The Amazing Saga of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers
The Amazing Saga of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers
The Amazing Saga of How Israel Turned Its F-15s Into Multi-Role Bombers
.V. CLUB DEADSPIN EARTHER GIZMODO JEZEBEL KOTAKU LIFEHACKER SPLINTER THE TAKEOUT THE ROOT THE ONI
When the F-15 was created, it was created to be a pure air-to-air fighter, with
the philosophy of “not a pound for air-to-ground” guiding designers. So how
did Israel end up turning their F-15s into deadly long-range multi-role strike
aircraft well before the F-15E Strike Eagle became a reality? Here’s how.
Israel’s love affair with the F-15 began out of the need to procure a fighter that
could trump the increasingly complex fighters that surrounding Arab states
were amassing from Russian and French sources. Both the F-14 Tomcat and
the F-15 Eagle were tested by Israel Air Force pilots in the US during the mid
1970s, with the Eagle being chosen hands down over the Tomcat. In Hebrew,
they call it the “Baz.”
Israel received the first of its initial order of two single seat F-15As and two,
two seat F-15Bs in 1976 under the Peace Fox foreign military sales program.
These aircraft were largely used as test, training and evaluation planes so that
the Israeli Air Force could prepare for its full order to arrive. Another 19 F-15As
and two F-15Bs were delivered by 1978, entering active service with 133
Squadron at Tel Nof airbase.
The Baz represented a quantum leap in capability for the IAF, with the service
having flown the F-4, A-4 and Mirage series prior to it, and was far and away
the most capable fighter aircraft in the region during the 1970s. Well, at least
aside from Iran’s then growing F-14A fleet.
The Baz was truly a national source of pride in Israel at the time of its arrival
and remains so to this day, with only the IAF’s very best pilots selected to fly
it. Obviously the aircraft’s strict air-to-air focus helped with this image as the
jet was viewed as a guardian of Israel, a weapon that would ensure the
country’s ability to exist through overwhelming air superiority capability.
Israeli F-15A and Bs were quick to live up to their hype, shooting down five
Syrian MiG-21s over Lebanese skies on June 27th, 1979. More Syrian kills
followed that September. Then, on February 13th, 1981, the Baz shot down the
very aircraft that spurred the F-15’s original development in the late 1960s, a
high and fast flying MiG-25 Foxbot, also of Syrian origin.
Israeli F-15s went on to support Operation Opera, the IAF’s daring raid on
Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Six F-15s would provide counter-air escort the eight
newly received F-16s that would do the bombing. The high-risk mission was a
massive success.
The Baz fleet would then go on to score dozens of kills against Syrian MiGs
during the Lebanon War of 1982. IAF Brig. Gen. Moshe Marom-Melnik
explained just how powerful the Baz was even against waves of Syrian MiGs:
“We kept the Syrians from flying in Lebanon, and did it in the best possible
fashion. Every flight of Syrian planes that tried to cross the lines and attack our
forces in Lebanon was shot down. Sometimes a single plane out of the flight
escaped and told the others the story of what had happened. We had a field day,
basically, shooting down practically everything that flew. The MiG-21 and MiG-
23, which formed the backbone of the Syrian air force, were crushed. As far as
our squadron was concerned, the war was more like a shooting range.”
During the early 1980s, the IAF received the improved F-15C/D Baz. 18 F-15Cs
and 8 F-15Ds were delivered during the 1982-1983 timeframe. These new jets
were more capable than their predecessors in almost every respect, although
their airframe remained visually nearly identical to the older A/B models.
These F-15C/Ds were in no way replacements for the IAF’s older A/B models,
instead they were meant to augment and grow Israel’s cherished and battle
proven Baz force and would work alongside the equally as new and growing
fleet of F-16A/Bs.
