Intestate estate of Gonzales vs.

Sato
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit,
did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who was already then blind and
79 years old to sign and thumbmark a special power of attorney
dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document
involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that said
document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a minor, to
sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or
entity of her properties all located at Tagaytay City.registered in
the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in
the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, said accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato
sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale and once in possession
of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died in
1994.Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to
the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was
his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
Contention of the petitioner
The properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita
whose daughter, Zenaida Carungcong-Sato (Sato’s wife), died on
January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner
because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land
could have arisen only after her mother’s death. Since Zenaida
predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and
the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no
longer existed.
Contention of the Accused
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the
relationship may not be invoked in case of death of the spouse at
the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death
of Zenaida extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve
the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship between Sato and
Zenaida’s mother, Manolita.
Ruling
It has been held that included in the exemptions are parents-in-
law, stepparents and adopted children. By virtue thereof, no
criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits
malicious mischief against his stepson; by the stepmother who
commits theft against her stepson; by the stepfather who steals
something from his stepson; by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law living
with him; and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.Affinity
is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the
other spouse. It is a relationship by marriage ora familial relation
resulting from marriage.It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by
law in connection with the institution of marriage and family
relations.
The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse,
regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not.29
Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the
dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the
death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view
considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit
step-relatives or in-laws, the "tie of affinity" between these people
and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as
terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
Scope of Article 332 of The Revised Penal Code
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code only applies to the felonies of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State
condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases
of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of
grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for
the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the
option to hold the offender civilly liable.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato
is being charged not with simple estafa but with the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
People of the Philippines, Appellee vs. Marlon Albert de
Leon, Appellant

FACTS:
 In the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000,
Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline
boys;Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security
guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at
Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint
green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said
gasoline station. The six male passengers of the same vehicle,
except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were
armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol. Appellant, who
guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the
latter's wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the
companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office
and took the money worth P3,000.00.[10] Those four robbers
were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.
Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service
firearm. After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo
Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately leave
the place. The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded
toward San Mateo, Rizal. When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta
stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the
robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin
Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately
hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin Macahis to
the hospital. Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to
the gunshot wound. As a result of the above incident, four (4)
Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against
appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias Rey, an alias
Jonard, an alias Precie, and an alias Renato. 1) For the taking
away of cash earnings of Energex Gasoline Station and for the
death of Edralin Macahis on the occasion of the robbery. 2) For
the taking away of personal belongings of Julieta Amistoso and
the employment of force upon her and for the death of Edralin
Macahis. 3) For the carrying away of the servive firearm of Edralin
Macahis and for his death. 4) For the violence upon the person of
Eduardo Zulueta and robbing of his personal belonings. The RTC
convicted him of all the charges, but on appeal the CA affirmed
with modification the decision convicting Marlon Albert de Leon
with only one count of Robbery with Homicide beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING: In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of

the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide
may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration.There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence.
The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with
homicide, must be consummated. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word
homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes
murder, parricide, and infanticide. Consequently, the CA was
correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of
robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide,
there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which
is to rob.

BENJAMIN PANGAN
vs.
HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITEG.R. No. 141718January 21,
2005
449 scra 144

Facts:

On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the

offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24,
1988,affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine
years. Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the
petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of
Mabalacat, Pampanga.

Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on

the grounds that:(a) the straight penalty of two months and one
day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article
93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and(b) having been able to
continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6,
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was denied as there was no evasion of the service
of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty.
Issue:
When does the prescription of penalties begin to run?
Ruling:
Petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having
fully served his sentence unless he is detained for another
offense or charge. The period of prescription of penalties ² the
succeeding Article 93 provides ² "shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".
In Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code discussed on how the
evasion of service of sentence was perfected and thus it was
stated there as such that; The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict
who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
l
To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence,
its elements must be present these are:

(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;

(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation
of liberty"; and
(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence.
For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service
of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while
serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors,
or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of
sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking. "As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General "escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and157 of the RPC
means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In

fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his
conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for
the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life
of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those
who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
People v. Layson
Facts:
Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino
Garces were the accused for the killing of their inmate Regino
Gasang. All of them admitted that they killed Gasang because
the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times.
Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on
him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days
prior to the actual slaying.
They all pleaded guilty to the crime of Murder. The court
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor
of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of recidivism
and reiteracion to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub,
the aggravating circumstance of recidivism to Cezar Fugoso and
Joventino Garces and the aggravating qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
(one is sufficient to qualify the crime) and the special aggravating
circumstance of quasi-recidivism. The Solicitor General
recommended that the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused.

Issues/ Rulings:
1. Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation be considered in favor of all the accused.
 No, for this circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the
act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed
from the commission of the offense by a considerable
length of time, during which period the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. Although they may be
moved by their ill-feeling towards the victim to commit the
crime, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during
which the accused regained their equanimity.

2. Which among treachery, evident premeditation and abuse

of superior strength qualifies the killing to murder?

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. It is proved

that the victim was killed in a manner insuring utter
suddenness and complete surprise in the execution
of the offense, with resultant incapability of the victim
to offer resistance.
That there was abuse of superior strength would suffice to
qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be
considered as absorbed in treachery.
Evident premeditation becomes a mere generic
aggravating circumstance which is offset by the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
3. What is the nature of a qualifying circumstance?

A qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its

proper and exclusive name but also places the author
thereof in such a situation as to deserve no other penalty
than that specially prescribed for said crime.
4. Whether the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism is present. What is its effect?

Yes, the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-

recidivism was correctly considered against all the
accused, who, at the time of the commission of the
offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective
sentences for previous convictions.

Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the

accused with the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

5. There the special aggravating circumstance of

reiteracion is properly appreciated.

No, it was error for the trial judge to consider against

the accused the aggravating circumstance of having
been previously punished for two or more crimes to
which the law attaches lighter penalties because the
said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion"
requires that the offender against whom it is
considered shall have served out his sentences for
the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving
their respective sentences at the time of the commission
of the murder.
MARK CLEMENTE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 194367 June 15, 2011

FACTS:
Mark Clemente is a detainee at the Manila City Jail.
On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person
of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr.
and Michael Passilan. Dela Cruz narrated that he received a
counterfeit P500.00 bill from Clemente with orders to buy a
bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The
bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and
refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and
Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to Clemente's cell
for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the
informant entered the cubicle first and found Clemente lying in
bed. The informant returned to Clemente the latter's P500.00 bill.
The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise
inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked Clemente and recovered a black
wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three
(23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be
counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them
sequentially. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was
returned by informant to Clemente.

Issue: Is Mark Clemente liable for violation of Art. 168 (Illegal

possession and use of false bank notes)?
Held: No. He is not liable.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged,

provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or

bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one
of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said

law are:

(1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other

obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument
payable to order or other document of credit not payable to
bearer is forged or falsified by another person;

(2) that the offender knows that any of the said

instruments is forged or falsified; and

(3) that he either used or possessed with intent to

use any of such forged or falsified instruments.

As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or

bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the
RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false
treasury or bank notes.

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner

used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the
counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly
gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in
court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by
Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks
at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short,
the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner
asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account,
however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the

matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the
accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate.
Discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how
the prosecution should present its case. However, in this case,
the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the
prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had
knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a
counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present
Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but
it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it
evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three
(23) pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner
is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for
there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
GIRON vs SANDIGANBAYAN Case Digest
PEDRO S. GIRON, ET AL. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 145357-59 August 23, 2006

FACTS:
The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the
construction of a two-kilometer road connecting Barangays
Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur ("Kinayan-
Kauswagan Road Project"). Contrary to what was stated in the
Monthly Status Report dated 25 January 1989 and the Physical
Status Report dated 31 January 1989 (collectively, "Reports"), the
Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project was not 100% complete as of
25 January 1989.

In a communication dated January 25, 1989, District Engr.

Giron submitted to the Regional Director of DPWH Regional
Office No. XI (Davao City) the Monthly Status Report of CY
1988 Infrastructure Program where it appeared that
Kauswagan-Kinayan Road was 100% complete as of January
25, 1989.

Thereafter, in a letter dated January 31, 1989, Engr. Lala, for and
in the absence of the District Engineer, submitted the Physical
Status Reports of Project Costing P2.0 M and below under C.Y.
1988 Infra Program to the same Regional Office of the DPWH
wherein it appeared that the Kauswagan-Kinayan Road, Barobo
Surigao del Sur is 100% complete.

Contrary to the Reports, the road was not finished by 25

January 1989. On 30 June 1989, the Barangay Council of
Kinayan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur resolved to request the
Ombudsman to make an immediate investigation on the
irregularities of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project.

The Ombudsman, through the Deputy Ombudsman for

Mindanao, ordered the Provincial Auditor to conduct an
investigation. On 19 June 1990, in a report addressed to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, State Auditor III Eusebia
Gamulo of the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Sur
wrote that: Actual implementation of the project was very much
delayed. In an interview made it was disclosed that while the road
opening started in November 1988, spreading of the delivered soil
lime base course was done in October 1989 only, which was
contrary to the DPWH report that said project was 100%
completed as of January 25, 1989.

ISSUE:
Whether Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are indeed guilty of
falsification of documents under Article 171(4) of the Revised
Penal Code.

HELD:
No.
There are three elements in the crime of falsification of
documents under Article 171(4).

First, the offender is a public officer, employee, or

notary public.
Second, the offender takes advantage of his official
position.
Third, the offender falsifies a document by making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

There is no doubt that all three are public officials, as they

were employees of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) at the time of the questioned act.
 There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone
among Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually took advantage of his
official position. The offender takes advantage of his official
position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or otherwise
to intervene in the preparation of the document, or he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies. According to
the Sandiganbayan, Giron testified that: In preparing these
reports, the project engineer reports to the Construction Section
the degree of work they had accomplished with respect to the
project assigned to them. The reports of the project engineers
were to be consolidated into one hence arriving at a Monthly
Status Report. These reports were being submitted every 25th of
the month and it takes the Office of the District Engineer three (3)
to five (5) days to prepare the said report. The Monthly Status
Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked by Cedro, and submitted
by Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro, who supervised the
preparation of the Monthly Status Report and checked the same,
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan because "he never signed
the subject reports." Salang was also acquitted by the
Sandiganbayan because "his participation was seemingly
limited to the acts before the actual construction of the
project."

Crizaldo's item was that of a General Construction Foreman

but she was not assigned to the project site. Crizaldo was
assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly Status
Report. The prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had
knowledge of the actual status of the Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project at the time she prepared the Monthly Status
Report. Crizaldo could have merely relied on field reports
submitted to her, precluding her from making, on her own,
untruthful statements at the time she prepared the Monthly Status
Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with any other party
because the Sandiganbayan found that "there is reasonable
doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part of the accused
herein to falsify the subject reports." The Sandiganbayan ruled
that "any criminal liability should be based on their individual
participation in the questioned act."

Giron's testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used

against him because he did not sign the Monthly Status Report.
Giron's facsimile signature was merely stamped on the Monthly
Status Report. The stamped facsimile signatures of Giron do
not establish his personal participation in the preparation of
the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion of Giron's
testimony to establish his personal participation is to extrapolate
and speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal action, which
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction.

Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan

Road Project. However, like Giron and Crizaldo, the prosecution
was unable to prove his actual participation in the questioned
reports. The Sandiganbayan found that Arreza "had no
participation in the preparation and execution of the said
document[s]." The Sandiganbayan also found that Arreza "did not
take advantage of his public position," and thus Arreza is liable
under Artcle 172 of the Revised Penal code for falsification of a
private document.

In sum, Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza are acquitted for failure

of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites for the conviction of the
crime of falsification of public documents. All are public officers,
However, the prosecution has failed to prove their criminal
culpability beyond reasonable doubt. There is no moral certainty
that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took advantage of their positions
to make a false statement in a narration of facts in a public
document.
 NORMA DELOS REYES VDA del PRADO vs People GR
186030

Facts:

Norma Delos Reyes Vda. Del Prado (Norma), Normita Del

Prado (Normita), Eulogia Del Prado (Eulogia) and Rodelia Del
Prado (Rodelia) was found guilty by the MTC of Lingayen,
Pangasinan to have feloniously falsified, execute[d] and
cause[d] the preparation of the DEED OF SUCCESSION, by
stating and making it appear in said document that they were the
only heirs of the late Rafael del Prado, when in truth and in fact,
all the accused well knew, that Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim is
also an heir who is entitled to inherit from the late Rafael Del
Prado, and all the accused deliberately used the DEED OF
SUCCESSION to claim ownership and possession of the land
mentioned in the DEED OF SUCCESSION to the exclusion of the
complainant Ma. Corazon Del Prado-Lim to her damage and
prejudice.

Contention of the Accused:

They did not intend to exclude Corazon from the estate of

the late Rafael, the petitioners cited their recognition of Corazons
right to the estate in the deed of extra-judicial partition,
confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange, joint affidavit and
petition for guardianship of minors Rafael, Jr., Eulogia, Antonio
and Normita, which they had earlier executed. The petitioners
denied having signed the deed of succession, and instead
insisted that their signatures in the deed were forged.
 Issue: Whether the court erred in failing to appreciate the
defense of good faith of the accused in which negates the
commission of falsification.

Ruling:

The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in

their deed of succession is clear, taking into account the very
nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was
transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement
before a notary public, required only truthful statements from
the petitioners. It was a legal requirement to effect the
cancellation of the original certificate of title and the issuance of
new titles by the Register of Deeds. The false statement made in
the deed greatly affected the indefeasibility normally accorded to
titles over properties brought under the coverage of land
registration, to the injury of Corazon who was deprived of her right
as a landowner, and the clear prejudice of third persons who
would rely on the land titles issued on the basis of the deed.
The court cannot subscribe to the petitioners claim of good
faith because several documents prove that they knew of the
untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession.
The petitioners alleged good faith is disputed by their prior
confirmation and recognition of Corazons right as an heir,
because despite knowledge of said fact, they included in the deed
a statement to the contrary. The wrongful intent to injure
Corazon is clear from their execution of the deed, showing a
desire to appropriate only unto themselves the subject parcel
of land. Corazon was unduly deprived of what was due her
not only under the provisions of the law on succession, but
also under contracts that she had previously executed with
the petitioners.
People v. Hon. Felicidad Carandang Villalon and Federico De
Guzman (192 SCRA 521)
Dec. 21, 1991
SUMMARY: De Guzman was charged with estafa thru
falsification of public document on March 29, 1974. As the
attorney-in-fact of Mariano Carrera (complainant), in 1964, De
Guzman forged his signature on the special power of attorney
(SPA) to use it to mortgage Carrera’s parel of land and obtain a
loan from the mortgage bank. Both documents (Power of Atty.
and mortgage contract) were later registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Pangasinan. The mortgage foreclosed, the land was
bought by someone else, and Carrera only knew about it when an
action for ejectment was filed against him by the new owner in
1972. The trial court dismissed the case against De Guzman on
the grounds that the said crime, which was punishable by prision
correcional, already prescribed, pursuant to Art. 90 of the RPC.
The SC affirmed the challenged decision of the trial court, ruling
that the crime prescribed upon the public registry of the power of
attorney which is considered a notice to the whole world.
FACTS:
- Mariano and Severo Carrere were owners of a parcel of land in
Pangasinan.
- Feb. 5, 1964 – Carrera executed a SPA with De Guzman,
naming him as his attorney-in-fact
 - Feb. 13, 1964 – De Guzman mortgaged Carrera’s property
with the People’s Bank and Trust Co. using the SPA and got
the P8,500 loan.
- The mortgage foreclosed and the land was sold to Ramon
Serafica and Vileta Quinto. Carrera discovered that his land
belonged to someone else when the former filed an action for his
ejectment.
- A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant, stating that:
a) The crime charged would not lie because of complainant’s
partial testimony. Mariano testified that it was his brother,
Severo, who asked him to sign the SPA to authorize De
Guzman to mortgage one half of their land.
b) Since the most serious crime in the complex crime was
estafa, the penalty of prision correctional will be imposed but
because it is a correctional penalty, it has already
prescribed. More than 10 years had passed from the
commission of the crime, which became public knowledge
upon its registry, to the filing of information.
- Prosecution’s counter:
a) Mariano’s testimony was intended to show that the
authority to mortgage only extended up to the one half
portion pertaining to his brother, not Mariano’s share.
b) Information was not filed out of time since the date to be
considered is January 1972 when Serafica filed the action
for ejectment which was when the crime was discovered. It
was not alleged because it was thought to be merely
evidentiary.
- Presiding Judge Castaneda of CFI of Pangasinan dismissed the
case. People’s motion for recon denied by Villalon.
- Special civil action for certiorari raised to the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the charge of estafa thru falsification of a
public document has sufficient basis to exist in law and in
fact

COURT: YES.

a) Falsification is only the means necessary to commit the

estafa because before the falsified document is used to
defraud another, the crime of falsification was already
consummated. The damages were caused by the
commission of estafa.

b) The alleged authorization given to De Guzman to get a

loan from the Bank only pertains to the half owned by
Mariano’s brother. In his testimony, Mariano only quoted his
brother.

2. Whether or not the crime has prescribed

COURT: YES. a) The start of the prescriptive period was when
the falsified SPA was registed in the Registry of Deeds on Feb.
13, 1964. In a crime of falsification of public document, the
prescriptive period commences from the time the offended
party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the
document was registered with the Register of Deeds.
Citing People v. Reyes, the Court said that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is a constructive
notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. Also, in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in
interpreting the phrase "from the discovery," it was held that the
discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds and that this
rule applies in criminal and civil cases.
VERDICT: Petition dismissed.

MELENCIO GIGANTONI Y JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional
Trial Court with the crime of usurpation of authority in violation of
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellant
Melencio Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain Mining
Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation, which are both private
companies doing business in the Philippines ,as an employee of
said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine
Air Lines (PAL) allegedly to conduct verification of some
travels made by Black Mountain’s officials. Upon reaching the
said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal
officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and
requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the
passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the
period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that he was then at the
tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping case. To further
convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni
exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a
PC-CIS agent. Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted,
and PAL legal officer showed to him the requested PAL records.
Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested manifest
and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV
auditor, and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of
Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel
Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni’s
purpose in securing copies of PAL records. They then became
suspicious of the accused” real identity prompting them to
conduct verification from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently
learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer
a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from
the service for gross misconduct brought about by the extortion
charges filed against him and his final conviction by the
Sandiganbayan for the said offense. Upon discovering the
foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni
would be coming back to the PAL office the following day.
When Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was
brought by Atty. Puno to their conference room while waiting for
the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted. In the
presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was
confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted
that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the
Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just checking
on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had
travelled. Upon the arrival of NBI agents Attys. Puno and Boro
turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI. They also
submitted a complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner knowingly and falsely represent
himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary.
HELD:
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority
or official functions, under which the petitioner was charged,
punishes any person:
(a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an
officer, agent or representative of any department or agency
of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government;
or
(b) who, under pretense of official position, performs any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so.

The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under

which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act
constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
However, the failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner
was duly notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the
charge that he “knowingly and falsely” represented himself to be a
CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only
be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by
mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and appellate
courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of
his dismissal by applying the disputable presumption “that official
duty has been regularly performed.” It was not for the accused to
prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not receive the order of
dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense
charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon
the prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation
that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent, by
presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent,
having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present
proof that he actually knew at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense that he was already dismissed from the service. A
mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has
not been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused
was confidential and was given to him only because he was
entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was
not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it
appears from the record of the case that the information,
which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was
readily made available to the accused because PAL officials
believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the
only offense with which he was charged in the information, that he
knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent
Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-
accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of
the crime charged.

Lucino Diaz vs. Court of Appeals and The People of the

Philippines

FACTS:

On February 14, 1978 Romeo Ramos together with Julius

Claraval (the victim)reached the intersection leading to
Bagumbayan and St. Ferdinand College they stopped, and watch
the people passing by. The junction was brightly illuminated from
the light coming from the lamp post and a nearny house. Just the,
Fe Diaz, her brother ( Boy Diaz aka Lucino Diaz), and another
male companion, passed by. Appellant was in khaki uniform
displaying "CIC DIAZ" opposite which was the word
"CONSTABULARY". Julius Claraval asked Fe Diaz "pwede
bang sumakay?", but appellant came near Julius Claraval
and said "dahan dahan ka sa pananalita mo". Julius said he
did not say anything bad and further said: "Even if you have
a gun do not brag about it." Appellant retorted: You are very
proud, and pulled out his .45 pistol and at one meter shot Julius
Claraval, hitting his mouth. Ramos tried to help him, but the
appellant warned him not to meddle or interfere.
Contention of the Petitioner (Lucino Diaz): Diaz disputes his
conviction solely on Ramos' testimony positively identifying him.
He argues that Ramos had earlier admitted at the PC
investigation that he was not present at the time Julius Claraval
was shot. After the lapse of almost four months from February 14,
1978 up to June 1978, however, Ramis changed his testimony
and informed tha authorities that Diaz was the one who shot
Claraval. Diaz insists that the appellate court should have
examined more closely his defense of alibi (physical impossibility
at the scene of the crime) , and because of his inconsistency,
inquired further into Ramos' motive.

Contention of the Respondents (Solicitor General): The SG

seeks the outright denial of the petition since Diaz, in effect, seeks
a review of the appellate court's finding of facts which is legally
possible only when the appellates court's finding of fact is
contrary to the those of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the positive identification of Diaz by the lone

witness Romeo Ramos sufficient to convict the petitioner.

Ruling: Assuming Diaz was in Santiago, Isabela from 5 p.m. on

February 14, 1978, the day of the shooting, up to the following
morning, it was still possible for him to go to Ilagan, Isabela from
5-8 p.m. since the distance of Santiago to Ilagan can still be
negotiated within one hour or even less. Also, the trial court and
the appellate court found the Ramos had no motive for falsely
testifying against Diaz. Ramos' delay or hesitancy in informing
authorities about Diaz as Claraval's assailant does not affect his
testimony and positive identification of Diaz is a valid basis of
Diaz' conviction. Diaz' flight has been incontrovertibly established
and is therefore evidence of Diaz' guilt. A warrant of arrest was
issued but it was only in January, 1984 that he was arrested (
after six years). Defense of alibi is weak.

