PCIB Vs Sps Santos
PCIB Vs Sps Santos
PCIB Vs Sps Santos
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PUNO, C.J p:
of the same nature was already filed on September 13, 1995 and was
DENIED on September 14, 1995. . . .;
3. That therefore, the order dated August 21, 2001 of this Honorable
Court which advised the complainant to avail of Rule 14 Section 14
of the Rules is contrary to its order dated September 14, 1995;
4. That up to this date, the complainant has not lifted a finger to
pursue this case against movants-defendants, hence, this Motion to
Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed
that this case be dismissed against the movants-defendants and to
order the deletion of the Notice ofLis Pendens at the back of the
subject title (sic).
This was opposed by petitioner, arguing that it had already filed a motion for
the service of summons by publication, but the trial court had yet to act on
it. 31 On July 25, 2003, this Motion was submitted for resolution. 32
On November 4, 2003, Spouses Dy and Chuyaco personally, and not
through their counsel, filed a "Motion for Inhibition without submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court", 33 the relevant portions
of which state: DTSIEc
jurisdiction of the court because the motion may raise myriad issues
in that one motion of special appearance as long as the objection to
the jurisdiction of the court is included. . . .
What necessarily changed also is that the medium of "special
appearance" is no longer restricted to a motion to dismiss because
one could now file any type of motion provided you included the
issue of lack of jurisdiction due to defective service of summons.
Thus, in this case at bar, the "two motions to dismiss" and the
"motion to inhibit" may be treated as "special appearance" since
they all included the issue of lack of jurisdiction due to non-service
of summons. They did not constitute as submitting the movant to
the jurisdiction of the court. IcTEAD
xxx xxx xxx
There being no proper service of summons on petitioners and there
being no voluntary appearance by petitioners, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants, the herein
petitioners. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court against
them would consequently be null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed June 23, 2004 Order
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, is hereby
DECLARED NULL AND VOID as against herein petitioners. The April
22, 1994 complaint filed by Philippine Commercial International
Bank is hereby DISMISSED as against herein petitioners DY and
CHUYACO only, no jurisdiction over their persons having been
acquired.
SO ORDERED. 39
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate court. 40
Hence this appeal, where petitioner argues that:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE JUNE 23, 2004
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT NULL AND VOID AND IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT AS AGAINST RESPONDENTS DY AND CHUYACO AND
RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN A
Page 9 of 16
asserts that respondents' failure to move for reconsideration of the June 23,
2004 Order of the trial court, denying the latter's motion for inhibition, provides
sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.
We disagree.
Petitioner is correct that a motion for reconsideration, as a general rule,
must have first been filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom
the writ of certiorari is sought. 43 This is intended to afford the latter an
opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it. 44 However,
there are several exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie
even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely: HcDSaT
a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests
of the government or the petitioner, or the subject matter of
the action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process;
h. where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. 45
Page 11 of 16
when they filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. Significantly,
the motion did not categorically and expressly raise the jurisdiction of the court
over their persons as an issue. It merely (i) "reminded" the court of its
purportedly conflicting Orders in respect of summons by publication, (ii) alleged
that because petitioner "has not lifted a finger to pursue this case against
movants-defendants", the case may be dismissed for failure to prosecute, and
(iii) prayed additionally for the deletion of the Notice of Lis Pendens indicated at
the back of the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties. We
note, furthermore, that the motion failed to qualify the capacity in which
respondents were appearing and seeking recourse. 51 It is in this light that the
Court's pronouncement in Busuego v. Court of Appeals 52 finds cogent
application:
A voluntary appearance is a waiver of the necessity of a formal
notice. An appearance in whatever form, without explicitly objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person. While the formal method of
entering an appearance in a cause pending in the courts is to deliver
to the clerk a written direction ordering him to enter the appearance
of the person who subscribes it, an appearance may be made by
simply filing a formal motion, or plea or answer. This formal method
of appearance is not necessary. He may appear without such formal
appearance and thus submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. He may appear by presenting a motion, for example, and
unless by such appearance he specifically objects to the jurisdiction
of the court, he thereby gives his assent to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. 53 (emphasis supplied)
Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance
dissipate when the respondents' motion for inhibition is considered. This
motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further
hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of
the case, respondents manifested their voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. 54
Page 13 of 16
To be sure, the convenient caveat in the title of the motion for inhibition
(i.e., "without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court") does not detract from this conclusion. It would suffice to say that the
allegations in a pleading or motion are determinative of its nature; the
designation or caption thereof is not controlling. 55 Furthermore, no amount of
caveat can change the fact that respondents tellingly signed the motion to
inhibit in their own behalf and not through counsel, let alone through a counsel
making a special appearance. ACEIac
Third Issue: Inhibition
Respondents argue that the trial court's so-called "continuous delay in the
proceedings" is indicative of the fact that it is incompetent to continue hearing
the case. Respondents therefore assert that the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
their motion to inhibit and required them to file their Answer.
We are not convinced.
Under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, a
judge or judicial officer shall be mandatorily disqualified to sit in any case in
which:
(a) he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise; or
(b) he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of civil law; or
(c) he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel; or
(d) he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision
is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record. 56
Paragraph two of the same provision meanwhile provides for the rule
on voluntary inhibition and states: "[a] judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above". That discretion is a matter of conscience and is
Page 14 of 16
However, the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 does not give
judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a
case. 61 The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we
have noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. 62 This Court has to
be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before
it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. 63 Moreover, extrinsic
evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order
itself. 64 The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent
as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. 65
We do not find any abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying
respondents' motion to inhibit. Our pronouncement in Webb, et al. v. People
of the Philippines, et al. 66 is apropos:
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce
any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent judge was
motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed
rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of adverse
rulings of the respondent judge which they characterized as palpable
errors. This is not enough. We note that respondent judge's rulings
resolving the various motions filed by petitioners were all made after
considering the arguments raised by all the parties. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous
interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not without remedy.
The range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court and we need
not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But certainly, the
remedy for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice
or bad faith, is not the outright disqualification of the judge. For there
is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are
always infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges
who err for we all err. (emphasis supplied) aSITDC
Truth be told, respondents are not entirely blameless for any perceived
delay in the resolution of the various incidents of the case. For instance, they
make much of the fact that close to three years passed before their "Omnibus
Page 16 of 16
Motion to Dismiss and to Annul All the Proceedings Taken Against the
Defendants", filed on December 11, 1998, was noted by the trial court. But the
fact remains that the said "motion", not having a notice of hearing addressed to
the adverse party, is legally a mere scrap of paper. 67 It presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court, and is not entitled to
judicial cognizance. 68
Considering the foregoing, we rule that respondents' accusations of
delay, incompetence, and bias on the part of the trial court are unfounded.
Hence, they are not entitled to the inhibition of Judge Inoturan as a relief.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
July 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated January 10, 2006
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another in their stead is hereby
rendered ORDERING respondent Spouses Dy and Chuyaco to answer the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 94-1585 within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Decision.
The trial court is directed to proceed hearing the case, and to resolve the
same with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
||| (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, G.R. No. 171137,
[June 5, 2009], 606 PHIL 615-640)