Examine the differences between interpretive and objectivist approaches to social science knowledge

and discuss if there are ways of integrating these competing schools of thought.

The alleged founder of Ontology, Parmenides of Elea, in his poem ‘On Nature’ views what is real
as a duality; that which is absolute and unchangeable, and that which is observed through sensory
perception, leading to knowledge. David Hume then argues that all realities in the world are only
sensed by humans and do not actually exist outside the thought. An empiricist, he argued that the
observations obtained are just a priori knowledge and does not predict the future, or causal effects.
August Comte took this belief further that the metaphysical stage, where cause and effect are judged,
will give way to positivist thought, by which reason and observation will be used to study the world.
Emile Durkheim would then take this same viewpoint and establish sociology as a science, with
scientific method as means of inquiry. An observer must be objective and detached from the data
collected. Conversely, Kant argues that the observer himself is the centre point of observations and
his perceptions cannot be separated from the data collection and interpretation. Weber furthered the
same belief and added that sociology may obtain very little objective knowledge due to this very
subjectivity of the observer.
So, social sciences as subject, must grapple with several fundamental questions before the nature and
behaviour of humans and knowledge about such can even be obtained.
ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Do objects and entities, facts and realities exist independently of an observer? Is there a single reality
or just a collection of perceptions? On one hand, a realist believes that reality is objective and does
exist, independent of the mind and of the language. One could be a naïve realist and argue that reality
exists and is adequately represented by our observations (Losch, 2009). One could also be a scientific
realist and deviate slightly to assume that our scientific theories are all approximately true (van
Fraassen, 1980). Exactly opposite to the realist standpoint, a relativist accepts that all knowledge
comes from ‘evolved perspective or point of view’ (Raskin, 2008). Even more extremely, that the
world does not exist outside of our perception or construction of it (Blaikie, 2007) (Reason &
Bradbury, 2006).

Perhaps more important and more varied are the epistemological assumptions that guide the current
social science research. Our views on how knowledge can be acquired directly influences the
methodology and methods employed in gaining that knowledge. Each of the ontologies discussed
above correspond to an extreme epistemological stand point as well. Realism has several, for the
want of better word, flavours to it. Positivism argues that anything that cannot be empirically verified
is immaterial and should not be discussed, i.e. such metaphysical questions that do not add value
should be left well alone. Positivism gleans its epistemic ideology from Objectivism, which states
that meaningful entities exist independent of conscious (realist ontology) and that truth can be found
by applying scientific methods of discovery (Crotty, 1998). Interpretivists on the other hand would
subscribe to the assumptions that all knowledge is constructed, all beliefs are non-absolute facts, one
can only claim causal effects based on stated belief systems and that there are multiple epistemic
belief systems that cannot be refuted and can coexist (Boghossian, 2006).

For social science research, (Crotty, 1998, p. 10) makes a very convincing argument that ontology
and epistemology are not entirely distinguished in the existing research. In some cases, realism (an
ontological position) is identified as objectivism (an epistemic approach). However, it is not as
simple as Realism corresponding to Objectivism (or Positivism) and Relativism to Interpretive
approaches only. While the ontological and epistemological issues arise together, it is important to
note that one can be a realist and believe in objective reality, and have interpretive epistemic views,
with the assumption that the knower cannot objectively separate oneself from the knowledge.

CONTRASTING OBJECTIVISM AND INTERPRETIVISM

Epistemology is the study of how we make knowledge (Dillon & Wals, 2006). Knowing the
epistemic underpinnings of Objectivism and Interpretivism, the next step is to look at the theoretical
perspective that a social science researcher needs to develop. This would inform the methodology
and the methods used in the research (Crotty, 1998, p. 4). If epistemology is the standpoint of a
researcher, then methodology is the plan following that epistemic stance and methods are the tools
to collect data and gain insights.

The purpose of research in the objectivist approach is to discover the truth and generalizing the
research findings while interpretivists believe that since there are multiple realities the purpose of
research is to progressively find meanings and focus on various contexts of subjects. Furthermore,
an objectivist believes in value neutrality of research while interpretivists argue that you cannot
separate knowledge from the knower. Hence, an objectivist would sound more impersonal in their
findings and context would be deemphasized while an interpretivist would be much more involved
in the findings and exploration of the content is considered critical.

Objectivist scheme of research is to use deductive reasoning and try to control the extraneous
variables, due to which the research design is usually fixed. The data collected for the research is
quantified, even if it is in the form of interviews. Also, since it is deductive research, the idea is to
prove or disprove the theory that is developed. In contrast, the interpretive approach is inductive in
its reasoning and research design is flexible. It is accepted that the extraneous variables are beyond
the control of researcher and must be described and accounted for in the discussion. The data
collected is often in textual format and very detailed, to completely reflect the context of words and
events. Since research design is inductive, theory is developed based on the results collected.
The methodology used by objectivists is usually experimental design or surveying, where the data is
already in the format of numbers or typically ordinal enough to be used as input for statistical
analysis. Since standardized statistical tools are used, the result of one study can be compared with
other studies of a similar nature. Interpretivists use methodologies such as ethnography,
phenomenological research, action research and discourse analysis (not a complete list) and usually
gather data in the form of interviews, focus group discussions, observations, case studies and
narratives etc. Interpretivist research is heavy on context so comparison of one study with another,
even with some similar variables, is impossible since observers are different.

