Zahavi, Dan - La Unidad Del Sí Mismo

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chapter 13
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UNITY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
A N D T H E P RO B L E M
OF SELF
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dan zahavi
Lilly tried to force me to drink some brandy. I bit hard on the rim of the glass, seeing the
ceiling light through the moist glass, spots overlapping spots, my dizziness got worse and
I felt nauseated. . . . Lilly pushed the brandy glass between my teeth again. The warm liquid
shook my tongue and slid down my throat. The ringing in my ears filled my whole
head. . . . Sweat ran down my neck, and Lilly wiped the cold sweat for me.
This short passage from Ryū Murakami’s novel Almost Transparent Blue can serve
as an example of something all of us should be familiar with, namely the fact that
experiences never occur in isolation, and that the stream of consciousness is an
ensemble of experiences that is unified both at and over time, both synchronically
and diachronically.
According to a classical view, we need to appeal to a self in order to account for
this diachronic and synchronic unity. To think of a simultaneous or temporally
dispersed plurality of objects is to think of myself being conscious of this plurality,
and this requires an undivided, invariable, unchanging me. On such an account,
the unity of self is taken to be something with explanatory power rather than
something that itself is in need of an explanation. The classical term for this
principle of organization and unification is transcendental ego.
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unity of consciousness 315
It shouldn’t come as a surprise, though, that not everybody has been willing to
accept the existence of such a principle. As Thomas Wakley, long-time editor of the
British medical journal The Lancet wrote in one of his editorials (25 March 1843):
From the fact that the philosophy of the human mind has been almost wholly uncultivated by
those who are best fitted for its pursuit, the study has received a wrong direction, and become
a subtle exercise for lawyers and casuists, and abstract reasoners, rather than a useful field of
scientific observation. Accordingly, we find the views, even of the most able and clear-headed
metaphysicians, coming into frequent collision with the known facts of physiology and
pathology. For example, that ‘consciousness is single’ is an axiom among the mental
philosophers, and the proof of personal identity is made by those gentlemen to rest chiefly
on the supposed universality or certainty of that allegation. But what would they say to the
case of a somnambulist who evinced what is regarded as double consciousness . . . (Quoted in
Hacking 1995: 221)
Wakley is not the only one who has used psychopathological findings as an
argument against the existence of a unitary and unifying self. A similar fascination
with cases of double consciousness can be found in French intellectuals such as
Hippolyte Taine and Théodule Ribot later in the nineteenth century. Both figures
were opposed to the idea of an autonomous, persisting, freestanding self—some-
thing distinct from the diversity of transient sensations, memories, ideas, percep-
tions, conceptions—and took cases of double consciousness to disprove the
existence of a transcendental ego. As Ribot, who held the chair of experimental
and comparative psychology at the Collège de France, wrote in his book Les
Maladies de la mémoire: ‘To conceive of the self as an entity distinct from states
of consciousness is a useless and contradictory hypothesis, which takes as simple
that which appears simple, and which postulates instead of explaining’ (Ribot 1883:
82–3).
If one moves forward in time and examines contemporary discussions of the
relation between consciousness and self, one will also come across various refer-
ences to neurological and psychiatric cases; just think of the frequent appeals to
split-brain patients or to cases of schizophrenic thought-insertion.
Whether neuro- and psychopathological findings can serve to disprove philo-
sophical claims regarding the nature of self is a question worthy of its own extensive
treatment. It is, for instance, not clear whether pathological disturbances create
new experiential phenomena, whether they are the exceptions that prove the rule,
or whether they involve breakdowns of more complex functions thereby disclosing
more primitive features of normal experience. But these are not issues I will focus
on in this chapter. Rather I will address the relation between unity and self from a
somewhat different angle. As I started out by indicating, one way to defend the
existence of the self is by arguing that our mental life would collapse into unstruc-
tured chaos if it were not buttressed by the organizing and unifying function of a
pure ego. Some critics however have accepted the underlying assumption, but have
then gone on to argue that if the diachronic and synchronic unity of consciousness
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were not conditioned by a distinct self, the latter would lose its raison d’être, and
there would no longer be any reason to uphold the reality of the self.
In the following I will consider a few accounts of consciousness that all explicitly
deny that the unity of consciousness is guaranteed or conditioned by a distinct self.
The question I then want to discuss is what conclusion we should draw if we accept
these arguments.
1. T H E I L LU S O RY S E L F
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My point of departure will be a recent book by Miri Albahari entitled Analytical
Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. Drawing on literature from Western
philosophy, neuroscience, and in particular Buddhism, Albahari’s basic aim is to
argue that the self is an illusion. What notion of self is she out to deny? She initially
provides the following definition: the self should be understood as a unified, happi-
ness-seeking, unbrokenly persisting, ontologically distinct conscious subject who is
the owner of experiences, the thinker of thoughts, and the agent of actions. What is
interesting about Albahari’s proposal is that whereas many advocates of a so-called
no-self doctrine have denied that consciousness is characterized by unity, unbroken-
ness, and invariability, and taken the denial of these features to amount to a denial of
the reality of the self, Albahari considers all three to be real features of consciousness,
but she nevertheless considers the self to be illusory (Albahari 2006: 3).
To get clearer on why she thinks this is the case let us look closer at a distinction
she introduces between different forms of ownership, namely possessive ownership,
perspectival ownership, and personal ownership. We can ignore possessive owner-
ship, which in this context is of less interest, since it merely denotes the fact that
certain objects (a car, a pair of trousers, etc.) can be regarded as mine by right of
social convention. But what is the difference between personal ownership and
perspectival ownership? Personal ownership is a question of identifying oneself
as the personal owner of an experience, thought, action; it is a question of
appropriating certain experiences, actions, thoughts etc. as one’s own, that is, a
question of either thinking of them as being mine or apprehending them as being
part of me (and this is something that can occur either pre-reflectively or reflec-
tively). By contrast, for a subject to own something in a perspectival sense is simply
for the experience, thought, or action in question to present itself in a distinctive
manner to the subject whose experience, thought, or action it is. So the reason I can
be said to perspectivally own my thoughts or perceptions—if one will excuse this
slightly awkward way of talking—is because they appear to me in a manner that is
different from how they can appear to anybody else. When it comes to objects
external to the subject, what will be perspectivally owned isn’t the object, but
the specific manner through which the object appears to the subject (Albahari
2006: 53).
Albahari argues that there is a close link between having a sense of personal
ownership and having a sense of self. When the subject identifies certain items as
being itself or being part of itself, it will harbor a sense of personal ownership
towards the items in question. But this very process of identification generates the
sense of a self–other distinction. It constitutes a felt boundary between what
belongs to self and what doesn’t. Thereby the self is cast as a unified and ontolog-
ically distinct entity—one that stands apart from other things (Albahari 2006: 73,
90). In this way, the subject understood as a mere point of view is turned into a
substantial personalized entity (ibid. 94). To put it differently, for Albahari, there is
more to being a self than being a point of view, than having perspectival ownership.
One way to bring out the difference between perspectival and personal owner-
ship is to point to possible dissociations between the two. Pathology seems to
provide some examples. In cases of depersonalization, we can come across
thoughts, feelings, etc. which are perspectivally owned, that is, which continue to
present themselves in a unique manner to the subject, without however being felt
as the subject’s own (Albahari 2006: 55). Thus on Albahari’s reading, the process of
identification fails in depersonalization, and as a consequence, no sense of personal
ownership regarding the experience in question will be generated (ibid. 61).
Let us now consider Albahari’s self-skepticism. What does it mean for the self to
lack reality? What does it mean for the self to be illusory? On Albahari’s account, an
illusion involves a conflict between appearance and reality. X is illusory if x does
not have any appearance-independent reality, but nevertheless purports to have
such reality, that is, we are dealing with an illusion if x purports through its
appearance to exist in a particular manner without really doing so (ibid. 122).
One obvious problem, however, with such a definition is whether it at all makes
sense to apply it to the self. Does the self really purport to exist outside of its own
appearance, or is the reality of the self rather subjective or experiential? This
consideration leads Albahari to redefine the notion of illusion slightly. If the self
purports to be what she calls unconstructed, that is, independent from the experi-
ences and objects it is the subject of, and if it should turn out that it in reality
depends, even if only partially, on perspectivally ownable objects (including
various experiential episodes), then the self must be regarded as being illusory
(ibid. 130).
Albahari also emphasizes the need for a distinction between self and sense of self.
To have a sense of x doesn’t necessarily entail that x exists. Indeed whereas Albahari
takes the sense of self to exist and to be real, she considers the self itself to be
illusory (2006: 17). Contrary to expectations, our sense of self is not underpinned
by an actually existing ontological independent self-entity. Rather, all that really
exists is the manifold of thoughts, emotions, perceptions, etc. as well as a pure
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locus of apprehension, which Albahari terms witness-consciousness. It is the experi-

