Dichoso vs. Marcos
Dichoso vs. Marcos
Dichoso vs. Marcos
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO,
Petitioners, v.PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
On August 2, 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against
respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of Lot No. 21553 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City; while respondent is the owner of
Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed
to have used a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however,
blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted another
passageway by the spouses Benjamin and Sylvia Arce (Spouses Arce), the owners of another
adjacent lot, the former instituted the complaint before the RTC and prayed that they be
granted a right of way over an area of 54 sqm of Lot 01 by paying the defendant the amount
ofP54,000.00, and that the right be annotated on defendant’s title. In addition to that, the
defendant will pay the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 as damages for attorney’s fees and costs
of suit.
In the defendant’s answer, he denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway.
Moreover, he stated that petitioners’ claim of right of way is only due to expediency and not
necessity for there already is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners
granted by the Spouses Arce. Thus, there is no need to establish another easement over
respondent’s property.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners by finding that they had adequately
established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649
and 650 of the Civil Code. Also, the trial court declared petitioners in good faith as they
expressed their willingness to pay proper indemnity. however, the he CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision ruling that a right of way had already been granted by the sevient estate. Thus,
there is no need to establish an easement over the respondent’s property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal easement of right of way
from their landlocked property through the property of private respondent which is the
shortest route in going to and from their property to the public street.
HELD:
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and
is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner
of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the
preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met: first, the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third, the isolation is not due to the
acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and fourth, the right of way claimed is at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the
above-enumerated requirements. Admittedly, they had been granted a right of way through
the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet
in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from
the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass
through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find
petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched
doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be
real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of
necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.
The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory
right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence,
when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient,
the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.