Nazi Germany and The Arab World PDF

Nazi Germany and the Arab World
This book considers the evolving strategic interests and foreign policy
intent of the Third Reich toward the Arabic-speaking world, from
Hitler’s assumption of power in January 1933 to 1944, a year following
the final Axis defeat in and expulsion from North Africa in May 1943.
It does so within the context of two central, interconnected issues in the
larger history of National Socialism and the Third Reich, namely Nazi
geopolitical interests and ambitions and the regime’s racial ideology and
policy. This book defines the relatively limited geopolitical interests of
Nazi Germany in the Middle East and North Africa within the context
of its relationships with the other European great powers and its policies
with regard to the Arabs and Jews who lived in those areas.
francis r. nicosia is Professor of History and the Raul Hilberg

Distinguished Professor of Holocaust Studies at the University of
Vermont. He is the author of Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi
Germany (Cambridge, 2008); the coeditor of Jewish Life in Nazi
Germany: Dilemmas and Responses (2010); and the coauthor of The
Columbia Guide to the Holocaust (2000). Nicosia was a Revson Fellow
at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum from 2000 to 2001 and a Senior Fulbright Research
Scholar in Berlin from 1992 to 1993 and from 2006 to 2007.
He received the Carnegie Foundation’s Vermont Professor of the
Year award in 2000 and the Holocaust Educational Foundation’s
Distinguished Achievement Award in 2014.
Nazi Germany and the Arab World
FRANCIS R. NICOSIA
University of Vermont
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, ny 10013-2473, usa
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© Francis R. Nicosia 2015
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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Nicosia, Francis R., 1944–
Nazi Germany and the Arab world / Francis R. Nicosia.
pages cm
isbn 978-1-107-06712-7 (Hardback)
1. Arab countries–Foreign relations–Germany. 2. Germany–Foreign relations–Arab
countries. 3. National socialism and Islam. I. Title.
ds63.2.g4n53 2014
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For Joseph and Patrick
Die mohammedanisch-arabische Kulturperiode ist das Verbindungsglied zwischen der
untergegangenen griechisch-römischen und der alten Kultur überhaupt und der seit dem
Renaissancezeitalter aufgeblühten europäischen Kultur. Die letztere hätte ohne dieses
Bindeglied schwerlich so bald ihre heutige Höhe erreicht.
( The era of Islamic-Arab culture represents the link between the fallen Greek-Roman
and generally the culture of antiquity, and the European culture that has blossomed
since the period of the Renaissance. Without this link, the latter would not have easily
reached its high position of today.)
August Bebel, Die Mohammedanisch-Arabische Kulturperiode, Herausgegeben und
eingeleitet von Wolfgang G. Schwanitz (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1999), 169.
Als völkischer Mann, der den Wert des Menschentums nach rassischen Grundlagen
abschätzt, darf ich schon aus der Erkenntnis der rassischen Minderwertigkeit dieser
sogennanten “unterdrückten Nationen” nicht das Schicksal des eigenen Volkes mit
dem ihren verketten.
(As a folkish man who estimates the value of humanity on racial bases, I may not,
simply because of my knowledge of their racial inferiority, link my own people’s fate
with that of these so-called “oppressed nations.”)
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Jubiläumsausgabe anläßlich der Vollendung des 50.
Lebensjahres des Führers (München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP/Frz. Eher Nachf.,
1939), 655.
Unsere Sender wiegeln die Araber auf. Jetzt wollen wir mal Oberst Lawrence spielen.
(Our radio stations are inciting the Arabs. Now we want to play Colonel Lawrence.)
Joseph Goebbels, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Elke Fröhlich Hrsg., Teil I,
Bd. 9, Bearbeitet von Hartmut Mehringer (Berlin: K.G. Sauer Verlag, 1995), 252.
Contents
List of Illustrations page ix

Abbreviations xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction 1
1 Continuity and Departure: Imperial and Weimar Germany 18
Imperial Germany and the First World War 18
The Weimar Years 28
2 Hitler, Race, and the World Beyond Europe 46
Race and the European Great Powers 46
Race and “Colonial Peoples” 54
3 Germany and the Arab World, 1933–1937 62
Hitler’s “Englandpolitik” 62
Arab Overtures, Nazi Responses 70
The Arab Revolt and German Arms 79
A Jewish State 89
4 The Coming of War, 1938–1939 101
Continuity and Departure in Hitler’s “Englandpolitik” 101
Germany, Italy, and the Middle East 116
Arms Exports 127
5 From the Periphery to the Center, 1940–1941 135
From the Periphery 135
To the Center 154
6 The Axis and Arab Independence, 1941–1942 180
Arab Leaders in Wartime Berlin 180
The Elusive Axis Declaration 188
vii
viii Contents
Anticipation of Victory: Fall 1942 204

The Mufti and North Africa 216
7 Collapse and Irrelevance, 1943–1944 222
North Africa, Continuity, and Collapse 222
The Jewish Question, the Middle East, and Palestine 239
Postscript: Handschar 257
Conclusions 265
Bibliography 281
Index 293
Illustrations
1.1 Map: Ottoman Empire 1914 page 20

1.2 Map: North Africa 1914 21
1.3 Map: The Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916 24
1.4 Map: Anglo-French Mandates in the Fertile Crescent 1922 26
3.1 Fritz Grobba (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin. 77
3.2 Ernst von Weizsäcker (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
3.3 Map: Peel Partition Plan 1937 96
3.4 Werner–Otto von Hentig (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv
des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin. 97
4.1 Joachim von Ribbentrop (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv
des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin. 102
4.2 Ernst Woermann (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
4.3 Mussolini meets with Hitler in Munich (25 September 1937).
Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 117
5.1 Adolf Hitler meets with Francisco Franco at Hendaye
(October 1940). Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 143
5.2 Otto Abetz (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
5.3 Adolf Hitler meets with Henri Philippe Pétain at Montoire
(October 1940). Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 154
5.4 Erwin Rommel and Afrikakorps arrive in Tripoli (February 1941).
Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 156
5.5 Rudolph Rahn (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
ix
x List of Illustrations
6.1 Hitler receives the Mufti Amin al-Husayni in Berlin

(November 1941). Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 193
6.2 The Mufti Amin al-Husayni and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Berlin
on the first anniversary of the coup in Iraq (April 1942).
Courtesy Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. 201
6.3 Erwin Ettel (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
6.4 Walter Schellenberg (September 1943). Courtesy Bundesarchiv,
Berlin. 217
7.1 Jews rounded up by the Germans in Tunis for forced labor,
marching to the port of Bizaret (December 1942). Courtesy
Bundesarchiv, Berlin, and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem. 240
7.2 Simon Brod, Jewish Agency for Palestine representative in Istanbul,
and Jewish refugees from Transnistria (May 1944). Courtesy
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C. 246
7.3 Eberhard von Thadden (no date). Courtesy Politisches Archiv des
7.4 Grand Mufti with Bosnian volunteers for Muslim Waffen-SS
Division (November 1943). Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin. 262
Abbreviations
AA Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office)

ADAP Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945
BA-MA Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau
BArch Bundesarchiv, Berlin
DB Deutsche Botschaft (German Embassy)
DG Deutsche Gesandtschaft (German Embassy)
DGK Deutsches General-Konsulat (German Consulate-General)
IfZ Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich
NAL National Archives, London
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
Maryland
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist
German Workers Party)
OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Supreme Command of the Army)
OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces)
PA Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin
RSHA Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office)
SD Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service) in the SS
USHMM United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.
WZO World Zionist Organization
ZMO Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin
xi
Acknowledgments
I wish to express my appreciation for the support of the scholars, archivists,

librarians, and support staffs of the various research and archival institutions at
which I was able to conduct the research for this book. These institutions,
which include the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (German Foreign
Office Archives) and the Bundesarchiv (Federal Archives) in Berlin, the
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Federal Archives-Military Archives) in Freiburg
im Breisgau, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, the National Archives
at Kew Gardens in London, and the National Archives and Records Adminis-
tration in College Park, Maryland, were indispensable in the long process of
preparing this study. I am particularly grateful to the librarians and support
staff at the Bailey-Howe Library of the University of Vermont for their
kind assistance, and to my former graduate student assistants Paul Blomerth,
Elizabeth Barnes, Ethan Jennings, and Michelle Sigiel.
But these institutions and individuals would not have been in a position to
help had it not been for the generous financial support I received for this project
from several granting bodies in the United States and in Germany. I am
indebted to the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars in Washing-
ton, D.C., and the Fulbright-Kommission in Berlin, for a sabbatical year
of research in Berlin 2006–2007. The endowment for the Raul Hilberg Distin-
guished Professorship in Holocaust Studies at the University of Vermont,
generously supported by the late Mr. Leonard Miller, provided financial
support for my research at the archives in Freiburg im Breisgau, in Munich,
and in London. I wish to thank Leonard Miller once again for his commitment
to, and support for, Holocaust-related scholarship at the University of
Vermont.
To friends and colleagues at all of these institutions, I am deeply grateful.
I also wish to thank the readers of the project proposal and this manuscript for
their helpful and constructive suggestions during the review process. Finally,
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
I am indebted to my wife, Ellen Oxfeld, an anthropologist and scholar, who

provided me with useful perspectives and constructive suggestions during the
process of manuscript revision.
For whatever may be positive about this study, all of these people deserve a
large share of the credit; for any shortcomings, the responsibility must rest
entirely with me.
Francis R. Nicosia
Middlebury, Vermont
Introduction
This book is a reexamination of the foreign policy of Hitler’s Third Reich

toward the Arabic-speaking world of North Africa, the Fertile Crescent, and
the Arabian Peninsula before and during the Second World War. Although it
touches briefly on the roles of the non-Arab states of Turkey and Iran in
German geopolitical and military considerations during those years, its focus
remains on the Arab lands, all of which remained in varying degrees under
the influence or control of a European colonial power. Turkey, unlike the
Arab states, was a fully sovereign and independent state, one toward which
Hitler’s regime pursued a consistent policy before and after 1939 based on the
recognition and support for Turkey’s territorial integrity, independence, and in
particular its neutrality in a European war. Iran was more or less independent
as well, at least until the Anglo-Soviet occupations of August 1941. It was
neither an immediate object of competing European imperial ambition, nor in
close proximity to German and Italian geopolitical interest and military reach
in eastern Europe, the Mediterranean region, and parts of Africa.
The book’s focus on the Arab world is presented within the framework of
two central, interconnected issues in the larger history of National Socialism
and the Third Reich, namely the geopolitical interests and ambitions of Hitler’s
National Socialist regime and its racial ideology and “world view.” It seeks to
define the geopolitical interests and policies of Nazi Germany in the Arab lands
of the Middle East and North Africa, within the context of Hitler’s primary
ambitions in Europe, Germany’s relationships with the other European powers
in the Mediterranean area, and Arab nationalism. It also considers Nazi racial
attitudes and policies toward the Arab population that lived in those regions,
and more generally with “colonial peoples” living under some form of
European control throughout the world at that time.
In recent years, events in the Middle East and beyond have generated a
renewed interest among scholars and non-scholars alike in the relationship
1
2 Nazi Germany and the Arab World, 1933–1944
between Hitler’s Germany and the Arab lands of the Middle East and North
Africa. This is especially true with regard to the Second World War and the
Nazi persecution and mass murder of the Jews in Europe. Prior to the end of the
last century, there were a few scholarly studies that appeared beginning in
the 1960s that focused on the aims and policies of Nazi Germany in the Arab
Middle East. Few, if any, provided much detail on the reactions of Arab leaders,
intellectuals, and the general Arab population to National Socialism, Germany,
and Nazi Jewish policy.1 However, much of the more recent literature has
begun to examine the responses of the Arab populations of the Middle East
and North Africa to Hitler, National Socialism, German and European anti-
Semitism, and the destruction of the Jews in Europe. Moreover, they consider
the question of Arab responses to National Socialism and the Holocaust in
Europe not only during the Second World War, but also in the turbulent
decades in the Arab world following the end of the war. One might engage in
conjecture and attribute the recent spike in interest in the topic of Arab and
Islamic responses to Nazism and the Holocaust to a host of developments:
the rapid growth of fundamentalist Islamic organizations and movements in the
Middle East over the past several decades; the continuing Israeli-Palestinian
conflict; the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and elsewhere; the American wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan; as well as the issue of terrorism and the so-called war
on terror since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Some of the recent literature tends to offer simplistic generalizations about
the responses to Hitler, National Socialism, and Nazi anti-Semitism in a very
large, complex, and highly diverse Arabic-speaking part of the world that
stretches from the Atlantic coast of Morocco in the west to the Persian Gulf
and Iraq’s border with Iran in the east, and from the Syrian and Iraqi borders
with Turkey in the north to the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula. A few
are works by scholars in the field of modern European and German history,
the Third Reich, and the Holocaust. As such, these provide valuable new
information on, analysis of, and insights into, German policy and propaganda
1
On the question of German Middle East policy, there was some interest in the mid 1960s with the
appearance of the following: Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966); Heinz Tillmann, Deutschlands Araberpolitik im Zweiten
Weltkrieg (Berlin: Deutscher Verlag für Wissenschaft, 1965); Robert Melka, “The Axis and the
Arab Middle East, 1930–1945,” Diss. University of Minnesota, 1966; Mohamed-Kamal el
Dessouki, “Hitler und der Nahe Osten,” Diss. Berlin, 1963; and Joseph Schechtman, The Mufti
and the Führer: The Rise and fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1965).
Several additional works on specific aspects of Nazi policy appeared during the three decades
following the 1960s, among them: Bernd Schröder, Deutschland und der Mittlere Osten im
Zweiten Welkkrieg (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1975); Yair Hirschfeld, Deutschland
und Iran im Spielfeld der Mächte (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1980); Francis R. Nicosia,
The Third Reich and the Palestine Question (Austin and London: University of Texas Press
and I.B. Tauris, 1985); Uriel Dann (ed.), The Great Powers and the Middle East, 1919–1939
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988); and Edgar Flacker, “Fritz Grobba and Nazi Germany’s
Middle East Policy, 1933–1942,” Diss. London, 1998.
Introduction 3
toward the Arab Middle East and North Africa.2 However, even they,
not unlike many of the non-scholarly, often polemical, literature that has
appeared since the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001,
at times imply the existence of a generally singular, uniform Arab world, with
a more or less uniform reception of Hitler, National Socialism, and the perse-
cution and mass murder of the Jews in Europe. They often assume the existence
of an Arab world in the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, and North
Africa that constituted a generally uniform and monolithic ethnic, cultural,
political, and religious entity with a more or less singular world view. As such,
they provide neither the necessary historical and cultural context of the modern
Middle East, nor do they really utilize the important and diverse Arabic-
language sources that historians and other scholars of the modern Middle East
naturally have consulted on this important topic.
In his analysis of Nazi propaganda to the Middle East during the Second
World War, Jeffrey Herf rightly concludes that the Nazi state and party, along
with the German military, “. . . made strenuous efforts with the resources at
their disposal to export the regime’s ideology in ways that they hoped would
strike a nerve among Arabs and Muslims.”3 He also points out that Allied and
German intelligence services “. . . all found evidence that there were individuals
and groups from which the Axis might have expected strong support.”4 Just as
scholars of the history of the Third Reich and the Second World War would
hardly disagree with Herf’s first point, scholars of modern Middle Eastern
history would generally concur with his second point. Moreover, Klaus-
Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers present important information about,
and insight into, Nazi plans and activities with regard to the Middle East during
the Second World War. These include efforts by the Nazi regime to intensify
hatred of the Jews among the Arab populations, as well as evidence for Nazi
plans during the war to extend the “final solution,” the mass murder of the
Jews in Europe, to the ancient Jewish communities in the Arab lands of North
Africa and the Middle East.5 As scholars of modern Europe and Germany,
Mallmann and Cüppers, Herf, and a few others make important contributions
to our knowledge and understanding of the Third Reich, and its attitudes and
policies toward the Arab world.6 Their focus on the handful of Arab exiles in
wartime Berlin and Rome is indeed important for understanding German and
2
See for example the studies by Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, Halbmond und
Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 2006); Klaus Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem und die Nationalsozialisten: Eine
politische Biographie Amin el-Husseinis (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007);
Jeffrey Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009);
and most recently Barry Rubin and Wolfgang Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the
Modern Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014).
3 4
Herf. Nazi Propaganda, 263 Ibid.
5
Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 137 ff.
6
See also Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem, chap. 4.
Axis policy toward the Arab world during the war; this study also uses these
individuals to this particular end. However, a focus on those Arab exiles in
wartime Berlin alone does not provide an adequate lens for understanding how
the diverse populations, organizations, and institutions in the Arab world
reacted to National Socialism and the policies of the Third Reich in Europe.
Some of the recent literature at times attributes Arab motives and Arab
violence against Jews in Palestine and elsewhere in the region during the years
1933–1945 to a historically-rooted, religiously- and culturally-based hatred of
Jews. For example, Klaus Gensicke feels compelled to attribute the Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem’s particular hatred of the Jews to Arabs in general, with
little analysis or context: “This fanatical extremism has become a tradition that
remains as virulent as it was at the time of the ‘great uprising’ (1936–1939) and
represents a failed policy of refusal to compromise, of irreconcilability, and
of ‘all or nothing.’”7 Mallmann and Cüppers, moreover, speculate that the anti-
Semitic potential of the Arabs as a whole during the summer of 1942, as
Erwin Rommel seemed poised to achieve victory over the British in Egypt and
eventually Palestine, was the same as that of the Lithuanians, the Latvians, and
the Ukrainians a year earlier in Europe: “There is no reason, therefore, why the
anti-Semitic potential of the Lithuanian, Latvian, or Ukrainian nationalists
should have been greater than that of the Arabs as they awaited the German
army.”8 In drawing conclusions about Nazi wartime propaganda to the Arab
world, often a joint effort of the Nazi regime and Arab exiles in Berlin,
Herf concludes: “Nazi Germany’s Arabic-language propaganda during
World War II was the product of a remarkable political and ideological
synthesis that took place in wartime Berlin. . .These materials displayed a
synthesis of Nazism, Arab nationalism, and fundamentalist Islam.”9 While
each of these three points may indeed possess some element of truth for some
Arabs, they also infer general truths about Arabs, Arab history, Arab national-
ism, and Arab responses to National Socialism. As such, they can be simplistic
generalizations that are impossible to demonstrate in the absence of a necessary
Middle Eastern historical context, familiarity with Arabic-language sources,
and the fortunate reality that Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second
World War.
Likewise, this study cannot consult what is no doubt a large and essential
array of Arabic-language sources that would enable it to draw legitimate and,
of necessity, nuanced conclusions about the reception of Nazi ideas and policies
in the Arab world between 1933 and 1945. Therefore, rather than drawing
such conclusions, this book will leave the question of Arab reception of,
and responses to, National Socialist Germany to scholars of the Middle East
who have undertaken this task. Moreover, some of the aforementioned recent
7 8
Ibid., 192. Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 164.
9
Herf, Nazi Propaganda, 261.
Introduction 5
scholarship tends to ignore or dismiss as a motivating force among Arabs at

that time, early and mid-twentieth-century Muslim and Christian Arab resent-
ment against western imperialism and domination of the region since the
nineteenth century. Notwithstanding legitimate Zionist efforts to deal with
centuries of anti-Semitism and persecution in Europe, as well as issues of Jewish
identity and survival in the Diaspora, some tend to dismiss Palestinian Arab
fears that Zionism, the Zionist movement, and the Jewish National Home,
within the context of Arab resentment against continuing European imperial-
ism in the region, ultimately sought a Jewish majority and state in Mandatory
Palestine after the First World War.10 Examples of Arab hatred and violence
against Jews in Palestine and elsewhere in the region during the more than two
decades following the First World War are undeniable. That many Arabs
during those decades did in fact resent European imperialism in the region,
and did fear and resent Zionism and Jewish immigration as serious obstacles to
the achievement of Arab national self-determination in Palestine, is equally
undeniable. That some may use the reality of European imperialism and fears
of Zionism to explain – not to justify or defend – a large part of that hatred
and violence is both reasonable and necessary if we are to fully understand this
history. Of course, even a partial explanation such as this would conflict with
claims that Arab animosity toward Jews was and remains a mirror image of the
deeply ingrained, historical hatred and persecution of Jews in Europe.
The important topic of Arab responses to Hitler, National Socialism,
and Nazi persecution and destruction of the Jews in Europe between 1933
and 1945 is something that this author will leave to historians and other
scholars of the modern Middle East. They possess the expertise in the
modern history of the Arab world, and are able to do the essential research in
10
See for example Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, Chap. 1; and Herf, Nazi
Propaganda, 261–266. While certainly not a replacement for Arabic-language primary sources,
some Zionist sources can provide useful and important context to this issue. Chaim Weizmann’s
pronouncement at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that the aim of Zionism was “to make
Palestine as Jewish as England is English” sent an unambiguous message to the Arab majority in
Palestine. See Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann
(New York: Harper, 1949), 244. Vladimir Jabotinsky rejected any compromise with the Arabs
over the absolute necessity of a Jewish majority and state in Palestine, noting that, as Walter
Laqueur has written, “the Arabs loved their country [Palestine] as much as the Jews did.
Instinctively, they understood Zionist aspirations very well, and their decision to resist them
was only natural.” See Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (New York: Holt Rinehart and
Winston, 1972), 256. David Ben Gurion’s 1938 statement “I support compulsory transfer.
I don’t see anything immoral in it,” might have served to heighten Arab fears. See Benny Morris,
Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict (New York: Vintage, 2001), 144.
On the other hand, and to illustrate the degree of Arab rejectionism to which Mallmann and
Cüppers refer, the call of some Zionists, especially Brit Shalom, during the interwar period for a
binational state based on Jewish-Arab equality, was vehemently rejected by most Arab leaders,
as it was by most Zionists. See Steven Aschheim, Beyond the Border: The German-Jewish
Legacy Abroad (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 6–44.
Arabic-language sources that are necessary in such an endeavor. In recent years,

there has emerged a growing body of scholarship that includes monographs,
collections of essays, and individual journal articles by scholars of the Middle
East and Islam who examine the complexities and varieties of Arab responses to
Hitler’s Germany.11 As is usually the case in scholarly discourse, there are
substantive disagreements among them over various issues. However, their
works seem to generally exhibit a common recognition of the considerable size,
diversity, and complexity of the Arabic-speaking world, and of the consequent
multiplicity and range of Arab attitudes and responses to Germany, National
Socialism, Nazi anti-Semitism, and the persecution and mass murder of the
Jews in Europe. These multiple responses, the natural result of such diversity,
would preclude simple generalizations about the Arab world in the 1930s and
1940s. Moreover, some make use of this historical context in their analyses
of the impact and legacy of those years on the turbulent developments in the
region in the decades following 1945. Their knowledge and understanding of
the modern history of the region, as well as their research in Arabic-language
sources, provide a necessary context for the debates that arise from this
very sensitive topic. They provide a perspective that those of us in the fields
of modern European and German history, anti-Semitism, National Socialism,
and the Holocaust are usually not in a position to adequately provide. In the
end, they generally assume the existence of a large and diverse “Arab world,”
one that was certainly far larger and more diverse in its responses to Hitler
and National Socialism than merely the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Rashid
Ali al-Gaylani of Iraq, and other Arab exiles in wartime Berlin.
11
See most recently Stefan Wild (ed.), Die Welt des Islams, International Journal for the Study of
Modern Islam, Special Theme Issue: “Islamofascism”? 52, 3-4 (2012); and Omar Kamil, Der
Holocaust im arabischen Gedächtnis. Eine Diskursgeschichte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2012). See also Götz Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The Ambivalence
of the German Option, 1933–1945 (New York: Routledge, 2009); Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs
and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli War of Narratives (New York: Henry Holt, 2009); Meir
Litvak and Esther Webman, From Empathy to Denial: Arab Responses to the Holocaust (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Peter Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian,
Totalitarian, and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941 (New York: Routledge, 2006); Israel
Gershoni and Götz Nordbruch, Sympathie und Schrecken. Begegnungen mit Faschismus und
Nationalsozialismus in Ägypten 1922–1937 (Berlin: Schwarz, 2011); Gerhard Höpp, Peter
Wien, and René Wildangel (eds.), Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem
Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Hans Schiler Verlag, 2004). See also the essays by Ulrike Freitag
and Israel Gershoni, Peter Wien, Nir Arielli, Jeffrey Herf, Anna Baldinetti, and Mustapha Kabha
in the special edition of Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 37 (3), 2011, edited by Ulrike Freitag and
Israel Gershoni. These essays are from the international workshop “Arab Responses to Fascism
and Nazism, 1933–1945: Reappraisals and New Directions,” which took place at Tel Aviv
University and the Open University in Israel in May 2010. An older but very useful source on this
question is Stefan Wild, “National Socialism in the Arab Near East Between 1933 and 1939,”
Die Welt des Islams 25 (1985): 126–173.
Introduction 7
That some Arabs eagerly sought to make common cause with Germany in
the decades following the First World War, regardless of the nature of its
government, is certainly clear. It would seem the logical and inevitable outcome
of a post–World War I settlement in the Middle East that clearly did not satisfy
the goal of many Arabs for immediate national self-determination and inde-
pendence from foreign rule. Winston Churchill met with a delegation of
Muslim and Christian Arabs in Haifa during a visit to Palestine in March
1921, on the heels of Palestinian Arab unrest and violence in the immediate
postwar years. With a postwar settlement in place that virtually ignored
the expectations and demands of Arabs in general, it is not surprising that the
atmosphere of this meeting was one of confrontation and recrimination. Arabs
expressed anger over what they perceived as broken promises and betrayal by
the Allies during and immediately following the First World War. By the time
of Churchill’s meeting with Arab leaders in Haifa, it had become clear that
British and French control over much of the former Arab territories of the
Ottoman Empire would be formalized with League of Nations mandates. These
included a British mandate over Palestine, and a Jewish National Home that
would be incorporated into the mandate. The expansion of Anglo-French
imperial influence and control to include the entire Fertile Crescent, along with
the creation of a Jewish National Home within Britain’s Mandate for Palestine,
would trump the attainment of Arab national self-determination and independ-
ence. The Arab delegation issued the following warning to Churchill that
would be of significance in the decades that followed:
Today the Arabs’ belief in England is not what it was. . .If England does not take up the
cause of the Arabs, other powers will. From India, Mesopotamia, the Hedjaz and
Palestine the cry goes up to England now. If she does not listen, then perhaps Russia
will take up their call someday, or perhaps even Germany.12
This study is limited to an examination of the intent and the policy of the
Third Reich with regard to the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa
from Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933 through most of the Second World
War. It does so, in a sense, with an implicit reference to the warning contained
in the last sentence of the statement by the Arab delegation to Churchill in
Haifa in 1921. There are many references to and discussions of periodic Arab
overtures for German support during the Nazi years. Although these overtures
constitute an important component of this study, there is no attempt to offer an
analysis of, or conclusions about, overall Arab attitudes and responses to
National Socialism, the Nazi state, and its policies in Europe. This book does,
however, assume the existence of a general frustration and anger among Arabs
against a post–World War I settlement that effectively denied them the inde-
pendence they had expected and believed to be rightfully theirs. There was
12
Doreen Ingrams (ed.), Palestine Papers, 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict (London: John Murray,
1972), 118.
indeed a fondness among Arabs for Germany that likely stemmed from the
general conviction that Germany, alone among the European powers, had
never harbored imperial ambitions in the Arab world. Based on that conviction,
of course, many attempts by Arab leaders to solicit German support for
overturning the post–World War I settlement in the Middle East would materi-
alize during the Weimar and Nazi periods.13 This sympathy for Germany also
produced an important constant in Nazi Germany’s attitudes and policy
toward the Arab world, namely the persistent refusal of Hitler’s government
to unequivocally recognize and openly support Arab efforts to overturn the
post–World War I status quo in the Middle East through the achievement of
real independence from European control. This study is limited, therefore, to
the substance of Nazi Germany’s ideological and strategic interests and policies
in the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa, albeit beyond the
platitudes and assertions contained in Nazi propaganda in the region during
the Second World War.
Finally, this book considers the many important instances of requests that
some Arab representatives made to Germany during the Weimar and Nazi
periods for diplomatic and material support against British, French, Italian,
and Spanish colonial rule in the region, and against Jewish immigration to the
Jewish National Home in Palestine. Its focus is on German responses to those
requests in order to understand the intent of German policy toward the Arab
world, rather than on Arab attitudes toward Germany, National Socialism, and
Nazi Jewish policy. These initiatives on the part of some Arabs appear regularly
in the German diplomatic reports from the Middle East to Berlin, and naturally
constitute an element in the relationship between Hitler’s Germany and various
sectors of the Arab nationalist movement during those years. Some of the more
obvious, numerous, and useful examples of Arab initiatives are those involving
the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, as well as Rashid Ali
al-Gaylani of Iraq, and a few other representatives in the Arab lands or living
in exile in wartime Berlin. The book draws conclusions only about the sub-
stance of Germany’s responses to those Arab initiatives within the context of
German interests and policy in the Arab world; the larger meaning or signifi-
cance of those Arab initiatives as part of a more general Arab reception of
Germany, National Socialism, and Nazi Jewish policy is left to other scholars.
The mostly German primary sources used in this study clearly provide an
abundant documentary basis for drawing conclusions about the motivations
13
This view is referred to time and again in the correspondence within the German Foreign
Office in Berlin, and between it and German diplomatic missions in the Arab world during
the Weimar and Nazi periods. See for instance Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter IfZ):
Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/34, “Großarabien und die Lage in Syrien,”
Aufzeichnung Werner-Otto von Hentig, 26. Februar 1941; and ED 113/6, “Der Orient in seiner
politischen Entwicklung seit dem Weltkrieg,” n.d. Additional references to this view will be made
in the chapters to follow.
Introduction 9
and aims of Hitler’s government; they do not necessarily do the same for Arab
motivations and intent as a whole, beyond reflecting a clear Arab desire for self-
determination and independence. While these sources do indeed provide
important information for an understanding and evaluation of some of the
motivations and ambitions of the Mufti and other Arab exiles in wartime
Berlin, neither they nor the activities of German and Italian-based Arab exiles
are used in isolation to draw larger conclusions about the Arab world as a
whole during those years.
Scholars of the history of the Third Reich and the Second World War have long
debated the larger question of Hitler’s ultimate geopolitical aims and ambitions
in Europe and the rest of the world. A major divide among them has been the
extent to which Hitler and his Nazi state had developed specific ideas and
ambitions for the world beyond the European continent, after an anticipated
victory over the Soviet Union and the conquest of German “living space”
(Lebensraum) in Europe.14 Some have argued that Hitler’s ultimate goals were
“continental” in nature and scope, limited to Europe, while others have insisted
that his goals extended beyond Europe, and thus were “global.” Some of the
earliest and most important historians of modern Germany and the Third Reich
in the postwar period represented the “continental” interpretation. Scholars
such as Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Alan Bullock, Axel Kuhn,
Eberhard Jäckel, and others outlined Hitler’s systematic plans for a war of
conquest that was essentially limited to continental Europe and to its complete
reorganization under the control of a Greater German Reich.15 Others made
the argument that Hitler’s geopolitical aims and ambitions were ultimately
global in nature. Scholars such as Andreas Hillgrüber, Klaus Hildebrand,
Jochen Thies, Gerhard Weinberg, and others argued that they evolved as the
Second World War progressed, extending from the European continent to
the world beyond.16
14
See Volker Berghahn’s Foreward in the new English edition of Jochen Thies’s Hitler’s Plans for
Global Domination: Nazi Architecture & Ultimate War Aims (New York: Berghahn Books,
2012), xii. Thies’s original German edition is Architekt der Weltherrschaft. Die Endziele Hitlers
(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1976).
15
See for example Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Außenpolitik 1933–1938
(Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1968); Hugh Trevor-Roper, “Hitlers Kriegsziele,”
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 8 (1960): 121–133; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Axel Kuhn, Hitlers Aussenpolitisches Program (Stuttgart:
Klett Verlag, 1970); Eberhard Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft
(Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, 1969).
16
See for example Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940–1941
(Frankfurt am Main: Bernhard Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965), and “England’s Place in
Hitler’s Plans for World Domination,” Journal of Contemporary History 9 (1974): 5–22; Klaus
Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und Kolonianfrage 1919–1945
(München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1969); Thies, Architekt der Weltherrschaft; Gerhard
Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge
To a significant extent, this debate has been linked to the debates over the
ultimate aims of Nazi anti-Semitism and race policy in Europe and beyond.
Nazi racial ideology was always an inherent part of the geopolitical consider-
ations of the Nazi state as it planned and waged war. There certainly has been
general agreement on the central role of racial ideology in the development of
Hitler’s geopolitical plans for Europe from the early days of the National
Socialist movement. The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP)
and the Nazi state after 1933 often professed Germany’s rightful pursuit of
Lebensraum for the German people (Volk), within the context of a “new racial
order” (rassische Neuordnung) in Europe. This new German living space
would initially be centered in a “racially reorganized” Greater Germany in
central Europe, but would eventually expand into the vast reaches of eastern
Europe. It would involve the eventual elimination of Jews, Roma and Sinti, and
ultimately most of the Slavic peoples, and would likely be followed by some
sort of new, but undefined racial order at least in parts of the world beyond the
European continent.17 Of course, one can only speculate on the form that such
a new world order outside of Europe would have taken. Moreover, scholarly
debates over the Nazi decision-making process that ultimately led to the “final
solution to the Jewish question in Europe,” the decision in the fall of 1941 to
systematically murder all of the Jews in Europe, of necessity involved the
relationship between race theory and anti-Semitism on the one hand, and
geopolitical calculations and timing with regard to Europe and the Soviet Union
on the other. The final solution was clearly a central part of Nazi military and
political efforts in the war for the conquest of living space in Europe. Scholars
such as Saul Friedländer and Christopher Browning have largely put the
debates surrounding the decision-making process and the final solution to rest
with the recognition of some degree of improvisation in Nazi implementation of
its racial ideology, within the context of foreign policy and war. Friedländer has
concluded:
The Crimes committed by the Nazi regime were neither a mere outcome of some
haphazard, involuntary, imperceptible, and chaotic onrush of unrelated events nor a
predetermined enactment of a demonic script; they were the result of converging factors,
of the interaction between intentions and contingencies, between discernible causes and
University Press, 1994). For German intentions in specific areas outside of continental Europe,
see for example Norman J. W. Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the
Path toward America (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998); and Klaus
Hildebrand, Das Dritte Reich, 7. Aufl. (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 77–79.
17
See, among others, Weinberg, A World at Arms, 898 ff. In her recent book, Shelley Baranowski
looks at the links between race and empire in modern German history, and contextualizes since
the nineteenth century German imperialist ambitions in Eastern Europe, and even beyond, as
embracing ethnic homogeneity over diversity, imperial enlargement over stasis, and “living
space” as the route to the biological survival of the German Volk. See her Nazi Empire: German
Colonialism and Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010).
Introduction 11
chance. General ideological objectives and tactical policy decisions enhanced one
another and always remained open to more radical moves as circumstances changed.18
And Browning has exposed this tendency toward improvisation as circum-

stances changed, and its deadly consequences in the final solution, within the
context of war, German conquest, and what he terms the “euphoria of seeming
victory” in Europe by 1941.19
How did Hitler’s intentions and policies with regard to the Arab lands of
North Africa and the Middle East after 1933 fit into the scenario of a two-
phased strategy of a successful European-centered Kontinentalpolitik, followed
by some sort of global or Weltpolitik? And how did Nazi racial ideology fit into
such a strategy? To some extent, the few early studies of the Third Reich’s
policies in the Middle East, written in the 1960s, did at least begin to address
this question. The most significant by far was historian Lukasz Hirszowicz’s
The Third Reich and the Arab East, a 1966 English translation from the
original Polish that was first published in Warsaw in 1963. This book, along
with an unpublished 1966 PhD dissertation by Robert Melka, offered the first
comprehensive scholarly studies of Nazi aims and policy in the Middle East.
Not surprisingly, these two otherwise valuable, groundbreaking studies tend to
define the Middle East as largely inconsequential in Hitler’s geopolitical calcu-
lations, focused as Hitler was on the expansion of German living space, eastern
Europe, and the Soviet Union. Moreover, Hirszowicz and Melka incorporate
little if any information on, or analysis of, Nazi racial ideology, anti-Semitism,
and Jewish policy as they might relate to the question of the Middle East in
Hitler’s thinking before and after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939. In the
years since then, however, these issues have become an increasingly significant
part of discussions about Nazi Germany and the Arab world, particularly given
the close geographical proximity to Europe of North Africa and the Middle
East, and the existence of significant Jewish populations in those regions.
Not until the 1980s and thereafter did Nazi racial ideology and anti-
Semitism become somewhat more integrated into the scholarship on Nazi
Germany’s strategic interests and policy in the Middle East before and after
1939. Among others, this author’s 1985 study of Nazi Germany’s relationship
to the Palestine Question before the outbreak of war in Europe in September
1939 combines the issues of Germany’s strategic interests in the region and its
relationship with Great Britain on the one hand, and Nazi Jewish policy,
specifically the role of Zionism and Jewish emigration from Germany to
Palestine before the Second World War, on the other. Mallmann and Cüppers’
2006 book offers a reexamination of overall Nazi Middle East policy, with a
18
Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933–1939
(New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 5.
19
Christopher Browning, The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xi.
focus on the war years that does include an analysis of anti-Semitism and
Jewish policy as part of Nazi strategic thinking. The authors frame their
analysis of German strategic interests and aims in the Middle East with clear
reference to the role of anti-Semitism and persecution of the Jews as a central
element both in the pursuit of German policy in North Africa and the Middle
East, as well as in Arab responses to that policy.
Race was indeed part of Hitler’s overall geopolitical calculations, including
the pursuit of Nazi objectives in the Arabic-speaking lands before and
during the Second World War. As was the case in Europe, those calculations
and policies were subject to improvisation as political and military realities on
the ground required. Even in the 1960s, Lukasz Hirszowicz concluded in his
final chapter: “Nazi racism made itself constantly felt in Germany’s relations
with Arab nationalist leaders. . .A contemptuous attitude to the Arabs, aversion
to their character and political behavior, disbelief in their state-forming cap-
acity and their loyalty as allies are expressed by many statements of German
leaders and officials.”20 Improvisation in the application of Nazi racial ideol-
ogy, specifically in the regime’s Jewish policy after 1933, also provides an
important, interpretive context for any study of Hitler’s aims and strategy in
the Middle East. Indeed, a key component in Hitler’s persecution of the
Jews before 1941 was the encouragement of Jewish emigration from Germany
and settlement in the Jewish National Home in Palestine.21 This policy, in direct
conflict with Arab national interests in Palestine and generally throughout
the Middle East, was pursued by Hitler’s regime before and even during the
early part of the war. Hitler’s government supported the continuation of British
rule in Palestine over the objections of Palestine’s Arab inhabitants. The adop-
tion of the final solution in 1941, and the consequent termination of the
policy of forcing Jewish emigration from Greater Germany and occupied
Europe, seemed to remove this impediment to some form of potential wartime
Arab-German understanding and cooperation against the western powers; but
it did nothing to change Hitler’s fundamental support for continued European
imperial domination of the Middle East, and consequently, his general disinter-
est in the idea of Arab independence. Moreover, even during the Nazi mass
murder of the Jews in wartime Europe, and Germany’s concurrent and massive
propaganda campaign aimed at rallying Arab support for the Axis, Berlin
reluctantly agreed to the movement of small groups of Jews from occupied
Europe to Palestine in exchange for German nationals held by the British,
much to the consternation of the Mufti and his circle in wartime Berlin.
Given the significant Jewish populations in the Arab world, their close proxim-
ity to Europe, Germany’s wartime physical presence in the region, however
brief, and the reality of a large and dominant Arab population, race and
20
Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 315.
21
See Francis R. Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
Introduction 13
geopolitics were in the end inextricably linked in a somewhat improvised Nazi

approach to the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa.
This book parts company from some of the assumptions in recent scholarly
works about Arab enthusiasm for National Socialism and the Third Reich,
based mainly on German assessments of Arab attitudes gleaned primarily from
regular contact with Arab exiles in wartime Berlin. With its focus on German
intent and policy in the region, this study takes a somewhat different position
regarding the German side of the equation. It concludes that there was indeed
no “synthesis” or “fusion” of German interests and intentions and those of
Arab nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, or the political and intellectual
elites in the European-controlled Arab states in the Middle East and North
Africa. This author’s 1980 essay in the International Journal of Middle East
Studies concludes that Nazi policy toward Arab nationalist aspirations in
Palestine during the 1930s, prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, reflected
an “ideological and strategic incompatibility” insofar as the Nazis and their
specific interests and aims were concerned.22 The goals of Nazi racial and
foreign policies prior to 1939 had included a determination to force Jews to
emigrate to Palestine and other overseas destinations, to avoid threatening
Great Britain’s imperial position in the Middle East and elsewhere, to support
Mussolini’s quest for a greater Italian presence in the Mediterranean area,
and to answer Arab overtures of friendship and solidarity with Nazi Germany
with responses that ranged from polite but noncommittal expressions of
sympathy, to indifference, to outright rejection. During most of the war after
1940, Palestine ceased to be a central component of Nazi Jewish policy.
Moreover, Nazi acceptance of, and support for, British imperial interests in
the Arab world and beyond gave way to a policy of support more or less for the
integrity of the French empire throughout the Mediterranean region, and its
coexistence with Italian and Spanish colonial interests in the Arab world.
Notions of compatibility usually reflect some degree of shared intent, even in
the absence of parity, in the mutual interests and goals of two or more parties.
This study contends that there was clearly an absence of shared intent
from the German side throughout the years of the Third Reich with regard to
the achievement of Arab independence. It is not in a position to assess the
conclusion drawn by Mallmann and Cüppers that, “Not in spite of, but
because of their virulent anti-Semitism, sympathy for Hitler and the Germans
increased among the Muslims of the Near and Middle East.”23 However,
it does maintain the characterization of the German-Arab relationship as one
of incompatibility on both the ideological and strategic levels. In the end, Nazi
Germany’s unambiguous and consistent refusal to accept and commit to
22
Francis R. Nicosia, “Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933–1939: Ideological
and Strategic Incompatibility,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980): 351–372.
23
Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 55.
Arab aspirations for full sovereignty and independence from European rule
precluded any sort of Nazi-Arab compatibility or synthesis.24
With the outbreak of war in Europe and the decision two years later to
systematically murder all of the Jews in Europe, German tactics with regard
to the Arab world did change. However, tactics and intent are not the same
thing. Given the need to defeat Britain and the United States in the region by all
possible means, Arab hostility toward Britain and the Jews was recognized in
Berlin as a potentially useful instrument in the Axis war effort, certainly insofar
as Germany’s wartime propaganda campaign was concerned. At least in terms
of the popular message of Nazi propaganda, the interests of the Axis powers
created a surface “compatibility” with the interests and aims of Arab national-
ism, namely the defeat and end of the Anglo-French colonial rule over much of
the Arab world. Of course, this was only superficially related to the substantive
intent of German policy. Herf’s conclusion that “Nazi Germany’s Arabic-
language propaganda during World War II was the product of a remarkable
political and ideological synthesis that took place in wartime Berlin”25 no
doubt reflects what was in the minds of the Mufti and some other Arab notables
living and working in exile in Berlin. Again, without making judgments
about the Arab component of this “synthesis,” and certainly not in terms
of the entire Arab world beyond the limits of Berlin and Rome, this book
contends that a Nazi component was simply absent. Hitler’s regime did not
intend to fight for or otherwise contribute to the Arab goal of national full
sovereignty and independence, despite the inferences in its propaganda cam-
paign toward the Arab world. Beyond seeking to influence Arab public opinion
in general to support the Axis war effort in the region by contributing to
Anglo-French difficulties in the Middle East and North Africa, there was no
Nazi belief in or intent to equate the interests and objectives of the German
Reich with those of an “Arab/Muslim world.” Nazi propaganda in the Arab
world remained simply that, propaganda, filled with the manipulative slogans
and platitudes that usually form the substance of propaganda in time of war.
In chapter 12 of his “Second Book,” dictated but not published in 1928,
Hitler put forward eight “Principles of German Foreign Policy” that he
deemed necessary for Germany’s future given its current “hopeless military
situation.”26 The eight principles at times bemoan Germany’s state of
24
Indeed, Mallmann and Cüppers in fact do stipulate that Nazi policy after 1933 was based on
promoting Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, on reasonably friendly relations with
Great Britain, and that, “After 1933, the foreign policy of the Third Reich was based above all
on premises that were not in any way compatible with Arab interests.” See Ibid., 57.
25
Herf, Nazi Propaganda, 261.
26
See Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf by
Adolf Hitler (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 153–154. See also the original German edition
of Hitler‘s 1928 manuscript, edited by Gerhard Weinberg and published with the support of the
Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich in 1961 as Hitlers Zweites Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem
Jahr 1928 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), 160.
Introduction 15
disarmament and consequent military weakness following the First World War,
as well as its relative isolation among the great powers. He alludes to the
necessity of breaking up the coalition of powers against which Germany had
fought in the previous war, and to the potential for alignment of future German
interests with the interests of some of those former enemies. Of course, that
wartime coalition had included the four other European great powers: Great
Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. In point five, for instance, Hitler argues that
Germany would be successful in the future only if it could persuade other states
that had been in the victorious Allied coalition in the First World War to break
away and form a new coalition with new goals that could not be realized
through the League of Nations.27 From that new coalition, Hitler would
eliminate France as a possible future partner for the “new” Germany, although
that position would change significantly following his victory over France in the
summer of 1940 and his simultaneous failure to defeat Great Britain. More-
over, since Russia had in the previous decade become the communist Soviet
Union, that left Great Britain and Italy, two key European powers in the Middle
East and North Africa in the post–World War I period, as possible European
partners on some level in future conflicts. After outlining Germany’s claims for
Lebensraum in eastern Europe, Hitler is clear about the potential for accom-
modation with Italian and British interests when he notes: “. . .but the nature of
such a foreign policy goal does not give reason for England and especially Italy
to maintain the enmity of the Great War.”28
Hitler would also eliminate another potential partner in the Mediterranean
region after Germany regained its standing as a great power, namely the Arabs
of North Africa and the Middle East. Obviously, an alliance with the various
Arab nationalist movements and leaders would be incompatible with his pro-
jected accommodations with Italy and England. In Mein Kampf, Hitler did not
conceal his admiration in racial terms for British rule over India, for example,
and by extension a large part of Asia and Africa.29 Hitler’s early racial views of
peoples of non-European descent, including Arabs, will be considered in some
detail in Chapter 2.
In the end, of course, Hitler’s early calculations and tendencies with
regard to future German strategic interests and foreign policy had to be adapted
to the realities of a world that did not exactly fit his preconceived framework,
ideological convictions, and desired timetables. The projected rapid defeat of
the Soviet Union and the consequent absorption of a vast new living space in
eastern Europe did not materialize. Great Britain did not accommodate itself
to Hitler’s expansionist ambitions in Europe before the outbreak of war in
September 1939, or his notions of Anglo-German racial kinship and shared
interests in the world. Moreover, his illusions of a future global conflict after the
27 28
Ibid., 154. Ibid., 159.
29
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Jubiläumsausgabe anläßlich der Vollendung des 50. Lebensjahres des
Führers (München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP/Frz. Eher Nachf., 1939), 655.
war, which would require Germany and Britain to someday join forces against
a common American enemy, would never find a receptive audience in
London.30 Finally, the course of the war in Europe and North Africa did not
generate pro-Axis rebellions among the Arabs in the region against the British
position, in spite of a persistent Arab animosity toward British and European
rule. Indeed, the Arab world remained relatively quiet on the domestic front
throughout the war. Of course, we are aware of all of this today. However,
Hitler and his government certainly were not at the time, at least not before the
winter and spring of 1943 when German and Axis forces experienced crushing
defeats in the Soviet Union and in North Africa.
In the Middle East and North Africa during the war, Nazi propaganda tried
to rouse the Arab populations against their imperial masters in London, in spite
of the fact that the call for Arab unrest and rebellion against British authority
was not uniformly or enthusiastically supported by the German state and
military bureaucracy, or by Mussolini’s government in Rome. In any case,
it was a propaganda effort that proved to be a dismal failure. A central part
of the appeal was to link Jews, Zionism, and the Jewish National Home in
Palestine to an alleged British and American imperial agenda in the region.
In the end, wartime Axis propaganda toward the Arabs was not unlike
Anglo-French efforts to incite the Arab populations in the Fertile Crescent
and the Arabian Peninsula against their Ottoman imperial overlords during
the First World War. With promises of liberation and vague references to Arab
national self-determination at the core of both Allied and Axis propaganda
efforts in the two World Wars respectively, the question naturally arises about
the real intent of those making such promises. The publication of the Allied
“secret treaties” in late 1917, including the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of
May 1916, exposed those Anglo-French promises of 1915–1916 to Sharif
Husayn of Mecca and the Arabs generally as deliberately misleading, and not
meant to be kept once the Ottoman Empire was defeated. This study will
address the similar questions with regard to German and Axis intentions in
the Arab lands of North Africa and the Middle East before and during the
Second World War.
It is important at this point to make a few brief comments about the rich and
varied primary source material used in the preparation of this book. This is a
study with a combined focus on the strategic, foreign, and Jewish policies of the
Third Reich. As such, it is important to remember that the Middle East and
North Africa constituted a region with a close geographical proximity to,
and strategic importance for, Europe, a significant Jewish population, and of
course a substantial population of non-European “colonial” Arabs. Given
these realities, this book requires a combined consideration of all three facets
30
Nevertheless, see Andrew Buchanan, America’s Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during
World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) for the most recent account of
American strategic aims in the Mediterranean region during the Second World War.
Introduction 17
of Nazi interest and policy. It naturally relies primarily on the main collections
of three central German archives. The role of the German Foreign Office is, of
course, paramount in any consideration of German policy in North Africa and
the Middle East during the Third Reich. It was a matter of German foreign
policy, primarily of German relations with other European governments, and
to a lesser extent, with the governments of several “nominally independent”
Arab states and with a few individuals and movements that aspired to consti-
tute governments in future independent Arab states. Therefore, for the formu-
lation and implementation of German foreign policy in the region, the records
from the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (the Political Archives of the
German Foreign Office) in Berlin contain the files of the Reich foreign minister,
as well as those of the offices of the state secretary and the under state secretary,
the Middle East department, embassy and consular reports, and the papers of
various individual civil servants and diplomats who dealt with the Arabic-
speaking lands in the Middle East and North Africa. From the Bundesarchiv
(Federal Archives) in Berlin, of course, SS and police files, particularly those
related to Nazi Jewish policy and plans for Palestine during the 1930s and for
the entire region during the war years, as well as state agencies including the
Foreign, Interior, Economics, and Propaganda Ministries, and Nazi party
offices, are particularly helpful. The rich collections of the Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv (Federal Archives-Military Archives) in Freiburg im Breisgau
possess the necessary military archival resources given Germany’s significant
military presence in the region between 1941 and 1943. They also possess
important records of German military intelligence for the war years. Addition-
ally, the archival resources of Britain’s National Archives in Kew Gardens,
London, contains much relevant information for this topic. The files of
Colonial and Foreign Offices, as well as British intelligence files from the war
years, are particularly useful in gauging the actual impact of German policy and
propaganda within the region in general, but as well on British reactions and
policy in particular, both before and after the outbreak of war in September
1939. Other archival resources, unpublished and published, provide useful
additional information for this book. With Italy’s important role in German
calculations regarding the entire southern and eastern Mediterranean region,
before and particularly during the war years, the diaries and diplomatic papers
of Mussolini’s son-in-law and foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano proved useful,
albeit somewhat peripheral resources for understanding German decision
making and policy. Diaries, memoirs, and papers of the German government,
military, and Nazi party officials, listed in the bibliography under published
primary sources, were also helpful in the research for this study. In the end,
however, it is the sheer volume and wealth of German archival materials that
were absolutely essential for the substance of this book.
1
Continuity and Departure:

