9

a
avid A. Mindell

h a t does a tele- noise and prediction, and

phone have to do communications theory,
with an anti-aircraft gun? shaped today’s informa-
In World War 11, the two tion society as much as
became intimately con- did the digital computer
nected, as telephone engi- itself.
neering reshaped the By 1940, more than a
technology for shooting decade of development
down airplanes. In 1945, had defined the basic lay-
Warren Weaver, former out of an “anti-aircraft
head of research on con- system.” Optical input
trol systems at the Na- devices (rangefinders and
tional Defense Research tracking telescopes) sup-
Committee (NDRC), ex- plied the range, bearing,
plained the unlikely role and elevation of the tar-
of telephone engineering get. As the war pro-
in solving the “antiair- gressed, radar took over
craft problem.” these functions, at first
At,first thought it may just for rangefinding and
seem curious that it was a later for target tracking. A
Bell Telephone Laborato- central computer or “gun
ries group which came forward with new proved particularly successful at shooting director” integrated these data with set-
ideas and techniques to apply to the AA down the V-1 “buzz bombs”-early tings for wind, terrain, and predetermined
[anti-aircraft1 problems. But for two rea- cruise missiles. By applying theories of ballistics, which depended on the particu-
sons this was natural. First, this group not feedback amplifiers to servomechanisms lar gun and shell. The director predicted
only had long and highly expert experi- and automatic control systems, Bell Labs the future location of the target based on
ence with a wide variety of electrical tech- engineers merged electronic messaging its speed and direction and calculated as
niques. Second, there are surprisingly with technological power. output the azimuth and elevation for aim-
close and valid analogies between the fire This article outlines the contributions ing the guns, as well as a fuze setting (the
control prediction problem and certain of Bell Telephone Laboratories to “sys- time after firing when the shell would
basic problems in communications engi- tem engineering” of anti-aircraft guns. explode). These data were transmitted to
neering [l]. Detailing the labs’ more significant pro- the guns, which pointed automatically
During World War 11,engineers at Bell jects illustrates how techniques originally with hydraulic power controls or manu-
Telephone Laboratories applied their ex- developed for the telephone system ac- ally with “follow-the-pointer’’indicators.
pertise in communications to the control quired utility and conceptual power when Still, the existing solutions used mechani-
of machinery. They designed and built a applied to military problems. The prod- cal calculations, which were inadequate,
gun director that employed electronic cir- ucts of this research, tempered by war, especially as the advent of radar and ad-
cuits and servomechanisms to perform were then adapted to general problems in vances in aircraft technology stressed sys-
calculations. This device replaced earlier electronics, communications, and infor- tem performance to its limit.
mechanical directors and, when inte- mation systems. Research into control Meanwhile, BTL initiated its own gun
grated with new microwave radars, systems, which addressed computing, director project independent of the earlier

72 IEEE Control Systems

 efforts, starting with the dream of a BTL [4]. The BTL group not only proposed transformed the observed data from polar
staff member, D.B. Parkinson. Parkinson, their own work, but also leamed about the to Cartesian coordinates, represented the
a Ph.D. in physics, was working on a army’s existing antiaircraft technology, target’s flight in a mechanical analog, and
device to record the logarithm of applied which had been in development since the extrapolated from that analog to predict
voltage on a strip chart. To derive this 1920s. future target position (the so-called “plan
value, the machine employed a shaped Later in June, Parkinson, Lovell, prediction”)before convertingback to po-
card wound with wire as a logarithmic Kelley, and a number of other BTL engi- lar.
potentiometer, and “to all intents and pur- neers met with the Signal Corps at Fort The Sperry systems incorporated ser-
poses, this small potentiometer could be Monmouth, N.J., which at that time was vos within their calculatingunits, but only
said to control the motion of the pen [of working on microwave detection, or early to transmit information between succes-
the recorder].”[2] radar. The Bell engineers inspected a sive stages. Lovell’s idea, in contrast, had
In the spring of 1940, as Nazi conquest Sperry M4 director and other fire control a servo perform actual calculation by put-
swept over France, Parkinson recalled, equipment, and received manuals and ting a mathematical element directly in
i had been working on the level re- books on antiaircraft guns and fire control the feedback loop. The servo then
corder for several weeks when one night i [5]. [See this column, April 1995, for a “solved” an equation, merely by its ten-
had the most vivid and peculiar dream. i discussion of the Sperry anti-aircraft de- dency to reduce the error to zero. Lovell
found myself in a gun pit or revetment with velopment projects] They also presented described how “servomechanismsmay be
an anti-aircraji gun crew. ...There was their ideas to the Navy, which declined used directly in making transformation
gun there ... it wasfiring occasionally, and interest in the project because it already from one coordinate system to another
the impressive thing was that every shot had sophisticated fire control, and a cadre without the necessity for setting up scale
brought down an airplane! After three or of officers and contractors trained in the models having to be considered.” While
four shots one of the men in the crew
technology [6].The army was interested, Bell engineers and NDRC staff com-
smiled at me and beckoned me to come
however, and in a letter of September 5 , monly referred to this technique as “elec-
closer to the gun. When I drew near he
1940, Col. Roger Colton, Chief Signal tronic,” it was really “electromechanical”
pointed to the exposed end of the leji trun-
Officer, strongly endorsed the BTL gun (a fact they acknowledged)-the servo
nion. Mounted there was the control po-
director idea. motor turned the special potentiometer,
tentiometer of my level recorder! There
During this initial period of explora- whose output voltage was a function of
was no mistaking it-it was the identical
the angular position.
item. ... It didn’t take long to make the tion, Parkinson and Lovell gathered a
group of BTL engineers to do some pre- During the summer of 1940,Parkinson
necessary translation+ the potentiome-
ter could control the high-speedmotion of liminary analysis. They produced a study worked on similar problems. He leamed
a recording pen with great accuracy, why titled “Electrical Mathematics,”which ex- that a gun director requires a means of
couldn’t a suitably engineered device do amined electrical or electromechanical calculating the firing solution from the
the same thing for an anti-aircraft gun? means of performing the mathematical ballistics of the gun, Le., a firing table.
About June 1, 1940, Parkinson pro- functions required for fire control equa- While his original idea included a wire-
posed this idea to his superior, C.A. tions: addition, subtraction, multiplica- wound potentiometer for solving equa-
Lovell. He described three BTL technolo- tion, division, integration, differentiation, tions, he had intended it only to for
gies that could contribute to an “electrical and looking up tabulated data. Lovell’s mathematical functions, such as sines and
predictor for automatic control, calcula- notebooks indicate he had picked up a cosines (Fig. 1).Now he realized that the
tion, and pointing of a small anti-aircraft general knowledge of the Sperry antiair- potentiometers could also provide tabular
gun or machine gun.” It required (1) a craft directors from his visit to Fort Mon- data [7]. Like Lovell, Parkinson displayed
means of solving equations electrically mouth a few weeks before. He understood growing understanding of fire control
(potentiometers), (2) a means of deriving Sperry’s “plan prediction method,” which technology and computing. Where Sperry
rate for prediction (an electrical differen-
tiator), and (3) ameans of moving the guns
in response to firing solutions (servo-
mechanisms) [ 3 ] . With no prior experi-
ence in fire control, Parkinson had quickly
grasped the essence of the problem.
Going from a bright idea to a full-scale
development program, however, required
selling it to the labs’ leadership, and then
to the military services.Lovell liked Park-
inson’s idea, and proposed it to his boss,
Mervin J. Kelley, then Director of Re-
search at BTL. Kelley, in turn, presented
the proposal to BTL founder Frank Jewett,
now at the National Academy of Sciences
and a member of the NDRC, who got in
touch with the Army Signal Corps, the Fig. 1 . Coordinate conversion with a sinusoidal potentiometer driven by a sew0 shaft
logical contact for the telephone company (from “FinalReport: 0 - 2 Project #2c, Study of Errors in T-10 Gun Director”).