Finally, it is important to look at methodological individualism and holism. An individualist would

argue that social facts and phenomena are reducible without remainder to facts about individuals
(Gorton, 2018). Holism can be explained as the fact that social mechanisms are more than the sum
of their parts, and that they can be explained without reference to individuals too. Most objectivist
researchers also tend to be methodologically individualistic. As an objectivist believes in the
generalizability of their results, this seems logical. On the other hand, since interpretivists do not
believe in generalizability of results, they usually correspond to the holistic methodological
approach, believing that social facts can be replicated and verified only under a specific set of
background hypotheses.

INTEGRATING EPISTEMOLOGY OR METHODS?

As discussed above, one of the differences between objectivist and interpretivist approach is the
different methodologies adopted to gain knowledge. The important thing to remember though is that
methodology is not the same as methods. Text books tend to focus most on the fact that objectivism
corresponds to quantitative methods and interpretivism to qualitative methods. (Guba & Lincoln,
1989) support the view point that qualitative and quantitative approaches are so different that trying
to reconcile would destroy the underlying philosophical assumptions of both. However, many
authors disagree and state that while ontological and epistemological assumptions cannot be
reconciled, it does not preclude a researcher from adopting multiple methods to reach truth
(Reichardt & Cook, 1979; Steckler, 1992). In fact, (Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil, 2002) clearly state that
the two types of methods can be used for complementary research.

(Crotty, 1998) absolutely refutes the idea that qualitative and quantitative methods need to be
distinguished at the level of epistemology. Epistemology only deals with the nature of knowledge
and its knowability and has nothing to say about the methods with which the knowledge can be
accessed. In fact, some of the qualitative methods such as earlier ethnography, now associated with
interpretivism, were used in empiricist and positivist manner. Erroneously, it is also concluded that
interpretivist research frowns upon all numeration. Descriptive statistics of research participants (if
large enough) may be used, if only to indicate that a diversity of opinion is used. This is not to say
that such numeration ‘ought’ to be used, as interpretivism is more concerned with context than
providing a balanced opinion from all sides. Another popular fallacy is that quantitative methods
would only collect and use questionnaires etc., to limit the responses to a predetermined set. While
it is true that quantitative analysis is based on statistics and need hard-wired responses, interviews
are also used as data collection tools for quantitative analysis. Response rate to questionnaires is
usually very low and structured interviews are a very good way to get around low response rate.

From the above discussion it is evident that the any methods can be used in both objectivist and
interpretivist research, with some limitations of course. The true distinction only arises at the
epistemological. If a researcher believes in objectivist epistemology, they cannot simultaneously
subscribe to interpretivist epistemic values as well. Believing that objective truth can be found/stated
(objectivism) and that social facts are constructed and not objective (interpretivism) at the same time
is not logical. The common thought that objectivism corresponds to realist ontology and
interpretivism to relativist ontology is not strictly correct either. One can believe that objective reality
exists (realism) and still believe that knowledge about social facts cannot be captured in its entirety
and needs to be interpreted based on contexts and social mechanisms (interpretivism).

In the previous section, it was discussed that methodological holism usually corresponds to
interpretivist epistemics and individualism to objectivism. It is true that interpretivism does not
sustain methodological individualism, but eminent positivists such as Emile Durkheim and Auguste
Comte subscribed to holistic views. Simply put, most social scientists believe that society is more
than the sum of its parts. At this level too, we can see that methodologically objectivists and
interpretivists may have common views.

CONCLUSIONS

Logically, objectivism and interpretivism can never be on the same page. The presuppositions are
exactly opposing to each other. However, epistemic standpoint aside, some parts of methodology
and most methods can be used interchangeably by researchers. The three main tasks of social science
are to uncover facts, get a grip on the large number of social variables through statistics and to
identify mechanisms (Gorton, 2018). Objectivists work on the task of finding social facts that can be
generalised through statistics. Interpretivists try to uncover facts too, but focus on identifying
mechanisms, not to generalise and predict, but to explain and judge in hindsight how they may have
been triggered. (Elster, 1999) admits that social sciences may never be able to generalise and produce
theories as grounded as in natural sciences. But that is not a point in favour of natural sciences per
se. Fallibilism is an essential part of scientific belief and will continue to be so, as a natural scientist
rejects dogmatic belief, a pinnacle of objectivism. Social sciences also strive that knowledge may be
progressively improved upon with the use of consistent research methods.

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