Socorro D. Ramirez, Petitioner vs. Honorable Court of

Appeals, and Ester Garcia,

FACTS:

Socorro Ramirez secretly recorded the conversation between him

and Ester Garcia and used it as an evidence in a civil case filed
by him (Ramirez) against the latter. As a result, Ester Garcia filed
a criminal case against him for violation of RA 4200 (Anti-
wiretapping Law). Ramirez filed a motion to quash the
information alleging that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense and the violation punished by RA 4200 to a taping of
communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication. From the trial court's order the private respondent
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court,
which referred the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
decision said that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
and that in granting the motion to quash the trial court's judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the petition.

Contention of the petitioner (Ramirez):

A) The applicable provision of RA 4200 does not apply to the
taping of private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
Petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation
must be alleged in the information, otherwise it would not
constitute a violation of RA 4200.
C) Finally, the petitioner contends that RA 4200 punishes the
taping of a private communication and not private conversation.

RULING:
A) The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to
be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator of RA 4200.
Where the law makes no distinction, one does not distinguish.
The nature of the conversation is immaterial to the violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under sec 1 of RA
4200.
C) The word communication comes from the latin word
"communicare", meaning to share or impart. In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in conversation. These definitions are broad
enough to include verbal or nonverbal. Any doubts about the
legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are put to rest by the fact that the terms
"converstion" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Tañada in his explanatory bill.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y
CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.

The Facts: Version of the Prosecution:

On September 29, 2002,the PDEA team with the informant went

to the house of Dahil. The informant then introduced PO2 Corpuz
as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil took out from his pocket six (6)
plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz.
PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills to Castro.

The buy-bust team arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz

frisked Dahil and recovered from his possession another five (5)
plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched
the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of
suspected marijuana.

Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were
then brought by the buy-bust team to the PDEA office. There, the
seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First,
the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil
to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters
"RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5) plastic sachets
recovered from Dahil were marked with "B-1" to "B-5" and with
letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick
confiscated from Castro was marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela
Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory examination,
affidavits of arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of
the seized items7 was also prepared which was signed by
Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the
confiscated drugs to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive
results for marijuana.

RTC found both accused liable for violating Sections 5 and 11 of

R.A. No. 9165, for the crime of illegal possession of marijuana
which CA affirmed.

Issue: whether or not the law enforcement officers

substantially complied with the chain of custody procedure
required by R.A. No. 9165.

The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not
complied with. The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.

In People v. Kamad, the Court identified the links that the

prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation to be as follows:

First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused

by the Apprehending Officer

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the

seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have
been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by
the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting
point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers
of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking
of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they
are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end
of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting or
contamination of evidence.35

It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is
different from the inventory-taking and photography under Section
21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165,
however, this Court had consistently held that failure of the
authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36

In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that
they had placed their initials on the seized items. They, however,
gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is
clear, nonetheless, that the marking was not immediately done at
the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at the
police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz

Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the

Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer

The second link is the transfer of the seized drugs by the

apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Usually, the
police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to
a supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to the police
crime laboratory for testing.42 This is a necessary step in the chain
of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall
conduct the proper investigation and prepare the necessary
documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to
properly prepare the required documents.

The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4

Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the
witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4
Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a drug-
related case to effectively perform his work without having
custody of the seized items.

Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal

Drugs to the Forensic Chemist

From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the

forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic
laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and
verify the nature of the substance.

In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2

Corpuz provided some information on the delivery of the seized
drugs to Camp Olivas.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by

the Forensic Chemist to the Court.

The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the
forensic chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the
criminal case.

No testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever

as to how the drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic
chemist until it was transferred to the court. The forensic chemist
should have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs
but the parties resorted to a general stipulation of her testimony.
Although several subpoenae were sent to the forensic chemist,
only a brown envelope containing the seized drugs arrived in
court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the
chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions
concerning the location of the misplaced marked money, which
was not even indispensable in the criminal case.

Carino vs People
Facts:
In an information dated April 28, 1952, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, the accused was charged with the crime of
rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, for
having, as a high ranking officer and/or member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and of the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps
(Huks), agreed in conspiracy with 31 others who were charged
with the same crime in other criminal cases then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government and disrupting its activities.
One night in the year 1946, Dr. Lava arrived in the house of the
accused asking for shelter, stating that he was being persecuted
by certain politicians from Bulacan, on suspicion that he had
something to do with the killing of Mayor Roxas of Bulacan,
Bulacan. Appellant gave Lava accommodation for the night, and
early the following morning Lava left. The next time that the
appellant heard from Lava was in May, 1949, when he received a
note from the latter asking for some cigarettes, powdered milk
and canned goods. The note was brought by a boy of 12 or 15
years, named Totoy, and through him the accused sent the
needed supplies. Thereafter, every now and then, the same boy
brought to appellant similar notes from Dr. Lava, requesting for
food and supplies, which the accused furnished in as small
amounts as he could send.
Issue: W/N the accsed is guilty of being accomplice in the crime
of rebellion
Held: NO. The above-mentioned acts of appellant constitute acts
of cooperation in the execution of the act of overthrowing the
government. If the acts of the accused may be considered an
indirect help or aid in the rebellion, which we positively doubt, the
same cannot constitute previous or simultaneous acts of uprising
or rebellion. In the crime of treason any act of giving comfort
or moral aid may be criminal, but such is not the case with
rebellion or insurrection where the Code expressly declares
that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of
arms in rebellion or insurrection. The act of sending or
furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk does not
prove intention to help him in committing rebellion or insurrection.
For the foregoing considerations, the guilt of appellant as an
accomplice in the crime of rebellion or insurrection as charged in
the information has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
his supposed acts not having been shown to be acts of direct
cooperation in the execution of the crime, nor have they been
introduced by a criminal intent, nor were they shown to be
sufficiently efficacious to make appellant guilty as accomplice in
the crime charged.
 MERENCILLO v. PEOPLE
521 SCRA 31

Facts:

Juanito Merencillo was charged of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of

RA 3019 and Direct bribery. Petitioner demanded from private
complainant Ma. Angeles Ramasola Cesar P20,000.00 in
exchange for the approval of the Certificate Authorizing
Registration (CAR). Due to the repeated demand of the petitioner
and delaying the release of CAR, private complainant seek the
help of the authorities. As a result, petitioner was caught in the
entrapment instituted by the police. After trial, the RTC found
petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed the decision to
the Sandiganbayan which was denied affirming the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition for review of certiorari, contending that he was
twice in jeopardy when he was prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3
(b) of RA 3019 and for direct bribery.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.

Ruling:

No. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 begins with the following

statement: Sec.3 In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following acts
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared unlawful: XXX XXX

One may therefore be charged with violation of RA 3019 in

addition to a felony under the RPC for the same delictual act, that
is, either concurrently or subsequent to being charged with a
felony under the RPC. There is no double jeopardy if a person is
charged simultaneously of successively for violation of the Sec.3
of RA 3019 and the RPC. The rule against double jeopardy
prohibits twice placing a person in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The test is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration thereof; or
whether one offense necessarily includes or os necessarily
included in the other, as provided in Sec.7 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint, constitute
the latter; and an offense charged is necessarily included in an
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

A comparison of the elements of the crime of direct bribery

defined and punished under RPC and those violation of Sec.3 (b)
of RA 3019 shows that there is neither identity nor necessary
inclusion between the two offenses although the two charges
against the petitioner stemmed from the same transaction, the
same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offense.

[ GR No. 41008, Oct 23, 1934 ]

PEOPLE v. ISIDORO T. POLICHER
DECISION
DIAZ, J.:
On May 20, 1928, to May 29, 1930, in Kolambugan, Lanao,
accused, then duly appointed treasurer of said municipal district
and as such was in charge and responsible, among other official
duties, for the issuance of cedula certificates in said municipal
district of Kolambugan. With grave abuse of his official position
and with intent to gain and of prejudicing and defrauding Moros
Somampot, Donato Marcos and Tindigan Dipatuan, falsified
cedula certificates G-Nos. 3844057, 3222523, 3843641, 3843629,
3844005, 3221650, 3221649, 3221752 and 3221753, by erasing
the names written thereon of persons to whom said cedula
certificates had originally been issued so as to reissue them, and
in fact he reissued them, in order to appropriate for himself, and in
fact he voluntarily, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated for his
own use and benefit, the proceeds of this reissuance of the
cedula certificates in question, amounting to P36, to the damage
of said Moros Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan, and Donato Marcos
in the sums of P4, P16 and P16, respectively.Isidoro T. Policher
was charged with, and convicted of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents in the Court of First
Instance of
Lanao which sentenced him to ten years and one day of prision
mayor with the corresponding accessories of the law, to pay a fine
of P1,000, and to indemnify Moros Somampot, Donato Marcos
and Tindigan Dipatuan in the sums of P4, P16
respectively, with costs.
The accused appealed from the judgment rendered against him,
assigning in his brief three alleged errors as committed by the trial
court, to wit:". The lower court erred in convicting the defendant-
appellant of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents beyond reasonable doubt and in not absolving him
from all criminal responsibilities."
ISSUE: Whether or not the charge of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents is correct.