December 1995 73
directors employed three-dimensional military problems. Warren Weaver of the difficult to change. More important,
mechanical cams to store the firing table, Rockefeller Foundation became head of Sperry’s resources, as well as those of
Parkinson suggested a “space potentiome- the NDRC’s fire control section, named many precision mechanical manufactur-
ter,” which would provide solutions as a Section D-2. Weaver assembled a com- ers, were already stretching thin. In con-
function of two variables rather than the mittee and traveled around the East Coast trast, Western Electric’s vast
- variable embodied in his “logarith- learning about fire control. In October, at manufacturing capacity remained under-
single
mic potentiometer.” utilized for war production,
Most important from a his- and thus could produce the
torical perspective, Lovell electronic director. Moreover.
noted that modeling mathe- workers possessing no special-
matics with servomechanisms ized skills could build electri-
had far-reaching implica- cal devices with existing
tions: components, as opposed to the
A digressionfrom theprin- complex machining procedure
cipal subject is made to com- required for the Speny ballistic
ment that the use of servo cams. Finally, the idea came
mechanisms to solve simulta- from engineers from a success-
neous systems of equations is ful laboratory with a good
f e a s i b l e a n d , in a large reputation and an organization
number of cases, practicable. familiar to the NDRC. After
This fact may lead to the ap- all, Bell Labs’ founder and for-
p l i c a t i o n of this type of mer president, Frank Jewett,
mechanism to the solution of was a founding member of the
many types ofproblems disso- NDRC.
ciated from the one in ques- The Army concurred, and
tion [8]. suggested the NDRC fund the
The tracker of the M-9 electrical gun director in action. As one
He recognized that the soldier orients the telescopes in elevation, the other orients them BTL project, “during the de-
computing elements were in azimuth by turning the entire tracker head. Photographs COUP- velopment stage, when flexi-
analogous to the mechanical tesy ofAT&T Archives. bilitv of contract is impor-
elements used in earlier com- tant.”[ll] NDRC Sectionb-2
puters: let a contract to BTL to design
.._the availability of accurate differen- the Coastal Artillery Board at Fort Mon- and build an electronic gun director, to
tiators and servo-mechanisms make pos- roe, VA, they were told of BTL’s elec- begin Nov. 6,1940 [ 121. [See this column,
sible the solution of differential equations, tronic director. Weaver and D-2 then August 1995, for a survey of the NDRC’s
and BTL had been using such circuits for visited Bell Labs and met with Kelley, other control system projects.] Under the
that purpose for another project. I want to Lovell, Parkinson, and other Bell engi- contract, BTL would design the machine,
point out that machines of the same char- neers. The BTL team explained thelr idea designated T-10, for use with the Army’s
acter as the differential analyzer of Bush and showed schematics of their circuits. new 90” gun, which had hydraulic
and Caldwell can be made to operate The NDRC representatives also saw power controls for remote aiming. An op-
electrically by the use ofthe means at our BTL’s machine for winding potentiome- tical rangefinder would provide altitude
disposal, and that a machine can be built ter cards of any shape, and a completed input, but the machine would include pro-
to solve systems of simultaneous differen- “sinusoidal” potentiometer [lo]. vision for radar inputs. It would also keep
tial equations, in particular multi-mesh BTL’s work appealed to Weaver and the “constant altitude assumption” of pre-
network equations [9]. his committee. An electronic machine vious directors, which predicted the future
In his notebook, Lovell sketched an would provide a necessary alternative to position of the target by assuming straight
equivalent for the MIT differential ana- Spew ’s directors, whose shortcomings in and level flight at constant speed.
lyzer made entirely out of servomechani- performance and production became During the next few months, BTL con-
cal computing devices. From the clearer every day. Bell engineers argued tinued gathering information and re-
beginning, Bell Labs researchers saw that that electronic computing provided sources o n control systems and
their innovative work on fire control prob- greater accuracy and speed at lower cost antiaircraft directors. Lovell visited the
lems had general importance for electron- than corresponding mechanical tech- army’s training schools for antiaircraft
ics and computation. niques-the traditional arguments for gunners and the arsenals responsible for
electronic over mechanical computing. technology development. He requested
NDRC Section D-2 Funds the But in 1940, these were not the arguments samples of telescopes, data transmitters,
BTL Director that appealed to the NDRC. Rather, they receivers, and other equipment [13]. The
Until this point the BTL gun director saw that an electronic f i e control com- Frankford Arsenal sent him blueprints for
work remained an intemally funded pro- puter would be easy to reconfigure to the tracking mechanisms in the Sperry M4
ject. But that same summer of 1940, Presi- change the algorithm (the components director, and drawings of other directors
dent Roosevelt and Vannevar Bush could be rewired). In contrast, a mechani- [ 141. Ed Poitras of the NDRC sent Park-
created the National Defense Research cal computer’s algorithm was tightly inson and Lovell copies of Gordon
Committee to fund scientific research into bound to its physical structure and was Brown’s servomechanisms paper, “Be-