ential flow in conjunction with this locus of apprehension that generates the sense
of self. But if this is so, the self lacks an essential property of selfhood, namely
ontological independence (ibid. 72). In short, the illusory status of the self is due to
the fact that the self does not have the ontological status it purports to have.
Thoughts appear to be owned and initiated by an independently existing unified
self, but rather than preceding the experiences, rather than thinking the thoughts, it
is in reality the other way around. It is not the self that unifies our thoughts and
experiences, they do so themselves with some help from the accompanying wit-
ness-consciousness (ibid. 130–2). To repeat, although it might seem to the subject
as if there is a pre-existing self which identifies with various intentional states, the
reality of the matter is that the self is created and constructed through these
repeated acts of identification (ibid. 58).
As I mentioned in the beginning, an interesting aspect of Albahari’s proposal is
that she considers many of the features traditionally ascribed to the self to be real, it
is just that they—in her view—become distorted and illusory if taken to be features
of the self (2006: 74). For instance, Albahari takes our conscious life to be char-
acterized by an intrinsic but elusive sense of subjective presence; one that is
common to all modalities of awareness, that is, one that is common to seeing,
hearing, thinking, feeling, introspecting, etc. (ibid. 112, 144, 156). What does this
subjective presence amount to? It includes the experience of being the perspectival
owner of various experiences. It also includes diachronic and synchronic unity.
Although we experience various objects, although the objects we experience might
change from one moment to the next, there still appears to be an unbroken
consciousness that observes the change without itself changing (ibid. 155). Indeed,
while from a first-person perspective it certainly makes sense to say that I have
various experiences, we automatically feel them to belong to one and the same
consciousness. For Albahari, all these features are properly ascribed to the witness-
consciousness, and she is adamant that we have to distinguish witness-conscious-
ness from self. Whereas the latter on her definition involves felt boundaries
between self and non-self, the former doesn’t.1
Let me recapitulate. For Albahari, one can be aware without being presented to
oneself as an ontologically unique subject with personalized boundaries that
distinguish a me from the rest of the world. One can be aware without being
aware of oneself as a personal owner, a thinker of thoughts, an agent of actions.
Examples that come to mind are cases of pathology. Albahari asks us to consider
both the real-life case of epileptic automatism and the hypothetical case of global
1 I think one can find various defenders of self, who would dispute its bounded nature, and for
instance deny that there is always a clear division to be made between self and environment. As a case
in point, consider Neisser’s notion of ecological self. I will, however, postpone a more extensive
criticism of the notion of bounded self to some later occasion.
depersonalization. In both cases, the person or patient would be awake and

