NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
decision1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products,
hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core
maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement2 for a period of six (6) months from May
28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the
applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass
which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was
treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the
office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press
machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the
amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter3 which reads:
August 2, 1990
Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano
gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at
may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.
Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay
pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang
makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.
Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:
Emergency and doctor fee P715.00
Medecines (sic) and others 317.04
Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang
tahi ng kanyang kamay.
Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto,
1990.
Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay,
pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto.
Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama
ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala
sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.
(Sgd.) Roberto Capili
Roberto Capili
On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner
for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79.4
Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC
Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of
other monetary benefits.
On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private
respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion
of the ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money
claims dismissed for lack of merit.
The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as
financial assistance.
SO ORDERED.5
Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto
Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the
terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only
to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does
not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without
authority and proper training.6
On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed
to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time
his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is
hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis
of law and evidence obtaining.
SO ORDERED.7
The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling
thus:
As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship
agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by
the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a
plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's
regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus
enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.
The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent,
pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349,
March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a
valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally
dismissed.8
On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private
respondent's representative was present.
On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ,
you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and
Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any
other places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private
respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll
reinstatement.
You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for
in the dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Hence, the instant petition — for certiorari.
The issues raised before us are the following:
I WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN APPRENTICE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY PROVEN THE
EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.
We find no merit in the petition.
Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly
be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and
approved at the time the agreement was executed.
Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already
established an employer-apprentice relationship.
Petitioner's argument is erroneous.
The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:
Contents of apprenticeship agreement. — Apprenticeship agreements, including the main
rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship
agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall
start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in
accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and
Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship.
(emphasis supplied)
In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private
respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in
the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was
prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However,
the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence
of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law.
It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice
shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship
program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be
validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and
Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously
give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.
Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national
apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government
and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection
of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to
any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such
apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship
programs and agreements cannot be debased.
Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has
no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the
DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery
boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should rightly be considered as a
regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)
and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare."9
Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.
There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due
process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal
exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process.
This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal
representation. 11
As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12
The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two
(2) written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints
the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any
judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs. NLRC, 185 SCRA
498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365
[1990]).
The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three
days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not
voluntary and deliberate.
Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy
("kargador" or "pahinante").
He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned
resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner
made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13
Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the
latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious
examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950
DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
(CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN
LUMANOG AND HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, respondents.
Quisumbing, Sycip and Quisumbing for petitioner.
Lazatin and Caballero for respondents.
Arsenio I. Martinez for the Court of Industrial Relations.

TUASON, J.:
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12) more laborers
from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the majority of the
laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was filed pending settlement by the
court of a labor dispute between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy
sa Pilipinas.
At the outset, the appellant takes exception to the finding of the court below that Dee C.
Chuan & Sons, Inc. is capitalized with foreign descent. This question has little or no bearing
on the case and may well be passed over except incidentally as a point of argument in relation
to the material issues.
It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of
selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that
"The restrictions of the number of aliens that nay be employed in any business, occupation,
trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Although the
brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the
laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's mind. certainly, the
order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, discriminate against the
petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in a case in
which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75 % of its
shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be
correct.
But is petitioner entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a law or an order which does
not adversely affect it, in behalf of aliens who are prejudiced thereby? The answer is not in
doubt. An alien may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and
so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.) The
prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not come
forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the petitioner has
no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others who are
unknown and undetermined. U.S. vs. Wong Ku Ark, 169 U.S. 649; Truax vs. Reich, 239 U.S.
39 60 Law ed., 131., and other American decisions cited do not support the petitioner for the
very simple reasons that in those cases it was the persons themselves whose rights and
immunities under the constitution were being violated that invoked the protection of the
courts.
The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the appealed
order restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. This complaint merits a more
detailed examination.
That the employer's right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. "This privilege of
hiring and firing ad libitumis, of course, being subjected to restraints today." Statutes are
cutting in on it. And so does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The regulations of the hours of
labor of employees and of the employment of women and children are familiar examples of
the limitation of the employer's right in this regard. The petitioner's request for permission
to employ additional; laborers is an implicit recognition of the correctness of the proposition.
The power of the legislature to make regulations is subject only to the condition that they
should be affected with public interest and reasonable under the circumstances. The power
may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the
courts or administrative agencies.
We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness
and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with the
constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes
have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country." (Antamok Goldfields
Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)1 "Commonwealth
Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene
in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages,
compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of." (Central
Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319,
324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-
seasons. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional
laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties."
The order in question has that specific end in view. In parallel view the court observed:
"Undoubtedly, without the admonition of the Court, nothing could prevent petitioner from
hiring purely alien laborers, and there is no gainsaying the fact that further conflict or dispute
would naturally ensue. To cope with this contingency, and acting within the powers granted
by the organic law, the court, believing in the necessity and expediency of making patent its
desire to avoid probable and possible further misunderstanding between the parties, issued
the order."
We are not prepared to declare that the order is not conducive to the aim pursued. The
question is a practical one depending on facts with which the court is best familiar. The fact
already noted should not be lost sight of — that there is a pending strike and besides, that
the employment of temporary laborers was opposed by the striking employees and was the
subject of a protracted hearing.
We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into
the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a
political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court's
action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does
not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent, all-embracing
regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in this case and
calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and
menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered
by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function
of the court to effectuate.
As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be
employed should be Filipinos is certain not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. The
petitioner's right to employ labor or to make contract with respect thereto is not unreasonably
curtailed and its interest is not jeopardized. We take it that the nationality of the additional
laborers to be taken in is immaterial to the petitioner. In its application for permission to
employ twelve temporary laborers it expressly says that these could be Filipinos or Chinese.
On the face of this statement, assuming the same to be sincere, the petitioner objection to
the condition imposed by the court would appear to be academic and a trifle.
We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as
pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems
to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary
laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the
application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court could turn it
down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission should be
undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or
established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step designed to
relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory
on petitioner's part to take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole
judge of whether it should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to
hire new laborers other than Chinese.
The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this appeal against the petitioner-appellant.