Imperial and Weimar Germany
imperial germany and the first world war

There was a line of continuity in German policy toward the Middle East that
extended from the Wilhelminian period through the Weimar years and through
much of the Third Reich. It reflects fundamental decisions on the part of
German governments during those years to more or less accept the political
preferences of other European imperial powers as well as the Ottoman Empire
in the region, and generally to defer to them by somehow aligning Germany’s
predominantly economic and cultural interests in the region to theirs. This is
not to say that governments in Berlin were consistently supportive of the
policies of each of those powers in the Arab world at all times. Nor does it
mean that governments in Berlin never considered Germany an instrument for
political change in the region, or a strategic factor in great power competition in
the Middle East and North Africa. It is certainly not an argument that Germany
saw its interests in the region as entirely peripheral or devoid of significant
strategic meaning or self-interest. However, it does reflect a degree of aloofness
and improvisation that was characteristic of German policy in the region from
the 1880s through the Second World War. Successive German governments
attempted to accommodate rapidly changing political and economic realities in
the region to prevailing perceptions about Germany’s primary interests and
policies in Europe and other parts of the world. This usually required adapting
German policy to the interests of those powers already in control of the various
Arab lands in the region. As a result, there was often a lack of clear and
consistent definition of general German interests and aims in the region, exacer-
bated in part by the intensification of the competing imperial interests of the
other powers in the region.
Germany’s late emergence as a unified European great power with global
potential relegated it largely to the position of bystander in the geopolitics of
18
Continuity and Departure: Imperial and Weimar Germany 19
the Middle East until its wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire during the
First World War. The relationship between Germany and the Ottoman
Empire during the years prior to 1914 has been a topic of interest and debate
among historians of modern Germany since the 1960s. Using the framework
of German interest in the so-called Eastern Question (Orientalische Frage) in
the years before 1914, historians such as Fritz Fischer, Wolfgang Mommsen,
Gregor Schöllgen, and some others have considered how the new German
empire came to assign an essential significance to the East, specifically to
southeastern Europe and the Middle East, in its effort to join the ranks of
world empires and ultimately achieve a “place in the sun.”1 The “Eastern
Question” was a political term used in reference to a process that involved
the steady decline of the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century
and first decade of the twentieth century, and its final collapse in 1918.
The “question” that was naturally generated by the Ottoman decline centered
on what would fill the void in the East created by the Ottoman demise.
The possibilities included the competing political and economic interests
of the European great powers, Germany among them, and the efforts of
the various nationalities in the East that sought self-determination and
independence.
Of particular interest was the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and
Germany, and the latter’s developing role as a factor in the Eastern Question
following German unification in 1870. This is especially the case after
the changeover from Bismarck’s supposedly Europe-centered foreign policy
(Europapolitik) to a global foreign policy (Weltpolitik) of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
Bismarck’s initial rejection of the latter was based primarily on his conviction
that German foreign policy must always be focused primarily on its relations
with Europe and North America.2 However, this position did not entirely rule
out support for some level of overseas colonial activity.3 Moreover, his initial
reluctance to acquire overseas colonies was somewhat compromised by peri-
odic adjustments in German foreign policy coming on the heels of events and
crises in 1879 and 1884, and between 1885 and 1888. These adjustments might
be interpreted as Germany’s initial entry into the great power mix of the
1
See for example Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen
Deutschland 1914/1918, 4. Aufl. (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1971); Wolfgang Mommsen, Das
Zeitalter des Imperialismus (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Bücherei, 1969); and Gregor Schöllgen,
Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871–
1914 (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1984).
2
See Wolfgang Schwanitz, “The German Middle Eastern Policy, 1871–1945,” in Wolfgang
Schwanitz (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 1871–1945 (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2004),
2–3.
3
For a brief analysis of Bismarck’s somewhat nuanced acceptance of limited German overseas
colonial activity, see Sebastian Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21–23.
Ottoman territory
Nominal Ottoman territory
RUSSIA
Black Sea
ANATOLIA
Mediterranean Sea
P E R S I A
EGYPT
ARABIA
R
e
d
S
e
a
Arabian
SUDAN
Sea
map 1.1. Ottoman Empire 1914
Eastern Question.4 Yet, the German approach to the Eastern Question during
the three decades before 1914 was ostensibly to seek peaceful economic
4
Schöllgen, Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht, 30–31, 419–420. See also Konrad Canis, Bismarcks
Außenpolitik 1870 bis 1890. Aufstieg und Gefährdung (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004); Jehuda
Wallach, “Bismarck and the ‘Eastern Question’ – A Re-Assessment,” in Jehuda Wallach (ed.),
British territory
French territory
Italian territory
SPANISH
MOROCCO Spanish territory
MADEIRA
TUNISIA
CANARY MOROCCO
ISLANDS IFNI
ALGERIA LIBYA
EGYPT
RIO DE ORO
FRENCH
SOMALILAND
ANGLO- ERITREA
EGYPTIAN BRITISH
SUDAN SOMALILAND
ETHIOPIA
ITALIAN
SOMALILAND
map 1.2. North Africa 1914
penetration of what remained of the Ottoman Empire, specifically Anatolia and

the Arabic-speaking lands of the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula,
while avoiding a military alliance with Istanbul.5
Generally, the approaches of both Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II to the
Eastern Question were more or less the same, namely to maintain as far as
possible the political status quo in the Arab lands of the Middle East and
North Africa, and to forego the pursuit of German colonies in the region.6 This
would include German recognition of complete European control over Arab
North Africa by Great Britain in Egypt and the Sudan, France in Tunisia, Algeria,
and Morocco, Italy in Libya, and Spain in Spanish Morocco, Ifni, and Rio de Oro.
In the end, however, it was Germany that rushed into an alliance with Istanbul in
August 1914 because of its immediate strategic and military needs after the
outbreak of war in Europe. Having finally driven England and Russia together
in the pursuit of a Weltpolitik beyond North Africa and the Middle East, with
the consequent need for a greater German naval force, the Kaiser’s immediate
Germany and the Middle East 1835–1939. International Symposium April, 1975 (Tel Aviv:
Nateev Printing and Publishing, 1975), 23–29; and Conrad, German Colonialism, 36–38.
5
Schöllgen, Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht, 417–421. See also Alexander Will, Kein Griff nach
der Weltmacht. Geheime Dienste und Propaganda im deutsch-österreichisch-türkischen Bündnis
1914–1918 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2012), 13–15.
6
Wolfgang Schwanitz, “The Jinnee and the Magic Bottle’: Fritz Grobba and German Middle
Policy, 1900–1945,” in Wolfgang Schwanitz (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 1871–1945
(Princeton: Markus Wiener, 2004), 93.
wartime strategic interests required the adherence of the Ottoman Empire to the
Central Powers. Strategically, of course, this was necessary to block Anglo-
French access to southern Russia through the straits separating Europe and
Anatolia. A similar strategic need to keep Turkey separated from its wartime
opponents would confront Nazi Germany beginning in 1939, in that particular
instance through the maintenance of strict Turkish neutrality.
In his classic study of the German-Ottoman alliance during the First World
War, Ulrich Trumpener considers Imperial Germany’s policy in the eastern
Mediterranean and the Middle East since the 1880s. He describes that policy
as seeking to expand German economic and cultural interests, while stumbling
into a doubtful wartime alliance that “. . .was not the culmination of carefully
laid German plans but instead a diplomatic improvisation.”7 After 1888,
Germany was generally regarded as the dominant foreign economic force in
the Ottoman Empire, despite the fact that Great Britain was still Istanbul’s
largest trading partner and France its largest creditor. Germany’s role in the
expansion of the Anatolian Railway and in the exploitation of Mesopotamian
oil and other natural resources, often in concert with Great Britain, coupled
with its increasing assumption of Ottoman debt, reflected Germany’s growing
economic stake in the region.8 Moreover, military relations between Berlin and
Istanbul began to expand beginning in the 1880s with Germany’s increasing
involvement in the training and modernization of the Ottoman military.9
Although the authorities in Berlin had had severe misgivings about an alliance
with the crumbling Ottoman Empire, they concluded that Germany had little
choice but to accept Ottoman military assistance in the eastern Mediterranean
in 1914 as a means of blocking Allied supply access to Russia. Trumpener does
assert that although the immediate military requirements of the war constituted
the primary concern of the German government between 1914 and 1918,
Berlin nevertheless soon aspired to increase German economic and political
influence in the Ottoman Empire upon a successful conclusion of hostilities.
The exact nature of those developing German ambitions in the region during
the war is not clear; but it does not appear likely that they included concrete
plans to expand German influence and power in the Arab world beyond the
confines of the Ottoman Empire, more or less as it existed in 1914.
As a wartime ally of the Ottoman Empire, the German government could
not promote or support Arab national self-determination and independence as
means of expanding its influence and power in the region or of aiding the
military fortunes of the Central Powers in the Middle East. Berlin did work
7
Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1918 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968), 366.
8
See Kurt Grunwald, ‟Pénétration Pacifique – the Financial Vehicles of Germany’s Drang nach
dem Osten,” in Jehuda Wallach (ed.), Germany and the Middle East 1835–1939. International
Symposium April, 1975 (Tel Aviv: Nateev Printing and Publishing, 1975), 85–98.
9
Schwanitz, “The German Middle East Policy,” 5–6.
with the Ottomans and their wartime propaganda efforts in calling for jihad
throughout the Islamic world against the Allies, a tactic that elicited little if
any positive response from among the Muslim populations of west and south
Asia. It was also a tactical approach that Hitler’s regime would embrace in
some form in its wartime propaganda in the Arab world during the Second
World War.10 Moreover, what would appear to have been a natural inclination
on the part of the Kaiser’s government to support the efforts of the Zionist
movement in its quest for international recognition of and support for a Jewish
National Homeland in Palestine was compromised by the same requirement to
adhere to Ottoman opposition to any idea or movement for national autonomy
within its greatly diminished multinational empire. This was the case whether it
meant the small but increasingly influential, European-based World Zionist
Organization (WZO) with its center in Berlin until 1914, or the still relatively
small Jewish population in Palestine. In theory, a pro-Zionist policy was
considered by many in Berlin, including the Kaiser, to be in the interest of
Germany’s domestic and foreign policies.11 It might strengthen pro-German
attitudes that already existed among the Jewish masses in eastern Europe, and
thereby assist the war effort against the Russian Empire in the East. Moreover,
it was believed that the establishment of an autonomous Jewish national
homeland in the strategically important Fertile Crescent would naturally be
sympathetic to German economic and cultural interests. It might also serve as a
destination for Eastern European Jews who might otherwise settle in Germany,
a factor that in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Germany appealed
to prevailing anti-Semitic attitudes both inside and outside the state
bureaucracy.
It was not until the final year of the war that Berlin felt it necessary to change
course, and to push the Ottoman government to support Zionist efforts in
Palestine. Following the perceived propaganda success of the British govern-
ment’s Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which committed the
government of Great Britain to the establishment of a “Jewish National Home”
in Palestine following the war, the German government persuaded the Ottoman
sultan to issue a declaration on December 12, 1917 in support of Zionist efforts
in Palestine. A similar declaration had been issued by Austria-Hungary on
November 21 of that year, and the German government issued its own state-
ment on January 5, 1918, which read:
With regard to Jewish efforts in Palestine, especially those of the Zionists, we support the
declaration recently made by the Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, and in particular the
intention of the Imperial Ottoman government, in keeping with their proven friendly
10
Ibid., 7–10. See also Thomas Hughes, “The German Mission to Afghanistan, 1915–1916,” in
Schwanitz (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 25–64.
11
Egmont Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik und die Juden im Ersten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck und Ruprecht, 1969), 285–286, 291–292.
Black Sea
R U S S I A
Sea
pian
Ankara
Cas
BLUE ZONE
(direct French control)
Alexandretta
Mosul
‘A’ ZONE PER S IA
(under French influence)
S
CYPRU
Tig
Eup
ris
Mediterranean
hr
te
a
s
Sea Damascus
Baghdad
‘B’ ZONE
INTERNATIONAL (under British influence) RED ZONE
ZONE Amman (direct
British control)
Jerusalem
Basrah
EG Y P T
Persian
A R A B I A Kuwait Gulf
Red Sea
map 1.3. The Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916
disposition toward the Jews, to promote the flourishing Jewish settlements in Palestine
by granting free immigration and settlement limited only by the absorptive capacity of
the land, the establishment of local self-government in keeping with the laws of the land
and the free development of their cultural individuality.12
Of course, periodic prewar and wartime Ottoman suppression of nationalist
sentiments among Arabs, Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Jews precluded
any German inclination to use those causes as weapons against the British.
Indeed, Germany’s foes in the war, Britain and France, had already publicly
adopted the cause of “Arab independence” in Egypt, the Fertile Crescent, and
the Arabian Peninsula as an Allied war aim in the Middle East by 1916 with the
12
Reprinted in the Zionist newspaper in Germany, the Jüdische Rundschau, 2 März 1934.
so-called Arab revolt. This public position in Allied wartime propaganda,

including the private promises made in 1915 on behalf of the British govern-
ment by the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, to Sharif
Hussein in Mecca, did not reflect Allied intent. The “secret treaties” of the
Allies in 1915 and 1916, specifically the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916
between Britain and France, clearly demonstrated Anglo-French intentions
to extend their imperial control over the Arab Fertile Crescent following
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. Postwar Arab cognizance of actual Anglo-
French intentions in the Middle East during the First World War would not
be entirely lost on the attitudes and reactions of some Arabs toward German
and Axis propaganda in the Arab world during the Second World War.
With Germany’s defeat in 1918 and the various postwar settlements in
Europe and the Middle East, the elements of German influence and power in
the Middle East for the most part evaporated. Notwithstanding the severe
political, economic, military, and diplomatic sanctions that crippled
Germany’s ability to function as a European and world power following
the war, all of the Arabic-speaking lands of North Africa and the Middle
East were in varying degrees under the influence and control of Germany’s
wartime foes, namely Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Arab states of
North Africa were still under their prewar European colonial rulers: Morocco
remained under French and Spanish control; Algeria and Tunisia were still
under French rule; Libya was still ruled by Italy; and Egypt and the Sudan
remained under the control of Great Britain, notwithstanding the nominal
independence granted to Egypt by the British in 1922. In the Arab territories
of the former Ottoman Empire, the British and French divided the Fertile
Crescent initially into three new “states” for which London and Paris drew
the boundaries, and over which they would exercise power: the new states
of Iraq and Palestine came under British control, with the new status of
mandates administered by Britain by authority of the League of Nations.
The new state of Syria became a French-administered mandate. In principle,
although with somewhat different border configurations, this result reflected
the basic outlines of the secret Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916,
under which London and Paris had agreed to divide the Fertile Crescent
among themselves in any postwar settlement. In 1921, Britain divided the
Palestine Mandate into two British-administered League of Nations man-
dates, namely Palestine west of the Jordan River, and yet another new state,
Transjordan, east of the Jordan river. A few years later, France divided
its Syrian Mandate into two by carving the new French-controlled state of
Lebanon out of the Syrian Mandate. In the Arabian Peninsula, much of the
interior had been under indirect Ottoman influence before 1914. Britain
retained its prewar control over the southern and eastern coasts, from the
port of Aden in the southwest to Kuwait in the northeast. It also established
some degree of influence within the now nominally independent central
and western regions of the peninsula, including the Hijaz, which would
Black Sea
Sea
R U S S I A
an
spi
T U R K E Y
Ca
SYRIA
(French) I R A N
LEBANON
(French)
Beirut
Mediterranean Damascus Baghdad
Sea
PALESTINE
I R A Q
Amman (British)
(British)
AN
Jerusalem RD
O
)
(Br S J
h
N
itis
T RA
EGYPT Persian
SAUDI ARABIA Gulf
(from 1932)
Red
Sea
map 1.4. Anglo-French Mandates in the Fertile Crescent 1922
become part of a new kingdom controlled by the Saud family after 1925,
and renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.
Although there remained much sympathy and support for Germany within
the World Zionist Organization (WZO), and among the Yishuv in Palestine, a
defeated Germany nevertheless lost much of its considerable prewar influence
within the Zionist movement after 1918. The headquarters of the WZO,
located in Berlin prior to 1914 and moved temporarily to Copenhagen during
the war years, was relocated again to London after the war. The Jewish
National Home in Palestine, promised by the British government in its Balfour
Declaration of November 2, 1917, had become a postwar reality and was
formally incorporated into the new, British-administered Palestine Mandate
under the authority of the League of Nations. As the German Zionist Richard
Lichtheim observed in his memoir, many Zionists were inclined, some reluc-
tantly, to look to Great Britain and away from Germany for the fulfillment
of Zionist hopes: “We owed Germany very much, but the course of events
in the war compelled Zionism to seek a connection with and help from the
Anglo-Saxon powers.”13 Indeed, the very brief one-year German-Zionist

understanding of sorts, centered on the Ottoman and German declarations of
late 1917 and early 1918 in favor of formalizing Jewish settlement and insti-
tutions in a postwar Palestine, came to an abrupt end a year later with the end
of the war. But it would reemerge very quickly within the context of some of the
foreign policy directions pursued by the governments of the Weimar Republic.
Despite the Kaiser’s wartime alliance with the Ottoman Empire, the defeated
Germany still enjoyed considerable sympathy among many Arab nationalist
leaders and intellectuals. Germany’s prewar status among Arabs in general
appears to have been positive, although not entirely above suspicion, and it
persisted during and after the war.14 This might have been due in part to the
perception that Germany, unlike the other European powers, harbored no
tangible imperial ambitions in the region that might compromise the Arab
quest for national self-determination and independence. In September 1921,
the German ambassador in London, Friedrich Stahmer, notified Berlin of his
recent talks in London with the same Arab delegation that had met with
Churchill in Haifa in March of that year. Stahmer’s conversations with the
Arab delegation were not substantive in nature. They focused instead on
the general wish of the Arabs and Germans to maintain friendly relations in
the coming years. In his report to Berlin, Stahmer described the Arab view of
past Arab-German relations in the following manner: “They have never had
hostile feelings for Germany, having instead trusted Germany more than the
other Great Powers because of their impression that, in the pursuit of its
interests, Germany has never acted in a purely selfish manner, having instead
respected the interests of the indigenous inhabitants.”15 Stahmer’s meeting
in London with the Arab delegation was the beginning of a succession of
initiatives by various Arab nationalist leaders and individuals to enlist German
diplomatic and material support against the post–World War I status quo in the
Middle East, based as it was on Anglo-French and Italian dominance and
control in North Africa and the Middle East, and the Jewish National Home
in Palestine. These attempts to secure German support for Arab independence
in any form are evident during the years of the Weimar Republic, and they
continued even more through the Nazi years before and during the Second
World War. The manner in which the governments in Berlin, particularly the
National Socialists, responded to these initiatives, within the context of overall
strategic and racial calculations, intent, and policy, constitutes the primary
focus of this book.
13
Richard Lichtheim, Rückkehr. Lebenserinnerungen aus der Frühzeit des deutschen Zionismus
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1970), 367.
14
See Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 2–3.
15
Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts-Berlin (hereafter, PA): Pol.Abt.III, Politik 6-Palästina,
Bd.1, DB-London an AA-Berlin, K.Nr. 69, 1. September 1921.
the weimar years

As was the case with the German government before 1914, the governments
of the Weimar Republic consistently, if at times somewhat critically, supported
the Anglo–French–Italian imperial positions and the new post–World War
I status quo in the Middle East and North Africa. Of course, Weimar Germany
was in no position, politically, economically, or militarily to challenge the new
realities in the region after 1918. Even when Imperial Germany was in a
position to do so, it had more or less accepted the dominant positions of
neighboring European powers in the region. In a speech in Hannover in
1924, Gustav Stresemann observed: “In foreign policy we have hitherto pur-
sued a narrow and limited course, and so perhaps we shall continue for a long
while. We are going through all the tribulations that must attend the policy of
an unarmed nation.”16 Moreover, it is generally accepted that from 1924 on,
Stresemann worked for rapprochement with Britain and France in an effort to
revise peacefully most of the provisions of the Versailles settlement in Europe.
These included a significant reduction in reparations to a manageable sum, the
end of the Allied occupation and the evacuation of the Rhineland and the Saar,
the protection of ethnic Germans in central and eastern Europe, a revision of
postwar boundaries in the East that would include a return of Upper Silesia, the
Corridor, and Danzig, and even the eventual union of Germany and Austria.17
Indeed, his foreign policy approach was centered on the Locarno Treaty of
1925 as the only means for German retention of the Rhineland and its prewar
western borders, as well as for the possible return of lands in the east that
were lost to Poland. And the key to Stresemann’s Locarno strategy, and thus to
the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, was friendly relations with Great
Britain. In a memorandum to Ambassador Stahmer in London on April 19,
1925, Stresemann noted: “The cooperation of England is an indispensable
condition for a peaceful solution, and only such a solution is possible for
us.”18 Moreover, in a memorandum a year later to the minister of finance,
Stresemann stressed that, in conjunction with postwar cooperation with
Great Britain, Germany should also seek to rebuild its economic presence and
interests in its former African colonies.19
16
Eric Sutton (ed.), Gustav Stresemann. His Diaries, Letters and Papers, I (London: Macmillan &
Co. Ltd., 1935), 317.
17
See Stresemann’s letter to the Crown Prince from September 1925 in Sutton, Gustav Stresemann,
II, 503–505.
18
Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik (hereafter ADAP), Serie B, Bd. II–1, 363–376. See also
Werner Weidenfeld, Die Englandpolitik Gustav Stresemanns (Mainz: v.Hase und Koehler
Verlag, 1972), 94–95, 106–108, 128–130; and Hansjörg Eiff, “Die jüdische Heimstätte in
Palästina in der Außenpolitik der Weimarer Rebublik,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft
12 (2013): 1016.
19
See ADAP: Serie B, Bd. I–1, 498–501.
If the postwar settlement in the Middle East confirmed an expanded

Anglo-French colonial rule in the Arab world and the establishment of a Jewish
National Home in the British Mandate for Palestine, it also meant the rejection
of Arab national self-determination and independence. Arabs had to content
themselves with a form of local self-government, perhaps as lip service to
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in conformity with the new system of
Anglo-French mandates under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. As
such, Weimar Germany’s policies in the region reflected these realities, and
remained centered on promoting primarily Germany’s economic and cultural
interests in the region. This required a consistent policy of support for the
legitimacy of the mandates and, therefore, for the status quo. This approach
is probably best summarized in the comprehensive report by Legationsrat
Moritz Sobernheim of the German Foreign Office upon his return to Berlin
from a two-month fact-finding trip to Palestine in March-April 1925.20 His
description of the situation in Palestine and the Fertile Crescent, of Germany’s
interests in the region, and his recommendations for the best way to preserve
German interests there provide a good general summary of the foundations of
German Middle East policy during the Weimar years.
In his report, Sobernheim tended to dismiss Arab claims in Palestine and
elsewhere in the region, and to credit Jewish capital and labor for the rapid
development of Palestine since the war.21 He described the Arabs as lacking the
capability and the will to develop the land, and as unjustified in their claims of
oppression by outsiders. He asserted that Palestine constituted a dynamic,
naturally friendly, and growing market for German exports, and a conduit
for access to other markets in the region for German goods. He also stressed
the necessity of rebuilding and expanding German cultural institutions and
prestige in Palestine and the larger region. Germany’s significant cultural influ-
ence in the Middle East before 1914, which had included relatively small
German colonies, schools, hospitals, institutes, and orphanages, and had gen-
erated considerable prestige and good will among Jews, Arabs, and Turks,
would have to be reestablished in the postwar period. Moreover, Sobernheim
viewed German support for Zionism and the Jewish National Home in
Palestine as central in German Middle East policy. Although relatively few
German Jews had been attracted to Zionism before and after the First World
War, those that were often occupied some of the highest professional,
academic, and business positions within the Yishuv, the Jewish community
20
PA: Botschaft Ankara. Pol.3-Palästina, 1924–1938, “Bericht über meine Reise nach Palästina im
März und April 1925,” III O 1269.
21
Sobernheim had already filed a detailed report some four months earlier, in December 1924, in
which he made the same assertion that Arab claims of being the victims of injustice in Palestine
were groundless. See PA: Pol. Abt. III. Politik 5: Innere Politik, Parlaments- und Parteiwesen in
Palästina, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung von Sobernheim an Herrn V.L.R. von Richthofen, 8. Dezember
1924.
in Palestine. This nucleus of German Jews, combined with the larger numbers
of Eastern European Jewish immigrants who generally retained their prewar
sympathies for Germany in any case, its culture, language, and history, were
seen by Sobernheim as agents of German economic and cultural interests and
influence in Palestine and the rest of the Middle East. Sobernheim emphasized
the central role of Great Britain in the pursuit of Germany’s admittedly limited
interests and objectives in the region, and he further identified the potential
political significance of Palestine and the entire region for Germany in the
future in the following manner: “For the aforementioned reasons, this part of
the Near East may possess in a political, as well as a spiritual and economic,
sense significant meaning for German policy.”22
Sobernheim’s report outlined policies that were for the most part already
in place. In fact, in May 1922, the German Foreign Office had issued its
first comprehensive statement on Palestine, German interests in the larger
region, and the emerging conflict involving British imperial interests, Arab
national ambitions, and the Zionist movement with its developing Jewish
National Home.23 The statement reviewed Britain’s gains during the war and
its consequent powerful position in the Middle East, as well as the negative
consequences of its conflicting wartime promises to the Jews and the Arabs, and
real and potential friction between Britain and France in the Fertile Crescent.
The statement did not directly criticize or oppose the British position in
Palestine or the larger Middle East; nor did it constitute a formal recognition
of Anglo-French authority in the Fertile Crescent. Rather it presented those
issues as a realistic and necessary backdrop to what it defined as Germany’s
growing economic interests and advantages in the area. It referred to
Germany’s favorable trade position and its rapidly rising exports to Palestine,
a trend that would promote the export of goods such as machinery, heavy
industrial products, and building materials that would be increasingly in
demand in a developing Palestinian economy, stimulated by the flow of Jewish
capital and immigration into the country. The memorandum signaled an
active German policy in Palestine, and considered the Zionist movement
and the developing Jewish National Home as the best vehicle for securing
German economic interests in the region. In this sense, it concluded: “Friendly
relations with the Jewish movement, as will doubtless be pursued by their
leaders, could be of significance for Germany’s economic and even political
position.”24 Finally, the memorandum placed the postwar Palestine situation
and, specifically, Arab opposition to Britain and France in general, within
the larger context of rising anti-imperialism in the colonial world. It concluded
22
PA: Botschaft Ankara. Pol.3-Palästina, 1924–1928, “Bericht über meine Reise nach Palästina im
März und April 1925,” III O 1269.
23
PA: Gesandtschaft Bern, Palästina 1922–1937, “Aufzeichnung des AA über die Lage in
Palästina,” Nr. IIb 245, 8. Mai 1922.
24
Ibid.
that Arab opposition to the British Mandate for Palestine was less about the
rejection of Jewish immigration and the Jewish National Home than it was
about the rejection of European imperial domination and the frustration of
Arab ambitions for independence. Citing the rebellions throughout the Arab
lands of the Middle East, the report concluded: “The unrest that has taken
place in Palestine over the past few years stems particularly from the shock that
has pervaded the entire Near East as a result of the war, which in the end has
little to do with Zionism; for in Egypt and India, where there is no Zionism, this
unrest has taken an even sharper form.”25
Germany’s entry into the League of Nations in October 1926 in a sense
represented Berlin’s formal recognition and acceptance of the postwar settle-
ment in the Middle East. With its formal acceptance of the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and specifically of the Anglo-French mandates, Germany
had become treaty-bound to support the new status quo in the Middle East,
something that it had already done de facto since the end of the war. This had
been situated within the context of Germany’s immediate postwar political,
economic, and diplomatic isolation, which then gave way to the era of Locarno.
The Locarno period was characterized by the gradual economic recovery of
Germany and western Europe, and the beginning of some revisions of the
Versailles Treaty in Europe that the German government had sought. It also
included the political reintegration of Germany into Europe based on cooper-
ation and friendly relations with the west, especially with Great Britain.
Germany was accorded great-power status with a permanent seat on the
League Council, and at its meeting on September 9, 1927, the council voted
to increase the membership of the Permanent Mandates Commission from nine
to ten with the appointment of Ludwig Kastl of Germany. Thus, with its seat on
the Permanent Mandates Commission, Weimar Germany became more directly
involved in the issues and conflicts inherent in the Anglo-French Mandates
in the Fertile Crescent. That involvement amounted to the enforcement of
Anglo-French control in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine,
at least for as long as those territories remained official League of Nations
mandates. It also reflected Germany’s continuing support for the Jewish
National Home within the Mandate for Palestine, something that the German
government had formally signaled would be forthcoming at least as early
as May 1922.
The documents also reveal that Weimar Germany’s desire for a seat on the
Permanent Mandates Commission was based in part on the hope of recovering
former colonial territories in Africa. According to State Secretary Carl von
Schubert in the spring of 1926, there had been mounting pressure from
within the German bureaucracy for the return of Germany’s former colonies.
Schubert reported in a memorandum of April 14, 1926 that it was hard for the
25
Ibid.
government to contain that pressure given the strong sentiment both within
state agencies and the general population for the return of the colonies, along
with continuing indignation over their loss after the war. In that memorandum
he also reported on discussions with the British ambassador in Berlin, Britain’s
unwillingness at that time to consider giving up any of its recently acquired
colonial territories, and its fears that German pressure on the issue of colonies
could damage German-British relations.26 Indeed, for some time Stresemann
himself had been convinced of the need for the return of at least some parts of
Germany’s former colonial empire in sub-Saharan Africa. However, in an
address of November 4, 1925, Stresemann argued that it would be unwise for
Germany to raise the issue of its former African colonies before it became a
member of the League of Nations, at which time Berlin could then pursue
its colonial aims from within, as a League member.27 With this in mind,
Stresemann pushed especially hard for the seat on the Permanent Mandates
Commission, despite initial opposition from Britain, France, Belgium, and
Japan, those wartime opponents that had reaped significant colonial gains at
Germany’s expense in the postwar settlements.28 By the end of May 1926, a
clear German strategy on the colonial question was apparent, one that was
based on the return of Germany’s former colonies in Africa and possibly the
acquisition of the Portuguese colony of Angola in western Africa, all within
the context of the following initiatives: German membership in the League
of Nations and a seat on the Permanent Mandates Commission; efforts to
influence public opinion in Britain, France, and the United States; the promo-
tion of German economic interests in the existing European mandates
and colonies; and the strengthening of the will of the German people to secure
colonies overseas.29
The task of promoting a pro-Zionist German foreign policy in the Middle
East, with full support for the Jewish National Home in Palestine, required
among other things some degree of support from the Jewish community at
home. However, since the beginnings of Zionism and the Zionist movement in
Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, the great majority of
German Jews had been non-Zionist or even anti-Zionist, seeing Zionism as a
serious threat to the considerable progress that Jews had made toward accept-
ance, integration, and assimilation in their native Germany. The often
bitter prewar conflicts between the Zionist Federation for Germany
(Zionistische Vereinigung für Deutschland) and the several larger non-Zionist
or “assimilationist” Jewish organizations, mainly the Central Association
26
ADAP: Serie B, Bd. I/1, Nr. 195.
27
See PA: Büro St.S. X: Kolonialfragen (Mandatsgebiete), Bd. 1 (complete file).
28
See PA: Büro des St.S, X: Kolonialfragen (Mandatsgebiete), Bd. 2, AA/Berlin an DB/London, DB/
Paris, und DB/Brussel, IIIa 1.3305/27, 26. April 1927. See also Bundesarchiv (hereafter Barch):
R43 I-162, Reichstagsrede Gustav Stresemanns, 23. Juni 1927.
29
ADAP: Serie B, Bd. I/1, Nr. 230.
of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith (Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger

jüdischen Glaubens), subsided during the war years in favor of an intense
German patriotism and support for the German war effort on all sides.
However, their struggles were renewed after the war with even greater inten-
sity. Zionist success in building the Jewish National Home in Palestine, coupled
with the conflicting phenomena of both greater progress for Jewish assimilation
in the democratic culture of the Weimar Republic and increasing virulence
and public tolerance of anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic movements, culminating
in the successes of Hitler and the National Socialist party in the early 1930s,
only served to heighten these conflicts. The German government wished to
make its policy toward Palestine and the Middle East acceptable to its Jewish
and non-Jewish citizens alike, and set out to enlist the support of prominent
Jewish and non-Jewish political and cultural leaders.
As its main tool for promoting domestically German policy in Palestine and
the Fertile Crescent, the government decided to constitute the German
Pro-Palestine Committee (Deutsches Pro-Palästina Komitee) in December
1926. The committee was similar to its short-lived wartime predecessor, the
German Committee for the Promotion of Jewish Settlement in Palestine
(Deutsches Komitee zur Förderung der jüdischen Palästinasiedlung). The latter
had been established in Berlin in May 1918 as part of the German government’s
efforts to neutralize the perceived propaganda benefits that Britain had reaped
with the Balfour Declaration, and in conjunction with the new Ottoman,
Austro-Hungarian, and German declarations in favor of Zionist efforts and
objectives in Palestine. Like its earlier version, the Pro-Palestine Committee was
made up of prominent Jewish and non-Jewish Germans of various political
tendencies, brought together by the common conviction that Germany’s stra-
tegic interests in Europe and the Middle East were best served by support
for Zionism and the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Count Johann
von Bernstorff became the first chairman of the organization in 1926. Von
Bernstorff had been the wartime German ambassador to the United States
and then to the Ottoman Empire, and had been instrumental in German efforts
to persuade Istanbul to issue its declaration of support for the Zionist cause in
late 1917.30 Besides the usual arguments that Germany’s political, economic,
and cultural interests were best served by supporting Zionist efforts in
30
Zechlin, Die deutsche Politik, 493 ff. See also Joseph Walk, “Das Deutsche Komitee Pro-
Palästina, 1926–1933,” Bulletin des Leo Baeck Instituts XV (1976): 162–193. Besides Johann
von Bernstorff, prominent non-Jewish members of the Pro-Palestine Committee included Mayor
Konrad Adenauer of Cologne, State Secretary in the Reich Chancellory Hermann Pünder, former
Chanceller Josef Karl Wirth, Prussian Minister of Culture Carl Heinrich Becker, and Chancellor
Hermann Müller, as well as Foreign Office notables such as Hartmann Freiherr von Richthofen
and Curt Prüfer of the Orient-Abteilung, and State Secretary Carl von Schubert. Of course,
Germany’s representatives at the League of Nations and the Permanent Mandates Commission,
Ludwig Kastl and Julius Ruppel, were also members, as were others. See Walk, “Das Deutsche
Komitee Pro-Palästina,” 168–178.
Palestine, von Bernstorff, the committee, and the German Foreign Office based
their support for Zionism and the Jewish National Home on the legal and
moral obligations that Germany had undertaken as a member of the League
of Nations, the League Council, and the Permanent Mandates Commission.
For example, von Bernstorff justified German policy in an October 1927 letter
to Georg Mecklenburg of the non-Zionist Centralverein in the following
manner: “Germany is a member of the League of Nations, and through
this membership German foreign policy has assumed co-responsibility for the
Palestine Mandate. The promotion of Jewish settlement in Palestine is, from the
standpoint of German foreign policy, a welcome endeavor.”31
The German government pursued this clear and very active policy toward
Palestine despite the battle of ideas raging within the German Jewish commu-
nity between Zionists and “assimilationists.” The Foreign Office in Berlin and
its Consulate General in Jerusalem were convinced that Jewish immigration
and settlement in Palestine would play an important role in efforts to increase
German exports to the Middle East, and thus contribute to the postwar
German economic recovery. An undated economic report from the German
Consulate General in Jerusalem, probably from some time in 1926, observed
that new Jewish firms that had been opening up in Palestine since 1921 were
inclined to order goods from German manufacturers, and that German trade
with Palestine did best when Jewish immigration was highest. It linked a
successful German trade policy with Zionist development and growth in the
Jewish National Home, arguing that the Zionist movement and Jewish settlers
in Palestine, regardless of their origin, were naturally pro-German, and that
they especially needed the kinds of industrial products that Germany produced.
The report concluded that, in contrast with the period before the war, when
Palestine was a market only for simple and inexpensive goods, the postwar
market there had changed dramatically: “The inflow of Jewish groups with
greater intelligence, more refined and sophisticated needs, has slowly resulted in
a change with regard to the quality of the needed products.”32
Arab nationalists in Palestine and throughout the Middle East turned
increasingly to Germany for diplomatic and material support against the post-
war settlement in the Middle East. As mentioned earlier, the September 1921
report of the German ambassador in London on his conversations with Arab
leaders indicated that Germany had not lost the generally pro-German senti-
ments that had existed in the Arab world before 1914, despite Germany’s
wartime alliance with the Ottomans. According to German diplomatic records,
attempts were made by Syrian Arabs to obtain German support against the
31
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2a-Palästina, Bd.1, Bernstorff an Mecklenburg, 3. Oktober 1927.
Bernstorff reiterated in his memoirs that the Pro-Palestine Committee enjoyed the warm and
consistent support of the German government. See J.H. Graf von Bernstorff, Memoirs of Count
Bernstorff (New York: Random House, 1936), 331–332.
32
PA: Pol.Abt. III-Wirtschaft, Palästina-Handel 11, Aufzeichnung des DGK/Jerusalem, (no date).
French in Syria and Lebanon. For instance, a representative of the Syrian

Orthodox Church, on a visit to Germany in 1921, wanted to involve Germany
in its dispute with the French mandatory authorities over alleged preferences
shown to the Maronite Catholics. The representative suggested that it would
give Germany “the opportunity to regain lost ground” in the region.33
The German government immediately rejected these overtures, arguing that it
would not serve German economic and cultural interests in Syria and through-
out the region to even appear to question French authority in Syria. Other
attempts to involve Germany in Syria were made in 1926 and 1927. Efforts by
the Druse in Syria in 1926 for a declaration of sympathy from the German Red
Cross for their treatment by French authorities were politely rebuffed in
Berlin.34 Syrian Arab nationalist Fawzi Bey approached the German consul
general in Jerusalem, Erich Nord, with a proposal for closer relations between
Syrian Arab nationalists and Germany, and a request for German weapons
assistance for a Syrian uprising.35 Nord immediately rejected the request,
pointing out that the Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from manufac-
turing most weapons, as well as from exporting any weapons. Nord also
mentioned that the Allied Control Commission in Germany strictly supervised
the German military as well as German industries capable of manufacturing
weapons. Moreover, even if German weapons had been available, their export
to Syrian Arabs would have violated the spirit of Germany’s obligations as
a soon-to-be member of the League of Nations and, later, the Permanent
Mandates Commission.
The December 1924 memorandum, authored and circulated by Sobernheim
in the German Foreign Office, already outlined Germany’s rejection of Arab
requests for German support in the Palestine conflict. It argued that the Arabs
had done nothing to develop the land in Palestine, and had therefore forfeited
their rights to the Jews who were developing the land and making it prosper.
With some irony, as was the case at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919,
Sobernheim and others in the German Foreign Office tended to dismiss the
Arabs as not yet fit for self-government. This approach in Palestine reflected
Germany’s economic interests in Palestine that Berlin felt were best served by
the British Mandate and the Jewish National Home with a growing Jewish
population, rather than by support for the Arab majority and for Arab nation-
alism and independence throughout the region.
Prior to the outbreak of renewed Arab violence in Palestine in August 1929,
relative peace had prevailed since the earlier violence of the immediate postwar
33
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd. 1, Freistaat Bayern, Ministerium des Äussern, an AA/Berlin,
Nr. 44928, 23. November 1921, and Aufzeichnung des Auswärtigen Amts, zu III.T. 1478, (o.D.).
34
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd. 2, Aufzeichnung des AA/Berlin (author unknown),
III.O.673, 11. Januar 1926.
35
PA: Geheim-Akten, 1920–1936, Politik 2-Syrien, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Jn 145/27, 24.
Januar 1927.
period before 1922. During this generally peaceful interlude, Berlin had been
free to pursue its aims in Palestine and in the wider region without the pressure
that a crisis situation would generate, specifically pressure that might call for
public policy statements on the issues. The German Foreign Office continued
to cultivate friendly relations with the Mandatory powers Britain and France,
to promote the Zionist cause in Palestine, and to reject Arab requests for
diplomatic and material support against the Mandatory powers and the Jewish
National Home. However, Berlin feared that the outbreak of unrest in
1929 might impede economic activity and expansion in Palestine, a particular
concern of those in the Near East Department (Abteilung III before 1936,
Abteilung VII thereafter) in the German Foreign Office. This was noted in an
internal memorandum in December 1929, which stipulated that “Germany’s
main interest is that order soon be restored in Palestine and that economic
development be promoted.”36 Moreover, in the public debates that ensued after
the outbreak of violence, Germany, as a member of the Permanent Mandates
Commission, was forced to define more precisely its position on the conflict
between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. In so doing, Berlin could not avoid a
discussion of Britain’s wartime and immediate postwar promises to both
the Jews and the Arabs, promises that the Germans contended made future
animosity and conflict virtually inevitable.
In conjunction with the international debates in late 1929 and 1930 over the
violence in Palestine, events in Germany and Europe were beginning to influ-
ence German foreign policy as well. Stresemann died in October 1929, and his
successors took a somewhat more independent, albeit not substantively differ-
ent, approach in foreign policy. This followed some of the revisions of the
Versailles Treaty, including the more favorable regulation of reparations
embodied in the Young Plan, as well as the end of the Allied Control Commis-
sion in Berlin and the Anglo-French-Belgian occupation of the Rhineland by
1930. It is difficult to determine whether the dramatic electoral successes of the
Right, especially the Nazis, beginning in September 1930, put pressure on the
government to pursue a more independent foreign policy. Moreover, in Abtei-
lung III of the German Foreign Office, Sobernheim was losing influence, and he
soon retired. Middle East specialists such as Fritz Grobba came to exert more
influence on German Middle East policy as a whole, pushing it in a direction
that was somewhat more critical of Britain and France in the Middle East in
general. Nevertheless, this slightly greater independence did not entail a change
Germany’s fundamental support for the status quo, namely for the Anglo-
French mandate system and for the Jewish National Home in Palestine. In
meetings of the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1929, for example, the
German delegation reiterated its full support for the Jewish National Home.
36
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 3, Aufzeichnung Ziemkes, A.O. 6577, 23. Dezember
1929. Kurt Ziemke was Legationsrat in the German Foreign Office in 1929.
This support remained constant even through the turmoil of the final years of
the Weimar Republic. This continuity was perhaps best summed up in a
January 1931 letter from State Secretary Bernhard von Bülow to the German
Pro-Palestine Committee in the following manner: “The German government
and the Foreign Office have repeatedly expressed their sympathy for the goals
and efforts of your committee.”37
Berlin’s somewhat more independent position at the League of Nations by
the end of the decade included a growing tendency to indirectly criticize
Britain’s conflicting wartime promises to the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine.
Its argument was that those promises had been used as convenient propaganda
tools in the war against Germany rather than as ideals honestly promoted for
their moral worth. A month after a November 1929 meeting of the Permanent
Mandates Commission regarding the situation in Palestine, Abteilung III of the
German Foreign Office circulated a memorandum stipulating that Great Britain
alone was responsible for the consequences of its policies, and that the British
government had the responsibility to work out a solution without outside
intervention: “Full responsibility for carrying out the provisions of the Mandate
rests with England, which itself created the deplorable conditions in Palestine
through its contradictory promises to Jews and Arabs. . .It is therefore in the
first instance England’s task to run the Mandate and to create peace in the land.
It cannot be our task to relieve England of a part of the responsibility, and to
somehow to seize the initiative.”38 This position did not mean that the German
government was now opposed to the British position in the Arab world, or
specifically to its mandate and the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Rather it
seemed to reflect Berlin’s lingering resentment over the postwar settlement by
pointing to Britain’s wartime strategy against Germany, a strategy that the
Germans now implied embodied dishonest and contradictory promises to both
the Jews and the Arabs.
Yet, without proposing a way to effectively eliminate the inherent contradic-
tions in Britain’s wartime promises, the German Foreign Office continued to
argue that Britain alone bore responsibility for achieving reconciliation between
Jews and Arabs in Palestine. For example, an internal memorandum of May 9,
1930 in Abteilung III in the German Foreign Office extended Germany’s full
support to the Shaw Commission, which the British government appointed in
1929 to come up with a solution to the recent violence and unrest in Palestine.
The memorandum first repeated the view that Britain’s primary motive in
issuing the Balfour Declaration in 1917 had been to mobilize Jews around the
world against Germany. It stated that Britain alone was in a position to rectify
the situation: “As we have already said, we must leave it to England to find a
37
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2a-Palästina, Bd. 2, AA/Berlin an das Pro-Palästina Komitee, III O 161,
16. Januar 1931.
38
See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 3-Länder (England), Bd. 2, Aufzeichnung des Auswärtigen Amts
(author unknown), III O 6430, 30. Dezember 1929.
way out of the situation,” and then concluded: “A satisfactory solution would
perhaps be possible, if Arabs and Jews should find themselves ready to reach an
agreement with each other. It will be the task of the British government to
promote and to produce such an understanding between both parties.”39
Consul-General Nord in Jerusalem reiterated this position and tendered similar
advice to Berlin during the summer of 1930.40 A few months later, Grobba
seemed to embody that slightly enhanced independence in German policy,
which now included general expressions of sympathy for Arab frustrations.
However, such expressions did not come at the expense of German support
for Zionist interests or for the British position in Palestine and throughout the
region. In an August 20 memorandum commenting on a recent report of the
Permanent Mandates Commission to the League Council, Grobba observed:
“From the German standpoint it is to be welcomed if the measures suggested by
the Commission are successful in establishing peace in Palestine, and thereby
secure a peaceful coexistence of the two peoples. Germany extends the same
sympathy to both peoples.”41
Finally, the Foreign Office in Berlin was careful to avoid German involvement
in the natural rivalries among the dominant European powers in the region,
especially between Britain and France. For instance, the German consulate in
Beirut reported to Berlin in March 1927 the fears of French Mandatory author-
ities that Britain was seeking to eliminate French control over Syria and establish
a greater Arab empire under British protection.42 It further reported that anti-
English sentiments were prevalent among French civilian and military officials in
Syria, that French authorities in Syria believed that Britain had instigated the
anti-French uprising among the Syrian Arab population immediately following
the war, and that France wanted German support at the League of Nations to
uphold the legitimacy of French authority in Syria and Lebanon. Berlin’s
39
See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 3, Aufzeichnung Ziemkes zu III.O. 2110-30, 9. Mai
1930. In September 1929, the government in London appointed a royal commission under Sir
Walter Shaw to investigate the recent violence in Palestine. It also sent a group under John Hope
Simpson to Palestine to aid in the investigations. The result of all this was the Passfield White
Paper in October 1930 which stipulated that there was nothing in the Balfour Declaration or in
the League Mandate’s Jewish National Home that promised an independent Jewish state in
Palestine. Nor had there been promises for an independent Arab state in Palestine. The White
Paper further recommended limits on Jewish immigration and land purchases. Naturally, it
contained nothing that might compromise the authority of the British Mandate in Palestine.
The British government itself, following intense Jewish and Arab criticism, rejected the recom-
mendations of the White Paper. See for example Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, 1917–
1948 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 111–20.
40
See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Pol. 3-Länder (England), Bd, 2, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr. Polit. 23/
30, III.O. 2373, 20. Mai 1930; and Pol.Abt. III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 3, DGK/Jerusalem an
AA/Berlin, Nr. Polit. 34/40, III.O. 2852, 21. Juni 1930.
41
PA: Pol. Abt. III, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 3, Aufzeichnung des AA (Grobba), III O 3612,
Vbd.2470, 20. August 1930.
42
ADAP: Serie B, Bd. IV, Nr. 252.
reaction was to categorically reject as premature and unfounded such allegations