responsive to the environment, so there would be awareness present. But there
would be no sense of a bounded individual self, there would be a complete lack of
personal ownership, there would be no sense of me or mine (Albahari 2006: 171,
177). Albahari suggests that such a state of mind might not only be encountered in
pathologies, but also in newborn infants, and in primitive organisms. And as she
then points out in the conclusion of her book, and this is of course where her
Buddhist orientation becomes evident, if we were to attain enlightenment, we would
move from consciousness-plus-self-illusion to consciousness-sans-self-illusion, and
the latter condition, although strictly speaking not identical with global depersonali-
zation—after all, it correlates with highly advanced cognitive capacities—might
nevertheless be compared to it (ibid. 161, 207).
2. P H E N O M E N O LO G I C A L C O N S I D E R AT I O N S
................................................................................................................
Having discussed Albahari’s position in some detail, let me now turn to two other
thinkers who have also questioned the unifying role of the self, but whose theoreti-
cal orientation and affiliation differ somewhat from hers.
Husserl
In the Logical Investigations, Husserl explicitly denied that the unity intrinsic to our
experiential life was conditioned or guaranteed by any ego. Indeed, on his view
whatever synthesizing contribution the ego could have made would be superfluous
since the unification had already taken place in accordance with intra-experiential
laws. To put it differently, on Husserl’s early view, the stream of consciousness is
self-unifying, and in order to understand its unity, we do not have to look at
anything above, beyond, or external to the stream itself. In fact, since the ego,
properly speaking, is the result of this unification, it couldn’t be something that
preceded or conditioned it (Husserl 1984: 364).
Husserl’s early reasoning was partly motivated by his aversion to any kind of
ego-metaphysics. As he wrote in a letter to Hans Cornelius in 1906: ‘The phenom-
enological investigation is not at all interested in egos or in states, experiences,
developments belonging to or occurring in egos’ (Husserl 1994: 27). However,
Husserl’s general view on the ego was subsequently to change. In Cartesian
Meditations for instance, Husserl claimed that the phenomenological task of
explicating the monadic ego ultimately included all constitutional problems, and
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that the phenomenology of self-constitution coincided with phenomenology as a

whole (Husserl 1950: 103). It would lead too far afield to explain precisely what
Husserl meant by these statements. Rather, for our purposes the point of interest is
that, even at this late stage, Husserl still held onto some of the claims he had
originally made in Logical Investigations.
Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, Husserl did not overlook the
problem of passivity in his phenomenological investigations. On the contrary, he
dedicated numerous analyses to this important issue. Although our starting-point
might be conscious episodes that involve an active position-taking by the subject,
that is, acts in which the subject is comparing, differentiating, judging, valuing,
wishing, or willing something, Husserl was quick to point out that whenever the
subject is active, it is also passive, since to be active is to react to something (Husserl
1952: 213, 337). And as he ultimately would say, every kind of active position-taking,
indeed every activity of the ego, presupposes a preceding affection, an affection by
something that escapes the control of the ego, an affection by something foreign to
the ego (ibid. 336). Indeed, for Husserl, intentional activity is founded upon and
conditioned by an obscure and blind passivity, by drives and associations. Husserl
considered the most fundamental constitutive synthesis of them all, the very
process of temporalization, to be a synthesis taking place in pure passivity. He
took it to be regulated by strict and rigid laws and he repeatedly denied that it was
initiated, influenced, or controlled by the ego (Husserl 1966: 72, 235, 323; 1950: 125).
If we look at the painstaking analysis of its structure that we find in the famous
Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time we will find no
reference to the ego as the ultimate unifying or synthesizing agent. In fact, Husserl
occasionally suggested that an in-depth investigation of temporality would lead to
a pre-egological level, that is, to a level of egoless streaming. As he wrote in Zur
Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III:
The analysis of the structure of the primal present (the persisting living streaming) leads us
to the ego-structure and to the continual substratum of the egoless streaming that founds it,
and thereby, through a consistently carried out regressive inquiry (Rückfrage), back to that
which makes even this sedimented activity possible and which this sedimented activity
presupposes: the radically pre-egoic. (Husserl 1973: 598)
So although Husserl is frequently considered an ardent defender of an egological

account of consciousness, he obviously did not envisage the ego or self as the big
unifier. But what is the implication of this? That the ego is ultimately illusory?
Husserl would never have drawn that conclusion. If we take a closer look at Husserl’s
analysis, we will somewhat surprisingly also find him stating that the ego is present
everywhere in the living present, and that even the anonymous stream of conscious-
ness would be unthinkable without an original ego-pole as the center of action and
affection (Husserl 1973: 350). Husserl’s simultaneous reference to the egoless and
egological character of the stream of consciousness makes it clear that some
equivocation is at play. My proposal is as follows. When Husserl speaks of an egoless

streaming, the term ‘egoless’ does not refer to the absence of self, rather the term
‘pre-egological’ is meant to indicate that the ego is not participating in or contribut-
ing to the (self-)constitution of this fundamental process in any active way. Thus,
Husserl is mainly referring to the passivity of the streaming, which is beyond the
influence of the ego (Husserl 1974: 293). It is not the ego which unifies the experi-
ences. This is taken care of by the very process of temporalization. But although the
passive syntheses are not initiated by me, they still happen to me, not to somebody
else or to nobody.
Sartre
Let us next turn to France, and to Sartre’s early work The Transcendence of the Ego.
As Sartre pointed out at the beginning of the text, many philosophers have
considered the ego a formal principle of unification. Many have argued that our
consciousness is unified because the ‘I think’ might accompany each of my
thoughts. It is because I can say my consciousness that my consciousness is
different from those of others (Sartre 1936: 16, 20). But is this really true, or is it
rather the ‘I think’ which is made possible by the synthetic unity of our thoughts?
To put it differently, is the ego an expression rather than a condition of unified
consciousness? Sartre’s own view is clear. On his account, the nature of the stream
of consciousness does not need an exterior principle of individuation, since it is
per se individuated. Nor is consciousness in need of any transcendent principle
of unification, since it is, as such, a flowing unity. Thus, a correct account of time-
consciousness will show that the contribution of a transcendental ego is unneces-
sary and it consequently loses its raison d’être (Sartre 1936: 21–3).
In addition, Sartre argued that a correct phenomenological description of lived
consciousness will simply not find any ego, whether understood as an inhabitant in
or possessor of consciousness. As long as we are absorbed in the experience, living
it, no ego will be present. The ego emerges only when we adopt a distancing and
objectifying attitude to the experience in question, that is, when we reflect upon it.
Even then, however, we are not dealing with an I-consciousness, since the reflecting
pole remains non-egological, but merely with a consciousness of I. As Sartre put it,
the appearing ego is the object and not the subject of reflection.
However, whereas Sartre in The Transcendence of the Ego characterized pre-
reflective consciousness as impersonal, he described this view as mistaken in both
Being and Nothingness and in his important 1948 article ‘Consciousness of Self and
Knowledge of Self ’. Why did he change his mind?
Sartre famously argued that intentional consciousness is for-itself (pour-soi), that
is, self-conscious. An experience does not simply exist, it exists for it-self, that is, it
is given for itself, and this self-givenness is not simply a quality added to the
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experience, a mere varnish; rather for Sartre it constitutes the very mode of being of
consciousness (Sartre 1948). When speaking of self-consciousness as a permanent
feature of consciousness, Sartre was however not referring to what we might call
reflective self-consciousness. Reflection (or higher order representation) is the
process whereby consciousness directs its intentional aim at itself, thereby taking
itself as its own object. By contrast, Sartre considered the self-consciousness in
question to be pre-reflective. It is not an addendum to, but a constitutive moment
of the original intentional experience.
Although no ego exists on the pre-reflective level, Sartre eventually came to
realize that consciousness far from being impersonal and anonymous must be said
to possess a basic dimension of selfhood—which Sartre termed ipseity (from the
Latin term for self ipse)—precisely because of its ubiquitous self-givenness. As he
wrote, ‘pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same notion of
self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness’ (Sartre
1943: 114).
3. S U B J E C T I V I T Y A N D THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF

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It is time to return to Albahari’s arguments for the illusory nature of the self. As we
have seen, Albahari considers invariability, unbrokenness, and subjective presence
to be real features of consciousness. What she is opposed to is the notion of an
ontologically independent self-entity. On Albahari’s view, the self purports to be
ontologically independent, independent from the experiences and objects it is the
subject of, and since it doesn’t really possess this status, since it consequently lacks
what she consider to be an essential property of selfhood, it must ultimately be
regarded as illusory (Albahari 2006: 72).
How should we appraise this argument? Frankly, I don’t find it convincing.
I think Albahari is committing the same mistake that I take Metzinger to have
made in his Being No One. In that book, Metzinger took the self to be a process-
independent ontological substance that might exist all by itself, that is, in isolation
from the rest of the world (Metzinger 2003: 577, 626), and since he denied the
existence of such an entity he concluded that no such things as selves exist. But the
only reason to accept his and Albahari’s conclusion would be if their respective
notions of self were the only ones available, and that is precisely what I would deny.
To put it differently, my worry is that many self-skeptics are implicitly endorsing a
very traditional reified understanding of what a self is. They seem committed to the
view that a self—if it exists—must be some kind of ontologically independent
invariant principle of identity that stands apart from and above the stream of
changing experiences. But such a view of the self has by and large been abandoned,
not only by most empirical researchers currently interested in the development,
structure, function, and pathology of selves, but certainly also by most figures in
twentieth-century French and German philosophy. Consider for instance Ricoeur’s
notion of narrative self. He has occasionally presented this notion as an alternative
to the traditional dilemma of having to choose between the Cartesian notion of the
self as a principle of identity that remains the same throughout the diversity of its
different states and the positions of Hume and Nietzsche, who held an identical
subject to be nothing but a substantialist illusion (Ricoeur 1985: 443). Ricoeur
suggests that we can avoid this dilemma if we replace the notion of identity that
they respectively defend and reject with the concept of narrative identity. As he
writes, the identity of the narrative self can include changes and mutations within
the cohesion of a lifetime. Indeed, Ricoeur explicitly rejects the attempt to account
for and define the self in terms of what he calls idem-identity, that is, the identity of
the same.
But let me postpone a further discussion of Ricoeur’s position for some other
occasion, and instead return to Husserl and Sartre. The reason why I chose to spend
some time presenting their respective views was not only in order to show that one
can find thinkers who maintain a belief in the reality of the self while denying that it
possesses the unifying role it traditionally is ascribed.2 The point was also to show
that both operate with a notion of self which is very different from the one
employed by Albahari, but which, as we shall see, nevertheless bears a striking
resemblance to a dimension of consciousness the reality of which she is prepared to
accept and defend.
For both Husserl and Sartre, an understanding of what it means to be a self calls
for an examination of the structure of experience, and vice versa. In other words,
their claim would be that the investigations of self and experience have to be
integrated if both are to be understood. Indeed for both of them the self referred
to is not something standing beyond or opposed to the stream of experiences but is
rather a crucial aspect of our experiential life. To quote the central passage from
Sartre once again: ‘pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. It is this same
notion of self which must be studied, for it defines the very being of consciousness.’
2 I would reject the view—and so would Husserl and Sartre—that it is the self or ego which unifies
the stream of consciousness. Does this rejection entail a rejection of the notion of a transcendental
ego? This is how Sartre would reason, though it is crucial to understand that he upholds the belief in
the existence of a constituting transcendental consciousness. His point is merely that the
transcendental dimension is pre-personal and non-egological (Sartre 1936: 18–19). But in fact, I don’t
think we need to reason like him. Contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, the notion of a
transcendental ego is not bound up with an idea of an autonomous sovereign free-standing ego. To
defend the existence of a transcendental ego is to be committed to the view that the first-person
perspective is a necessary condition of possibility for manifestation. It neither commits one to the idea
that it is a sufficient condition of possibility, nor does it necessarily involve a failure to recognize the
role of passivity.
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Or as Michel Henry would later put it, the most basic form of selfhood is the one
constituted by the very self-manifestation of experience (Henry 1963: 581; 1965: 53).
To better understand the guiding idea,3 consider the following example:
I have climbed the spire of Our Saviour’s Church together with my oldest son. Holding
onto the railing, I see Copenhagen spread out before me. I can hear the distant noise from
the traffic beneath me and feel the wind blow against my face. Far away, I can see an airship.
My attention is drawn to something that is written on its side, but despite repeated attempts
to decipher the text, I cannot read it. My concentration is suddenly interrupted by a pull in
my hand. My son asks me when we are supposed to meet his mother and brother for cake
and hot chocolate. I look at my watch and embarrassingly realize that we are already too late
for our appointment. I decide to start the descent immediately, but when rushing down the
stairways, I stumble over an iron rod and feel pain blossom up my shin.
A careful analysis of this episode will reveal many differences. If we compare percep-
tual experiences, voluntary movements, passivity experiences, social emotions, the
experience of pain, effortful concentration or decision-making etc., we will not only
encounter a phenomenal complexity, but also a diversity of qualitatively different
experiences of self. There is for instance a vivid difference between the kind of self-
experience we find in embarrassment and the kind of self-experience we have when
our body is moved by external forces. Despite these differences, however, there is also
something that the manifold of experiences has in common. Whatever their character,
whatever their object, all experiences are subjective in the sense that they feel like
something for somebody. They are subjective in the sense that there is a distinctive way
they present themselves to the subject or self whose episodes they are.
Some might object that there is no property common to all my experiences, no
stamp or label that clearly identifies them as mine. But this objection seems
misplaced in that it looks for the commonality in the wrong place. When con-
sciously seeing the moon, imagining Santa Claus, desiring a hot shower, anticipat-
ing a forthcoming film festival, or remembering a recent holiday in Sicily, all of
these experiences present me with different intentional objects. These objects are
there for me in different experiential modes of givenness (as seen, imagined,
desired, anticipated, recollected, etc.).4 This for-me-ness or mineness, which seems
inescapably required by the experiential presence of intentional objects and which
is the feature that really makes it appropriate to speak of the subjectivity of
experience, is obviously not a quality like green, sweet, or hard. It doesn’t refer to
a specific experiential content, to a specific what, nor does it refer to the diachronic
or synchronic sum of such content, or to some other relation that might obtain
between the contents in question. Rather, it refers to the distinct givenness or how
3 For a more extensive discussion see Zahavi 1999, 2005.

