Case Digest : Garvida vs Sales Jr. (G.R. No. 124893.

April 18, 1997)

Doctrine: A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365th day cycle.
On his 21st birthday, he has completed his entire span of 21 365 day cycles. The
day after the birthday is the 1st day of the 22nd 365 day year cycle. Not more that
21 years is not equal to less than 22

Civil Code Article 13:

When the law speaks of years, months or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of 365 days each; months of 30 days; days of 24 hours; and nights from sunset
to sunrise.

If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number
of days which they respectively have.

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy
was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years
old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court
ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales,
in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida.
When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got
76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed
by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a
maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the
maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be
construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less than 22 years – so long
 as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21
years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for
SK must be:

1. Filipino citizen;
2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay
list.

The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is
not equivalent to “less than 22 years old.” The law does not state that the candidate
be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in
framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such.
Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should
be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention?
No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though
obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected
by reason of the winner’s eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be
declared as successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of
votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would have been different if Sales was
able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility,
this would have rendered her votes “stray”.
Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK
member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member
obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?**
(**Not to be confused with Sales’ situation – Sales was a candidate for SK
chairmanship not SK membership.)
The above argument can’t be considered in this case because Section 435 only
applies when the SK Chairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is
convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3)
consecutive months.” Garvida’s case is not what Section 435 contemplates. Her
removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being “eligible”
means being “legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or
the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds
enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman.
CASE DIGEST: BELLIS VS. BELLIS
1 Reply

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al

Doctrine: Intestate and testamentary succession follow the law of the national.
NOT where the property is situated. Ergo if person was domiciled and citizen of
USA, his properties in PH follow the laws of the USA not PH. In USA law, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate
children.

6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven surviving children. The
appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition claiming that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the
Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate
to be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of
the illegitimate children’s successional rights

RULING:

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall
be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic
validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the
legitimes, is valid.

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the
legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

(Another Ruling)

Applying the nationality rule, the law of Texas should govern the intrinsic validity
of the will and therefore answer the question on entitlement to legitimes. But since
the law of Texas was never proven, the doctrine of processual presumption was
applied. Hence, SC assumed that Texas law is the same as Philippine laws, which
upholds the nationality rule. Renvoi doctrine is not applicable because there is no
conflict as to the nationality and domicile of Bellis. He is both a citizen and a
resident of Texas. So even if assuming the law of Texas applies the domiciliary rule,
it is still Texas law that governs because his domicile is Texas.
Tenchavez v Escano (1965) (G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965)
Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Doctrine: the filing of Vicenta for divorce in another state (Nevada, US) is not
recognized by the Philippines as stated in Article 15 of the Civil Code. And
cohabitation with Moran is technically, “intercourse with a person not her
husband”, therefore the plaintiff is entitled, under the Philippines law to a decree
of “legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City.
As of June 1948, the newly-weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano
left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce
against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On
September 13, 1954, Escano married an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a
complaint for legal separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-
Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving
of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta
from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying
another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not
raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it
contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that
contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of
affection involves the performance of a positive act.
Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree
was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on
the grounds of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium,
and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC.
Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not admit absolute divorce
but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be
a patent violation of the declared policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd
par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of
our society whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain
absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced
by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon
plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy"
(Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral
damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal
separation has been added to Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the
damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176)
expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect
accorded to individual liberty in civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably
deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code of the Phil.).
And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there
is no cogent reason why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of
breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if in private relations
physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and
factum
Constantino Vs Mendez

G.R. No. 57227 May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented
herein by the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s complaint and set aside the
resolution of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, ordering private
respondent: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as his illegitimate
child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral
damages; and (4) to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
Petitioner filed with the then CFI of Davao an action for acknowledgment, support
and damages against private respondent in June 1975. Petitioner alleges, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met respondent at Tony’s Restaurant,
where she worked as a waitress; the following day respondent invited petitioner to
dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; on the pretext of getting
something, respondent brought petitioner inside his hotel room and through a
promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter and
repeated whenever respondent is in Manila even after respondent confessed that
he is a married man after their first sexual contact.
In respondent’s answer in August 1975, Ivan admitted that he met petitioner at
Tony’s Cocktail Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with
her. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court rendered a decision, in favor of petitioner. Respondent is to pay for
actual and moral damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. Both parties
filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Respondent anchored his motion
on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence.
Petitioner sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as
the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.

