G.R. No.

201427, March 18, 2015

1. TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, Petitioner, v. FE. T. ADOLFO, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner insists that respondent’s failure to reply to his written

request for admission resulted in her admitting that the subject property is a
conjugal asset, applying Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules; that the CA
grossly erred in disregarding the rule; that with the resulting admission,
there remains no genuine issue to be resolved in civil case, such that
judgment based on the pleadings is proper. Finally, petitioner adds that
respondent’s trifling with the law and rules of procedure – by conveniently
claiming in one case that the subject property is conjugal, and then in
another that it is paraphernal – should not be countenanced; she should be
held to her original declaration that the subject property is conjugal.

Respondent counters that, as correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner elected

the wrong remedy in filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings when he
should have moved for summary judgment; that in a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, the movant is deemed to admit the truth of all of the
opposing party’s material and relevant allegations, and rest his motion on
those allegations taken together with that of his own as are admitted in the
pleadings; that the effect of this is that petitioner is deemed to have
admitted that the subject property is paraphernal, as claimed in her Answer;
that with the final and executory decision of CA, the subject property should
now be considered as her paraphernal property, and petitioner’s case for
partition on the claim that the subject property is conjugal should be
dismissed for being moot and academic.

Issue:
Court of Appeals erred in deciding the case on a question of substance not
in accord with law, Rule 26 of the 1997 Rules

Ruling: The Court denies the Petition.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an

issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleading.” Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
On the other hand, “whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are
genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for
judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at
all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues
generated by the pleadings.”47 “A ‘genuine issue’ is an issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or
question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for.

2. Heirs of Johnny Aoas Vs. Juliet As-Il; G.R. No. 219558; October
19, 2016

Facts: As-il filed a complaint for forcible entry and damages against the
Heirs of Aoas before the MTC, claiming absolute ownership and possessory
rights over the 42 square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-57645. She discovered that the Heirs of Aoas, by stealth and
strategy, initiated the preparatory digging, clearing and construction of a
house and enclosing the subject land, thus, depriving and dispossessing her
of the same; and that when confronted, they asserted ownership of the
same property. From the foregoing, As-il asked the MTC to order the Heirs of
Aoas to vacate the subject property and that compensation be given to her
as well as damages and attorney’s fees.

In their Answer, the Heirs of Aoas contended that the area As-il claimed was
their property, it being part of a land registered in their names under TCT
No. T-32507; that they had been in continuous, public and adverse
possession and occupation of it. As-il asserted her claim over the property;
and that in the belief of being the true owners, they refused As-il’s demands
to turn over the property.

MTC ruled that a portion of the land claimed by the Heirs of Aoas encroached
a part of the land registered under As-il’s name. It found that As-il had prior
physical possession over the subject property, which could not be defeated
by the subsequent possession of the Heirs of Aoas. RTC initially affirmed the
MTC decision. Acting on petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, however,
the RTC reversed itself. CA set aside resolutionof RTC.
Issue: Whether Rule 70 is the proper remedy.

Ruling: it is clear that this case deals not with the right to possess the
property. Instead, the main discussions in the lower courts and the CA went
around the boundary dispute between the contending parties over the 42
square meter parcel of land. This is apparent from the fact that the
properties being claimed by both parties are covered by separate certificates
of title and overlapped each other. Stated differently, both parties lay claim
to that property on the basis of their certificates of title, both of which cover
the contested land. The MTC and RTC findings confirm this.

Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be
resolved in the context of an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment
case.[17] InManalang v. Bacani, the Court held that boundary dispute cannot
be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves different issues, to wit:
The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is,
whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiffs
property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful
detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully
withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination
of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied.
The defendant’s possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful
only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In
forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the
defendant had the prior possession de facto.

3. Tan Siok Kuan and Pute Ching Vs. Felicisimo “Boy” Ho, et al.; G.R.
No. 175085; June 1, 2016

Facts: Seven (7) separate complaints for unlawful detainer were filed by
petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against defendants Avelino Bombita
(Bombita), Felix Gagarin (Gagarin), Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano),
Felicisimo “Boy” Ho (Ho), Rodolfo Returta (Returta), Vicente Salas (Salas),
and Lolita Malonzo (Malonzo). Defendants were given ten (10) days to pay
the rentals due or else to vacate the premises and turn over the possession
thereof to petitioners, but defendants allegedly ignored petitioners’ demand,
warranting the filing of the complaints for unlawful detainer.
Defendants argued that the lease agreements they have executed with
petitioners are void ab initio, petitioners being Chinese nationals who are not
entitled to own real property in the Philippines. Moreover, they claimed to
have been in possession of the subject premises since 1968 or some 35
years ago, thus plaintiffs action cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful
detainer, but accion publiciana which must be filed before the RTC.[11]

Respondents, maintained that they have been in possession of the subject

premises for 37 years without any rentals being paid to any landlord or his
agents, and that there are no existing lease contracts between respondents
and petitioners. In fact, in separate letters to petitioners, in response to the
latter’s demand letters, respondents categorically denied renting the subject
premises. Respondents also asserted that they have started possessing said
property in 1966 by building residential houses, and that they have been in
continuous possession since then. respondents argued that even assuming
that petitioners’ titles are authentic, their cause of action should have
been accion publiciana considering that respondents are in possession and
that no lease contract exists between the parties.