The very idea of what the Baz/Eagle is, and how it could be used in combat,
was totally changed on October 1st, 1985 when six F-15Ds and two F-15Cs flew
over 1200 miles from their Israeli bases across the Mediterranean Sea to strike
the PLO’s headquarters located on the coast of Tunis, Tunisia. This complex
and risky strike, which was dubbed Operation Wooden Leg, was in retaliation
for the supposed murder of three innocent Israelis yachting off of Cyprus. The
PLO claimed they were Israeli spies.
At the time, this was the longest-range IAF airstrike ever, which took
advantage of the Eagle’s great endurance, especially the new C/D models
which carried approximately 2,000lbs of additional internal fuel than their
predecessors. It was also made possible by IAF’s new aerial refueling
capabilities, with two KC-707s being used as tankers and command posts for
the mission. The tankers were procured in 1983 and the idea to give the Baz
some sort of precision guided strike capability began around that same time.
By 1985, crews were trained and the gear was ready for just this type of
operation.
Still, training for something and executing it in reality are two entirely
different things.
In order for the mission to succeed, the flight had to remain undetected by
North African countries, as well as Syrian and even U.S. Naval vessel’s radars.
As a result, the route was far from direct. An Israeli vessel with a helicopter
aboard was pre-positioned off of Malta should any of the crews have to eject.
Also, two spare F-15s, in addition to the eight primary attacker F-15s, would
make it to the first refueling point before turning back. This was a hedge
against any mechanical failures with the primary attack force.
Although the distances involved in the strike were groundbreaking, the fact
that the F-15 would prove its ability to be adapted for the ground attack role in
actual combat was monumental. The F-15A-D was actually built with a very
austere ground attack capability based around gravity bombing with basic
Mk82, 83 and 84 general purpose bombs. This largely dormant capability has
never been exercised by any other operator but the IAF. Still, having the Baz
lob dumb bombs at targets could not provide enough precision for such a
high-value operation as Wooden Leg, which was aimed at telling the PLO, and
the world, that Israel could retaliate against its enemies anywhere in the world
via air power, with devastating results.
With this goal in mind, the six F-15Ds used in the strike were equipped with
the ability to launch and guide a pair of 2,000lb GBU-15 optically guided glide
bombs, with the backseaters controlling the massive weapons via a man-in-
the-loop, two way data-link pod mounted on the Eagle’s centerline station.
The GBU-15 has a range of about 24 miles when launched from 40,000 feet,
but in practice, a launch from 25,000 feet, with a range of about 12-15 miles is
more common. The other two aircraft used on the raid were F-15Cs, which
would be the last aircraft on target. They carried six 500lb Mk82s general
purpose bombs each on a multiple ejector bomb racks attached to the Baz’s
centerline station. In addition to air-to-ground weaponry, the Eagles flew with
AIM-7 Sparrows and their 20mm cannon magazines topped off with 940
rounds (510 rounds in the D model), just in case an aerial threat materialized.
The jets, which had all their identifying marks stripped off before the mission,
made it to their targets undetected. As the first wave of three Bazs approached
the coastline they launched their weapons and obtained perfect results, with
the second trio launching theirs GBU-15s shortly after. The flight lead then
joined with the final pair of F-15Cs after the first 5 jets turned back towards
the east, their wing stations now empty. He then push into the target area with
the last two F-15Cs for their bomb runs, working as a spotter and taking
photos of the damage for later assessment.
Almost every weapon hit their intended target, obliterating the PLO
headquarters totally. For the IAF, the mission was a massive success,
obliterating the briefed targets and killing large amounts of PLO personnel
(IAF claimed around 60 PLO personnel were killed, while others claimed the
death rate to be in the hundreds). The attacks resulted in broad international
condemnation, even from the US, although for the Israelis the message they
wanted to send to the world could not have been clearer. On top of this, they
realized that their F-15 Baz fleet, which gained Israel air supremacy once and
for all over the region in years prior, could become so much more, it could be a
deterrent force aimed at enemies far from Israel’s borders.
