THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

BERANG (Bagobo)

Facts:

The appellant was charged with three cases of parricide. He was acquitted in one of them
and found guilty in the other two.

Issue:

Is the accused is guilty of parricide?

Ruling:

Finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of killing his daughter Paya and
Beling, whom he lived maritally, in the absence of clear evidence of the marriage, the court
considered the crime committed by Berang in killing Beling as homicide only and for the crime
of parricide for the death of his daughter Paya.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIAS BORROMEO
FACTS:
On July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde, mother of Susana that
Susana was screaming because Elias was trying to kill her. Matilde, her husband with one of their sons went to
Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still
with the weapon in his hands.
He was found guilty of Parricide. In his appeal, he argued that even though they were legally married there
was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later on, thus, he should only be liable for homicide. However,
in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest.

ISSUE:
What is the criminal liability of the accused?
RULING:
The accused is liable for the crime of Parricide. He himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his
legitimate wife. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
FRANCISCO JUMAWAN

FACTS:
Francisco Jumawan is the father of his co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and
Presentacion Jumawan. Presentacion Jumawan was married to Rodolfo Magnaye. The above named accused
conspired to each other to kill Magnaye. The accused was charged for murder. However, in the complaint it was not
allege that Prestacion is the wife of Rodolfo.

ISSUE:
What was the crime committed?

RULING:
Presentacion should have been accused of Parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is
not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of Murder only qualified by abuse of superior
strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned
against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of murder. And
as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRUCTUOSO RABANDABAN

Facts:

Florida Napala and the appellant were husband and wife living together in a house in one of the barrios of
the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte. Coming home one night from his camote plantation, appellant found his wife lying
in bed with another man. The man was able to escape through the window, but the wife received a severe scolding
from her husband and was ordered to leave the house. The wife gathered her clothes and picked up a bolo in the
kitchen, and when her husband followed her there, she attacked him with bolo, wounding him twice in the abdomen.

Issue:

What is the criminal liability of the accused?

Held:

Although the husband found his wife in bed with another man, it was not for that reason that he killed and
bade her leave the house. Held, he is not entitled to the benefit of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

He should have been guilty of parricide having killed his wife after she attacked him with a bolo. However,
the evidence shows unlawful serious aggression on the part of the victim without sufficient provocation, and it also
seems apparent that there was reasonable necessity for the means employed to repel the assault. Under the facts
proved appellant is declared exempt from criminal liability on the ground of self-defense.

Accused acquitted.
PEOPLE VS. ABARCA (G.R. NO. L-74433)

FACTS:

Accused Abarca has a wife who had an illicit relationship with Khingsley Paul Koh. Upon reaching home,
Abarca found his wife and Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife noticed the accused, she pushed Koh
who got his revolver. The accused who was peeping above the built-in cabinet ran away. He went to the house of PC
soldier Arturo Talbo, got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not
able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the mahjong house where Koh used to hangout. The accused
found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at him three times with his rifle .Koh, Arnold and one Lina Amparado were hit.

ISSUE:

What is the criminal liability of the accused?

HELD:

The accused is entitled to the defense of death under exceptional circumstance under Art. 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour in the act of illicit
copulation. Although an hour has passed between the sexual act and the shooting of Koh, the shooting must be
understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused. The law only requires that the death
caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage. Regarding the physical
injuries sustained by the Amparado spouses, the Court held that the accused is only liable for the crime of less
serious physical injuries thru simple negligence or imprudence and not frustrated murder.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO M. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 134759. September 19, 2002

FACTS:
When Orlando (herein appellant) knew the illicit relationship between Ocampo and his sister, Nora, he
decided to bring her to Manila. On January 7, 1997, Ocampo went to the house of the Orlando, suddenly kicked the
door to open and asked the whereabouts of Nora. Appellant replied that he did not know. Ocampo then warned that
if ever appellant could not present Nora to him, blood will be spilled around their house. Ocampo suddenly rushed
towards appellant and lunged at him, and while doing so, drew out a knife from his waist. Appellant immediately
reached for a wooden club they kept beside the door struck Ocampo on the head which caused him to step
backward and again, this time causing Ocampo to fall down on the porch of the house. After he fell, appellant got
Ocampo’s knife and used it to slash his neck, to the point of completely severing the head from the body. He then
proceeded to cut off the victim’s penis. Orlando placed Ocampo’s head beside his body, and then went out of the
house.