HELD: The charge is not correct. The crime committed by the

appellant is not the complex crime of estafa through falsification
but nine falsifications of official or public documents, as are the
cedulas, and malversation (however,malversation was not
appreciated since the appellee-complainant did not include/allege
in the information).When a public official, whose official duty is to
collect taxes, receives a payment in said concept, he makes
himself directly accountable to the Government for the money so
collected and received inasmuch as thereaftersaid money
acquires the character or forms part of the public funds and the
tax on account of which said payment was made should also
thenceforth be considered paid by the taxpayer without further
responsibility on his part. To hold the taxpayer responsible for the
misappropriation of the money collected for taxes due, by the
public official who has collected and received payment, would be
not only unreasonable but also highly unjust.It is true that only
one action was instituted and only one information filed against
the appellant but it is none the less true that in said information he
was expressly charged with nine acts of falsification of public
documents by reason ofthe issuance of nine different cedulas.
In the case of United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), this court
held that there is nothing to prevent the imposition upon the
accused of as many penaltiesas there are offenses imputed
to him and proven at the trial, if, as in this case, it
satisfactorily appears that he has consented to the action
wherein said crimes
were imputed to him by failing to interpose on time, although
he could have done so, a demurrer on the ground that the
information charged him with more than one offense. The
right to be charged with not more than one offense in an
information may be waived, the only exceptions to this rule being
the cases where one of the offenses charged has been a
necessary means for committing the other and where both have
been the result of a single act, (Article 89 of theold Penal Code;
article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.)
Inasmuch as the falsifications proven at the trial took place long
before the Revised Penal Code went into effect, the law
applicable to the case is undoubtedly the old Penal Code. Under
the provisions of article 88 of said Code, a penalty in excess of
three-fold the most severe penalty which the appellant deserves
for one of said crimes cannot be imposed upon him (or said nine
crimes of falsification of public documents.
According to said Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, each of
said acts of falsification is punishable with prision mayor and a
fine of from 250 to 12,500 pesetas. In view whereof, and taking
into consideration the fact that no modifying circumstance of any
kind has been proven, the penalty which should be imposed for
one of said crimes is eight years and one day of prision mayor
which is the minimum of the medium period of prision mayor plus
a fine of 250 pesetas.
Wherefore, by amending the appealed judgment, the appellant is
hereby sentenced, for the nine crimes with which he was charged
andconvicted, to twenty-four years and three days of prision,
which is threefoldeight years and one day of prision mayor, and to
pay a fine of P150, withcosts. In view, however, of the provisions
of Act No. 4103, the minimum of said penalty of twenty-four years
and three days of prision is fixed at six years. So ordered.
OTHER MATERIAL FACTS/DISCUSSION/COP:
The evidence shows that the appellant was the municipal
treasurer of the municipal district of Kolambugan, of the Province
of Lanao, for at least some years prior to February 27, 1927, the
date on which the witness for the prosecution, Felix Jalasan,
entered the service as clerk under said appellant. Prior to the date
above stated, he had acted as municipal treasurer of other
municipalities, and in 1933, when this case was tried, he had
already been in the Government service as municipal treasurer
for about eleven years.
The only spaces of these cedulas which could be filled in then
were those intended for the names, said witness Jalasan having
written therein those of Ditual, Balingting Alongan, Ditual
Macaagan and Salangan, respectively, because they were the
only data then available.Instead of delivering the nine cedulas in
question to the taxpayers who had paid for them, they were
retained in the appellant's office on the ground that the interested
parties had not furnished all the necessary data relative to their
personal circumstances. While waiting for said data, the cedulas
in question together with others were in the custody of clerk Felix
Jalasan. At this juncture, the appellant summoned Moros
Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan and Donato Marcos to appear
before him in order to demand of them the payment of their back
cedulas.
YSIDORO VS PEOPLE
CASE: TECHNICAL MALVERSATION
On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Brgy.
Tinugtogan, was 70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting
for work for the reason that they had to find food for their families.
This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge,
for such construction stoppage could result in the loss of
construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought
the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in
charge of the municipality’s Supplemental Feeding Program
(SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told
Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines
in its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the
mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, th
e Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval. After explaining th
e situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the wi
thdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines wort
h P3,396.00 to CSAP.
Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Leyte, filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller,
Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified that the subject
SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s
malnourished children. She also pointed out that the
Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local
Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods.Thus,
Ysidoro committed technical malversation when he approved the
distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang
Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-
133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropri
ation was based on the executive budget which allocated P100,00
0.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Int
egrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housi
ng projects.
The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public property to a
pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated
by law or ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical
malversation
Ruling: No.
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code4 has three elements:
a) that the offender is an accountable public officer;
b) that he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use;
and
c) that the public use for which such funds or property were
applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense
under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two
boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP beneficiaries were not
appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the
distribution of the goods to those providing free labor for the
rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If
Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction materials
appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP
malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended
for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of
using the SFP goods for the CSAP beneficiaries came, not from
him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those
beneficiaries. Having no criminal intent, he argues that he cannot
be convicted of the crime.
But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation.
The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked
by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another
public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that
the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a
criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission
based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the
law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines
whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule
the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of technical
malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his
offense is not grave, warranting a mere fine.

GEORGE BONGALON v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013

FACTS:
 Bongalon was charged for the crime of Child Abuse under
Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610. Bongalon allegedly physically abused
and or maltreated Jayson (12 years old) with his palm hitting the
latter at his back and slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and
uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family. On his part,
Bongalon denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson
but only confronted him when the latter threw stones at his
daughters, calling them “kimi” and for burning one of his
daughter’s hair. Both the RTC and the CA held Bongalon guilty of
child abuse.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of Bongalon constituted Child Abuse

within the purview of R.A. 7610.

RULING:

No. Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610 under which Bongalon

was charged states:

Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or

Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development – (a) Any
person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 or
P.D. 603, as amended, but not covered by the RPC, as amended
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayorin its minimum period.

Child Abuse, on the other hand, is defined by Section 3 (b)

as maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes

x x x
 (2) Any acts by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being;

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child

constitutes child abuse. Only when the laying of hands is
shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be
punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the
Revised Penal Code. In this case, the records showed that the
laying of hands on Jayson at the spur of the moment and in
anger, is indicative of his being overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and his companion.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked the specific intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the
child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of Child
Abuse. However, considering that Jayson suffered physical injury
requiring five to seven days of medical attention, Bongalon is
liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the
Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE V. ABARCA

FACTS:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983
Bar examinations.
Sometime thereafter, the accused was in his residence in
Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus
station to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch
the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the
afternoon to take the afternoon trip but the bus had engine trouble
and could not leave. The accused, then arrived at his residence at
the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon.
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got
his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-
in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away.
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went
to the house of a PC soldier Arturo Talbo, taking the latter's
firearm and went back to his residence. He was not able to find
his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session"
as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his
rifle, Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying
a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong
were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh died
instantaneously of cardio respiratory arrest due to shock and
hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head,
trunk and abdomen: Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and
operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by
bullet fragments
ISSUES:
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF
ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE
247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her
paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as
a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. The elements under Article 247 are
present here.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, between the
time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was
actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the
accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of
intercourse, does not say that he should commit the killing
instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the
killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors.
The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not
define an offense. Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon
the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his
protection. It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under
exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be
qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in
this case.
SECOND ISSUE: NO
The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated
murder against the accused-appellant. The accused-appellant did
not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. As a rule, one
committing an offense is liable, it presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony.
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-
appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle
upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.
The accused-appellant is not totally free from any responsibility.
While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered
warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") that is not enough a
precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second
paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence.

BENABAYE vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015

estafa, Swindling, juridical possession, Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Effect of appeal by any of several
accused
OCTOBER 19, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner Benabaye was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank

and was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments of
Siam Bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts therefor,
accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day
detailing the amounts of money that she has received, and remit
such payments to Tupag, her supervisor.

Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of

its loan transactions and found out that fraud and certain
irregularities attended the same. It discovered the non-remittance
of some loan payments received from its clients based on the
provisional receipts issued by its account officers, as well as the
daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional
receipts.

Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain the discrepancies

between the provisional receipts she had issued and the
unremitted money involved, and made a final demand upon her to
return the amount of the money involved. In her written
explanation, Benabaye claimed that the discrepancies could be
clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted
her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding
provisional receipts.

Tupag admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some

of his co-employees were privy to the acts which resulted in the
discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.

Siam Bank terminated the employment of both Benabaye and

Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case for Estafa.

The RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b).

The CA affirmed Benabaye’s conviction in toto, similarly finding

that all the elements of Estafa through misappropriation have
been established.

The CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and Tupag was

sufficiently established, considering that both had access and
facility to determine if payments made by Siam Bank’s clients
were properly remitted.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining Benabaye’s conviction
for the crime of Estafa through misappropriation.

RULING:

The first element of Estafa through misappropriation has not been

established.

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under

which Benabaye was charged and prosecuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud
another by any means mentioned herein below shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to

prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code,
the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be[.]

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of

another, money, goods or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.

The elements of Estafa under this provision are:

(a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal

property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to
return, the same;

(b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the

money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money
or property;

(c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the

prejudice of another; and

(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.

Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other
personal property is received by the offender from the offended
party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the
offender acquires both material or physical possession and
juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession
means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the
owner.
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an
employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only
in the material possession of the employee. The material
possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the
employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing
appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.

Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an

employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both
material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.

In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa

through misappropriation has not been established, insisting that
her possession of the collected loan payments was merely
material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of
the said crime.

The Court agrees.

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan

payments from Siam Bank’s clients. At the end of every banking
day, she was required to remit all cash payments received
together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her
supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her
hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the
banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically,
its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank
teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but
only their physical or material possession.

As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no

juridical possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in
Guzman v. CA,where a travelling sales agent was convicted of
the crime of Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the
proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court
had occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of
a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal
liability for Estafa, viz.:

There is an essential distinction between the possession of a

receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the
former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to
the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the
funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or
possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an
independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods
received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify
him for damages suffered without his fault.

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any
manner, an agent who could have asserted a right against Siam
Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired material and
not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot
be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the
dismissal of the Estafa charge against Benabaye should come as
a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charge against her as may be warranted
under the circumstances of this case.

The criminal charges against petitioner Benabaye and her co-

accused Tupag are DISMISSED without prejudice.
Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People

Facts:

Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, DPWH testified that when

he arrived at his residence, he immediately proceeded inside the
house, leaving behind his driver and two housemaids outside to
pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this point
that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the
grassy portion of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to
his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside his house.
They were made to lie face down on the floor and thereafter, the
robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other
personal properties including cash. After the intruders left the
house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was
later told that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as
tipped by the informer the police and an entrapment was made
with their participation. He and his wife posed as a buyer and
were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the
stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan.
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to prove by
evidence that the recovered items were part of the loot and such
recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein
private complainants. That the recovered items were found in the
possession of the accused and she was not able to rebut the
presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that the
stall is owned by one Fredo. The CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court but set aside the penalty imposed.
Issue: WON the accused knew or should have known that the
items recovered from her were the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
Held:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing
Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft."
The accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the RPC or under P.D. No. 1612.
However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory
but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. The state may
thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal
Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter
would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing
14 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property. 15

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the

commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;

3. The accused knows or should have known that the said

article, item, object or anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for
himself or for another.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and
fourth elements were duly established. A robbery was committed
on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants
who afterwards reported the incident to the authorities and
submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry that
were later displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner
in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display
of the articles for sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the
part of the petitioner.
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere
possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is
presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the items found in
her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The
presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference
can arise from the established fact of her possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does
not offend the presumption of innocence enshrined in the
fundamental law.
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D.
No. 1612. She relied solely on the testimony of her brother which
was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the
contrary, even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the
purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy from a
certain Fredo.
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established
that he was a licensed dealer or supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles
dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or
anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public,
secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city
where such store, establishment or entity is located." Under the
Rules and Regulations promulgated to carry out the provisions of
Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or
establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the
business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand articles,"
which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of
whether the same has actually or in fact been used.

People vs. Empleo

G.R. No. 148547 September 27, 2006

Facts:

On 6 October 1999, a search warrant was issued for the search

and seizure of shabu and paraphernalia at the room rented by
private respondent Dante Mah ("private respondent") at a Lodge
in Dipolog City. He was found to be in possession of 6.4grams of
Shabu and 1 roll or stick of marijuana an dthe prosecution filed
two informations, one for possession of shabu and the other for
possession of marijuana before the RTC.

Conflict:
Respondent pleaded not guilty and petitioned to dismiss the other
case because respondent alleged that the single act of
possession of drugs committed at the same time and at the same
place cannot be the subject of two separate informations. Petition
to dismiss was granted in the RTC (Empleo)and in CA.

