Wiarda ConstitutionalCoups Web
Wiarda ConstitutionalCoups Web
Wiarda ConstitutionalCoups Web
americas program
Constitutional Coups?
military interventions in latin america
June 2011
Ë|xHSKITCy06 476zv*:+:!:+:!
a report of the csis
americas program
Constitutional Coups?
military interventions in latin america
Authors
Howard J. Wiarda
Hilary Collins
June 2011
About CSIS
At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in
government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan,
nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis
and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.
Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS
was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for
good in the world.
Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy
institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused
on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and
climate to global development and economic integration.
Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and
John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be
understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2011 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-89206-647-6
| iii
Blank
embedd constitutional coups?
military interventions in latin america
Military coups are a regular, recurrent, normal part of the Latin American political
process.—Kalman H. Silvert 2
Americans are so committed to elections and democracy as the only legitimate path to political
power that it is sometimes hard to conceive of politics by other means. Moreover U.S. policymakers
tend to believe that elections occupy a higher realm of moral authority and hope that, with
democracy assistance programs, Latin America and other developing areas will “move beyond”
revolutions, coup d’états, general strikes, and other nonelectoral routes to power. But as the Silvert
quote above indicates, nonelectoral paths may still be pursued, especially in crisis circumstances;
furthermore, these extra-electoral means may enjoy both legitimacy and constitutional mandate. In
this report, we test these propositions as they apply in Latin America.
1
Howard J. Wiarda is Dean Rusk Professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia in Athens
and a senior associate in residence with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC. Hilary Collins is an intern with the CSIS Americas Program.
2
Kalman H. Silvert, The Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin America (New Orleans, LA:
Hauser Press,, 1961).
|1
offices. Still, with all of Reagan’s efforts to promote democracy both domestically and abroad, there
remains the possibility of military intervention in many countries in the Western Hemisphere.
In the course of pursuing his democracy-promotion agenda, Reagan discovered a number of
advantages, which helps explain why his successors have followed and expanded the policy and why
it has wide bipartisan support. First, it gives moral purpose to U.S. foreign policy and reinforces the
longtime American belief that the United States is a “beacon on a hill,” a “light to the world”; no
one would dare to disagree with that. Second, it serves as a way to unite the often-feuding
departments and agencies—State Department, Defense Department, CIA, and now FBI and
Homeland Security Department—behind the policy, to overcome what in the academic literature is
called the “bureaucratic politics” of foreign policy decisionmaking. Third, Reagan discovered that
democracy promotion is good domestic politics; he found that otherwise opposing religious and
human rights groups, the media, and the other party in Congress would support his policies if they
were stated in pro-democracy terms. Finally, Reagan discovered that democracy promotion was
good policy in Central America, Eastern Union, and the Soviet Union, leading generally to
moderate, centrist, middle-of-the-road governments that are easier for the United States to deal
with than either right-wing authoritarians or Marxist regimes. Moral purpose and good policy were
thus combined.
Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed, and Russia, for a time, as well as Eastern Europe, adopted
democracy, the agenda seemed vindicated. In his famous book, The End of History, 3 Francis
Fukuyama argued that democracy was the terminus of the Hegelian dialectic; other political
scientists proclaimed that democracy was “the only game in town.” The funds for NED were vastly
increased, and one prominent neoconservative predicted that in a short time “all the world would
be democratic.” With regard to Latin America, the mantra became that all countries, except Cuba,
were democratic. Within foreign affairs agencies like the State Department, Agency for
International Development, and others, the consensus on the democracy agenda was so strong that
no other alternatives or possibilities were considered. The few doubters—Samuel Huntington (The
Clash of Civilizations 4), Peter Berger (Many Globalizations 5), and others who suggested that
democracy was incomplete or partial—were either dismissed or ignored.
Now, the wheel has turned once again. First, the United States itself is not doing so well
economically, and there is less eagerness in the Third World to emulate the U.S. model. Second,
China is doing spectacularly well; the Asian model of strong state direction and close coordination
between the public and private sectors is widely popular. Third, 20 years’ experience has shown that
some so-called democracies continue to utilize repressive practices. Additionally, fourth,
democracy by itself does not, as Latin American citizens expected, automatically produce social and
3
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992).
4
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 1996).
5
Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the
Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
6
Some classic related studies include Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in
Spanish America (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1993) and David R. Mares, ed., Civil-Military
Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
7
See Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “Constitutions and Comparative Constitutional
Study,” Political Database of the Americas, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/constudies.html; and
Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), A Comparative Atlas of Defense in Latin America
and Caribbean: 2010 Edition (Buenos Aires, Argentina: RESDAL, 2010).
8
Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny; see also the writings of historians Lyle McAlister, John J. Johnson,
Edwin Lieuwen, and John Lynch.
9
Norma C. Gutiérrez, Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues, Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Law
Library of Congress, August 2099), http://schock.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Schock_CRS_Report_Honduras_
FINAL.pdf; also Peter J. Meyer, Honduran-U.S. Relations (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,
February 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf.
Conclusion
Echoing the Silvert quote with which we began, coups are a regular, recurrent, almost normal part
of the Latin American political process. One can hope that they have gone away, but they likely
have not, and the international community has to deal with this fact realistically.
Coups may take unconstitutional directions but may have a considerable degree of constitutional
legitimacy. They tend to occur when the normal civilian political system has broken down, is in
crisis, is paralyzed, or when internal order is threatened. They also tend to occur in the least
developed countries, lacking strong institutions or strong civil society; when these institutions have
failed, the armed forces are often called upon, and have a constitutional obligation, to step in and
fill the vacuum. They are not necessarily usurping power but most often fulfilling their
constitutional responsibilities.
Three countries of Latin America (Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama) have no regular armed forces;
nevertheless, their police forces or guardias may play a political role. In five countries of Latin
America (Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay), the armed forces are either not
mentioned in their constitutions or have a limited constitutional role. But in 12 Latin American
countries (60 percent), the armed forces do have a constitutional role, usually revolving around the
Constitutional Coups?
military interventions in latin america
June 2011
Ë|xHSKITCy06 476zv*:+:!:+:!