1.

Aquino vs Enrile 59 SCRA 183

FACTS:

The cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by thel
military by virtue of Proclamation 1081. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order
No.2 of the President "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize
political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force..." General Order No.
2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of Proclamation 1081
placing the entire country under martial law.

ISSUES:

1) Is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject
to judicial inquiry?; and

2) Is the detention of the petitioners legal in accordance to the declaration of martial law?

HELD:

5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices
held that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
academic. Implicit in the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation,
which is to suppress invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent
danger thereof. The preservation of society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of
martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

2. Cabanas vs Pilapil

58 SCRA 94 – Political Law – Parens Patriae – Strengthening the Family

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits
shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when Florentino
died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit of the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only
to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance
policy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected
then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best interest of
that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate
relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards the child than
the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s tradition of
favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

3. Macariola Vs. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77

Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.

Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by
or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to
its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte .1

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving
parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the
legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of
the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project
partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly
authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision
became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge
Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a
judge” on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was
involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against
Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
action, either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the
project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were
insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the
property in 1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the
property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon,
who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a
“dummy” of Asuncion.
Koj

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that
what she got were insignificant portions of the land.

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.

4. Republic vs Villasor

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First
Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts:

The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo
P. Villasor.

Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the
strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on
the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment.

The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and
garnishments are null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Held:

No

Ratio:

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state
and its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR

G.R. No. L-30671, November 28 1973, 54 SCRA 84

FACTS:

On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner
herein, confirming the arbitration award subject of Special Proceedings.

On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated
decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well
as] Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the corresponding Alias Writ of
Execution was issued. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the respondent
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, specially on the `monies due
the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in
the said Writ of Execution’; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian
personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Petitioner then alleged that respondent Judge, Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of
jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance
of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias
Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void."

In the answer filed by respondents, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being
that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the notices of garnishment are null and void.

HELD:

The Republic of the Philippines did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done
by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable
why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Sociological
jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar.

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter.
It is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." A corollary, both dictated
by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged

5. Wylie vs. Rarang

M.H. Wylie v Rarang

FACTS:

Petitioner M.H. Wylie was the assistant administrativeofficer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was
the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private Respondent (PR) Aurora
Rarang was assigned as merchandise control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal M.H. Wylie, in
his capacity as asst. admin. Officer, supervised the publication of the so-called “Plan of the Day” (POD)
published daily by the US Naval Base Station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary
precautions and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD
was the “action line inquiry” (NAVSTA ACTION LINEINQUIRY), a telephone answering device in the Office
of the Admin Asst intended to provide personnel access to the Commanding Officer on matters they feel
should be brought to his attention for correction or investigation. On February 3, 1978, the POD
under the (NAVSTA) action line inquiry, published and mentioned a certain “AURING” as “…a disgrace to
her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. The same article explicitly implied that Auring was
consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like like cigarettes and foodstuffs. The PR was
the only one who was named “Auring” in the Office of the Provost Marshal. As a result thereof, she was
investigated by her superior. The PR commenced an ACTION FOR DAMAGES in the CFI of Zambales against
M.H. Wylie, Capt. James Williams and the US Naval Base alleging that the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. The TC ruled in favour of the PR and dismissed
the suit against the US Naval Base. The IAC (now,CA) affirmed the judgment of the TC with modifications
as to the amount of damages awarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the American naval officers (such as Wylie and Capt. Williams) who commit a crime or
tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit.
Does the grant of rights, power, and authority to the US under the RP-US Bases Treaty
cover immunity of its officers from crimes and torts?

HELD:

The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing
of bad faith (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan).It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as
commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the chain of command from the offensive
publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on
the base. However, in this particular case, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and that he approved it. ART. 2176, CC prescribes a civil liability for
damages caused by a person’s act or omission constituting fault or negligence, stating that,
“Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,..” Moreover, ART. 2219(7), Civil Code provides that moral
damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.”Indeed, the
imputation of theft contained in the POD was a defamation against the character and reputation of the
PR. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the
deletion of the name “Auring” if the article will be published. The petitioners, however, were
NEGLIGENTbecause under their direction, they issued thepublication without deleting the said name.
Such act or omission was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty. It was
a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the PR. As a result of petitioner’s act, PR suffered besmirched
reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, especially so, since the article was
baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the damages they
caused the Private Respondent
6. Taxicab Operators vs BOT

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation, 117 SCRA 597

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

(Administrative Law, reasonableness, quasi-judicial power)

Facts: Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old.

Pursuant to the BOT circular, the Bureau of Land Transportation issued Implementing Circular No. 52
instructing the implementation of said circular and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be
allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.

Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is
arbitrarily and oppressive because the road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should
be taken into consideration at the time of the registration.