4 Pace various representationalist approaches to phenomenality it makes little sense to claim
that this aspect of experience is simply a property of the represented object.
of experience. It refers to the first-personal presence of experience. It refers to what

Albahari calls perspectival ownership. It refers to the fact that the experiences I am
living through are given differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to
anybody else. It could consequently be claimed that anybody who denies the for-
me-ness or mineness5 of experience simply fails to recognize an essential constitu-
tive aspect of experience. Such a denial would be tantamount to a denial of the
first-person perspective. It would entail the view that my own mind is either not
given to me at all—I would be mind- or self-blind—or present to me in exactly the
same way as the minds of others.6
But who or what is this self that has or lives through the experiences? The
account I favor denies that the self under consideration—and let us just call it the
experiential core self—is a separately existing entity, but it would also deny that the
self is simply reducible to any specific experience or (sub)set of experiences. If we
shift the focus from a narrow investigation of a single experience and instead
consider a diachronic sequence of experiences, it should be obvious that each
successive experience doesn’t have its own unique for-me-ness or mineness—as
if the difference between one experience and the next experience was as absolute as
the difference between my current experience and the current experience of
somebody else—but that the for-me-ness or mineness can on the contrary preserve
its identity in the flux of changing experiences. If I compare two experiences, say a
perception of a blackbird and a recollection of a summer holiday, I can focus on the
differences between the two, namely their respective object and mode of presenta-
tion, but I can also attend to that which remains the same, namely the first-
personal self-givenness of both experiences. To put it differently, we can distinguish
the plurality of changing experiences from the abiding dative of manifestation. The
latter has a certain transcendence vis-à-vis the former. The self does not exist in
separation from the experiences, but nor can it simply be reduced to the sum of or
connection between the experiences. An informative way of describing it is conse-
quently as a ubiquitous dimension of first-personal self-givenness in the multitude
of changing experiences. This way of presenting matters tallies well with Husserl’s
observation that the ego cannot simply be identified with our experiences, since the
former preserves its identity, whereas the latter arise and perish in the stream of
consciousness, replacing each other in a permanent flux (Husserl 1952: 98; 1974:
363). But as Husserl then goes on to emphasize, although the ego must be
distinguished from the experiences in which it lives and functions, it cannot in
5 And whereas the dative suggests a structural feature, the genitive suggest a qualitative
feature—both aspects are important.
6 I wouldn’t consider the latter option a successful way of addressing the problem of other minds. It
wouldn’t solve the problem; it would dissolve it by failing to recognize the difference between our
experience of self and our experience of others.
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any way exist independently of them. It is a transcendence, but in Husserl’s famous