Although details of Israel’s startlingly long-ranged attack were kept out of the
public eye following the mission, US intelligence services were surely aware of
exactly how the mission was executed after the fact. The use of lightly
modified F-15C/D Bazs undoubtedly gave further heft to the then finally
blossoming F-15E Strike Eagle program, which had been envisioned in
different configurations by McDonnell Douglas and the USAF as far back as the
mid 1970s.
The F-15E’s official first flight, after the demonstrator beat out the F-16XL
during a fly-off competition, would occur just a year after Operation Wooden
Leg, with its introduction into USAF service occurring in 1988, although
without many of its most advanced features available.
One of the features that the F-15E would be built with was conformal fuel
tanks, otherwise known as “FAST Packs,” as in Fuel And Sensor Tactical Packs.
These flank hugging 849 gallon tanks were not new to the F-15 with the
advent of the Strike Eagle, in fact they were envisioned as an option for the F-
15C/D and even retrofittable to the A and B models early on, with the first test
flight being flown with them attached to an Eagle in the mid 1970s. They were
envisioned to carry everything from fuel to cargo, although the majority of
these concepts never made it to fruition.
USAF Eagles only took limited advantage of FAST packs, with some jets
deployed to Iceland or stationed in Alaska using them sporadically for the
long-range air sovereignty role. The IAF on the other hand saw the great
utility in these conformal fuel tanks, not just to enhance range, but to make
their air superiority focused Bazs true multi-role heavy fighters.
Like those found on the F-15E, F-15 Baz’s conformal tanks could be fitted with
hardpoints for air-to-air missiles or for bombs. This allows for the Baz to fly
missions with a pair of underwing tanks and even a centerline tank while still
being able execute air-to-ground missions. Today, many Bazs can be seen
fitted with indigenously developed FAST Packs built by IAI, but the fact is
these were flying on Bazs many decades ago.
The IAF’s love affair with conformal fuel tanks continues on today, not just on
the remaining Baz fleet, but also on every fighter aircraft ordered since the
early 1990s. Additionally, fuel is not the only thing they carry. Sensors and
emitters can also be fitted within them, giving the Baz a whole range of
secondary mounting options beyond just its stock hardpoints.
By the late 1980s, the IAF took delivery of yet another batch of F-15C/Ds, some
of the last ever built. Then, following the Gulf War, the US awarded Israel with
12 surplus F-15As and a single surplus F-15B, all from Louisiana Air National
Guard stocks, as a thank you for not intervening in Operation Desert Storm
even though Saddam’s SCUD missiles were fell on the country throughout the
conflict. Exactly what happened to these aircraft remains unclear. Some were
said to have been in worse condition than Israel’s own F-15A/Bs, although the
B model, which the IAF puts a heavy value on, was surely integrated into the
Baz fleet. The rest of the aircraft may have been used for training and/or
cannibalized for spare parts.
During this same time period, much like its once Fleet Defender turned attack
aircraft naval counterpart, the F-14 Tomcat, the Baz fleet received small
upgrades enhancing its ability to attack ground targets. The longer range
Popeye air-to-surface missile was integrated into the Baz’s repertoire, which
greatly expanded the Baz’s standoff ground attack range to almost 50 miles.
Still, the Popeye used a similar, demanding control interface as the GBU-15
and it was an expensive and powerful weapon. Nonetheless, it made the Baz
fleet more capable of striking targets deep in highly defended enemy territory
than ever before.
The Baz also saw air-to-ground combat once again during Operation
Accountability on July 25, 1993, striking Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. This
was the first time the Baz had hit targets in the regional defense role,
something that would become a bread and butter mission for the big fighter in
the new millennium.
The Louisiana air guard surplus F-15As and single F-15B were the last batch of
F-15 Bazs delivered to the IAF, with orders switching over to the F-15E Strike
Eagle derivative, known as the F-15I “Ra’am” or “Thunder” after 1993.