Issue: WON a circular phasing out taxicabs more than 6 years old is unreasonable and arbitrary.

Held: No. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly. The
span of 6 yearsw supplies that reaonable standard. By the time taxis have fully depreciated, theircost
recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. Thyey are also generally dilapidated and no longer
fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.

Taxicabs in Manila, compared to those in other places are subject to heavier traffic pressure and constant
use.

GR # L-59234, September 30, 1982 (Constitutional Law – Police Power, Equal Protection)

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more
than six years old on grounds that it is violative of the constitutional rights of equal protection because it
is only enforced in Manila and directed solely towards the taxi industry.

Respondents contend that the purpose of the regulation is the promotion of safety and comfort of the
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.

ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative regulation phasing out taxicabs more than six years old is a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety
and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal protection clause
because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and
more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from taxicabs of other places.

7. Balacuit vs CFI of Agusan del Norte

FACTS
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640
passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of
persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other
public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and 12years of
age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket.
Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before the Court
of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30, 1969,
praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void
andunenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuancons
titutional and valid.

ISSUE
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional
and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

HELD
It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition
are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the
local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the
interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must
be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere
with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In
other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts. The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question
of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be
regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an
arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have
a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their
own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

He exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of
the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or
isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being
Unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be
upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null
and void. This decision is immediately executory.

8. Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Assn vs

Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together
with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining
Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals. After several
unsuccessful actions to cancel the FTAA agreement with the government, the petitioners finally
submitted a petition to the court. In their memorandum petitioners pose whether or not Republic Act
No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust and unlawful taking of property without
payment of just compensation , in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues.

Issue: Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the unlawful and unjust taking of property
without payment of just compensation. Ratio Decidendi: Public respondents are of the view that petitioners¶
eminent domain claim is not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken
their properties nor do they allege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account of
CAMC¶sFTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which
this Court can take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of
the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.

Actual eviction of the land owner’s and occupants need not happen for this Court to intervene. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened
into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the
baseless contention of the issues submitted. The FTAA was in full compliance with the necessary requirements of the law and
Constitution. The allegation of the lack of payment of just compensation was dismissed since the court has had authority in
eminent domain cases to make sure the proper amount was established regardless of the fact that there would
be an intervention from an executive department or legislature to make any initial determination of the amount.

9. Tuason vs Register of Deeds of Caloocan City

FACT:

Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City by virtue of which
they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of their property. In 1973, President
Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued 293 cancelling the certificates of titles of Carmel Farms
and declaring the lands covered to be open for disposition and sale to members of the Malacañang
Association Inc.
ISSUE:

W/N the President has the power to cancel certificates of titles

HELD:

The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Sincere was never vested
with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC and such inferior courts as
may be established by law -- the judicial acts done by him were under the circumstances alien to his
office as chief executive.

10. Defensor-Santiago vs Guingona

FACTS:

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th
Congress. On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator
Marcelo B. Fernan were nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator
Fernan was duly elected President of the Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan
comprised the majority while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion,
Senator Juan M. Flavier also manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP --
numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority
leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of session.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members
of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The
Senated President then recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo
warranto alleging that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minorit leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?

Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?

RULING:

First Issue: Court's Jurisdiction

The Court took jurisdiction over the petition stating that It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Petitioners claim that there was a violation of the Constitution when the Senate President recognized
Senator Guingona as minority leader.

The Court, however, did not find any violation since all that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall
choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The court held that, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself,
not by this Court.

Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing
the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by tradition and
long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature.

Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the
contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise
to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in
determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution,
the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in
no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue: Fernan's Recognition of Guingona

Supreme Court held that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. The latter belongs to one of the minority
parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party
that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein
both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, the Court believed that the Senate President cannot be accused of
“capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment” or of “an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.” Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate
has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

The Petition is DISMISSED.

11. Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities – this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary… of any… municipality… and may change the
seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require…

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs
were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA
2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed” except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?”

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being
created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created
without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated
such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of
Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such
standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or
beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still,
such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the
phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the
proper interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such
place therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

12. Chavez vs Romulo

Facts: GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance
pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying
firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the
implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and injunction against
Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.
Issue: Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the
banning of carrying firearms outside the residence is a valid exercise of police power?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised
under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked. Revocation
of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not
entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside
of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply
for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily,
crime incidents will be curtailed.

13. Salonga vs Farrale

Section 10, Article II

Section 10, Article II states that “The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.”
Salonga vs. Farrales

Facts:

1. Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased.

2. Prior to the acquisition by Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already a lessee of some
portion of the land. She had built a house and paid rentals thereon.

3. Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales filed an ejectment case (one of the old forms of
action for recovery of the possession of real property) for non-payment of rentals against Salonga. The
lower court rendered a decision in favor of Farrales and ordered Salonga and the other lessees (Pascual
et al.) to vacate the portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney’s fees and costs.