about English intent in Syria. Its position remained that German interests in the
Middle East were best served by avoiding involvement in great power rivalries
and disputes in the region, and to reaffirm Germany’s interest in maintaining the
postwar status quo in the Middle East. In its April 20, 1927 response to the
consulate in Beirut, with copies to German diplomatic missions in London,
Paris, Rome, Constantinople, Cairo, Jerusalem, and Baghdad, the German
Foreign Office concluded: “Nevertheless, it seems to us that the idea of provid-
ing France with active political support for the strengthening of its position in
any form in Syria is not opportune, just as we naturally would never think of
increasing French difficulties there. Our position with regard to the entire
Mandate system is limited by the basic proposition, that we recognize and
respect the situation that was established without our involvement.”43
As its Imperial predecessor had done, Weimar Germany also pursued pri-
marily economic and cultural interests in Egypt. Berlin recognized Britain’s
political and economic dominance, France’s cultural advantages, and Italy’s
postwar push to establish a greater economic and cultural presence in Egypt.
In May 1927, the German embassy in Cairo delivered a lengthy report to the
Foreign Office in Berlin in which it reviewed Germany’s position in Egypt in
relation to the other European powers. The report identified advantages for
Germany in the fact that, unlike Britain, France, and Italy, Germany did not
have political interests there: “In contrast to these powers, Germany has
no active political aims to pursue in Egypt or the neighboring countries. . .”44
It observed further that Germany enjoyed popular sympathy, especially among
educated Egyptians who generally held German culture and science in high
esteem, and recognized Germany’s “civilizing mission” in the world. The
German ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer, recommended efforts to promote
German language instruction, an increase in German medical training and
personnel in Egypt, more German teachers for Egyptian universities and trade
schools, promotion of German music and art in Egypt, greater opportunities for
Egyptian students to study in German schools and universities, film exchanges,
and visits to Egypt by German sports teams.
In Palestine, there had been a German cultural presence since the middle
of the nineteenth century, with the presence of several thousand Germans living
in Christian colonies and institutions, Protestant and Catholic. The largest was
the Temple Society (Tempelgesellschaft), a breakaway Lutheran community
from Württemberg that had settled and built mainly agricultural colonies in
Palestine since the late 1860s.45 With the arrival of Jewish settlers, mostly from
43
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd. 1, AA/Berlin an die Deutschen Botschaften bzw. Konsulate in
Paris, London, Rom, Konstantinople, Kairo, Jerusalem und Bagdad, zu III O 1455, 20. April 1927.
44
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 26-Ägypten, Bd.-, DG/Kairo an AA/Berlin, Nr. 308, 28. Mai 1927.
45
See Alex Carmel, Die Siedlungen der Württembergischen Templer in Palästina 1868–1918
(Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1973).
eastern Europe, in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, there was some
demand for German language instruction in some of the new Jewish schools.
The diplomatic reports from Jerusalem following the war seem to indicate that
the German Christian communities had enjoyed generally good relations with
Ottoman officials, as well as with the local Jewish and Arab communities
before the war. After the war, Berlin worked with the British government for
the satisfactory resettlement of almost nine hundred Palestinian Germans
(Palästinadeutsche) who had been interned in Egypt during the latter part of
the war in the Middle East. Seeking to build on these relations, and to support
German economic interests in the Palestine Mandate at the same time,
the German Consulate-General undertook several cultural initiatives. Foremost
among them were the promotion of German-language teaching in Jewish and
Arab schools, the establishment of a chair in German language and literature
at the new Hebrew University, the promotion of German tourism with the
creation of tourist information centers in Palestine, and the promotion of
cultural exchanges with the visit of German musicians, lecturers, and others.46
To emphasize the absence of German political interests in the region beyond
its support for the status quo and any necessary peaceful, internationally
recognized changes to that status quo, Germany rejected requests by Libyan
and other Arab leaders for German diplomatic intervention in Libya. In the
spring of 1931, for instance, unnamed Arabs complained to the German
Consulate-General in Jerusalem, and to the Jerusalem consulates of other
states, about Italian atrocities against the Arab population in Libya.47 As was
the case with earlier efforts to involve Germany in the French Mandate of Syria,
mentioned earlier, the Foreign Office in Berlin was clear in its response to the
Consulate-General in Jerusalem: “The Consulate-General is instructed in
future cases to not accept the written petitions of groups from the Arab or
the Jewish population. . .and to advise the relevant delegations to proceed via
the Mandatory government and its diplomatic representative to the appropriate
foreign government.”48
Moreover, examples of Weimar Germany’s support for peaceful, inter-
nationally recognized changes to the postwar status quo in the region include
Britain’s agreement in 1930 to end the mandate over Iraq and to recognize
Iraq’s nominal independence. Article 22 of the League Covenant stipulated that
mandates would eventually become independent states with full rights as
46
See for example PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 26-Palästina, Bd. 1, “Vorschläge für eine deutsche
Kulturinstitution in Jerusalem,“ Nachtrag zu den Memoranden vom Juni und November 1928,
Hecker/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, 31. Mai 1929; and DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Kult. 1/30,
III O 588, Deutsche Kulturpropaganda mit Beziehung auf den Bericht vom 9. April v.Js., Nr.Kult.
7/29, 8. Januar 1930.
47
See for example PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 3-Länder, Bd. 1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, J.N.
Polit. 31/31, 30. April 1931.
48
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 3-Länder, Bd. 1, AA/Berlin an DGK/Jerusalem, III O 01539/31, auf den
Bericht vom 30. April d.J., 27. Mai 1931.
members of the League of Nations. Germany greeted Britain’s decision to grant

nominal independence to Iraq with full support. In 1931, as a member of the
League Council, the German Foreign Office issued the following statement in
support of Iraq’s entry as an independent state into the League of Nations:
“Germany has always supported the Iraqi wish to be freed from the shackles of
the Mandate and to bring this to reality. Germany greets with sincere joy the
fact that this Iraqi wish has been realized. . .”49 On October 3, 1932, Iraq was
formally admitted into the League of Nations as an independent state. Berlin
also expressed its understanding and full acceptance of the reality that in Iraq,
as well as perhaps later in Syria, Britain and France would retain certain
political, economic, and military prerogatives when the mandates became
independent states at some point in the future. This position was perfectly
consistent with the fact that Germany had no political ambitions in the region.
In Abteilung III, Grobba, who would soon be appointed as Germany’s first
ambassador to Iraq, circulated a memorandum in January 1932 which outlined
this position quite clearly: “As opposed to Italy, we have no political interests in
these Mandate territories, and we are of the opinion that our economic and
cultural interests in these future independent states, states that will nevertheless
still remain somewhat dependent on England and France, will be even more
secure than was the case under the direct English and French administrative
supervision in the Mandates.”50
Berlin also accepted the formal alliance between Great Britain and Iraq that
would accompany the latter’s nominal independence. In Berlin, all of this was
viewed as an opportunity to further promote German economic interests in the
region, especially in the growing international efforts to exploit oil reserves in
Iraq. Indeed, Germany’s main interest in the exploitation of Iraq’s oil resources
was not so much for the oil itself as for its major role in supplying much of the
industrial equipment needed for the petroleum industry in Iraq. This included
oil drilling and pipeline equipment and materials, railway construction, as well
as irrigation equipment for the development of some of the territories in the
vicinity of Iraq’s major oil fields.51 In talks with King Faysal of the new Iraqi
state in the summer of 1930, Grobba expressed Germany’s complete
49
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak, Bd.-, “Entwurf einer Ansprache des Herrn Reichsministers
anlässlich der Aufnahme des Irak in den Völkerbund,” III.O.3113, (no date).
50
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak, Bd.-, Fritz Grobba, “66. Tagung des Völkerbundsrats: Punkt 8
der Tagesordnung,” III.O. 4477/31, 16. Januar 1932. In May 1932, Curt Prüfer in Abteilung III
in the Foreign Office in Berlin instructed the German delegation in Geneva to adopt the following
position on Iraq’s formal admission to the League of Nations: “Please continue to observe
benevolent neutrality in the question of the Iraq Mandate.” See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak,
Bd.-, AA/Berlin (Prüfer) an Deutsche Delegation/Genf, zu III.O. 1510/32, 12. Mai 1932.
51
See for example PA: Pol.Abt. III-Wirtschaft, Irak-Rohstoffe und Waren: Petroleum, Bd. 1,
Aufzeichnung des AA, III R.26/31, 9. Januar 1931; and Pol.Abt. III-Wirtschaft, Irak-Wirtschaft
6: Wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zu Deutschland, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, III O 4347, Nr. 688,
1. Dezember 1931.
understanding that the new Iraq would need the kind of security that a formal
alliance with Great Britain would provide. Grobba told Faysal that the German
government would support such an alliance “. . .so long as in the new alliance
England would not be accorded a preferred economic position in Iraq, and that
Germany would be treated equally with England and other powers and be
allowed to compete economically.”52 Faysal also mentioned to Grobba the
problem of Iraq’s border dispute with Syria as it related to the oil-rich Mosul
area in northern Iraq. Faysal asked Grobba for Germany’s support in the
ongoing dispute. In a follow-up memorandum the next day, August 12, Grobba
advised his superiors in Berlin in a manner that seemed to contradict the
existing Weimar policy of adhering to a policy of strict neutrality in political
issues and disputes in the region. He argued that German firms had long been
interested in exploiting the oil resources in the Mosul area of northern Iraq, and
that Germany’s position in the dispute should accommodate that of an inde-
pendent Iraq. He concluded: “Since we are interested in the oil in this region,
the king should be able to count on our sympathy in this question.”53
Three days later, the Reich foreign minister approved Grobba’s suggestions
and the content of his talks with King Faysal.54 Grobba’s desire for a general
expression of sympathy on a particular question was not tantamount to actual
diplomatic intervention or support.
By the early 1930s, Weimar Germany’s primary goal of promoting
Germany’s economic interests, particularly German exports, as well as its
cultural interests in the Middle East, seem to have achieved a level with which
the German Foreign Office was more or less satisfied. In the Palestine Mandate,
for example, the diplomatic correspondence between Berlin and Jerusalem
reflects a belief in a causal relationship between local Arab perceptions of
German neutrality in Arab conflicts with British rule and with Jewish immigra-
tion and the Jewish National Home, and the growth of German imports.
Reports from the Consulate-General to Berlin in the politically difficult years
of 1929–1932, years of Arab unrest and subsequent international discussions
about the future of Palestine, indicate German satisfaction with both Arab and
Jewish attitudes toward Germany, and toward German economic activity. In
the Consulate-General’s annual report for the year 1929, for example, Consul
General Nord reported that even with the unrest of the previous year, which
included an Arab boycott of Jewish businesses and a consequent drop in Jewish
orders from Germany, Germany still remained second only to Great Britain in
imports into Palestine. Nord attributed this position to the ongoing friendly
attitude of both Arabs and Jews toward Germany, in spite of the difficult events
52
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Grobbas, III.0. 3552/30, 11. August 1930.
53
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Grobbas, III.0. 3588, 12. August 1930.
54
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Irak, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung des RAM, zu III.0. 3588/30, 14. August
1930. This internal statement also called for securing expanded German concessions for air links
into Iraq, as well as the opening of the Iraqi market to more imports of German trucks.
of the past year: “The attitude of the population in Palestine toward Germany
has remained generally unchanged and friendly.”55 In fact, Berlin tried to
improve Germany’s trade position in Palestine through a League of Nations
intervention between 1927 and 1931. It complained of deliberate British efforts
to take advantage of its position as Mandatory power to favor British firms, all
in violation of Article 18 of the Mandate Statutes that promise economic
equality to all powers in Palestine. In November 1927, the German consul
general in Jerusalem complained that the British Mandatory government tried
to “. . .protect the outward appearance of equal access for all competitors. . .”56
while usually favoring British firms, even in instances where German goods
were less expensive. However, Germany’s repeated attempts as a member of the
Mandates Commission to obtain satisfaction apparently were unsuccessful.57
By 1931, of course, an entirely different crisis, the world-wide depression, was
the primary factor that negatively affected German exports to Palestine and
elsewhere. Still, in its reports for the years 1930 and 1931, the German consul
general concluded that in spite of the economic downturn and, by the end of
1931, the overall decline in its trade with Palestine, Germany had maintained
its favorable trade position with Palestine.58
In the Arabian Peninsula, Germany was at first hesitant, then moved slowly
but deliberately in positioning itself to pursue its economic interests after
the Saud family’s 1925 overthrow of the previous Hashemite ruler, Sharif
Hussein. First calling itself the Kingdom of the Hijaz and the Nejd in 1925, the
soon-to-be Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed an interest in importing
German weapons, as well as automobiles, tires, and other industrial products,
and assistance in building railway lines.59 The German government carefully
secured the approval of the British government in the establishment of
friendly relations between Berlin and the Saudi monarchy. This lead to the
signing of a Treaty of Friendship between Germany and the Kingdom of the
Hijaz and the Nejd on April 26, 1929, followed two years later by the opening
55
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Sonderreferat W-Allgemeines, Bd. 3, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Jahresüber-
sicht 1929, Nr.Polit. 2/30, III O 536, 23. Januar 1930. This report was virtually identical in
substance to the annual report a year earlier, for 1928, before the unrest and consequent
disruptions of the summer of 1929. See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Sonderreferat W-Allgemeines, Bd. 3,
DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Jahresübersicht 1928, Nr.Polit. 1-28, III O 498, 24. Januar 1929.
56
PA: Pol.Abt. III-Wirtschaft, Palästina-Handel 11, Aufzeichnung des DGK/Jerusalem, (no date);
and Wirtschaft, Palästina-Wirtschaft 7, Bd. 1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, JN 2386/27, 14.
November 1927.
57
See for example PA: Pol.Abt. III, Palästina-Wirtschaft 7, Bd. 1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin,
Nr.Haf. 9/28, 19.Dezember 1928; and AA/Berlin an Ministerialdirektor Ruppel/Berlin, Nr. III
01142, 14. März 1931.
58
See PA: Pol.Abt. III, Sonderreferat W-Allgemeines, Bd. 3, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/ Berlin,
Jahresübersicht 1930, Nr.Polit. 6-31, III O 406, 21. Januar 1931; and DGK/Jerusalem an
AA/Berlin, Jahresübersicht 1931, Nr.Polit. 15-32, III O 679, 18. Februar 1932.
59
Uwe Pfullmann, “German-Saudi Relations and Their Actors on the Arabian Peninsula, 1924–
1939,” in Schwanitz (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 121–130.
of a German consulate in Jidda. Britain even approved the shipment of three

thousand Polish rifles with ammunition from Hamburg to the Kingdom via
German ships.60
With the defeat of the Central Powers in the First World War, the so called
Eastern Question had disappeared from the diplomatic narrative among the
Great Powers. The Ottoman Empire had finally collapsed, and the western
powers, specifically Great Britain and France, had further extended their
prewar penetration of the Arab world, from the lands of North Africa into
the predominantly Arab Fertile Crescent. Unlike most of the nationalities of
southeastern Europe, which had more or less achieved independent statehood
by 1914, the Arab peoples of the Fertile Crescent and much of the Arabian
Peninsula, not already under some form of British control before the war,
came under various forms of Anglo-French rule, mostly in the form of the
League of Nations Mandates at the end of the war. Imperial Germany’s
position on the Eastern Question, somewhat confused prior to 1914, never-
theless pursued German economic and cultural penetration of Ottoman lands
while maintaining the Ottoman Empire’s existence in the Fertile Crescent and
Arabia in the face of British, French, and Italian imperial ambitions. In other
words, Germany had generally favored maintaining the status quo in North
Africa and the Middle East, satisfied with an expansion of German influence
within existing political structures. As a defeated power, of course, Germany
had no say in the creation of a new order in the Middle East following the
war. The Allied victory enabled the extension of Anglo-French imperial
interests and ambition into almost all of the remaining Ottoman-Arab terri-
tories of the Fertile Crescent and Arabia, as well as a successful effort by
the Zionist movement to include the establishment of a Jewish National
Home within the final peace settlement and Britain’s League of Nations
Mandate for Palestine.
With this context in mind, and the reality of Germany’s weakness following
its total collapse and defeat in 1918, the new German republic played no role in
the creation of a new postwar order in the Middle East. With its main focus on
Europe, and on obtaining revisions of at least some of the harsher provisions of
the Versailles Treaty in Europe, the new Weimar Republic quietly pursued its
rather modest economic and cultural agenda in the Arabic-speaking lands of
North Africa and the Middle East. As was the case with Imperial Germany
prior to the war, so too did the postwar Weimar Republic define its interests in
the region primarily in economic and cultural terms; and, as before 1914, Berlin
set out to promote those interests within the context, once again, of recognizing
and working within the geopolitical status quo in the region. To the extent that
German Middle East policy under the Kaiser and the Weimar Republic
reflected common underlying strategic or political considerations, interests,
60
Ibid., 132–133.
and goals, these were to be found ultimately in Europe.61 German support for
the postwar status quo required its acceptance of, and support for, Anglo-
French-Italian imperial domination and the establishment and development of
the Jewish National Home in Palestine, even if Berlin’s implied criticism of that
status quo was always evident in its repeated assertions that Germany had
nothing to do with its creation. This position also reflected a range of attitudes
with regard to the Arab quest for national self-determination and independence
after the First World War that ranged from general indifference to outright
rejection. This range would also be evident in Hitler’s strategic calculations and
policy decisions toward Arab nationalism and the Middle East during the Third
Reich.
61
For instance, Gordon Craig’s assessment more than half a century ago of Gustav Stresemann’s
approach to Anglo-French interests in the Middle East, and their direct impact on Germany’s
immediate needs in post–World War I Europe, seems to have stood the test of time. See his From
Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1958), 74–75.
2
Hitler, Race, and the World Beyond Europe
race and the european great powers

Hitler and the fledgling National Socialist party exhibited at a minimum a
partly developed strategic and racially centered approach to foreign policy in
the early years of the movement. The connection between a Nazi racial world
view and early geopolitical fantasies about the conquest of new German “living
space” in eastern Europe has long been established.1 It resulted in a world
war that ultimately involved the physical displacement and mass murder of
millions of Jews, Roma, Slavs, and others in Europe. Indeed, Hitler publicly
espoused the connection between race and geopolitics during the first half of the
decade of the 1920s. By 1925, when he finished the second volume of Mein
Kampf, race, war, a future new Germany’s relationship with the relevant
European great powers and the United States, and the identification of targeted
“racial” groups were for the most part set in his mind. In Mein Kampf,
he wrote: “We have been chosen by fate, as witnesses of a catastrophe that
will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the völkisch theory.”2
Hitler wrote this within the context of what he believed was a necessary war
with the new Soviet Union, the conquest of German living space in eastern
Europe and, in the process, the elimination of defined “racial” groups, primar-
ily the Jews, from Poland to the Urals. This did not in any way preclude
the extension of such an approach to foreign affairs globally, to the world
beyond Europe, following the successful culmination of war for the conquest of
German Lebensraum and the establishment of a “new racial order” (rassische
Neuordnung) in Europe.
1
See Weinberg, A World at Arms, 44 ff.
2
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 651. See also Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936 Hubris (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1999), 79, 249–250.
46
Hitler, Race, and the World Beyond Europe 47
Hitler was always aware of the relevance of the other European great
powers, as well as the United States and Japan, to his developing plans for
Germany in Europe and in the world beyond. Indeed, his many references to
those powers in his early writings, certainly to the European powers and
the United States, are indicative of a realization that his strategic and racial
notions were naturally contingent on the role that those powers would play in
the process. This is not to say that Hitler possessed a keen insight into, or solid
understanding of, the world and its realities beyond the borders of the Reich.
Indeed, it is likely that he knew little about the world outside of Europe,
and that he generally cared even less. It does, however, reflect his thinking that
the achievement of German aims would require a clear identification of friends
and foes in the future wars that he believed would be necessary to achieve a new
Germany’s foreign policy aims in Europe and in the world beyond. Some of
those potential friends and foes were imperial powers with a significant pres-
ence and established interests and ambitions in the Arabic-speaking lands
of North Africa, the Fertile Crescent, and the Arabian Peninsula following the
First World War. Therefore, Hitler’s early strategic and foreign policy calculations
were always based in part on the imperial interests and demands of Germany’s
potential allies in any future wars for the establishment of his desired new order in
Europe and possibly beyond.3 As Britain and Italy emerged early on as Hitler’s
logical choices to be the new Germany’s future allies, the Reich’s Middle East
policy after 1933, specifically its views on Arab nationalism and independence,
would have to accommodate first British, and then Italian, and after 1940, French
and Spanish imperial interests in the region.4
Some four decades ago, Klaus Hildebrand argued that Hitler’s early foreign
policy calculations were plagued by an “authoritarian-led anarchy” that was
characteristic of the fledgling NSDAP and its various positions on all issues.5
Indeed, some of Hitler’s earliest pronouncements on Germany’s relationships
with the other great powers reflected an effort to chart a course for a future new
Germany in the lingering environment of immediate postwar anger, violence,
and unrest. They seemed to demonstrate a state of confusion in his mind about
the world beyond Germany, fueled in part by the chaos of those immediate
postwar years. Some degree of certainty in his developing strategic and foreign
policy inclinations would indeed emerge just a few years later, in both
Mein Kampf and his “Second Book.” However, his public statements between
1919 and 1921 betrayed a rather mixed assortment of ideas that generally
rested on lingering popular resentment and harsh criticism of all of Germany’s
3
Hitler’s virtual obsession with determining future German allies and enemies is evident, for
example, in the second volume of his Mein Kampf. See Hitler, Mein Kampf, II, Chaps. 13 and 14.
4
Josef Schröder, “Die Beziehungen der Achsenmächte zur arabischen Welt,” Zeitschrift für Politik
18 (1971): 95.
5
See Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973), 12–23.
wartime foes, with particular emphasis on Russia, France, and Great Britain.6
Even Italy, as one of the victorious Allies in 1918, was viewed negatively.
Of course, the Jews were also targeted for their alleged international conspir-
acy and dominance over all of the powers that had been Germany’s foes in
the war.
In a speech to the local Munich branch (Ortsgruppe) of the NSDAP on
December 10, 1919, with a view that would be significant and directly relevant
more than twenty years later, Hitler singled out Great Britain and the United
States as belonging to a “second echelon” of Germany’s enemies. He stated:
“Look at our enemies. We divide them into two groups: one includes our
absolute opponents. England and America, the second group: nations, who as
a result of their own unhappy situation or as a result of other circumstances
have become our opponents.”7 In his speech at the Hofbräuhaus on April 17,
1920, Hitler again placed Germany’s enemies in certain categories; this time he
revealed a somewhat mixed attitude toward Great Britain and its global
empire.8 While he clearly placed France in the category of long-standing
enemies, he seemed to relegate Great Britain and Russia into a category of
great powers that only recently, and for a variety of reasons, had become
Germany’s enemies. Yet, at times, he would also assert that “international
Jewry” had come to control both the British and Russian Empires, especially
the former, making any sort of future accommodation impossible.9 By the
spring of 1920, his position on Britain mellowed somewhat, particularly as
he increasingly inserted considerations of race into his strategic calculations for
the future. This factor will be considered in the sections that follow.
Nevertheless, and in spite of his relatively early and positive assessment of
the racial foundations of the British Empire, Hitler clearly was not yet com-
mitted to the idea of an Anglo-German accommodation in the immediate
postwar years. However, several factors in 1922 and 1923 undoubtedly did
contribute to both a hardening of his opposition to Russia and a softening of
his immediate postwar animosity toward Great Britain.10 His early outlook,
influenced to some extent by Heinrich Claß and the Alldeutsche Verband,
tended more in the direction of restoring a Wilhelminian approach to German
6
See the excerpts from, and analysis of, the meetings of the NSDAP in Munich between December
1919 and December 1920 at which Hitler was the main speaker, in Reginald Phelps, “Hitler als
Parteiredner im Jahre 1920,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (1963): 274–330.
7
Ibid., 290. See also the account of his speech of July 6, 1920 in the Völkischer Beobachter,
July 11, 1920.
8
Phelps, “Hitler als Parteiredner, ” 297–299.
9
See Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 47–48, 64–65.
10
See Günter Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft
und Politik, 1963), 74–75, 133; Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 35–36; Dietrich Aigner, Das
Ringen um England (Munich: Bechtle Verlag, 1969), 34 ff; and Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign
Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–1936 (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1970), 14–15. See also Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 57–58.
strategic interests and foreign policy aims.11 This included a restoration and
completion of the unity of the German Volk in central Europe, the right to
overseas colonies as sources of raw materials, and the revision of the hated
Versailles settlement. This approach, of course, would not bode well for
friendly relations with Great Britain. However, the final triumph in 1922
of the Bolsheviks over their opponents in the Russian civil war appeared
to Hitler and his fellow National Socialists to ensure the victory of
“international Marxism” in Russia and, therefore, a triumph for the alleged
international Jewish conspiracy. Another factor might have been Alfred
Rosenberg’s increasing ideological influence on Hitler’s “world view” begin-
ning in 1920, particularly with regard to casting Russia, Bolshevism, and the
Jews as the single, monolithic enemy of the Reich. Any sort of future cooper-
ation with Russia now seemed out of the question with the rise to power of
an alleged Jewish-controlled Bolshevik regime in the new Soviet Union.
Of course, the existence of France and Russia as Germany’s implacable foes
would place Great Britain in a somewhat different light in Hitler’s evolving
calculations.
A year later, with the crisis in the Ruhrgebiet over Germany’s default on
its reparations payments, France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr area of
Germany in spite of British objections. Hitler’s previous fears regarding the
likely permanence of the prewar and wartime Anglo-French Entente gave
way to a new recognition of the historical rivalry between Britain and France
that predated the Anglo-French Entente of 1904. In April 1923, for example,
Hitler stated: “For 140 years, England stood in bitter rivalry with France
for hegemony. They have, despite their joint ‘war of theft’, remained to this
moment old and bitter rivals.”12 From this point on, one may observe
in Hitler’s speeches and in writings such as Mein Kampf and later his
“Second Book,” a not particularly subtle change in his assessment of Great
Britain from that of a potential opponent of Germany to the status of a
potential ally.
Regardless of the evolution of his early views on Germany’s future in rela-
tion to the other powers, it seems clear that from the early years of the Weimar
Republic Hitler came to view both Italy and Great Britain possible, desirable,
and even likely German partners in an otherwise uncertain future.13 British and
German diplomatic documents and other sources reveal that on many occa-
sions just before and after his appointment as Reich Chancellor in 1933, Hitler
would refer to his “early” conviction that Britain and Italy were Germany’s
11
See especially Hitler’s speeches of November 26, 1919 and December 10, 1919 in Ernst
Deuerlein, “Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeit-
geschichte 7 (1959): 208–210. See also several of his speeches in 1920 in Phelps, “Hitler als
Parteiredner,” 298, 314–316, 320, 329. See also Hildebrand, Foreign Policy, 18–22.
12
Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 35–36. See also Schubert, Anfänge, 74–75.
13
See Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936 Hubris, 246.
natural allies for the future.14 For instance, in a December 4, 1932 letter to
Colonel Walter von Reichenau of the Reichswehr, Hitler wrote: “Therefore,
based on these considerations, for the past twelve years I have steadfastly
suggested closer ties to Italy on the one hand, and to England on the other, as
the most desirable foreign policy goals for which to strive.”15 His many
speeches in the very early years of the Nazi movement indicate that Hitler
was indeed positive about a future alliance with Italy. In the summer of 1920,
two years before Mussolini’s march on Rome and the first step in his successful
rise to power in Italy, Hitler was contemplating an important role for Italy
in his geopolitical plans and foreign policy for a future National Socialist
Germany. In Hitler’s calculations, the most important reality underlining his
connection to Italy was his perception of an intractable imperial conflict
between Italy and France in the Mediterranean area, particularly in North
Africa. In a speech in Munich on July 6, 1920, for instance, Hitler defined
Germany’s future relationship with Italy in terms of their common “enemy,”
France. He asserted: “For us the enemy sits on the other side of the Rhine,
not in Italy or some other place.”16 And, in September 1920, Hitler argued:
“The main demand is: eliminate the peace treaty! In this context, we must do
our utmost primarily to exploit the conflicts between France and Italy so that
we have Italy on our side.”17 Those Italian-French conflicts were in the area of
the Mediterranean Sea, especially in the French-controlled states of Tunisia and
Algeria in North Africa, Syria, as well as Corsica and southeastern France.
Of course, despite being on the winning side in the First World War, Italy
too was deeply dissatisfied with a peace settlement that fell considerably short
of satisfying its wartime imperial ambitions. Italian dissatisfaction was a fact
both before as well as after Mussolini’s rise to power in 1922. Again, the
primary point of competition between France and Italy in the postwar years
was in the Mediterranean area, which included Arab North Africa and the
Fertile Crescent, where Hitler had no discernible foreign policy interests or
ambitions at that time. This factor would be of considerable significance less
than two decades later. Moreover, the ideological affinity between Italian
Fascism and German National Socialism, in harmony with these geopolitical
calculations, would also become a decisive factor in the realization of Hitler’s
future alliance with Mussolini’s Italy.18
By 1923, Hitler had come to believe in a future accommodation between
Germany and Great Britain as well. His very early distrust of the British, based
14
See Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 45–48. See also Kurt Luedecke, I Knew Hitler
(New York: Scribners, 1937), 77.
15
Thilo Vogelsang, “Hitlers Brief an Reichenau vom 4. Dezember 1932,” Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte 7 (1959): 435.
16
Phelps, “Hitler als Parteiredner,” 305. 17
Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 42.
18
See Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany (1933–1936), 16–20; and Walter Werner
Pese, “Hitler und Italien 1920–1926,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (1955): 126.
as it was on the premise that England was still tied to France in a common
postwar effort to enslave Germany, and that the British government was under
the control of an alleged “international Jewry,” soon gave way to the idea of
common Anglo-German strategic interests, as well as to fantasies about racial
bonds and kinship between Germans and Anglo-Saxons. This also represented
a shift in Hitler’s geopolitical thinking. On the one hand, he was moving
toward replacing Imperial Germany’s pre–World War I tendency to simultan-
eously pursue a Kontinentalpolitik of dominance in Europe and a Weltpolitik
of overseas colonial expansion with a “policy of one after the other” (Politik
des Nacheinanders), in which the conquest of living space in eastern Europe
would precede, but not necessarily exclude, the possibility of eventual overseas
colonial acquisitions.19 In 1924, Hitler apparently came to the conclusion that
German expansion in eastern Europe would be most effectively pursued in
alliance with Great Britain against Russia, a scenario that would mean fore-
going global sea power and colonial expansion, at least for the time being.20
With the publication of the complete Mein Kampf in July 1925, Hitler remarks
in several places that German expansion in central and eastern Europe, and a
consequent war with Russia, would require the friendship of Great Britain.
For example, he writes: “If one wants territory in Europe, then this can happen
for the most part only at Russia’s expense. . .For such a policy, however, there
would be only one ally in Europe: England. Only with England alone does
one have the power, with the rear covered, to begin the new German thrust.”21
He concludes that “No sacrifice is too great in winning over England.”22
On the other hand, the role of France in Hitler’s strategic view shifted from
that of Britain’s very real but temporary postwar accomplice in punishing
Germany, to that of the deadly enemy of both Germany and the British Empire
in Europe and the world. As was the case with Italy, France would also be the
common denominator in drawing Britain and Germany together. In Mein
Kampf, Hitler writes “Any great power today that, like us, finds France’s
domination of the continent un-bearable, is our natural ally.”23 In a more
direct way, Hitler tried to depict Britain as the main loser in Germany’s defeat
in the war, and what he alleged were the negative consequences of French
power in Europe as a result of its victory: “With the disintegration of Germany
as a great power in continental Europe, only the enemies of England can be the
victors.”24 He goes to great lengths in his book to outline a common Anglo-
German aversion to French power in Europe and the world, and in particular
what he believed constituted potentially negative consequences for the British
Empire. After reasserting that, regardless of who is in power, “. . .France is and
remains the bitter enemy of the German people. . .,”25 he concludes that “. . .the
19
See Josef Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül 1935–1939 (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt,
1973), 20.
20 21
See Jäckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung, 38. Hitler, Mein Kampf, 145.
22 23 24 25
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 610, 611–615. Ibid., 614.
military super power of France placed great pressure on the heart of the great
British world empire.”26 In particular, he goes to great lengths to identify the
Ruhr crisis of 1923 as the main example of French perfidy and justification for
a common Anglo-German interest in containing French power.27
In the case of both Italy and Great Britain, Hitler tended to emphasize the
“power-political” (machtpolitische) incentives for drawing both countries
into future accommodations or alliances with Germany. There were also the
ideological factors that included Italy’s Fascism and the centrality of race in
Nazi thinking; however, as important as they were, they nevertheless remained
secondary in Hitler’s immediate calculations.28 It does seem clear that by 1925
and the publication of the complete Mein Kampf, Hitler felt certain that Britain
would not oppose his rationale for German ascendancy in Europe, specifically
for the expansion of German Lebensraum in eastern Europe at the expense of
the Soviet Union, so long as Germany did not then immediately follow with an
aggressive Weltpolitik. Rejecting the logic that Britain would oppose German
ascendance in Europe alone, he reasoned that “England’s wish is and remains
the prevention of the rapid ascendance of a continental power to a significant
world power, that is, the maintenance of a definite balance of power in the
relationships of the European states with each other.”29 However, for Hitler
this did not at all preclude Germany’s pursuit of some form of Weltpolitik
at some point in the future, after achieving German ambitions on the European
continent. This was a scenario that he believed would then necessitate Anglo-
German cooperation against the emerging world power and global ambitions
of the United States.30
Any doubts about the relative importance of power-political and racial-
ideological considerations in Hitler’s early strategic and foreign policy analysis
in Mein Kampf seem to fade with their integration into his 1928 unpublished
sequel. The manuscript, edited by Gerhard Weinberg, was first published by the
Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich in 1961 under the title Hitlers zweites
Buch. Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928. This version appeared in English
translation in 2003 as Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein
Kampf, also with Weinberg as editor. In his Introduction, Weinberg describes
the content of the book as mainly about Hitler’s obsession with Germany’s
struggle for Lebensraum in Europe as a question with combined geopolitical
and racial content: “In history he sees only the struggle for Lebensraum, based
on the rules of racial determinism. . . In the present and the future, Hitler sees
and proclaims the fight against the Jews and for the acquisition of territory in
the East. These were his primary ideas throughout his life.”31 Of course, these
ideas were not new in Hitler’s mind in 1928, as he had aired them for the most
26 27
Ibid. Ibid., 672–675.
28
See Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik, 81.
29 30
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 611. See Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 21–27.
31
Weinberg, Hitler’s Second Book, xxi–xxii.
part just a few years earlier in Mein Kampf. Moreover, he also wrote in the
“Second Book” that he had long advocated within the National Socialist
movement “. . .the idea of an alliance between Germany, Italy, and
England. . .”32 But, as Weinberg observes, the very fact that not much that
was new had emerged in Hitler’s thinking during the eight years between 1925
and his appointment as Reich Chancellor in 1933 is significant in itself. Indeed,
his overall geopolitical and ideological aims remained more or less fixed in
his mind and consistent in his long-term planning, even if the formulation and
implementation of policies designed to ultimately achieve those aims required
improvisation and timely adaptation to the realities on the ground.
In section 13 of the manuscript, designated by the editor as chapter 13 with
the title “The Possible Goals,” (Die möglichen Ziele) Hitler outlines four
possibilities that had already become evident in his thinking by the time of
the publication of Mein Kampf. Besides pushing for a restoration of Germany’s
1914 borders, he also imagined that: “Germany decides to adopt a clear,
farsighted policy of space. . .and. . .concentrates instead all of its strength on
marking out a way of life for our people through the allocation of adequate
Lebensraum for the next one hundred years. Because this space can lie only in
the East, the obligation of a naval power takes a back seat. . .”33 He reasons
that a foreign policy that initially renounces global ambitions would preclude
bringing Germany into conflict with Britain and Italy, although France would
in any case remain Germany’s enemy: “. . .the nature of such a foreign policy
goal does not give reason for England and especially Italy to maintain the
enmity of the Great War.”34
Elsewhere in the manuscript, Hitler reasserts his conviction that a foreign
policy based clearly and exclusively on the expansion of German Lebensraum
in Europe alone, and on a rejection of the Kaiser’s prewar global ambitions,
would remove any British doubts about the future benefits of an alliance with a
new Germany. For instance, he writes: “If. . .Germany arrives at a fundamental
political reorientation that. . .instead limits itself to continental goals, then there
is no longer a logical basis for English hostility.”35 Similarly, as he had done
with regard to Germany’s future relationship with Great Britain, he devotes
much of chapter 15 to his earlier rationalizations about future German-Italian
cooperation and alliance. Here too he identifies France as Italy’s natural enemy.
Indeed, until the final Allied expulsion of Axis troops from North Africa in
May 1943, Hitler maintained the position he outlined in the “Second Book”
that: “The natural area for Italian expansion is and remains the land bordering
the Mediterranean Sea.”36 After reiterating that France would never
accept Italy becoming a dominant Mediterranean power, Hitler concluded:
“What the Mediterranean Sea is for Italy, the eastern shore of the Baltic is for
32 33 34 35 36
Ibid., 182. Ibid., 158 Ibid., 159. Ibid., 172–173. Ibid., 177–178.
Germany. Germany’s mortal enemy in any further development. . .is France,

which is likewise the mortal enemy of Italy.”37
This study does not attempt to definitively determine which of the two, Great
Britain or Italy, was dominant in Hitler’s early foreign policy thinking or, for
that matter, in his planning after 1933. It is sufficient here to note that each
played an important role in the formulation of Nazi geopolitical considerations
and foreign policy from the early years of the movement to the collapse of the
Axis position in North Africa and of Mussolini’s regime in the summer and
fall of 1943. Indeed, a consequence of the rapidly changing circumstances on
the ground before and especially after January 30, 1933 was the often impro-
visational nature of much of Nazi domestic and foreign policy. That is to say,
the tendency to improvise in Nazi policy making did not necessarily mean the
permanent sacrifice of core components of Nazi ideology and its ultimate goals.
This was certainly true in the evolution of Jewish policy after 1933, as distinct
from Nazi racial ideology; it was especially true in the evolution of Nazi foreign
policy, particularly with regard to the Mediterranean area and the Middle East.
Neither power-political requirements on the ground, nor the ideological foun-
dations of National Socialism, were entirely absent from the regime’s internal
debates and considerations; rather, at any given time one or the other might
take precedence in the formulation of policy. This will be evident in Hitler’s
approach to the Middle East in the early years of Nazi rule, as well as during the
years before and after the outbreak of war in 1939.
race and “colonial peoples”

A brief reference to Hitler’s early recognition of race as a factor in his develop-
ing attitude toward Britain and its empire has already been made. A few
examples of those references are instructive at this point. In his April 17,
1920 speech at the Hofbräuhaus, Hitler seemed to temper his resentment of
the British with a positive recognition of the global British Empire. He ascribed
its power, scope, and longevity to several factors, using an apparently racial
context and framework. He marveled that as a small state with a relatively
small population of its own, England had been able to establish its control over
more than one-fifth of the earth’s land surface. He attributed this primarily to
the determination of the English people to maintain its racial purity in the
colonies, and asserted that, “The Englishman has always understood that
he must be master, and not brother.”38 By the time of the publication of Mein
Kampf in 1925, Great Britain’s racial value as a prospective German ally
seemed as fixed in Hitler’s mind as its strategic and political value. While
recognizing the quality of England’s superior armaments and its soldiers,
37
Ibid., 212. 38
Phelps,“Hitler als Parteiredner, ” 297.
Hitler referred to another factor in the survival of the British Empire: “. . .but
the valuable blood of the entire nation comes to the fore. . .”39
By 1925, Hitler seemed to have developed a level of contempt for the
colonial peoples of Africa and Asia, and their developing movements for self-
determination and independence. From time to time, he dismissed these move-
ments as pure fantasy. For instance, he wrote: “For the attempt through a
‘League of the Oppressed Nations’ to be able to disarm the all-powerful victors
is not only laughable, but also pernicious.”40 It is unlikely that Hitler was
alluding here to the futility of any German effort to achieve its aims peacefully
through the League of Nations, or to the strength of the British Empire
following the First World War; rather it is likely that he was dismissing the
efforts of anticolonial movements throughout Asia and the Middle East to
achieve independence from European colonial rule. In particular, he creates a
racial framework in his approach to the question of Anglo-German friendship
and cooperation that is utterly contemptuous of those independence move-
ments against British imperial rule. He scorns as childish and incomprehensible
statements in 1920 and 1921 by those in völkisch circles who, after listening
to “Asian charlatans” (asiatische Gaukler), had argued that England was
facing a collapse in India.41 He reiterates that the English people were always
aware of the absolute central importance of India in the British Empire, and
that statements about the pending collapse of British rule in India are proof
of the utter ignorance of some Germans with regard to Britain’s ability to
maintain its strength and control over its empire. He concluded:
England will lose India only if it falls victim to racial degeneration within its own
administrative machinery. . .or if it is compelled to by the sword of a powerful enemy.
Indian rebels will, however, never achieve this. We Germans have learned well enough
how hard it is to force England. Entirely aside from the fact that as a German, I would,
despite everything, still rather see India under English rule than under some other rule.42
On the same page in Mein Kampf, Hitler alludes to the futility of Egyptian
efforts to achieve independence from Great Britain. He writes positively of
the racial basis of British rule in Egypt since 1882, and then goes on to describe
as equally pitiful the views expressed by some in the same völkisch circles
in Germany that Egyptian unrest and demands for independence might be
successful. He argues:
It is simply impossible for a coalition of cripples to defeat a powerful state determined, if
need be, to shed its last drop of blood for its existence. As a völkisch man, who estimates
the value of humanity according to racial principles, I may not, simply because of
my knowledge of their racial inferiority, link my own nation’s fate with that of these
so-called ‘oppressed nations.’43
39 40 41 42
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 149. Ibid., 654. Ibid., 654–655. Ibid., 655.
43
Ibid.
Hitler’s obvious focus on power-political relations among the European

powers did not mean that he lost sight of the racial foundations of his emerging
foreign policy. He seemed to stress race as the most significant component of
the strength and worth of a people, even more important than the quantity and
level of technology of modern weapons and the size and power of modern
armies. He wrote: “Nothing is easier to replace than the loss of weapons, and
every form of organization can be recreated or renewed. What is irreplaceable is
the corrupted blood of a people – the destroyed inner quality.”44 After asserting
that the intrinsic value of peoples is not the same, he noted: “The higher the
racial worth of a people, the greater its overall value, [through] which in
conflict and in the struggle with other peoples, it must then be mobilized for
the benefit of its life.”45 In his “Second Book,” Hitler ascribes the greatness of
the Roman and British Empires to the combination of the highest genetic
quality and clear political objectives; he then warns against the mixing of blood
and the consequent decline of racial quality as a key component in the fall of
world powers. In concluding his integration of power-political and racial-
ideological principles, he laid out eight “Principles of German Foreign Policy”
(Grundsätze der deutschen Außenpolitik), the seventh of which stipulated that
“Germany should never hope to be able to make world history through
alliances with peoples whose military worth is inferior – this being adequately
identified through the fact of their previous defeat or their general racial
significance.”46 This position is instructive for the later discussion of Nazi
Germany’s Middle East policy beginning in 1933.
Finally, it is important to note that Hitler’s emphasis in his writings in the
mid to late 1920s on German continental hegemony and the achievement of
German living space in Europe as a foundation for Anglo-German cooperation
in no way reflected a permanent rejection of the pursuit of Weltpolitik.
This was clearly implied in Mein Kampf, mentioned earlier, when he referred
to race as the ultimate logic of European domination of the colonial peoples of
the world, as well as in speeches during the several years before his appointment
as Reich Chancellor.47 In his “Second Book,” moreover, a specific “power-
political” rationalization emerged in Hitler’s thinking that would ostensibly
permit Germany, with British approval, to move beyond its strictly continental
position in Europe to one that would be more global in scope. When he wrote:
“. . .wherever our success ends, it will only be the jump-off point for a new
struggle,”48 one might then apply Hitler’s “logic” to sometime in the future
when, having consolidated its hegemony in central and eastern Europe,
Germany would then set out in the pursuit of some sort of Weltpolitik.
As mentioned earlier, the key to this evolution from a Kontinentalpolitik to a
44 45 46
Ibid., 31. Ibid., 32–33. Weinberg, Hitler’s Second Book, 154.
47
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 653–661. See also Thies, Architekt, 52–56.
48
Goda, Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa, and the Path toward America, xvii.
Weltpolitik, in alliance with Great Britain, was likely in Hitler’s view the
emerging global power of the United States. In Mein Kampf, Hitler had already
alluded to an alleged American threat to the British Empire and by extension
to Europe:
All the kinship connections, however, cannot prevent a certain feeling of envious
concern in England for the growth of the American Union in all fields of international
economic and power politics. A new mistress of the world seems to be growing out of the
former colonial country, the child of the great mother. It is understandable if England
today re-examines her former alliances in anxious disquiet. . .49
In his “Second Book,” Hitler continued to raise the specter of the United
States as a significant threat to Britain and its global empire, one that was every
bit as dangerous as France and Russia. He referred to “. . .the significance of the
menacing American hegemonic position. . .,” and to a solution in which
“. . .the only state that will be able to stand up to North America will be the
state that has understood how. . .to raise the racial value of its people and bring
it into the most practical national form for this purpose.”50 For Hitler, the
implication here was that Germany’s future strategic interests would indeed
become global in nature, in part within a context of Anglo-German cooperation
against a new, global threat from the United States: “If England itself remains
true to its great international political aims, then its potential adversaries in
Europe will be France and Russia, and in the rest of the world in the future
especially the American union.”51
Hitler’s foreign policy inclinations were relatively fixed before January 30,
1933. Both power-political and racial-ideological considerations were not
merely interchangeable. They were the two sides of a single coin that involved
an initial, albeit temporary, renunciation of global interest and ambition in
favor of an exclusively Europe-centered policy of expanded German domin-
ation and living space in eastern Europe at the expense of the new Soviet Union.
It also identified France as an implacable enemy of the German people, and
both Great Britain and Italy as Germany’s future allies, based on the inherent
strategic competition and conflict of British and Italian imperial interests with
those of France. Furthermore, Hitler also identified the expanding ambitions of
the United States as an emerging global power that would, ultimately, come
into conflict with the interests of Britain, Germany, and indeed with all of
Europe. Generally, this would amount to the maintenance of existing European
empires with as yet undefined changes in the configuration of colonial bound-
aries that would likely benefit Italy and Great Britain. This would not necessar-
ily mean the dismantling of the French empire, nor exclude an as yet undefined
German colonial presence. A preliminary definition would soon be provided
49 50
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 633–634. Weinberg, Hitler’s Second Book, 114–116.
51
Ibid., 172.
after Hitler’s assumption of power by Nazi demands in 1936 for the return of at
least some, if not all, of Germany’s pre-1914 colonial empire in Africa.
This fusion of power politics and racial ideology in Hitler’s thinking are
clearly evident in his speech to the Düsseldorf Industrieklub on January 27,
1932, just one year before his appointment as Reich Chancellor. Speaking to an
audience of industrialists, he stressed the importance of reestablishing and
improving Germany’s competitive position in world trade, within the larger
context of his strategic calculations and his approach to a new German foreign
policy as it had evolved in his mind since the earliest days of the NSDAP.
Toward the end of this very long speech, he seemed to hint at the two phases of
his approach to Germany’s future foreign policy with the following remark:
“It is wrong to say: world politics, the position in the world alone determined
Germany’s fate in the sixteenth century. No, our internal situation back then
had helped to shape the picture of the world, under which we later so dearly
suffered: the division of the world without Germany.”52 These words were
uttered just after Hitler‘s lament in that speech that the religious wars between
Protestants and Catholics in Germany had prevented the German Volk from
assuming its rightful place in Europe and the world, as part of the domination
of the world by the “white race.” Thus, nation/race is posited here as a critical
missing element in Germany’s unfortunate past, and a matter of absolute
necessity if Germany was to attain its rightful place in the world in the future.
Indeed, in much of the speech, Hitler argued that a new Germany, grounded in
principles and policies that would protect and enhance the racial purity of the
German people, would have to play its part in the continued domination of
the world by the “white race”: “We have the so-called white race that, since
the end of antiquity, has established its preeminent position in the world for the
past thousand years.”53 With an audience consisting mainly of industrialists,
Hitler insisted in the speech that the economic domination of the world by the
“white race” was the natural consequence of its racial superiority, a superiority
that enabled Europe and America to create a world economic system “. . .that is
characterized by gigantic central factories in Europe and lately in America, and
by huge export markets and sources of raw materials in the rest of the
world.”54 He concluded his speech by differentiating himself from the current
German government in terms of the best way to build a better future for
Germany. As vitally important as his strategic and foreign policy ideas were
in this speech, and had been since the early years of the movement, Hitler once
again returned to domestic affairs and his fantasies about preserving a healthy
Volkskörper (racial community) at home: “Therefore, contrary to the official
government, I see the means to Germany’s rebirth not in the primacy of
52
Max Domarus (ed.), Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, 4th Ed., Vol. I (Leonberg:
Pamminger & Partner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1973), 82.
53 54
Ibid., 74–75. Ibid., 75.
German foreign policy, but in the primacy of the rebirth of a healthy, national
and strong German people.”55
There are many other examples of the centrality of race in Hitler’s racial
view of the world, and generally the role of Nazi racial ideology in the strategic
calculations and foreign policy of the Third Reich. This view, no doubt shared
by most within the Nazi party hierarchy, was likewise generally shared in the
educated and established elites in government, the universities, and the profes-
sions, in Germany as elsewhere, during the interwar years. It was a view of
modern society and the world that, in Mein Kampf, Hitler actually accuses the
bourgeoisie of not sharing, one that reflected his and the larger society’s race-
based and Social Darwinist conviction that the “strong” must prevail over the
“weak.”56 In this context, according to Hitler, the so-called colonial peoples
of the world naturally must be ruled by the “white” nations of Europe and
North America. In Mein Kampf, he mocks the bourgeoisie for permitting the
occasional person of African descent to become a lawyer, a teacher, a clergy-
man, or even an opera tenor, and, of course, explains this as the result of the
manipulation of the Jew who seeks “. . .to construe from this a new proof of
the correctness of his theory of the ‘equality of men’ which he intends to instill
into the nations.”57 He condemns the idea of trying to educate non-whites for
responsible positions as a “. . .sin against reason. . .a criminal absurdity to train
a born half ape until one believes a lawyer has been made of him. . .”58 He then
bemoans the fact that millions of proletarian members of the racially and
culturally superior “white” race are condemned to the most menial labor
“. . .while Hottentots and Zulu Kafirs are trained for intellectual vocations.”59
Although Hitler did not make these observations within the context of
European colonial empires, it would no doubt be applicable to his assessment
of colonial peoples and their growing movements for independence in the world
after the First World War.
Hitler’s ideas about the racial justification for European colonial empires
were also evident in some of his statements during the years following his
assumption of power in January 1933. For instance, in a public speech before
a Nazi student rally in Munich in January 1936, Hitler made the following call
for continued “white” domination of the world: “. . .and when we consider this
peculiar historical picture today, then we can only comprehend it if we are
determined to employ the eternal organizational drive of the white race, that is,
this natural conviction that this white race has been ordained to govern, to lead
and to rule the rest of the world.”60 Other notables in the Nazi state after 1933
also referred time and again to the racial foundations of National Socialism’s
55
Ibid., 90.
56
Eberhard Jäckel and Axel Kuhn (eds.), Hitler. Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 1905–1924 (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1980), 887.
57 58 59
Hitler, Mein Kampf, 423. Ibid. Ibid., 424.
60
BArch: NS/26–60, Rede Hitlers vor dem NS-Studentenbund in München am 26. Januar 1936.
view of the world beyond the confines of the European continent. For instance,
Alfred Rosenberg spoke of European racial solidarity in the face of growing
independence movements in Africa and Asia during the interwar years, while
Joachim von Ribbentrop’s promotion of an Anglo-German alliance during his
term as German ambassador to London was often couched in notions of racial
and Germanic kinship between Anglo-Saxons and Germans.61 Nevertheless, as
Germany’s head of state, Hitler did receive political leaders and other person-
alities from non-Western states, many of which were still not free of European
influence and control. As we shall see in the following chapters, several of these
personalities were from the Arab world.
Hitler’s racial view of the world and that of other Nazi officials during the
Third Reich must also be considered within the context of Germany’s wartime
propaganda to the Arab world. It was a propaganda that trumpeted themes of
common interests uniting the German and Arab peoples, and the need for close
cooperation against their common enemies.62 For example, on several occa-
sions, German leaders seemed to place Amin al-Husayni, the pro-Axis Grand
Mufti of Jerusalem who lived in exile in Berlin and Rome between 1941
and 1945, both racially apart from, as well as part of, the Arab people. They
commented on his ostensible “Aryan” appearance, yet ascribed to him a
“scheming intelligence.” In July 1942, for example, Hitler commented on his
one meeting with the Mufti eight months earlier that, “With his blonde hair and
blue eyes, he gives the impression, despite his shrew-like face, of a man whose
ancestors were more likely to have been Aryans, and who perhaps is descended
from the best Roman blood. . .In sheer intelligence he almost comes close to
the Japanese.”63 On April 26, 1944, almost a year after the total defeat of the
Axis in North Africa, Joseph Goebbels remarked in his diary after a meeting
with the Mufti, “This Grand Mufti makes a very good impression on me.
One might almost believe that it is about his completely Nordic appearance.”64
Notwithstanding Germany’s military collapse in the Middle East and North
Africa in May 1943, followed by the surrender and developing Allied occupa-
tion of Italy in the fall, and the Wehrmacht’s defeats and increasingly defensive
posture on the Eastern Front, Goebbels still entertained al-Husayni’s efforts to
impress upon him the value of some 400 million Muslim Arabs to the German
war effort and Germany’s need to improve its propaganda toward the Arabs.
On the following day, however, the only observation that Goebbels saw fit to
write in his diary was: “The Führer has the same impression of the Grand Mufti
61
See for example BArch:Sammlung Schumacher, 124, “Die kulturelle und politische Mission der
vier europäischen Großmächte, Rede von Alfred Rosenberg, 30. Oktober 1937; Aigner, Das
Ringen um England, 13.
62
See Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem, 62–63.
63
See Hitler’s comment of July 2, 1942 in Henry Picker (ed.), Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führer-
hauptquartier. Hitler, wie er wirklich war (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1983), 403–404.
64
Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil II, Bd. 12, 188–189.
of Jerusalem as I have. He considers him to be a descendant of the crusaders,