MeTC-Branch 40, Quezon City ruled in favor of petitioners. As regards

defendants, the MeTC held that they impliedly admitted the existence of
lease contracts between them and petitioners and, as such, they cannot
deny the consequent lessor-lessee relationship following the rule that a
tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord. RTC-Branch 87,
Quezon City affirmed the MeTC.

Issue: Whether a lessor-lessee relationship between the parties was

properly established.

Ruling: No. they have not shown any evidence of a lease between them and
respondents, be it express or implied. As keenly observed by the CA, there
was no mention of how and when the alleged contract of lease started, there
was no proof of prior payment of rentals or any prior demand for such
payment considering petitioners’ allegation that respondents failed to pay
rentals since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in 2003.

Moreover, there is merit in respondents’ invocation of the principle of res

inter alios acta or that principle which states that “the right of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided, among which are: (1) admission by third party, (2)
admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4)
admission by privies.”
petitioners failed to establish that the defendants’[32] alleged implied
admission of a lessor-lessee relationship falls under the exceptions to the
principle of res inter alios acta as to make such admission binding upon
respondents. Although defendants and respondents were all defendants in
the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners, it is very clear that
defendants and respondents espoused different defenses. Contrary to
defendants’ position, respondents, as early as the filing of their response to
petitioners’ demand letter, firmly and consistently denied the existence of
any lease contract between them and petitioners over the subject land.

4. David Yu Kimteng, et al. Vs. Atty. Walter T. Young, et al.; G.R. No.
210554; August 5, 2015

Facts: Petitioners ask that law firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat, and
Judge Ofelia L. Calo (Judge Calo), be cited in contempt of court under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.[2] Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (Revilla) was disbarred on
December 2009 in an En Banc Resolution of this court in A.C. No. 7054
entitled Que v. Atty. Revilla, Jr. Walter T. Young (Atty. Young), Jovito
Gambol (Atty. Gambol), and Dan Reynald Magat (Atty. Magat) are lawyers
practicing under the firm, Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.[9] They entered
their appearance in the liquidation proceedings of the Ruby Industrial
Corporation as counsels for the liquidator. An Opposition[11] was filed against
the appearance of Young Revilla Gambol & Magat on the ground that Revilla
was already disbarred in 2009.[12]

Young Revilla Gambol & Magat filed a Reply[13] to the Opposition stating that
the firm opted to retain Revilla’s name in the firm name even after he had
been disbarred, with the retention serving as an act of charity.[14]

Judge Calo overruled the opposition to the appearance of Young Revilla

Gambol & Magat and stated that Atty. Young could still appear for the
liquidator as long as his appearance was under the Young Law Firm and not
under Young Revilla Gambol & Magat.[15] Young Law Firm does not exist.

Private Respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat counter that they
maintained Revilla’s name in the firm name for sentimental reasons.[28]

Atty. Young and Atty. Magat explained that they did not intend to deceive
the public[29] and that in any case, the retention of Revilla’s name “does not
give added value to the [law firm] nor does it enhance the standing of the
member lawyers thereof.”[30]
They further argue that:

The non-deletion of [Anastacio E. Revilla’s] name in the Young Law Firm’s

name is no more misleading than including the names of dead or retired
partners in a law firm’s name. It is more for sentimental reasons. It is a
fraternal expression to a former brother in the profession that the Private
Respondents fully understand, his [referring to Revilla] principled albeit
quixotic advocacy.

Issue: whether private respondents Atty. Walter T. Young, Atty. Jovito

Gambol, and Atty. Dan Reynald R. Magat are in contempt of court when they
continued to use respondent Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.’s name in their firm
name even after his disbarment

Ruling: Maintaining a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name is different

from using a deceased partner’s name in the firm name. Canon 3, Rule 3.02
allows the use of a deceased partner’s name as long as there is an indication
that the partner is deceased. This ensures that the public is not misled. On
the other hand, the retention of a disbarred lawyer’s name in the firm name
may mislead the public into believing that the lawyer is still authorized to
practice law.