phrase: a transcendence in the immanence (Husserl 1976: 123–4).7
Let me stress that although the self in question can be described as an ubiquitous
dimension of first-personal self-givenness, this is not meant to imply that genuine
self-experience requires the experience of something invariant or identical, as if one
had necessarily to be conscious of one’s overarching identity as the subject of
different experiences in order to be self-conscious. We certainly need to distinguish
the case where I reflect on myself as the one who in turn deliberates, resolves, acts,
and suffers and the case where I simply consciously perceive a table, but even the
latter is an experience of something for someone, even that experience entails a pre-
reflective sense of self.8
On this view, there is no pure experience-independent self. The self is the very
subjectivity of experience and not something that exists independently of the
experiential flow. Moreover, the experiences in question are world-directed experi-
ences. They present the world in a certain way, but at the same time they also
involve self-presence and hence a subjective point of view. In short, they are of
something other than the subject and they are like something for the subject. If we
want to study the self, we should consequently not turn the gaze inwards; rather we
should look at our intentional experiences. I experience myself in what I do and
suffer, in what confronts me and in what I accomplish, in my concerns and
disregards. I am acquainted with myself when I am captured and captivated by
the world. Just as the self is what it is in its worldly relations, self-acquaintance is
not something that takes place or occurs in separation from our living in a world.
On the contrary, self-experience is the self-experience of a world-immersed self, or
to put it differently, our experiential life is world-related, and there is a presence of
self when we are worldly engaged.
On the present account, there is obviously no experiential self, no self as defined
from the first-person perspective, when we are non-conscious. But this does not
necessarily imply that the diachronic unity of self is threatened by alleged interruptions
7 For comparison consider the relation between an object and its profiles. The object is not
merely the sum of its profiles—had that been the case, we would never see the object as long as we
merely saw one of its profiles, but only part of the object, and that doesn’t seem right—but rather
an identity in and across the manifold of profiles. This doesn’t mean that the object stands in
opposition to or is independent of its profiles.
8 One might add though that experiences never occur in isolation, and that there will always be a
tacit experience of synchronic and diachronic unity. But even if we grant that, the tacitly experienced
unity will differ from the identity we disclose when we explicitly compare different experiences in
order to isolate that which remains the same. Moreover, this also confronts us with the tricky issue of
how to individuate experiences. When does an experience stop and a new one start? When are we
dealing with a complex experience and when with a set of distinct experiences? If our gaze wanders
over our desk by taking in, one after the other, the computer, the keyboard, the books and papers, the
empty coffee cups, are we then confronted with one complex perceptual experience or with a
multiplicity of perceptual experiences, each with its own distinct object?
of the stream of consciousness (such as dreamless sleep, coma, etc.), since the identity
of the self is defined in terms of givenness rather than in terms of temporal continuity.
Whether two temporally distinct experiences are mine or not depends on whether
they are characterized by the same first-personal self-givenness, it is not a question
of whether they are part of an uninterrupted stream of consciousness. In that sense, it is
a category mistake to liken the relationship between my present and my past experience
to the relation between two different beads on one and the same string of pearls, since
the two beads would be part of the same necklace only if they were in fact joined by an
uninterrupted string.
Given what has been said so far, it could be argued that there is indeed some
relation between self and unity after all. The self doesn’t actively unite disparate bits
of experience, nor is the self an extra element that must be added to the stream of
consciousness in order to ensure its unification. The point is rather that all
experiences that share the same primary presence or first-personal self-givenness
are mine. To put it differently, experiential (diachronic and synchronic) unity is
constituted by first-personal self-givenness.9
Hopefully, it should by now have become clear that the notion of self defended
by Husserl and Sartre is very similar to the invariable but elusive subjective
presence that Albahari also wants to retain and defend. Albahari takes ontological
independence—or to use one of her own technical terms ‘unconstructedness’—to
be an essential property of selfhood, and since she denies the reality of this feature,
she claims that the self is illusory.10 As I have tried to show, many other thinkers
9 At the same time, however, it should also be obvious that there are clear limitations to what this
notion of self can explain and account for. Consider for instance the case of a man who early in life
makes a decision that proves formative for his subsequent life and career. The episode in question is
however subsequently forgotten by the person. He no longer enjoys first-person access to it. If we
restrict ourselves to what can be accounted for by means of the experiential core self, we cannot speak
of the decision as being his, as being one he made. Or take the case where we might wish to ascribe
responsibility for past actions to an individual who no longer remembers them. By doing that we
postulate an identity between the past offender and the present subject, but the identity in question is
again not one that can be accounted for in terms of the experiential core self. However, on the account
I favour, we need to realize that the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary
accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity. In short, we ultimately need to
adopt a multilayered account of self. We are more than experiential core selves, we are for instance also
narratively configured socialized persons. And we continue to remain so even when non-conscious. So
even if there is no experiential self (no self as defined from the first-person perspective) when we are
non-conscious, there are various other aspects of our self that remain, and which makes it perfectly
legitimate to say that we are non-conscious, i.e. that we can persist even when non-conscious.
10 It is by the way remarkable that Albahari although denying unconstructedness to self ascribes it
to witness-consciousness. As she puts it at one point, ‘awareness must be shown to exist in the manner
it purports to exist. Awareness purports to exist as a witnessing presence that is unified, unbroken and
yet elusive to direct observation. As something whose phenomenology purports to be unborrowed
from objects of consciousness, awareness, if it exists, must exist as completely unconstructed by the
content of any perspectivally ownable objects such as thoughts, emotions or perceptions. If apparent
awareness . . . turned out to owe its existence to such object-content rather than to (unconstructed)
awareness itself, then that would render awareness constructed and illusory and hence lacking in
328 dan zahavi
would refute this definition of self. They would insist that selfhood, rather than
being something that stands apart from and above the stream of consciousness, is
on the contrary a crucial aspect of its givenness, and therefore something that in no
way could exist in separation from our experiential life. As a consequence, they
would in no way feel compelled to draw the same conclusion as Albahari does
regarding the illusory character of self.
4. O W N E R S H I P AND I D E N T I F I C AT I O N
................................................................................................................
Let me end by considering an obvious rejoinder. It could be argued that the
contentious issue rather than being metaphysical is a semantic one. When is it
appropriate to call something a self? Albahari might very well agree with a strong
emphasis on first-personal self-givenness, but might simply deny that first-person-
al self-givenness, that is, the subjectivity of experience, equals a minimal form of
self. In short, she might insist that the minimal notion of experiential core self
I wish to defend is too deflationary and revisionary.11 Another way to press this
objection is as follows. It could be argued that there is something like subjectivity of
experience, but that too much focus on this trivial truth will belittle a significant
difference, namely the one existing between experiences that so to speak are mere
happenings in the history of my mental life and experiences that are my own in a
much more profound sense. To put it differently, it could be argued that, although
it is undeniably true that an experience, that is, a conscious thought, desire,
passion, etc., cannot occur without an experiencer (see Chapter 10 above), since
every experience is necessarily an experience for someone, this truism will mask
crucial distinctions. Consider, for instance, thoughts that willy-nilly run through
our heads, thoughts that strikes us out of the blue, consider passions and desires
that are felt, from the first-person perspective, as intrusive—as when somebody
says that, when he was possessed by anger, he was not in possession of himself—or
take experiences that are induced in us through hypnosis or drugs, and then
compare these cases with experiences, thoughts, and desires that we welcome or
accept at the time of their occurrence. As Frankfurt argues, although the former
class might indeed be conscious events that occur in us, although they are events in
the history of a person’s mind, they are not that person’s desire, experience, or
independent reality’ (2006: 162). This seems to commit one to viewing awareness as an ontological
independent region. It is not clear to me why one would want to uphold such a view of consciousness
in the first place.
11 In fact, this is a rejoinder that Albahari has made in personal correspondence. I am grateful to
her for several helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
thought (Frankfurt 1988: 59–61). According to Frankfurt, a person is not simply to