4. Even before the rendition of the decision of the lower court, Farrales sold to Pascual et al. (the
other lessees of Farrales) the areas occupied by them.

5. Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga was leasing. Farrales
persistently refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case.
Hence if Salonga’s offer to purchase was persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no meeting of
the minds took place and no contract was ever perfected between them. It was revealed that Farrales
wanted the payment of the portion of land under consideration to be in cash but Salonga did not have
any money for that purpose that is why Farrales persistently refused to sell the portion of the leased
land to the lessee.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the ground that no legal
contract exists between Farrales and Salonga.

Held:

Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of perfection. In the case at bar, Farrales
rejected and did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent
there is, therefore, no contract to sell to speak of. In the case of the other lessees (Pascual et al.) who
were able to buy the portion of land that they occupy, there was an existing contract between them and
Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the right to buy the land in question because the contract
between her and Farrales is non-existent.
 Section 10, Article II states that “The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.” The aforementioned provision is applicable to the case at bar. The social justice cannot
be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners who are also entitled for protection under our
Constitution. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights
from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. The plea for social justice cannot
nullify the law on obligations and contracts.

Supreme Court’s Decision: The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit and the judgment
appealed is hereby affirmed.

14. Oposa vs Factoran

224 SCRA 792 – Political Law – Harmony in Nature – Inter-Generational Responsibility – Inter-
Generational Justice

A taxpayer’s class suit was initiated by the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI) together with the
minors Juan Antonio Oposa et al and their parents. All were duly represented. They claimed that as
taxpayers they have the right to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the
country’s rainforests. They prayed that a judgment be rendered ordering Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr,
his agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements, Factoran being the secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: Yes, petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The
right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also
the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses
may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.

15. Guingona vs Carague

FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a
total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it
being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the
Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the
budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to
protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake.
Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated
to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as
unconstitutional

Guingona, JR v Carague, Supreme Court of the Philippines - G.R. No. 94571, 22 April 1991
Guingona, JR v Carague, Supreme Court of the Philippines - G.R. No. 94571, 22 April 1991
Keywords: Resource allocation, budgetary contraints, availability, national court, constitutional law,
Philippines
A group of senators in the Philippines challenged the constitutionality of the budgetary allocation of P86
billion for debt servicing which compared to P27 billion for education. The Constitution of the
Philippines obliges the government to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
The Court found that education had constituted the highest allocation apart from debt servicing which
was necessary to safeguard the creditworthiness of the country and the survival of its ecomomy.
In making its decision, the Court stated;
‘There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not
the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been
incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an
issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound
discretion.’
The application was unsuccessful.

17. JMM Promotion and management vs CA

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC. v. CA 260 SCRA 319 August 5, 1996 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL INC., petitioner, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESSOR, then Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit
on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and
requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and
deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,
1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.)
deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the
constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity)
filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding its
decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issed. The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a valid exercise
of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of
police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a
legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public
morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion
so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define
the mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself
or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of
regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are
required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is
not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due
process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996; 260 SCRA 319
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011

(Labor Standards – Artist Record Book as a requirement for overseas employment contract)
Facts: The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by the government through
Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers were required an Artist Record Book as a
precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. Petitioners
contends that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution and avers
that the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates due process
and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.
Issue: WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.
Held: Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to its issuance were
issued pursuant to a valid exercise of police power which considers the welfare of Filipino performing
artists, particularly the women.

18. APCD vs PCA

286 SCRA 109 – Political Law – Free Enterprise

The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 232 as an independent
public corporation to promote the rapid integrated development and growth of the coconut and other
palm oil industry in all its aspects and to ensure that coconut farmers become direct participants in, and
beneficiaries of, such development and growth through a regulatory scheme set up by law.

PCA is also in charge of the issuing of licenses to would-be coconut plant operators. In March 1993,
however, PCA issued Board Resolution No. 018-93 which no longer require those wishing to engage in
coconut processing to apply for licenses as a condition for engaging in such business. The purpose of which
is to promote free enterprise unhampered by protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
tapes. But this caused cut-throat competition among operators specifically in congested areas,
underselling, smuggling, and the decline of coconut-based commodities. The Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators (APCD) then filed a petition for mandamus to compel PCA to revoke B.R. No. 018-93.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD: Yes. Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as an
economic principle. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless
reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.
As such, free enterprise does not call for the removal of “protective regulations” for the benefit of the
general public. This is so because under Art. 12, Secs. 6 and 9, it is very clear that the government reserves
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare and when the public interest
so requires.

19. Lina vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,

petitioners, vs

. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,

respondents
.

G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the
following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon.
Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and
(3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of
the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local
government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming
from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted
by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp