to Russia’s high-end maritime
challenging for maritime forces. Much of it is shallow in
capabilities in the region. 2
depth, and access to the region is controlled by narrow
inlets such as the Danish Straits. The Baltic Sea is busy
with commercial shipping, especially toward the south,
NATO in the Baltic Sea
which creates clutter and constrains the ability of naval Over the last three years, the Baltic Sea region has
forces to maneuver during peacetime. The Baltic Sea seen an increase in maritime exercises both in scope
is also relatively narrow (its average width is only 120 and in number. The annual BALTOPS exercise, driven
miles), meaning that modern ground-based systems, by the US Sixth Fleet, has expanded considerably
such as air defense and anti-ship missile batteries can and is increasingly focused on high-end maritime
range over much of the maritime domain in the region. warfighting in the Baltic Sea as well as missions such as
This threat is especially acute in the southeastern anti-submarine warfare, air defense, and amphibious
corner of the Baltic Sea, where Russia is developing a landings. National and other multinational exercises
robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) network in its in the region, such as Northern Coasts, have also
Kaliningrad enclave. increased since 2014. The navies of the Baltic states
(including both ships and staff members) are frequent
Russia’s Baltic Sea Fleet participants in these exercises.
Russian naval power is more constrained in the Baltic In combination, the navies of the Baltic Sea region
Sea today in comparison to the Cold War. Russia lost its bring a considerable set of capabilities that would be
maritime infrastructure and bases in the Baltic states relevant to a crisis in the region. For example, Germany
when Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regained their and Sweden (the latter a close NATO partner nation)
independence, and now only maintains naval forces provide high-end, sub-surface warfare capabilities
and supporting infrastructure in Kaliningrad and in the and expertise with their submarine forces, even
vicinity of Saint Petersburg. Russia’s Baltic Sea fleet though these forces are numerically smaller than
has also received comparatively less attention than
the Northern and Black Sea fleets in Russian military
modernization efforts. Today, the Baltic Sea fleet 1 Reuters Staff, “Russian frigate fires cruise missiles at Islamic State
consists of some fifty ships, including two destroyers, targets near Syria’s Deir al-Zor,” Reuters, September 5, 2017.
six frigates, six corvettes, two submarines, a collection 2 Damien Sharkov, “Russia’s Baltic Fleet to Receive New Missile
Corvette and Bomber,” Newsweek, May 17, 2017, http://www.
of mine hunters, and assorted smaller surface ships. newsweek.com/russias-baltic-fleet-receive-new-missile-corvette-
Many of these are of Cold War vintage, and have not and-bombers-611049.

2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

Royal Netherlands Navy, British Royal Navy, and Estonian Navy mine hunters conduct a minesweeping exercise in the
Baltic Sea as part of Standing NATO Maritime Group 2, May 2015. Photo credit: US Navy/Wikimedia.

levels maintained during the Cold War. Current naval The Maritime Domain and Challenges to
investment plans for the navies of the region also Baltic Security
point to a strong focus on high-end naval warfighting, Due to location, geography, and available resources,
including anti-submarine warfare (ASW), air defense, the maritime domain presents unique challenges for
sub-surface warfare, and electronic warfare. 3 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Fundamentally for the
Baltic states, it is not a matter of operating across
These developments in maritime capabilities and
the Baltic Sea (as it is for most NATO members) but
exercises in the Baltic Sea are a reflection of more
to keep its approaches and ports open for seaborne
attention to the maritime domain within NATO
NATO reinforcements. In a high-end conflict scenario
more broadly. NATO has also increased the size and
in northern Europe, the maritime domain would play an
complexity of naval exercises elsewhere, such as the
important supporting role. A Russian offensive would
North Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and movement
likely include all domains of warfare (ground, air, sea,
in the Alliance is expected on command structure and
and cyber) and, in the case of the maritime domain,
strategy related to operations in the maritime domain.
could include efforts to deny the use of any Baltic port
as a seaport of debarkation for reinforcements, or to
strike at what could be perceived as a vulnerable flank.
Indeed, it would be useful to draw on lessons learned
from the Russian annexation of Crimea, which was
primarily a ground operation, but did include maritime
3 See Magnus Nordenman and Franklin D. Kramer, “A Maritime elements to reinforce the initial Russian deployment
Framework for the Baltic Sea Region,” Atlantic Council, April 6,
2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/a- and to frustrate the initial Ukrainian military response
maritime-framework-for-the-baltic-sea-region. to the crisis. Maritime efforts aimed at the Baltic