74 IEEE Control Systems

havior and Design of Servomechanisms.” transmitted its data to the “computer” (see The T-10’s “electro-mechanical”
This paper, which the NDRC published in photo). The system was “ballistically mathematical units represented a con-
secret, explained to BTL engineers the complete”: it included all known factors scious compromise because, as the de-
MIT transient analysis approach to servo- into the ballistic calculation, and “ap- signers noted, “[while] a completely
mechanisms, which Harold Hazen, proaches the ideal of completely automat- electrical solution might be obtained by
Brown, and others had developed during ic operation. The only manual processes the use of variable electrical elements ...
the 1930s, and which still remained dis- involved in its operation were the tracking the problem of controlling these elements
tinct from feedback amplifier design [15]. functions for deriving suitable input accurately is difficult.” Rather, by includ-
In less than six months, Bell Labs had data.”[l7] ing mechanical elements (i.e., potenti-
transformed an individual’s dream into The director takes three inputs: azi- ometers) in the calculating mechanisms,
one of the country’s leading control sys- muth (a), elevation (E), and range (r). It they can be driven by servomechanisms,
tems projects. produces three outputs for the guns, azi- and “servo performance is readily studied
muth (ap),elevation ( E ~ ) , and the fuze by the highly developed method of feed-
Enter the T-10 Director settinghime of flight (AT). Box I converts back analysis. That a servo is a feedback
During 1941, Lovell, Parkinson, and the slant-range input to a voltage, and Box system becomes apparent from a com-
their engineers designed and built the T- I1 combines slant-range with elevation to parison of its action and that of the feed-
I O director. Fig. 2 shows the block dia- derive its height component. Box I11 com- back summing amplifier.”[181
gram for the T-10 computer. The basic bines the target height with azimuth to BTL engineers used feedback theory
algorithm and data flow closely resemble derive the target position in rectangular not only for the individual components
that of the mechanical S p e w directors coordinates (x, y, and v for vertical but also to understand the system overall.
built during the late 1930s. Warren height). Box IV performs the actual pre- They envisioned T-10 director as a feed-
Weaver, in a foreword to the final report diction, deriving the target velocities (i.e., back system at cvery lcvel, from the elcc-
on the T- 10project, explained the similar- differentiating the position components trical amplifiers, to the servos which
ity as a conservative approach to the new with respect to time), multiplying the ve- performed calculation, to the algorithm
electrical technology. “It seemed sensible locities by the lime of flight (AT), and itself. A section in the T-10 final report,
to construct a predictor which would be a adding them to the original positions. As “The Computer as a Servo,” explains that
rather close electrical counterpart of the in the Sperry system, the time-of-flight the prediction loop itself works just like a
[Sperry] mechanical predictor which was parameter closes a feedback loop around servo. Were it not for the many correc-
the army’s then standard for heavy AA. In the prediction calculation-the time of tions and firing data within that loop, the
this way one would get the most direct and flight depends on the predicted position report added, the entire prediction could
easily interpretable comparison between and the predicted position depends on the be performed by a single servomecha-
the mechanical and electrical ways of go- time of flight. The output of Box IV, then, nism. The smaller servos “merely intro-
ing at the problem.”[16] is the predicted position of the target, xp, duce local feedback and, provided they
The T- 10 consisted of four servos, each yp, and vp. Blocks V, VI, and VI1 then are fast and stable, do not affect the opera-
with a selsyn transmitter for sending firing convert this set of three voltages repre- tion of the major prediction loop. For
data to the gun, 30 DC amplifiers, five senting rectangular voltages back to polar those familiar with servo operation the
power supplies, and a host of voltage coordinates, represented now by angular understanding of the prediction process
regulators, adjustment panels, and con- shaft positions. Servomotors perform both will be clarified by considering the com-
trols. The entire unit weighed 1600 the conversion calculation (multiplying puter as a servo.”[191Overall, “the system
pounds. The human trackers operated by a sine or cosine) and the electrical-to- has a structural resemblance to a feedback
telescopes on a small, separate unit called mechanical conversion. amplifier with multiple loop feedback,
the “tracking head,” which electrically and may be analyzed by the usual feed-
back methods.”[20]
Throughout, BTL engineers con-
ceived and described the problem in the
language of communications. As one en-
gineer put it, “A servo, in general, in-
volves a carrier, and a means for
modulating that carrier according to some
function,” using terms from radio and te-
lephony [21]. In a similar vein, Sidney
Darlingon suggested a circuit for an elec-
tronic differentiator, to determine the rate
of change of a signal, so necessary for the
prediction computation in fire control sys-
tems. This device did not include a servo,
but rather a standard electrical amplifier
with a capacitor in its feedback loop. Bell
Fig. 2. Simplified block diagram of T-10 director “computor structure” (from “Final Re- engineers constructed the circuit and
made it work, and gradually developed
port: 0 - 2 Project #2c, Study of Errors in T-IO Gun Director”).
other methods for using feedback ampli-