The trial court granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal the amended decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed.
Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED

ON ARTICLES 19 & 21
HELD: NO, PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON ARTICLES 19 &
21
According to ART. 19 Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

In the case at bar petitioner was already 28 years old and she admitted that she
was attracted to respondent. Petitioner’s attraction to respondent is the reason
why she surrendered her womanhood. Had petitioner been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately ended her relation
with respondent when she knew that respondent was a married man after their
first sexual contact. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and
November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion
and not the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force that made her
submit herself to respondent. The Supreme Court said “Damages could only be
awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire”
therefore petitioner is not entitled to claim for damages based on articles 19 & 21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
 CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. v. QUINONES
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Respondent went inside the Guess USA Boutique in Robinson’s Department Store
in Cebu City and decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2098. While she was
walking, she was confronted by a Guess employee and told her that she failed to
pay for the item she got to which respondent replied that she did and showed the
receipt. Respondent then suggested they talk about it in the Cebu Pacific office in
the mall. While in there, she was allegedly embarrassed and humiliated by the
Guess employees in front of their clients. The next day, Guess employees event
sent a demand letter to respondents employers. While the RTC ruled for them, CA
reversed the decision saying that the acts done by the employees were not in good
faith. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of CA.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners, California

Clothing, Inc., Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and Michelle S. Ybañez,
alleging that due to the incident, she suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights,
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock
and humiliation. She demanded payment for moral, nominal, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the respondent to clarify whether
or not payment was made and that they approached and talked to the respondent
in a gentle and polite manner. They sought payment for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses as counterclaim.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim
stating that the petitioners acted in good faith and the respondent was the one
who put herself in that situation by inviting the Guess employees to the Cebu Pacific
Office to discuss about the issue of payment. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that there was
preponderance of evidence showing the petitioners acted in bad faith but,
Hawayon and Villagonzalo were absolved from liability due to good faith. Since
petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent was entitled to damages and attorney’s
fees.
A. Legal Issue
Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith which resulted to the Court of
Appeals awarding moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent, Shirley G.
Quiñones.

B. Ruling
Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the award for moral damages and
attorney’s fees to respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals’ decision. The principle of abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil
Code is present in the case. Respondent complained when petitioners
embarrassed her and insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans despite the
issuance of an official receipt in her favor.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs. Valmonte in which the elements of
abuse of rights were enumerated. “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows:
(1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements stated are complete in the
present case. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made
when respondent already presented the black jeans with the original receipt.
Second, they accused the respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the black
jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly left the shop. Third, the letters sent
to the respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for assistance in
collection of the payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance
with the purpose of its establishment and not abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
G.R. No. L-36249: ANIANO OBAÑA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANICETO
SANDOVAL 1985
March 29, 135 scra 557
Contract of Sale – Ownership – Rescissible Contract – Unjust Enrichment

Facts:
On November 21, 1964, Anicleto Sandoval (owner of Sandoval’s and Sons
Rice Mill) was approached by Chan Lin who offered to purchase from him 170
cavans of rice at the price of P37.25 per cavan. The driver attempted to collect the
payment from Chan Lin and Petitioner Anacleto Sandoval but the latter refused,
stating that he had already made the payment to Chan Lin. Further demands having
been met with refusal, Sandoval, as plaintiff, filed suit for Replevin against
petitioner, before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, La Union which ordered
petitioner- defendant to pay to Sandoval ½ of the cost of the rice or P2,805. On
appeal by the petitioner to the court of First Instance, judgment was rendered
dismissing the complaint. On appeal to respondent Appellate Court, Sandoval
obtained a reversal in his favor. Hence, the present petition seeks for the review of
the decision of Court of Appeals ordering Obaña in action for Replevin to return to
Sandoval, Private Respondent herein, 170 cavans of rice or to pay its value in the
amount P37.25 per cavan, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until
fully paid.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner-dependent had unjustly enriched himself at
the expense of another by holding on to property no longer belonging to him.