Ever since the Strike Eagle become operational in USAF service, Israel was
interested in buying the advanced jet, yet the US was not willing to sell it to
them. Then, the signing of the Oslo Accords occurred in 1993, which opened
the door for Israel’s Strike Eagle wishes to become a reality. This is very
similar as to how the signing of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty opened the door
to the F-16 for the IAF about a decade and a half earlier.
Price was a major issue surrounding the Strike Eagle purchase. The aircraft
would cost almost three times that of an F-16, and close to double that of a
F/A-18. The fact that unique Israeli sub-systems would need to be integrated
into the Strike Eagle design only made procuring large amounts of the jets
more cost prohibitive. Israel even looked at buying used F-111s Aardvarks
instead of the Strike Eagle, along with more F-16s, as a way to get more value
for their dollar. After closely examining F-111 operations at RAF Lakenheath in
England, they realized the maintenance required for the swing-wing bombers
would be prohibitive. Also, the F-111 had very little ability to defend itself
against enemy fighters, so it would still rely on the F-15 to get its job done.
In the end, a total of just 25 of the Strike Eagle derivatives would be ordered
and they would become the most capable fighter in IAF service. As a way of
augmenting the reduced F-15I buy, Israel would procure a similarly modified,
but much more plentiful F-16I “Sufa,” or “Storm,” fighter fleet of 100 jets.
By the mid 1990s, with 100 F-16Is and 25 F-15Is on order, Israel turned its
focus on a much needed deep F-15 Baz upgrade program, with enhancements
similar to those found in the USAF’s F-15 MSIP (Multi-Stage Improvement
Program). Israel had to chose between going through an American led
improvement program, or largely going about enhancing the now dated Baz
for the coming decades on its own.
The IAF chose to indigenously upgrade the Baz fleet, mainly due to cost and
the fact that their own unique sub-systems would have to be integrated
anyway. Known as the Baz 2000 program, this reworking of the best of the
IAF’s Baz fleet would give F-15A/B/C/D aircraft a common cockpit
configuration, although that was just the start of the improvements.
Many of the upgrades were ported over from the F-15I, while others were
unique to the Baz fleet. The radars were upgraded to fire the AIM-120
AMRAAM. A new Hands-On Throttle And Stick setup was installed. Multi-
function displays were added to the cockpit, both front and aft in the B/D
model’s case. Enhanced data-links and updated communications gear were
installed. A new electronic warfare suite was also integrated into the middle
aged jets along with new mission computers and navigation systems (with
embedded GPS). Enhanced cooling was also a much needed feature. To support
these new systems, the Bazs were totally rewired, which in itself was an
impressive feat.
In the end, the Baz 2000 initiative gobbled up an incredible 8,000 man hours
per jet and ran from 1995 to 2005. Israeli technicians found that many jets was
built slightly differently, so they could not just replace one black box with
another, each jet had to be worked on in a one by one basis. The whole process
was said to be a grueling one.
The result of the costly program was a Baz that looked very similar to the way
it did decades before, but when it came to deadliness and adaptability, it was
an entirely different animal. Because Israel had flown the wings off (literally!)
of a good portion of the oldest Baz fleet, not every available airframe was put
through the Baz 2000 upgrade program, with only the cream of the fleet
(about 50 aircraft) being renewed for decades of future operations.
Israel’s reinvigorated Baz fleet has never been more relevant than it is today.
The advent of GPS guided weaponry, such as the JDAM, allows them to finally
work as pinpoint, all weather, fixed target strikers without having to rely on
cumbersome optically guided weaponry. They can also still work as standoff
weapons haulers as they had for decades, the only difference being that now
Israel has a whole array of standoff weaponry that can be tailored to the target
at hand. In addition, the Baz’s speed, range and stability made it an ideal
platform for tactical reconnaissance, and large reconnaissance pods have been
seen slung underneath these jets over the last decade or so.