December 1995 75
fiers for mathematical purposes [22]. In rushing it into production would waste rate (Le., its velocity) directly from its
fact, the 1947 paper by Ragazzini, Ran- money, “I cannot emphasize too strongly position, by differentiating. The observed
dall, and Russell which coined the term my own feeling that, since at least $2.5 position data unavoidably contained
“operational amplifier” acknowledges the million will be spent on the first few di- roughness, due either to the jerky nature
authors drew inspiration from “the cir- rectors, every effort should be made to of human tracking or to electrical noise in
cuits employed in the Western Electric improve this part [the data handling] of the a radar signal. Thus the instantaneous rate
M-IX antiaircraft gun director [the opera- predictor, and this effort should be made derived from this signal fluctuated wildly.
tional version of the T-10].”[23] By ap- as promptly as possible.”[29] Both Ste- Smoothing could average out these errors
plying their experience in telephone wart and Stibitz built automatic testing over some time period, but only by intro-
engineering to control systems problems, machines for quantifying the performance ducing time delays which caused errors in
then, BTL engineers made fundamental of the T-10 and other new directors. prediction (Le., the predictor operated on
contributions to modem electronics. The Army’s Anti-Aircraft Artillery stale data). Also, the DC amplifiers tended
Board reported that tests showed the T-IO to “drift,” or fall out of adjustment over
Making it Work-Delivery and to be about equal in performance to the time. Furthermore, each oftheT-lo’scon-
Testing of the T-10 mechanical directors. D-2 agreed, arguing versions-from polar, to Cartesian, and
Designing this electrical computer was the device should not go into full produc- then back to polar coordinates-intro-
no easy task, but making it actually work tion but rather apilot production lot be run duced distortion and loss of accuracy. To
proved even more difficult. Numerous for field trials. For the Army, however, accommodate these conversions, then,
problems delayed the first T- 10 prototype, advantages of production and procure- each stage required comparatively higher
which was supposed to ship to the Anti- ment outweighed deficiencies in perform- performance to maintain the overall accu-
Aircraft Artillery Board at Fort Monroe on ance. They told Weaver, “If a good supply racy of the system.
Sept. 1, 1941. The project faced many of instruments [the T-101 were available To overcome these problems, only
difficulties, but none as challenging as the which were not even as good as the Sperry three months into the T-10 project, BTL
specially shaped potentiometers that pro- M-4, [Army] Ordnance would still feel and the NDRC initiated a new project to
vided functions and range table data. The compelled to purchase this supply.”[30] study algorithms and electrical comput-
wire that wrapped the potentiometers In these tense weeks after Pearl Harbor, ing, “Fundamental Director Studies.” In
needed to have uniform resistance down the Army needed decisive action on new February 1941,BTL undertook the design
its entire length, and to maintain consis- technologies. In mid-February 1942 the of another director, the T-15, as a compet-
tency despite temperature changes [24]. T-10 was standardized by the Army as the ing project to the T-10, headed by Walter
Winding the wire smoothly on the odd M-9 Director. McNair. Henrik Bode, as part of McNair’s
shapes demanded new and specialized Section D-2 was uncomfortable with team, applied his previous experience
equipment. The NDRC, while frustrated the Army’s decision to uncriticaIIy adopt with feedback amplifiers to design the
at the missed delivery date, recognized the the T-10 [31]. Weaver thus extended smoothing networks for the T-15. Instead
novelty of the machine, and that its suc- BTL’s contract to allow for improvements of the Plan Prediction Method, the T-15
cess was by no means assured [25]. Fi- in smoothing and error reduction of the employed a “memory point method” and
nally, the unit was ready and shipped to T-IO before production. This work, in the worked entirely in polar coordinates. The
Fort Monroe for testing, the day before spring of 1942, achieved most of its in- director stored an initial data point for the
Pearl Harbor [26].Using testing machines tended results, bringing director’s per- target in a mechanical “memory.” For any
constructed specifically for comparing formance to a level that satisfied D-2, future time, it derived target velocity by
gun directors, the T-10 performed about including the addition of an averaging subtracting the initial from the current
as well as, or perhaps a bit worse than, the circuit for data smoothing. In 1942, the position, and the dividing the difference
Sperry directors. M-9 went into production with Western by time. This calculation required no dif-
But even before the unit shipped, while Electric as prime contractor, subcontract- ferentiation and even smoothed out per-
BTL still conducted its own tests, the ing out the tracking unit and a few other turbations. Because this method, which
Army announced an order for 200 of the components to the Ford Instrument Com- came to be called “one plus,” used the
directors, without waitingfor theNDRC’s pany [32].During the war, Western EIec- difference between the current position
approval or for any field testing by the tric produced more than 1500 M-9 and the predicted position, it operated on
Army [27]. This move caused concern at directors and its derivatives, M-10, M-12, relatively small magnitudes, which re-
the NDRC; Duncan Stewart, who oversaw M-13, as well as the M-8 and M-14 which quired less accurate computing mecha-
the BTL project, worried about perform- included ballistics for British guns [33]. nisms. Second, because the T-15’s
ance. He found the test data inconclusive, computation required no differentiation, it
and “little to choose between any of these Fundamental Director Studies could use AC circuits, inherently drift-
[Sperry or BTL directors] on the basis of The T-10 was a essentially a rush pro- free and more accurate than DC amplifi-
results.”[28] George Stibitz, himself a re- ject to design an electrical director and get ers. While the T-15 proved more accurate
searcher at Bell Labs and now a member it into production as quickly as possible. by about a factor of two than the T-10, and
of Section D-2 as well, echoed Stewart’s Hence, it introduced no innovations in settled on a solution twice as quickly, it
reservations. He warned that “the me- computation; it only implemented exist- never went into production.
chanical inaccuracies in T-10 are com- ing algorithms with new electronic tech- Nonetheless, the T-15 did advance the
pletely swamped by poor use of data.” In niques. But the original S p e w algorithm state of the art, both in electrical comput-
Stibitz’s view, the Army was overly im- had a number of basic problems. Its “Plan ing and in analytical understanding of the
pressed with BTL’s new machine, and Prediction Method” derived the target’s fire control problem. Although its design