and he also looks like one.”65
It is not within the scope of this study to consider race and geopolitics in the
Nazi quest for German Lebensraum in eastern Europe, and its application
within the context of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and Hitler’s
quest for a racial new order (rassische Neuordnung) in Europe. This would
include mass murder of the Jews, the Roma and Sinti, and, ultimately perhaps,
the Slavic peoples of eastern Europe. However, it should be remembered that
North Africa and the Middle East represented a large area, in very close
geographic proximity to Europe, one in which German troops were for a brief
time militarily engaged and even more briefly on the verge of what appeared in
1942 to be a military victory. Therefore, Germany was theoretically in a
position to apply National Socialist racial principles to the populations living
in the region, a significant minority of whom were Jews, and the overwhelming
majority of whom were Arabs. It is also clear that, had the Axis won the war,
Germany ultimately would have included the Jews in the Arab world in the
“final solution,” the physical annihilation of the Jews that had become a central
element in its war in Europe. It is, of course, unlikely that the same fate would
have befallen the Arabs. However, given the absence of defined German colo-
nial ambitions in the Middle East and North Africa, and the reality of Italian,
French, and continuing British imperial interests in the Arabic-speaking world,
it is equally unlikely that Hitler would have supported Arab independence and
the termination of European colonial rule in any meaningful way. It is certainly
true that one can find almost anything when reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf or his
“Second Book,” including the many references cited earlier to his belief in
the “racial” inferiority of the colonial peoples of the world, as well as to the
desirability of European or “white” hegemony in the world. Indeed, this view
of the world was evident in Hitler’s indecision over the British military cam-
paign against the short-lived pro-Axis al-Gaylani regime in Iraq in May 1941.
Goebbels notes in his diary entry for May 9, 1941: “The Führer rightly does not
expect much fighting ability from the Arabs. They don’t possess the nerves and
the intelligence to use modern weapons.”66 The centrality of Nazi racial ideol-
ogy has been overwhelmingly acknowledged and accepted in explanations of
Nazi policy in Germany and the rest of occupied Europe during the Second
World War, with the connections often made to statements and actions by
Hitler and other Nazi officials before and after 1933. One must assume,
therefore, that had the Axis powers been militarily successful in the Mediterra-
nean area during the war, those earlier references to race and to colonial
peoples in North Africa and the Middle East, that is, to Arabs, would have
likewise played an important role at some point and in some manner in the
formulation and implementation of German and Axis policy.
65 66
Ibid., 200. Fröhlich, Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 9, 301.
3
Germany and the Arab World, 1933–1937
hitler’s “englandpolitik”
When Hitler became Germany’s new Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933,
he possessed some basic outline of a foreign policy that he had articulated in his
speeches and writings beginning in the early 1920s. It had evolved into a more
comprehensive and ambitious program than the very limited goal of revising
the Versailles Treaty, as demanded in the National Socialist Party Program of
February 1920.1 Hitler’s approach represented a combination of some of the
trends in early Nazi thinking with regard to a future German foreign policy.
Some emphasized the restoration of Germany’s prewar borders and its colonial
empire, by war if necessary. This approach was advocated by people such as
Ritter von Epp, Hermann Göring, and a few others. Some, such as Alfred
Rosenberg and Walter Darré, demanded a Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil)
approach that seemed to reject the pursuit of overseas colonies in favor of a
large continental empire in central and eastern Europe, one that would come at
the expense of Russia, but possibly in alliance with Great Britain.2 Hitler’s
earlier thinking for the most part reflected the first tendency, one in which he
demanded the restoration of Germany’s prewar boundaries and at least some of
its former colonial empire, with the unity of the German Volk in one “Greater
Germany” in central Europe. Initially, there was little evidence of notions
of Lebensraum in eastern Europe in his geopolitical calculations. Given the
outcome of the First World War and the content of the Versailles Treaty, part
of Hitler’s early approach of necessity included hostility toward both France
and Britain as Germany’s Erbfeinde, enemies that he believed were determined
to deny Germany its rightful claims.3 In 1921, for instance, Hitler also
1 2
Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 11–12. See Hildebrand, Foreign Policy, 12–13.
3
See Phelps, “Hitler als Parteiredner,” 290, 297–298, 308.
62
Germany and the Arab World, 1933–1937 63
concluded that Britain had come under the control of “world Jewry.”4
His position on Great Britain and its role in Germany’s future geopolitical
and foreign policy calculations would have to change as he gravitated to the
much more ambitious undertaking of expanding German living space into
eastern Europe. He now concluded that this would ultimately mean war against
France and the new Soviet Union, a reality that would place Britain in a new
and very different position than had been the case in his earlier geopolitical
outlook.
It is difficult to discern precisely at which point in the early years of the Nazi
movement Hitler’s attitude toward Britain began to change. In his brief article
“Why did an 8th November have to come”? (Warum mußte ein 8. November
kommen?), published in the monthly journal Deutschlands Erneurung in
Munich in 1924, Hitler referred to the possible benefits of an Anglo-German
alliance.5 In 1932, in a letter to Reichswehr General Walter von Reichenau,
he wrote that he had favored an alliance with Great Britain for twelve years.6
Of course, Alfred Rosenberg’s influence on Hitler, of some importance in the
early years of the movement, was a likely factor, particularly with regard
to Rosenberg’s conviction that Germany’s future lay in the conquest of Lebens-
raum in the East, the destruction of “Jewish-inspired” Bolshevism, and
the consequent advisability of future alliances with Italy and Great Britain.7
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous chapter, external events, particularly
the Bolshevik victory in the Russian civil war in 1922, and the Ruhr crisis of
1923 in which Britain did not support France’s Ruhr occupation, likely made a
significant impression on Hitler. In any case, these realities, along with the
consequences of Mussolini’s march on Rome in 1922, encouraged Hitler to see
both England and Italy as Germany’s possible allies against France and
Russia in Europe. He also began to assume that British and Italian colonial
and other rivalries with France would lead to the same result. All of this seemed
to be set in Hitler’s mind by the publication of the second volume of Mein
Kampf in 1925.8 If one adds to this the racial content of Hitler’s developing
attitude toward Britain, the British Empire, and the colonial peoples of Asia
and Africa, as briefly outlined in the previous chapter, the role of Great
Britain in the geopolitical calculations and foreign policy of a new Germany
4
See Völkischer Beobachter, 29. Mai 1921.
5
See Wolfgang Horn, “Ein unbekannter Aufsatz Hitlers aus dem Frühjahr 1924,” Vierteljahrshefte
für Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), 280–294.
6
See Vogelsang, “Hitlers Brief an Reichenau,” 435. See again Luedecke, I Knew Hitler, 77.
7
See Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik (München: Verlag Franz
Eher Nachf., 1927), 20–21, 55. See also Ernst Piper, Alfred Rosenberg. Hitlers Chefideologe
(München: Karl Blessing Verlag, 2005), 155, 163–164; Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches
Programm, 57–58; and Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik, 133.
8
See Jäckel, Hitler’s Weltanschauung, 35–36; Schubert, Anfänge nationalsozialistischer Aussenpo-
litik, 58 ff, 74–75; Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 269.
under National Socialism was more or less set by the time Hitler assumed
power on January 30, 1933.
With the enactment of the Enabling Law of March 24, 1933, Hitler was on
his way to securing dictatorial power. He presided over a cabinet meeting on
April 7 during which Germany’s current and future foreign policy was on the
agenda, and at which it was agreed by all that while a future understanding
with France was not possible, good relations with both Britain and Italy were
essential.9 To secure an understanding with Britain, Hitler understood that, at
least for the time being, he would have to forsake demands for the return of
German colonies in Africa and the Pacific, as well as any inclination to build a
large global navy as part of any future German rearmament program. This
decision was reflected in the Anglo-German Naval Pact of June 18, 1935. It was
an agreement that seemed to indicate Hitler’s determination at the time to
pursue a foreign policy based in part on some sort of accommodation, perhaps
even a formal alliance, with Great Britain. Indeed, in an interview with the
Daily Telegraph in May 1933, Hitler expressed his disinterest in overseas
colonial ambitions in favor of German “interests” in eastern Europe: “The idea
of overseas German expansion, as it existed before the war, has been given up.
Germany should not seek to enter into a naval competition with England.
The German destiny does not depend on colonies or dominions, but on its
eastern borders.”10 In those early years, at least until 1935, Hitler tended
to frame his pitch to the British government in terms of Germany’s rejection
of colonial acquisitions and global naval power, which was another way of
signaling its public recognition and acceptance of the integrity and security of
the British Empire throughout the world.
After two years of avoiding mention of German colonial claims, Hitler’s
government began to send signals in 1935 that at some point it would seek
the return of at least some of Germany’s former colonies. In March 1935,
British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden met with Hitler
in Berlin. Without specifically mentioning eastern Europe or overseas colonies,
Hitler described Germany’s insufficient economic living space in central
Europe, and the necessity of rectifying the situation in order to avoid future
conflict.11 But Hitler also emphasized the community of interests between Great
Britain and Germany, and his hope that a special relationship between the
two would be established immediately. It does not appear that he was moving
away from the goal of an eventual alliance with Britain. He was, however,
increasingly under pressure from some in his government, including Hjalmar
Schacht, who advocated the return of some of Germany’s former colonies for
9
BArch: R/43-II, 1399, Ministerbesprechung über die aussenpolitische Lage am 7. April 1933.
10
The Daily Telegraph, May 5, 1933. Some of Hitler’s comments to the interviewer can be found
in the original German in Domarus, Hitler, Bd. 1, 265.
11
ADAP: Serie C, Bd. III/2, Nr. 555. See also The Right Hon. Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs.
Facing the Dictators (London: Cassell, 1962), 132–138.
its perceived economic benefit.12 The push for colonial revisions became openly
apparent in 1936 and 1937. In his speech of March 7, 1936, after the reoccu-
pation of the Rhineland, as well as at the Reichsparteitag in September of that
year, Hitler called for the return of former German colonies because of the
Reich’s need for more sources of food and raw materials.13 In his recently
uncovered diary, Alfred Rosenberg describes Hitler’s position on colonies
in September 1936 in the following way: “The Führer stressed that the colonial
question is not one of prestige, but rather a purely economic one.”14 Yet, Hitler
continued to stress the necessity of friendly relations with Great Britain and the
desirability of an Anglo-German partnership. This seems evident in his guide-
lines for the pursuit of German colonial policy, sent to Ritter von Epp, the head
of the Kolonialpolitisches Amt (Colonial Policy Office) of the National Socialist
party, on November 25, 1935. Hitler cautioned: “. . .that the scale of the
propaganda from all participating offices for our colonial goals be compatible
with the direction of foreign policy.”15 Moreover, Hitler’s appointment of
Joachim von Ribbentrop, long an advocate for some form of Anglo-German
accommodation, as German ambassador to London in 1936 was another
indication of his continuing hopes for an understanding of some sort with the
British government.16 Rosenberg, the head of the Aussenpolitisches Amt der
NSDAP, one of several foreign policy agencies within the Nazi party, had long
been committed to an Anglo-German alliance. Except perhaps for the return
of a former colony or two as sources for raw materials, Rosenberg and the APA
argued that Germany should concentrate on eastern Europe and generally
refrain from pursuing a Weltpolitik of any sort beyond the European continent.
Rosenberg believed that, for both racial and strategic reasons, Great Britain
was Germany’s natural ally.17
At that cabinet meeting of April 7, 1933, Reich Foreign Minister
von Neurath joined the chorus of those who doubted the possibility of a
future understanding with France, and who advocated close relations with
Great Britain. Von Neurath also raised doubts about German relations with
12
BArch: R/43-I, 627, Schacht an Ritter von Epp, 19. März 1935.
13
See Hildebrand, Foreign Policy, 39–43; and BArch: R/43-II, 991a, VIII. Reichsparteitag
Nürnberg, 9. September 1936.
14
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (hereafter USHMM): The Alfred Rosenberg Diary,
17. September 1936, 69.
15
BArch: R/43-I, 627, Der Staatssekretär und Chef der Reichskanzlei an den Reichsstatthalter in
Bayern, Herrn Gen. Ritter von Epp, 25. November 1935.
16
In his memoirs, Ribbentrop claimed that before he left to assume his post as German ambassador
in London, Hitler gave him the following instructions: “Bring me the English alliance.” See
Joachim von Ribbentrop, Zwischen London und Moskau. Erinnerungen und letzte Aufzeich-
nungen (Leoni am Starnbergersee: Druffel Verlag, 1953), 93. See also Henke, England in Hitlers
politischem Kalkül, 56.
17
See Alfred Rosenberg, Das Politische Tagebuch Alfred Rosenbergs aus den Jahren 1934–1935
und 1939–1940 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956), 4, 17, 20, 138–140. See also Jacob-
sen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, 45 ff.
Italy, a relevant question given the potential conflicts between Italian and
British imperial interests in the Mediterranean area, Northeastern Africa, and
even in the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula. As indicated in the previous
chapter, Hitler was quite clear in both Mein Kampf and the “Second Book”
that Britain and Italy were natural partners for a future National Socialist
Germany. He had assumed that neither had conflicts with Germany, and that
both were, like Germany, the natural enemies of France. He also assumed that
Britain and Italy could themselves be natural allies with competing, but not
necessarily conflicting, imperial interests. Echoing Hitler’s long-standing
interest in an Italian-German alliance, von Neurath asserted the need for
close cooperation with Italy; but, at the same time, he also stressed points
of potential conflict between Berlin and Rome, especially in Austria.18
The question arose, therefore, about the relative worth of Britain and Italy
to Germany, especially given conflicting imperial interests between London
and Rome in the Mediterranean and Red Sea regions, as well as the initial
areas of concern in German-Italian relations after 1933. Indeed, conflicting
British and Italian imperial interests were evident to Hitler with the crisis
over Ethiopia in 1935.
Hitler’s overtures to Great Britain between 1933 and 1936 were not
matched by similar efforts with regard to Italy.19 There is some evidence that
Hitler might have opted for the British over the Italians had London been more
amenable to his gestures, even with Anglo-Italian differences and the potential
for conflict in the Mediterranean and in northeastern Africa. Exchanges
between the Foreign Office in Berlin and the German Embassy in Rome shortly
after Hitler’s appointment as Reich Chancellor indicate that both recom-
mended cooperation and friendly relations with Italy, but the avoidance of
any sort of formal alliance.20 At that early stage, the Foreign Office in Berlin felt
that Germany was in a weak position vis-à-vis France, and that Italy would not
be able to help Germany in case of hostilities on its western border. German-
Italian tension over Austria in 1934, and the international crisis over Ethiopia
in 1935, also shed some light on the relative worth of Britain and Italy
in Hitler’s eyes during the first two years of the Third Reich. For instance,
at the time of Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Hitler’s adjutant,
Fritz Wiedemann, claimed that Hitler predicted Italy would fail should Britain
decide to militarily resist the invasion. According to Wiedemann, Hitler
observed: “If I had a choice between Mussolini and the English, then of course
I would go with the English. As much as Mussolini is more ideologically
compatible with me, I know the English from the First World War. They are
18
BArch: R/43-II, 1399, Ministerbesprechung über die aussenpolitische Lage am 7. April 1933.
19
See Jens Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933–1936 (Tübin-
gen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1973), 61 ff.
20
See PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, Italien Pol. 2, Bd. 3, AA/Berlin (Köpke) an DB/Rom (v.
Hassell), 20. Februar 1933; and DB/Rom (v. Hassell) an AA/Berlin (Köpke), 6. März 1933.
hardy chaps.”21 Albert Speer also claims in his memoirs that Hitler preferred
the British over the Italians if given the choice.22 In the end, of course, London,
while amenable to Anglo-German friendship and cooperation, was not willing
to enter into any sort of formal accommodation or alliance with Hitler’s
Germany. This would leave Hitler with little choice but to proceed with Italy
alone. Nevertheless, he did not give up hope that one day Germany and Great
Britain would come to some sort of understanding, perhaps even an alliance.
In December 1937, State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker characterized German
policy toward England within the context of the previous two years, especially
with the recently concluded Rome-Berlin Axis in mind. He reasoned:
“Under no circumstances can the line between Berlin and London be allowed
to break. . .But in the end, time will work for an improvement in German-
English relations. Therefore, the Rome-Berlin Axis for the moment is useful
and tactically expedient. . .The Foreign Office will take advantage of every
opportunity to promote German-English relations.”23
Hitler’s assumptions that Britain might support Nazi ambitions for
continental hegemony and acquiesce in his regime’s police state terror and
persecution of the Jews in Germany beginning in 1933 were obviously naïve
and unrealistic.24 Yet, before and even at times during the war, Hitler refused
to accept that London would never acquiesce in significant changes in Europe
through some sort of bilateral Anglo-German accommodation, as opposed to
working through the framework of multilateral agreements and collective
security. Indeed, the Anglo–German Naval Agreement of 1935 turned out not
to be the important step toward a much closer arrangement that Hitler had
hoped it would be, and would never translate into British support for his plans
to redraw the map of central and eastern Europe. In the fall of 1934, the
German embassy in London delivered a list of impediments to improved
Anglo-German relations to the Foreign Office in Berlin. Among other things,
the report cited the events of June 30, 1934, recent violence in Austria, fears
of German rearmament, persecution of the Jews, and political repression in
general.25 Yet, the only gestures that Hitler seemed prepared to offer the British
21
See Fritz Wiedemann, Der Mann der Feldherr Werden Wollte: Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen des
Vorgesetzten Hitlers im Ersten Weltkrieg und seinen späteren persönlichen Adjutanten (Velbert/
Kettwig: Blick und Bild Verlag, 1964), 151.
22
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Macmillan, 1970), 71–72. See also Henke,
England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 42–43. Speer claims that it was England’s decision not to
resist the Italians in Ethiopia that convinced Hitler to reassess his strategies toward Italy and
Britain, and to proceed with the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936.
23
PA: Dienststelle Ribbentrop, Vertrauliche Berichte 1935–1939, Teil I, Vortragsnotiz, Dezember
1937.
24
For an account of the generally negative reaction to Nazi domestic policies in British political
circles as well as in British society in general, see Oswald Hauser, England und das Dritte Reich,
Bd. 1 (Stuttgard: Seewald Verlag, 1972), 261–265.
25
See BArch: R/43-II, 1433, DB/London an AA/Berlin, A.3234, 12. September 1934.
were his repeated guarantees for the integrity and security of the British Empire,
and the renunciation of contacts between his government and the Fascist
movement in Britain. German rearmament, the expansion of German Lebens-
raum in Europe, authoritarianism and police state politics, and the separation,
dispossession, and expulsion of the Jews from Germany remained at the core of
National Socialist ideology and Nazi state policy beginning in 1933.
In late 1936, von Ribbentrop reported to Hitler that in spite of his efforts,
Britain would not enter into a formal alliance with Germany.26 Moreover,
Britain’s apparent acquiescence in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, as well as
in Italian and German intervention in the Spanish civil war, probably convinced
Hitler that an active Anglo-German alliance, while still highly desirable,
might not be necessary at that moment for Germany to move forward with
its aims in Europe. An approach “without England” seems clear in Hitler’s
“Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan,” drawn up some time in August 1936. In it,
Hitler reaffirmed Germany’s need for Lebensraum in eastern Europe, and that
the German economy and army must be ready for war within four years.
He referred briefly to Italy and Japan as reliable friends of Germany, but made
no mention at all of Great Britain.27 Nevertheless, Hitler continued to make
alliance overtures to the British in 1936 and 1937, but to no avail. By the end
of 1937, he seemed to be resigned to achieving his aims in Europe without
some sort of Anglo-German understanding, and perhaps even in spite of the
possibility of British resistance. This was apparent at the infamous
Reichskanzlei meeting of November 5, 1937, at which he once again outlined
his regime’s plans for possible war and the expansion of German Lebensraum
in the East, and specifically the necessary initial steps with regard to Austria and
Czechoslovakia.28 For the first time since the early 1920s, he placed England in
the same category as France, labeling both as Haßgegnern (hateful opponents)
who opposed a stronger Germany in the middle of Europe and overseas. Hitler
also seemed to conclude that Britain would never agree to the return of
Germany’s former colonies, and even fantasized that the British would in fact
be incapable of defending their far-flung empire in future wars. He concluded
that Britain and France possessed neither the will nor the capacity to intervene
in Germany’s upcoming moves in central Europe and in its future conquests in
the East. On the other hand, the minutes of the meeting reveal no inclination
on Hitler’s part to actually enter a war against Great Britain or to compromise
in any way British imperial interests and security. It is likely that he had come to
the conclusion that Germany must prepare to achieve its aims in Europe
26
Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 77–78. Klaus Hildebrand characterized
Ribbentrop’s efforts in London as “the final clarification regarding Great Britain.” See
Hildebrand, Vom Reich zum Weltreich, 491–511.
27
See Wilhelm Treue, “Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan,” Vierteljahrshefte für
Zeitgeschichte 3 (1955), 204–210.
28
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 19.
without England, and indeed, in the face of British opposition, after

which London might then be brought into an accommodation with Germany
through a fait accompli.
Discussions with soon-to-be British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax at
Berchtesgaden later in November 1937 revealed just how far apart the British
and German governments were in bilateral Anglo-German relations in general,
and in the specific issues inherent in Nazi ambitions in Europe.29 Halifax’s
willingness to consider peaceful changes in Austria and Czechoslovakia was a
far cry from Hitler’s notion of an Anglo-German partnership that included
British acceptance of German hegemony in Europe. On the matter of returning
some of Germany’s former colonies, Halifax was unwilling to promise much
beyond the possibility of establishing one or two new German colonies some-
where in Africa or Asia. Halifax did observe later that Hitler expressed his total
disinterest in colonial compensation in North Africa and the Mediterranean,
due to existing and competing British, French, and Italian interests in the
region.30 This was perhaps indicative of Germany’s relative disinterest, past
and future, in the Arabic-speaking lands of North Africa and the Middle East.
None of this meant that Hitler’s view of Great Britain and the British
Empire had fundamentally changed or that he no longer desired Anglo-German
collaboration or thought it necessary for the future. It did mean that Hitler was
resolved to achieve his goals, at a minimum in Europe, in spite of British
objections, after which Germany would be in a better position to make
common cause with the British Empire in world affairs. It is also clear that
none of the goals espoused by his regime with regard to Europe and beyond
were intended to come at the expense of the security of the British Empire, at
least in terms of Hitler’s understanding of British imperial interests at that time.
It is true that he publicly expressed his frustration and bitterness toward
Britain following its declaration of war on Germany in the fall of 1939.31
Yet even as late as the summer of 1940, when a German victory in Europe
seemed a virtual certainty, Hitler continued to believe in the power and surviv-
ability of the British Empire. At a meeting with Mussolini in Munich in
June 1940, as Germany’s military victory over France was at hand, Hitler
asserted that the British Empire must be preserved as a central element in the
world balance of power. In his diary entry for June 18 and June 19, 1940,
Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano observed: “But Hitler makes
many reservations on the desirability of demolishing the British Empire, which
29
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 31.
30
See Earl of Halifax, Fullness of Days (London: Collins, 1957), 187–188.
31
For example, Hitler’s November 8, 1939 speech at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich amounted to
a “tirade of hate” against Britain in general, and against Churchill in particular. See Piper, Alfred
Rosenberg, 312. For more on the disappointment and resentment toward Britain in Hitler’s
government in 1939, see also USHMM: The Alfred Rosenberg Diary, 22 and 25 August 1939,
273, 275, and 3 December 1939, 337.
he considers, even today, to be an important factor in world equilibrium.”32

At a meeting one month later, Hitler asserted: “If we defeat England militarily,
the British Empire will collapse. But Germany has no interest in that outcome.
With German blood, we would accomplish something the only beneficiaries
of which would be Japan, America, and others.”33
Hitler’s placement of both Great Britain and Italy at the center of his
geopolitical calculations during the approximately decade and a half between
the publication of Mein Kampf in 1925 and the early years of the Second
World War played a decisive role in his attitudes and policy toward the Arab
world and its quest for independence from European imperial domination.
Power politics and racial ideology would preclude for the most part any
meaningful German diplomatic and material support for Arab national self-
determination and independence from the European imperial powers between
1933 and the end of the Second World War. Notwithstanding the obvious
wartime necessity for intense Nazi propaganda toward the Arab world
between 1940 and 1945, propaganda that stressed Arab/Islamic/Axis solidar-
ity against Bolshevism, the Anglo-Saxon powers, and the Jews, it is highly
unlikely that an Axis victory would have resulted in the real sovereignty and
independence for the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa.
arab overtures, nazi responses

In their study of the Third Reich, the Arabs, and Palestine, Klaus-Michael
Mallmann and Martin Cüppers consider how the Arab populations through-
out the Middle East and North Africa responded to National Socialism,
Hitler’s regime, and its Jewish policy in Germany after 1933. They assert
that: “Muslims from all countries in the general region, in particular from
Palestine, consistently sought an alliance with Nazi Germany, which had for
some time avoided playing the Arab card.”34 The existence of significant pro-
German and pro-Nazi sympathies in the Arab lands after 1933 represented in
part a continuation of a general sympathy and even enthusiasm for Germany
in the Arab lands after 1918. It was an attitude that in some ways saw
Germany as a fellow victim of the settlements that followed the First World
War, and that considered Germany historically as the only European great
power that had not coveted Arab territory. Moreover, Mallmann and
Cüppers characterize the Nazi regime’s attitude toward Arab nationalist
movements and goals and toward Arab overtures for German assistance in
their efforts to achieve independence from Britain, France, and Italy, as rather
indifferent before 1939. However, they also conclude that, from the beginning
32
Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943 (Safety Harbor: Simon Publications, 2001), 265.
33
Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 155.
34
of its rule in Germany, Hitler’s regime viewed Arabs and Muslims as

Germany’s natural and future allies.35
This study departs from the conclusions of Mallmann and Cüppers on this
latter point. It is true, as they suggest, that Hitler’s approach to the Arab world
evolved from one of relative distance before 1938 to one of closer engagement
thereafter, one that further intensified during the war years. However, their
tendency to see a fairly positive Nazi strategic and ideological assessment of the
Arabs before the war, possibly as Germany’s future allies, is highly question-
able. To the contrary, this study sees Hitler’s move toward the Arabs, beginning
in the late 1930s and intensifying during the war, as largely superficial, and
decidedly negative with regard to Arab ambitions. It points to the regime’s
tendency to improvise when the facts on the ground necessitated an unwelcome
and temporary move in a particular direction, and to do so primarily in the
regime’s wartime propaganda to the Arab world. In the end, therefore,
this study argues that the Arab-Nazi relationship between 1933 and the end
of the Second World War, from the perspective of Hitler and his Nazi state, was
and remained “ideologically and strategically incompatible.”36
Given their the frustration, resentment, and hostility toward the post–World
War I settlement in the Middle East, many Arab leaders and intellectuals
greeted the new regime in Germany with enthusiasm early in 1933.37
As observed in Chapter 1, some Arab leaders had informed German officials
in the immediate post–World War I years that Germany, unlike Great Britain,
France, and Italy, was never an object of suspicion and hostility in the Arab
world given the general perception among Arabs that Germany had never had
colonial ambitions in the region. There were also some Arabs who sought to
identify themselves with National Socialism, particularly with the Nazi move-
ment’s perceived discipline, order, national solidarity, strength, and political
success. That some identified as well with Nazi hatred and persecution of the
Jews in Germany was likely a reflection of their bitter opposition to the Jewish
National Home and Jewish immigration into Palestine as well. All of this
tended to promote the hope among some Arabs that Germany, as a “neutral
bystander” in the postwar Middle East, might be a potential source of active
support against the western powers and the Jewish National Home.
The nationalist fervor of the Nazis, and their determination to eliminate the
postwar settlement in Europe held considerable appeal for some Arabs who
considered the mandate system a cover for an extended European imperial
35
Ibid., 68.
36
See Francis R. Nicosia, “Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933–1939:
Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12
(1980): 351–372.
37
See for example the report of the German Consul-General in Jerusalem in March 1933 in PA:
Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palastina, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 3/33, 20. März
1933.
presence, and the implementation of the Balfour Declaration in the form of the
Jewish National Home as part of the injustice of the postwar settlement in
the Middle East. It is doubtful that the majority of Arabs really understood the
comprehensive nature of National Socialism’s racial world view, beyond
its specific anti-Semitism and persecution of the Jews in Germany. Nor is it
likely that most understood that the Nazi state would not be inclined to
undermine European colonial rule over the Arab world.38 At the same time,
and with regard to the question of Palestine, many at least initially seemed to
ignore the reality that the new Germany they admired so much was to a large
degree responsible for the dramatic increase in the Jewish immigration into
Palestine after 1933, a process that they adamantly opposed.
In Palestine, the views of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, were
conveyed to Berlin by Heinrich Wolff, appointed as the German consul general
in Jerusalem in November 1932, in a Telegram on March 31, 1933. The Mufti
left little doubt about his disdain for democracy and for the Jews at this
relatively early stage, and about his eagerness to establish some sort of common
ground between Arab and German national interests. As was his tendency
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Mufti claimed to speak for all Arabs
and Muslims in his talks with Wolff. After his meeting with the Mufti, Wolff
reported to Berlin: “Today the Mufti told me that Muslims inside and outside
of Palestine greet the new regime in Germany, and hope for the spread of
Fascist and anti-democratic state authority to other lands. Current Jewish
influence on the economy and on politics is damaging, and must be
resisted. . .”39 Wolff again met with the Mufti and other Palestinian notables
almost a month later at Nebi Musa, in the mountains near the Dead Sea. After
proclaiming their sympathy and admiration for the new Germany, the Mufti
and his colleagues expressed their approval of Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies,
requesting only that the German government make every effort to prevent
German Jews from reaching Palestine.40 That there was some awareness among
Arabs that the Germany to which they looked to for assistance was in fact a
major cause of increased Jewish immigration into Palestine was not lost on the
German Consul General in Jerusalem in his report to Berlin in October 1933:
“The point of view can also move to the forefront, that the Arabs will begin to
assign guilt to Germany for their unhappiness when they say that it is the Reich
government that sends the Jews to this land.”41
38
See Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism, 7–8.
39
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. I, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr.5, 31.
März 1933.
40
PA: Pol.Abt. IV-Kultur-Minderheiten, Nr.14, Bd. I, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/ Berlin, Nr.Polit.
24/33, 20. April 1933.
41
PA: Botschaft Rom, Politik 3-Palastina, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Unr. 2/33, 30.
Oktober 1933. In his annual review for the year 1933, Consul-General Wolfe nevertheless
dismissed the Arabs as generally unable to recognize that Nazi Jewish policy was partially
responsible for the rapid increase in Jewish immigration in Palestine in 1933. See PA: Botschaft
The generally positive responses to the Nazi assumption of power in Germany

could be found in other Arab countries as well, according to reports reaching the
Foreign Office and other government ministries in Berlin. The German Consulate
in Beirut reported that it received letters of admiration for Hitler and support for
the new Germany from various Arab leaders in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. Some
suggested direct cooperation. One such proposal, from Sheik Rahhal Scheiban of
Baalbeck in a letter to Adolf Hitler in July 1934, suggested: “I am ready, as I wrote
to you earlier, to place at your disposal 100 riders with horses as soon as I receive
a nod from you. . .We are always ready to stand at your service at the first nod that
you give.”42 In the spring of 1934, Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry alerted the
Foreign Office in Berlin that it had received reports from its sources throughout
the Middle East that, “In all countries in the East I could happily ascertain that all
the people, with the exception of the Jews, are following the developments in the
new Germany with great sympathy and happiness.”43 The report goes on to
describe the particular appeal of Fascism to the youth of the region who were in
the process of trying to form anti-English and anti-French movements and organ-
izations, and that everywhere people wished for a leader comparable to Adolf
Hitler. It also mentioned that more people were reading German newspapers and
suggested that appropriate propaganda in the region would be very useful for
Germany. By the summer of 1935, however, the German Consul in Jaffa,
Timotheus Wurst, attempted to describe the basis for Arab enthusiasm for the
new Germany. In an attempt to provide a realistic context for understanding Arab
enthusiasm for the Nazi state, Wurst wrote that, “Many of the local young Arabs
sympathize with the Führer and Reich Chancellor, and the Nazi party, but that
for the most part they have vague notions at best about the real meaning of Adolf
Hitler and the goals of the NSDAP.”44 Wurst observed that this pro-German
sympathy was often based on the Nazi persecution of the Jews in Germany, which
in Palestine was of particular significance, and that others, especially those in
nationalist movements, were more attracted to the idea of building movements in
the Middle East that would be similar to the NSDAP and would enjoy similar
success. That “success,” of course, could only be achieved within the context of
Arab states achieving independence from European colonial rule. Wurst also
mentioned that his consulate had been regularly approached with requests for
German advice and support for building such movements in the Arab world.
Rom, Politik 3-Palastina, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 3/34, “Politische Über-
sicht üiber das Jahr 1933,” 15. Januar 1934. In spite of this, Wolf recorded that Arab leaders in
Palestine accorded Hitler and the new Germany considerable enthusiasm and support.
42
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.2, Der St.S. in der Reichskanzlei an AA/Berlin, RK.6878,
2. August 1934.
43
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.2, Promi an AA/Berlin, VII/7074/16.3.34, 10. April 1934.
The author of this report in the Propaganda Ministry is not known.
44
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 26-Palästina, Bd. I, DK/Jaffa an AA/Berlin, J.N. 4043/35, 14. August
1935.
Wurst was not the only German diplomat in the region to receive such
requests. Similar manifestations of friendship and enthusiasm for Nazi
Germany were followed by attempts to secure German material support for the
Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere in the Middle East. Some Arabs solicited
money and weapons from Germany for use against Britain, France, and the
Jewish National Home in Palestine. Pro-German tendencies, especially the man-
date territories of Palestine, Syria and the former Mandate of Iraq, remained
strong and consistent throughout the 1930s, and during the years of the Second
World War. By no means does this mean that sympathy among Arabs for Hitler,
National Socialism, and the events in Germany after 1933 was characteristic of
all or even most Arabs and their organizations and institutions in the region. It
merely confirms that these attitudes and activities existed among some Arabs.
It also signifies that the German government was confronted with that reality
as it attempted to formulate and implement its foreign policy in the region.
In Jerusalem, Consul General Wolff was rather contemptuous of the Arabs
and their efforts to secure German financial and military assistance against the
French in Syria in the summer of 1933. With regard to these requests,
he reported to Berlin: “Of the behavior of the Arabs, one can only say that it
is always the same thing. . .. In such circumstances I always think about a
conversation between the famous Lawrence from the war and Dr. Arlossoroff
who, before he was murdered not long ago, told me that Lawrence once talked
to him about the Arabs as follows: ‘I don’t know how one can take the Arabs
seriously. I know them well. It is not worth the effort.’”45 Wolff exhibited a
similar attitude in response to Arab requests in June 1934 for German diplo-
matic support for the Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere in the region.
In early July, he reported to Berlin that he answered these requests in his usual
way, namely that Germany was not in a position to provide financial or arms
support, but that the Reich, as always, extended “. . .to the Arabs and their
interests great sympathy and moral support. . .”46 In the same report to Berlin,
Wolff cautioned that, “Probably everyone who has the opportunity to observe
Arab politics must in time become always more skeptical.”47
Wolff was, to be sure, a diplomat who had been very sympathetic to
Jewish immigration into Palestine and the initial establishment and subsequent
development of the Jewish National Home.48 But his indifference to Arab
nationalism and national self-determination, and his views on German interests
45
PA: HaPol Abt., Handakten Clodius-Pälastina, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit.III/33,
25. August 1933.
46
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 11, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit. 55/34, “Politisches
Programm des Emirs für seine Besprechungen in London,” 7. Juli 1934.
47
Ibid.
48
See Francis R. Nicosia and Christopher Browning, “Ambivalenz und Paradox bei der Durchset-
zung der NS-Judenpolitik. Heinrich Wolff und Wilhelm Melchers,” in Widerstand und Auswär-
tiges Amt. Diplomaten gegen Hitler, Jan Erik Schulte und Michael Wala, eds. (München: Siedler
Verlag, 2013), 199–209.
in the Middle East in general, reflected the positions of his superiors in the
German Foreign Office in Berlin during the 1930s. An interesting example of
official German indifference to the Arab cause during this period occurred during
the visit to Berlin of Amir Schekib Arslan in November 1934. Arslan lived in
Geneva and was the editor of the newspaper La Nation Arabe, which was
published there. A strong Arab nationalist, he was a leading spokesperson in
Europe for the cause of Arab independence. Arslan, a Syrian, was especially
hostile to France and French colonial rule in Syria and Lebanon, as well as in
North Africa. He wanted to use Franco-German and Franco-Italian friction to
win over both Germany and, rather naively, Italy for the cause of Arab independ-
ence. Arslan went to Berlin in the fall of 1934 hoping to see Hitler. However, he
was unable to get past Curt Prüfer of the Near East Department in the German
Foreign Office. During his talks with Prüfer, Arslan suggested that Germany
would eventually have to align itself with the Arab world, and noted that Syria,
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, as countries under French colonial rule, would be
Germany’s natural allies. In response, Prüfer warned Arslan that the kind of
collaboration he was proposing could involve Germany in a war for which it was
neither inclined nor prepared. In his report to his superiors regarding his conver-
sation with Arslan, submitted on November 7, 1934, Prüfer drew on Germany’s
experience in the Middle East in the First World War. He counseled:
‟Germany cannot in an emergency support the Arabs with money or weapons. . .The
experience of the war has demonstrated that in spite of our alliance with the leading
Islamic power and in spite of our already existing intensive propaganda in Islamic lands
before the war, we did not succeed in igniting the so-called ‘holy war’ among Muslims
and especially among Arabs. I do not believe that it would serve any practical purpose to
take up the Amir’s suggestions.”49
Prüfer’s report was approved by Foreign Minister von Neurath, who agreed
with Prüfer’s suggestion that Arslan be denied an audience with high govern-
ment officials and with Hitler. The Reich Chancellory in turn concurred with the
views of both von Neurath and Prüfer.
During the 1930s, much of the initiative in the movement for national self-
determination for all Arabs came from Syria and Palestine. Since Egypt and
Iraq had been granted nominal independence by England in 1922/1936, and
1930 respectively, and the territory in the Arabian peninsula that officially
became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 had managed to retain some
degree of independence after the First World War, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine,
and Transjordan were the only Arab states east of Egypt still under the direct
colonial authority of the mandatory powers, namely France and Great Britain.
Moreover, the monarchies in Iraq and Egypt remained subject to considerable
49
PA: Geheim Akten 1920–1936, Syrien-Pol.2, Aufzeichnung Prüfers, III 0 4210,7. November
1934. See also Pol.Abt.III-Jüdische Angelegenheiten, Jüd.Pol. l, Bd. 13, AA/Berlin an DK/Genf,
III 0/3856, 26. Oktober 1933.
British influence, and were quite dependent on direct British financial, political,
and military support. The nationalist movements in Syria, Palestine, and else-
where against the continued existence of any level of French and British
domination over the Arab world in whatever form were also part of a larger
Pan-Arab nationalism that continued to manifest itself and to grow during the
interwar period. Indeed, most of the state borders in the Arabic-speaking lands
of North Africa and the Middle East had only relatively recently been drawn by
European powers, while the memory of a unified Arab and Islamic past from
the days of the Arab Caliphates was no doubt still alive. Nevertheless, during
the years following the First World War, Arab nationalist movements and their
leaders were not able to agree on the substance and conditions of Arab unity.
Yet, the movement for Arab independence during the interwar period con-
tinued to demonstrate the existence of popular notions of Pan-Arab unity as a
possible basis for ending European control in its various forms, and for an end
to Zionist efforts to build a Jewish National Home and an independent Jewish
state in Palestine.50
In early February 1935, a group of Syrian and Palestinian representatives of
the Pan-Arab Committee, established in Baghdad almost two years earlier,
approached Fritz Grobba, the German ambassador to Iraq, and proposed
mutual cooperation between Germany and an ill-defined Pan-Arab nationalist
movement.51 They proposed cooperative efforts in propaganda, diplomatic
support and, possibly later, some unspecified “active support”52 (aktive Unter-
stützung). Grobba made the usual expressions of German sympathy for Arab
efforts to achieve unity and independence, but rejected any form of direct
German support for the Arab movement. Furthermore, he received the
following instructions from his superiors in the Foreign Office in Berlin on
February 12, 1935: “Please avoid any connection with this group or its emis-
saries. We want nothing to do with these efforts.”53 Syrian nationalists had
made similar overtures to German Consul General Ferdinand Seiler in Beirut
since 1933 for German support against the French Mandate. Seiler responded
50
See Fritz Grobba, Männer und Mächte im Orient. 25 Jahre diplomatischer Tätigkeit im Orient
(Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1967), 96–104.
51
Fritz Grobba, a German diplomat and specialist in Middle East affairs, was ambassador to Iraq
from 1932 to 1939, when the outbreak of war resulted in Iraq’s break in diplomatic relations
with Germany. In February 1939, he also assumed concurrently the post of German ambassador
to Saudi Arabia. He played an important role in the German Foreign Office’s Middle East policy
during the Second World War. He was generally considered to be the German diplomat with the
most knowledge of and familiarity with the languages, culture, and political conditions in the
region during the Nazi period. See Wolfgang Schwanitz, “’The Jinnee and the Magic Bottle’,”
87–117; and Francis R. Nicosia, “Fritz Grobba and the Middle East Policy of the Third Reich,”
in: Edward Ingram (ed.), National and International Politics in the Middle East. Essays in
Honour of Elie Kedouri (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 206–228.
52
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Pol.4-Pan-Arab. Bund, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, III 0 574, 2. Februar 1935.
53
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Pol.4-Pan-Arab. Bund, AA/Berlin and DG/Bagdad, Te1egramm Nr.2, 12.Feb-
ruar 1935.
photo 3.1. Fritz Grobba (no date).