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

states during a crisis could include limited amphibious The navies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are small and
landings, mining of maritime approaches, sabotage by primarily focused on mine hunting, an understandable
maritime special operations forces, and strikes from post-Cold War maritime capabilities evolution. After
the sea using long-range missile systems. the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent
Baltic states found their coasts and waters littered with
The Baltic states must also consider hybrid challenges World War II era mines and unexploded ordnance that
in the maritime domain that would leave them threatened commercial shipping and fisheries. The
vulnerable in scenarios that do not reach the threshold mine-hunting mission with Mine Countermeasure ships
for NATO’s Article 5. For example, the Baltic states was also seen as a real and practical contribution to
rely on seabed infrastructure, such as communications NATO’s increasing out-of-area focus with its Standing
and electricity cables in the Baltic Sea for connectivity NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCG). Over
to the rest of the Baltic Sea region and beyond, the last two decades, the Baltic states have built up
which could be disrupted during a crisis with Russia. considerable mine-hunting expertise and are viewed
Latvia and Lithuania are particularly vulnerable in as leaders within NATO in this field.
such a scenario, given the limited number of nodes
connecting them to the undersea cables. Indeed, In combination, the Baltic states have some twelve
Russia has taken a growing interest in operating close mine-hunting vessels at their disposal, along with
to undersea infrastructure for surveillance and training an assortment of patrol vessels with limited surface
purposes, and the construction of an electricity linkage warfare capabilities. Naval modernization efforts
between Sweden and Lithuania served as the pretext among the Baltic states have included a limited set of
for aggressive Russian behavior toward the ships laying anti-submarine warfare sensors, coastal surveillance
cables in the Baltic Sea in 2015.4 networks, and further enhancements of the pre-
existing mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities.
Finally, the Baltic states must consider peacetime naval Moving forward, the naval modernization efforts of the
challenges from Russia, which are to some degree part Baltic states are expected to remain relatively modest.
of the new normal in the Baltic Sea region, but must Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all reached NATO’s
nevertheless be heeded and managed. These include agreed commitment of 2 percent of gross domestic
the persistent surveillance conducted by Russia in the product (GDP) for defense and have ambitious
air and at sea aimed at territory, units, infrastructure, modernization and readiness plans in place. However,
training, and exercises; close encounters between given the small size of the Baltic economies and the
aircraft and ships from Russia and NATO members; and many competing demands (including, but not limited
potential incursions into the sea and airspace of the to, anti-armor capabilities, soldier protection, mobility,
Baltic states. These challenges are not necessarily part and air defense), the resources available for maritime
of a crisis escalation scenario, but must be monitored, capabilities will remain modest.
responded to, and better understood not only by the
Baltic states and the other Baltic Sea nations, but The Way Ahead on Baltic Maritime Defense
across the Alliance in order to build familiarity with
Given the limited resources available to the Baltic
the maritime dynamics of the region among decision
states (even though they have been significantly
makers. Indeed, most of the close and potentially
expanded and are in line with the commitments made
dangerous encounters between Russia and NATO in the
to NATO), along with other investment priorities, the
Baltic Sea region do not involve warships or shipping
individual contributions by the Baltic states to defense
from the Baltic states, but instead are focused on
and deterrence in the maritime domain will continue
deployed ships from other NATO nations, in particular
to be constrained. Furthermore, generating and
the United States.
sustaining many naval capabilities, such as ASW, air
defense, and surface warfare is very expensive and
therefore out of reach for the Baltic states. However,
if the efforts of the Baltic states were broadly aligned
4 For more on hybrid maritime threats in the Baltic Sea region see
with each other as well as with the efforts of NATO and
Martin Murphy, Frank Hoffman, and Gary Schaub, Hybrid Maritime larger nations in the Baltic Sea region, Estonia, Latvia,
Warfare and the Baltic Sea Region, Centre for Military Studies, and Lithuania could significantly contribute to NATO’s
University of Copenhagen, October 25, 2016, http://cms.polsci.
ku.dk/english/cmsnews/hybrid-maritime-warfare/.
ability to operate in the maritime domain of the Baltic

4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

During BALTOPS 2016, a landing craft air cushion arrives ashore as part of an amphibious landing exercise in Ustka,
Poland, June 2016. Photo credit: US Navy/Flickr.