HELD: Ownership was transferred to Chan Lin when the cavans of rice were
delivered to Aniano’s store. This was agreed upon in the contract between
Sandoval and Chan Lin. However, it was found that 3 days after the delivery, Chan
Lin returned Aniano’s money. Aniano claimed that he then returned the cavans of
rice to Sandoval. But Sandoval’s driver said Aniano never returned the sacks of rice.
They would have withdrawn the replevin case had the sacks of rice been returned.
Sandoval has all the right to recover the rice and rescind the contract as he was not
paid. Aniano cannot unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Sandoval.

No person should be benefited without a valid basis or justification, shall enrich

himself at the expense of another and hold on to a property no longer belonging
to him. The petition- defendant in his own testimony said that he was repaid the
sum of P5,600 by Chan Lin and claimed that he delivered the rice back to them.
However, the driver denied that the rice had ever been returned. The driver’s
version is more credible since Sandoval’s lawyer had manifested in open court that
they would have withdrawn the complaint if the return of the rice had been
effected. In law and equity, therefore, Sandoval is entitled to recover the rice, or
the value thereof since he was not paid the price therefor.
REPUBLIC vs BALLOCANAG

REPUBLIC vs HON. NORMELITO BALLOCANAG and Danilo ReyesG.R. NO. 163794

28 November 2008

Doctrine: Government is not exempt from the principle of Unjust Enrichment and
must repay planter in good faith for all the trees he planted in the public domain.

FACTS: Danilo Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500 sq.m. at Brgy Banus,
Pimanalayan, Oriental Mindoro from Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase,
Reyes introduced improvements and planted Mangoes, Mandarin citrus, and
Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land transferred in his name. Unfortunately, It
turned out that the subject land is part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and
therefore, not subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing law and
is not transferable.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of petitioner, filed a complaint
for “ Cancellation of Title and/or Revision” that the issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) is spurious, fictitious, and irregularly issued on account of the subject
title was part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro per Bureau of Forest
Department (BFD) Land Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the
140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty.
Augusto D. Marte; that the subject land cannot be subject of any disposition or
acquisition under the law.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that Reyes TCT No. 45238 are null and void and
ordered to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the
premises. Reyes then appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeal (CA),
apparently, Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should pay Reyes the value of the
Improvements he introduced on the property.

HELD:

To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the
State -- because the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part
of inalienable forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutable
-- would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of
Reyes, a planter in good faith.

Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest.[28] This basic doctrine on unjust
enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
himself inequitably at anothers expense.[29] There is unjust enrichment when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience.[30] Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this
wise:

ART. 22. Every person who, through an act of performance by

another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.

The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant
case. There is enrichment on the part of the petitioner, as the State would come
into possession of -- and may technically appropriate -- the more than one
thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There is
impoverishment on the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the improvements
he had painstakingly planted and invested in. There is lack of valid cause for the
State to acquire these improvements, because, as discussed above, Reyes
introduced the improvements in good faith. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
commit any error in ruling that Reyes is entitled to the benefits of Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code.

Thus, even if we accept the OSGs submission that Reyes entitlement to these
benefits is not absolute because he can no longer claim good faith after the filing
of the reversion case in 1987, still, there is no gainsaying that prior to that ― all the
way back to 1970 ― he had possessed the land and introduced improvements
thereon in good faith. At the very least, then, Reyes is entitled to these benefits for
the 17 years that he had been a planter in good faith.
However, we are mindful of the fact that the subject land is currently covered by
Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) No. 175 issued by the Ministry of
(now Department of Environment and) Natural Resources in favor of Atty. Augusto
D. Marte, which will expire on December 21, 2011. By the terms of the AFFLA, the
lessee shall, among others, do all in his power to suppress fires, cooperate with the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) in the protection and conservation of the
forest growth in the area and undertake all possible measures to insure the
protection of watershed and environmental values within the leased area and areas
adjacent thereto. This obligation to prevent any damage to the land subject of the
lease is consonant with fundamental principles and state policies set forth in
Section 16,[31] Article II and Section 4,[32] Article XII of the Constitution.