Courtesy Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin.
to these overtures in a similar manner two months later. For instance, in a

report to Berlin in April 1935, Seiler warned that the political situation in Syria
was ripe for a new round of violence and rebellion against French rule, and that
French authorities in Syria had become very suspicious and fearful of German
intentions. Popular enthusiasm for Germany had probably led French author-
ities to suspect German intervention where there was none. Seiler’s advice to
Berlin was the same as Grobba’s, namely that: “We must make every effort to
avoid anything that might suggest we are taking advantage of the situation and
that we want to make common cause with the pan-Islamic Nationalists.”54
German officials in the Middle East and in Berlin were also confronted with
Arab attempts to establish political organizations and movements based on
Italian Fascist or German National Socialist models. In Baghdad and Jerusalem
in 1933, Grobba and Wolff were approached by individuals with plans to
organize National Socialist parties and movements in Iraq and Palestine,
respectively.55 Besides Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies, Nazi authoritarian methods
54
PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 2-Syrien, Bd.l, DGK/Beirut an AA/Berlin, 1/J.N.978, l2. April 1935.
55
In Palestine, the correspondent of the newspaper Al’Ahram, Joseph Francis, represented a group
of Palestinian Arabs interested in establishing such a party and made this suggestion to Wolff in
Jerusalem in April. In Iraq, Abdul Ghaffur el-Bedri, publisher of the newspaper Istiqlal, and a
group of his supporters made similar overtures to Grobba in Baghdad in August of that year. See
and organization as well as the military trappings of German National Socialism

apparently appealed to some Arab nationalists. In his report to Berlin on this
matter, Wolff noted his opposition to any German encouragement or support
for an Arab Nazi Party in Palestine, lest British authorities suspect German
interference in the internal affairs of the Palestine Mandate. He noted: “Through
a thoughtless indiscretion, the trust of the Mandate government in me. . .could
be placed in considerable danger. . .”56 In Berlin, the Foreign Office strongly
opposed any effort to involve Germany in the creation of Arab National
Socialist movements or parties in Palestine or elsewhere in the region. The Near
East Department in the German Foreign Office made this very clear in early July,
in a memorandum to Wolff in Jerusalem. It fully endorsed Wolff’s arguments
against any German involvement in the organization of National Socialist
parties or other political organizations and movements in Palestine or elsewhere
in the region. The memo further reasoned that the allegedly notorious political
unreliability of the Arabs would expose such a connection that would become
known throughout the Middle East, as well as in France and Great Britain, and
that the resulting negative consequences would be serious. It concluded:
Our work in the Middle East to this point, since the end of the war, has had as its goal
Germany’s economic and cultural expansion through complete political neutrality.
A change in this position through the interference of our representatives in the domestic
affairs of these countries would result not only in economic setbacks, but, given the
preeminent power positions of Britain and France in the Middle East, also in severe
negative consequences for Germany’s policy in Europe.57
Nor were Arabs permitted to have contact with or join the small NSDAP
organizations that had been established within overseas German communities
(Auslandsdeutsche) living and working in some of the Arab states. In response
to these questions, Ernst Bohle of the Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP issued
a directive in June 1934 that membership in the NSDAP overseas was to be
denied to foreigners. Again, both Nazi party agencies as well as state agencies
wished to avoid any suspicion that Germany was meddling in the internal
affairs of the states in the region: “Foreigners may not be admitted into the
National Socialist German Workers Party, as the AO of the NSDAP wishes to
avoid the impression that it interferes in the internal affairs of foreign states.”58
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.l, Joseph Francis/Jaffa an DGK/Jerusalem, 13. April 1933;
and Referat-Deutschland, Po5 NE adh7, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.1130, 10. August 1933.
56
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Palastina, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Polit.74/33, 27. Juni
1933.
57
PA: Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Palastina, Bd.l, Aufzeichnung der Abteilung III, zu III 0 2362, 7. Juli
1933. See also Pol.Abt. III, Politik 2-Palastina, Bd.l, AA/Berlin an DGK/Jerusalem, zu III 0 2362,
31. Juli 1933.
58
PA: Inland II A/B, 82-03: AO der NSDAP an AA/Berlin, Nr. 82-02 1/6, 1. Juni 1934. According
to Albert Speer, Hitler opposed the general idea of exporting National Socialism to other
countries lest it strengthen their own nationalism and compromise Germany’s ability to deal
the arab revolt and german arms

The Arab uprising and general strike that began in Palestine in April 1936 was
intended to force the British government to end the Palestine Mandate, Jewish
immigration into Palestine, and land sales to Jews. Arabs in Palestine had also
demanded the establishment of an independent state in Palestine which, at that
time, would have meant a state with a large Arab majority. In November 1935,
an Arab delegation, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, had formally submitted
these demands to the British High Commissioner in Palestine; the revolt,
beginning in April 1936, was in response to London’s refusal to grant Arab
demands.59 To some extent, neighboring Arab states were drawn into the
conflict, as “Committees for the Defense of Palestine” were formed in Amman,
Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus to recruit volunteers from those states to join
the revolt in Palestine. The new German consul general in Jerusalem, Walter
Döhle, observed that the immediate cause of the revolt and general strike was
the significant increase in Jewish immigration into Palestine, in part a result of
Nazi persecution of the Jews in Germany since Hitler’s assumption of power in
January 1933.60 The Jewish population in Palestine, about 60,000 at the end
of the First World War, would approach 400,000 by the end of 1936, or
approximately 30 percent of the Palestinian population.61 Fears of eventual
minority status in a Jewish state, coupled with ongoing resentment over con-
tinued British rule, contributed to the Arab uprising and general strike in 1936.
This occurred at precisely the same time that German Jews, facing an increas-
ingly desperate situation in Germany, were in ever-greater need of destinations
to which they could immigrate and find safety. That the British had granted
nominal independence to Egypt in 1922 and 1936, and nominal independence
to Iraq in 1930, along with some measure of autonomy to Transjordan in 1928,
likely added to the pressure in Palestine. Moreover, in 1936, France declared its
intention to terminate its mandates over Syria and Lebanon, and to grant some
measure of self-government to those states. However, none of this would
substantially diminish the dominant Anglo-French political, economic, and
military presence in the region. By 1936, with the conflicting aims of Arab
with them at a later date. For some parts of Europe and the rest of the world, racial ideology
likely played a part as well. See: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 122.
59
See for example Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate
(New York: Owl Books, 2001), 366–374.
60
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr. Polit. 26/36, 30.
Juni 1936. Walter Döhle was appointed to replace Heinrich Wolff as German Consul-General in
Jerusalem in the fall of 1935.
61
See Esco Foundation for Palestine Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies, II
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 665. See also A Survey of Palestine. Prepared in
December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry, Vol. I (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1946), 141. This three-volume British
government survey was reprinted by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C., in
1991.
and Jewish national ambitions in Palestine, the prospects for Palestinian Arab
independence in any form seemed increasingly remote.
The German government generally greeted the Arab revolt in Palestine with
disinterest. Some mild criticism of British policy appeared in the Nazi press,
apparently no more negative than much of the commentary had been in
Weimar Germany regarding Britain’s conflicting wartime promises to Arabs
and Jews. In the spring and summer of 1936, the British embassy in Berlin
reported that the press in Germany had generally refrained from taking an anti-
British and pro-Arab position. The British ambassador in Berlin, Eric Phipps,
described the coverage of the revolt in several Nazi newspapers in a report to
London in May of that year.62 Phipps noted that the intent of German press
coverage of the Palestine revolt and unrest in other parts of the Arab world was
to contrast those disorders with the peace and stability that prevailed in the new
Germany. As was the case during the Weimar years, the German press tended
to demand that Britain do everything necessary in Palestine to somehow recon-
cile Arabs and Jews, but without any specific suggestions that it be done by
satisfying either Arab or Jewish claims. In June 1936, Alfred Rosenberg did
write an article in the Völkischer Beobachter that was critical of what he
described as one-sided British support for the Jews in Palestine, to the detriment
of the Arab population.63 He argued that greater British sensitivity to Arab
demands would not compromise London’s responsibilities under the Balfour
Declaration that was in any case, according to Rosenberg, the basis for a Jewish
National Home, and not a Jewish state, in Palestine. Rosenberg’s argument
reflected the views and policy of Hitler’s regime with regard to Palestine, and
the role of Zionism and Palestine in Nazi Jewish policy between 1933 and
1941.64 During the 1930s, Berlin’s determination to dispossess and then expel
the Jews from Greater Germany as quickly as possible was also based on
promoting significant Jewish immigration into Palestine. Yet, it also reflected
the seeming contradiction between Nazi ideology and policy, namely that under
no circumstances should an independent Jewish state ever be permitted to come
into existence, in Palestine or anywhere else. However, since an independent
Arab Palestine would surely mean the end of Jewish immigration and the
Jewish National Home in Palestine, the only practical solution from the
62
National Archives/London (hereafter NAL): FO371, 20020-E3048, British Embassy/Berlin to
Foreign Office/London, Telegramme No. 127, May 27, 1936. The German newspapers that
Phipps described included Der Angriff, the Berliner Tageblatt, the Börsen Zeitung, and the
Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz.
63
Völkischer Beobachter, 4. Juni 1936. In a note from Berlin to Anthony Eden on June 4,
Ambassador Phipps commented favorably on the substance of Rosenberg’s piece. See NAL:
FO371, 20020-E3327, British Embassy/Berlin to Foreign Office/London, June 4, 1936. An
additional report along the same lines by Phipps on the reaction of the German press to the
unrest and violence in Palestine can be found in FO371, 20028-E6609, British Embassy/Berlin to
Foreign Office/London, October 15, 1936.
64
See Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, particularly chapters 3 and 4.
perspective of Nazi interests and policy at that time was the continuation, in
some form, of British rule in Palestine. This view was also entirely compatible
with Hitler’s Englandpolitik during the prewar years.
The Arab revolt in Palestine prompted some Arab leaders, particularly in
states that were recently granted nominal independence such as Iraq and Egypt,
to seek German arms for their own defensive purposes, or for use in other parts
of the Arab world, including in Palestine. The terms of independence for Iraq
and Egypt provided for continued British military installations, influence in
Egyptian and Iraqi foreign policies, as well as certain restrictions on the pur-
chase of arms from other countries. Arab attempts to secure German weapons
for the insurgents in Palestine were generally met with caution, at least until
1938, as German policy continued to adhere to a policy of political non-
involvement in Palestine and in Arab affairs in general. For example, in Decem-
ber 1936, Fauzi Kaoukji, a Syrian Arab and former officer in the Ottoman army
who was leading Arab rebels in the Palestinian uprising, submitted a request for
weapons assistance to the German Embassy in Baghdad.65 Fritz Grobba
responded with the usual German expressions of sympathy for Arab efforts
to achieve self-determination in Palestine. Grobba reported to Berlin:
“I explained to him that we wished to maintain good relations with Great
Britain, and that in spite of our sympathy for the Arabs, we could not support
an uprising against England.”66 Grobba was also visited in Baghdad by
members of the Mufti’s Higher Committee in January 1937. They were in
search of German financial and weapons support at a time when the Peel
Commission, in the midst of a truce in Palestine since October of the previous
year, pursued its efforts to find a solution to the conflict. With most observers
expecting the Peel Commission to recommend an independent Jewish state in
some part of Mandatory Palestine, the Mufti’s representatives presented their
case to Grobba in terms of Germany’s interest in an independent Arab state,
and its well-known opposition to an independent Jewish state in Palestine. In a
telegram to Berlin, Grobba described his response to the Arab delegation as
follows: “I responded that Germany, with full appreciation for the Arab point
of view, wants good relations with England and therefore cannot support a
struggle against England.”67 On the same day, the Foreign Office in Berlin sent
a return telegram to Grobba expressing its approval of the position he had been
65
For more on Fauzi Kaoukji and his role in the revolt, see Iwo Jorda, Araber Aufstand. Erlebnisse
und Dokumente aus Palästina (Vienna: Wilhelmbraumüller, 1943), 261 f.
66
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Po.5-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 3121, 17. Dezember
1936. Earlier that year, Grobba reported receiving requests for German weapons, made to him
in Baghdad by Syrian Arabs for use in the revolt in Palestine. See PA: Botschaft Rom, Pol.3,
Palästina 1920–1939, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1335, 30. Mai 1936.
67
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG-Bagdad an AA-Berlin, Pol. VII 116–37, Tele-
gramm, 5. Januar 1937. Although sympathetic to the Arab cause in Palestine, Grobba was also a
firm supporter of Hitler’s policy of accommodation with Britain. While he shared the Nazi
regime’s complete opposition to an independent Jewish state in Palestine, he was also mindful of
taking in his meetings with Arab notables since the revolt in Palestine began:
“In general, the position that you have expressed to Fauzi Kaoukji is shared
here. We cannot interfere in the current dispute. Any sort of official German
support cannot, therefore, be approved.”68
In the original text of that telegram, with its instructions to Grobba in
Baghdad, the word “official” (amtlich) is underlined. This might raise suspi-
cions that some form of “unofficial” German support, perhaps in the form of
money and/or weapons might have been under consideration in Berlin by
1937. However, there does not appear to be any evidence of this in the
archival sources. Again, it was generally assumed that the Peel Commission
would recommend the establishment of nominally independent Jewish and
Arab states in Palestine in some form. It is also clear that the Nazi regime was,
for its own ideological and other reasons, vehemently opposed to the creation
of a Jewish state. We also know that by 1937, with rearmament well under
way, Hitler’s regime would soon begin to plan for the consolidation of a
Greater Germany in central Europe at the expense of Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Poland. These potentially unilateral revisions of the post–World
War I settlement in Europe would, of course, run the risk of a new war in
Europe, a risk that Hitler was certainly aware of when he set the process in
motion at his Reich Chancellory meeting on November 5, 1937. In order to
mitigate this reality, Germany might indeed welcome unrest overseas in the
British and French empires in order to distract London and Paris from
developments in Europe, and thereby diminish their resolve to resist Hitler’s
moves. This apparent alteration in German policy will be considered in some
detail in the next chapter.
In keeping with its formal rearmament plans announced earlier in the year,
followed by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June, the Nazi regime
decreed the Law for the Export and Import of War Materials (Gesetz über
Aus- und Einfuhr von Kriegsgeräte) on November 6, 1935.69 The new law
replaced several previous laws from the Weimar years that had prohibited the
import and export of weapons by Germany. Paragraph 3 of the new law
provided for the punishment of anyone caught exporting weapons outside of
established procedures, stipulating that all arms transactions be handled
by the appropriate state agency, namely the office of the Reich Kommissar
for Export and Import Allowance (Reichkommissar für Aus- und Einfuhrbe-
willigung). Although Hitler’s regime would now allow itself to export
weapons, it was not clear that there would be much to export in the short
the central role of Zionism and Palestine in the regime’s efforts to force Jewish emigration from
Germany. See Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 106.
68
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. 1, AA-Berlin an DG-Bagdad, zu Pol. VII 116, Tele-
gramme, 5. Januar 1937.
69
See Reichsgesetzblatt, 1935, Teil I, 1337. The law was signed by Hitler, Blomberg, von Bülow,
and Schacht.
term due to Germany’s own considerable rearmament requirements. On the

other hand, as was the case with other German industries during the economic
recovery from the depression, the arms industry too was eager to tap into
export markets abroad. A consortium of German firms was established in
1936 for the purpose of cooperating with the government in promoting
German arms sales abroad. Known as the Reich Industry Consortium: Export
Group for Armaments (Reichsgruppe Industrie: Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für
Kriegsgerät), this consortium was made up of some of Germany’s leading
weapons manufacturers. It reflected the government’s interest in selling
German weapons overseas in support of its effort to increase overall German
exports, and thus earn much-needed foreign currency. The consortium
defined its task as the promotion of arms exports as the occasions arose in
order to achieve the best possible economic return for Germany, namely in the
form of foreign currency.70 For this reason, and the fact that it was still
subject to a high degree of Anglo-French control, the Arab Middle East and
North Africa was not likely in any case to be a major market for German arms
exports before the war.
In one of its earliest weapons transactions under the November 1935 law,
the German government authorized Mauser-Werke in Oberndorf to export to
Yemen various small arms, including more than 700 machine guns and more
than a thousand machine pistols by the end of 1936.71 In late 1936, represen-
tatives from Rheinmetall-Borsig of Berlin and Otto Wolff of Cologne traveled
to Iraq where they received an order for arms worth RM 5 Million from the
Iraqi government for various weapons. According to Fritz Grobba, the request
was made to Germany because Britain had refused to sell the Iraqi government
the weapons it desired, mainly due to London’s own rearmament program that
had precluded the export of weapons that its own forces required.72 As a result,
Grobba reported in March 1937 that, according to the government in Baghdad,
Britain had given Iraq permission to fill its weapons needs elsewhere. He stated
that the Iraqi government’s main motive in its effort to purchase arms was to
counter armed and rebellious tribes inside Iraq, to maintain national unity and
national defense against its potential enemy in Iran, which was also engaged
70
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allgemeines,
Bd. 3, Reichsgruppe Industrie: Ausfuhrgemeinschaft füf Kriegsgerät, Nr. B-4, Jahresbericht für
1937. Germany usually demanded full payment in foreign currency or in raw materials. See for
example PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Kriegsgerät, Allge-
meines, Bd. 3, Bericht der Handelspolitische Abteilung vom 25. Januar 1938.
71
BArch: R901, 68470, Reichskommissar für Aus- und Einfuhrbewilligung, an AA/Berlin, RK.
40439/37, 21. Juni 1937. This report to the German Foreign Office in Berlin stated that between
November 1935 and June 1937, a total of 37,361 small arms had been exported from Germany
to all countries. The report did not, however, discuss the age or quality of the weapons. With
full-scale German rearmament under way, it is possible that those exports involved mostly older
weapons, perhaps many from the previous war.
72
Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 157–158, 167.
in its own armaments program.73 The firm Friedrich Krupp reported in

March 1937 that the Iraqi government wished to purchase arms from Krupp
worth up to RM 10 Million. Krupp informed the Foreign Office in Berlin that it
had no intention of selling arms to Iraq if the British government opposed to
such a transaction.74 In any case, the Reich Ministry for War informed the
Foreign Office in April that most of the Iraqi order with Krupp likely would
not be filled due to production problems, not the least of which was a problem
that Germany shared with Britain: “With other weapons. . .our situation is
similar to the situation in England, namely that in view of our own armaments
needs, deliveries will hardly be possible.”75
The Reich Ministry of Economics naturally seemed to be the most enthusi-
astic about concluding weapons agreements with Iraq and other countries in
the Middle East in 1937. Its interests in the matter were purely economic,
centered as they were on promoting German exports and securing payment in
foreign currency. In reference to the discussions that the German firms Krupp
and Otto Wolff were having with the Iraqi government in the spring of 1937,
the Economics Ministry informed the Foreign Office of its full support for
the export of weapons to Iraq so long as the following standard applied:
“Both transactions should be pursued with the goal of payment in currency
as soon as possible.”76 The Economics Ministry further emphasized its purely
economic interests in weapons sales to Iraq when, after recognizing the political
hesitations expressed by Grobba in Baghdad, it encouraged the Foreign Office’s
view that it “. . .would be prepared to dismiss these hesitations if the new
business is considered economically desirable, that, in view of the currency
situation, an economically favorable outcome might be hoped for from these
transactions. . .”77
It is difficult to know with certainty the quantity, variety, and source of the
weapons used by Arab insurgents in Palestine between the outbreak of the
revolt in April 1936 and the beginning of the Second World War. In July 1937,
Grobba reported from Baghdad that Britain’s hitherto neutral attitude
regarding Iraqi freedom to purchase weapons wherever it pleased was
73
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak m, Bd. 1, Pol. 1, 1579,
DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 679, 20. März 1937. In June 1937, Italy approached the Iraqi
government with offers to sell arms to and provide training for the Iraqi military. Grobba
reported that Iraqi leaders had confided to him their preference for dealing with Germany. PA:
Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät: Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd. 2, Pol. 1, 2923, DG/
Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1304, 1. Juni 1937.
74
See PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät: Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd. 1, Pol. 1, 1241,
Friedrich Krupp AG an AA/Berlin, Nr. 32532/Pba/Va, 8. März 1937.
75
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät: Handel mit Irak (Geheim), Bd. 1, Reichskriegsmi-
nisterium an AA/Berlin, Pol. 1, 1793, 3. April 1937.
76
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 1, Pol. 1, 2684g,
RWM/Berlin an AA/Berlin, II 301/37g, 29. Mai 1937.
77
Ibid.
changing. He explained that Baghdad’s recent weapons transactions with Italy,

coupled with Iraqi support for the Arab revolt in Palestine, had caused Britain
to reassess its approach to Iraqi arms procurement.78 It would seem that
neighboring Arab countries, Iraq among them, would have been likely sources
of, or conduits for, arms intended for Palestine.
In June 1936, British authorities in Palestine reported to London that
significant sums of money had been collected by the Mufti’s Central Relief
Committee, primarily in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria.79 In July, Consul General
Döhle in Jerusalem advised Berlin that small arms were entering Palestine
from Transjordan, notwithstanding Amir Abdullah’s efforts to mediate a
truce between Arab rebels and the British.80 Moreover, in October of that
year, Grobba reported from Baghdad that he had information to the
effect that Belgian and English weapons, originally bought by the Ethiopian
government for use against Italy, had been diverted to Saudi Arabia and then
transferred to Palestine via Transjordan.81 From London, the German
Embassy reported to Berlin in June that the British government, in a long
debate in the House of Commons, had indicated its suspicions that the
weapons used by Arab insurgents in Palestine were of Italian and Russian
origin.82 That the British government strongly suspected Mussolini’s regime
of interfering in Palestine seems clear in a July 28, 1936 memorandum in the
Colonial Office, as well as in a later conversation between Eric Drummond,
the British ambassador in Rome, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count
Ciano, on October 7 of that year.83 Moreover, by 1938, French intelligence
was certain that Italian financial support was behind the Arab revolt
in Palestine.84 On the other hand, Fritz Grobba reported to Berlin in
December 1936 that his contact in Baghdad, Fauzi Kaoukji, had indicated
that while Italy had offered him arms assistance for Palestine, Arab distrust
78
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 2, Pol. 1, 3707g,
DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1717, 15. Juli 1937. Grobba also reported that Iraqi leaders were
constantly trying to impress him with Iraq’s importance in the Islamic world and its future worth
as a friend of Germany.
79
NAL: FO371, 20021-E4329, Report of the Deputy Inspector General in Palestine, 8 June 1936.
80
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 1, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/ Berlin, Nr. Polit. 34/36, 12.
Juli 1936.
81
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5-Irak, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 2569, 3. Oktober 1936.
82
PA: Pol.Abt. II, Politik 3-England, Bd. 1, DB/London an AA/Berlin, A. 2539, 22. Juni 1936. On
several occasions, Döhle in Jerusalem and Grobba in Baghdad expressed the opinion that Russia
was the main source of weapons for the Arabs, a suspicion that they maintained was shared by
British authorities in Palestine. See also PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 1, DGK/
Jerusalem an AA/ Berlin, Nr.Polit. 6/37, 17. Februar 1937.
83
See NAL: FO371, 20022-E4858, Colonial Office, London, July 28, 1936; and Malcolm Mug-
geridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers (London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1948), 51. Ciano denied
Drummond’s suggestion.
84
NAL: FO371, 21887-E3046, British Embassy/Rome to Foreign Office/London, May 21, 1938.
of Italy had forced him to reject it.85 Finally, although Ciano had denied
British allegations in 1936 that his government was providing aid to Palestin-
ian rebels, he admitted to Hermann Göring in discussions two years later in
Rome that Italy had indeed provided financial aid to the Palestinian Arab
revolt. In a meeting between Mussolini and Göring on April 18, 1938, in
which he also participated, Ciano noted that Italy had been providing money
for the Palestinian revolt, but not weapons.86 With Italian money, Ciano
alleged, the Arabs had been able to purchase weapons through Greek middle-
men, and smuggle them into Palestine via Syria. Direct weapons shipments
from Italy were, according to Ciano, too dangerous.
On the issue of weapons exports to the Middle East, Germany appears to
have been more sensitive than Italy to British interests in the region, at least
prior to 1938. At each stage of German-Iraqi discussions regarding the pur-
chase of German weapons in 1936 and 1937, the German side was always
mindful of British policy. Yet, there was uncertainty and a consequent lack of
clarity in Germany’s weapons export policy to the Middle East before 1938,
as seems clear in an exchange between Grobba in Baghdad and the Foreign
Office in Berlin in June and July 1937. Grobba concluded that Germany’s
previous policy of refusing to export weapons to Iraq without Britain’s prior
agreement seemed no longer relevant since Iraq had apparently purchased some
war planes from Italy over British objections. Yet, he also observed that Berlin’s
previous reluctance to enter into sales agreements with Iraq due to concerns
over Iraq’s ability to pay for German weapons with foreign currency was all the
more sensible given British reluctance to approve German weapons sales to
Baghdad in any case. In June 1937, after describing Iraqi arms requests from
Germany, Grobba observed that, “The British know or suspect all of this, and
are naturally not pleased.”87 In his discussions with British representatives in
Baghdad a month later, Grobba noted: “England is bothered by any large
German business in Iraq, and tries to prevent it.”88 Grobba also observed that
Britain wanted to prevent Iraq from ever being able to defend itself without
some form of English help, and he concluded that if Iraq did not receive
weapons from Germany, it would find them elsewhere. Thus, it appeared that
Grobba wanted to promote German influence and a much larger German
85
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 3121, 17. Dezember
1936.
86
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 211. Two years later, Ciano again informed Göring that Italy had
been supplying the Mufti with funds for several years for the purchase of weapons. See PA:
Botschaft Rom-Geheim Akten, 44/1, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1677, 14. Septem-
ber 1940.
87
PA: Büro des Chefs der Auslandsorganisation, Irak 1937–1941, Bd. 92, DG/Bagdad an Chef der
AO im AA/Berlin, EWB/RO, 19. Juni 1937.
88
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 2, DG/Bagdad an
AA/Berlin, Nr. 1823, Betr. Deutsche Waffenlieferungen für Irak, 24. Juli 1937.
presence in Iraq, but to do it in such a way that London would not view it as a
threat to its imperial interests in the region.
In spite of some reluctance within the Foreign Office in Berlin,89 the first
German-Iraqi arms agreement was finally signed between the Iraq government
and the firm Rheinmetall-Borsig AG on December 9, 1937.90 Representatives
from Rheinmetall-Borsig had already visited London in October seeking British
approval for the transaction with Iraq, as well as for possible German arms
sales to Egypt and Iran.91 Although in principle opposed to German arms
exports to Iraq and Egypt because of the terms of its treaties with those two
states, Britain indicated a willingness to go along with German sales to Iraq and
Egypt of arms that Britain itself was not in a position to supply. The December
9 agreement involved defensive equipment, specifically Iraq’s purchase of
18 anti-aircraft guns with equipment and ammunition. The Iraqi prime minister
told Grobba that Iraq wished to purchase more weapons from Germany that it
was unable to buy from the British; indeed, Rheinmetall-Borsig informed the
German government a week and a half later that it had been assured by
the government in Baghdad that, “According to the English-Iraqi treaty, the
Iraqi government was free to procure war materials from other sources.”92
Germany and Iraq concluded two additional arms transactions in late 1938,
both of which involved largely defensive weapons such as anti-aircraft pieces
with ammunition.93 Caution was also very much the rule for Germany with
regard to other possible weapons markets in the Arab world in the 1930s.
In June, and again in August 1937, the German Embassy in Cairo reported to
Berlin that the Egyptian Ministry of War expressed an interest in buying arms
from countries other than Britain, and that Germany was one of those coun-
tries. The reports also noted that the Egyptian government would do so only
with the approval of the British government, and that therefore the only way to
proceed was through London.94 In August 1937, the Dresdner Bank office in
Cairo sent the same message to its superiors in Berlin, namely that German
arms producers could sell to Egypt only with London’s approval.95 But by late
89
See for example PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 2,
Aufzeichnung zur Randnotiz auf dem Bericht des Deutschen Gesandten in Bagdad vom 24. Juli
1937, Nr. 1823, 29. Juli 1937; and Pol. Abt. VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG-Bagdad an
AA-Berlin, Nr. 2633, 9. November 1937.
90
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 2, DG/Bagdad an
AA/Berlin, Nr. 2921, W454g, 12. Dezember 1937.
91
See NAL: FO371/20911-J4567, Secret Papers 1937, War Office Memorandum, October 1937.
92
PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Irak, Bd. 2, zu II 891/37g,
Rheinmatall-Borsig AG an RWM/Berlin, 22. Dezember 1937.
93
See for example PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim): Handel mit Kriegsgerät,
Allgemeines, Bd. 3, Kriegslieferungsverträge (Geheim), e.o. W746g, 10. August 1938.
94
See BArch: R901-68425, DG/Kairo an AA/Berlin, Nr. 434, 4. Juni 1937; and DG/Kairo an AA/
Berlin, Nr. 634, 21. August 1937.
95
BArch: R901-68425, Dresdner Bank, Filiale Kairo, an Dresdner Bank/Berlin, Nr. 500, 17.
August 1937.
1937, and the spring of 1938, the German Embassy in Cairo was quite negative
about opportunities in Egypt for German weapons manufacturers. Inquiries
to the German Embassy from German arms producers were answered with
the observation that their prospects were not good, and that the British
government, as was the case in Iraq, was not always supportive of foreign arms
suppliers.96
Thus, in spite of the economic interest of German arms manufacturers and
the Ministry of Economics in Berlin in the promotion of German exports,
Hitler’s regime did not avidly promote arms agreements with Arab states
without at least the implicit acquiescence of the British government. Indeed,
Egypt and Iraq, along with perhaps Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as the only
nominally independent Arab states, constituted the arms market such as it
was for the Arab world. This apparently was not a factor for the Italian
government, although the Italians were reluctant to send weapons into
Palestine, opting instead to provide financial support for leaders of the Arab
revolt. The statistics of the Handelspolitische Abteilung (Trade Policy Section)
of the German Foreign Office indicate that Germany ended up exporting
relatively little war material to the Middle East in 1936 and 1937, and some-
what more in 1938 and 1939.97 The statistics for 1936 and 1937 do show the
export of a small number of rifles and some munitions to Palestine; but it is not
known if these were approved by responsible authorities in Berlin, by the
British, or even if they were actually intended for Arab insurgents. We know,
for instance, that the Foreign Office in Berlin informed the German Consulate-
General in Beirut in October 1937 that Germany would not provide arms for
the Arab revolt in Palestine, and that a month later, the embassy in Bagdad
confided to the private secretary of King Ibn-Saud of Saudi Arabia that
Germany would not support the Arab cause in Palestine with arms.98 It is
possible that some of the small arms exported to Yemen ended up in Palestine.
But it seems clear that in 1936 and 1937, the first two years that Germany was
in a position to export relatively modest amounts of war material, the Nazi
state generally sought to avoid antagonizing Great Britain in the Middle East,
and therefore did not actively seek a significant foothold in the still relatively
limited arms market in the region. Moreover, its own rearmament needs
after 1935 meant that Germany was not in a position to export large quantities
of weapons even if it had wanted to do so. Indeed, by late March 1938,
96
BArch: R901-68425, DG/Kairo an AA/Berlin, Nr. 802, 4. November 1937; and DG/Kairo an
AA/Berlin, Nr. 335, 23. April 1938.
97
Bde. 1-4; and Geheim Akten 1920–1936, II FK.33: Kriegsgerät Allgemeines, Geheimsachen,
Statistik über K.G. Ausfuhr.
98
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd. 2, AA/Berlin (von Hentig) an DGK/Beirut, 8. Oktober
1937; and Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad (Grobba) an AA/Berlin, Nr. 2633,
9. November 1937.
the British ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, reported to London that he

considered Germany’s interest in the Eastern Mediterranean area to be purely
commercial in nature, and that in any case the Italian government was not at all
in favor of German involvement in the Mediterranean area.99 This caution
and reluctance would diminish somewhat in the lead-up to war in Europe in
1938 and 1939, when a policy of exacerbating existing Anglo-French colonial
problems in the Middle East and around the world would be deemed in Berlin
to be in Germany’s interest.
a jewish state
Arab unrest and periodic violence in Palestine since the end of the First World
War were directed against two key elements of the postwar settlement in
Palestine. These were British rule in Palestine as authorized by the League of
Nations through the mandate system, and the Jewish National Home that had
become a legal component of that League of Nations mandate. With
the substantial increases in Jewish immigration into the National Home in
Palestine, particularly between 1920 and 1925, and again after 1930, the
Jewish percentage of the population within the Palestine Mandate rose from
about 10 percent in 1918 to close to 30 percent just twenty years later.
Of course, a significant part of that dramatic increase after 1930 was the result
of the Nazi assumption of power in Germany on January 30, 1933, and its
policy of dispossession and the forced emigration of German Jews to destin-
ations that were, from the perspective of Hitler’s regime, preferably outside of
Europe. Within the context of that Jewish policy, Palestine played a critical
role in Nazi efforts to force Jews to leave Germany.100
Yet the pursuit of that policy always carried with it concerns among Nazi
policy makers that exiled German Jews would contribute to growing anti-
German sentiment from their new homes abroad, particularly in the British
dominions and in the United States. Indeed, at a meeting on Jewish emigration
on September 29, 1936, attended by representatives of the Ministry of the
Interior, the Ministry of Economics, and the office of the Stellvertreter des
Führers, State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart of the Interior Ministry reiterated
such fears, and offered suggestions about the best way to neutralize them:
“For these reasons, the emigration of Jews first and foremost to Palestine has
been promoted.”101 Aware of Germany’s relative popularity in the Arab world
before and especially since Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, Stuckart
asserted with confidence that in the Middle East there was little chance of harm
to Germany as a result of possible anti-German agitation among the Jewish
99
NAL: FO371/21998-1355, British Embassy/Rome to Foreign Office/London, No. 330, 31
March 1938.
100
See Nicosia, Zionism and Anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany, 126–144.
101
BArch: R1501, 5514, Vermerk über die Besprechung am 29. September 1936.
population. Nevertheless, events in the region, affected in part by increased

German-Jewish immigration into Palestine after 1933, would briefly call into
question the wisdom of the Nazi government’s policy of promoting Zionism
and Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, particularly with the
approach of war in 1938 and 1939.
The Royal (Peel) Commission on Palestine was established by the British
government in November 1936 in response to the Arab revolt that broke out
in April of that year. From the beginning, the Peel Commission generated
considerable speculation about a possible recommendation to end the British
Mandate and establish nominally independent Jewish and Arab states within
the borders of Mandatory Palestine. Although the Peel Commission’s findings
and recommendations were not made public until July 1937, the German
Foreign Ministry, mindful of the public speculation about a Jewish state, began
in January to consider the political implications of such a recommendation for
Germany’s domestic Jewish policy and its foreign policy in the Middle East.
Walther Hinrichs of Referat-Deutschland, the Nazi party office within the
German Foreign Office, warned the state secretary that an independent Jewish
state in part of Palestine would likely be the outcome of the Peel Commission’s
deliberations. He then identified the negative implications of an emigration
policy that since 1933 had actively promoted Jewish emigration from Germany
to Palestine. Drawing on old anti-Semitic myths, he warned of the dangerous
strategic and ideological consequences of an independent Jewish state:
“Therefore it should be noted that a Jewish state in Palestine would strengthen
Jewish influence in the world to unimaginable levels. Just as Moscow is the
central authority for the Comintern, Jerusalem would become the base for a
Jewish world organization that, like Moscow, would be in a position to carry
out its work with diplomatic means.”102 Referat-Deutschland’s Vicco von
Bülow-Schwante cited the possible strategic disadvantages of an independent
Jewish state that, once admitted to the League of Nations, would join the
growing coalition of states hostile to the new Germany.103 While some in
the Nazi bureaucracy adhered to the traditional anti-Semitic myths of a mono-
lithic international Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world from its own
independent power base in Palestine, others stressed the strategic disadvantages
for Germany in promoting the establishment of yet another state that would be
hostile to the Third Reich.
Fears of an independent Jewish state in Palestine grew in government and
party agencies during the spring of 1937, raising questions about what had
become a key element in Nazi Jewish policy. For state and party agencies
in Berlin, unqualified support in the past for unhindered Jewish emigration
102
PA: R99359, Inland II A/B, 83-21a, Bd.1a, Aufzeichnung des Referat- Deutschlands (Hinrichs)
vom 9. Januar 1937.
103
PA: R27266, Büro des Chefs der Auslandsorganisation, Aufzeichnung des Referat-D vom 27.
April 1937.
from Germany to Palestine, and for the Jewish National Home under British
authority, was never meant as an endorsement of an independent Jewish state.
Nevertheless, some began to see an independent Jewish state as possibly a
logical outcome of such a policy. Nor was Germany promoting an Arab state
in Palestine, as indicated earlier in this chapter. There seems to have been an
unspoken assumption that Great Britain would continue to rule both Jews and
Arabs in Palestine, an assumption that, moreover, reflected Hitler’s anti-
Semitism and his racial view of the world, as well as the role of the British
Empire in it. In any case, the possibility of even a nominally independent Jewish
state in a small part of a small Mandatory Palestine prompted a reassessment of
the regime’s policy on Jewish emigration from Germany in 1937. Moreover,
there were divisions among interested agencies such as the Foreign Office, the
Interior Ministry, the Economics Ministry, the Overseas Organization of
the NSDAP (Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP), and the SS over the final aim
of Nazi Jewish policy and its promotion of Jewish emigration from Germany to
Palestine. Was it in Germany’s interest to seek to concentrate Jews in Palestine
and/or a few other selected parts of the world, or was it preferable to try to
scatter them as small minorities in as many different parts of the world as
possible? Of course, this was a meaningless debate since there was virtually
nothing that the German government could do in the end to control the final
destination of Jews once they left Germany.
In April 1937, a little more than two months before the publication of
the Peel Commission report, Ministerial Director Ernst von Weizsäcker in the
German Foreign Office issued policy guidelines on Palestine to the responsible
departments in the German Foreign Office.104 The guidelines reiterated
the government’s goal of rapid Jewish emigration from Germany, but cautioned
against concentrating Jews in Palestine so as not to facilitate the establishment
of a Jewish state. Weizsäcker suggested that Jews be directed to destinations
other than Palestine. On June 1, Foreign Minister von Neurath issued further
guidelines on Palestine to the German embassies in London and Baghdad,
and the German Consulate-General in Jerusalem. Von Neurath reiterated
Germany’s firm opposition to the establishment of an independent Jewish state
in Palestine: “. . .for a state in Palestine would not absorb world Jewry, but
would establish in the process a legal power base for international Jewry,
something like the Vatican state for political Catholicism or Moscow for
the Comintern.”105 He also called for friendlier relations with the Arabs in
Palestine, and the Arab states in the Middle East, but insisted that Germany
would not become directly involved in the conflict. He also noted: “In this,
German understanding for Arab national aspirations would be clearer than
104
See PA: R27266, Büro des Chefs der Auslandsorganisation, Aufzeichnung des Referat-D vom
27. April 1937. See also PA: R99359, Inland II A/B, 83-21a, Bd.1a, Aufzeichnung des Referat-
D, zu 83-21a 25/5, 25. Mai 1937. Von Weizsäcker was appointed State Secretary in 1938.
105
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr.561.
photo 3.2. Ernst von Weizsäcker (no date).

before, but without giving any specific guarantees.”106 Von Neurath instructed
the German Embassy in London to notify the British government that Ger-
many’s promotion of Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine was not an
endorsement of an independent Jewish state. Finally, von Neurath stated that a
comprehensive reexamination of emigration policy would begin soon.
Referat-Deutschland’s June 22, 1937 circular to all German consular mis-
sions abroad announced a forthcoming reassessment of Jewish emigration
policy. The circular raised questions about a past Jewish policy that, by empha-
sizing the rapid removal of Jews from Germany, had dealt with the Jewish
question as a purely domestic issue while ignoring its foreign policy implica-
tions. The negative consequence of that, according to the circular, was that the
significant concentration of Jews in Palestine only enhanced the possibility of a
Jewish state.107 It went on to suggest that the single-minded emphasis on
making Germany judenrein (cleansed of Jews) gave the false impression that
the Jewish question would in fact be resolved for Germany once all of the Jews
had departed from the Reich. In an ominous hint at the foundations of future
106
Von Neurath was not suggesting a change in Germany’s hitherto consistent policy of refusing to
intervene in support of the Arabs diplomatically or materially in Palestine and throughout the
region. In reality, there was to be virtually no change at all.
107
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 564.
Nazi Jewish policy, within the context of the conquest of German living space
in the East, the circular concluded: “In reality there exists a larger German
interest in maintaining the fragmentation of Jewry. For the Jewish question will
still not be solved for Germany when not a single member of the Jewish race
lives on German soil. . .The Jewish question is, therefore, at the same time one
of the most important problems for German foreign policy.”108
In the end, the Nazi government did not reverse those components of its
Jewish policy that relied on Zionism, the Zionist movement, and Palestine for
the removal of Jews from Germany. The imperative of National Socialist
ideology to resist an imagined world Jewish conspiracy by attempting to
control where Jewish emigrants from Germany eventually ended up was futile
in any case. The German government did not participate in international
discussions on Palestine or on the growing Jewish refugee problem, nor did it
provide material or diplomatic support for the Arab cause in Palestine at that
time. Furthermore, Germany did not put pressure on anti-Semitic governments
in eastern Europe, particularly Poland and Rumania, to alter their policies that
also vigorously promoted Jewish emigration to Palestine. Still, emigration
policy did become a focus of debate among state and party agencies during
the second half of 1937 and into early 1938. The extent to which the entire
process of Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine facilitated Zionist
efforts to build an independent Jewish state in Palestine was the question on
which the debate centered. Yet it appears doubtful that anyone in Berlin
seriously thought that Germany could decisively influence events in Palestine
simply by altering the regime’s emigration policy. German Jews comprised
about 20 percent of the total Jewish immigration into Palestine between 1933
and 1937, and constituted an even smaller percentage of the total Jewish
population living in the Jewish National Home.109 At the time, it was believed
that the success or failure of Zionist hopes for a Jewish state would ultimately
depend much more on the greater numbers of Jewish immigrants arriving in
Palestine from elsewhere, especially from eastern Europe. Any attempt to
significantly alter the movement of Jews to Palestine once they left Germany,
an almost impossible task in any case, would likely not be fatal to the idea of a
Jewish state.
The SS and the Gestapo had remained in the background on the issue of the
Arab revolt, the Peel Commission, and a possible Jewish state in Palestine. They
were not yet in control of the formulation of Nazi Jewish policy; their role
remained essentially the implementation and enforcement of Jewish policy
inside Germany. The removal of Jews from Germany, and not the foreign
108
Ibid.
109
See BArch: R57, 25, Reichsstelle für das Auswanderungswesen, Bericht des Assessors
Dr. Wilmanns über seine Reise nach Palästina, G.Z. B2400, 10. Juni 1937. See also Werner
Feilchenfeld, Dolf Michaelis, Ludwig Pinner, Haavara-Transfer nach Palästina und Einwander-
ung Deutscher Juden 1933–1939 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Siebeck, 1972), 90.
policy implications of the eventual destinations of emigrating Jews, was their

principal task. While they too opposed the idea of an independent Jewish
state in Palestine on ideological grounds, there were some in the SS who did
not entirely oppose the idea, even as late as the summer of 1936. Articles in the
SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps in 1936 stressed the primary SS task of
removing all Jews from Germany, by all possible means, even if that meant the
establishment of a Jewish state at some point in the future. One article did note
that a solution had to be found to the problem of settling Jews among peoples
who rejected their presence in order to prevent what it described as the sacrifice
of additional people to Jewish control.110 However, two months later, the same
publication referred to what it termed “Arab terrorists” (arabische Terroristen)
who opposed Jewish immigration to Palestine, and expressed SS fears that:
“The solution to the entire Jewish question will be rendered impossible if it
comes to that.”111 In his article in the Völkischer Beobachter on July 9, 1937,
Alfred Rosenberg condemned the idea of an independent Jewish state, and
criticized the inherent contradictions in British policy since the First World
War. However, he also reaffirmed Germany’s noninvolvement in the violence
in Palestine, and demanded its quick resolution in a way that protected
Germany’s economic interests in the region.112
At the end of 1936, an unknown source within Abteilung II-1 in the
Sicherheitsdienst of the SS filed a comprehensive report with the title
“The Arab Space” (Der arabische Raum). The report largely dismissed pan-
Arab efforts to create a unified Arab state, and concluded that internal racial,
religious, and dynastic differences rendered Arab unity impossible. It also
commented that England had learned that fact “. . .from the proverbial and
proven unreliability of the Arabs, who are easy to win over for those willing to
pay more Gold. . .”113 The report also observed that it would be easy for
Germany to win over Arab support in the future given Britain’s support for
the Jewish National Home in Palestine, but that it would be hardly worth it
because, “There would not be the slightest chance that armed Palestinian
Arabs . . .could mount serious resistance against the much better disciplined
Jews or even the English. Therefore active Arab military assistance for us would
not be possible.”114 Finally, in early 1937, at the height of speculation over
the Peel Commission’s forthcoming recommendations, Abteilung II-112 of the
Sicherheitsdienst (“Security Service” in the SS) issued a report on the Jewish
question in Germany that emphasized rapid Jewish emigration from Germany
as the “guiding principle” (Leitgedanke) of state policy toward the Jews.
It further emphasized the necessary role that Zionism and Palestine played in
110 111
Das Schwarze Korps, 25. Juni 1936. Das Schwarze Korps, 27. August 1936.
112
Völkischer Beobachter, 9. Juli 1937.
113
BArch: R58-6381, Betr. Lagebericht “Der arabische Raum,” an II-1, Berlin, den 14. Dezember
1936.
114
Ibid.
that policy, and criticized those in the German Foreign Office who allegedly
advocated a greater, albeit more superficial, sympathy for the Arab cause. The
guidelines warned: “Any attempt to foster anti-Jewish sentiment among the
Arabs in Palestine is strictly prohibited. Provoking the Arabs against Jewish
immigrants only serves to harm the Reich, for the unrest severely hampers
our emigration efforts, and this was particularly evident during the unrest of
1936.”115
The first ministerial meeting on this issue took place on July 29, 1937, just
three weeks after the July 7 publication in London of the Peel Commission
report.116 The meeting was attended by the interested departments in
the German Foreign Office, as well as representatives from the Office of the
Stellvertreter des Führers, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Econom-
ics, the Reichsbank, and Rosenberg’s Foreign Policy Office (Aussenpolitisches
Amt) of the NSDAP. The Interior Ministry, the agency still primarily respon-
sible for the Jewish emigration process prior to late 1938, reported that Hitler
continued to insist on forcing Jewish emigration from Germany by all possible
means, regardless of the destination of the emigrants. The discussions con-
tinued on September 21 and 22 at the Ministry of Economics. However, the
tone of these last two meetings was quite different from the July 29 discussions.
Given Hitler’s apparent wishes, as represented at the July meeting, it was clear
at the September meetings that Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine
would continue as before. While the meetings discussed the advantages and
disadvantages of the Ha’avara transfer system, and the possibility of revising
the agreement to better accommodate the economic interests of Palestinian
Arabs and the German Christian community (Palästinadeutsche) in Palestine,
virtually nothing was said about the role of Jewish emigration from Germany to
Palestine in the possible establishment of a Jewish state.117
Indeed, by the autumn of 1937, some Nazi authorities had begun to view the
growing obstacles to increased Jewish immigration into Palestine with greater
alarm than the possibility of a Jewish state. After the publication of the Peel
Commission’s report, with its recommendation to partition Palestine into nom-
inally independent Jewish and Arab states, and the retention of the British
Mandate in several pockets that would remain under British control, the Arab
115
See BArch: R58, 956, Aufzeichnung des SD (II/112), “Zum Judenproblem,” Januar 1937. This
report is unsigned, but the author was likely Adolf Eichmann.
116
See PA: R104785, Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung von Pol.VII über die
Besprechung betr. Haavara am 29. Juli 1937, zu WIII SE 7115, 3. August 1937.
117
See PA: R105970, Handelspolitische Abteilung, Handakten Clodius-Palästina, Aufzeichnung
über die Besprechung am 21.IX.37 betr. Haavara, zu WIII SE 766/37, 25. September 1937. The
Ha’avara Agreement, concluded between the German government and the German and inter-
national Zionist movements on August 28, 1933, allowed German Jews going to Palestine to
take a small portion of their assets in the form of German exports to Palestine. Once in
Palestine, German-Jewish immigrants were reimbursed from the sale of those German goods
on the Palestinian market.
N
NO
BA
LE
SYRIA
a
Se
Haifa Lake
Tiberias
an
Nazareth
ne
Jenin
ra
er
Nablus
it
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
ed
T R A N S J
M
Jerusalem
Dead
Sea
O R D A N
Beersheba
EGYPT
Jewish state
Arab state
Mandated zone
under British control
Aqaba
Gulf of Aqaba
map 3.3. Peel Partition Plan 1937
revolt resumed with even greater intensity. In response, British authorities

placed stricter limits on Jewish immigration, an act that resulted in a decrease
in overall Jewish immigration into Palestine and contributed to a decline in the
overall level of Jewish emigration from Germany.118 In response, the Interior
Ministry called another ministerial meeting on October 18, attended by repre-
sentatives of the same offices as well as a representative of the Sicherheitsdienst
of the SS.119 Although the effectiveness and future of the Ha’avara Agreement
was still questioned, there was general agreement at this meeting that Zionist
118
See Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine, Vol. 2, 406–407.
119
See IfZ: F71/3, 4-9 (Lösener Handakten), Vermerk über die Besprechung am 18.X.37, Nr. IB
191 VI/5012dg, 28. Oktober 1937. See also BArch: R1501, 5514, RIM an Stellvertreter des
Führers, AA, RWM und SD, IB 191g/5012d, 7. Oktober 1937, and RIM an RWM, Nr. IB 191
IVg/5012d, 14. Oktober 1937.
photo 3.4. Werner-Otto von Hentig (no date).

