Korea Technologies Co. v. Lerma
Korea Technologies Co. v. Lerma
Korea Technologies Co. v. Lerma
Petitioner: KOGIES
- Korean corporation engaged in the supply and installation of LPG
Cylinder Manufacturing Plants
Respondent: PGSMC, a domestic corporation
TIMELINE OF EVENTS:
- For the remaining balance of USD 306, 000 for the installation and
operation of the plant, PGSMC issued two postdated checks.
- Checks were dishonored, thus, KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC
threatening a criminal action for violation of bouncing checks law. (may 8,
1998)
- On same date, PGSMC faxed a letter dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES
President complaining that petitioner did not deliver equipment parts paid for.
Hence, PGSMC replied to the demand letter stating that the checks were
actually fully funded but payments were stopped for reasons previously made
known to petitioner.
- PGSMC then cancelled their contract dated March 5, 197 on the ground
that KOGIES had altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the
machineries it delivered, and that PGSMC would dismantle and transfer the
same from the Carmona plant.
- Petitioner insisted that their disputes should be settled by arbitration per
the arbitration clause in their contract. Thus, KOGIEs instituted an
Application for Arbitration before the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board
(KCAB).
- KOGIES filed a complaint for specific performance against PGSMC alleging
that PGSMC violated their contract by unilaterally rescinding the contract
without resorting to arbitration (TRO was issued to retrained PGSMC from
dismantling and transferring the machinery and equipment)
- PGSMC opposed contending that the arbitration clause was void for being
against public policy as it oust local courts of their jurisdiction.
1. WON the arbitration clause is against public policy for ousting the courts
of jurisdiction. – NO
Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract
is made governs. The contract in this case was perfected in the Philippines, therefore,
our laws ought to govern. Nonetheless, art. 2044 of the civil code sanctions the validity
of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and binding effect of an arbitral
award. Art. 2044 provides, “any stipulation that the arbitrators award or decision shall
be final, is valid, without prejudice to articles 2038, 2039, and 2040.”
The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has
not been shown to be contrary to any law, morals, good customs, public order, and
public policy. We held that submission to arbitration is a contract and that a clause in
a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
arbitration is a contract.
In case of foreign arbitral body is chosen by the parties, the arbitration rules of our
domestic arbitration bodies would not be applied. As signatory to the UNCITRAL Model
Law on June 21, 1985, the Philippines is committed to be bound by the model law.
While RA 9285 was passed only in 2004, it applies in the case since it is a procedural
law which has a retroactive effect. Likewise, KOGIES files its application for arbitration
with KCAB but still pending because no arbitral award has yet been rendered. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
personal rights because no vested right has yet attached.
Therefore, the arbitration clause does not oust the courts of jurisdiction as the
international arbitral award is not without exceptions since it is still judicially
reviewable. Further, a party may not unilaterally terminate the contract for whatever
cause without first resorting to arbitration.