76 IEEE Control Systems

used the same assumption of constant tar- [38]. When designing his antenna and tracking mechanism (human or radar),
get course and altitude as the Speny and tracking unit, he had to know how fast the and the calculation mechanism itself.
T-10 directors, with the T-15 engineers T-10 could keep up with input data. The They were not simple questions, and
had begun to consider the possibilities of close contact between BTL and the Rad the problems raised by the T-10 initiated
predicting the position of airplanes taking Lab was critical to making an integrated a major program of research in data
evasive action, or “curved flight predic- system workproperly, and the T-10 group smoothing that complemented the work
tion.” The NDRC let further contracts to stressed the value of systems engineering on prediction. In the words of MIT engi-
Bell Labs to study this problem, as well as across organizational boundaries. “Close neer A.C. Hall, “The advent of radar re-
to Norbert Wiener at MIT. In the end, BTL liaison should be maintained between di- quired the controls engineer to design
rejected Wiener’s statistical approach be- rector designers and designers of radars equipment to operate well in the presence
cause of problems of performance and and other tracking equipment. The speci- of signals that he could not even describe
complexity, but Wiener’s work proved fications on each unit should be written in terms then in general use.” These prob-
influential in his later work on cybernetics with full consideration of the features and lems added impetus to efforts already un-
[see Stuart Bennett’s account in this col- capabilities of the other.”[39] derway by Hall, Herbert Harris, and
umn, “Norbert Wiener and Control of In April 1942, the Radiation Lab’s new others to apply Nyquist’s frequency-re-
Anti-Aircraft Guns,” December 1994 fire control radar was standardized by the sponse methods to automatic control
CS]. The Bell Labs work culminated in a Army as the SCR-584 and went into pro- problems [42]. Hence, Warren Weaver’s
report by R.C. Blackman, Bode, and duction. It could track an aircraft to one- observation, quoted above, that the design
Claude Shannon, “Data Smoothing and twentieth of a degree out to 32,000 yards of the electrical director raised “certain
Prediction in Fire-Control Systems,” and included a PPI or “plan position indi- basic problems in communications engi-
which, in treating the problem as “a spe- cator,” which displayed a flat repre- neering,” and that “if one applies the term
cial case of the transmission, manipula- sentation of the space it scanned on a signal to the variables which describe the
tion, and utilization of intelligence,” cathode ray tube, much as the “plan posi- actual true motion of the target; and the
specifically applied electronic analogs to tion method” laid out the trajectory of its term noise to the inevitable tracking er-
the prediction problem, anticipated much target in a flat mechanism. The SCR-584 rors, then the purpose of a smoothing cir-
of modern signal processing, and influ- became the most successful ground radar cuit (just as in communications
enced Shannon’s later work on informa- of the war, with 1700 units eventually engineering) is to minimize the noise and
tion theory. Once again, the BTL delivered [40]. at the same time distort the signal as little
engineers recognized the broad applica- Even with close relations between de- as possible.”[43] The noise problem, as
bility of their work, noting, “The input sign groups, however, integrating the ra- well as the problem of prediction, led to
data ... are thought of as constituting a dar into a fire control system remained the idea that all elements in an integrated
series in time similar to weather records, difficult. The first time it was connected, system can be defined in terms of the
stock market prices, production statistics, the system nearly shook itself apart be- signals they accept and produce, a key
and the like.”[35] Thus, BTL’s electrical cause of noise. The electrical or electro- component of modern systems engineer-
computer, although sharing little circuitry mechanical servos worked fine as ing.
or architecture with modern computers, calculators when the input data was per-
shaped the fundamental conception of an fect. But errors in tracking, if treated as Battle of the Robot Weapons
information processing system. good data, “would produce prediction er- Even by itself, the SCR-584 radar was
rors of dominating proportions.”[41] This a remarkable device, “the answer to the
Radar and Fire Control problem arose particularly with radar in- antiaircraft artilleryman’s prayer.”[44]
Prediction, however, was not the only puts: as a radar beam reflected off an Combined with Bell Lab’s electrical di-
problem that required subtle data manipu- airplane, it would shift from one part of rector, it had great potential as an auto-
lation. Integrating radar into the automatic the plane to another (analogous to the mated weapon. But despite automatic
control system proved equally as chal- airplane “twinkling” in the sun). Some radar tracking, prediction, and ballistics
lenging. Warren Weaver had instructed kind of data smoothing and filtering sys- calculation, gunfire remained essentially
BTL to design the T-10 to accept micro- tem was necessary, especially because an open loop process; once the shell left
wave input data, and all through the design differentiating the prediction signal would the gun, one could only hope for the best.
process in 1941, the BTL group cooper- aggravate the noise problem. A data One other technology, however, began to
ated with the NDRC radar group at MIT smoother could eliminate short, high-fre- close that loop, by putting a single dimen-
[36]. Louis Ridenour, who headed fire quency perturbations from the input data, sion of control into the shell itself the
control radar work at the Radiation Lab, but it carried a tradeoff. The more smooth- proximity fuze, developed by Merle Tuve
maintained close contact with Love11 at ing, the greater the time lag, so the and his special “Division T” of the
Bell Labs during the whole design process smoothed data was no longer current NDRC. This device, dubbed the VT (for
[37]. Similarly, George Stibitz visited when sent into the predictor. How could Variable-Time) fuze, had a microwave
MIT and discussed the interfaces between one determine the optimal smoothing ver- detector inside the shell which detonated
the T-10 and the Rad Lab’s new fire con- sus lag for a network? Could one reduce it near the target. Together these devices
trol radar, which was being designed un- the time lag for a given network? How did began to make fire control a fully closed-
der the leadership of Ivan Getting. To the smoother distinguish proper tracking loop system.
connect the radar to fire control comput- data from erroneous inputs? These ques- This automatic fire control system first
ers, Getting was particularly interested in tions all depended on the frequency char- achieved success at the beachhead in Feb-
the time constants of the system elements acteristics of the radar reflection, the ruary 1944 in Anzio, Italy. Together, the