ISSUES:
What is the crime committed by the accused?

RULING:
The accused is gulty of murder.
The manner of entry of the victim constitutes an act of aggression which, appellant contends, he had the
right to repel. But having established that there was no more unlawful aggression to speak of at the moment of killing,
there can likewise be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, as the element of the unlawful aggression.
The location number and seriousness of the wounds inflicted on the victim belie appellant’s claim of self-
defense. The victim suffered multiple mortal injuries while appellant suffered nary a scratch. The factual
circumstances leading to the infliction of the lethal wounds on the victim’s head and body show that appellant had
ample opportunity to take a more prudent course of action. But he gave vent to his anger, a deep-seated thirst for
revenge, and a brutal lust for blood.
THE UNITED STATES v. VICENTE ABIOG and LUIS ABIOG
G.R. No. L-12747 November 13, 1917

FACTS:
The chance remarks of the deceased made the defendant Vicente indignant at its allusions, which prompted
the latter to vindicate. Thus, Vicente immediately went to his house to get a revolver but while returning to the scene,
his brother attempted to prevent him of his plan by gaining the possession of the revolver which accidentally fired and
killed the latter. This incident further infuriated Vicente and caused him to cling on his intention of killing the deceased
whom he actually wounded in the stomach by firing his weapon. Running in his succor, his brother Luis also attacked
the deceased with a bolo. The mortal wounds sustained by the victim caused his untimely death.

ISSUE:
What is the liability of the accused?

RULING:
It was contended that where one languishing from a mortal wound is killed by an intervening cause, then the
deceased was not killed by the defendant; though mortally wounded by the defendant, as the deceased actually died
from an independent, intervening cause, the defendant at the most could only be guilty of a felonious intent.
The Court said that since the mortal wounds inflicted by the defendants upon the deceased caused the
latter’s immediate death, they are guilty of homicide. In the absence of conspiracy, the criminal liability resulting from
different acts committed against one and the same person is individual and not collective and each one of the culprits
is responsible only for his own acts.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO PUGAY

G.R. No. 74324, NOVEMBER 17, 1988

FACTS:

On the evening of May 19, 1982, a fiesta celebration was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite.
Sometime after midnight Pugay and Samson with several other companions arrived drunk and started making fun of
Miranda. Not content with what they are doing, Pugay took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on Miranda’s
body. Gabion, who was then sitting beside the ferris wheel told Pugay not to do the deed but Samson was already in
the process of pouring the gasoline. Samson then set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him which caused
his death.

ISSUE:

What is the criminal liability of the accused?

RULING:

Pugay having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from
the act committed by his companions who at the same time making fun of the deceased is guilty of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

Samson, since there are no sufficient evidence that appears establishing qualifying circumstance and
granted mitigating circumstance that he never intended the crime so grave a wrong is guilty of Homicide.
THE UNITED STATES v. D. B. JEFFREY
G.R. No. 5597 March 5, 1910

FACTS:
On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Saguinsin was in a chinese shop, D. B. Jeffrey appeared and
without any apparent reason whatever, struck her three times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying. As a
consequence of which the woman fell to the ground with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb. She was
immediately taken to her home in a carretela, and being three months pregnant she had a miscarriage on the
following day according to the examination made by the municipal board of health. The woman was ill and unable to
attend to her usual duties for forty-five days.

ISSUE:
What is the crime committed?