Issue:
Whether the prosecution should file only one Information for
illegal possession of shabu and marijuana.

Held: Yes.

The prosecution was correct in filing two separate

informations for the crimes of illegal possession of shabu
and illegal possession of marijuana. Clearly, the Legislature
did not intend to lump these two separate crimes into just one
crime of "possession of dangerous drugs." Otherwise, there would
be no need to specify the different kinds of drugs and the
corresponding quantity in the application of the appropriate
penalty. Multiple offenses can be committed under RA 6425
even if the crimes are committed in the same place, at the
same time, and by the same person. Same ruling was applied
to People vs. Tira.

Spouses Veroy v. Layague, G.R. No. L-95630, 210 SCRA 97,

June 18, 1992

FACTS:

The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City

to a caretaker who had keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had
the keys to the interior of the house.
Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel
soldiers are allegedly hiding there.
With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up
to the yard since the owner was not around and they did not have
a search warrant.
They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the
house was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave
permission to search the house with the condition that Major
Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must be there during the
search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various
rooms, including the children’s room, and confiscated a .45
caliber gun and other effects, which were the basis of the charge
of illegal possession of firearms against them.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet
been served on them, petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since
it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter
refused to receive them on the ground that his office has not yet
received copies of their warrants of arrest.
The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the
evidence for being obtained in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence is admissible?

RULING:

NO.
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to
enter their house, it was merely for the purpose of ascertaining
the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did
not include the authority to conduct a room to room search
inside the house. The items taken were, therefore, products of
an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights. As such,
they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the
exceptions for a warrantless search. The reason for searching the
house is that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and
recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able
to enter the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not
have a search warrant and the owners were not present. This
shows that he himself recognized the need for a search warrant,
hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather
contacted the Veroys to seek permission to enter the same.
Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter the house but only
to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a
search warrant but they did not.
The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal
possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not
follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they
are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being
applicable, the articles seized were confiscated illegally and are
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They cannot be
used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action
against them for illegal possession of firearms.

"Qualified consent"

The permission to enter a house and search for persons and

effects may be qualified, and the searching officer may not act in
excess of the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a
malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be
seized simply because they are prohibited. A search warrant is
still necessary in the context of this case.

ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and
Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the
Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the
effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it
violates the fundamental rights of the accused.
The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the
law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are: combination,
series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the
facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law

Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner possesses the locus
standi to attack the validity of the law using the facial
challenge.

Ruling:
On how the law uses the terms combination and series does
not constitute vagueness. The petitioner’s contention that it would
not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law seeks
to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness
doctrine is manifestly misplaced under the petitioner’s reliance
since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, wherein
clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked.
Said doctrine may not invoked in this case since the statute is
clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

On the other hand, overbreadth doctrine decrees that

governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial
challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one
which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon
protected speech. Furthermore, in the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial
challenge to legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully since the challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools
developed for facial challenge of a statute in free speech cases.
With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one to
who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to
attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of
statues results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than
real.

The crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have

been resolve in the Congress’ decision to include it among the
heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Supreme Court holds the plunder law constitutional and petition is
dismissed for lacking merit.

Issues:

1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being

vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide

or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct
would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the
language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various
elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide
for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series”
in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of
terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect”
upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because
of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech.
 3. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of

establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability
lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The “reasonable doubt” standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged—the
element of the offense.
Relative to petitioner’s contentions on the purported defect of
Sec. 4 is his submission that “pattern” is a “very important
element of the crime of plunder;” and that Sec. 4 is “two-pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of
the crime, “ such that without it the accused cannot be convicted
of plunder –
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from
its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports
to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely
procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in
furtherance of a remedy.
What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

4. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum

prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.

No.
It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the
element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder.
It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the
crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and
criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention In support of his contention that
the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the
reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B.
No.733
Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern
are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be
proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
 The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder
since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by
his criminal intent.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a
malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being.
There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are
mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA

7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to
declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

People of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Sandiganbayan and

Seferino S. Paredes
FACTS: Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and
December 9,1986, with the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) by
Teofilion Gelacio. Gelacio's complaint questioned the issuance
to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial
attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for a lot with an area of
1,391 sq. meter, more or less, in the Rosario public land
subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. Paredes was
arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Paredes
filed in the Sandiganbayan "An urgent motion to quash the
information and to recall warrant of arrest." The Sandiganbayan
granted his motion on the ground of prescription of the offense
charged. Hence, this petition.

Contention of the Petitioner (People): The prescriptive period

should not commence to run upon the filing of Paredes'
application because no one could have known except Paredes
and Lands Inspector Luison.

Contention of Paredes: The time of the prescription of the

offense should have commenced to run from January 21, 1976,
the time of Paredes' application for the free patent. NOTE: BP
195 increases the period of prescription for the violation of the
provisions of RA 3019 from 10 yrs to 15, this law was approved
on March 16, 1982, but the same cannot be applied in the case at
bar for being unfavorable to the accused and would then become
an ex post facto law. (Now Sec 11. of RA 3019 prescriptibe period
is 15 years)

RULING: Act No. 3326, Sec 2. Prescription shall begin to run

from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. The Sandiganbayan correctly
observed that "the date of the violation of the law becomes the
operative date for the commencement of the period of
prescription." The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive
period should not commence upon the filing of Paredes'
application because no one could have known about it except
Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for, as the
Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the Lands
Inspector who passes upon the disposability of public land . . .
other public officials pass upon the application for a free patent
including the location of the land and, therefore, the disposable
character thereof. Indeed, practically all the department
personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the
application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the
land to ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who
prepared its technical description: (3) the regional director who
assessed the application and determined the land classification:
(4) the Director of Lands who prepared the free patent: and (5)
the Department Secretary who signed it, could not have helped
"discovering" that the subject of the application was
nondisposable public agricultural land. The Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the filing of
Paredes application for a free patent in January 1976 or his
supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval,
prescribed ten (10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's
complaint, dated October 28, 1986, was filed late. Even if the
ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the
registration and issuance of the free patent title by the
Register of Deeds on May 28, 1976, registration being
constructive notice to the whole world, the prescriptive period
would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5)
months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen
(13) years before judicial proceedings were initiated in the
Sandiganbayan on August 10, 1989 by the filing of the information
therein.

PALACIOS VS. PEOPLE

GR 168544 MARCH 31, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was the mayor of the Municipality of Culasi,
Province of Antique from July 1998 to June 2001. During her
administration, there were infrastructure projects that were
initiated during the incumbency of her predecessor, then
Mayor Aida Alpas, which remained partially unpaid. These
included the Dams and Roads which were contracted by L.S.
Gamotin Construction with a total project cost of 2 million. For the
said projects, the municipality owed the contractor P791, 047.00.
Relative to the aforesaid projects, petitioner, together with
Venturanza, then the Municipal Security Officer, was indicted in
an information for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused were guilty?
RULING: YES.
Section 3 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
provides:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition

to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
 practices of any public officer and are hereby declared
to be unlawful:

(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,

present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity
has to intervene under the law.

To be convicted of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.

3019, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
following elements:
1) the offender is a public officer;
2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a
percentage, or benefit;
3) on behalf of the offender or any other person;
4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the
government;
5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the
law, has the right to intervene.

At the time material to the case, petitioner was the mayor of

the Municipality of Culasi, Antique. As mayor, her signature, both
in the vouchers and in the checks issued by the municipality, was
necessary to effect payment to contractors (for government
projects). Since the case involved the collection by L.S. Gamotin
of the municipality’s outstanding obligation to the former, the right
of petitioner to intervene in her official capacity is
undisputed. Therefore, elements 1, 4 and 5 of the offense
are present. Section 3(b) penalizes three distinct acts –1)
demanding or requesting; 2) receiving; or 3) demanding,
requesting and receiving– any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in connection with
any contract or transaction between the government and any
other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to
intervene under the law. Each of these modes of committing the
offense is distinct and different from one another. Proof
of existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction. The
Sandiganbayan viewed the case as one, the resolution of which
hinged primarily on the matter of credibility. It found Superficial
and her testimony worthy of credence, that petitioner
demanded “grease money” as a condition for the release of the
final payment to L.S. Gamotin. Aside from the demand made by
petitioner, the Sandiganbayan likewise concluded that, indeed,
she received the “grease money” through Venturanza. Therefore,
petitioner was convicted both for demanding and
receiving “grease money.”

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS and DR. ROLANDO P.

DAYCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Dr. Posadas was Chancellor of the University of the

Philippines (UP) Diliman he formed a Task Force on Science and
Technology Assessment Management and Policy. The Task
Force was to prepare the needed curricula for masteral and
doctoral programs in "technology management, innovation
studies, science and technology and related areas." On June 6,
1995, acting on the Task Force's proposal, UP established the U
Technology Management Center (UP TMC) the members of
which nominated Dr. Posadas for the post of Center Director. He
declined the nomination, however, resulting in the designation of
Professor Jose B. Tabbada as acting UP TMC Director.

Malacanang granted Dr. Posadas and fifteen other UP

Diliman officials authority to attend the foundation day of the state
university in Fujian, China. Before he left, Dr. Posadas formally
designated Dr. Dayco, then UP Diliman Vice-Chancellor for
Administration, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) in his absence. On
November 7, 1995, his last day as OIC Chancellor, Dr Dayco
appointed Dr. Posadas as "Project Director of the TMC Project
from September 18, 1995 to September 17, 1996." In an undated
letter, Dr. Dayco also appointed Dr. Posadas consultant to the
project. The appointments were to retroact to September 18, 1995
when the project began.

The Commission on Audit (COA) Resident Auditor issued a

Notice of Suspension of payments made to UP TMC personnel,
including the second payment to Dr. Posadas for his services as
TMC Project’s Local Consultant. The Resident Auditor further
suspended payment to Dr. Posadas as Project Director. However,
the UP Diliman Legal Office issued a Memorandum to the COA
Resident Auditor, pointing out that the amounts paid the TMC
Project personnel "were legal, being in the nature of consultancy
fees." The legal office also "confirmed the authority of Dr. Dayco,
while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as project
director and consultant of the TMC Project." Finding this
explanation "acceptable," the COA Resident Auditor lifted his
previous notices of suspension.

Sandiganbayan found both Dr. Posadas and Dr. Dayco

guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 and
imposed on them an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for 9
years and one day as minimum and 12 years as maximum, with
the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office. The court also found them guilty of violation of Section 7(b)
of Republic Act 6713 and imposed on them the penalty of
imprisonment for 5 years with the same disqualification. They
were further ordered to indemnify the government in the sum of
₱336,000.00.1

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is violation of RA 3019?

HELD:

The appointments were in good faith

The bad faith that Section 3(e) of Republic 3019 requires, said
this Court, does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.
It imputes a dishonest purpose, some moral obliquity, and a
conscious doing of a wrong. Indeed, it partakes of the nature of
fraud. Here, admittedly, Dr. Dayco appears to have taken
advantage of his brief designation as OIC Chancellor to appoint
the absent Chancellor, Dr. Posadas, as Director and consultant of
the TMC Project. But it cannot be said that Dr. Dayco made those
appointments and Dr. Posadas accepted them, fraudulently,
knowing fully well that Dr. Dayco did not have that authority as
OIC Chancellor.