December 1995 77
SCR-584 and the BTL M-9 director shot anti-aircraft control system saw its finest Before World War 11, Bell Labs re-
down enemy aircraft, over a hundred in hour. Hitler unleashed the “V-1 Blitz” searchers applied their expertise primarily
one month, which had been harassing Al- against London in mid-1944, and over the to “The System” and problems in commu-
lied landings. On D-day, 39 systems next 80 days launched about 7500 against nications. As engineering became more
landed in Normandy to protect the inva- the English capital. In anticipation of the analytical and scientific, those problems
sion force against air attack. Despite their V-1 blitz, and in response to a special assumed increasingly general importance
automation, however, these systems still request by Churchll, the Radiation lab for electrical engineering. The crisis of
maintained the “constant altitude assump- rushed experts to England who helped set World War 11thrust Bell Labs, like much
tion.” The M-9, rushed into production in up nearly 100 anti-aircraft batteries. Be- American science and technology, into
1942, did not even incorporate the latest tween June 18 and July 17, 1944, the defense research. In tackling the design
results on predicting curved flight from systems, consisting of the Bell Labs M-9 problems of anti-aircraft control systems,
BTL and MIT. The systems worked best, gun director, the Radiation Lab SCR-584 Bell Labs engineers found that their expe-
then, against attackers that flew straight Radar, the 90mm gun, and the Proximity rience in communications, especially with
and level. German aircrews, of course, fuze, shot down 343 V-ls, or 10% of the feedback amplifiers, prepared them to
learned to maneuver to throw off the sim- total and about 20% of those shot down analyze a broad range of problems with
ple predictors. (the others were brought down by aircraft, similar techniques. These included elec-
In June 1944, nevertheless, a new barrage balloons, and ships) [46]. During tromechanical and electronic computing
threat emerged from Nazi engineers, one this period the AA batteries deployed in a circuits, prediction machines, and radar
that perfectly matched the constant alti- ring south of London, and their ability to signal processing. Together with other re-
tude assumption because the new airplane fire was limited by the need to avoid hit- search supported by the NDRC, the war-
had no human operator. This threat itself ting Allied fighters that were also attack- time efforts of Bell Labs in fire control
relied on an automatic control system to ing the buzz bombs. Thus, aircraft had the contributed to a new vision of technology,
fly, and hence formed the ideal target for first chance at the missiles. That situation a vision that treated different types of
the automatic antiaircraft system: the first changed in mid-July when the AA batter- machinery (radar, amplifiers, electric mo-
operational robot bomb, the V-1 “buzz ies moved to the coast, where they could tors, computers) in analytically similar
bomb.” Although they did fly straight and fire over the English Channel. From July terms-paving the way for information
level, the buzz bombs were no easy tar- 17 to Aug. 31, the automated guns ac- theory, systems engineering, and classical
gets. Smaller than a typical airplane, they counted for 1286 V-1 kilIs, or 34% of the control theory. These efforts produced not
flew at about 380 miles per hour, much attack and more than 50% of those shot only new weapons but also a vision of
faster than bombers of the day, and at low down [47]. That October, the M-9/SCR- signals and systems. Through ideas and
altitudes, averaging about 2000 feet-in- 584PT-Fuze combination defended Ant- through people, this vision diffused into
deed, “fast and low” would become a ra- werp from the buzz bombs with similar engineering culture and solidified as the
dar-evading strategy in later years. And success. In this tense confrontation of ro- technical and conceptual foundations of
the V-1s proved remarkably resistant to bot weapons, the automated battlefield, the information age.
shellfire, sometimes taking several hits which even today remains a dream of mili-
before falling. tary technologists, began to take shape. References
But in the words of the British head of [1] Warren Weaver, foreword to “Final Report:
the Anti-Aircraft Command, “It seemed to Conclusion D-2 Project #2, Study of Errors in T-10 Gun
us that the obvious answer to the robot Despite this success, or indeed because Director,”National Archives, Office of Scientific
target or the flying bomb ... was a robot of it, by the end of the war anti-aircraft Research and Development,Division 7 (hereafter
defense.”[45] Against the V-1, to para- control systems were reaching their limits. referred to as OSRD7) Office Files of Warren
phrase Winston Churchill, the automatic Electronic circuits calculated ballistics Weaver, 3.
and other factors with an accuracy that 121 D.B. Parkinson wrote an account of his dream
exceeded the uncertainty of the system on Jan. 5, 1975. It is stored in the AT&T archives
Ihu‘rci A. Mindelt is an elcclrical overall. Radar and telescopes could track and reprinted in M.D. Fagan, ed., A History of
cnginecr and a tloctornl s~udentin the targets with similar precision. But Engineering and Science in the Bell System: Na-
I listory cil‘ Tcchnolog at h e Massa- “straight and level” prediction schemes tional Service in War and Peace (1925-1975)
chusetts Instilute of I‘eclinology. He is had fatal flaws, and predictions based on (Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1978), 135-36.
currently a f‘tllow at the Dibncr histi-
past history could only marginally im- [3] D.B. Parkinson, Notebook #16413, Project
prove their performance. There was sim- File 23140, AT&T archives (hereafter referred to
ply no reliable way to hit a distant, rapidly as ATT). For other notebooks on this project, see
ihc hislory c:f control systems from B.T. Weber,#16042, K.D. Swartzel, Jr.,#17512&
maneuvering target with a ballistic shell.
1916-1945. Bcforc coming to h41T hc 16312,C.A.Lovell,#17665 &#15627,D.B.Park-
The fire control system, or part of it,
\vas ii skiff enginccr ai. tlic Deep Sub- inson, #16413, and B.T. Weber, #18009, ATT.
needed to move into the projectile, ex-
mcrgcncc I-nboralory 01‘ thc Woods
tending the feedback in the proximity fuze [4] For detailed chronology of this project, see
I. I o 1c Oce a i ! o gra 1) hi c Ins i tu I io 11,
w1iei:c hc de\,cloped the control system to several more dimensions. The stage “Check list for use in connection with record of
was set, then, for the guided missile. In laboratories work on N.D.R.C. and O.S.R.D. con-
for .I,\SON. a remotely opcratctl vchi- tracts, no. NDCrc-127.” Project File 23140, ATT.
clu [or clcc.p-c.)ccanexploration. He can fact, Bell Labs built the first postwar anti-
bc rcazlicd at mindell~~iiiit.cdu. aircraft guided missile, Nike, with person- [5] E.C. Wente diary, July 3, 1940. Project file
nel and technology from its wartime fire 23140, ATT. For another chronology of these
control projects [48]. events, see R.B. Colton to M.J. Kelley, Oct. 6,