Sea region and help keep the approaches to the Baltic environment, NATO should consider developing a
states open for seaborne reinforcements. maritime defense strategy for the Baltic Sea, which
outlines key tasks, needed capabilities , command
In light of this, the Baltic states should consider the and control arrangements, and how the maritime
following resource-informed recommendations: domain aligns with NATO’s broader defense and
deterrence planning for the region.
Strategy and Regional Cooperation
• Align Baltic efforts with NATO’s emerging • Cooperation with Key Baltic Sea states. In
maritime focus. Real attention to the maritime aggregate, the nations of the Baltic Sea region
domain is emerging within NATO, and future bring a substantial range of naval capabilities,
command structure updates are highly likely to including anti-submarine warfare, air defense,
have a maritime focus. Furthermore, it is probable sub-surface warfare, and electronic warfare. In
that NATO will update its Alliance Maritime addition, the new naval investments in the Baltic
Strategy in the near future. The development of Sea region will help cover some of the capabilities
Baltic maritime capabilities and roles should be gaps that are left by the limited resources of the
closely aligned and supportive of the broader Baltic states themselves. In this context, Germany
evolution of the Alliance’s structures, capabilities, is emerging as a regional leader of sorts in terms
and concepts for maritime operations, in particular of orchestrating regional maritime cooperation
those aspects focused on collective defense and in capabilities development and exercises. In the
deterrence. In addition, given the unique nature and coming years, this German role in the Baltic Sea will
role of the Baltic Sea in the new European security likely be further strengthened with the Baltic Sea

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 5
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

Latvian Naval Forces minelayer A-53 Virsaitis, June 2012. Photo credit: Łukasz Golowanow/Wikimedia.

Maritime Component Command in Rostock, which regional cooperation and provide a rotational
will provide command and control capabilities for presence in the Baltic Sea, which would contribute
operations. 5 The Baltic states should therefore to the Alliance’s deterrence posture in the region.6
consider cooperation opportunities with Germany
in the maritime domain, in order to grow capabilities In practical terms, a US naval presence in the Baltic
and ensure alignment with the efforts of other Sea should be focused on capabilities development
nations in the Baltic Sea region. to address either US or allied shortfalls. US-Baltic
naval cooperation could, specifically, focus on MCM
• A US Naval Role in the Baltic Sea. In a crisis scenario and mine warfare (for additional details see below
in the Baltic Sea region, US naval forces would play in Roles and Capabilities); an area of deep Baltic
a key role in delivering long-range strike, electronic expertise, but where the United States is currently
warfare, and sea-based air defense capabilities for developing new concepts and approaches. A US
the NATO response. Furthermore, US amphibious Navy littoral combat ship with an MCM mission
forces, along with allied counterparts, could play package would be a suitable platform for this
a key role in the reinforcements package for the cooperation.
Baltic States. Also, the US can contribute undersea
sensors and mine warfare capabilities to regional • Give NATO Force Integration Units a stronger
defense efforts. US naval forces could also play a maritime dimension. Along with eFP groups,
very helpful role in peacetime to generate further each Baltic nation currently hosts a NATO Force
Integration Unit (NFIU), which is responsible for

5 See Magnus Nordenman, “Back to the North: The Future of the

German Navy in the New European Security Environment,” Atlan-
tic Council, April 4, 2017, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publica- 6 See Bruce Stubbs, “The US Navy Has a Role in the Baltic,” Pro-
tions/issue-briefs/back-to-the-north. ceedings Magazine, September 2017, 47-51.