All indications are that they acted in good faith. They were
scientists, not lawyers, hence unfamiliar with Civil Service rules
and regulations. The world of the academe is usually preoccupied
with studies, researches, and lectures. Thus, those appointments
appear to have been taken for granted at UP. It did not invite any
immediate protest from those who could have had an interest in
the positions. It was only after about a year that the COA
Resident Auditor issued a notice of suspension covering
payments out of the Project to all UP personnel involved,
including Dr. Posadas.

Still, in response to this notice, the UP Diliman Legal Office itself

rendered a legal opinion that "confirmed the authority of Dr.
Dayco, while he was OIC Chancellor, to appoint Dr. Posadas as
project director and consultant of the TMC Project." Not only this,
the COA Resident Auditor, who at first thought that the OIC
Chancellor had no power to make the designations, later
accepted the Legal Office’s opinion and withdrew the Notices of
Suspension of payment that he issued. All these indicate a need
for the Court to reexamine its position that Dr. Dayco and Dr.
Posadas acted in bad faith in the matter of those appointments.

The prosecution did not prove unwarranted benefit or undue

injury

Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 requires the prosecution to

prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused "undue
injury" to the government or gave him "unwarranted
benefits."

This Court has always interpreted "undue injury" as "actual

damage." What is more, such "actual damage" must not only be
capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. A finding of "undue injury" cannot be based
on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon speculation,
conjecture, or guesswork.5 The Court held in Llorente v.
Sandiganbayan6 that the element of undue injury cannot be
presumed even after the supposed wrong has been established.
It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime.
The prosecution also failed to prove that Dr. Dayco gave Dr.
Posadas "unwarranted advantage" as a result of the
appointments in question. The honoraria he received cannot be
considered "unwarranted" since there is no evidence that he
did not discharge the additional responsibilities that such
appointments entailed.

G.R. Nos. 168951 & 169000 November 27, 2013

PP vs Dalabajan

Facts:
Sometime on January 1, 1986 at around 1:00 oclock in the
morning and while the people of Barangay Cayapas, Dumaran,
Palawan were celebrating the New Years eve with a dance at
their Barangay Hall located near the seashore, Melencio dela
Cruz saw Hernando Dalabajan kick and stab one Amado Zabalo,
Jr. as the latter was coming out of the said Barangay Hall. Amado
was kicked on his right thigh and stabbed on his right abdomen.
Other residents, mostly relatives of the Dalabajans, then joined
Hernando in mauling Amado. Amado tried to escape by running
towards the nearby seashore and wading into the water.
Hernando Dalabajan, together with co-accused Dominador and
Fernando Dalabajan and the rest of their relatives, pursued
Amado. Upon the reaching the seashore only the three accused-
appellants took a banca and chased the latter. The rest of their
relatives stayed by the seashore. When the accused-appellants
were finally able to overtake Amado about 30-40 meters away
from the shore, they helped one another in hitting him with bladed
instruments, wooden clubs and a boat paddle on different parts of
his body. Thereafter, the three accused left the already unmoving
body of the victim which was face down in the water and
proceeded back towards the seashore. At this juncture, Melencio
dela Cruz, who was hiding behind the bushes by the seashore
from where he watched the incident happen, then went to the
house of the victim and reported the incident to the latters
relatives.
Issue: W/N the Dalabajans are guilty of murder, nowithstanding
the recantation of the sole witness
Held: YES. The Dalabajans are guilty of murder, not
tumultous affray. It is highly doubtful that the eyewitness Dela
Cruz, after through the trouble of being sworn in, testifying in open
court, and being subjected to a rigid cross-examination by the
defense counsel, wherein he unhesitatingly pointed to the
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, would, after
four years, suddenly turn around and reverse himself. We have
previously held that mere retraction by a prosecution witness
does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible.The
affidavit of Desistance executed by the victims father also merits
scant consideration, for it is axiomatic in our jurisdiction that for
such desistance to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to
the filing of a criminal complaint.
The accused-appellants insists that Dela Cuz could not have
been able to identify Zabalos assailants from a distance of thirty
(30) to (40) meters. This contention is incorrect. It had been
established that Dela Cruz witnessed the attack on Amado
Zabalo, Jr. by the accused-appellants from the time of its
inception, when Hernando Dalabajan stabbed the victim, to the
time when the victim tried to escape by wading out to sea, and up
to its horrible climax when the victim was mercilessly killed by the
three accused who unrelentingly pursued him. Dela Cruz fully
witnessed the attack on the victim. Thus, the accuseds are guilty
of murder and not tumultuos affray.
In the case at bench, there were no groups of persons
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally. Consequently, there was no
affray among several groups of persons in the course of which
Amado Zabalo, Jr. died. The fact is that there was only one group
of persons, the accused themselves, who caused an attack on a
single victim, Amado Zabalo, Jr. This group of persons, motivated
as they were, attacked and killed the aforesaid victim. The
persons who assaulted and killed the victim were clearly
identified. Since it was ascertained as to who actually killed the
deceased, the death of the victim cannot be said to have been
caused in a tumultuous affray.
There is, appreciated herein, as recommended by the Solicitor
General, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the
case of Hernando Dalabajan. This mitigating circumstance is,
however, offset by the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. Treachery has
qualified the killing to murder. Consequently, as correctly found by
the trial court, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.

G.R. No. 212196 January 12, 2015

ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, G.R. No. 163866
Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 29, 2005

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts: The offended party Cristina Elitiong was a 16-year old high
school student who with her brothers were employed by the
accused, 64-year old Isidro Olivarez, in the making of sampaguita
garlands.

At about 11:30 oclock in the morning of July 20, 1997, Cristina,

her two brothers Macoy and Dodong, and one named Liezel were
at their work when the accused who was near the main door
called for her. She dutifully approached him. The accused asked
her if she had told her mother that he gave her money, and when
she said that she did not, he embraced her and held her breast.
The workers were facing the street so that the two were not seen.
He pulled her to the kitchen and, closing the kitchen door, kissed
her on the lips. She pushed him away and went back to her
station. Her brother Macoy saw her crying when she came out of
the house. She did not say a word, but went to the faucet and
washed her face.

The trial court found Olivarez guilty of violating Section 5 of R.A.

7610 which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contention: The Honorable Court of Appeals

committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding that the
essential elements in Violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic
Act 7610, that she is an abused or exploited child as defined in
the law, not having been alleged in the Information,
petitioner/accused cannot be found guilty of said offense and
must be acquitted.
SC: Petition denied. The elements of sexual abuse under Section
5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse

or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age.

Section 32, Article XIII, of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of R.A. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:
“The intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or
the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person.”

The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond

reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her
breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts
themselves and the environmental circumstances.

The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is
likewise present.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. ...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a
child is abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct.

As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep. Act No.

7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation...

Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when

the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused
because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in
a lascivious conduct.

Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse occurred

only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610,
the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article
III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse because Congress really intended to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated
into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The
law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of
sexual abuse.

In addition to moral damages, a fine in the amount of P15,000.00

should likewise be imposed pursuant to our ruling in Amployo v.
People:

People vs. Garcia

580 SCRA 259
GR 173480, February 25, 2009

FACTS:
 1. Accused (Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz) was charged of selling P200
worth of marijuana (in violation of Sec.5, Article II, RA 9165)
in a buy-bust operation.
2. PO1 Samuel Garcia and the other arresting officers brought
Ruiz to the San Jose Lying-in Center for medical
examination. Then, they brought Ruiz to the Drug
Enforcement Unit (DEU) office for investigation. PO1 Garcia
turned over the seized items to the investigator, who then
placed markings on the wrapper. The seized items were
thereafter sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination;
they tested positive for marijuana.
3. The accused put up the defense of extortion and police
frame-up.
4. The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that Ruiz
failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim
of frame-up; his (Ruiz) evidence also failed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
by the public officers in the case.

ISSUE: Is the chain of custody requirement fulfilled to convict the

accused of the charge?

HELD:
No. After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT Ruiz, as the
prosecution’s evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police
complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and with the chain of evidence requirement of this Act.

In the present case, while PO1 Garcia duly testified on the identity
of the buyer and seller, on the consideration that supported the
transaction, and on the manner the sale took place, the
prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the chain that would
have shown that the marijuana presented in court was the very
item seized from Ruiz at the time of his arrest.
 (a) The first crucial link in the chain of custody

The first crucial link was from the time the marijuana was
seized by PO1 Garcia to its delivery to the police investigator at
the police headquarters. Only PO1 Garcia testified to this
link. From his own testimony, he did not mark the seized
marijuana after it was handed to him by Ruiz; he only marked it at
the police station when he turned it over to the investigator. In the
interim, he and the rest of the buy-bust team had taken Ruiz to
a lying-in clinic for medical examination. The evidence does
not show who was in possession of the marijuana during the ride
from the crime scene to the lying-in center, and from the lying-in
center to the police station.

(b) The second link in the chain of custody

The second link in the chain of custody of the seized

marijuana is from PO1 Garcia to the police investigator. The
identity of this police investigator to whom the custody of the
seized marijuana was turned over was not disclosed. Although a
reading of the Memorandum dated February 28, 2003 shows that
a certain Ferdinand Lavadia Balgoa, as Police Inspector Chief
SDEU, prepared the request for the laboratory examination of the
seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory, this piece of
evidence does not establish the latter’s identity as the police
inspector to whom PO1 Garcia turned over the marijuana, and
who subsequently made the corresponding markings on the
seized items.

(c) The subsequent links in the chain of custody

The evidence on record relating to the subsequent links in

the chain of custody from the police inspector to the PNP Crime
Laboratory did not identify the person who submitted the seized
marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Whether
it was the Police Inspector Chief SDEU is not clear from the
evidence that only shows that he signed the request for the
laboratory examination of the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. At the same time, the identity of the person who had
the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana, after it was
chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court, was also
not disclosed.

In this regard, Sections 3 and 6 (paragraph 8) of Dangerous

Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 2003 require laboratory
personnel to document the chain of custody each time a specimen
is handled or transferred until the specimen is disposed. The
board regulation also requires the identification of the individuals
participating in the chain. The available records in the case fail to
show compliance with this regulation.

Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious

uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized marijuana
that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the
prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime
charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of
the accused. As we pointed out in the opening statement of our
Ruling, this brings the case to a situation where the defense does
not even need to present evidence as it has no viable case to
meet. We need not therefore discuss the specific defenses raised.
Nor do we need to discuss the lower courts misplaced reliance on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
except to state that the presumption only arises in the absence of
contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the
performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the
police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures
prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption.
 To our mind, the procedural lapses in the handling and
identification of the seized items, as well as the unexplained
discrepancy in their markings, collectively raise doubts on whether
the items presented in court were the exact same items that were
taken from Ruiz when he was arrested. These constitute major
lapses that, standing unexplained, are fatal to the prosecution’s
case.