78 IEEE Control Systems

1944, OSRD7, Project #2 Folder, Office Files of gan, ed., A Hisiory of Engineering and Science in Lovell to Ridenour, Sept. 23, 1941. OSRD7 GP,
Warren Weaver. the Bell System, 14445. Project #2.

[6] These two meetings were on June 27, 1940, [25] Duncan Stewart wrote, “It is important to [38] GRS diary, May 21, 1941. OSRD7 GP, Pro-
and Aug. 5, 1940. Ibid. bear in mind that the Bell Telephone Laboratories, ject #2.
with unselfish and patriotic motives, has under-
[7] D.B. Parkinson, July 23, 1940. Notebook taken the development and construction of t h s [39] “Final Report: D-2 Project #2, Study of Er-
#16413, Project File 23140, ATT. instrument. in accordance with a program which rors in T-10 Gun Director.”
[8] C.A. Lovell, July 17, 1940,Notebook#15627, not only would be foolish under normal circum- [40] For the difficulties of producing the SCR-584
Project File 23140, ATT. stances but is entirely at variance with the Bell see George Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris,
Telephone Laboratories ordinary development Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany Terrett, The United
[9] C.A. Lovell, April 14, 1941. Notebook procedure.” DJS diary, Sept. 20, 1941. OSRD7 States army in World War II: The Technical Sew-
#15627, Project File 23140, ATT. GP, Project #Z. ices, The Signal Corps: The Test (December,1941
[lo] WW diary, Oct. 24, 1940. OSRD7 General [26] Kelley to WW, Dec. 17, 1941. OSRD7 GP, to July 1943) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Project Files (hereafterreferred to as GP), Project Project #2. Chief of Military History, United States Army,
#2. 1957), 265-274; Ivan Getting, All in a Lifetime:
[27] WW to KTC, Nov. 11, 1941. OSRD7 GP, Science in the Defense of Democracy (New York:
[ l l ] WW diary of phone call to Somers, Nov. 6, Project #2. Vantage Press, 1989), 121-127;Guerlac,Radar in
1940. OSRD7 GP, Project #2.
[28] DJS to HLH, WW, EJP, GRS, Dec. 31,1942, World War II (New York: Pomash Publish-
[12] WW to Kelley, Nov. 9, 1940, and Memoran- OSRD7 GIP, Project #2. This memo summarizes ers/American Institute of Physics, 1987), 81-83.
dum of Agreement between NDRC and Bell Tele- Stewart’s problems with the BTL project, which
phone Laboratories, May 19, 1941. OSRD 7 GP, 1411 “Study of Errors in T-10 Gun Director,” 72.
were many.
Project #2. [42] A.C. Hall, “Early History of the Frequency
1291 GRS diary, Dec. 25, 1941.0SRD7 GP, Pro-
[I31C.A. Lovell to OrdnanceDept., Jan. 15,1941. ject #2. Response Field,” Trans. ASME 76 (no. 8) 1954,
Project file 23140, ATT. 1153.
[30] WW tlo Fletcher, Oct. 31, 1941. OSRD7 GP,
[I41 C.A. Lovell diary, Dec. 21,1940. Project file Project #2. [43] Warren Weaver, foreword to “Final Report:
23140, ATT. D-2 Project #2, Study of Errors in T-10 Gun
[31] WWd,iary,Feb.25,1942.OSRD7GP,Project Director,” OSRD7 Office Files Of Warren
[15] EJP to Parkinson, Nov. 27, 1940. Project file #2.
Weaver, 3.
23140, ATT. Gordon S. Brown, “Behavior and
[32] WWdiary, Jan. 23,1942.OSm7 GP, Project
Design of Servomechanisms” OSRD 39, Report [44] George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Har-
#2.
to the Services 2, MassachusettsInstitute of Tech- ris, The United States Army in World War II: The
nology, Nov. 1940. Stuart Bennett, A History of [33] William J. Wuest, “History of Heavy AAFire Technical Services, The Signal Corps: The Out-
Control Engineering, 1930-1960 (London: Peter Control anld Materiel,”(Ft. Bliss, Texas: U S . come (Mid-1943 Through 1945) (Washington,
Pegrinus, Ltd., 1993), 138-140. army, The Artillery School, Anti-Aircraft and D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,
Guided Missiles Branch), 1951. In ATT folder 84 United States Army, 1966), 474-477. For a de-
[16] Warren Weaver, foreword to “Final Report: 05 02 03. ~~~