work in Germany, and Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, would

continue as before.
Through the summer of 1937, the Foreign Office in Berlin generally recog-
nized the necessity of maintaining Palestine as a key element in the regime’s
policy of forcing Jews to emigrate from Germany. Moreover, it refused Arab
requests for a more public German opposition to the possible establishment of a
Jewish state, and for a public German identity with the Arab cause in its
opposition to the Peel Commission’s recommendations. In July 1937, Amin
al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, met with the German Consul-General in
Jerusalem, Walter Döhle. The Mufti suggested to Döhle closer German-Arab
coordination in opposing a Jewish state, and asked the Consul-General to
arrange a visit to Berlin for his representative, Mousa El-Alami. After informing
his superiors in the Foreign Office in Berlin of the Mufti’s request, Döhle was
told by Ernst von Weizsäcker that there was no point to such a visit. In his
response to Jerusalem, von Weizsäcker reasoned in a telegram: “As long as
position of Arab states uncertain, visit of representative appears pointless.”120
In the Near East Department (Abteilung VII), Werner-Otto von Hentig,
the head of the department, also dismissed the idea of a possible visit to Berlin
120
See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 637, 638.
of a representative from the Mufti.121 On August 7, Abteilung VII issued a

policy statement firmly opposing the establishment of a Jewish state in Pales-
tine. After reviewing all of the arguments for opposing an independent Jewish
state, and even admitting that such a state would in fact accelerate Jewish
emigration from Germany, the memorandum concluded that, “Foreign policy
measures with the goal of redirecting German-Jewish emigration to Palestine to
other lands can hardly be considered.”122 Finally, in his November 5, 1937
meeting in Baghdad with Sheik Yussuf Yassin, the private secretary of King Ibn-
Saud of Saudi Arabia, Fritz Grobba politely declined Yassin’s request for strong
German diplomatic support for the Arab cause in Palestine, and against the Peel
Commission’s recommendations. Citing his government’s wish to maintain
good relations with Great Britain, Grobba described his response to Yassin as
follows: “I explained to the sheik that Anglo-German relations were also
friendly. Given this reality, the Palestinian Arabs were expecting from Germany
an active support that Germany could not give to them. . .”123
Germany’s efforts to generally keep the Arabs at a polite distance are also
evident in Reich Youth Leader Baldur von Schirach’s visit to the Middle East in
late 1937. The trip included stops in Damascus, Baghdad, and Aleppo, as well
as to Teheran. In his request for formal permission from Hitler to make the trip,
von Schirach explained that he had received many invitations from various
countries, including some in the Middle East, and that the purpose of the trip
was to get to know the youth organizations in the lands to be visited.124
However, he was quick to point out that the proposed trip had no political
motives, and that the most important part of the trip would be his stop in Iran:
“The main goal of the trip, Iran, is of special interest to me because in a
relatively short period of time a youth organization was established with a
national importance that is considered to be very high.”125 Of course, Iran was
independent, and not an Arab state.
German fears of an independent Jewish state in Palestine had virtually
disappeared by the end of 1937. The Peel Commission’s specific
121
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 569. Von Hentig was an Orientalist and one of the more know-
ledgeable diplomats in Arab affairs in the German Foreign Office. During the war, he was
attached for a time to the Sixth Army in the southern Soviet Union as it sought to move into the
Caucasus and then into the Arab Fertile Crescent. See Eckart Conze et.al., Das Amt und die
Vergangenheit. Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik (Munich:
Karl Blessing Verlag, 2010), 155–156, 209–213.
122
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 571. At one point, the memorandum mentioned possibly providing
the Arabs with money or even arms through other Arab states, particularly Iraq, as a way of
opposing the establishment of a Jewish state. This possibility was dismissed by von Weizsäcker
in a comment in the margins.
123
124
BArch: R43-3506, Der Jugendführer des Deutschen Reichs an den Staatssekretär und Chef der
Reichskanzlei Dr. Lammers, RK.18251, 18. November 1937.
125
Ibid.
recommendations, already rejected by the Arabs and the Zionists, and not yet
formally adopted by the British government, no longer seemed relevant to Nazi
policy by the end of the year.126 In early 1938, Hitler apparently made a final,
specific, commitment to the continued use of Zionism and Palestine in the
regime’s policy on Jewish emigration from Germany. Carl Clodius of the Trade
Policy Department (Handelspolitische Abteilung) in the Foreign Office referred
to Hitler’s commitment in a January 27, 1938 memorandum, while Ernst von
Weizsäcker referred to the same initiative in a note to Rosenberg’s Foreign
Policy Office (Aussenpolitisches Amt) in the NSDAP that same month.127
A note from the Foreign Trade Office (Aussenhandelsamt) of the Overseas
Organization (Auslandsorganisation, or AO) of the NSDAP to the director of
the AO in the Foreign Office on February 1, 1938, referred to Hitler’s move
in the following way: “. . . on the basis of a recommendation by Reichsleiter
Rosenberg, the Führer has made the decision that Jewish emigration from
Germany should continue to be promoted with all possible means, and it
should be directed first and foremost to Palestine.”128 Moreover, at a meeting
with representatives of the Foreign Office on January 24, the same information
was presented by representatives of the Ministry of Economics.129 At the same
time, three former Zionist officials also verified Hitler’s initiative in January
1938.130 Finally, two Gestapo memoranda of February and March 1938
respectively, allude to a desired further emigration of German Jews to
Palestine.131 The backdrop for all of this, no doubt, was the lead-up to the
annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938, a move that would instantly
increase the Jewish population of the Reich by some 200,000. This reality alone
126
See PA: R104785, Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung von Pol.VII, 92 (o.D.);
R104789, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd.3, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, Nr.Pol. 96/37, 29. Dezem-
ber 1937; and R29899, Büro des U.St.S.-Palästina, Weizsäcker an Pol.VII, zu 83-24 Ag. 13/1,
19. Januar 1938. The Arabs rejected the Peel Commission’s recommendations out of hand,
while the Zionist movement accepted, with reluctance, the principle of partition, but not the
specific partition proposal of the Peel Commission. With both Arabs and Jews opposed to that
particular plan, the British government seemed to drop the Commission’s recommendations by
the end of 1937, and formally renounced partition as a solution in 1938. See Esco Foundation
for Palestine, Inc., Palestine, Vol. 2, 861–874.
127
See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 579; and PA: R104785, Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd.1,
Aufzeichnung Weizsäckers an das Aussenpolitische Amt, Pol.VII-92, Januar 1938.
128
PA: R99387, Inland II A/B, 83-24a, Bd.1, Aussenhandelsamt der AO der NSDAP an den Leiter
der AO im Auswärtigen Amt, Ag.13/1, 1. Februar 1938.
129
PA: R99387, Inland II A/B, 83-24a, Bd.1, Vermerk über die Besprechung vom 24. 1. 1938 betr.
die Handelsattachés, 26. Januar 1938.
130
See Ernst Marcus, “The German Foreign Office and the Palestine Question in the Period 1938–
1939,” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 193; and Feilchenfeld, Haavara Transfer, 32.
131
See BArch: R187, Sammlung Schumacher, 240/I, Geheime Staatspolizei, Staatspolizeistelle
Würzburg, B.Nr. 1130/38 IIB, 28. Februar 1938; and PA: R99388, Inland II A/B, 83-24a,
Bd.2, Geheime Staatspolizei an AA/Berlin, Nr. IIB 3-F.455, 29. März 1938.
likely precluded any change in policy that would in any way limit Jewish
emigration from a “Greater Germany” to Palestine.
Throughout the Arab territories in the Middle East, and not only in
Palestine, there was public outrage at the published recommendations of the
Peel Commission beginning in July 1937. From Baghdad, Grobba reported to
Berlin that the Iraqi government announced plans to both organize world
opinion against the plan, as well as to forbid public demonstrations against
the Peel Commission’s recommendations out of fears that demonstrators might
attack Iraqi Jews, their property, and their institutions. Grobba also relayed
warnings given to him by Iraqi Prime Minister Hikmet Suleiman that should
Britain proceed to implement the partition plan, “. . .many volunteers from all
Arab countries, including Iraq, would rush to Palestine and fight against the
English.”132 Grobba relayed additional communications he received from other
Arab leaders and organizations, within and outside of Iraq, with more or less
the same message, many of them appealing for German help in thwarting the
Peel Commission recommendations for Palestine.133
In these and other reports, Grobba in Baghdad and his superiors in the
Foreign Office in Berlin listened to Arab complaints about the situation in
Palestine, and requests for some form of German support, be it diplomatic,
financial, or weapons. The Arabs received in return only general statements
of German sympathy for the Arab people in their quest for national self-
determination. Even regarding the question of Jewish immigration into
Palestine, Hitler’s government made the explicit decision in the second half of
1937 to continue the one element of its Jewish policy that most Arabs
clearly rejected, namely the promotion of Jewish emigration from Germany to
Palestine. It seems clear, therefore, that by the beginning of 1938, German
policy toward the Arab lands of the Middle East reflected a desire more or less
to maintain the post–World War I status quo in the region, as well as a
complete disinterest in any form of active political identity, cooperation,
or solidarity with Arab nationalism and its goal of Arab independence from
European control. But this would be modified, largely for tactical reasons,
in 1938 and 1939 as the situation in Europe changed, and as Hitler began to
adjust to the likelihood that he would have to achieve his goals in Europe in the
face British and French opposition.
132
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd. 1, DG-Bagdad an AA-Berlin, Nr. 1674, 10. Juli 1937.
133
See for example PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 5a-Palästina, Bd. 1, Anlage zum Bericht der Deutschen
Gesandtschaft in Bagdad, Nr. 1730, 15. Juli 1937; DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1692, 13. Juli
1937; and DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1752, 17. Juli 1937. This last report noted the
outbreak of some anti-Jewish violence in Iraq.
4
The Coming of War, 1938–1939
continuity and departure in hitler’s “englandpolitik”

By the end of 1938, Hitler’s regime had reached the conclusion that Great
Britain would neither support German expansion in central and eastern
Europe, nor necessarily go to war against Germany to prevent it. London’s
apparent acquiescence in unilateral German rearmament, in Mussolini’s war in
Ethiopia, in Germany’s military occupation of the Rhineland, in Axis military
intervention in the Spanish civil war, and other factors likely contributed to
this conclusion in Berlin. Although a far cry from the formal Anglo-German
accommodation or alliance to which Hitler had referred since the early days
of the movement, it was nevertheless a rationale that could be used to at
least begin his plans for expanding German “living space” in Europe, despite
British disapproval. A rationale such as this was apparent at the infamous
Reichskanzlei meeting of November 5, 1937, at which Hitler and his civilian
and military advisors made the decision to proceed with plans to annex Austria
and to dismember the Czechoslovak state beginning in 1938. Their assumption
seemed to be that the risk of precipitating a war in Europe was low at that time.
Indeed, at several points in his summary of the meeting, Colonel Hossbach
cites Hitler’s references to Britain’s problems throughout its empire, and his
consequent assumption that, as a result of those problems, Britain was less
likely to risk a war in Europe: “The difficulties in the empire and the prospect
of becoming caught up again in a long-lasting European war should be decisive
factors in dissuading England from becoming involved in a war against
Germany. The English position will certainly have an effect on that of France.”1
In late 1937, Hitler seemed reasonably confident that Britain would
accept changes with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia through peaceful
1
See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 19.
101
photo 4.1. Joachim von Ribbentrop (no date).

international negotiations, based on the principle of German national

self-determination. At his meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November
19, 1937, Lord Halifax indicated Britain’s willingness to accept peaceful
changes regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia on the basis of multilateral
agreements. From London, Ambassador von Ribbentrop reported on
several occasions in early 1938 his conviction that the current British govern-
ment would not attempt to militarily resist even a unilateral and forced German
annexation of Austria.2 Czechoslovakia, of course, involved much more than
the principle of national self-determination of the Sudeten Germans as far as
Hitler’s intentions were concerned; and these intentions went beyond what the
British government was willing to accept. In his May 30, 1938 directive, known
as “Operation Green” (Fall Grün), Hitler instructed his military commanders
to prepare for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in the near future. Hitler stated in
2
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 31 (Mit Anlage), 145, 146, 147, 149. See also Halifax, Fullness of
Days, 184–190. Halifax also mentions that when the conversation turned to the return of some of
Germany’s former colonies, Hitler indicated that he was not interested in North Africa and the
Mediterranean area due to competing Anglo-French-Italian interests there.
The Coming of War, 1938–1939 103
no uncertain terms: “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia in

the foreseeable future through a military action.”3 With these words, Hitler
clearly intended to eliminate the state of Czechoslovakia altogether. On May
11, the British ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, informed von Ribben-
trop that while Britain was willing to consider peaceful changes in the status of
the Sudeten Germans, it could not remain indifferent to a German invasion of
Czechoslovakia.4 Hitler’s decision to agree to the Munich conference in the fall
of 1938, and thus to delay his final plans for Czechoslovakia, indicate that the
rationale to proceed in Europe without English support, confidant that England
would not resist militarily, was perhaps flawed. He decided not to risk war with
Britain in 1938, and agreed to a deal at the Munich conference in the fall that
fell significantly short of his intention to eliminate the Czechoslovak state. As a
result, and with some reluctance, the German government found it expedient to
take advantage of Britain’s imperial problems in the Middle East and elsewhere
in an effort to distract London from the situation in central Europe, and thus
weaken its willingness to consider war over Hitler’s plans to expand Germany’s
living space in Europe.5
German efforts to pressure Britain into acquiescing in his plans for Austria,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland in 1938 and 1939 were augmented by an anti-
British propaganda campaign. Beginning in late 1937, the British Embassy in
Berlin began reporting on the growing anti-British tendencies in the German
press that portrayed Great Britain as staunchly opposed to Germany’s equality
as a great power.6 Through much of 1938, the British government was unsure
of German intentions toward Britain, as indicated in a meeting of the Cabinet
Committee on Foreign Policy on November 14.7 But by the end of 1938 and the
start of spring of 1939, reports indicate that London was reasonably satisfied
that German propaganda in the Middle East prior to the outbreak of war was
merely intended to put pressure on the British position in the region, and
thereby turn London’s attention away from Europe, rather than to undermine
or damage the security of the British Empire.8 The specific aims of the campaign
were to impress upon the British government Germany’s determination to
3 4
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 221 (Anlage). ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 154 (Anlage).
5
This tactic is outlined in a memo from Werner-Otto von Hentig, the head of the Near East
department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign Office, to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in
late June 1938. See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/6, “Vorschläge zur Behan-
dlung von Arabern und Indern,“ 27. Juni 1938.
6
See Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 79–80, 120; and Aigner, Das Ringen, 310 ff.
7
See NAL: FO371/21658-14396 (Secret 1938), Committee on Foreign Policy, 32nd Meeting,
November 14, 1938.
8
See NAL: FO371/22988-C551618, Report of the Press Attaché of the British Embassy in Berlin,
December 28, 1938; FO371/21665-C14758, Foreign Office Memorandum of November 22,
1938; and FO371/23232-E2274, War Office Memoranda of March 2 and May 7, 1939. See
also Herf, Nazi Propaganda to the Arab World, Chap. 3; and Henke, England in Hitlers
politischem Kalkül, 201 ff.
achieve its aims in central Europe by war if necessary, and to distract British
attention from Europe by publicly attacking Britain’s imperial policies, but not
its strategic position or security. Much of the content for this campaign was
provided by the volatile situation in the Middle East, especially in Palestine
following the publication of the Peel Commission’s report in July 1937.9 Early
in 1938, Germany began broadcasting in Arabic to the Middle East from a
transmitter at Zeesen near Berlin. The broadcasts stressed Arab-German friend-
ship, and they were critical of British and French policy in the Middle East.
Palestine was a particularly convenient source for anti-British propaganda; yet
the German attacks on British policy that appeared in the German press and on
German radio did not call for the elimination of British power in the eastern
Mediterranean, or for anything that would significantly alter the post–World
War I settlement and status quo in the Arab world. Vague references to the
legitimate national aspirations of the Arab people were not necessarily meant to
promote the end of British power and influence in the Middle East, an end to
the Jewish National Home in Palestine, or the achievement of Arab independ-
ence anywhere in the Arabic-speaking world. Once again, this was a conclusion
reached at the time by British officials in London and the Middle East.
In 1938 and 1939, Hitler involved himself personally in the effort to
focus attention abroad on Britain’s problems in the Middle East, especially in
Palestine. In a speech before the Reichstag on February 20, 1938, he publicly
rebuked the British parliament and press for their persistent criticism of Nazi
political oppression and the persecution of the Jews in Germany.10 Referring to
the harsh punishment of Arab rebels by British military courts, he advised the
members of the British parliament to look into the judgments of British courts
in Jerusalem rather than the decisions of the German People’s Court, and
suggested that he would never permit members of the German Reichstag to
publicly question British justice. He expressed understanding and respect for
the problems and for the legitimate interests of the British world empire,
but then advised the British to, in effect, mind their own business and
tend to their own problems. In his speech at the annual Nuremberg Party rally
on September 12, 1938, he compared the plight of the Sudeten Germans
with that of the Palestinian Arabs with the words: “I am not inclined to permit
the establishment of a second Palestine here in the heart of Germany through
the cleverness of other statesmen.”11 In a speech at Saarbrücken on October 9,
Hitler demanded that Britain respect Germany’s legitimate sphere of interest
in central Europe, just as Germany respects and accepts British authority in
Palestine and elsewhere in the world. Again, stressing the quid pro quo logic
behind his idealized conception of Anglo-German relations, he advised London:
9
See the articles and editorials published during this period in the Völkischer Beobachter, 8.-13.,
26. Juli 1938; 2., 9., 21. August 1938; 19., 21., 23. Oktober 1938; and 15.-23., 25. November
1938.
10 11
Domarus, Hitler, Vol. 2, 793–804. Ibid., 904.
“We would like to advise all of these gentlemen to concern themselves with
their own problems, and leave us in peace.”12 He continued this line of
argument at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on November 8 with the words:
“The gentlemen of the British Parliament are surely very much at home in the
British world Empire, but they are not in Central Europe. Here they lack
knowledge of the conditions, events, and the relationships. . .in the end, we
ourselves don’t know our way around very well in India, or in Egypt, or even in
Palestine.”13 Finally, in Wilhelmshaven on April 1, as he rejected British
criticism of Germany’s March 15, 1939 occupation of Bohemia and Moravia,
Hitler actually endorsed Britain’s insistence that Germany had no business in
Palestine with the words: “We do not seek anything in Palestine. Just as we
Germans have so little business in Palestine, so too does England have so little
business in our German living space.”14
The original orders for Operation Green were based on the expectation that
German demands would be unacceptable to the Czechoslovak government,
and therefore a pretext for military action. However, developments through
the summer and fall of 1938 produced sufficient doubt in Hitler’s mind about
the likely British reaction to a German military assault to force him to cancel
plans for a German invasion of Czechoslovakia. On July 18, the German
Embassy in London submitted a comprehensive report to the German Foreign
Office in Berlin on Anglo-German relations in light of the recent German
annexation of Austria and the developing crisis over the Sudetenland and
Czechoslovakia. The contents of the report likely added to the confusion
in Hitler’s mind about how he might proceed with the Sudetenland issue.
The report began with a very negative view of the state of bilateral relations
between Berlin and London, and cited as causes several factors: fears aroused in
Britain over Germany’s recent annexation of Austria; general war-like tenden-
cies throughout Europe, allegedly fed by world Jewry, the Communist
International, and various nationalist groups within individual countries;
Britain’s rearmament program, and particularly its air defense system; and
the political polarization in British domestic politics between the Chamberlain
and Churchill factions and their perceived different approaches toward German
demands in Europe. The report further observed that the great majority of the
British population preferred an understanding with Germany. It concluded
that although the current state of bilateral relations was unsettled and
filled with tension, the current British government supported the negative
German view of the Soviet Union, and Germany’s demand that the issue of
the Sudetenland be resolved through bilateral agreements rather than through
the League of Nations. However, the report cautioned that only a peaceful
resolution of the Sudeten German crisis was acceptable to London, and that
Britain would undoubtedly side with France if Germany chose the path of
12 13 14
Ibid., 956. Ibid., 969. Ibid., Vol. 3, 1121.
military action against Czechoslovakia. Ambassador von Dirksen then

suggested: “The attempt to achieve an understanding with England will there-
fore have to be the urgent task of our foreign policy, as soon as the proper
conditions for it can be established.”15
Thus, Hitler was confronted with the choice between the free pursuit of
German policy in its own self-defined sphere of influence in Europe
and peaceful relations with Great Britain, a choice that he had always hoped
to avoid. On September 26, Sir Horace Wilson, an advisor to Neville Cham-
berlain, warned Hitler that Britain would support France in any Franco-
German conflict that might arise from the crisis over the Sudetenland.16 Two
days later, the German Embassy in London warned the Foreign Office in
Berlin by telephone that the British government would likely intervene militarily
in any German military action against Czechoslovakia.17 Given Mussolini’s
apparent desire for an international meeting to peacefully resolve the Sudeten
issue, Hitler was isolated internationally and forced to settle at least temporarily
for a compromise over the Sudetenland, one that fell far short of his intention
to erase the Czechoslovak state from the map of Europe.
In the months following the Munich Agreement and the cession of the
Sudetenland to Germany, Hitler seemed to regret his decision to back away
from his initial intention to invade Czechoslovakia. He concluded that
Britain in fact would not have declared war merely to ensure the survival of
Czechoslovakia. This is apparent in speeches he delivered in Saarbrücken on
October 9, in Weimar on November 6, and in Munich on November 8.18 In all
three, he implied that he would no longer tolerate British interference in
Germany’s sphere of influence in Europe, and that Germany’s legitimate rights
would no longer be sacrificed through needless negotiations with other powers.
By the start of the new year 1939, therefore, Hitler was prepared to pursue his
aims in Europe even if it meant war with Great Britain. On March 15, having
concluded that the British had been bluffing a few months earlier, Hitler
ordered German troops to occupy Bohemia and Moravia, and to enter Prague.
In the end, he did carry out his intention to eliminate the Czechoslovak state.
Hitler had not given up his illusions of reaching some sort of geopolitical
accommodation with Great Britain, based on mutual recognition and support
for separate German and British spheres of interest. When he ordered German
troops into Bohemia and Moravia on March 15, his acceptance of the
15
BArch: R43 II/1436 (Auswärtige Angelegenheiten), DB/London an AA/Berlin, A. 3161
(Geheim), “Der gegenwärtigen Stand der deutsch-englischen Beziehungen,” 18. Juli 1938.
16
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 634. See also Paul-Otto Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne
1923–1945: Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern
Europas (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949), 409–410.
17
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. II, Nr. 657. See also Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher 1938–1944.
Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland (Munich: Siedler Verlag, 1989), 54–55.
18
See Domarus, Vol. 2, 956, 965, 967–969.
possibility of war represented an attempt to force Britain into the sort of

partnership he had long favored, rather than a desire to undermine or destroy
the British Empire.19 He hoped to neutralize France and thereby deny Britain a
foothold on the European continent. He would then turn his attention to the
invasion and defeat of the Soviet Union, and the conquest of German Lebens-
raum in eastern Europe. In his meeting with military commanders in the Reich-
skanzlei on May 23, 1939, Hitler reiterated his primary goal: “Danzig is not the
object here. For us it is about the expansion of our living space in the east. . .”20
Hitler also concluded that since there was little likelihood of achieving this aim
without provoking a war with the western powers at some point, plans were
drawn up for the defeat and occupation of the Netherlands, Belgium, and
France. While an air and naval campaign would be carried out from airfields
and ports along the North Sea and English Channel until the British accepted
Germany’s new position of hegemony in Europe, there were as yet no plans
for the occupation of Great Britain, and certainly none for the destruction of
the British Empire.
By the summer of 1939, Hitler had decided that, despite a continuing desire
for some sort of bilateral understanding with Great Britain, he was now
prepared to go to war against Britain and France rather than postpone any
longer his quest for Lebensraum in eastern Europe. This included his last-
minute agreement with the Soviet Union less than two weeks before the
German invasion of Poland. On the other hand, he continued to harbor hopes
for some sort of last-minute understanding with the British government,
and the avoidance of an all-out war in the west. In his meetings with British
ambassador Henderson on August 23 and 25, 1939, just a week before the
German invasion of Poland, he spoke of his many attempts to reach an
understanding with Britain in the past, and London’s refusal to respond posi-
tively to those overtures.21 He warned Henderson that Germany was deter-
mined to resolve its problems with Poland unilaterally, that it now had the
military and political means to do so, and that the recently concluded pact with
Stalin freed Germany from the burden of a major two-front war. His rationale
remained a bilateral agreement between Germany and Great Britain that estab-
lished mutually recognized spheres of influence for each, with Germany’s
sphere primarily in Europe and Britain’s overseas. For Hitler, the inherent
problems in Anglo-German relations had always been centered in Britain’s
refusal to grant Germany that free hand in Europe. From Hitler’s perspective,
and certainly prior to September 1, 1939, it never had anything to do with
19
See Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 155, 204 ff.
20
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 433.
21
See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VII, Nr. 200, 265. See also Hitler’s August 11, 1939 discussions with
Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, in Carl Burckhardt, Meine
Danziger Mission 1937–1939 (Munich: Verlag Georg D. W. Callwey, 1960), 348.
disagreements or conflicts over British imperial interests outside of Europe in

general, or with the Mediterranean region and the Middle East in particular.
In December 1937, Schwarz van Berk from the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff
was in Cairo where he was collecting information on the situation in Palestine.
He sent a rather long report to Werner-Otto von Hentig of the Near East
Department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign Office in Berlin with his
observation on the high level of violence in Palestine since the outbreak of the
revolt. On that particular issue, van Berk discussed the weakness of the Arab
insurgents as a result of their lack of money and weapons, the activities of the
Mufti and those around him in Beirut, and the reluctance of Arab governments
to actively help the Palestinian uprising. But much of van Berk’s letter to von
Hentig concerned his assessment of Germany’s interests in the evolving situ-
ation in the region, specifically what he perceived as some of the possible
benefits that might accrue to Hitler’s government. He identified two advantages
that the unrest in Palestine had created for Germany: “. . .for one that the
English will have to focus on this point. . .and for another that the Jewish
problem outside of Germany remains a discussion point.”22 In his report, van
Berk sang the praises of the Ha’avara transfer system, and its economic benefits
for Germany as well as for Zionist efforts in Palestine, and closed by citing the
irony that although Germany sends many Jews to Palestine, there remains
much sympathy for the Reich among the Arab population.
However, Germany made only sporadic attempts to take advantage of
Arab unrest after the summer of 1938, when tensions in Europe surrounding
Nazi moves against Austria and Czechoslovakia provided Hitler with a pretext
for contributing to Britain’s problems in the Middle East and elsewhere. There
is some evidence that the German government sought to use the unrest in
Palestine to distract Britain from the Sudeten crisis, and thereby discourage
British intervention in central Europe. Hitler held a secret conference in mid
July, 1938, attended by Göring, Keitel, Goebbels, Himmler and a few others, at
which he ordered the timing of an attack on Czechoslovakia to coincide with
any period of heightened conflict in Palestine.23 Admiral Canaris’ Abwehr,
along with German Ambassador Fritz Grobba in Bagdad, would also be
22
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Palästina, Bd. 1, Schwarz van Berk/Kairo an Werner-Otto von
Hentig/Berlin, 9. Dezember 1937.
23
This information was relayed by General Walther von Brauchitsch to Ian Colvin, a British
journalist in Berlin with contacts to important personalities in Nazi Germany. Colvin writes
that the meeting was held “around” the 14th of July. See Ian Colvin, Vansittart in Office: An
Historical Survey of the Origins of the Second World War Based on the Papers of Sir Robert
Vansittart (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1965), 220. H. Fitzgerald Harley, a member of the
British Union of Fascists who had been in Germany at the time, told the British Embassy in Paris
that he saw the minutes of the July meeting in the office of Dr. Karl Schmidt of the Gestapo, and
that it had been decided at the meeting to provide the Arabs with some money in order to
provoke further unrest in Palestine. See NAL: F0371/21782-C7624. British Embassy/Paris to
Foreign Office/London, 22 July 1938.
photo 4.2. Ernst Woermann (no date).

involved in cultivating unrest in Palestine as a way of possibly discouraging

British intervention in central Europe. Former Abwehr officer Helmut
Groscurth made the following note in his diary entry for August 29, 1938:
“Conversation with Ambassador Grobba from Baghdad. The Arab movement
should be immediately activated.”24 Canaris had met the Mufti, Amin
al-Husayni, early in the year during a trip to Beirut, and apparently provided
some financial aid for the Mufti’s political activities in Beirut, to which he had
fled in 1937 in order to avoid arrest in Palestine by the British authorities.
Moreover, Grobba was used on at least one occasion to deliver money to the
Mufti’s personal secretary in Damascus, Musa el-Alami.25 Indeed, in a note to
Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann in the Foreign Office in Berlin in May
1939, Grobba did mention financial assistance that Germany had recently
provided to Arab rebels in Palestine through Saudi Arabia.26
24
Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1970), 106.
25
See Karl-Heinz Abshagen, Canaris (London: Hutchinson, 1956), 208; and Melka, “The Axis
and the Arab Middle East,” 53. The Abwehr also sought to provide arms to Arab rebels in
Palestine at the time through the government of Saudi Arabia, which had been interested in
acquiring weapons for use in Palestine. See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 590. See also Grobba,
Männer und Mächte, 112.
26
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 313, 422.
By the summer of 1939, the British government had suspected German

financial assistance to the Mufti for the Arab revolt in Palestine, and Grobba’s
role in the process.27 Moreover, in Berlin there was at least some consideration
of encouraging Arab unrest in Syria to distract France from central
Europe. After a warning from Franz Reichert, the agent of the Deutsches
Nachrichtenbüro in Jerusalem, that more unrest in Syria against French rule
was imminent, Herbert Hagen of II-112 of the Sicherheitsdienst in the SS
suggested: “. . .under these circumstances it seems possible, if there is interest
at the moment, to strengthen the political propaganda among the Arabs
there.”28 However, there is no evidence that Hagen’s suggestion led to any
direct German intervention in Syria. In brief, while it appears likely that some
German financial support did reach the Mufti in Beirut and the Arab rebellion
in Palestine through Canaris’s Abwehr, it does not appear that Germany tried
to send weapons to Palestine or Syria during the two years before the outbreak
of war in Europe. Indeed, even when the situation in Europe became increas-
ingly unstable in the second half of 1938 and throughout 1939, Germany
remained quite cautious in its response to events in the Middle East. It is also
important to note that Arab unrest in Palestine declined dramatically in the
summer of 1939, despite Palestinian Arab rejection of the British government’s
White Paper on Palestine in May. The wealth of German Foreign Office
documents portray top Nazi officials such as von Ribbentrop, von Weizsäcker,
Woermann, and von Hentig as not particularly interested in courting Arab
opinion at that time. Fritz Grobba in Baghdad, on the other hand, seemed to be
the only major German diplomat in the region with an interest in closer
political and economic ties to Iraq and Saudi Arabia; in the case of the latter
that meant selling some arms to the Saudis, as well as funneling some money
through the Saudi government to the Arab revolt in Palestine. Yet Grobba too
was reluctant to grant various Arab leaders much of what they wanted from
Germany at that time, particularly as he agreed that, in the event of war,
the Saudis and other Arab states would likely side with Great Britain.29
The Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP (APA) took an interest in the
Middle East during the two years or so before the war. It tended to support a
policy of greater German involvement in the Arab world, particularly in Saudi
Arabia. In March 1938, King Ibn-Saud sent his personal secretary, Khalid
al-Hud, to Berlin to negotiate closer political and economic ties with Germany.
27
See NAL: FO371/21887-E4838, Memorandum of the Foreign Office, August 12, 1938; FO371/
21872-E7560, Memorandum of the Foreign Office, December 14, 1938; FO371/21871-E7394,
Memorandum of the Foreign Office, December 1938; FO-371/23238-E5101, Memorandum of
the Colonial Office, July 14, 1939; and FO371/23191-E5128, Foreign Office/London to British
Embassy/Baghdad, July 18, 1939.
28
See Nicosia, Third Reich, 279 (n.98).
29
See PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, DG/Djidda an AA/Berlin, Nr. Dj.9, 27.
Januar 1939; and Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr.
Dj. 44, 18. Februar 1939.
He was able to meet only with the APA. The APA received with enthusiasm
al-Hud’s request for German military assistance, which included 25,000 rifles
with ammunition. Its memorandum of July 23, 1938 outlined the APA’s hopes
as follows: “Germany’s policy in the Near East could be effectively supported
through Saudi Arabia, the center of the Mohammedan world. The APA has
therefore tried for a long time to establish ties with Saudi Arabia through the
neutral means of economic exchange.”30 The same memorandum, as well as
others, complained of strong opposition from some of the responsible Reich
ministries to closer political and economic ties with Saudi Arabia.31 Indeed,
both the Ministry of Economics and much of the Foreign Office in Berlin were
unenthusiastic about arms and other exports to Saudi Arabia because of
its inability to pay with foreign currency, as well as the Saudi government’s
inability to pursue policies to which the British might object.32 Nor was the
German military leadership (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW) par-
ticularly keen on German arms sales to, and efforts to forge closer military and
political ties with, Saudi Arabia, as von Hentig noted in a February 28 memo-
randum in the Foreign Office: “The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht shares
our view that we cannot expect an improvement in our political position from
such weapons deliveries under these circumstances, but that they would instead
work against us.”33 One apparent victory for Grobba and for the APA did
come in February 1939 when full diplomatic relations were finally established
between Germany and Saudi Arabia.
By late May 1939, Hitler’s acceptance of the likelihood of war with the
west over Poland led to a slight change in the German position on selling some
weapons to Saudi Arabia. This somewhat altered view was also evident by
then in the German Foreign Office, and enabled Grobba to convince State
30
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung des APA, Pol. VII 1061, 23.
Juli 1938. There was always friction between Rosenberg’s Foreign Policy Office (APA) in the
Nazi party and the German Foreign Office. Most of the younger party members who entered the
diplomatic corps in greater numbers after 1933 were products of von Ribbentrop’s Dienststelle
Ribbentrop in the NSDAP. See Piper, Alfred Rosenberg, 288.
31
See also PA: Aussenpolitisches Amt, Politische Berichte-Saudisch-Arabien, Aktennotiz des Amts
für Vorderasien, 12. Juni 1939.
32
See PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, von Hentig/AA an Woermann/AA, zu
Pol. VII 1263, 6. September 1938; Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, von Hentig/AA an
Malletke/APA, (no date); Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd. 1, Woermann/AA an von Hentig/
AA, zu Pol. VII/1263, 26. September 1938. In July 1938, Hitler indicated his support for the
state agencies when he issued an order prohibiting party officials from speaking publicly about
foreign policy issues: “In order to avoid false impressions, I hereby forbid until further notice
certain party leaders from speaking publicly about foreign policy problems.” See BArch: R43 II/
1400, Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 25. Juli 1938.
33
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 590. See also IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/34, von
Hentig an Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP, September 1938. In thinking about a possible
war, von Hentig concluded: “We must assume, therefore, that Ibn Saud. . .will be on Britain’s
side.”
Secretary Woermann and even von Hentig that closer relations with Saudi
Arabia could be in Germany’s political and economic interest in the event of
war in Europe. Grobba asked Woermann in early May 1939 to reconsider his
position on arms sales to Saudi Arabia, implying that Germany would likely
be at war with England soon, and that for this reason, he was renewing his
efforts with regard to Saudi Arabia. He reiterated that the Saudi king had
promised his country’s benevolent neutrality should war break out in Europe,
and had requested in return German help in developing his country and its
defensive capabilities. Grobba argued that Germany should assert its position
in Saudi Arabia and predicted that: “In the event of war we will surely try
with all our means to cultivate relations with Ibn-Saud; but everything that
we now can establish in peace and quiet will then have to be improvised with
great sacrifice.”34 In the same month, von Hentig made a similar case to
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop for closer ties to Saudi Arabia, implying as
well that war in Europe was a strong possibility.35 He referred to the political
and economic situation in the Middle East, which made a move in Saudi
Arabia advisable in view of the European situation. In explaining his own
change of mind, he pointed out that most of the countries in the region
would either side with the British or retain a pro-British neutrality. He also
asserted that the British White Paper of May 1939 had effectively neutralized
the Arab revolt in Palestine, and that Italy was an object of distrust and
scorn throughout the Arab world. In this region of vanishing opportunities,
von Hentig now viewed the Saudis as one of the few remaining trading
partners in the region, especially in view of their small but steadily growing
oil revenues.
In the middle of May, the Saudi representative Khalid al-Hud returned
to Berlin to make another attempt at securing German weapons. This time,
he met with a more interested and receptive German Foreign Office, and was
not forced to waste his time with the APA as he had done a year earlier.
On June 8, 1939, he was received by von Ribbentrop who agreed to the Saudi
request for a large quantity of German rifles and the construction of a muni-
tions factory in Saudi Arabia.36 On June 17, Hitler received al-Hud at the
Berghof and gave his approval for the sale of 8,000 rifles with 8 million
rounds of ammunition, the construction of a small munitions factory in Saudi
Arabia, and, in the more distant future, the sale of anti-aircraft guns and
tanks.37 Italy, aware of its own unpopularity in the Arabian Peninsula and
that a greater German presence might help to weaken British power in the
34
35
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr.422. In a note in the margin, Ribbentrop expressed his agreement
with von Hentig’s arguments. Von Hentig again outlined his new position in another memoran-
dum to von Ribbentrop on June 9. See PA: Pol.Abt.VII. Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.l. Hentig
an RAM, Pol.VII 949, 9. Juni 1939.
36 37
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr.498. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr.54l.
Red Sea, had come to support Germany’s involvement in Saudi Arabia.38

Negotiations between the Saudi representative, the German Foreign Office,
and the OKW on a weapons package and terms of payment continued until
an agreement was reached in July.39 The deal, which included 4,000 rifles,
ammunition, anti-aircraft guns, and the munitions factory, was never put into
effect due to the outbreak of war in September.
In the spring and summer of 1939, German policy with regard to weapons
exports to the Middle East appeared to reflect a realization in Berlin that in the
event of war, England’s position in the region was virtually unassailable. Von
Hentig’s May 22 memorandum to Ribbentrop had described the disappearance
of opportunities for Germany throughout the region, leaving Saudi Arabia as
perhaps the last and only mechanism for potentially complicating Britain’s
problems in the Middle East. Yet, suspicions about Saudi Arabia lingered in
Berlin, despite al-Hud’s meetings with von Ribbentrop and Hitler in June 1939.
This left the German government with the possibility that, in the end, it might
refrain from delivering the promised arms. In fact, on July 11, less than a month
after Hitler’s initial approval of the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia, the OKW
passed on the following instructions from Hitler to the Foreign Office in Berlin:
“On 11 July 1939, the Führer let it be known through his adjutant that he
disapproved of weapons deliveries to hostile countries or to countries whose
position in a war is doubtful. Weapons should be delivered to destinations
where they could be useful or at least not damaging to us, e.g. to South
America, the Baltic states, Norway, and Bulgaria.”40 In the end, while arms
exports to Iran and Afghanistan increased significantly in 1939, those to the
Arab states remained negligible.41
In his memoirs, Grobba characterizes Germany’s policy in the Arab world
during the 1930s as one of wasted opportunities, as having failed to promote
German political and economic interests and influence in the region by taking
advantage of Arab hostility toward Britain and France, and sympathy for
38
PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.l, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, Pol. VII 1059, 20.
Juni 1939. See also: Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 109–110.
39
PA: Pol.Abt.VII. Politik 2-Saudisch Arabien, Bd.l, Aufzeichnungen von Hentig, Pol.VII 1163, 4.
Juli 1939.
40
PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät (Gemeim), Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Kriegsgerät-Allgemeines, Bd. 4,
OKW an AA/Berlin, Nr. 6147/39g, 22. Juli 1939.
41
See PA: HaPol Abt.-Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Kriegsgerät, Handel mit Kriegsgerät-Allgemeines,
Bde. 1–4. As early as October 1936, Hitler had personally ordered the Foreign Office in Berlin
to pursue closer economic ties with the governments of Iran and Afghanistan. The intention here,
according to a report from Karl Ritter of the economic affairs department (Sonderreferat-W) in
the Foreign Office, appears to have been to secure a significant role for Germany in the economic
development of these two countries. After describing this aim with regard to Afghanistan, Ritter
described the same aims in Iran as follows: “The same applies to Iran. Also with regard to Iran,
the Führer desires an active economic policy and cooperation in Iran’s development.” See PA:
Handelspolitische Abteilung, Handakten-Wiehl, Afghanistan, Aktenvermerk von Karl Ritter,
16. Oktober 1936.
Germany.42 He attributes this to a racism that was directed against both

Arabs and Jews, to Hitler’s fundamental disinterest in the Middle East, to his
deference to Italian ambitions in the region, and finally to a basic desire to
preserve the British Empire. He concludes that because of his racial view of the
world and a geopolitical determination that gave primacy to both England and
Italy, Hitler in the end never accepted the idea of Arab independence and
national self-determination. Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff of
the Army between 1938 and 1942, shared Grobba’s view in his Foreword to a
study of German relations with Arab nationalist movements, prepared for the
U.S. Army by two former German officers who served in the Middle East
during the war. Referring to the years both before and after 1939, Halder
concluded: “German efforts to exploit the Arab nationalist movements against
Britain lacked a solid foundation. Occupied by other problems more closely
akin to his nature, Hitler expended too little interest in the political and
psychological currents prevalent in the Arab world. . .no uniformly thought-
out plan was developed for the exploitation of the Arab nationalist move-
ments.”43 This view seems to be confirmed in the documentary record of
the German Foreign Office in Berlin, and of other state and party agencies,
certainly before the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939. The German
government’s policy of very limited involvement in Palestine, as well as its
cautious and often reluctant approach before the war to arms sales to states
such as Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, was meant to dissuade Britain from
intervening in central Europe; there is no indication that Hitler had decided
prior to September 1939 on the need to undermine the imperial positions of
Great Britain or France in the Middle East through the support of Arab
independence in the region. Indeed, the value of exploiting Arab nationalism
as a useful means to other ends was recognized by Mussolini and Göring at a
meeting in April 1939, at which they agreed that Axis anti-English propaganda
was meant to create “. . .among the Arabs a certain tension, but not a
revolution.”44
German policy in the Middle East before the war also remained in part
subordinate to the needs of both domestic Nazi Jewish policy that included
rapid Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, as well as a foreign policy
that included Germany’s alliance obligations to Mussolini’s Italy. Arabs
initially tended to overlook the direct relationship between German Jewish
42
See Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 317–318.
43
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA): MS/P-
207, “German Use of the Arab Nationalist Movements in World War II,” by General der Flieger
a.D. Hellmuth Felmy and General der Artillerie a.D. Walter Warlimont, with a Foreward by
Generaloberst a.D. Franz Halder. Historical Division Headquarters, United States Army-
Europe, Foreign Ministry Studies Branch, 1955, 1957. In 1957, Fritz Grobba submitted a
300-page supplement to this report, one that essentially confirms its basic conclusions about
Hitler’s general disinterest in the Middle East.
44
policy and increased Jewish immigration into Palestine during much of the
1930s. As observed in the previous chapter, some expressed admiration
for Nazi anti-Semitism and persecution of Jews in Germany, and viewed
Germany as a fellow victim of Anglo-French duplicity and imperialism during
and after the First World War. Nevertheless, instances of Arab criticism of
Nazi Jewish policy as a major cause of their “problem” in Palestine did
become more common during the two years prior to the beginning of the
Second World War. During his meeting with Hitler in Berlin in June 1939,
for instance, the Saudi representative Khalid al-Hud criticized Germany’s
Jewish emigration policy and its obvious causal link with greatly increased
Jewish immigration in Palestine.45 In January 1938, the German Consul-
General in Jerusalem, Walter Döhle, had reported from Jerusalem that Arab
sympathy for Germany was in fact declining due to the German government’s
open and consistent promotion of Jewish emigration to Palestine. He also
referred to Germany’s increased import of Palestinian oranges from Jewish
citrus farmers, and suggested that Germany’s persistent refusal to materially
support the Arab revolt in Palestine against Great Britain and the Zionists
only undermined Arab sympathy for Germany. Döhle further warned: “I fear
that the Arab people’s hatred of the English is developing into a hatred of all
Europeans in general. . .”46 In November 1938, Grobba warned Berlin from
Baghdad of a common Iraqi complaint that German persecution of the Jews
only served to increase sympathy for Jews around the world, and for Jewish
claims and efforts in Palestine.47 Official German references to dissatisfaction
with German emigration policy throughout the Arab lands continued through
the summer of 1939. Moreover, in June and July, both Werner-Otto von
Hentig of Abteilung VII and Walter Hinrichs of Referat-Deutschland referred
to Arab criticism of recent public roundups and expulsions of Polish Jews
because of the international sympathy for those Jews that these actions
generated. They reiterated Arab complaints that Nazi Jewish policies only
intensified Jewish immigration into Palestine. In particular, they described
growing Arab hostility toward Germany over its role in “illegal” Jewish
immigration into Palestine, a role that required some degree of cooperation
between the Gestapo and Jewish authorities and organizations in Palestine,
including the Haganah.48
45 46
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 541. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 577.
47
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Gesandtschaft Beirut, 63, Palästina und Transjordanien, Bd. 2, DB/Bagdad an
AA/Berlin, Nr. 2950, 16. November 1938.
48
See PA: Inland II A/B, 83-26 Polen, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, Pol. VII 1041, 19. Juni 1939; and
Referat-D (Hinrichs) an Gestapo (Lischka), zu 83-26 19/6, 10. Juli 1936. For details on the
Gestapo’s role in the “illegal” Jewish immigration into Palestine beginning in 1938, see Nicosia,
Zionism and Anti-Semitism, 257–278.
germany, italy, and the middle east

It seems clear that Hitler’s government saw the Middle East as a desirable
export market for German industrial products, including perhaps limited
weapons sales. Moreover, Hitler’s repeated references since the early years of
the Nazi movement to the Mediterranean region as Italy’s natural sphere of
interest and expansion seemed to reflect his own political disinterest in the
Mediterranean region and the Arab world. In May 1937, the foreign policy
section of the army (OKW) issued a confidential report on talks between
German Foreign Minister von Neurath, Mussolini, and Italian Foreign Minister
Ciano in Rome, during which “. . .the full agreement in all matters of foreign
policy was reached.”49 Ciano later observed in March 1939: “I recalled that the
Führer has said both to me and to the Duce that the Mediterranean does not
interest the Germans; and it is upon this premise that we have formulated the
policy of the Axis.”50 Hitler’s apparent endorsement of Italian imperial ambi-
tions was not at all predicated on support for specific Italian claims against
British-controlled territory, or on promoting an Anglo-Italian conflict in North
Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, it is not easy at any given time to identify
precisely all of the territories that Fascist Italy coveted in the Mediterranean,
Africa, and the Middle East. It is equally difficult to determine the appropriate
balance between British and Italian imperial interests and control in those
regions that Hitler’s government might have preferred in both the short and
the long term. Gerhard Weinberg writes that Mussolini clearly wanted territor-
ies that were under French imperial control, namely Tunisia, parts of Algeria,
Djibouti, as well as an expansion of Italian-controlled Libya at the expense of
parts of French Equatorial Africa.51 These territories would all come at the
expense of the French empire, and therefore would not pose a problem for
Hitler’s geopolitical calculations, at least not before the fall of France in 1940.
However, Weinberg also identifies significant territories in the Mediterranean,
the Middle East, and Africa in which the Italians had expressed an interest,
territories that would clearly conflict with Britain’s imperial interests and
position. These territories included Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, British Somaliland,
Aden, Iraq, Iran, the western coast of Arabia, and the eastern coast of the
Mediterranean that included Palestine. This latter and much broader group of
territories is somewhat less clear, and appears increasingly in Mussolini’s
fantasies during the early years of the war. Indeed, potential Italian designs
49
Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.B. (hereafter BA-MA): RW5-350, Wehrmachtamt-
Ausland, Nr. 4368/37, Geheim, Übersicht über die aussenpolitische Vorgänge in der Zeit vom
23.4. – 12.5.37, 12. Mai 1937. See also BA-MA: RW5-350, Wehrmachtamt-Ausland, Nr. 8250/
37, Geheim, Übersicht Nr. 55 über die aussenpolitische Vorgänge vom 19.8. – 2.9.39, 2.
September 1937.
50
Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943, 46.
51
Gerhard Weinberg, Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 46–47.
photo 4.3. Mussolini meets with Hitler in Munich (25 September 1937).
Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin.
such as these on key parts of Britain’s imperial system prior to 1940 would
certainly have been in conflict with Hitler’s desire to avoid any conflict with
Britain in the Mediterranean region.
Hitler’s references to German support for Italian imperial ambitions in the
Mediterranean area were many, and naturally became more frequent during
the late 1930s with the forging of the alliance between Berlin and Rome.
In some ways, the emerging alliance tended to formalize and reinforce his
general disinterest in the Mediterranean, as well as his support for a strong
Italian position in the area. For example, Hans Frank told Mussolini in
September 1936 in Rome of Hitler’s view that Italy rightfully should have a
dominant role in the Mediterranean region.52 During his visit to Germany in
September 1937, Mussolini recognized German interests in Austria, and
accepted a German declaration of support for Italian interests throughout the
Mediterranean region.53 By November, 1938, Consul-General Döhle observed
52
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 44.
53
PA: Pol.Abt.IV, Po. 2-3 Italien, AA/Berlin an alle Botschaften und europäischen diplomatischen
Missionen sowie Konsulat Genf, Pol.IV-4936, 30. September 1937.
from Jerusalem that, within the context of the Rome-Berlin Axis, Germany was
in full support of Italian policy in the Middle East.54 In Rome in March 1939,
German Ambassador von Mackensen reaffirmed to Ciano that Hitler still fully
supported Italian interests in the Mediterranean, and that Germany had no
territorial ambitions in the region.55 Moreover, Foreign Minister von Ribben-
trop strongly implied that support for Italian imperial ambitions, rather than
for Arab national self-determination, was part of German strategic and foreign
policy. He informed state and party agencies on March 25, 1939 that:
“I request, therefore, that the following principles be observed: ‘Our position
on all ethnic and minority questions in the lands of the Mediterranean Sea must
be subordinate to the wishes of the Italian government.’”56
The Ethiopian war in 1935, followed by the start of the Spanish civil war in
1936, brought Mussolini to the realization that his ambitions would have to be
achieved in the face of Anglo-French opposition. However, his ill-defined
notions of the entire Mediterranean Sea as Italy’s mare nostrum did not
necessarily include the goal of removing entirely the imperial positions of both
Great Britain and France from the Mediterranean region and from the Red Sea.
In fact, Italy posited no tangible claims against Britain in the Middle East,
perhaps with the exception of a desire to share in some capacity in the control
and operation of the Suez Canal. While anxious to protect and promote its own
prestige and influence in Palestine, Italy did not seek to replace Britain as the
mandatory power there. Indeed, Mussolini had come to accept the British claim
that Palestine and Transjordan were central elements in its imperial communi-
cations with southern Asia, and he generally did not dispute Britain’s authority
in those territories. On the other hand, Italy had more clearly demonstrated its
interests with regard to the French Mandates in Syria and Lebanon, including
its wish to succeed France as mandatory power in those two states.57 Of course,
Italy’s very clear territorial ambitions in French-controlled Tunisia and Algeria
since the latter part of the previous century represented a direct threat to French
imperial interests. Corsica and Nice were also significant aims in the Italian
quest for more influence in the Mediterranean region during the interwar years.
Their position in Italian history guaranteed that Corsica and Nice would create
additional friction with France. Of course, those territories had nothing to do
with the Arab world. Anglo-Italian friction also grew out of Italian ambitions in
non-Arab areas such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and Malta, while a more limited
54
PA: Pol.Abt.VII, Politik 2-Palastina, Bd.l, DGK/Jerusalem an AA/Berlin, J.Nr. 2289, 2. Novem-
ber 1938.
55
56
BArch: R43/II-1450, AA/Berlin an sämtliche Reichsministerien, Stellvertreter des Führers und
Chef der Reichskanzlei, Rk.8447b, 25. März 1939.
57
See, for example, PA: Pol.Abt.III, Politik 5-Palastina, Bd.2, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, 13171, III 0
4682, 5. September 1929; and Botschaft Ankara, Po3-Palastina, 1924–1938, DGK/Jerusalem an
das AA/Berlin, J.N.2735/27, 31. Dezember 1937.
potential for problems prior to the war was created by Italy’s poorly defined
aims in Egypt, Yemen, and the Red Sea.
By early 1938, Italy had embarked on an intense anti-English propaganda
campaign throughout the Middle East, a program of some financial support
for Arab insurgents in Palestine, and efforts to negotiate the sale of arms to
Yemen and Saudi Arabia.58 Its efforts to woo Arab opinion after 1936 were
designed more to put pressure on Britain to accept the Italian conquest of
Ethiopia and some measure of equality with Great Britain in East Africa and
the Red Sea, than to seriously undermine British power in the Arab world.
In this regard, Mussolini’s strategy in the Arabic-speaking lands seemed more
in line with Hitler’s during the two years prior to the start of the Second
World War, as both sought to dissuade London from using force to impede
their respective political ambitions. Given his long-held wish to make both
England and Italy Germany’s allies, Hitler was particularly committed to
avoiding an Anglo-Italian military conflict in the Mediterranean area, the
Middle East, and East Africa before 1940. While both saw value in utilizing
Britain’s overseas troubles to pressure London into a more compliant attitude
toward their respective foreign policy plans in central Europe, the Mediterra-
nean, and Northeast Africa, neither sought at this point to critically under-
mine Britain’s position in the Middle East. In November 1937, the British
ambassador in Berlin, Neville Henderson, sent the following assessment of the
value of Italian policy in the Mediterranean region for Germany’s developing
aims in Europe:
If an Anglo-German understanding proves impossible of accomplishment, it is likely
that the German government will seek in the first place to realize its aims not by an act
of aggression against Great Britain, but by a policy of pressure in other parts of the
world. The ties with Italy and Japan will afford Germany a good opportunity
for exploiting her own nuisance value and it may be expected that the German govern-
ment will more or less actively assist Italy in causing us trouble in the whole of the
Mediterranean basin.59
While Italian efforts to encourage anti-British feeling in the Arab world were
of some advantage to Germany, Hitler’s regime also encouraged measures that
would prevent an Anglo-Italian conflict in the Mediterranean area. For
example, Berlin approved of the Anglo-Italian “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of
January 1937, according to which Britain and Italy agreed to take steps to bring
to an end their propaganda war in the Middle East, and to maintain the current
status quo throughout the region.60 Although this agreement did not lead to a
58
See Nir Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933–1940 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010), 133.
59
NAL: F0371/20820-E68l6, Henderson/Berlin to Foreign Office/London, 17 November, 1937.
60
Kuhn, Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm, 201. See also Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s
Hidden Diary, 1937–1938 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1953), 75.
significant improvement in Anglo-Italian relations, it was a step toward a more