6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

preparing and facilitating the deployment of allied short-range and light anti-ship missiles, which can
forces and the Very High Readiness Joint Task be made highly mobile when carried by light or
Force (VJTF) to the Baltic region. The role of the medium trucks; such light coastal defense missiles
NFIU could be further strengthened by giving it could also be mounted on and fired from small
more of a maritime dimension in terms of staff and patrol boats.
focus.
There are examples of current systems of this type,
Roles and Capabilities which include Hellfire missiles as well as the Spike-
ER missile. Both were originally anti-tank systems
• Sustain the MCM role. The Baltic states are
that have been adapted to a coastal defense role.
recognized leaders in mine hunting in littoral areas;
These systems are in use by other armed forces
a capability that is relevant to the broader Alliance
in the broader region, namely Norway, Sweden,
and may still find uses in future expeditionary
and Finland. The Spike system is already in the
operations. More importantly, the MCM capability
inventory of the Latvian and Lithuanian armed
is directly relevant to the new security environment
forces as an anti-tank capability.
in the Baltic Sea region. The use of sea mines by
Russia, overtly or covertly deployed, would present • Enable reinforcements and a forward naval
a real challenge to NATO’s maritime operations presence. The Baltic states enjoy the use of a number
in the Baltic Sea, and even a few mines would of good ports in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
suffice to delay reinforcements or restrict naval which are currently engaged in processing high
operations. Sustaining and further developing volumes of cargo and shipping. Indeed, some
the Baltic states’ MCM capabilities are therefore of them have already been utilized to flow NATO
a direct contribution to NATO’s efforts to defeat members forces into the region for training and
Russia’s A2/AD strategy in the Baltic Sea region. exercises. The Baltic port infrastructure should be
further reviewed in order to ensure their suitability
• Consider a mine warfare mission for the Baltic
for receiving reinforcements, and their port
navies. Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea is
security arrangements strengthened against both
constrained and during a crisis or war could be
sabotage and cyber attacks. NATO must also more
further made difficult by the use of sea mines,
fully use the ports for exercises in order to build
thereby frustrating parts of Russia’s A2/AD efforts
familiarity with the infrastructure available, and to
before they could be fully deployed. The location
allow any shortcomings that need to be addressed
of the Baltic states would also mean that the Baltic
to emerge now in order to allow an effective use of
navies could serve as “first responders” in the event
the ports before or during a crisis.
of a military crisis in the region. Weapons such as
mines are relatively cheap to procure and maintain The Baltic states and NATO should consider the
and can be deployed from a range of ships, even creation of a hub for a forward naval presence in
converted fishing vessels. the Baltic region. Such a hub would not only be
used for reinforcement shipments before or during
• Bolster maritime domain awareness with
a crisis, but could also host NATO member naval
unmanned systems. The Baltic states, along with
forces on a rotational basis for training and exercises
the other nations of the region, urgently need to
in the region and with the Baltic navies and other
enhance maritime domain awareness to build
forces. The port of Liepaja in Latvia, for example,
a better picture of the dynamics and patterns in
would be suitable for this type of arrangement. It
the maritime environment. A cost-effective way
is a commercial port, and the Latvian navy already
could be the use of small unmanned aerial systems
operates out of the area. The geographical location
for coastal surveillance with cameras and other
of Liepaja would allow NATO naval forces space
sensors.
for operational maneuver, something that is not
• Consider a coastal defense capability. The Baltic available closer to Kaliningrad or in the Gulf of Riga,
states are vulnerable to amphibious and near- and that is a crucial consideration given Russia’s
shore operations. This threat can be answered A2/AD network in the region.
with the development of a modest coastal defense
capability. This could include relatively cheap

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 7
 ISSU E B RIEF Maritime Defense for the Baltic States

A full-fledged NATO maritime hub in Liepaja would and NATO to comprehensively consider the Baltic
require a number of functions and infrastructure Sea maritime domain and the threats and challenges
features to be functional both as a seaport of there. Northern Europe is sure to remain a ground-
debarkation and as a staging area for a forward centric domain in terms of defense and deterrence for
naval presence. This includes effective seaport NATO, but the maritime domain can play an important
management, arrival and departure coordination, supporting role, not least as an avenue of approach
movement control, robust hazardous cargo handling, for NATO reinforcements and long-range strike from
tug support, maintenance, as well as port security and the sea. While there are more national resources
force protection by the host nation. The infrastructure available for defense in the Baltic states, the room for
requirements, meanwhile, include deep draft piers, the development of maritime capabilities will remain
on- and off-loading equipment, marshalling areas, limited given other priorities. A resource-informed way
munition and fuel storage, and interfaces with road forward for the Baltic states in the maritime domain
and rail networks for onward movement. therefore lies in the transition to a coastal defense force
as a contribution to restricting Russian operations in
Conclusion the Baltic Sea and close alignment with the efforts of
Since 2014, NATO and the Baltic states have made the broader Alliance and key NATO members in the
significant progress in strengthening collective region.
defense and deterrence in the Baltic Sea region. The
Baltic region now plays host to NATO’s enhanced
forward presence groups, which provide a much- Magnus Nordenman is the director of the Transatlantic
needed trip wire and serve as the basis for further Security Initiative and deputy director of the Scowcroft
development of capabilities and operations in the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
ground domain. It is now time for the Baltic states

8 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
 Atlantic Council Board of Directors

INTERIM CHAIRMAN R. Nicholas Burns Reuben Jeffery, III Robert Rangel

*James L. Jones, Jr. *Richard R. Burt Joia M. Johnson Thomas J. Ridge
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, Michael Calvey Stephen R. Kappes Charles O. Rossotti
INTERNATIONAL James E. Cartwright *Maria Pica Karp Robert O. Rowland
ADVISORY BOARD John E. Chapoton Andre Kelleners Harry Sachinis
Brent Scowcroft Ahmed Charai *Zalmay M. Khalilzad Rajiv Shah
Melanie Chen Robert M. Kimmitt Stephen Shapiro
CHAIRMAN,
INTERNATIONAL Michael Chertoff Henry A. Kissinger Kris Singh
ADVISORY BOARD George Chopivsky Franklin D. Kramer James G. Stavridis
David McCormick Wesley K. Clark Laura Lane Richard J.A. Steele
David W. Craig Richard L. Lawson Paula Stern
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *Jan M. Lodal Robert J. Stevens
*Frederick Kempe
Nelson W. Cunningham *Jane Holl Lute Robert L. Stout, Jr.
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS Ivo H. Daalder William J. Lynn *Ellen O. Tauscher
*Adrienne Arsht Ankit N. Desai Wendy W. Makins Nathan D. Tibbits
*Stephen J. Hadley *Paula J. Dobriansky Zaza Mamulaishvili Frances M. Townsend
VICE CHAIRS Christopher J. Dodd Mian M. Mansha Clyde C. Tuggle
*Robert J. Abernethy Conrado Dornier Gerardo Mato Melanne Verveer
*Richard W. Edelman Thomas J. Egan, Jr. William E. Mayer Charles F. Wald
*C. Boyden Gray *Stuart E. Eizenstat T. Allan McArtor Michael F. Walsh
*George Lund Thomas R. Eldridge Timothy McBride Maciej Witucki
*Virginia A. Mulberger Julie Finley John M. McHugh Neal S. Wolin
*W. DeVier Pierson Lawrence P. Fisher, II Eric D.K. Melby Guang Yang
*John J. Studzinski *Alan H. Fleischmann Franklin C. Miller Mary C. Yates
*Ronald M. Freeman James N. Miller Dov S. Zakheim
TREASURER
Laurie S. Fulton Judith A. Miller
*Brian C. McK. Henderson HONORARY DIRECTORS
Courtney Geduldig *Alexander V. Mirtchev
David C. Acheson
SECRETARY *Robert S. Gelbard Susan Molinari Madeleine K. Albright
*Walter B. Slocombe Gianni Di Giovanni Michael J. Morell James A. Baker, III
DIRECTORS Thomas H. Glocer Richard Morningstar Harold Brown
Stéphane Abrial Murathan Gunal Edward J. Newberry Frank C. Carlucci, III
Odeh Aburdene Sherri W. Goodman Thomas R. Nides Ashton B. Carter
*Peter Ackerman Ian Hague Victoria J. Nuland Robert M. Gates
Timothy D. Adams Amir A. Handjani Franco Nuschese Michael G. Mullen
Bertrand-Marc Allen John D. Harris, II Joseph S. Nye Leon E. Panetta
*Michael Andersson Frank Haun Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg William J. Perry
David D. Aufhauser Michael V. Hayden Sean C. O’Keefe Colin L. Powell
Matthew C. Bernstein Annette Heuser Ahmet M. Oren Condoleezza Rice
*Rafic A. Bizri Amos Hochstein Sally A. Painter Edward L. Rowny
Dennis C. Blair Ed Holland *Ana I. Palacio George P. Shultz
*Thomas L. Blair *Karl V. Hopkins Carlos Pascual Horst Teltschik
Philip M. Breedlove Robert D. Hormats Alan Pellegrini John W. Warner
Reuben E. Brigety II Miroslav Hornak David H. Petraeus William H. Webster
Myron Brilliant *Mary L. Howell Thomas R. Pickering
*Esther Brimmer Wolfgang F. Ischinger Daniel B. Poneman *Executive Committee Members

Reza Bundy Deborah Lee James Arnold L. Punaro

List as of November 30, 2017
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