tailed operational history of the SCR-584, see

D-2 Project #2, Study of Errors in T-10 Gun
[34] Norbert Wiener, “The Extrapolation,Interpo- Guerlac,Radar in World War11480-496,853-862,
Director,” OSRD7 Office Files Of Warren
lation, and Smoothing of StationaryTime Series,” 882-897, 1018-1025. Getting, All in a Lifetime,
Weaver, 3.
NDRC Report to the Services 370, Feb. 1, 1942, 130-35. Rugged and versatile, the SCR-584 was
[I71 “Study of Errors in T-10 Gun Director,” 129. OSRD7 GI! See also, Stuart Bennett, “Norbert employed by field commanders for numerous uses
Wiener and Control of Anti-Aircraft Guns,’’IEEE beyond the one originally envisioned. For exam
1181 “Final Report: D-2 Project #2: Study of Er-
Control Systems Magazine (December 1994). ple, during testing at Fort Monroe, it tracked shell
rors in T-10 Gun Director,” OSRD7 GP, Project
fred from the Amiy’s 90” guns and led to the
#2,37. Also see C.A. Lovell, June 18 1940,Note- [35] National Defense Research Committee, discovery of a significant error in their firing
book#15627, Project File 23140, ATT. “Anti-AircraftDirector T-15,”Report to the Serv- tables. The tables had been calculated on a Bush
1191 “Study of Errors in T-10 Gun Director,” 68. ices No. 62 (Contractor’s Report on OEMsr-353), differential analyzer,but its operator had set up its
August 1943. See also Fagan, ed., A History oj gearing incorrectly. These errors had then been
[20] “Study of Errors in T-10 Gun Director,” Ap- Engineering and Science in the Bell System, 151- built into all the S p e w M-7 directors, but, since
pendix 11,“Stability Considerations.” 155, which is based on this report and on C.A. the T-10 was still in development, it could be
[21] K.D. Swartzel, Jr., April 9, 1941. Notebook Lovell, menlo to M.D. Fagan, Jan. 3,1974, Folder properly corrected.
#17512, Project file 23140, A T . 84 05 02 03 A T , and on M.D. Fagan, “The War
Years,” manuscript in idem. folder. R.B. Black- [45] Sir General Frederick A. Pile, Ack-Ack:Brit-
[22] K.D. Swartzel, Jr., April-June, 1941. Note- man, H.W. Bode, and C.E. Shannon, “Data ain’s Defense Against Air Attack During the Sec-
book #17512, Project file 23140, Am. Smoothing and Prediction in Fire-Control Sys- ond World War (London: Harrat, 1949) quoted in
tems,” in Hirold Hazen, Summarj Technical Re- Thompson and Harris, The Outcome, 477.
1231 John R. Ragazzini, Robert H. Randall, and
port of Division 7, NDRC Volume I: Gunfire
Frederick A. Russell, “Analysis of Problems in [46] Some of these systems used the British No.
Control (Washington: Office of Scientific Re-
Dynamics by Electronic Circuits,’’Proc. I.R.E. 35 10 director, which was the same as the M-9 but
search and IDevelopment, National Defense Re-
(May, 1947),444. See also C.A.Lovell, “Continu- modified for the ballistics of British guns. Not all
search Committee, 1946).
ous Electrical Computation,” Bell Laboratories of these batteries employed the VT fuze.
Record 24 (no. 3) March 1947. [36] WW to Fletcher, Feb. 28, 1941. Project file
23140,ATT. [47] Guerlac, Radar in World War II, 859.
[24] Fletcher to R.R. Williams, May 21, 1941.
Project File 23140, ATT. For a more detailed 1371 Ridenour to Lovell, Sept. 24, 1941. Project [48] Fagan, ed., A History of Engfneering and
discussion of the wire winding machine, see Fa- file23140,ATT. RidenourtoLovel1,Aug. 6,1941. Science in the Bell System, Chapter 7.

80 IEEE Control Systems