The use of a deceased partner’s name in a law firm’s name was allowed
upon the effectivity of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with the
requirement that “the firm indicates in all its communications that said
partner is deceased.”[53]

On the other hand, this court has ruled that the use of the name of a person
who is not authorized to practice law constitutes contempt of court.

In San Luis v. Pineda, this court has held that “[n]eedless to say, [the]
practice of law by one who is disbarred constitutes contempt of
court.”[54] United States v. Ney, et al. involved J. Garcia Bosque who was
denied admission to the bar because he chose to remain a Spanish subject
during the cession of the Philippines under the Treaty of Paris.[55] Bosque
entered into an arrangement with Ney, a practicing attorney, and
established “Ney & Bosque.”[56]Bosque did not personally appear in courts
but the papers of their office were signed “Ney and Bosque-C.W. Ney,
Abogado.”[57] The matter was referred to the then Attorney-General, and
contempt proceedings were instituted

From the time respondent Revilla was disbarred in 2009, it appears that no
efforts were exerted to remove his name from the firm name. Thus,
respondents Atty. Young and Atty. Magat are held liable for contempt of
court.

5. Zuneca Pharmaceutical, Akram Arain and/or Venus Arain M.D. dba

Zuneca Pharmaceutical Vs. Natrapharm, Inc.; G.R. No. 197802;
November 11, 2015

Facts: Since 2003 or even as early as 2001, petitioners have been selling a
medicine imported from Lahore, Pakistan bearing the generic name
“CARBAMAZEPINE,” an anti-convulsant indicated for epilepsy, under the
brand name “ZYNAPS,” which trademark is however not registered with the
IPO. “ZYNAPS” is pronounced exactly like “ZYNAPSE.” Respondent is an all-
Filipino pharmaceutical company which manufactures and sells a medicine
bearing the generic name “CITICOLINE,” which is indicated for heart and
stroke patients. The said medicine is marketed by respondent under its
registered trademark “ZYNAPSE,” which respondent obtained from the
Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on September 24, 2007 under Certificate of
Trademark Registration No. 4-2007-005596. With its registration, the
trademark “ZYNAPSE” enjoys protection for a term of 10 years.. Respondent
further alleged that petitioners are selling their product “ZYNAPS”
CARBAMAZEPINE in numerous drugstores in the country where its own
product “ZYNAPSE” CITICOLINE is also being sold. respondent sent
petitioners a cease-and-desist demand letter.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for trademark infringement

for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property
Code of the Philippines (IPC), with prayer for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. To justify the TRO/writ of
preliminary injunction, respondent cited Section 122[11] of R.A. No. 8293,
under which the registration of “ZYNAPSE” gives it the exclusive right to use
the said name as well as to exclude others from using the same.[12] In
addition, respondent argued that under Sections 138[13] and 147.1[14] of the
IPC, certificates of registration are prima facie evidence of the registrant’s
ownership of the mark and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the
same.[15] Respondent also invoked the case of Conrad and Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals[16] where it was ruled that an invasion of a registered mark
entitles the holder of a certificate of registration thereof to injunctive
relief.[17]

In their answer, petitioners argued that they enjoyed prior use in good faith
of the brand name “ZYNAPS,” having submitted their application for CPR
with the BFAD on October 2, 2001, with the name “ZYNAPS” expressly
indicated thereon. The CPR was issued to them on April 15,
2003.[18] Moreover, petitioners averred that under Section 159 [19]of the IPC
their right to use the said mark is protected.[20]

In its December 21, 2007 Order,[21] the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied
respondent’s application for a TRO, ruling that even if respondent was able
to first register its mark “ZYNAPSE” with the IPO in 2007, it is nevertheless
defeated by the prior actual use by petitioners of “ZYNAPS” in 2003. RTC
denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether the CA may order a permanent injunction in deciding a

petition for certiorari against the denial of an application for a preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC?

Ruling: A preliminary injunction, like any preliminary writ and any

interlocutory order, cannot survive the main case of which it is an incident;
because an ancillary writ of preliminary injunction loses its force and effect
after the decision in the main petition.

Here, this Court is being asked to determine whether the CA erred by

issuing a permanent injunction in a case which questioned the propriety of
the denial of an ancillary writ. But with the RTC’s December 2, 2011 Decision
on the case for “Injunction, Trademark Infringement, Damages and
Destruction,” the issues raised in the instant petition have been rendered
moot and academic. We note that the case brought to the CA on a petition
for certiorari merely involved the RTC’s denial of respondent’s application for
a writ of preliminary injunction, a mere ancillary writ. Since a decision on the
merits has already been rendered and which includes in its disposition a
permanent injunction, the proper remedy is an appeal36 from the decision in
the main case.