To allow Reyes to remove the fruit-bearing trees now full-grown on the subject
land, even if he is legally entitled to do so, would be risking substantial damage to
the land. It would negate the policy consideration underlying the AFFLA -- to
protect and preserve the biodiversity and the environment, and to prevent any
damage to the land. Further, it would violate the implicit mandate of Article 547 of
the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage

to the principal thing, the possessor in good faith may remove them
unless the person who recovers the possession exercises the option
under paragraph 2 of the preceding article.

In this light, the options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the
trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to
pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is
only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon the expiration of the
lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all
permanent improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic
without any obligation on its part to indemnify the lessee.

Yes, Supreme Court resolved to deny Reyes petition for failure to sufficient show
that the CA had committed any reversible error in the questioned the judge. The
SC agree with the CA that Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the
subject land. He titled the land, planted fruit trees thereon and invested money
from 1970. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the trees he planted the
only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes.

Petition DENIED and DIRECTED the RTC to determines the actual improvements
introduced on the subject land, their current value and the amount of the expenses
actually spent by Reyes and DIRECTED the DENR-BFD to pay private respondent the
value of such actual improvements he introduced on the subject land.
G.R. No. L-35697-99 April 15, 1988
ELADlA DE LIMA, POTENCIANO REQUIJO, NEMESIO FLORES, REYNALDO REQUIJO,
DOMINADOR REQUIJO and MARIO REQUIJO, petitioners,
vs.
LAGUNA TAYABAS CO., CLARO SAMONTE, SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., (SEVEN-UP
BOTTLING CO., OF THE PHILIPPINES) and PORVENIR ABAJAR
BARRETO, respondents.

Leon O. Ty, Gesmundo and Gesmundo and Renato B. Vasquez for petitioners.

Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Doctrine : Court must be vigilant in dealing with indigents. Denial of substantial

justice due to legal technicalities are to be avoided

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision De Lima vs. Laguna
Tayabas Co. of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming the decision of the court a quo with
modification to include an award of legal interest on the amounts adjudged in favor
of the petitioners from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeals to the time
of actual payment.

FACTS:

On June 3, 1958 a passanger bus of Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and a delivery
truck of Seven Up Bottling Co., Philippines collided causing the death of Petra Dela
Cruz and serious physical injuries to Eladia De Lima and Nemesio Flores. Three suits
were filed against the respondents before the Court of First Instance of Laguna (San
Pablo City)

On December 27, 1963, the court a quo rendered a decision in favour of the
plaintiffs specifying the indemnity afforded to them. However, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration on the decision by the court a quo seeking award of
legal interest on the adjudged amount in their favour from the date of the said
decision but their motion was not acted upon by the said court.

All of the plaintiffs desisted from appealing with the hope that the defendant will
comply with the indemnity. But instead, the defendant filed an appeal in contrary
to the motion for reconsideration raised by the petitioners to the Court of Appeals.
This appeal was pending for around 30 years.

On December 1971, the petitioners filed a motion before the court of Appeals
seeking the grant of legal interest from the date of the decision of the Court a quo
and increasing the civil indemnity for the death of Petra Dela Cruz. The appelatte
court denied the motion on the contention that the petitioners failed to make an
appeal on the error on lower court’s ruling for not awarding the legal interest and
damages. The Supreme Court after thorough review and analysis of the case
GRANTED the petition of the petitioners with modifications on the amounts
previously specified by the court a quo.

ISSUE:

Whether the Supreme Court’s decision through its liberal stance manifested
vigilance in favor of the indigent litigants

HOLDING:

YES. Article 24 provides that “In all contractual, property and other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantages on the account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.” The petitioners were
litigating as paupers. By reason of their indigence, they failed to appeal but
petitioners De Lima and Requijo had filed their manifestation making reference to
the law and jurisprudence upon which they base their prayer for relief while
petitioner Flores filed his brief.In the liberal stance of the Supreme Court seeing the
case pending for 30 years, it shall an exemption to the rule that it should not be
entertained because of its failure to make an appeal on the lower court’s decision.
The heirs though they failed to do such should be afforded with equitable relief by
the courts as it must be vigilant for their protection. The claim for legal interest and
increase in indemnity should be entertained in spite of the claimant’s failure to
appeal the judgement. Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be construed
liberally in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to pursue their
respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities may be avoided.