Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M.
CARIAGA, Provincial Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer,
Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the defunct Court of First
Instance of Abra, Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656,
entitled "Abra Valley Junior College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff vs.
Armin M. Cariaga as Provincial Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. Bosque as Municipal
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Paterno Millare, defendants," the decretal portion of
which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares:

That the distraint seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra, the
Provincial Treasurer of said province against the lot and building of the Abra Valley Junior
College, Inc., represented by Director Pedro Borgonia located at Bangued, Abra, is valid;

That since the school is not exempt from paying taxes, it should therefore pay all back
taxes in the amount of P5,140.31 and back taxes and penalties from the promulgation of
this decision;

That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of P60,000.00 before the trial, be
confiscated to apply for the payment of the back taxes and for the redemption of the
property in question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00, the remainder must be
returned to the Director of Pedro Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff herein;

That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of P6,000.00 also before the
trial must be returned to said Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra;

And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated

with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of
Answer by the respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on July 10, 1972
in the court a quo to annul and declare void the "Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of
Sale" of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate
taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said "Notice of Seizure" of the college lot
and building covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly registered in the
name of petitioner, plaintiff below, on July 6, 1972, by respondents Municipal Treasurer
and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said
taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the
respondent treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot
and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal
Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.

On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now deceased) filed through
counstel a motion to dismiss the complaint.

On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer,
through then Provincial Fiscal Loreto C. Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer
by the respondents Heirs of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the complaint. This
was followed by an amended answer (Annex "3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August
31, 1972.

On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his answer (Annex "5," ibid;
Rollo, pp. 106-108).

On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school premises at public auction,
the respondent Judge, Hon. Juan P. Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra,
Branch I, ordered (Annex "6," ibid; Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial and
municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the auction sale.
Hence, on December 14, 1972, petitioner, through Director Borgonia, deposited with the
trial court the sum of P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.

On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied
by the trial court in its questioned decision. Said Stipulations reads:

STIPULATION OF FACTS

COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
enter into the following agreed stipulation of facts:

1. That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the

complaint is admitted; but the particular person of Mr. Armin M. Cariaga is to be
substituted, however, by anyone who is actually holding the position of Provincial
Treasurer of the Province of Abra;

2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings
thereon located in Bangued, Abra under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83;
 3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra
caused to be served upon the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure on the
property of said school under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83 for the satisfaction of
real property taxes thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of Seizure being the one
attached to the complaint as Exhibit A;

4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. was
sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and
the same was sold to defendant Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of P6,000.00
and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal Treasurer.

5. That all other matters not particularly and specially covered by this stipulation of facts
will be the subject of evidence by the parties.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to consider and admit this
stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by the parties.

Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973.

Sgd. Agripino Brillantes

Typ AGRIPINO BRILLANTES
Attorney for Plaintiff

Sgd. Loreto Roldan

Typ LORETO ROLDAN
Provincial Fiscal
Counsel for Defendants
Provincial Treasurer of
Abra and the Municipal
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra

Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre

Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE
Attorney for Defendant
Paterno Millare (Rollo, pp. 17-18)

Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, found the following: (a)
that the school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School
and College Courses, and has a school population of more than one thousand students
all in all; (b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from
the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; (c) that the
elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that the high
school and college students are housed in the main building; (e) that the Director with
his family is in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross
income of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.

From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by
the parties, is whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for
educational purposes. (Rollo, p. 20)
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon.
Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and
a Supplemental Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the
evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building
and school lot used for educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
exempted from the payment of taxes." (Annexes "B," "B-1" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49;
44 and 49).

Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the
Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government
and rendered the assailed decision.

After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within
which to perfect its appeal (Per Order dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition;
Rollo, p. 57) petitioner instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition was filed on August 17,
1974 (Rollo, p.2).

In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to
the petition (Rollo, p. 58). Respondents were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p.
74).

Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID THE SEIZURE AND SALE
OF THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF
THE PETITIONER.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND
BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR
EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES MERELY BECAUSE THE COLLEGE PRESIDENT
RESIDES IN ONE ROOM OF THE COLLEGE BUILDING.

III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND
BUILDING OF THE PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES
AND IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.

IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00
DEPOSIT MADE IN THE COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31
REALTY TAXES. (See Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)

The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase "used exclusively
for educational purposes."

Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes,
and not the incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under
Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of
subject college lot and building, which are contrary thereto as well as to the provision of
Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are without
legal basis and therefore void.

On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in
question which were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are
used: (1) for the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of
the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the
in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the ground floor of
the college building is being used and rented by a commercial establishment, the
Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as Annex "8" (Comment;
Rollo, p. 90]).

Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application in the case at
bar is Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
which expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes ...

Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by
Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides:

The following are exempted from real property tax under the Assessment Law:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational
purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school lot and building is the
basic and controlling guide, norm and standard to determine tax exemption, and not the
mere incidental use thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217
[1916], this Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a
boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute
business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used exclusively for
religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be
exempted from taxation.

In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352
[1972], this Court included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and
another lot formerly used as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used exclusively"
considers incidental use also. Thus, the exemption from payment of land tax in favor of
the convent includes, not only the land actually occupied by the building but also the
adjacent garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish priest. The lot which is not
used for commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort of lodging place, also qualifies
for exemption because this constitutes incidental use in religious functions.

The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this
Court in the cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA
186 [1961] and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the Missionary District,
14 SCRA 991 [1965], thus —

Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or

educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefor (Cooley
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use to provide housing
facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the hospital
staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents' (84 CJS 6621),
such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used for the inmates of the institution. (Cooley
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).

The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in
the Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).

It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-
restrictive interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as
provided for in Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which
are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of
the second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the
Director and his family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which
is complimentary to the main or primary purpose—educational, the lease of the first
floor thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to have been raised for
the first time in this Court. That the matter was not taken up in the to court is really
apparent in the decision of respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the
stipulation of facts, not even in the description of the school building by the trial judge,
both embodied in the decision nor as one of the issues to resolve in order to determine
whether or not said properly may be exempted from payment of real estate taxes (Rollo,
pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that such fact was not disputed even
after it was raised in this Court.

Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot be taken up for the
first time on appeal. Nonetheless, as an exception to the rule, this Court has held that
although a factual issue is not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial
justice, this Court is not prevented from considering a pivotal factual matter. "The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as
such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision." (Perez
vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).

Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the
school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the
second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial purposes.
However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half
of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I,
is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be
returned to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Penned by the respondent Judge, Hon. Judge P. Aquino.