People vs Eduardo Dahilig y Agaran

FACTS: That on December 17, 2000 Eduardo Dahilig y Agaran

by means of force and intimidation, and taking advantage of night
time and in the dwelling of complainant, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
one AAA, sixteen (16) year old minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, against her will and consent.

Contention of the Accused: The sexual congress that transpired

between them was consensual as she was then his girlfriend.-
Sweetheart defense

The Trial Court convicted Eduardo Dahilig for the crime of rape
since he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his
sweetheart defense.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court
but clarified that the crime charged should have been child abuse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of rape was committed.

RULING: Yes, the crime of rape was committed.

 If the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the
offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the
other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should
be charged with either sexual abuse or rape. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with sexual
abuse. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony
under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.

Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with either

Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor. Considering,
however, that the information correctly charged the accused with
rape and that he was convicted therefor, the CA should have
merely affirmed the conviction.

People. Pacayana

People vs. Glino

On November 15, 1998, at around 7:20 p.m., in Moonwalk, Las
Piñas City, husband and wife Domingo and Virginia Boji hailed a
passenger jeepney bound for Alabang-Zapote Road. The couple
sat on the two remaining vacant seats on opposing rows of the
jeepney. Virginia seated herself on the vehicle's left side while
Domingo occupied the vacant seat at the right row.
Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia alighted.
Accused-appellant Conrado Glino took her place. He was reeking
of liquor. As the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginia noticed
accused-appellant inching closer to her. His head eventually
found its way on Virginia's shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought
accused-appellant's attention and asked him to sit properly, citing
adequate space. Accused-appellant angrily replied, "Oh, kung
ayaw mong may katabi, bumaba ka, at magtaxi ka!" Virginia
decided to ignore his snide remarks.
Accused-appellant, however, persisted in violating Virginia's
personal space, leaning on the latter's shoulders. It was at this
point that Domingo decided to tell Glino to sit properly. Accused-
appellant arrogantly retorted, "Anong pakialam mo?" Domingo
reasoned out that he is Virginia's husband. Domingo further said,
"Kasi lalasing-lasing ka, hindi mo naman kaya!"
Marvin Baloes, who, it turned out, was Glino's equally drunk
companion, cursed Domingo.After the heated verbal tussle,
accused-appellant and Baloes appeared to have calmed down,
confining themselves to whispering to one another.
When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to
the driver and told him that he and Glino were about to alight. As
the jeepney ground to a halt, Baloes unexpectedly drew an
improvised knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest.12 Accused-
appellant then unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife (balisong) and
joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the
sudden attack, Domingo failed to offer any form of resistance to
the duo's vicious assault. In all, Domingo sustained nine stab
wounds throughout his body.13
Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants. When
the senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied
from incised wounds in her fingers.14Accused-appellant Glino
and Baloes attempted to flee the scene of the crime and ran
towards Camella Center.
On June 15, 1999, accused Marvin Baloes succumbed to cardio-
pulmonary arrest while on detention.
Accused was charged for murder and attempted murder
Contention of the accused:He did not know the other accused
Marvin Baloes.He did not have any companion. He rode on a
passenger jeep bound to Zapote. He could not recall the number
of people inside the jeepney because the seats were all occupied.
Then he saw the victim was stabbed by accused Baloes.
Issue: Whether Glino is gulity of murder and attempted murder
Ruling:
Murder:Yes
Conspiracy
Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Marvin Baloes who
inflicted the fatal stab, accused-appellant cannot escape.There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.It is
not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an
unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to
be carried out. The acts of accused-appellant Glino and Baloes
before, during and after the killing of Domingo are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. In
her testimony before the trial court, Virginia categorically narrated
that while Baloes was stabbing Domingo, accused-appellant Glino
was blocking her path, effectively preventing her from rendering
aid to her husband.47 Accused-appellant later joined Baloes in
stabbing Domingo with a Batangas knife
Treachery
That treachery or alevosia was present is incontrovertible. The
essence of this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the assailant on an unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself.Domingo
was overpowered by accused-appellant Glino and Baloes, who
took turns in stabbing the hapless victim. By all indications,
Domingo was without opportunity to evade the knife thrusts,
defend himself, or retaliate. In sum, the finding of treachery
stands on solid legal footing.
No Attempted Murder But
Less Serious Physical Injuries
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their
consummated, frustrated or attempted stage, is intent of the
offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously
with the infliction of injuries. If the assailants also intended to kill
her, they could have easily stabbed her in any vital part of her
body. They did not. The nature and location of her wound
militates against the finding of their intent to kill.
If the assailants also intended to kill her, they could have easily
stabbed her in any vital part of her body. They did not. The nature
and location of her wound militates against the finding of their
intent to kill.
 RICHARD RICALDE, Petitione

v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Rape through sexual assault, gender-free rape,

homosexual rape, variance doctrine

FACTS:

On January 30, 2002, at around 2:00 a.m., XXX, then

10 years old, woke up as “he felt pain in his anus and stomach
and something inserted in his anus.” He saw that Ricalde, 31
years old, a distant relative and textmate of XXX, “fondled his
penis.” When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his
mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother
that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.

RTC found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

rape through sexual assault. CA affirmed the conviction but
lowered the amount of damages.

ISSUES:
Whether or not XXX’s failure to categorically state that a penis
was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any
object being inserted into his anal orifice fatal.

1. Whether or not the absence of trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or

any trace of spermatozoa disproves penile or object penetration.
2. Whether or not the invocation of “variance doctrine” is proper.
3. Whether or not the slightest penetration into one’s anus
constitutes rape through sexual assault.
HELD:

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is

also known as “instrument or object rape,” “gender-free rape,” or
“homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s
genital or anal orifice.”

First issue: NO

The Court held that a victim need not identify what was
inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to find
that rape through sexual assault was committed. In People v.
Soria, the Court ruled that “We find it inconsequential that “AAA”
could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object
that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant
is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require
“AAA” to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into
her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due
process.”

Second issue: NO

Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no

recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa,
lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice
does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony
of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and
consistent with human nature.
 The Court has explained the merely corroborative
character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for
rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.

Third issue: NO

Variance doctrine

Variance doctrine is provided under Sections 4 and 5 of

Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. It states:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and

proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part
of those constituting the latter.

In the instant case, no variance exists between what

was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of
rape through sexual assault.

Fourth issue: YES

 XXX testified that he “felt something was inserted into
his anus.” The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ
distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.

Long line of cases consider a woman’s private organ

since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a
woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by
analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration
to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through
sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the

victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape
is an “assault on human dignity.”

Caballo v People (689 SCRA 227)

GR No. 198732
Q: Reiteration of ruling in Malto; importance of Section 10, Art. III
of RA 7610; definition of “coercion” and “inducement”
FACTS:
 Decision of the RTC of Surigao City finding petitioner
Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
10(a) of RA 7610
 Caballo is a 23 year old man who took advantage of the
innocence and lack of worldly experience of AAA who was
only 17 years old
o Caballo is the student of AAA’s uncle
o Caballo allegedly willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
committed sexual abuse upon AAA by persuading and
inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him,
which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy and
delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and
prejudice of AAA
  During the trial the prosecution asserted that Caballo was
only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to promises
of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her
pregnant due to the use of the “withdrawal method;” the
prosecution also claimed that Caballo was shocked to the
news of AAA’s pregnancy and advised her to have an
abortion
 The RTC found Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to
Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
 The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification
the RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610
o While the Amended Information denominated the crime
charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610, the statements in its body actually support a
charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
o It found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
clearly showed that Caballo persuaded, induced and
enticed AAA, then a minor, to have carnal knowledge
with him
 It was upon these repeated coaxing and assuring
words that AAA succumbed to Caballo’s cvild
desires which deflowered and got her pregnant
ISSUE/S:
W/N the interpretation of the phrase “due to the coercion or
influence of any adult”—which would then hold petitioner liable
under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610, is correctly defined in the
decision of the CA
HELD:
 Caballo essentially argues that his promise to marry or his
use of the withdrawal method should not be considered as
“persuasion” or “inducement” sufficient to convict him for the
aforementioned offense
 o He also alleges that he and AAA were sweethearts
 Respondent advances the argument that there was no
sexual abuse since it was only upon Caballo’s repeated
assurances and persuasion that AA gave in to his worldly
desires
 Olivarez v CA, elements of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
o Accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct
o The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
o The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age
 The first and third elements are undisputedly present in the
case
 What is in question is the presence of the second element
o Caballo submits that AAA could not be considered as a
“child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse”
since the incidents do not point to any form of
“coercion” or “influence” on Caballo’s part
 RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy of affording
“special protection to chidren from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruely, exploitation and discrimination and other
conditions prejudicial to their development”
o Section 5 provides a definition of who is considered a
“child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse”
 A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group
o The law not only covers a situation in which a child is
abused for profit, but also one in which a child, through
coercion or intimidation, engages in lascivious conduct
 Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party’s free will
o Influence: improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another’s objective
o Coercion: improper use of power to compel another to
submit to the wishes of one who wields it
 SC: Caballo’s actuations may be classified as “coercion” and
“influence” within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA
7610
o AAA was a minor at the time of commission, who is not
fully capable of understanding or knowing the import of
her actions;
 consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 (Malto Ruling:
unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Sec.5, Art. III of RA
7610; the mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense—it is mala
prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed
o Age disparity between an adult and a minor placed
Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable
him to force his will upon the latter
o Caballo’s actions effectively constitute overt acts of
coercion and influence—Caballo repeatedly assured
AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry
her; in addition he also guaranteed that she would not
get pregnant since he would be using the “withdrawal
method” for safety
  Finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains
Caballo’s conviction for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of
RA 7610

G.R. Nos.170339, 170398-403: March 9, 2010

ROLANDO E. SISON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Petitioner was the municipal mayor of Calintaan, Occidental

Mindoro, a fourth-class municipality, from July 1, 1992 to June 30,
1995, while Rigoberto de Jesus was the municipal treasurer. On
July 18, 1994, state auditor Elsa E. Pajayon conducted a post-
audit investigation which revealed that during petitioners
incumbency, no public bidding was conducted for the purchase of
a Toyota Land Cruiser, 119 bags of Fortune cement, an electric
generator set, certain construction materials, two Desert Dueler
tires, and a computer and its accessories. Pajayon also found out
that there were irregularities in the documents supporting the
acquisitions.

Thus, on June 4, 1998, petitioner and de Jesus were

indicted before the Sandiganbayan for seven counts of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019. Petitioner pleaded not
guilty to all the Informations. Accused de Jesus has remained at
large.

During the trial, he admitted that indeed, no public bidding

was conducted insofar as the purchases he was being accused of
were concerned. When asked how the purchases were made, he
answered that they were done through personal canvass.
Accordingly, no public bidding could be conducted because all the
dealers of the items were based in Manila. It was therefore
useless to invite bidders since nobody would bid anyway.

The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged.As

such, he was meted in each Information an imprisonment term
ranging from six years and one month as minimum to ten years
as maximum and perpetual disqualification from holding public
office. The Sandiganbayan also ordered that an alias warrant of
arrest be issued against accused de Jesus.

On appeal, the Court dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of Section

3(e) of RA 3019?