Because the Baz still has similar range as its more contemporary successors,
the F-15I and the F-16I, it can work as a forward deployed networking and
command and control node, absorbing the battle picture via data-link from
fighters within its line of sight and then beaming this information up to a
satellite, which then beams it back down to Israeli commanders hundreds, or
even thousands of miles away. This can also go in the opposite direction, with
new orders, alerts of pop-up air defenses, and other updates being sent from
behind friendly lines or from orbiting strategic intelligence aircraft to the F-
15B/D Baz. From here, the Baz can disperse this information to the rest of the
non-satellite communications equipped strike package.
In recent years, the upgraded Baz fleet has been used in conflicts near and
within Israel’s borders as well as far beyond them. With the IAF taking out
Syrian and Hezbollah targets on a seemingly regular basis, and long-range
raids, like the one on the Khartoum weapons dump in 2012, continuing to be
an operational reality, the IAF’s F-15 fleet remains a cherished resource.
Additionally, the Baz has been used on attack missions within Israel’s own
borders during conflicts in Gaza, the most recent being the wide-ranging and
controversial Operation Pillar Defense.
Still, no target looms larger for all of Israel’s longer-ranged fighter force than
Iran and its nuclear facilities. Clearly, this mission alone has helped justify the
continued investment into the aging F-15 Baz fleet. The jet’s ability to lug
large weapons over long distances and be rapidly adapted to various roles
beyond fighter or bomber makes it an intrinsic part of any potential sustained
air operation against Iranian nuclear interests. This is especially true if Israel
were to have to take a long, round-about route to strike Iran, a feat that will
push the IAF’s small but growing tanker fleet to the absolute max.
The Baz is scheduled to not just remain in service for decades to come, but to
also receive more investment in the form of additional upgrades. These
proposed upgrades could include improving the jet’s radar, upgrading its
electronic warfare capability, integrating new weapons, and fielding new
cockpit display interfaces. Even a possible structural upgrade may be ordered.
This should allow at least the F-15C/D portion of the Baz fleet to continue
flying well into the next two decades, at which time it will be joined by the F-
35A Joint Strike Fighter.
If the F-15C/D Baz fleet were to see an Active Electronically Scanned Array
radar upgrade, similar to the USAF’s APG-63V3 radar upgrade for its Eagles,
such a powerful radar system could be a force multiplier for the rest of Israel’s
fighter fleet. It could provide long-range situational awareness, enhanced
ability to spot low-flying cruise missiles and stealthy targets in the homeland
defense roll, and it could be yet another electronic attack weapon in Israel’s
already bristling bag of electronic warfare tricks.
Such a system could also benefit the F-35, which like all stealth aircraft, best
goes about its business without putting any electromagnetic energy into the
environment around it. Instead, it could use the F-15C/D’s AESA radar
information, taken from dozens of miles to its rear and sent forward to the F-
35 via data-link, to evade or even prosecute aerial targets without emitting any
electromagnetic energy at all. Similar tactics have been developed for the
USAF’ sF-15C/D and F-22 air dominance team.
Although it remains unclear if the Baz will make the leap into the AESA
capability space, it is possible, although it depends on Israel’s impression of
the F-35. If the F-35 becomes a favored part of the IAF’s arsenal, it will
compete for large portions of the IAF’s available funds, just like it does within
the Pentagon today. Such a struggle could limit how much more the Baz
evolves, no matter how relevant the jet remains. If further upgrades do indeed
comes to pass, the Baz could remain Israel’s long sword and watchful sentinel
for decades to come, adding to a legacy that has become the most illustrious in
the history of modern air combat.
Photo credits, a huge thanks to Nir Ben-Yosef for providing the images where marked.
All other images via IAF. USAF, AP, Public Domain
Tyler Rogoway is a defense journalist and photographer who maintains the website
Foxtrot Alpha for Jalopnik.com You can reach Tyler with story ideas or direct
comments regarding this or any other defense topic via the email address
[email protected]