be identified with whatever goes on in his mind. On the contrary, conscious states
or episodes that we disapprove of when they occur might not be ours in the full
sense of the word (ibid. 63). To disapprove of or reject passions or desires means to
withdraw or distance oneself from them. To accept passions or desires, to see them
as having a natural place in one’s experience, means to identify with them (ibid.
68). Frankfurt concedes that it is difficult to articulate the notion of identification
at stake in a satisfactory manner, but ultimately he suggests that when a person
decides something without reservations,
the decision determines what the person really wants by making the desire on which he
decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in making a decision by which he identifies
with a desire, constitutes himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to
him. It is not a desire that he ‘has’ merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur,
as a person may ‘have’ an involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his
body. It comes to be a desire that is incorporated into him by virtue of the fact that he has it
by his own will . . . . Even if the person is not responsible for the fact that the desire occurs,
there is an important sense in which he takes responsibility for the fact of having the
desire—the fact that the desire is in the fullest sense his, that it constitutes what he really
wants—when he identifies himself with it. (Ibid. 170)
Frankfurt’s basic point, that the identification in question amounts to a specific

form of ownership which is constitutive of self, fits neatly with Albahari’s notion of
personal ownership (though of course, there is nothing to suggest that Frankfurt
would agree with Albahari’s metaphysical conclusion, her self-skepticism), and also
with her suggestion that the constitution of a sense of self is closely linked to the
issue of emotional investment. Not only do emotions such as guilt, fear, and
disappointment help constitute our sense of being a temporally extended numeri-
cally identical self (Albahari 2006: 141), but according to Albahari, emotions
generally involve boundaries between self and desired/undesired scenarios and
thereby help construct a bounded self. Indeed on her account emotional concern
for one’s own welfare is a major contributor to the construction of a sense of self
(ibid. 171, 178–9). Frankfurt’s point also tallies rather well with points made by
Ricoeur and Taylor. For Ricoeur, to be a self is a question of adopting certain norms
as binding; to be bound by obligation or loyalty. It is to remain true to oneself in
promise keeping. It is to be somebody others can count on. It is to assume
responsibility for one’s past actions and for the future consequences of one’s
present actions (Ricoeur 1990: 341–2). As Ricoeur already pointed out back in his
1950 Philosophie de la volonté:
I form the consciousness of being the author of my acts in the world and, more generally,
the author of my acts of thought, principally on the occasion of my contacts with an other,
in a social context. Someone asks, who did that? I rise and reply, I did. Response-responsi-
bility. To be responsible means to be ready to respond to such a question. (Ricoeur 1950: 55)
330 dan zahavi
As for Taylor, he has argued that the self is a kind of being that can only exist within
a normative space, that being a self is to stand in a interpretative and evaluative
relation to oneself, and he therefore claims that any attempt to define selfhood
through some minimal or formal form of self-awareness must fail, since such a self
is either non-existent or insignificant (Taylor 1989: 49). Again, let me stress that
Frankfurt, Ricoeur, and Taylor would distance themselves from the metaphysical
conclusions drawn by Albahari, but they all share the view that the mere subjectiv-
ity of experience is insufficient for selfhood.
How might one respond to this criticism? There are several moves available. One
possibility would be to say that subjectivity of experience although being insuffi-
cient for selfhood is nevertheless a necessary condition for selfhood, there is no self
without it, and that it consequently is something that any plausible theory of self
must consider and account for. To put it differently, any account of self which
disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life is a non-
starter, and a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must
necessarily do justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of
self-reference that it entails. Moreover, to claim that the subjectivity of experience is
trivial and banal in the sense that it doesn’t call for further examination and
clarification would be to commit a serious mistake. Not only would it disregard
many of the recent insights concerning the function of first-person indexicals (the
fact that ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘my’, ‘mine’ cannot without loss be replaced by definite descrip-
tions) and ascriptionless self-reference (the fact that one can be self-conscious
without identifying oneself via specific properties), but it would also discount the
laborious attempt to spell out the microstructure of lived subjective presence that
we find in Husserl’s writings on time. As Husserl would argue, given the temporal
character of the stream of consciousness, even something as apparently synchronic
as the subjective givenness of a present experience is not comprehensible without
taking the innermost structures of time-consciousness into account. Indeed, Hus-
serl’s investigation of inner time-consciousness was precisely motivated by his
interest in the question of how consciousness manifests itself to itself. His analysis
of the interplay between protention, primal impression, and retention is conse-
quently to be understood as a contribution to a better understanding of the
relationship between selfhood, self-experience, and temporality.
Another possibility would be to maintain that the subjectivity of experience
amounts to more than merely an indispensable and necessary prerequisite for any
true notion of self, but that it rather in and of itself is a minimal form of self.
Ultimately, however, the distinction between these two options (considering sub-
jectivity of experience as a necessary but insufficient vs. necessary and sufficient
condition for selfhood) might be less relevant than one should initially assume,
since we—with the possible exception of certain severe pathologies, say, the final
stages of Alzheimer’s disease—will never encounter the experiential core self in its
purity. It will always already be embedded in an environmental and temporal
horizon. It will be intertwined with, shaped, and contextualized by memories,

expressive behaviour, and social interaction, by passively acquired habits, inclina-
tions, associations, etc. In that sense, a narrow focus on the experiential self might
indeed be said to involve an abstraction. Nevertheless, and this would be my own
view, although one must concede that such a minimal notion is unable to accom-
modate or capture all ordinary senses of the term ‘self ’, and although it certainly
doesn’t provide an exhaustive understanding of what it means to be a self, the very
fact that we employ notions like first-person perspective, for-me-ness, and mineness
in order to describe our experiential life, the fact that it is characterized by a basic
and pervasive reflexivity and pre-reflective self-consciousness, is ultimately suffi-
cient to warrant the use of the term ‘self ’.
It is intriguing that Frankfurt, while defending the importance of identification
and commitment for the constitution of self, at the same time accepts that
consciousness does entail a basic form of self-consciousness. As he writes:
what would it be like to be conscious of something without being aware of this conscious-
ness? It would mean having an experience with no awareness whatever of its occurrence.
This would be, precisely, a case of unconscious experience. It appears, then, that being
conscious is identical with being self-conscious. Consciousness is self-consciousness.
(Frankfurt 1988: 1612)
As Frankfurt makes clear this claim is not meant to suggest that he endorses some
version of a higher order theory of consciousness. The idea is not that conscious-
ness is invariably dual in the sense that every instance of it involves both a primary
awareness and another instance of consciousness which is somehow distinct and
separable from the first and which has the first as its object. Rather, and this
constitutes a clear affinity with a perspective found in phenomenology,
the self-consciousness in question is a sort of immanent reflexivity by virtue of which every
instance of being conscious grasps not only that of which it is an awareness but also the
awareness of it. It is like a source of light which, in addition to illuminating whatever other
things fall within its scope, renders itself visible as well. (Ibid. 162)
For Frankfurt, however, self-consciousness doesn’t amount to consciousness of a

self. Rather, the reflexivity in question is merely consciousness’s awareness of itself
(ibid.). Couldn’t this be the fall-back option of the self-skeptics? Just as they might
concede that there is a subjectivity of experience without thereby accepting the
existence of self, they might accept that consciousness is characterized by a funda-
mental reflexivity without thereby seeing themselves as being committed to the
reality of self.
On the face of it, it is quite true that self-consciousness doesn’t have to be
understood as a consciousness of a separate and distinct self; it might simply refer
to the awareness which a specific experience has of itself (cf. Gurwitsch 1941). It is
a mistake, however, to suggest that we in the latter case would be dealing with a
332 dan zahavi
non-egological type of self-consciousness, one lacking any sense of self. The very
distinction between egological and non-egological types of (self-)consciousness is
ultimately too crude and fuelled by a too narrow definition of what a self amounts
to. As I have argued above, there is subjectivity of experience and a minimal sense
of self, not only when I realize that I am perceiving a candle, but whenever there is
perspectival ownership, whenever there is first-personal presence or manifestation
of experience. It is this pre-reflective sense of self which provides the experiential
grounding for any subsequent self-ascription, reflective appropriation, and the-
matic self-identification. Had our experiences been completely anonymous when
originally lived through, any such subsequent appropriation would become inex-
plicable.
Thus, rather than saying that the self does not exist, I think the self-skeptics
should settle for a more modest claim. They should qualify their statement and
instead deny the existence of a special kind of self.
REFERENCES
Albahari, M. (2006). Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan).
Frankfurt, H. (1988). The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Gurwitsch, A. (1941). ‘A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness’, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 1: 325–338.
Hacking, I. (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory
(Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Henry, M. (1963). L’Essence de la manifestation (Paris: PUF).
——(1965). Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps (Paris: PUF).
Husserl, E. (1950). Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (Husserliana, 1; The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1952). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, ii.
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, 4; The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff).
——(1966). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten
1918–1926 (Husserliana, 11; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1973). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass, iii. 1929–1935
(Husserliana, 15; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1974). Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft
(Husserliana, 17; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie
I (Husserliana, 3/1–2; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1984). Logische Untersuchungen, ii. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie
der Erkenntnis (Husserliana, 19; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).
——(1994). Briefwechsel II (Husserliana Dokumente, 3/1–10; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

Publishers).
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being No One (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Ribot, Th. (1883). Les Maladies de la mémoire (Paris: Librairie Germer Baillière).
Ricoeur, P. (1950). Philosophie de la volonté, i. Le Volontaire et l’involontaire (Paris: Aubier).
——(1985). Temps et recit, iii. Le Temps raconté (Paris: Éditions du Seuil).
——(1990). Soi-même comme un autre (Paris: Seuil).
Shoemaker, S. (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Sartre, J.-P. (1936). La Transcendance de l’ego (Paris: Vrin).
——(1943/1976). L’Etre et le néant (Paris: Tel Gallimard).
——(1948). ‘Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi’, Bulletin de la Société Française de
Philosophie, 42: 49–91.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
Zahavi, D. (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation (Evanston,
Ill.: Northwestern University Press).
——(2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press).

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unity of consciousness 315

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unity of consciousness 317

318 dan zahavi

locus of apprehension, which Albahari terms witness-consciousness. It is the experi-

unity of consciousness 319

depersonalization. In both cases, the person or patient would be awake and

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that the phenomenology of self-constitution coincided with phenomenology as a

So although Husserl is frequently considered an ardent defender of an egological

unity of consciousness 321

equivocation is at play. My proposal is as follows. When Husserl speaks of an egoless

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3. S U B J E C T I V I T Y A N D THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF

unity of consciousness 323

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3 For a more extensive discussion see Zahavi 1999, 2005.

unity of consciousness 325

of experience. It refers to the first-personal presence of experience. It refers to what

326 dan zahavi

any way exist independently of them. It is a transcendence, but in Husserl’s famous

unity of consciousness 327

328 dan zahavi

unity of consciousness 329

thought (Frankfurt 1988: 59–61). According to Frankfurt, a person is not simply to

Frankfurt’s basic point, that the identification in question amounts to a specific

330 dan zahavi

unity of consciousness 331

horizon. It will be intertwined with, shaped, and contextualized by memories,

For Frankfurt, however, self-consciousness doesn’t amount to consciousness of a

332 dan zahavi

unity of consciousness 333

——(1994). Briefwechsel II (Husserliana Dokumente, 3/1–10; Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic

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