RULING:
Even though it was not the criminal intent of the defendant to cause the abortion, the fact that, without any
apparent reason whatever, he maltreated Saguinsin, presumably not knowing that she was pregnant, as author of
the abuse which caused the miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment but also for the consequence
thereof, to wit, for the abortion; and it was also proven that on the said occasion the defendant was drunk, which
circumstance explains how he came to strike the woman with a bottle without any known motive.
THE UNITED STATES v. VICTORIA VEDRA
G.R. No. 4779 November 20, 1908

FACTS:
On November 16, 1907, the nephew of the accused, who lived in the same house, awakened by the cries of
the newly-born child. He saw her aunt hastily left the house, taking the infant with her. After an hour she returned
alone, no longer carrying the infant. The nephew reported the affair to the lieutenant of the barrio where it occurred
and the latter at once made an investigation. At first, the accused denied the allegations, but finally confessed, stating
that she had buried the child and pointed out the place of burial of the body was there found a newly born child, fully
developed and of a good constitution, showing an abrasion on both sides of the nose which might have been caused
by pressure exerted by another person that might have produced the death of the child by suffocation.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty of infanticide?

RULING:
All of the acts related above, performed by the accused immediately after her confinement, reveal in a clear
and unquestionable manner her decided intent to kill the newly born child in order to conceal her dishonor; and the
signs of violence found on the body demonstrate that she actually effected her purpose. The aforesaid signs,
together with the above mentioned conduct of the accused, constitute conclusive proof of her guilt as the author of
the crime of infanticide herein prosecuted.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANICETO MARTIN
G.R. No. L-3002 May 23, 1951

FACTS:

On August 1, 1948, the corpse of Laura was found inside the toilet, which was at a certain distance from
their home, with a maguey rope, six meters long and one centimeter in diameter, around her neck. Upon being
interrogated by the police officer, the defendant at first denied any knowledge of the event, but later promised to
make a statement in the municipal building. The defendant made a confession that he killed his wife. They had been
arguing and she came after him to the toilet with a rope in her hands and, as she approached him she placed around
his neck the rope, which angered him so he snatched the rope from her, and in turn placed same around her neck,
and in that position tightened the rope and his wife died. The autopsy on the corpse of Laura issued a certificate
which stated that the cause of death was heart failure due to fright or shock.

Aniceto Martin was found guilty of parricide.

ISSUE:
Is the defendant guilty of parricide, even though the means he employed did not kill his wife, but the
resulting heart failure?

RULING:
Yes. The court noted that the heart failure was due to the fright or shock caused by the strangling, and
consequently, the defendant was responsible for the death, notwithstanding the fact that the victim was already sick.
Had not the defendant strangled the deceased, the latter, notwithstanding her illness, would not have died.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ANTONIO NAVARRO
G.R. No. 1878 March 9, 1907

FACTS:
During the early hours of the morning of November 30, 1903, Garces and Navarro, after having had an
altercation in the bar and in the presence of other persons, left the place together for the purpose, or fighting in
another place. It was alleged that they fought and during which fight the accused was slightly wounded while Garces
received a large and deep wound on his right arm. After the fight they left the place, proceeding the house of
Ambrosio and Bernardo where the Navarro requested for a piece of an old skirt with which he bound the wounded
arm of Ricardo Garces, which wound was then bleeding profusely. Garces being assisted to some extent by the
accused left the house and upon arriving at the Santa Mesa road the accused was detained by a policeman who had
been called by the witness Rosario.
Garces was brought and operated on in a hospital, but notwithstanding the assistance and attendant of the
hospital surgeons, he dies the following day.

Issue:
Can the acts be considered as duel?

Held:
The crime committed in this case is not that of dueling. A duel implies or means an agreement to fight under
determined conditions and with the participations and intervention of seconds, who fix such conditions. In a fight
arranged under agreement like the one that has taken place, the result of provocation and an accepted challenge,
the aggression is reciprocal and legitimate as between two contending parties, though the same cannot be qualified
as a duel, for the reason that the conditions and elements necessary to constitute this crime are not present.
SEVERINO P. JUSTO, Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-8611. June 28, 1956

FACTS:
On October 16, 1950, De la Cuesta, School’s District Supervisor, was ordered to report from to office to revise
the plantilla. When he was about to take his lunch, he saw Justo talking to Caridad, the academic supervisor. Justo
requested De la Cuesta to go with him and Caridad to the office of the latter. They did and in the office of Caridad, he
asked about the possibility of accommodating Miss Racela as a teacher in the district of De la Cuesta. Caridad said
that there were no vacancy, except that of the position of a shop teacher. Upon hearing such answer, Justo got angry
to the extent that he grabbed the paper weight and challenged the offended party to go out. He left the office, De la
Cuesta. When they were in front of the table of Bueno, a clerk in the division office, De la Cuesta approached Severino
and tried to settle the problembut instead grabbed the neck and collar of the polo shirt of the complainant which was
torn. Carlos Bueno separated the protagonists, but not before the De la Cuesta had boxed the Justo several times.

