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the company as a regular employee for as long as the company existed and as soon as he fully
recovered from his injury.
In September 1999, after he recovered from his injury, petitioner reported for work. Instead of giving
THIRD DIVISION him employment, they made him sign a memorandum of resignation to formalize his separation from
the company in the light of the expiration of his five-month contract.
RONILO SORREDA, G.R. No. 172927 On November 16, 1999, petitioner filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC of Dasmarias,
Petitioner, Cavite a complaint[8] for illegal dismissal (later changed to breach of contract). In his position paper,
Present: he raised the following issues:

CORONA, J., Chairperson, 1. whether there was a valid agreement or contract of perpetual employment
VELASCO, JR., perfected between the parties concerned;
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and 2. whether respondent corporation was bound thereby and
MENDOZA, JJ.
3. whether [petitioner] has a cause of action for damages against respondent based on
CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONICS the contract.[9]
CORPORATION,[1]
Respondent. Promulgated: He claimed that respondent failed to comply with the terms of the contract of perpetual
February 11, 2010 employment which was perfected in June 1999 when he was called to a meeting by
x--------------------------------------------------x management.[10] He prayed that respondent be made to pay compensatory, [11] moral[12] and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees for default or breach of contract.
DECISION Respondent denied that it extended regular employment to petitioner. Only words of encouragement
CORONA, J.: were offered but not perpetual employment. Moreover, it assailed the labor arbiters jurisdiction over
the case, claiming a lack of causal connection between the alleged breach of contract and their
employer-employee relationship.
This petition[2] seeks to reverse and set aside the May 26, 2005 decision [3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77303 and its resolution denying reconsideration. [4] The CA affirmed The labor arbiter held that he had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case as it involved the
the resolution[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 028156-01 employer-employee relationship of the contending parties. He ruled that petitioner who had been
declaring that petitioner Ronilo Sorreda was not a regular employee of respondent Cambridge employed on a per-project basis became a regular employee by virtue of the contract of perpetual
Electronics Corporation. employment. He stated that the positive declaration of the witnesses (common-law wife, father and
cousin) present at the meeting and the parole evidence rule was enough to support the petitioners
On May 8, 1999, petitioner was hired by respondent as a technician for a period of 5 months at claim. Thus, in a decision dated March 9, 2001, the labor arbiter ruled that petitioner was employed
minimum wage.[6] Five weeks into the job (on June 15, 1999), petitioner met an accident in which his by respondent for an indefinite period of employment (that is, on regular status.) He ordered
left arm was crushed by a machine and had to be amputated. [7] petitioners reinstatement and the payment of backwages, moral damages and exemplary damages as
well as attorneys fees.[13]
Petitioner claimed that, shortly after his release from the hospital, officers of respondent company Both petitioner and respondent appealed to the NLRC. Petitioner claimed that the labor arbiter erred
called him to a meeting with his common-law wife, father and cousin. There he was assured a place in in finding that he was a regular employee, that the case was based on illegal dismissal and that
reinstatement and payment of backwages were the proper reliefs. Respondent, on the other hand,
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asked for the reversal of the labor arbiters decision based on grave abuse of discretion for assuming contract. Thus, petitioner insisted that there was a perfected contract of perpetual employment and
jurisdiction over the case. that respondent was liable to pay him damages.

The NLRC agreed with respondent.[14] It found that petitioner was not a regular employee; thus, he We note, however, that petitioner filed the case only when respondent refused to rehire him.[23]
was neither illegally dismissed nor entitled to reinstatement and backwages. Petitioner sued for While there was an employer-employee relationship between the parties under their five-month per-
compensatory damages because of the accident that befell him. As the contract for per-project project contract of employment, the present dispute is neither rooted in the aforestated contract nor
employment had already expired, the issue no longer fell under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter is it one inherently linked to it. Petitioner insists on a right to be employed again in respondent
and NLRC. Moreover, the testimonies of petitioners witnesses were declared self-serving and thus company and seeks a determination of the existence of a new and separate contract that established
insufficient to prove the contract of perpetual employment. The motion for reconsideration of that right. As such, his case is within the jurisdiction not of the labor arbiter but of the regular
petitioner was denied.[15] courts. The NLRC and the CA were therefore correct in ruling that the labor arbiter erroneously took
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[16] in the CA questioning the NLRCs finding of non- cognizance of the case.
existence of the contract of perpetual employment. Even assuming arguendo that the labor arbiter had the jurisdiction to decide the case, the Court
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, stating that the labor arbiter decided the case on an cannot countenance petitioners claim that a contract of perpetual employment was ever constituted.
issue that was never raised (i.e., the employment status of petitioner). Moreover, petitioners principal While the Constitution recognizes the primacy of labor, it also recognizes the critical role of private
cause of action, breach of contract, was not cognizable by the labor courts but by the regular enterprise in nation-building and the prerogatives of management. A contract of perpetual
courts.[17] The CA concluded that the NLRC did not commit any reversible error in finding that the employment deprives management of its prerogative to decide whom to hire, fire and promote, and
labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove grave abuse of renders inutile the basic precepts of labor relations. While management may validly waive it
discretion in the NLRCs exercise of its quasi-judicial function. prerogatives, such waiver should not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.[18] Thus, this petition. customs.[24] An absolute and unqualified employment for life in the mold of petitioners concept of
We affirm the Court of Appeals. perpetual employment is contrary to public policy and good customs, as it unjustly forbids the
employer from terminating the services of an employee despite the existence of a just or valid cause.
This case rests on the issue of whether the labor arbiter had the jurisdiction to take cognizance It likewise compels the employer to retain an employee despite the attainment of the statutory
thereof. retirement age, even if the employee has became a non-performing asset or, worse, a liability to the
employer.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a complaint is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.[19] In Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,[20] the Court reiterated that where no Moreover, aside from the self-serving claim of petitioner, there was no concrete proof to establish the
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, and the Labor Code or any labor statute existence of such agreement. Petitioner cannot validly force respondent to enter into a permanent
or collective bargaining agreement is not needed to resolve any issue raised by them, it is the Regional employment contract with him. Such stance is contrary to the consensuality principle of contracts as
Trial Court which has jurisdiction. Thus it has been consistently held that the determination of the well as to the management prerogative of respondent company to choose its employees.
existence of a contract as well as the payment of damages is inherently civil in nature. [21] A labor
arbiter may only take cognizance of a case and award damages where the claim for such damages WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
arises out of an employer-employee relationship.[22]
In this instance, petitioner, from the period May 8, 1999 to October 8, 1999, was clearly a per-project
employee of private respondent, resulting in an employer-employee relationship. Consequently,
questions or disputes arising out of this relationship fell under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.

However, based on petitioners allegations in his position paper, his cause of action was based on an
alleged second contract of employment separate and distinct from the per-project employment