comprehensive Anglo-Italian understanding that would follow in 1938. In the
summer and autumn of 1937, Britain briefly sought Italian support for the
Peel Commission’s recommendations for the end of the British Mandate and
the partition of Palestine into nominally independent Arab and Jewish states. In
the face of both Arab and Jewish criticism of the plan, London wanted to reach
an agreement whereby Italy would cease its propaganda support for anti-
British forces in Palestine, both Arab and Jewish.61 On August 23, 1937, the
Foreign Office in Berlin instructed the German embassy in Rome to
refrain from any effort to influence Italian policy or Italy’s negotiations with
England.62 Germany’s strong opposition to the idea of a Palestine partition and
the establishment of even a very small, nominally independent Jewish state was
not a factor in German-Italian relations. The August 23 telegram also contained
instructions for the German embassy to inform the Italian government of
Germany’s views on the situation in Palestine, as well as to learn what the
Italian position on Palestine and the partition plan would be in any future
Anglo-Italian negotiations. Mussolini’s position on Zionism and a Jewish
state in Palestine, while never entirely clear, seemed to want it both ways with
the Jews and the Arabs at the time. The Italian government let it be known that
it supported the establishment of a Jewish state, albeit in some location other
than Palestine.63
The German Foreign Office reacted favorably to the Anglo-Italian agreement
of April 16, 1938. According to the agreement, both sides undertook to
preserve the status quo in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea.64
In return for British recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and a larger
role in Yemen, Italy agreed to stop its anti-British propaganda in the Middle
East, and to respect the status quo in Palestine and throughout the Arab world.
Both Britain and Italy agreed to recognize the independence of Saudi Arabia
and Yemen, and Mussolini even agreed to a reduction in the number of Italian
troops in Libya, a reduction that was reversed just five months later.65 Italian
efforts to secure from Britain a greater role in the operation of the Suez Canal
were not successful. In his diaries, Ciano characterized the treaty with satisfac-
tion as the achievement by Italy of parity with Great Britain in the Red Sea, as
having turned the lands of the Red Sea into “a condominium of two powers”
that “. . .obliges Italy and Great Britain to resist every attempt on the part of a
61
Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs, 486, 662; and Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain
(London: Macmillan, 1970), 335. See also: PA: Inland II A/B, 83-2la, Bd.1a, Aufzeichnung von
Pol.IV (Heinburg), zu 83-2lA 5/8, l8. August 1937.
62
PA: Inland II A/B. 83-2la, Bd. 1a, Telegramm Nr. 269, AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, 23. August 1937.
63
See PA: Inland II A/B, Referat-D, 83-24a, “Gründung eines Palästinastaates,” Bd. 1, AA/Berlin
an DB/Rom, 19. Februar 1938. See also Muggeridge, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 75.
64
See: ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IV, Nr.409; Neville Chamberlain, In Search of Peace (N.Y.: G. Putnam
& Sons, 1939), 105ff; Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 190–191, 220
65
Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 138.
third power to establish itself in Arabia.”66 Moreover, by the time of the

signing of the accord, the recommendations of the Peel Commission report
for partition of Palestine and the establishment of nominally independent
Jewish and Arab states had been dropped completely.
From Berlin, Ernst von Weizsäcker sent a telegram to the German Embassy
in Prague on April 19, 1938, in which he observed: “Given our community of
interests with Italy, as contained in the Axis, we see in the elimination of Italian-
English difficulties advantages for us as well.”67 Later that same month,
an unsigned German Foreign Office memorandum elaborated on the reasons
for Germany’s support for the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16, 1938.
The author, very likely von Weizsäcker again, pointed to the risks for Germany
in a war between Britain and Italy in the Mediterranean and North Africa,
particularly the possibility of being drawn into the conflict. The author makes a
key point that reflected the Reich’s positive assessment of great power bilateral
agreements that in Berlin’s view had the potential to both neutralize past
alliances as well as the entire post–World War I international order and its
League of Nations sponsor. He remarks that the Anglo-Italian agreement
represented a new success for the idea of bilateral agreements, as opposed to
the notion of general regulations in which all interested parties might partici-
pate. He considered this too as a positive development for Germany, and
concludes: “It is to be hoped that the effects of the new treaty will include a
further departure from these sterile methods of the past, and in the process
make our continued foreign policy endeavors easier.”68
Hitler’s support for the April 1938 accommodation between Italy and Great
Britain reflected his opposition to a conflict in the Mediterranean between his
Italian ally and either Britain or France prior to the outbreak of war in
September 1939. Indeed, conflict in the Mediterranean would likely have
required material support for Italy, and would have been a distraction that
could only weaken Germany’s efforts in central and eastern Europe. Henke
observes that discussions between Germany and Italy during the spring of 1939
revealed a Germany focused primarily on a possible war against Britain and
France in western Europe, and not on a great power conflict in the Mediterra-
nean region.69 In March 1939, Hitler told Italian Ambassador Attolico that
the Axis would need from 18 months to 2 years to prepare for war against
Britain and France.70 This was probably intended to discourage Mussolini from
pushing the British too far. Hitler reiterated his general support for Italy, but
said nothing about specific Italian claims in the Mediterranean. In fact,
by August 1939 Ciano had come to suspect the German government of
66
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 99–100, 115, 187–191. While Ciano no doubt had France
in mind when referring to article 3 of the treaty and its negative reference to a possible “third
power” in the region, he was confident that Germany would not be that third power.
67 68
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr.742 ADAP: Serie D, Bd. I, Nr. 755.
69 70
Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 249. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 52.
dishonesty in its very general statements of support for Italian imperial interests
vis-à-vis Great Britain and even France. He seemed to fear that Hitler placed
little value on Germany’s alliance with Italy, and was merely using it as a tool in
the pursuit of his own interests and aims in Europe.71 Hitler certainly opposed
any unilateral action by Italy against France or Britain in the Mediterranean
region in 1939, as Germany was engaged in preparing for its upcoming military
campaign against Poland.72 Italy’s repeated warnings that it could not contem-
plate war until 1942 or 1943 at the earliest were gladly accepted by Göring
during his talks with Mussolini in Rome on April 15 and 16, and by von
Ribbentrop during his talks with Ciano in Milan on May 6 and 7.73 It seems
clear that in 1938 and 1939, both Germany and Italy agreed on the necessity of
avoiding war between Italy and the western democracies in the Mediterranean
region, at least until such time as Germany had achieved its goals in eastern
Europe. For Hitler, this logic in his strategic planning seemed sound enough;
but it was one that would never quite reflect the actual realities of the war on
the ground once it began on September 1, 1939.
The Anglo-Italian agreements in 1937 and 1938 obviously did not
satisfy Italy’s long-range imperial ambitions, whatever they were, in the Medi-
terranean Sea, North Africa, and the Middle East. Nor did German endorse-
ment of the agreements mean that Hitler necessarily would support over the
long term the current status quo in the Middle East in which Britain’s imperial
position was clearly dominant vis-à-vis Italy’s. In a speech in Genoa on May 14,
1938, just one month after the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 16, Mussolini
hinted that as an empire, Italy would not settle for parity in the Mediterranean,
but that it would eventually have to become the dominant force in the entire
region.74 In September, General Ugo Cavallero asserted that within two years
Italy would have the resources to occupy Egypt, and perhaps even attack
Britain’s base at the port of Aden in the southwestern corner of the Arabian
Peninsula.75 In November and December, Mussolini clarified his intentions in
Egypt by telling Ciano that besides acquiring Tunisia, Corsica, and Djibuti,
Italy would at a minimum demand a share of control over the Suez Canal.76
Moreover, Ciano confirmed Germany’s understanding and support for a
future, albeit undefined, change in the status quo in the Mediterranean area
71
Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943, 118–120.
72
See Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 434.
73
Italy had no intention of going to war against Britain and France in 1939. The Italian govern-
ment repeatedly communicated to Berlin its wish to avoid war at least for a period of up to three
years. See ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 52, 205, 211, 341, 459 (Anhang).
74
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 116.
75
Ibid., 152. Some sources state that Cavallero told the Germans at that time that Italy would not
be ready for war until 1943. See MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces,
Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16.
76
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Hidden Diary, 191, 201n; and Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers,
250–251, 258.
when von Ribbentrop assured Mussolini in general terms in October 1938 that
“. . .the Mediterranean is destined to become an Italian Sea. Germany intends to
work to that end.”77 Finally, despite his suspicions of German motives and
intentions by the summer of 1939, Ciano describes Hitler’s assurances to him in
August of that year as follows: “Italy, which is, on the other hand, the most
important nation in the Mediterranean, must affirm and enlarge its dominion
over the shores of that sea.”78
To the extent that Hitler countenanced Italian expansion in the Mediterra-
nean and the Middle East in a future war, there was an obvious preference
before the war that Mussolini focus his ambitions on the French rather than
on the British position in the region. In January 1939, for example, with the
threat of war in Europe growing, the OKW foreign policy section summarized
Mussolini’s increasingly public claims for Italian expansion in the Mediterra-
nean. The OKW report characterized those claims as directed solely against
France, with the usual calls for an Italian takeover of Nice, Corsica, and Tunis.
The report avoided mention of Italian hopes regarding the Suez Canal and the
Red Sea. It concluded that none of Italy’s ambitions constituted a threat to
British imperial interests, a conclusion that was in keeping with Hitler’s
endorsement of the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 1938, and generally
with his continued aversion to a possible Axis conflict with the British in the
Mediterranean Sea. With this in mind, and in the most general terms,
the January 21 OKW report then concluded: “The Führer and the Reich
government have clearly stated that they view the Italian demands with sym-
pathy. The Italians have promptly kept the Reich government informed about
the content of Italian-English discussions.”79
Of course, Italian ambitions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East,
notwithstanding the likely conflicts with British and French strategic
interests, guaranteed the failure of Mussolini’s propaganda efforts in the region
over the previous decade. It had been an effort that sought to portray Italy as
the natural friend and ally of all Muslims and Arabs in their struggles against
Anglo-French imperialism. His moves in 1938 and 1939, based as they were
on the logic of an expanded Italian empire in the region, only reinforced anti-
Italian animosities that had existed for a long time among the Arab populations
of North Africa and the Middle East.80 For example, Italy’s harsh rule over
Libya since 1911, and its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 obviously did nothing to
help in promoting Italy’s image in the Arab world. Moreover, Italian efforts
to colonize the coast of Libya with Italians in the 1930s, at the expense of the
Arab and Berber populations, were coupled with new Italian race laws that
77 78
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 246. Ibid., 303.
79
BA-MA: RW5-350, OKW Nr. 369/39, Geheim, Aussenpolitische Mitteilung: „Die Lage im
westlichen Mittelmeer,“ 21. Januar 1939.
80
See Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 144–162; and Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the
Arab East, 13–15.
applied throughout its empire. They restricted social and sexual relations
between Italians and indigenous Arab and Berber populations, and established
a virtual apartheid system that had been characteristic of most European
colonial empires. The Italian invasion of Muslim Albania in April 1939,
coupled with the Anglo-Italian Treaty a year earlier, only deepened Arab
distrust for Fascist Italy; its policies clearly contradicted the Italian propaganda
line about alleged post–World War I British and French treachery, and about
Italian sympathy and support for the Arab people. Even the Italian anti-Jewish
race laws of 1938 did little to enhance Italy’s image among Arab nationalists.
Indeed, by 1939, Hitler’s Germany was generally viewed in a positive way by
the Arab and Muslim populations in the region, reflecting the long-standing
absence of a German colonial interest or presence in the Arab world. The
general animosity toward Italy, on the other hand, was the natural result of
an opposite reality.
Most in the Nazi hierarchy, including Hitler himself, do not seem to have
viewed Italy’s negative image in the Arab world as a significant problem before
1940. However, those few in the German Foreign Office in Berlin who had
advocated a greater German interest in, and an expanded German presence
among, the Arab states, albeit not in conflict with the imperial interests of
Britain, France, and Italy, were indeed alarmed. They were particularly con-
cerned with those Arab states already at least nominally independent, such as
Iraq and Egypt, and were troubled by the distrust and animosity that those
populations and their governments increasingly displayed toward Germany’s
Italian ally during the crisis years of 1938 and 1939. The main advocate of a
larger German presence in the Arab world was Fritz Grobba, the German
ambassador in Baghdad between 1932 and the outbreak of the Second
World War. From his post in Baghdad, Grobba cultivated relations with Iraqi
leaders within the context of Britain’s continuing position of influence in the
former British Mandate, as well as with important political personalities from
Saudi Arabia, including King Ibn Saud. Grobba knew in the end that the
Iraqi government would likely side with Britain in the event of a war in Europe;
but he believed that Saudi Arabia would remain neutral in any future war,
and thus, as an Arab state with which Germany might be able to establish a
constructive relationship. He finally persuaded his somewhat reluctant
superiors in Berlin to establish full diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia
in February 1939. In the event of war, he had argued, he would likely have
to leave Iraq, but Saudi Arabia’s anticipated neutrality might enable him to
work from the Saudi kingdom as German ambassador, and thereby maintain a
German presence in the region.81 Grobba served briefly as German ambassador
for both Iraq and Saudi Arabia from his post in Baghdad in 1939,
81
See Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 114.
but the German government recalled him to Berlin from Baghdad rather than
have him remain in Saudi Arabia as ambassador when the war began.
In July 1938, Grobba met in Baghdad with an unnamed representative of
Ibn-Saud’s who expressed the Saudi monarch’s fear that the recently concluded
Anglo-Italian treaty meant that Italy was expanding its role in Arabia and the
Red Sea. He lamented Germany’s lack of interest in the Red Sea, and its
tendency to pursue its own interests by following the Italian lead. Grobba
reported that the Saudi representative confidently asserted: “Italy is to be
compared with a rabid dog that dies after forty days,” and “in the future
Germany will be the only strong power.”82 On a visit to the Saudi capital in
late January 1939, Grobba met with Luigi Sillitti, the Italian ambassador to
Saudi Arabia, and the results of their talks would seem to support the conten-
tion that Germany did indeed follow Italy’s lead in assessing Saudi Arabia’s role
in a future war. Sillitti told Grobba that he did not believe Saudi Arabia was
subservient to Britain’s wishes in the region, and that Italy wanted to strengthen
Saudi resolve to resist Britain and to remain neutral in any future war by
providing it with some weapons and military training. He stressed the strategic
importance of Saudi Arabia and the need for the Axis to support the Saudi
wish to remain neutral. In his summary of Sillitti’s points sent to Berlin on
January 27, Grobba indicated that he agreed entirely with the Italian assess-
ment.83 But he warned Sillitti that the only way to ultimately assure Saudi
neutrality would be to provide the Saudis with abundant supplies of foodstuffs,
just as the English had done for the Arab revolt against the Ottomans that
began in Arabia in 1916, and as they would likely attempt to do in any future
war. Finally, after stressing Ibn-Saud’s distrust of both Britain and Italy,
Grobba also stated that the Saudi government wished to purchase German
arms. He suggested that it might be worthwhile for Berlin to consider supplying
some German arms support for the Saudis as a way of helping them to maintain
their independence from Britain and their neutrality in any future war.
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Grobba’s suggestion that Ger-
many consider sending small quantities of arms to Saudi Arabia was not well
received by the Near East Department (Abteilung VII) of the Foreign Office.84
In any case, Italy’s very negative image in the Arab world continued to cause
some degree of frustration on the part of Fritz Grobba that does not seem to
have been shared by his colleagues and superiors in Berlin. This was very clear
in his lengthy March 7, 1939 memorandum to Under State Secretary
82
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabiens zu Deutsch-
land, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1687, 4. Juli 1938.
83
PA:Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabiens zu Deutsch-
land, Bd. 1, DG/Djidda an AA/Berlin, Nr. Dj. 9, 27. Januar 1939. See also Grobba, Männer und
Mächte, 109–110.
84
See PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabiens zu
Deutschland, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an U.St.S. Woermann, Nr. Dj. 44, 18. Februar 1939.
Woermann in the Foreign Office in Berlin.85 For example, Grobba mentioned

Arab dissatisfaction with comments in the German press that the Reich gov-
ernment was disinterested in Syria, and that it was indifferent to Italy taking
control over Syria. Arabs also expressed to Grobba their fears that Germany
sought to strengthen Italy in the region, and that Berlin did not care much about
the national aspirations of the Arab people. Some told him that Germany
should make an effort to convince Italy that the friendship of the Arab people
was worth more in the end than Italian control over them. King Ibn-Saud had
warned Grobba that Egypt’s efforts to free itself of the last vestiges of British
control were hindered at times by fears of Italian ambitions. Even the German
diplomats at the German embassy in Cairo had complained that Germany had
done nothing to allay Egyptian fears of Italian aims, and thus had done nothing
to promote Egyptian neutrality in the event of war.
Grobba summed up these and other Arab complaints about the relationship
between Germany, Italy, and the Arab world in the following way: “Fear of
Italy and hopes about Germany, from which one expects that, to win the
friendship of the eastern peoples, it [Germany] will prevail upon Italy to leave
the territories of the Near East alone.”86 He further noted that Arab fears about
Italy are well founded, that Germany was in a position to achieve for itself a
very favorable position in relation to Britain and France in the region, but that:
“An obstacle that remains is our close relationship with Italy, as long as
the eastern peoples fear Italian intentions.”87 Grobba then recommended the
following steps: while Germany should definitely continue to refrain from
pursuing its own independent and active policy in the region, it should also
stop encouraging Italian policies that will only turn Arabs into enemies; it
should inform the Italians that there were no lands to be won in the Middle
East, and that the Axis should support Arab efforts to gain independence, albeit
without giving the impression that it is providing any direct support for the
Arab cause. Finally, Grobba warned Berlin that in the event of a war, the
Middle East would play a much more important role than it did in the previous
war, particularly due to its rich and ever-expanding reserves of crude oil, as well
as rich stores of other raw materials. In this regard, he concluded, friendship
with the Arab peoples had to be cultivated as part of Germany’s preparations
for the next war, preparations that would require a Middle East policy that was
more active and independent than was currently the case.88
85
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabiens zu Deutsch-
land, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an U.St.S. Woermann, Nr. 796, 7. März 1939.
86
Ibid. The March 7 report also mentions the opinion of some in the Iraqi government that they
were not worried about the Arab states in North Africa, presumably west of Egypt, and that they
did not care if Italy replaced France in Tunis.
87
Ibid.
88
When war broke out in Europe in September, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with Germany.
Grobba was forced to leave Baghdad. Although he was still the German ambassador to Saudi
Arabia, and was invited to come to Djidda in that capacity by King Ibn-Saud, the German
Grobba’s assessment and recommendations were firmly rejected by his

superiors at the Foreign Office in Berlin. Under State Secretary Woermann
replied to Grobba on April 18 that Saudi Arabia’s uncertain position vis-à-vis
Great Britain in the event of a war made any attempt to expand an already
friendly relationship between Berlin and the Saudis inadvisable. Woermann
also instructed Grobba that the delivery of German arms to Saudi Arabia or
Yemen was out of the question at that time, especially in the case of Yemen
where Italian sensitivities might be provoked by German arms deliveries. The
continuing issue of arms sales to these two states is considered in the section
that follows. Woermann concluded by cautioning Grobba that there would
be no change in German policy in the Arabian Peninsula, especially due to the
all-consuming political situation in Europe: “In summary, I would like there-
fore to say that we. . .for the time being do not believe that we can institute a
fundamental change in our current policy in the area of the Arabian
Peninsula.”89 Grobba’s effort to forge an active German Middle East policy,
one that was independent of Italian imperial ambitions in the run-up to war in
1938 and 1939, was rejected by Hitler’s regime in 1939. It does not appear to
have been driven by a desire to establish a German colonial foothold in
North Africa and the Middle East; nor was Grobba unaware of the political
uncertainties and risks associated with closer German involvement in individual
Arab states.90 Rather, he had concluded that war against the western democra-
cies in the near future was probably unavoidable given the situation in Europe,
and that a more active policy in, and friendlier relations with, the Arab world,
rather than continuing passivity and blind support for Italian imperialism in
North Africa and the Middle East, would be to Germany’s strategic advantage.
arms exports
Germany’s inability to more precisely define its specific geopolitical interests
and aims in the Arab world was apparent in the critical months of 1939, as the
situation in Europe seemed to move toward war. This is important given
the strategic significance and close proximity of the Mediterranean area that
Foreign Ministry ordered him back to Berlin. Thus, his recommendations for an independent
and active German policy in the region went unheeded. For Grobba’s negative postwar account
of all of this, see Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 183. He apparently did receive some support for
his efforts to forge closer ties with the Saudis from Alfred Rosenberg’s Aussenpolitisches Amt.
See USHMM: The Alfred Rosenberg Diary, Mitte Mai 1939, 249.
89
90
For instance, he strongly rebuffed the efforts by Hashemite conspirators to obtain German
weapons for the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy. The conspirators tried to convince Grobba
that Ibn-Saud was pro-English, and thus, not sympathetic to Germany. It is not clear what their
relationship was to the Hashemite monarchies of Transjordan and Iraq. For Grobba’s entire
position on this initiative, see PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen
Saudisch Arabiens zu Deutschland, Bd. 1, DG/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Nr. 27, 7. Januar 1938.
constituted the potentially dangerous southern flank in Hitler’s upcoming battle

for German Lebensraum in Europe, and any role that his Italian partner
might play in a future war. In Europe, of course, Hitler’s government took
the initiative in the pursuit of its objectives in Czechoslovakia and Poland.
In the Mediterranean and the Middle East, however, Berlin had played
a passive, essentially reactive, role in developments in the region. There was a
relative absence of specific German ambitions in the region, beyond a general
desire to expand Germany’s economic presence and the volume of its exports.91
This, along with the logical consequence of Hitler’s deference to Italian interests
and “leadership” south of the Alps, meant that the substance of Germany’s
Middle East policy prior to September 1, 1939 amounted to little more than
maintaining Mussolini’s agreement to avoid war in the Mediterranean
region for at least a few years. Again, this was certainly implied in Hitler’s
approval of the April 1938 Anglo-Italian Agreement, as well as in the several
statements that he and von Ribbentrop made thereafter at meetings with
Mussolini and Ciano.
To the extent that Germany paid any attention to the Arab states during the
1930s, it was directed for the most part only to those states that had some
degree of autonomy in their relationships with powers other than Great Britain.
This is evident in its primary motivation and mission in the region, namely the
promotion of German economic interests, and especially German exports. By
the end of 1938, however, the likely position of these states in an eventual war
in Europe between Germany and Great Britain became increasingly relevant in
German policy calculations.92 The states to which Berlin did pay some atten-
tion were Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser degree, Yemen. These were
all Arab states in which Britain continued to exercise a high degree of influence,
especially in Iraq and Egypt, as a result of previous colonial rule. Britain also
maintained a continuing military presence in these states through bilateral
treaties. The non-Arab states in the wider region, namely Turkey, Iran, and
Afghanistan, were also targets in German strategic and economic consider-
ations. Arms and other military equipment constituted an important part of
Germany’s industrial production that was of interest to these states. However,
these were products that only Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan imported from
Germany, albeit in relatively insignificant quantities in 1938 and 1939.
The experience of the consortium of German weapons manufacturers,
formed in 1936 to promote exports of German weapons and referred to in
the previous chapter, had been one of uneven success with regard to Iraq.
German exports to Iraq, consisting mainly of cement, various industrial
91
See Schröder, “Die Beziehungen der Achsenmächte,” 81–82.
92
See for example Fritz Grobba’s memorandum from Baghdad regarding his uncertainty whether
Iraq would enter a war between Germany and Britain as Britain’s ally, or declare its neutrality.
He presented this question while also recognizing both official as well as popular admiration and
sympathy in Iraq for Germany. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 586.
products and machinery, and finally in 1937 some small arms and munitions,
had tripled between 1932 and 1937.93 Still, the Ministry of Economics was well
aware that Great Britain remained the major economic force in Iraq. This was
particularly so in the Iraqi petroleum industry given the terms of Iraqi inde-
pendence in 1930 and Iraq’s relatively important political and military position
in the region. Nevertheless, there was some hope in Berlin for further increasing
overall German exports to Iraq, in part through weapons sales, between 1937
and the outbreak of war in 1939. Consortium members Rheinmetall-Borsig,
Krupp, and Otto Wolff concluded agreements with Iraq in 1938 for some
artillery pieces, small arms, and ammunition, to be paid for with foreign
currency over a five-year period, and approved by the British government.94
However, the consortium had its problems in Iraq as well. Grobba reported
that in Baghdad the representatives from Rheinmetall and from Wolff often
fought over contract details, with the result that Iraqi authorities took advan-
tage of these squabbles and played one firm against the other.95 Nevertheless,
Iraq remained a target for German weapons exports through the late 1930s,
albeit one that resulted only in modest sales that in any case remained depend-
ent on British approval.
Nor did Egypt prove to be a lucrative market for German arms manufactur-
ers after 1936. According to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, all arms
acquired by the Egyptian army were required to be compatible with the
weapons used by the British military. The German embassy in Cairo concluded,
therefore, that British weapons firms would have a virtual monopoly in arms
sales to the Egyptian government, and that other countries might play a role,
but only with British permission.96 This was also the case with regard to the
Iraqi military, as mentioned in the previous chapter. This meant that German
weapons would have to be compatible with those of the British army, making it
very difficult and expensive for German firms to supply such weapons.
The German Ministry of Economics concluded in 1938 that the higher costs
and long delays, especially given the needs of the German rearmament pro-
gram, meant that weapons exports to Egypt would not be worth it.97 By the end
of 1938, both the Economics Ministry and the Foreign Office in Berlin con-
cluded that the talk of a possible war and the clear likelihood of Egypt siding
with the British meant that there was little chance of promoting weapons
93
See BArch: R3101-VI, 222/2, “Der deutsch-irakische Warenaustausch,” Reichwirtschaftsminis-
terium v.s. Nr. 35, 5. April 1938; and “Irak: handel mit Deutschland, ” Reichwirtschaftsminis-
terium v.s. Nr. 102, 1. September 1938.
94
Bd. 3, “Kriegslieferungsverträge” Geheim, e.o. W746g, 10. August 1938.
95
See PA: Handelspolitische Abteilung, Handakten-Wiehl, Irak (Geheim), Bd. 1, W-III S.E.,
Tagesmeldung vom 14. April 1938.
96
BArch: R901-68425, DG/Kairo an AA/Berlin, Nr. 579, 24. Juni 1938.
97
BArch: R901-68425, RWM an AA/Berlin. 901/30g, 5. August 1938.
exports to Egypt.98 Thus, between 1936 and 1939, Germany managed to sell
only a few automatic pistols to the Egyptian government.
The Foreign Office in Berlin remained somewhat skeptical about intensifying
the friendly relations that already existed between Germany and Saudi Arabia.
In the summer of 1938, for example, von Hentig appeared to define how far
Berlin was willing to go in cultivating its relations with the Saudi monarchy.
In his discussions in Berlin in late August with Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister
Fuad Hamza, von Hentig reviewed with the Saudi minister the state of German-
Saudi relations. After referring to the usual Arab distrust of Italy and admir-
ation for Germany, Fuad Hamza inquired about further steps that Germany
might be willing to take in Arabia to enhance German-Arab relations. In his
response, von Hentig made suggestions for closer cultural ties between
Germany and the Arab world, in particular German-language training for
Arabs and Arabic-language training for Germans, as well as translations of
German and Arabic literature, and other cultural exchanges.99 A month later,
in a note to the Foreign Policy Office (APA) of the Nazi party, Under State
Secretary Woermann outlined his understanding of Saudi Arabia’s relationship
with Great Britain and concluded: “As the situation stands today, we must
therefore assume that Ibn-Saud, who is also reluctant to assert himself in the
Palestine question, will side with the English. From a political point of view,
therefore, we cannot at present approve the sale of weapons on credit to the
king.”100 Thus, arms exports to Saudi Arabia generally did not appeal to
the German government and to the Wehrmacht, at least not until the summer
of 1939. By that time, however, with the outbreak of war in Europe imminent,
it was too late for Germany to guarantee the delivery of weapons to Saudi
Arabia. German weapons exports to Saudi Arabia and Yemen between
January 1936 and March 1938 had been quite modest and not without some
misgivings and debate within the Foreign Office in Berlin.
A January 10, 1939 memorandum from Legationssekretär Schlobies in
Abteilung VII provided some details as he confirmed this negative position.
It stated: “In the matter of weapons deliveries to Saudi Arabia. . .the Foreign
Office has to date for political and economic reasons taken a negative
position.”101 Schlobies cited the Anglo-Italian agreement of April 1938 and
Germany’s relations with both Italy and Great Britain as reasons, as well as the
strong possibility that the Saudis would side with the British in a future war;
he also referred to the alleged “unreliability” (Unzuverlässigkeit) of the Arabs.
Yet, he also asserted that Germany did in fact favor expanding its general
economic relations with Saudi Arabia given the kingdom’s economic develop-
ment potential. This was a position that the Ministry of Economics and the
Foreign Policy Office (APA) had also favored. Finally, Schlobies also referred
98
BArch: R901-68425, RWM an AA/Berlin, 9/871/38g, 5 Dezember 1938.
99 100
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 582. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 585.
101
to the general opposition of the German military (OKW) to formal and legal
weapons deliveries to the Saudis, although it expressed its willingness to allow
the clandestine delivery of some obsolete weapons. This position was essentially
reaffirmed by von Hentig in a February 28, 1939 memorandum in Abteilung
VII, in which he cited the agreement of the OKW that the political and
economic conditions were not conducive to large arms shipments to Saudi
Arabia.102
Grobba’s efforts through the spring and summer of 1939 to convince his
colleagues in Berlin that Saudi Arabia would not join Britain in a future war
had little impact on German policy. On May 2, he wrote to Woermann: “I have
the clear impression that he [Ibn-Saud] hates the English and that he tries to pull
as far away as possible from their influence.”103 As examples, Grobba men-
tioned the fact that the Saudi king awarded oil concessions to the United States,
and not to Great Britain, and that he strongly disapproved of the Anglo-Italian
treaty of April 1938. He argued that the original purpose of establishing formal
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in February of that year was precisely to
secure a diplomatic post for Germany in the region in the event of a war with
Britain. He then made a final pitch for the necessity of providing Saudi Arabia
with arms: “Ibn-Saud offers us at a minimum his well-intentioned neutrality in
war. He expects from us in return the help he has requested for domestic
development and for the arming of his country. I don’t have the slightest doubt
that he will keep his word if we meet his requests.”104
Grobba’s letter did manage to change the views of some in Berlin, but it was
clearly too late. Three days after Grobba sent his appeal to Berlin, Under State
Secretary Woermann noted in the margin of Grobba’s letter: “I have been
convinced by this letter.”105 Later that month, von Hentig in Abteilung VII
noted in a May 22 memorandum that he too had come around to accepting
Grobba’s contention that Ibn-Saud was sincere in his desire to be independent
of England and to develop a strong relationship with the Reich.106 This might
include Saudi purchases of German weapons, full support for German partici-
pation in the exploitation of Saudi natural resources, including oil, and perhaps
even some sort of a political understanding. Saudi Arabia, he noted, was in the
process of accruing wealth, which not only made it less dependent on Great
Britain, but also able to pay for German weapons and other goods with foreign
currency. As he concluded by ruling out any opportunities for German influ-
ence in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, or Palestine, von Hentig strongly recommended
exploring closer ties with the Saudi government. Military intelligence also came
around to supporting this approach to Saudi Arabia on June 26 when it warned
that Britain’s May 17 White Paper on Palestine represented a British turn to the
Arabs and away from the Jews, and part of the British government’s
102 103 104

ADAP: Serie D, Bd. V, Nr. 590. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 313. Ibid.
105 106
Ibid. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. VI, Nr. 422.
Einkreisungspolitik (policy of encirclement) to solidify relations with the Arabs,

the Turks, and the Soviet Union in preparation for war against Germany.107
The argument here was that closer ties to Saudi Arabia might help to neutralize
Britain’s political strategy in the region.
As previously mentioned, King ibn-Saud’s adviser, Khalid al-Hud, met with
von Ribbentrop on June 8, and with Hitler on June 17, to request German
weapons support. Hitler approved the request, and the groundwork was laid
for an agreement that included a gift from Germany of 4,000 rifles with
ammunition, and Saudi weapons purchases from Germany worth RM 6 mil-
lion.108 The German government apparently had come to the conclusion by the
middle of the summer of 1939 that Germany might need one friendly Arab state
in the Middle East, that King Ibn-Saud in fact really did intend to keep Britain
at a distance in the event of war, and that he would maintain friendly neutrality
toward Germany.109 In the end, however, events moved quickly in Europe in
the summer of 1939. Hitler’s focus on and preparations for the invasion of
Poland intensified and the initial weapons agreement was never implemented.
The possibility of at least some sort of a German foothold in the Arabian
Peninsula, while briefly considered in the summer of 1939, was never accorded
meaningful support until it was too late. Thus, arms exports to Saudi Arabia
between January 1936 and April 1938 amounted to several thousand rifles with
ammunition, some explosives with charges, and a few pistols with ammunition.
During the same period, Yemen received some 4,500 rifles with ammunition,
55 automatic pistols, and one airplane.110 In any case, Germany’s support
for the Anglo-Italian Treaty in April 1938 would minimize German arms
shipments to either Saudi Arabia or Yemen.
Finally, given its geographical proximity to Europe and its political status as
a fully independent state, Turkey would inevitably play a different and more
107
BA-MA: RW5-350, OKW Nr. 5625/39, Geheim, Übersicht Nr. 76 über aussenpolitische
Vorgänge bis zum 26. Juni 1939, 26. Juni 1939.
108
PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabien zu Deutsch-
land, Bd. 1, AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, Telegramm Nr. 301, 20. Juni 1939; and Woermann an
Khalid al-Hud, 12. Juli 1939. See also Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 58–59.
109
See PA: Pol.Abt. VII, Pol.2-Saudisch Arabien, Politische Beziehungen Saudisch Arabien zu
Deutschland, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, Herrn Vortragenden Legationsrat Schmidt
vorgelegt, Geheim, 21. Juni 1939.
110
PA: Geheim-Akten 1920–1936, II FK.33: Kriegsgerät Allgemeines, Geheimsachen, “Statistik
über K.G. Ausfuhr”; and Handelspolitische Abteilung, Kriegsgerät (Geheim), Handel mit
Kriegsgerät, Allgemeines, Bde. 1–4. It is impossible to know how much of this material if any
was smuggled into Palestine during those years. Ibn-Saud at times spoke of using Saudi Arabia
as a conduit for arms to be smuggled into Palestine, and Grobba verifies that King Ibn-Saud was
indeed eager to channel arms imports to the Palestinian Arabs. See BArch: R901-68470, DG/
Jidda an AA/Berlin, Tel. Nr. 6, 14. Februar 1939; and Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 112, 114–
115. Similarly, the Foreign Office, the Economics Ministry, and the OKW opposed major
weapons sales to Yemen. See BArch: R901-68470, AA/Berlin an RWM, W 416g, 18. Mai
1938; and R901-68470, AA/Berlin an RWM, W250/39g and W251-39g, 20. März 1939.
immediate role in German calculations in the months leading up to war in

Europe. German goals in eastern Europe, based as they were on the conquest of
German living space, of necessity would require an all-out war with, and
destruction of, the Soviet Union. Moreover, in August 1939 Hitler had to
conclude that after the defeat of Poland he would likely have to deal with
Britain and France in the west before mounting an assault on the Soviet Union.
In some ways, Turkey possessed many of the same strategic considerations for
German war planners as did the Ottoman Empire during the previous war,
especially given Turkey’s position on the southern border of the Soviet Union
that was simultaneously the southern flank of any future German military
operations in the East. But unlike a generation earlier, Hitler’s government
determined that German interests in a future war were well served by Turkish
neutrality. A neutral Turkey would also preclude an Anglo-French military
campaign through Anatolia, in contrast to the Allied attempts in the First
World War to offset German military success in Russia by directly attacking
Germany’s Ottoman Turkish ally at Gallipoli and attempting to seize the
Straits.
During the 1930s, German-Turkish trade was extensive. Germany
accounted for about half of all Turkish exports, and the Turkish and German
governments discussed the sale of German arms, including tanks and warships,
to Ankara well into the late 1930s. Most of these talks came to naught, as
Germany required payment in foreign currency or raw materials, which the
Turks apparently were unable to provide.111 Moreover, statements throughout
1938 reaffirming Turkish neutrality were openly supported by the German
Foreign Office. For instance, after discussions with the Turkish state secretary
and the Turkish ambassador in the summer of 1938, von Ribbentrop con-
cluded: “A policy of benevolent neutrality would also appear to me to be the
proper basis from which closer cooperation can later develop.”112 Indeed,
increasing indications of German ambitions in eastern Europe by 1939 were
not immediately seen as a threat to Turkish sovereignty, so long as they did not
include southeastern Europe.
However, there was a considerable degree of Turkish unease in its relation-
ship with Hitler’s Germany by the late 1930s, due in part to Italian expansion-
ism and ambitions in the Balkans and possibly Syria. Indeed, increasingly
close German-Italian relations by 1938, followed by Italy’s invasion
and occupation of Albania in April 1939 and the German-Italian “Pact of
Steel” the following month, adversely affected German-Turkish relations
and made them somewhat more problematic in the months leading up
111
See for example BArch: R901-68459, Verzeichnis der schwebenden Geschäfte, 13. Dezember
1938; and AA/Berlin an RWM, Durchdruck als Konzept, zu W1352/39g, 23. August 1939.
112
See for example Ribbentrop’s July 1938 statement recognizing Turkish neutrality in PA:
R29775, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Turkei, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung von Ribbentrop, R.M. 224,
1. Juli 1938.
to war in 1939.113 Turkish determination to remain neutral in any war was,

at a minimum, also clearly and consistently supported by the German govern-
ment, notwithstanding Berlin’s unease with Turkish negotiations and agree-
ments with both France and Great Britain in the spring of 1939 that were
likewise aimed at guaranteeing Turkish territorial sovereignty and neutrality
in the event of a war in Europe.114
113
See for example PA: R29775, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Turkei, Bd. 1, DG/Ankara an AA/
Berlin, Nr. 135, 27. April 1939; AA/Berlin (Weizsäcker) an DG/Ankara, Nr. 100, 2. Mai 1939;
and DG/Ankara an AA/Berlin, Nr. 142, 3. Mai 1939. The Pact of Steel unequivocally commit-
ted each of the signatories to full support for the attainment of the other’s “living space.” For
the Turkish government, of course, the question remained exactly what Italy’s “living space”
might include. For the German text of the Pact of Steel, see ADAP: Serie D. Bd. VI, Nr. 426. See
also Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 15–16.
114
See PA: R29775, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Turkei, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung von Woermann, Pol.
VII 450, 21. März 1939; and Weizsäcker an DG/Belgrade, DG/Athen, und DG/Bukarest, Pol. II
1636, 1640, 15. Mai 1939.
5
From the Periphery to the Center, 1940–1941
from the periphery

When the war began in Europe in September 1939, most Arab states were unable
or unwilling to oppose Britain and France, or for that matter, Italy and Spain.
Much of Morocco, as well as Algeria and Tunisia had been part of the French
empire since the previous century, while Libya had been under Italian rule since
1911. On the basis of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, a nominally independ-
ent Egypt, which had been under various levels of British control since 1882,
was forced to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. The Egyptian govern-
ment interned some German nationals, and took over German banks and other
businesses, as Egyptian public opinion remained overwhelmingly in favor of
neutrality.1 Egypt declared war on Germany in March 1945. Iraq, nominally
independent since 1930, also severed diplomatic relations with Germany, in spite
of popular sympathy for Germany among some in the Iraqi government and
population. Moreover, the Mufti of Jerusalem and his Palestinian Arab associates
were headquartered in Baghdad from October 1939 until the early summer of
1941. The Iraqi government expelled most German nationals living and working
in Iraq, and temporarily interned some. Iraq would eventually declare war on
the Axis powers in January 1943. Saudi Arabia did not sever its diplomatic
relations with Germany right away, and remained neutral for most of the war.
It wished to retain German friendship, while avoiding anything that might
arouse British suspicions.2 In Syria and Lebanon, the expected nominal independ-
ence was put on hold as France reasserted its control and continued both man-
dates. Agreements in 1936 had initially proposed Syrian and Lebanese
independence after three years, to be followed by membership in the League of
1
Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 65–67.
2
Ibid., 68–69. Saudi Arabia also declared war on Germany in March 1945.
135
Nations.3 However, the deteriorating situation in Europe, coupled with domestic

sectarian and other political conflicts, resulted in a postponement of Syrian
and Lebanese independence. Non-Arab Turkey remained neutral for most of
the war, before declaring war on Germany in early 1945. By the end of March
1945, the few Arab states with some degree of independence, including Saudi
Arabia, as well as a fully-independent Turkey, had declared war on Germany.
In Palestine, still a British Mandate, the Arab insurgency seemed to put itself
on virtual hold following the release of the British White Paper on May 17, 1939
and the approach of war that summer. It remained for the most part moribund
for the duration of the war, despite the widespread Palestinian Arab rejection of
the provisions of the White Paper.4 British Colonial Office records contain many
references in 1939 to apathy among Palestinian Arabs and a waning interest in
continuing the revolt. They also indicate that the Mufti, who had been in exile in
Beirut since October 1937, at least initially hoped to be able to strike a deal with
the British after the war broke out in 1939.5 Within a year of the start of the war
in Europe, the German Foreign Office had come to believe that Arab violence
and unrest had ended, at least for the time being. In December 1940, in a
summary of Germany policy in the Arab world, it drew the following conclusion
about Palestine: “The situation is generally peaceful. Jewish-Arab conflict is no
longer to be seen.”6 Moreover, the Mufti was obviously aware that his main
rival in Palestine, the Nashashibi clan, had declared publicly its support for
Britain and France. In any case, heightened Anglo-French security concerns in
the immediate region forced al-Husayni to leave his temporary exile in Lebanon
and move to Iraq with his entourage in October 1939.
In spite of a growing propaganda campaign by the Axis powers proclaiming
solidarity with all Arabs and Muslims against British and later American
imperialism and the Jews, a general Arab uprising or revolt in support of the
Axis against the Allies never materialized during the war years. The many
3
Ibid., 64. See also Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 83.
4
The White Paper of May 17, 1939, finally rejected the idea of a partition of Palestine and
stipulated that a single Palestinian state would be granted independence in ten years. Jewish
immigration would be capped at 75,000 over the next five years, after which it would be left to
the entire Palestinian population to democratically determine future levels of Jewish immigration.
Since the Jewish population would at most constitute barely one-third of the population of
Palestine by 1944, the White Paper would mean the end of Jewish hopes for a majority and a
Jewish state. The Zionist movement categorically rejected the White Paper, but so too did much of
the Palestinian Arab leadership who objected to allowing an additional 75,000 Jewish immigrants
into Palestine between 1939 and 1944.
5
See NAL: KV2–2084, Colonial Office, CX/88500, September 30, 1939. For more on the Mufti’s
earlier inclinations to seek some sort of accommodation with the British at the expense of the
Zionists and the Jewish National Home in Palestine, see Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem:
Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1988), 50–80.
6
PA: R29882, Büro des Unterstaatssekretärs, Irak, Bd. 1, Zusammenstellung für die Besprechung
beim Herrn Staatssekretär am 9. Dezember 1940, Die deutsche Politik in Arabien.
From the Periphery to the Center, 1940–1941 137
wartime reports from German diplomats, military personnel, and various