Justo was found guilty of assault upon a person in authority.

ISSUE:
Is the ruling correct?

RULING:
Yes. The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will, but attaches to a public official until
he ceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant was not actually performing the duties of his office when
assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of assault upon a person in authority; so long as the impelling
motive of the attack is the performance of official duty. This is apparent from the phraseology of Article 148 of our
Revised Penal Code, in penalizing attacks upon person in authority “while engaged in the performance of official duties
or on occasion of such performance”, the words “on occasion” signifying “because” or “by reason” of the past
performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no official duty was being discharged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSENDO LAYOSO @ SENDONG, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 141773-76. January 22, 2003

FACTS:
Rosendo “Sendong” Layoso was charged with four counts of rape for sexually assaulting Marlene Nitoya,
who was 14 years old when the first three incidents of rape happened and just turned 15 when that last incident
happened.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the victim to exert adequate resistance and the inconsistencies of the
statements of the victim and other witnesses are material in a rape case.

RULING:

The Court held that Marlene’s failure to shout or offer adequate resistance against accused-appellant is of
no moment. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and
she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust out of fear for her life and personal safety.

Rape, by its very nature, is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public. More often than
not, this crime is committed in the presence of only the victim and her defiler. The commission of the four acts of rape
were established by the testimony of the victim herself. The alleged inconsistencies of prosecution witnesses do not
in any way detract from the fact that Marlene was raped by accused-appellant. The testimonies of victim who is
young and of tender age deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication
especially where she have absolutely no motive to testify against the accused, as in this case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001

FACTS:
The victim of rape in this case was a minor below twelve years of age, who herself narrated the shameful
details of the dastardly act against her virtue. She was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she
treated as a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several
acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The victim, Maria Rosilyn, grew up under the care of Delantar,
whom she treated as her own father. Delantar was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose ostensible source of income
was selling longganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house. He, however, was also engaged in the skin
trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn and Delantar first met Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office located near Robinson’s
Galleria. Rosilyn was brought there and introduced by a talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Jalosjos
promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. On several occasions, Rosilyn and Delantar returned to accused-
appellant’s condominium unit at Ritz Towers. The accused had a carnal knowledge with the victim.

ISSUE:
What crime did Jalosjos committed?

RULING:
In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the
time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or passive
submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had
sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People v. Pruna
G.R. No. 138471. October 10, 2002

FACTS:
On January 3, 1995, the accused succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party,
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, alleged 3-year-old girl. Upon motion of Pruna’s counsel, the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO), the Information was amended changing the name of the accused from Manuel Pruna y
Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth certificate. However, when
he testified in court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna and in the minutes of the court
proceedings, he signed the name Manuel Pruna.
The accused was convicted by the trial court of the crime of qualified rape.

ISSUE:
Is the ruling correct?

RULING:
No. The testimony of Lizette’s mother that she was three years old at the time of the commission of
the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding the accused liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12
years of age.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT
G.R. No. 123819. November 14, 2001

FACTS:
On November 19, 1993, Whisenhunt was charged with murder of Elsa Santos-Castillo. The evidence shows
that accused and the deceased were lovers. Both were married but they were estranged from their respective
spouses.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for Whisenhunt ordered
him to fetch Elsa at her parents’ house. One the same day, while Demetrio was in the servants’ quarters watching
television, the accused came in and confessed that Elsa was dead and that he cut off her head. The accused seek
the help of the Demetrio to dispose the corpse of Elsa.

ISSUE:
What is the criminal liability of the accused?

RULING:
The trial court was correct in convicting the accused of the crime of murder, qualified by outraging and
scoffing at the victim’s person or corpse. The circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was
correctly appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victim’s head constitutes outraging or scoffing at
the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.