Ariola | Lopez | Martinez | Reyna | Ti 1

Article 26
(1) GARCIA v. RECIO case (see Article 3, Civil Code)
(2) PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA case (see Article 15-16, Civil Code)

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 | October 8, 1985

Facts:
Alice Van Dorn, a citizen of the Philippines, and Upton, a citizen of the United States, married in Hong Kong in 1972. After the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. The parties were then divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982. After that, Alice re-married also Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton filed a case
stating that Alice Van Dorn’s business in Ermita (Galleon Shop) is conjugal property and asks that he be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property. Alice Van Dorn states that this action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce obtained in
Nevada wherein Upton acknowledged that he and Alice had “no community property” as of June 11, 1882. Judge Romillo
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so
that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue/s:
W/N the divorce obtained abroad is valid. - Yes
W/N the divorce decree has an effect on the conjugal property – Yes (Ex-husband has no control)

Held/Ratio:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on Upton as an American citizen. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, “However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” In the case at bar, the
divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of Van Dorn. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as Van Dorn's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

To maintain Upton’s contention that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to him. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
G.R. No. 103047 | September 2, 1994

Facts:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Cardenas personally attended to
the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage,
license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting
parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. Before moving to the U.S., Castro consulted a lawyer and they found out that
no marriage license was issued prior to the celebration of the marriage. As proof, Castro offered in evidence a certification
from the civil register of Pasig, which states that they had no record of Castro and Cardenas’ marriage license. Angelina Castro
seeks to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin Cardenas. Castro claims that no marriage license was
ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Issue:
W/N the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.

Held/Ratio:
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At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code.
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being
one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. The
certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any
circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability
to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties. The
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the
subject marriage license.

Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of
an official record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no
such record or entry.

Articles 27-34: Marriages Exempt from License Requirement

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones (September 26, 1974) and had children (the petitioners). Pepito shot Teodulfa
and after 20 months married Norma Bayadog without any marriage license (December 11, 1986). Pepito later on died in a car
accident. The petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.

Issue:
WON the marriage of Pepito and Norma may be declared null and void
WON the heirs have a cause of action to file for declaration of nullity

Held:
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A valid marriage
license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
There are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is
that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. In this
case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and
wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even under the assumption that Pepito and teodulfa were
separated in fact while Norma and Pepito were living together, their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."
For the second issue, the respondent judge ruled that Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy
to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage.
"Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral,
in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the
wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts."
Action for marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights. A
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void marriage can be attacked collaterally and is imprescriptible. Therefore void marriages can be questioned even after the
death of either party and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages are provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.

Manzano vs. Sanchez (A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001)

Facts:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the
bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract
clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was
married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated
with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;

2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Issue:

W/N the marriage between Manzano and Payao is void.

Held/Ratio:

It is void. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar, particularly [2]. Respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits,
which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of
legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The
maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special application to judges.

COSCA v. PALAYPAYON (see Article 2-6, Fam Code)

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN
MARIATEGUI and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari.
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He had 4
children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera (deceased), Maria del Rosario, Urbano
and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano
where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3
children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig
Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Lupo acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. His descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was
subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in
the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim. Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of
natural children.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise
offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the
marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

Republic vs. Dayot (G. R. No. 175581, 28 March 2008)

Facts:
Petitioners challenged the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot and
Felisa void ab initio.

The facts of the case are, in 1986, that Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall, which was solemnized by Rev.
Tomas V. Atienza, and in lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they have lived together for at least 5
years as husband and wife. In 1990, Jose contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual, a co-worker in the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.

In 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy and an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman, while Jose filed a
complaint for annulment with the RTC-Biñan Laguna on the ground that the marriage was a sham as no marriage ceremony
was celebrated between the parties, and that the sworn affidavit executed and his consent was vitiated. He recounted that he
signed pieces of paper to claim a certain package for Felisa, but later on discovered that the same were copies of his marriage
contract with the former. Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage on the ground that they
had a husband-wife relationship in the early part of 1980.

Issue:
W/N the marriage is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license.

Held/Ratio:
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Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates marriages
contracted in this manner. The lacking requirement is not a mere irregularity, hence the right to impugn marriage does not
prescribe and may be raised any time.