Lecture 15 - Web Security

CSE497b - Spring 2007

CSE497b Introduction to Computer and Network Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger
Web Server
• Entry point for clients
– To a variety of services
– Customized for clients (e.g., via cookies)
– Supported by complex backend applications (e.g.,
databases)
• Target of attackers
– Common protocol
– Supports a wide range of inputs
– Complex software interactions
– Running with high privilege
• Q: How does this impact?
– Vulnerabilities, Threats, Risks

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Web Server Deployments
• Note the multiple application layers and connection
to legacy code

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Web Server Software
• E.g., IIS 7

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Web Server Architecture
• Server Components
Generic
Services
(E.g., SMTP,
FTP, etc)
Legacy
Network Application
Server
Front-End
(E.g., IIS)
Application
Layer
(E.g., Active Database
Server Layer
Pages) (Pick your
favorite)

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Server-side Scripting
• Program placed directly in content, run at during
request time and output returned in content
– MS active server pages (ASP)
– PHP
– mod_perl
– server-side JavaScript
– python, ....
• Nice at generating output
– Dangerous if tied to user input

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Dynamic Content Security
• Largely just applications
– Inasmuch as application are secure
– Command shells, interpreters, are dangerous
• Three things to prevent DC vulnerabilities
– Validate input
• Input often received as part of user supplied data
• E.g., cookie
– Limit program functionality
• Don’t leave open ended-functionality
– Execute with limited privileges

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Web Server Vulnerabilities
• Not surprisingly, these are numerous
• For IIS 5, focus was on function
– All services were ON by default
– Buffer overflow -- e.g., Code Red
• Interactions between components are complex
– HTTP input to database queries
– SQL Injection -- execute user input directly
• Web server permissions
– Web servers have broad access
– Deface web server -- modify server files
– Compromise system -- modify system files

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
What can be done?
• Checklist for IIS 5
– windows.stanford.edu/docs/IISsecchecklist.htm
– Gives an idea of what must be done for IIS
• Some examples
– “Disable all unnecessary ISAPI filters [services]”
• “Delete DLLs [libraries] associated with disabled filters”
– “Website must never be on the system drive”
– “Only necessary services” -- only SMTP
– “Remove NTFS write permissions where possible”
– Obscurity
• “Don’t use obvious names for script and code directories”
• “Set default website to extreme security”
• IIS 7 does does many of these -- automate all?
CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Web Server as a Host Security Problem
• Adversary’s Goal
– Integrity/Secrecy/Availability
– Get code running on your system
• That is under the adversary’s control
• Ways to Execute Code
– Accessible interfaces
• Defense: minimize attack surface
– Vulnerable interfaces
• Defense: prevent various code injections: buffer overflows
• Privilege
– Attackers want this code to do as much as possible
• Defense: minimize its privilege

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Canonical (common) DOS - Request Flood
• Attack: request flooding
– Overwhelm some resource with legitimate requests
– e.g., web-server, phone system

• Note: unintentional flood is called a flash crowd

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
DOS Prevention - Reverse-Turing Tests
• Turing test: measures whether a human can tell the
difference between a human or computer (AI)
• Reverse Turning tests: measures whether a user on
the internet is a person, a bot, whatever?
• CAPTCHA - completely automated public Turing test
to tell computers and humans apart
– contorted image humans can read, computers can’t
– image processing pressing SOA, making these harder

• Note: often used not just for DOS prevention, but for
protecting “free” services (email accounts)
CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
DOS Prevention - Puzzles
• Make the solver present evidence of “work” done
– If work is proven, then process request
– Note: only useful if request processing significantly more
work than
• Puzzle design
– Must be hard to solve
– Easy to Verify
• Canonical Example
– Puzzle: given x-bits of input r and h(r), where h is a
cryptographic hash function
– Solution: Invert h(r)
– Q: Assume you are given 108 bits of input for 128-bit hash
input, how hard would it be to solve the puzzle?
CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page
Take Away
• The complexity of web server (and web client)
systems makes ensuring their security complex
– A single interface (HTTP) enhances function
– Lots of services can be accessed which makes attack
surface large
– The variety of inputs via this interface makes detecting
malicious input very difficult
– Privileges available to injected code can be sufficient to
take over system
• Servers are high profile targets
– Valuable info (credit cards, private user data)
– Represent an entity (denial of service)

CSE497b Introduction to Computer (and Network) Security - Spring 2007 - Professor Jaeger Page