HELD:

The petition is denied.

POLITICAL LAW: personal canvass

RA 7160explicitly provides that, as a rule, acquisitions of

supplies by local government units shall be through competitive
bidding.By way of exception, no bidding is required in the
following instances: (1) personal canvass of responsible
merchants; (2) emergency purchase; (3) negotiated purchase; (4)
direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusivedistributors and
(5)purchase from other government entities.

Since personal canvass (the method availed of by petitioner)

is an exception to the rule requiring public bidding, Section 367 of
RA 7160 provides for limitations on the resort to this mode of
procurement.

In relation thereto, Section 364 of RA 7160 mandates:

Thereshallbe in every province, city or municipality a Committee
on Awards to decide the winning bids and questions of awards on
procurement and disposal of property. The Committee on
Awardsshallbe composed of the local chief executive as
chairman, the local treasurer, the local accountant, the local
budget officer, the local general services officer, and the head of
office or department for whose use the supplies are being
procured, as members.In case a head of office or department
would sit in a dual capacity a member of thesanggunianelected
from among its members shall sit as a member. The Committee
on Awards at thebarangaylevel shall be thesangguniang
barangay. No national official shall sit as member of the
Committee on Awards.

Note that the law repeatedly uses the word shall to

emphasize the mandatory nature of its provisions.

Insofar as the purchase of the Toyota Land Cruiseris

concerned, the Sandiganbayan found that the personal canvass
was effected solely by petitioner, without the participation of the
municipal accountant and petitioners co-accused de Jesus, the
municipal treasurer. Worse, there was no showing that that the
award was decided by the Committee on Awards. Only an
abstract of canvass supported the award, signed by petitioner and
de Jesus, without the required signatures of the municipal
accountant and budget officer.

To reiterate, RA 7160 requires that where the head of the

office or department requesting the requisition sits in a dual
capacity, the participation of anSanggunianmember (elected from
among the members of theSanggunian) is necessary. Petitioner
clearly disregarded this requirement because, in all the purchases
made, he signed in a dual capacityas chairman and member
(representing the head of office for whose use the supplies were
being procured). That is strictly prohibited. None of the regular
members of the Committee on Awards may sit in a dual capacity.
Where any of the regular members is the requisitioning party, a
special member from theSanggunianis required. The prohibition is
meant to check or prevent conflict of interest as well as to protect
the use of the procurement process and the public funds for
irregular or unlawful purchases.

The same flaws attended the procurement of 119 bags of

Fortune cement, electric power generator set,various construction
materials, two Desert Dueler tiresand a computer and its
accessories.

With the kind of items purchased by petitioner, he also

clearly spent more thanP20,000or beyond the threshold amount
per month allowed by Section 367 of RA 7160 as far as
purchases through personal canvass by fourth-class
municipalities (like Calintaan) are concerned.

POLITICAL LAW: corrupt practices

To be found guilty under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the

following elements must concur: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public
officers official, administrative or judicial functions;

(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident

bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public
officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government,orgave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference.

It is undisputed that the first two elements are present in the

case at bar.

The third element of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be

committed in three ways, through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof ofanyof these three
in connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 is enough to convict.

Partiality is synonymous with bias which excites a disposition

to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as
they are. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty
through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the
omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to take on their own property.

In the instant case, petitioner was grossly negligent in all the

purchases that were made under his watch. Petitioner's
admission that the canvass sheets sent out by de Jesus to the
suppliers already contained his signatures because he pre-signed
these forms only proved his utter disregard of the consequences
of his actions. Petitioner also admitted that he knew the provisions
of RA 7160 on personal canvass but he did not follow the law
because he was merely following the practice of his
predecessors. This was an admission of a mindless disregard for
the law in a tradition of illegality. This is totally unacceptable,
considering that as municipal mayor, petitioner ought to
implement the law to the letter. As local chief executive, he should
have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was
followed by his constituency. Sadly, however, he was the first to
break it.

Petitioner should have complied with the requirements laid

down by RA 7160 on personal canvass, no matter how strict they
may have been.Dura lex sed lex. The law is difficult but it is the
law. These requirements are not empty words but were
specifically crafted to ensure transparency in the acquisition of
government supplies, especially since no public bidding is
involved in personal canvass. Truly, the requirement that the
canvass and awarding of supplies be made by a collegial body
assures the general public that despotic, irregular or unlawful
transactions do not occur. It also guarantees that no personal
preference is given to any supplier and that the government is
given the best possible price for its procurements.

The fourth element is likewise present. While it is true that

the prosecution was not able to prove any undue injury to the
government as a result of the purchases, it should be noted that
there are two ways by which Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be
violated the first, by causing undue injury to any party,
including the government, or the second, by giving any
private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense,
an accused may be charged under either mode or both. The use
of the disjunctive or connotes that the two modes need not be
present at the same time. In other words, the presence of one
would suffice for conviction.

POLITICAL LAW: unwarranted benefit, advantage,

preference

The word unwarranted means lacking adequate or official

support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or
adequate reason. Advantage means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind;
benefit from some course of action. Preference signifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above
another.

In order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices

that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another,
in the exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner did just that. The fact that he repeatedly failed to follow
the requirements of RA 7160 on personal canvass proves that
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference was given to the
winning suppliers. These suppliers were awarded the
procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in
determining the best possible price for the government. The
private suppliers, which were all personally chosen by
respondent, were able to profit from the transactions without
showing proof that their prices were the most beneficial to the
government.

The petitioner is guilty of seven counts of violation of Section 3(e)

of Republic Act (RA) 3019.

People of the Philippines v. Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva

and Eduardo Chua, G.R. No. 187534, April 4, 2011
Facts: Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code by the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela.
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor, together
with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, on December
17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after
several days of conducting surveillance on their intended victim,
on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall,
Cubao, Quezon City. However, the intended kidnapping failed,
because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February 5,
1998, a second attempt was made, but they encountered an
accident before they could even execute their original plan.
Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not
able to establish his participation in the commission of the crime
because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in
Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the kidnappers and the victims
arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that there was
no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will
point to his clear participation in the crime because he was just
the driver of the car that brought the victims to the place where
the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that he was
not a participant in the offense charged in the Information.
Basically, the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.
Ruling:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his
confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural consequences
even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends
to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law,
chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are
necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless
such act differs radically and substantively from that which
they intended to commit.
All of the appellants, having been proven that they each took part
in the accomplishment of the original design, are all equally liable
for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants were
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping although the
death of the victim was of natural cause since the death occurred
on the occasion of kidnapping.

PAERA VS PP.
FACTS:
As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental,
Santiago Paera allocated his constituents use of communal water
coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the
residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in
the neighboring barangay of and owned by complainant Vicente
Darong and father of complainant, Indalecio. Despite petitioners’
scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Later
on, Paera reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme
and cut Indalecio’s access.
One day, Paera inspected the tank after constituents
complained of water supply interruption. He discovered a tap from
the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of
water from the ensuing leak, he fashioned a wooden plug using a
borrowed bolo. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived.
Paera, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged
towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!).
Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea
Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon
seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead
of replying, petitioner shouted Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka,
patyon tikaw! (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will
kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the
nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner
turned his attention back to Indalecio. As Paera chased Indalecio,
he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust
his bolo towards him, shouting Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo
ulo! (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!).
The court found Paera guilty of Grave Threats under Article
282. On appeal, he concedes his liability but only for a single
count of the continued complex crime of Grave Threats. He
contends that he is only liable for one count of Grave Threats
because he only had a single mental resolution, a single impulse,
and single intent to threaten the Darongs.
Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges
for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in
lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances under
paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.
Issues/ Rulings:
1. What is the nature of Grave threats?

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave

Threats any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family
of any wrong amounting to a crime.
 This felony is consummated as soon as the threats
come to the knowledge of the person threatened.

2. Whether Paera committed a single count of the continued

complex crime of Grave Threats.

No, the nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the

proper application of the concepts of continued and complex
crimes preclude the adoption of his theory.

The theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave

Threats because he only had a single mental resolution, a
single impulse, and single intent to threaten the Darongs
assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio,
Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water tank.

It is clear that the threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea

and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person
amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious
physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats
were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and
Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Thus,
having spoken the threats at different points in time to these
three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner
incurred three separate criminal liabilities.

3. Was the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger

present in the case?

No. Defense of a stranger requires proof of:

 (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and
(3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and
resentment.
None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the
Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties
rights when Paera successively threatened them with bodily
harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary, peaceful
acts. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry
on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to
prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for the third
requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that
petitioner acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs
repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme,
causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the
Darongs with bodily harm.
4. Was the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
exercise of office is present.
No, the law requires proof that the offense committed
was the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of office.
Paera exceeded the bounds of his office when he
successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon,
threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A
number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of
his office lay before him and his resort to any of them would
have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so
 places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune
official conduct. He ought to know that no amount of concern
for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective
officials of violence or threats of violence.

G.R. No. 177752 February 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellant,

vs.
ROBERTO ABAY
Facts:
Sometime in December 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
appellant commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct against
[AAA], a minor, 13 years of age. Appellant pleaded not guilty
during arraignment. During trial, AAA testified that appellant, her
mother’s live-in partner, had been sexually abusing her since she
was seven years old. Whenever her mother was working or was
asleep in the evening, appellant would threaten her with a bladed
instrument and force her to undress and engage in sexual
intercourse with him.
BBB (mother) corroborated AAA’s testimony. She testified that
she knew about appellant’s dastardly acts. However, because he
would beat her up and accuse AAA of lying whenever she
confronted him, she kept her silence. Thus, when she caught
appellant in the act of molesting her daughter on December 25,
1999, she immediately proceeded to the police station and
reported the incident.
According to Dr. Guerrero-Manalo, AAA confided to her that
appellant had been sexually abusing her for six years. This was
confirmed by AAA’s physical examination indicating prior and
recent penetration injuries.
The RTC concluded that appellant had indeed sexually abused
AAA. A young girl would not have exposed herself to humiliation
and public scandal unless she was impelled by a strong desire to
seek justice. In a decision dated November 25, 2003, the RTC
found appellant guilty of committing the crime of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 against AAA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the penalty and award
of damages. In view of the enactment of RA 83537 and RA
9346,8 the CA found appellant guilty only of simple rape and
reduced the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua. The SC
affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether the crime is simple rape or a violation of section 5(b) of
RA 7610

HELD :
SIMPLE RAPE
Under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if
the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender
should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape
under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim
is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article
266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the
same act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability
for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with
a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the
Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an
offense penalized by a special law.
In this case, the victim was more than 12 years old when the
crime was committed against her. The Information against
appellant stated that AAA was 13 years old at the time of the
incident. Therefore, appellant may be prosecuted either for
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. While the
Information may have alleged the elements of both crimes, the
prosecution’s evidence only established that appellant sexually
violated the person of AAA through force and intimidation by
threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit
to his bestial designs. Thus, rape was established.
Indeed, the records are replete with evidence establishing that
appellant forced AAA to engage in sexual intercourse with him on
December 25, 1999. Appellant is therefore found guilty of rape
under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.