German agents (Vertrauensmänner) in parts of North Africa and the Middle
East indicated the continued existence among the Arab populations of affection
and sympathy for Germany. They also indicated a continued aversion to Italy,
a popular mood that later led to random Arab shooting at retreating Italian
troops in North Africa.7 Germany’s relative disinterest in the Middle East and
North Africa as a region for expanding its own imperial interests, as well as
Italy’s well-known and very real appetite for additional territories in North
Africa and the Middle East, may provide at least a partial explanation for the
general absence of wartime anti-British and anti-French unrest and violence in
the region. Certainly the presence of powerful Axis and Allied armies in the
Arab lands was also a disincentive to popular revolt. But even the presence of a
strong German military force in North Africa between 1941 and 1943, the very
prospect, however brief, of an Axis military victory over the British in the region
in 1942, and an all-out Nazi propaganda campaign calling on Arabs and
Muslims to rise up and join in the Axis struggle against Anglo-American
imperialism and alleged Jewish domination failed to ignite a new “Arab revolt.”
Hitler’s Germany was clearly not in a position to undertake military action
in the Arab world during the first year of the war in Europe. It was mindful of a
possible two-front war in Europe, as well as the concentration of British and
French troops in the close proximity of the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent
and North Africa. Berlin also considered the theoretical possibility of an Anglo-
French attack on Germany through the Balkans, and a possible Anglo-French
preference for a war on the southern periphery of Europe. For these reasons, it
was in Germany’s interest that Italy initially chose to remain out of the war, at
least for the time being.8 It seemed apparent to the Nazis that a two-front war,
with one front in southern Europe and the Mediterranean, was unlikely so long
as Italy stayed out of the war. In this scenario, it was also necessary that Turkey
remained neutral, that the Nazi-Soviet Pact survive, and that London and Paris
be forced to brace for a German attack in western Europe following Hitler’s
rapid victory in Poland.9
Berlin seemed content to let Germany’s Arabic-language radio propaganda
in the Middle East, begun on April 25, 1939 from Zeesen, a town just south of
Berlin, intensify after the outbreak of war in Europe.10 According to German
7
See for example BA-MA: RH2–614, OKH/Chef des Generalstabes des Herres, Op.Abt. (IIb),
Zwischenmeldung vom 21. Dezember 1941. The files in RH2 contain many reports on the military
situation in North Africa in 1941 and 1942, some of which mention Arab attacks on Italians, but
none of which mention any Arab efforts in North Africa to revolt in support of the Axis troops. See
also B.H. Liddell-Hart, The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953), 138–139.
8
Hitler told this to Mussolini at their meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940. See, for
example, the report on the substance of their conversation in ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IX, Nr.1.
9
See Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 70–73.
10
For a good summary of early German Arabic-language radio propaganda to the Arab world, see
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 37 ff.
military intelligence, the considerable air time of the German radio station was
having a positive effect in the Arab world. For example, in a report from
Teheran in late November 1939, an unnamed German agent reassured Berlin
that there was little danger of Iran entering the war, and then offered his view of
German radio propaganda toward the Arab states in the region: “On radio the
appeal is made for the soul of the Arabs. Every evening the Arabic speaker
on Berlin radio gives rousing addresses aimed at the entire Arab world.
He is a brilliant speaker. . .and doubtlessly exercises great influence over his
listeners.”11 Moreover, the regime took steps to organize within the govern-
ment Germany’s coming wartime propaganda activity in the Middle East.
With the approach of war in the summer of 1939, the German Foreign Office
formally assumed a leading role in the conduct of German propaganda activ-
ities toward the Middle East. Joseph Goebbels’s Propaganda Ministry also
assumed a supporting role in foreign propaganda, although not without
complaints.12
At their meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, Hitler repeatedly
thanked Mussolini for his initial decision to remain out of the war. Hitler
recognized this as very much in Germany’s interest. Indeed, given his funda-
mental disinterest in the Mediterranean and the Middle East early in the war,
the only discernible strategic link between Hitler’s regime in Berlin and the
future of the Mediterranean and the Middle East remained the imperial inter-
ests and ambitions of his Italian ally.13 The Nazi regime had concluded that the
western allies would have preferred to fight on Europe’s periphery, particularly
in the Mediterranean region, where they were much stronger, and where
German military power was negligible. Had the Italians immediately entered
the war, Germany likely would have been distracted militarily from its strategic
objectives in Europe. At that meeting with Mussolini at the Brenner Pass,
Hitler is paraphrased as saying: “By the middle of September [1939] there
was no longer a danger for Germany from the west, and it was therefore correct
that Italy remained out of the war.”14 After insisting that he had always wanted
friendship with Great Britain, Hitler went on to tell Mussolini that Italy alone
11
BA-MA: RW5–583, Bericht eines Vertrauensmannes, “Der Osten und Orient nach dem Pakt von
Ankara,” Streng Vertraulich, November 1939; and Bericht eines Vertrauensmannes aus
Teheran, “Der Rundfunkkampf um die arabischen Welt,” Streng Vertraulich, Ende November
1939.
12
BArch: R58–783, Deutscher Pressenachrichtendienst und die deutsche Propaganda im Vorderen
Orient, II 224 v.K./Kö, Geheime Reichssache, 25. August 1939. See also Herf, Nazi Propaganda
for the Arab World, 38–40. For an example of Goebbels’ periodic displeasure with the propa-
ganda activities of the German Foreign Office, see his entry for May 13, 1941 in Fröhlich, Die
Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 9, 308. See also Peter Longerich, Propagandisten
im Krieg. Die Presseabteilung des Auswärtigen Amts unter Ribbentrop (München: Oldenbourg
Verlag, 1987).
13
See Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hackenkreuz, 69–71.
14
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IX, Nr.1.
was Germany’s friend and partner in Europe. The two also agreed that the most
opportune time for Italy to enter the war on Germany’s side would be when
Germany was on the verge of victory against Britain and France in western
Europe. Hitler assured Mussolini that the Reich had been making the necessary
preparations for an assault on the west, and that Italy’s entry should follow
Germany’s anticipated military victories. Finally, Hitler told Mussolini that
Germany had no interests in the Mediterranean region, implying once again
that Italy’s imperial ambitions in the region could only be satisfied with the
rapid defeat of Britain and France.
Nevertheless, in their plans for the attack in the west in the spring of 1940,
the Germans were forced to prepare for Italy’s entry into the war and reach a
decision about the preferred manner in which Italian forces might be integrated
into the final struggle with the western powers. Expecting a rapid victory, Hitler
must have remembered Mussolini’s promise at the Brenner Pass in March to
enter the war at the very moment the Germans were poised to inflict a final,
crushing defeat on Anglo-French forces in western Europe. Moreover, in his
April 4 instructions to the Wehrmacht, Hitler ordered that hostilities in the
Balkans be avoided for the time being, but that Anglo-French naval power in
the Mediterranean Sea should be neutralized.15 The assumption here had to be
that the Italian navy and air force would be primarily responsible for this
enormous task, a responsibility that Italy would be unable to fulfill. However,
the Germans were also forced to begin defining their own strategic interests in
an eventual reorganization of the Mediterranean region, specifically the Arab
lands of North Africa and the Middle East. Italian entry into the war, on the
heels of a German victory in western Europe, of necessity would result in a
political reorganization of the Arab lands, and possibly more. What, then,
would Germany seek or support in the region given the significant but not
always well-defined ambitions of its Italian ally? Precisely how would the
victors dispose of the Anglo-French-controlled lands of the Arab world? And
what role if any would Arab nationalism and Arab demands for independence
play in German policy following its anticipated victory over France and Britain?
Retired General Gerhard Engel, Hitler’s adjutant between 1938 and 1943,
referred in 1941 to the low priority that Hitler attached to the Middle East in
German strategy and policy during the Second World War. In his diary entry
for April 24, 1941, for example, Engel notes that Hitler subordinated every-
thing to the German war against the Soviet Union. With regard to the Middle
East, Engle paraphrases Hitler as follows: “Unfortunately the Arabs are unreli-
able and prone to bribery with money, something the English and the French
understand. F. [Führer] regrets and excuses himself that one cannot
be everywhere and help.”16 The diplomat Fritz Grobba arrived at the same
15
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IX, Nr. 46.
16
Hildegard von Kotze (ed.), Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors
Engel (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), 102.
conclusion in his memoirs with regard to Hitler’s dismissiveness of the Arabs,

one that was based on what he perceived as Hitler’s strategic short-sightedness,
as well as racist Nazi views of Arabs. Grobba argued that Hitler’s refusal to
recognize the right of the Arabs to complete sovereignty and independence
was a significant cause of Germany’s failure in the Middle East during
the war: “We did not use the chances we had in the Middle East in the last
war with the friendly views of the Arabs because we did not promise the
Arabs independence, something that would have been a pre-condition for their
willingness to bear arms.”17
On July 1, 1940, Werner-Otto von Hentig in the German Foreign Office put
together an extensive analysis of the situation in the Arab world following
Germany’s military victory in France, with concrete suggestions for a German
strategy in the region pending the achievement of an Axis victory.18 He began
by stressing the strategic importance of the region for Germany’s future central
African colonial empire. The North African states of Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya would, of course, remain under some form of French,
Spanish, and Italian rule, albeit with greater autonomy. Egypt, on the other
hand, would be freed from British rule and given independence, along with
sovereignty over the Sudan. In Palestine, von Hentig recommended that Jewish
immigration to Palestine be ended, that Jews be given minority rights there, and
that efforts be made to find other areas in the world to which Jews from Europe
should immigrate. In the states of the Fertile Crescent, however, von Hentig
argued that it would be a mistake for Germany to support any form of Italian
rule, as Arab hatred of Italy would only damage Germany’s economic and
political interests, in particular its relations with Turkey and its future interests
in the oil resources of Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. He suggested an inde-
pendent state or several states, after an appropriate transition period.
He concluded with a determined plea for immediate and direct German
involvement in the Arab world and its political future with the following words:
“For the current war, as well as for the postwar period, it is necessary to
establish a clear position on how we view the future of these states, what sort
of assistance we are prepared to give them, and what demands we will make on
them in return for our assistance.”19 In the summer of 1940, von Hentig’s
suggestions appear to have been ignored by his superiors in the German Foreign
Office and by Hitler’s inner circle.
However, a few general German aims in North Africa and the Middle East
did in fact materialize in Hitler’s planning in the summer of 1940, as German
troops won military victories on the western front in Europe. His June 18, 1940
meeting with Mussolini in Munich, just a week after Italy’s entry into the war
17
Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 317. See also Grobba’s supplementary report to the 1957 report
by Generals Helmuth Felmy and Walter Warlimont in NARA: MS/P-207.
18
IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/6, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, 1. Juli 1940.
19
Ibid.
and a day after the French surrender, was all about defining the conditions that
the Axis would impose on the defeated France. When Mussolini announced
Italy’s entry into the war on June 10, he had stated Italian aims only in the most
general terms, namely to obtain a dominant position in the Mediterranean area
that would ensure Italy’s free access to the oceans through the Straits of
Gibraltar in the west, and the Suez Canal in the east.20 The meeting centered
on more immediate issues that included the surrender of the French fleet in the
Mediterranean and the division of France into occupied and unoccupied zones.
The Italians managed to briefly raise the matter of their claims to Tunisia,
Corsica, and Djibuti, although Hitler told Mussolini that he was not interested
in imposing harsh peace terms on the French. Hitler implied that his govern-
ment hoped to keep Britain isolated and therefore more inclined to eventually
make peace with the Axis. While Hitler did not mention the Arabs or the
Middle East at all in this context, the minutes of the meeting reveal that:
“The Führer further explained that he did not intend to deal with the French
as they had done with us in 1918. He is prepared to make concessions on a few
important points that are of significance for the French.”21 While Hitler did
stipulate at the meeting that he would not agree to every French request, he
would nevertheless pursue this approach “. . .if it is at all possible to push a
French government in France to an understanding.”22 Ciano, who was also
present at the meeting, confirms Hitler’s intention “. . .to avoid offering condi-
tions to the French such as would give a pretext to refuse to conclude the
negotiations. . .”23 There was nothing at the meeting to indicate that Germany
itself possessed imperial claims in the Arab world, or that Hitler paid the
slightest heed to Arab demands for national self-determination and independ-
ence. Yet Hitler’s apparent deference to French interests would seem to indicate
that any Italian demands for substantial colonial compensation in North and
East Africa and the Middle East might not receive complete German support
after all if, in the end, Hitler chose to preserve for the most part the integrity of
the French colonial empire in North Africa and the Fertile Crescent.
20 21
Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies, 17. ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IX, Nr. 479.
22
Ibid. The German diplomat Rudolf Rahn, assigned to the German embassy in Paris in August
1940, has written that the appointment of the pro-French and Francophile Otto Abetz as
German ambassador in Paris reflected this approach by Hitler toward France in the summer
of 1940. See Rudolf Rahn, Ruheloses Leben. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen (Düsseldorf:
Diederichs Verlag, 1949), 145. See also Roland Ray, Annährung an Frankreich im Dienste
Hitlers? Otto Abetz und die deutsche Frankreichpolitik 1930-1942 (München: Oldenbourg
Verlag, 2000). Abetz, German ambassador to France from June 1940 to August 1944, also
points to this approach by Hitler to a defeated France in the summer of 1940. See Otto Abetz,
Das offene Problem. Ein Rückblick auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreichpolitik (Köln:
Greven Verlag, 1951), 130.
23
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 372. Nevertheless, Ciano does note that at this meeting
the Italians still put forward their claims to Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and French Somaliland, as
well as their “interests” in Algeria and Morocco.
Another complicating factor was the position of Franco’s Spain in any

Axis-dominated postwar settlement in North Africa. Spain’s demands for
colonial compensation from France as the price for entering the war on the
side of the Axis had always included at a minimum all of Morocco and parts
of Algeria, a reality that conflicted with Hitler’s desire to make peace with
France and, ultimately, Great Britain, and to at least partially satisfy Italian
claims. Moreover, Germany’s wartime planning began to include the need for
several military bases in northwest Africa.24 On June 19, State Secretary von
Weizsäcker informed Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that the Spanish ambas-
sador in Berlin had raised the issues of Spain’s possible entry into the war, and
its claims on French territory in North Africa. The ambassador told von
Weizsäcker that the Spanish government would find it unacceptable for the
French empire to maintain control over certain territories in North Africa, and
that “. . .it claims the area around Oran, the unification of Morocco under a
Spanish Protectorate, the expansion of its current Sahara territories to the
20th degree of latitude, the extension of its coastal territory in the coastal
section between the Niger delta and Cape Lopez.”25 In September 1940,
Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suñer met with von Ribbentrop and
demanded all of Morocco and part of Algeria, as well as other parts of the
French colonial empire, as the price for Spain’s entry into the war.26 In effect,
Spain’s demands throughout 1940 and 1941 as the price for entering the
war on the side of the Axis remained all of French-ruled Morocco and at
least a part of French-controlled Algeria. In his wartime diary entry for
November 11, 1940, the German diplomat and former ambassador to Italy,
Ulrich von Hassell, once again points to the obvious contradictions between
Franco’s aims in northwestern Africa and German hopes for a wartime accom-
modation with France. He also suggests that Italy’s ambitions in North
Africa further complicated the situation for German policy makers and
their strategy with regard to France.27 Finally, Ciano notes in his diaries in
November 1940 that Suñer had been very critical of “. . .the German effort
to get together with the French.”28 There was no mention of Arab nationalism,
or the possibility of independence for Morocco and Algeria in any of these
deliberations and exchanges.
Hitler’s brief meeting with Franco at Hendaye in southern France on
October 23, 1940 apparently failed to produce an agreement that would pave
24
Stanley Payne, Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2009), 72, 76–77. See also Goda, Tomorrow the World, chap. 2.
25
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. IX, Nr. 488. See also Payne, Franco and Hitler, 89 ff.
26
Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 497–500. Schmidt also writes that Hitler instructed
von Ribbentrop to avoid promising Spain any transfers of French colonial territory in North
Africa because of the need to convince the Vichy government to enter the war against England.
27
See Von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 215–216.
28
Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943, 312.
photo 5.1. Adolf Hitler meets with Francisco Franco at Hendaye (October 1940).
the way for Spain’s entry into the war on the Axis side. In a draft secret protocol
following the meeting, Hitler agreed in principle that Spain would receive
Gibraltar, along with unspecified French territories in Africa, for which
France would be compensated with British colonial territory.29 Just a few
weeks later, in his Directive No. 18 (Weisung Nr. 18) of November 12, 1940,
Hitler once again addressed this potential conflict should Spain enter the war on
the side of the Axis. He asserted: “The goal of my policy toward France is to
cooperate with this country in an effective way in the future pursuit of the war
against England.”30 He envisioned France’s future role as one of “benevolent
neutrality” (die Rolle einer nicht kriegführenden Macht) that would tolerate
necessary wartime measures undertaken by Germany in its African colonies,
and would use its own troops in support of the defense of its own territories.
The directive also mentioned the desirability of a quick Spanish entry into the
war, and the deployment of German troops in Spain for the purpose of driving
Britain out of Gibraltar as the first step toward driving them out of the western
Mediterranean area. The matter of Spanish claims against France in Morocco
and Algeria as the price for its entry into the war was not mentioned in the
directive. Indeed, Hitler had already told Mussolini in Florence on October 28,
29 30
Payne, Franco and Hitler, 92–93. Domarus, Reden, Bd. 3, 1609–1610.
1940 that it was in the best interests of the Axis that the Vichy government
should maintain its control over the French empire in North Africa.31
If Italian imperial ambitions prior to the summer of 1940 were not always
clear, the defeat of France and what appeared to be Britain’s imminent
collapse and the possible end of the war pushed Mussolini’s government to
become somewhat more specific.32 On July 17, German Ambassador von
Mackensen reported from Rome that the Italians were demanding Nice,
Corsica, Tunisia, and part of Algeria, as well as a land connection between
Libya and Ethiopia. The latter would require the transfer of a significant
portion of British-controlled Sudan to Italy. Also included in the Italian
position was the suggestion that treaties with Egypt, Syria, and Palestine be
concluded that would guarantee Italian political and economic influence and
access to raw materials. It is unlikely that Mussolini was prepared to recog-
nize the independence of these three states, although von Mackensen sug-
gested that “. . . for Egypt, Italy has decided to make some significant
concessions in questions regarding its [Egypt’s] sovereignty and independ-
ence.”33 In fact, in December 1939, German intelligence from Rome had
reported that Italy’s recent and future ambitions in eastern Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in Ethiopia, parts of the Sudan, all of
Somaliland, Yemen, and the Red Sea, meant that Italian interest in Egypt
was centered on the Suez Canal as Italy’s point of access to those areas. Italy
would demand at a minimum the internationalization and complete neutrality
of the canal, according to the international statute of 1888.34 Finally,
the Italians at that particular time were also asking for British and French
Somaliland, and a southward expansion of Libya’s border.
As observed earlier, Germany’s sense of its own strategic interests in the
Arab world materialized somewhat in late July and August 1940, after the
Axis worked out its cease-fire terms and agreement with France in late June.35
On July 21, 1940, both State Secretary von Weizsäcker and Under State
Secretary Woermann outlined the German Foreign Office’s tactical approach
to the obvious contradictions involved in the fulfillment of Italian imperial
ambitions, the need to maintain at least temporarily the status quo with regard
to French colonial interests in North Africa and the Fertile Crescent pending the
31
32
See Arielli, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 139–140, 162–165, 187–188.
33
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. X, Nr. 193. See also BA-MA: RW5–584, Bericht unseres Vertrauensmannes
in Italien, Streng Vertraulich, 15. Dezember 1939.
34
BA-MA: RW5–584, Bericht unseres Vertrauensmannes in Italien, Streng Vertraulich, 15.
Dezember 1939.
35
The formal armistice between France and Germany was signed on June 22, and between France
and Italy two days later. The agreements outlined the rules for administration of French
territories, including French colonial territories. Reflecting Germany’s support for Italian pre-
eminence in the Mediterranean, the rules for certain overseas territories were largely left to the
Franco-Italian armistice. See Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 89–93.
final outcome of the war, and a carefully crafted German propaganda message
to the Arabs. Woermann stipulated that he believed that Germany should
follow Italy’s lead in any reorganization of the Arab world, and observed that
such a policy was embedded in the terms of the cease-fire agreements that were
reached after the French surrender. He reiterated: “As a result, a German claim
for leadership in the Arab world, or a shared leadership claim with Italy is out
of the question.”36 Indeed, the substantial correspondence between the Foreign
Office in Berlin, the German embassy in Rome, and the German Cease-Fire
Commission in the summer of 1940 indicates quite clearly that the German
government continued to accept Italy’s leadership in the Mediterranean area
and Arab world.37 Yet, it also indicates that Hitler was increasingly committed
to supporting French demands that its empire remain for the most part intact in
any final peace settlement with the Axis powers.38 However, Woermann also
observed that Germany’s political disinterest did not mean its economic disin-
terest. He maintained that Germany had an interest in expanding its air
connections, as well as its future access to Iraqi oil: “We will be able to achieve
the solution to both questions in cooperation with Italy, but under the vigorous
protection of our own interests.”39
Woermann did finally address the question of the Arabs and their quest for
national self-determination. He pointed to the pro-German sympathies of the
Arabs and their intense aversion to Italy. He further cautioned that Germany
should not let itself be drawn into what he termed “the Arab game,” to be used
by the Arabs as a support against the Italians. He concluded: “This means that
our policy, along with our radio propaganda in the Near East or toward North
Africa and the Middle East, now as before, should be pursued with the utmost
anti-English, as well as a toned down anti-French, urgency.”40 In his notes in
the margin of the Woermann memorandum, von Weizsäcker penciled in that he
agreed with the content. Regarding the situation with the Arabs and German
policy, Woermann further suggested that since Germany was still at war “. . .we
should just tell the Arabs what we are fighting, namely England, and speak only
in terms of the ‘liberation of the Arab world,’ without any statements about
36
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. X, Nr. 200.
37
See for instance PA: R29607, Büro des Staatesekretärs, Friedensverhandlungen mit Frankreich,
Bd. 1, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm ohne Nummer, 25. Juni 1940; Hencke/Waffenstill-
standskommission an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 32, 5. Juli 1940; Hencke/Waffenstillstands-
kommission an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 91, 1. August 1940; and Aufzeichnung von Grote,
Pol. I 12244g, 4. September 1940.
38
See for instance PA: R29607, Büro des Staatesekretärs, Friedensverhandlungen mit Frankreich,
Bd. 2, Hencke/Waffenstillstandskommission an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 156, 2. September
1940; Aufzeichnung von Federer, Pol. I Mg., 21. September 1940; and Hencke/Waffenstill-
standskommission an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 174, 21. September 1940.
39
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. X, Nr. 200. See also Dietrich Eichholtz, Krieg um Öl: Ein Erdölimperium als
deutsches Kriegsziel 1938–1943 (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2006).
40
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. X, Nr. 200.
future goals.”41 Of course, that had been the substance of German radio
propaganda to the Arabs since shortly before the start of the war, and it
wouldn’t change very much as the war progressed. At this point, therefore,
references to Arab independence were simply out of the question.
By late August 1940, after almost a year of war in Europe, the Foreign Office
in Berlin circulated an internal policy paper that outlined German policy
toward the Arab world.42 The paper, dated August 20, 1940, was in part the
result of inquiries by several unnamed Arab leaders at the few remaining
German diplomatic missions in the Middle East. The circular seemed to take
for granted that victory in the war in Europe was a certainty, despite the refusal
of Great Britain to surrender and the increasing aid it was receiving from the
United States. It also reflected the position that Woermann had outlined and
von Weizsäcker had approved just one month before. The paper began by
reiterating the proposition that Germany possessed no political interests in
the Mediterranean area, a space it defined as including the Arab world in its
southern and eastern sections. It also stipulated that Germany did have import-
ant economic, communications, and cultural interests in the Arab lands. To this
point, therefore, after more than seven years of National Socialism and a year
of war in Europe, German policy had not changed substantively from the
Middle East policies of the earlier Imperial and Weimar governments. Further-
more, the paper once again declared that Germany would follow Italy’s polit-
ical lead in the Arab lands: “It [Germany] will therefore leave the lead to Italy in
the political reorganization also of the Arab space.”43 As states and regions in
the “Arab space,” it listed the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Palestine, Transjor-
dan, Syria-Lebanon, and Iraq, and reiterated the position that Germany
claimed neither a unilateral nor even a shared leadership role in the political
future of these areas. It was not deemed necessary to mention the North African
Arab states west of Egypt since these lands were already under the direct rule of
Italy, Vichy France, and Spain, Germany’s real and would-be allies.
The August 20 paper also briefly specified the non-political interests that
Germany would vigorously pursue. Above all, it reasserted Germany’s claim
to participate in the exploitation of Iraqi oil reserves, its insistence on secure
air traffic connections in the region, and the continuation of German archeo-
logical activities in the Middle East, all of which would be accomplished
in full cooperation with Italian authorities. Finally, the paper once again
described the public position that Germany would follow with regard to Arab
demands for national self-determination, at least for the duration of the war.
It reiterated the need to avoid any public discussion or positions on specific
political issues regarding the future of the Arab lands of North Africa and the
41
Ibid.
42
PA: Botschaft Rom (Quir.) Geheim Akten, 44/1, “Arabische Länder 1940,” Runderlaß Pol. VII
2025g (Woermann), 20. August 1940.
43
Ibid.
Middle East. Rather, the German Foreign Office and other state agencies were
advised to stress only “. . .the common German and Arab interest in the defeat
of England. . .” and that the Reich extended to the Arab people “. . .the full
sympathy of Germany for the struggle for freedom of their people. . .”44
Finally, individual German officials were advised to avoid any public discus-
sions or positions on the future political organization of the Arab lands:
“Any raising of the question of the future political organization of the Arab
area is to be avoided. . .”45
However, pressure from some Arab leaders would not allow German
officials to ignore the political future of the Arab world entirely. For example,
in the fall of 1940, from his refuge in Iraq, the Mufti of Jerusalem formulated a
list of requests that he sent to Berlin with his private secretary, Osman Kemal
Haddad.46 The German Foreign Office, in a telegram to the German embassy in
Rome that reported on the Mufti’s “wish list,” also indicated that the Mufti’s
suggestions had the approval of some members in the Iraqi government. The list
included German and Italian recognition of the following: the independence of
the Arab states (Syria, Palestine/Transjordan, Egypt, Sudan, and the Protector-
ates on the rim of the Arabian Peninsula); no German or Italian Mandates or
limits on Arab independence; the right of Arab states to form a union; the right
of the Arabs to solve the Jewish question in Palestine; and maintenance of the
status quo for the Christian holy places in Palestine. The Mufti’s list also
suggested that the Iraqi government would sign a treaty of friendship with the
Axis, as well as secret treaties to govern economic and cultural affairs, and
would also assist in the organization of uprisings in Palestine and Transjordan
against the British and help to secure weapons for this from the French troops
in Syria. There were no references to the Arab states in North Africa. Without
commenting at all on the Mufti’s suggestions regarding Arab independence,
von Weizsäcker did express German support for securing French weapons for
an Arab uprising in Palestine, so long as the Italians were in agreement: “Reich
government takes a positive position in the matter, i.e. under certain circum-
stances it would be ready to help with captured weapons (Beutewaffen) and
money, but would only proceed in agreement with Italy.”47 He instructed the
German embassy in Rome to take the Mufti’s list to Foreign Minister Ciano to
ascertain the reaction of the Italian government. Moreover, since Iraq still
maintained diplomatic relations with Italy, von Weizsäcker instructed the
German embassy in Rome to avoid discussion of the matter with the Iraqi
embassy there.
44 45
Ibid. Ibid.
46
PA: Botschaft Rom (Quir.), Geheim Akten 44/1, “Vorschläge des Grossmufti betr. Arabische
Länder 1940,” AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, Nr. 1232, 9 September 1940. Kemal Haddad traveled
under the name of Tawfik al-Shakir
47
Ibid.
The German Foreign Office was initially under the impression that Italian
diplomats in Baghdad had already approved in principle the Mufti’s request
for just such a public declaration.48 However, the Italian government quickly
replied to the German embassy in Rome with a rejection of a public declar-
ation of support for Arab independence.49 In particular, Mussolini rejected
any idea that the Axis powers should renounce mandates or other kinds of
limits on Arab sovereignty after the war. The Italian rationale was that the
Arabs did not have the experience or ability to effectively govern themselves
and, as a result, would be unable to resist aggression by outside powers,
particularly by the British. The Italians also argued that Iraq was not capable
of organizing an Arab insurgency in Palestine, even with outside financial
support. About the only item that Italy did endorse was the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between Iraq and Germany. The embassy in Rome fur-
ther reported that in spite of its rejection of most of the Mufti’s recommenda-
tions, the Italian government also suggested that the discussion started by the
Mufti’s initiative should not be cut off. It recommended that the kinds of
assurances given to the Arabs in the past should be continued: “Until now,
oral, and unofficial guarantees have been given for the independence and
integrity of the Arab states. These assurances were of a general character,
and they could be renewed, and also carried on radio broadcasts. Nothing
more than that should be undertaken.”50
The Italians also recommended that the Mufti’s recent requests from Bagdad
for financial assistance should be granted, although not in the amounts he had
asked for, and not exactly for his stated purposes. Instead, the Italians argued
that the financial assistance should be used by the Mufti for, among other
things, political assassinations and for sabotaging the oil pipelines in Iraq in
order to disrupt the British war effort in the Middle East. Thus, the Italian
government was quite clear in its opposition to any official public declaration
by the Axis in favor of Arab sovereignty and independence, while simultan-
eously expecting specific Arab action of a military nature designed solely to
contribute in some way to the military defeat of Great Britain at the hands of a
victorious Italy.
In another telegram on the same day from the German embassy in Rome,
von Mackensen relayed Ciano’s description of alleged Italian approval
in Baghdad of a declaration favoring Arab independence as “pure fantasy”
48
On his way to Berlin from Baghdad, Kemal Haddad had told German ambassador von Papen in
Turkey that such an approval had been given in Baghdad. See PA: R29539, Büro des St.S.,
Arabien, Bd.1, Tarabya an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 602, 6. August 1940.
49
Länder 1940,” DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1678, 14. September 1940. This telegram from the
German embassy in Rome to Berlin contains the Italian response, in German translation, of
September 11 to the German communication of two days earlier.
50
Ibid.
(reine Phantasie).51 Ciano explained to von Mackensen that Italian diplomats

in Baghdad had done nothing more in June and July than to repeat what Italian
radio had been broadcasting from Bari, namely that Italy had an interest in the
Arabs’ ability to stand on their own (Selbstständigkeit) against England, and to
protect their territorial integrity. In other words, Axis propaganda should give
the impression of German and Italian support for Arab self-determination, even
when that was not the actual intent of their policies. He concluded: “For purely
propagandistic reasons at that time, such statements by the Italian ambassador
were deemed useful, but which could never be characterized in any way as an
obligatory declaration or to be published in writing.”52
Besides reflecting its still somewhat ill-defined imperial ambitions in the Arab
states of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt, Italy’s rejection of the Mufti’s earlier
proposals also pointed to the continuing absence of any specific postwar
German political plans for the Arab lands, in deference to its Italian ally.
Nevertheless, Berlin concluded at the end of September 1940 that the Axis
powers could no longer avoid giving some sort of public pronouncement about
their ultimate intentions toward the Arabs, regardless of Italian opposition to
such a move. This seemed especially urgent to the German government in late
September, as actual military conflict had just begun in the region with
Italy’s military campaign from Libya against the British in Egypt. On the matter
of a public recognition of Arab independence, Berlin proposed a compromise to
the Italian government, a plan that would alter the delivery, but not the
essential substance, of the Axis message in the Arab world. In a late September
memo to von Ribbentrop, Woermann recommended that Germany would have
to make some kind of public statement to the Mufti’s private secretary, Kemal
Haddad, who had been waiting in Berlin for a month after delivering the
Mufti’s original request. Woermann suggested a weak declaration, to be sent
by radio broadcast that would mainly differ from past German statements
to Arab officials in that it would appear publicly as official German policy:
“For some time it has been Germany’s wish that the Arab lands free themselves
from English and French domination, enjoy greater self-government, and that
they achieve full independence. In their struggle to achieve this goal, the
Arab lands can count on Germany’s complete sympathy.”53 Unlike past unoffi-
cial statements, Woermann’s suggestion did include the words “full independ-
ence” (volle Unabhängigkeit), with the implication that it was meant for at least
some Arab states. Of course, this level of clarity would be even more problem-
atic for Mussolini’s regime.
51
See PA: R29533, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, DB/Rom (Quirinal) an AA/Berlin, Telegramm
Nr. 1677, 14. September 1940.
52
Ibid.
53
Länder 1940,” Woermann an von Ribbentrop, (n.d.) The likely date for this communication is
September 28, 1940.
Meanwhile, a degree of Arab pressure on Germany was also coming from

some officials in the Iraqi government, which had broken diplomatic relations
with Germany when war broke out in Europe a year before. In spite of its
diplomatic break with Germany and declared neutrality, the Iraqi government
still resented Britain’s increased wartime military presence in, and pressure on,
the Iraqi government to sever diplomatic relations with Italy. The German
ambassador in neutral Turkey, Franz von Papen, informed the Foreign Office
in Berlin on October 3 that he had met in Istanbul with Naji Shawkat, at the
time the Iraqi justice minister. Shawkat called for a more assertive German
Middle East policy, one that did not merely follow the lead of Italy.54
He reminded von Papen that Italy was not at all trusted in Iraq and elsewhere
in the Arab world, especially now due to its refusal to issue a public declaration
in support of the independence of the Arab states in the Near East. He also
warned von Papen that the Arabs would eventually enter the war on the side of
Great Britain if their hopes remain unfulfilled by Germany. In his report to the
Foreign Office in Berlin, von Papen observed that Shawkat demanded an
official German declaration right away. The German approach to the Arabs,
he argued, had to change, particularly since the military conflict between
Italy and Britain was now raging on the Egyptian-Libyan border, and Arab
support could be the difference between victory and defeat for the Axis in the
Arab world. He asserted: “In this regard, I would be remiss if I did not advise
you that the course of these events has extraordinarily serious implications for
the position of the Reich. From here it is about unleashing Arab forces in Syria
and Palestine in a way that would benefit the Italian war effort.”55
The two key issues in this give and take between Berlin and Rome centered
on Arab independence and the possibility of forming some sort of federation or
closer union of Arab states. Italy came around to approve a general and
noncommittal declaration of sympathy for the principle of Arab independence,
but refused to include in any declaration of Italian support for a union or
federation of independent Arab states.56 With the apparent agreement of the
Italian government, Germany issued its first public statement in late October
1940 on the question of the political future of the Arab people. Broadcast on
German radio on October 21 and 22, and officially published on October 23,
the declaration read as follows:
Germany, which has always been filled with feelings of friendship for the Arabs and has
always cherished the hope that they will thrive and be happy and gain their historic,
natural and rightful place among the peoples of the earth, has for a long time followed
54
Länder 1940,” DGK/Istanbul an AA/Berlin, Nr. A4828, 3. Oktober 1940.
55
Ibid.
56
Länder 1940,” DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1785, 2. Oktober 1940; AA/Berlin an DB/Rom, Nr.
1401, 6. Oktober 1940; and DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Nr. 1819, 8. Oktober 1940.
with interest the struggle of the Arab lands for the attainment of their independence.
The Arab lands can continue to count on Germany’s complete sympathy in their efforts
to reach this goal. With the publication of this declaration Germany finds itself in full
agreement with its ally Italy.57
Needless to say, the Mufti’s private secretary and others were quite disappointed
with the declaration, despite the fact that the German Foreign Office did report
some satisfaction with the declaration in the Arab world.58 The declaration did
not explicitly recognize Arab independence; it was merely a statement that
Germany had observed the long Arab struggle for independence in the past with
sympathy. Von Weizsäcker’s reply to the Mufti’s secretary, altogether beside the
point, was that the Arabs would have to win their independence for themselves.
Therefore, as Hitler’s government moved forward into 1941, it still followed the
Italian lead in the Middle East as it became more and more absorbed in its
preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Despite Hitler’s focus on eastern Europe and an invasion of the Soviet Union
sometime in mid 1941, as well as his continuing ambivalence about the Arab
world, wartime circumstances in the Middle East in the fall of 1940 put
pressure on Germany to more directly engage the military and political issues
in the region. Hitler’s apparent determination to avoid direct German involve-
ment in the question of the future of the Arab world had reflected his long-held
view that North Africa and the Middle East should be subject to some mutually
agreeable division of the region among the European powers that included
Italy, Britain, France, and Spain. To the extent that the Nazi regime had any
imperial aims beyond the European continent, they were to be found in sub-
Saharan Africa, in some or all of Germany’s former colonies, as well as other
potential postwar acquisitions. By the summer of 1940, of course, there was no
specific talk of a continuing British imperial presence in the Arab lands of the
Middle East after an Axis victory, although there was nothing in German policy
and projections about the future in 1940 and 1941 that necessarily precluded
some sort of continuing British presence. In fact, in discussions in Munich with
Italian Foreign Minister Ciano in June 1940, German Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop had stated that Britain would have to give up some of its imperial
possessions, but that the British Empire was “. . .an element of stability and
social order in the world. . .,” and that the Führer “. . .does not desire the
destruction of the British Empire.”59 And in his speech before the Reichstag
of July 19, Hitler stated: “For as long as there has been a National Socialist
57
Länder 1940,” Aufzeichnung Weizsäckers, Pol. VII 3273g, “Gespräch mit dem Privatsekretär
des Großmufti aus Anlaß der Abgabe einer Erklärung über die deutsche Politik gegenüber den
Arabern, ” 21. Oktober 1940. See also Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 199.
58
59
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 373. In his diary entry for June 18-19,1940, Ciano
wrote: “If London wants war, it will be a total war. . .But Hitler makes many reservations on the
regime, there have been two goals in its foreign policy program: 1. the establish-
ment of a true understanding and friendship with Italy, and 2. the establishment
of the same kind of relationship with England.”60 Berlin’s problem with regard
to any future postwar settlement in the Middle East and North Africa remained
the inherent conflicts in the positions and ambitions of those entities with which
Germany was not at war, but which had a direct interest in the region.
These included Italy, Vichy France, Spain, and, of course, the Arabs. Moreover,
Hitler still seemed to entertain notions of a continuing British imperial presence
in the Arab world following an Axis victory in the war.
Several German military intelligence reports from the Arab world in the late
summer and fall of 1940 reflect these contradictions. For instance, these reports
all speak of the Arab wish for real independence from England, the generally
positive Arab view of Germany, and, as always, the entirely negative view and
distrust of Italy. A note from the OKW to the German Foreign Office in late
November described the determination of the Arabs to rid themselves of British
rule, as well as their reluctance to do much about it during the war for fear of
replacing British control with an even worse Italian regime: “In Egypt, Syria,
Palestine, and a large part of the Muslim world one vigorously demands
freedom from the English yoke; however, one fears that a victory of the Axis
powers will mean Italy’s domination of the eastern Mediterranean, something
that is even less desirable than English domination.”61 From a military perspec-
tive, the report also regretted that the total failure to dispel Arab fears of future
Italian control over the Arab world made it impossible to generate a general
Arab uprising against British authority. With the arrival in Beirut of the Italian
Armistice Commission for Syria in 1940 following the surrender of France,
accompanied by a few German officials, public fears of Italian expansionism in
the eastern Mediterranean only intensified.62
Military intelligence and other officials also questioned the policy of
Hitler’s government with regard to Syria and Lebanon in the fall and winter
of 1940–1941. Otto Abetz, the German ambassador to Vichy France in Paris,
warned that any German support for Arab independence, particularly support
for the establishment of a large, unified, and sovereign Arab state in the Fertile
Crescent, would be regarded by the Vichy regime as a violation of the armistice
desirability of demolishing the British Empire, which he considers even today, to be an important
factor in world equilibrium.” See Gibson, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943, 265.
60
Domarus, Hitler, Bd, 3, 1553. In September 1940, Alfred Rosenberg wrote in his diary that
Hitler felt pained to have to attack Great Britain and that he hoped the war with England would
not last long. See USHMM: The Alfred Rosenberg Diary, September 10, 1940, 439, 441.
61
BA-MA: RW5–358, OKW an AA/Berlin, Nr. 19237/40, Laufende Informationen Nr. 72, 25.
November 1940. See also RW5–358, OKW an AA/Berlin, Nr. 415/40, Laufende Informationen
Nr. 54, 22. August 1940; and RW5–350, OKW Nr. 01200/40, Aussenpolitische Übersicht,
Entwicklung der aussenpolitischen Lage im Monat September 1940, 7. Oktober 1940. These
reports also warned that the British were fully taking advantage of Arab hatred of Italy.
62
Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 90.
photo 5.2. Otto Abetz (no date).

between France and the Axis powers that had guaranteed the continued viabil-
ity of the French empire. He also warned that it would likely facilitate a Gaulist
or Free French takeover in Syria.63 Abetz describes Hitler’s “generous” offers to
the chief of state of Vichy France, Henri-Philippe Pétain, at their meeting in
Montoire on October 24, 1940 in his postwar memoirs. He writes about
Hitler’s belief in the need to build a European coalition led by Germany and
France to defeat Britain. He also describes Hitler’s assurances to Pétain that,
following the return of Germany’s former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa and
the likely redrawing of some colonial boundaries, any French losses would be
compensated with territory from British colonies. Indeed, Under State Secretary
Woermann asserted in early 1941 that the recent push by the Mufti and some
members of the Iraqi government for a large pan-Arab state in the Fertile
Crescent was impossible due to Germany’s obligations to both Italy and to
Vichy France.64 Military intelligence reports on Syria from the late summer of
63
Abetz, Das offene Problem, 157–159. For more on Otto Abetz, his personal and professional ties
to France, his unique role as both German ambassador to France and “Plenipotentiary of the
Foreign Office to the German Commander-in-Chief” in Paris, and his specific task of maintain-
ing friendly relations with the Vichy French government, see Conze et.al., Das Amt und die
Vergangenheit, 151, 190 ff.
64
For more on Hitler’s promises to Pétain at Montoire, at the expense of both Italian and Arab
nationalist aims in Syria, see IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/26, von Hentig an
photo 5.3. Adolf Hitler meets with Henri Philippe Pétain at Montoire (October 1940).
1940 to the spring of 1941 also paint a picture of uncertainty and conflict with
regard to Germany’s interests there.65 The Vichy regime seemed to be in
control, with the military commander, General Henri Dentz, said to be a
supporter of Pétain. However, the existence of so many French military and
civilian officials who were supporters of Charles de Gaulle, and the threat of an
English invasion from the south, left things very much up in the air. In any case,
the reports seemed to support the notion that German support for Arab inde-
pendence might undermine Vichy rule in Syria, and thereby strengthen the
Gaullists who also hoped to preserve the French empire after the war.
to the center
Italy’s defeats in North Africa and Greece in the fall of 1940 resulted in greater
German military and political involvement in the Mediterranean region and the
Melchers, 7. November 1940. See also Werner-Otto von Hentig, Mein Leben. Eine Dienstreise
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 355–356; and Grobba, Männer und Mächte,
209–211.
65
See BA-MA: RW5–350, OKW, Nr. 0888/40, Aussenpolitische Übersicht, Entwicklung der
aussenpolitischen Lage im Monat Juli 1940, 5. August 1940. See also the unidentified agent
(Vertrauensmänner) reports from the spring of 1941 in BA-MA: RW49–594.
Arab world. This naturally produced a slight change in the tenor of German-
Italian relations, with Germany taking on a somewhat more active role in Axis
decision making toward the Arab world. Germany’s greater military commit-
ment in the Middle East in 1941 occurred despite Hitler’s simultaneous prep-
arations for the assault on the Soviet Union (code name Operation Barbarossa)
and the expected conquest of German Lebensraum in eastern Europe, origin-
ally planned for May 1941. Although Britain’s refusal to surrender meant that
the war in western Europe had not yet been brought entirely to a successful
conclusion, Hitler was confident in late October 1940 that it was only a matter
of time before an isolated Britain would give up. He abandoned for the time
being plans for an invasion of the British Isles, and reasoned that a quick
elimination of the Soviet Union would likely force London to sue for peace.
Moreover, in October 1940 he hoped to be able to quickly end the war in the
Mediterranean with an Axis victory in Egypt, the closing of the Suez Canal, and
possibly the taking of Gibraltar in cooperation with Franco’s Spain.66 He likely
assumed that all of this would occur in a relatively short period of time so that
he would still be able to launch his assault on the Soviet Union by the beginning
of the summer of 1941.
However, Hitler was forced to face the negative impact of Italy’s disastrous
invasions of Egypt in mid- September and Greece some six weeks later. As
observed earlier, the Nazi regime had previously cautioned Mussolini the year
before to avoid a second front in the Mediterranean until after a successful war
against Britain and France. That this prerequisite appeared to Hitler to have
been achieved by the fall of 1940 accounts for his general confidence that the
Axis could end the war against Britain in the Mediterranean in the fall and
winter of 1940–1941, without disrupting plans for the invasion of the Soviet
Union. However, the Italian invasion of Egypt was decisively turned back by
reinforced British forces in Egypt by December 1940. The British then moved
across the border into Libya, captured much of the Italian command and many
of its troops, and took control of much of Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) by the end
of January 1941.67 To further complicate matters for the Germans, Mussolini
also launched his unsuccessful invasion of Greece on October 28. It was
repulsed by the Greeks with some assistance from the British navy in the eastern
Mediterranean. In brief, before the end of 1940, as Nazi preparations for a
massive assault on the Soviet Union were getting under way, Hitler was forced
to confront two significant Italian defeats in the eastern Mediterranean and the
Arab world, defeats that also represented significant victories for the British.
Moreover, Italian losses in Egypt and Greece between September 1940
and January 1941 would compromise Italy’s ostensible political and military
leadership of the Axis in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Of necessity,
66
Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 97–98.
67
See Weinberg, A World at Arms, 201–212; and Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the
Arab East, 98.
photo 5.4. Erwin Rommel and Afrikakorps arrive in Tripoli (February 1941).
Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin
this would force Germany to play a more direct military and political role in
the region.68
Having previously refused German offers of an armored division to help in
the invasion of Egypt, the Italians were forced to seek German military assist-
ance in Libya in December 1940 and January 1941. Following Italy’s defeat at
the hands of the British, the possibility arose that British forces, after having
entered Cyrenaica, might soon be in a position to take all of Libya. Hitler
concluded that Germany could not permit an Italian defeat in the Mediterra-
nean and North Africa, and on December 31 assured Mussolini of Germany’s
full support.69 In meetings with his military commanders on January 8 and 9,
Hitler stated that an Italian collapse was to be avoided at all costs. Two days
later, he issued Directive No. 22 (Weisung Nr. 22) to provide military assist-
ance to Italy in Libya, in spite of the fears of some of Hitler’s generals
that sending troops and equipment to North Africa would compromise prepar-
ations for Operation Barbarossa. On February 6, 1941, Operation Sunflower
(Fall Sonnenblume) was set in motion with the order to ship substantial
numbers of German troops to North Africa. On February 12, a large German
68
See Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 71–75.
69
Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 99.
force under General Erwin Rommel arrived in Tripoli to salvage the Axis
position in North Africa and to breathe new life into the war against Britain
in the Arab world. Although Rommel was placed in command of German and
Italian troops on the ground, general military operations were still technically
under the authority of the Italian High Command in North Africa. At least in
terms of military operations, this new reality might be interpreted as the
reluctant acceptance by Germany of more responsibility in Axis decision
making in the Arab world. Particularly in time of war, the line between military
and political decision making is often blurred.
Perhaps sensing potential political changes as a result of the new military
realities in the Mediterranean and North Africa, Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of
Jerusalem, sent his private secretary, Kemal Haddad, from Baghdad back to
Berlin. Haddad left Baghdad on January 22 and arrived in Berlin via Ankara
and Rome on February 12, 1941. Sometime after his arrival in Berlin, he met
with Fritz Grobba and gave him a letter from the Mufti for Hitler.70
The content of the letter was different from the list of specific recommendations
for the Axis powers to undertake vis-à-vis the Arabs that the Mufti had sent
to the German government with Haddad the previous September. Still,
Haddad also carried with him a list of demands that more or less mirrored
those he had submitted to the Germans in the early fall of 1940. It is not known
to what extent this list and its contents were discussed in his meetings with
officials in the German Foreign Office.71
The letter to Hitler was dated January 20, 1941 and seemed to pursue a
different, much more indirect and diplomatic approach. It began with
al-Husayni reminding the Führer of the incalculable strategic value of the Arab
lands in the Middle East to the strength and security of the British Empire,
and the degree to which past Anglo-French dominance of the Arab lands had
actually strengthened the strategic bonds between London and Paris. Referring
specifically to the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt, the Mufti
juxtaposed the enormous strategic advantages that Britain reaped from control
of these Arab lands to the determination of the Arab people to end that control.
As he would always do for the duration of the war, the Mufti claimed to speak
for all Arabs when he promised that the Arab people would take up arms as the
loyal ally of the Axis powers against the British. Perhaps mindful of the
challenging strategic position in the Arab world in which the Germans found
themselves in early 1941, al-Husayni was likely trying in a more indirect way to
solicit from Hitler the still missing formal commitment to, and declaration of,
Axis support for full Arab independence. Without submitting any specific
requests or demands this time, the Mufti was asking the German government
70
Gerhard Höpp (ed.), Mufti-Papiere. Briefe, Memoranden, Reden und Aufrufe Amin al-Husainis
aus dem Exil, 1940–1945 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), 20–23. The original letter,
dated January 20, 1941, was in French.
71
See Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 109.
to begin a process of negotiations with him for future cooperation: “By sending
my private secretary to the German government, I am seizing this opportunity
with the aim, in the name of the strongest Arab organization and in my own
name, to begin the negotiations necessary for a sincere and trustworthy cooper-
ation in all areas.”72
Sometime before Haddad’s arrival in Berlin on February 12, the German
Foreign Office addressed the political situation in the Middle East, in light of
the negative military realities for the Axis in the region. In December 1940, in a
year-end summary of German Middle East policy, the Foreign Office in Berlin
recognized the contradictions in Germany’s relationships with both Italy and
the Arab world. On the one hand, the summary recognized Arab nationalism
as Germany’s natural ally, while on the other it noted that Italy rejected
“. . .the written recognition of the independence of the Arab states and
their right to form a union. . .”73 Nevertheless, the summary concluded that
Germany must continue to follow Italy’s lead in the Arab world: “The line
of German policy is therefore settled, to leave to Italy the unconditional lead in
political matters in the Arab area.” Heading into 1941, therefore, Germany
chose to continue following the Italian lead on the question of Axis recognition
of future Arab independence, namely that there should be no formal, public
commitment to the sovereignty and independence of the Arab states in a
postwar world. Informal, general, and highly emotional statements in Axis
propaganda expressing sympathy for Arabs suffering under British colonial
rule and their quest for independence would be the accepted approach. In a
May 22, 1941 meeting in the German Foreign Office that dealt with propa-
ganda, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop reiterated that in the Arab world
Germany had to consider the interests of the Vichy French government,
particularly in Syria. He stipulated that “. . .the propaganda toward the Arab
world must for the time being be strengthened only to the extent that freedom
only in the most general sense is mentioned.”74
On February 4, 1941, von Ribbentrop asserted that: “We must now as
before pay special attention to Italian sensitivities in policy toward the
Arabs.”75 Yet, von Ribbentrop also observed that since the Italians had been
ignoring the Arab question, Germany should take the initiative in certain cases,
albeit with proper notification of the Italian government, followed by due
deference to Italian leadership and interests on these issues. He also favored
72
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 22.
73
PA: R29882, Büro des Unterstaatssekretärs, Irak, Bd. 1, Zusammenstellung für die Besprechung
beim Herrn Staatssekretär am 9. Dezember 1940, Die deutsche Politik in Arabien.
74
PA: R67482, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Verbindungsmann RAM, Bd. 7, Aufzeichnung
betr. Sitzung beim Herrn RAM über die Propaganda nach den unter Joche Großbritanniens
stehenden Ländern, 22. Mai 1941.
75
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung des U.St.S., Pol. Nr. 54, 4. Februar
1941.
in principle sending some weapons to Iraq, but recognized that finding a safe
transport route for the weapons would be problematic. He approved of pro-
viding the Mufti in Baghdad with financial support, but only if Italy was in
agreement. After ordering full cooperation with the OKW, von Ribbentrop
approved immediate consultations with the Italian Foreign Ministry following
the forthcoming talks with Haddad upon his arrival in Berlin. The Italian
embassy in Berlin soon informed the German Foreign Office that Italy had
approved sending some weapons to Iraq, as well as the provision of money for
the Mufti in Baghdad. However, the government in Rome did not necessarily
wish to push the Iraqi government into a war with Great Britain at that time,
especially since British forces could easily take over the rest of Iraq and thus
improve Britain’s strategic position in the region.76
Still, Berlin wrestled with the conflicting issues of loyalty to the imperial
interests in the Arab world of its Italian ally, and the demands of potentially
useful, but as yet ill-defined, Arab allies. Aware of this conflict, Under State
Secretary Woermann sought the advice of Otto Abetz in Paris regarding the
same issues in Germany’s relations with Vichy France.77 Woermann’s initiative
was the result of recent deliberations in Berlin, probably instigated by Haddad’s
visit to Berlin as the Mufti’s representative, over whether Germany should go
beyond its weak and largely meaningless statement from the previous fall
regarding the future of the Arab world, and move closer to the Mufti’s demands
for a formal Axis commitment to an independent Arab union. Woermann told
Abetz that German commitments to Italy precluded the sort of action that the
Mufti desired, and that it was likely the case with regard to Vichy French
interests in Syria as well. Woermann even alluded to a similar situation for
French Indochina and the imperial interests there of Germany’s Japanese ally.
Nevertheless, Woermann sought Abetz’s advice on the likely impact on France
and Syria of an official German statement of support for a future independent
Arab union in the Fertile Crescent. Of course, Abetz was opposed to any official
statement of German support for Arab independence.
On March 7, 1941, Woermann issued a lengthy analysis of, and suggestions
for, future German policy toward the Arabs. The eighteen-page document
emphasized from the very beginning Germany’s most important single goal in
the Arab world, namely the defeat of Great Britain, as follows: “The task reads:
to work out a recommendation for the further handling of the Arab question,
especially how this problem should be dealt with in conjunction with our goal
to defeat England.”78 The report also confined its analysis to Saudi Arabia,
76
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., R29539, Arabien, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung des U.St.S., Pol. Nr. 137, 21.
Februar 1941.
77
PA: R29882, Büro des Unterstaatssekretärs, Irak, Bd. 1, Woermann/Berlin an DB/Paris, Ferns-
chreiben, 25. Februar 1941.
78
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, Aufzeichnung zur arabischen Frage, Pol.VII 123 g
Rs., 7. März 1941.
Yemen, the various Arab territories on the rim of the Arabian Peninsula, as well
as the states of the Fertile Crescent, which included Iraq, Palestine, Transjor-
dan, Syria, and Lebanon. Egypt and the Sudan were recognized as Arab states
that would be referred to in the report from time to time, while the other Arab
states of North Africa, under French and Italian rule, naturally were omitted.
In a summary of nine recommendations at the end of the document, the report
first reaffirmed Italy’s lead role in Axis policy in the Arab world; but it departed
from past practice by asserting that Germany would undertake stronger initia-
tives in certain questions, albeit always in consultation with the Italian govern-
ment. It also announced a stepped-up effort in German propaganda in the Arab
world, as well as increased German intelligence activities, acts of sabotage, and
efforts to foment revolts in Palestine and Transjordan. In addressing what had
become the most urgent demand of the Mufti and some of his Iraqi supporters,
the report called for further consideration of the possibility of a joint German-
Italian political declaration. However, it would fall far short of meeting Arab
hopes because it did not endorse a clear statement of German or Axis support
for Arab independence. On the question of recognizing a future, unified Arab
state or federation, Woermann did not raise any objections in principle, but
nevertheless concluded: “A declaration fully in harmony with Arab wishes for a
Greater Arab Empire based on a federation is, in view of the policies of Italy
and other states, currently not possible.”79 It proposed further examination of
the possibility of sending weapons to some Arab states, as well approval of
financial assistance for the Mufti. Sensitive to Italian wishes, it also suggested
caution in the matter of encouraging an Iraqi uprising against British forces
stationed there, until such time as it would have a good chance of success.
Finally, the report called for official German representation on the Italian
Cease-Fire Commission in Syria, and German-Italian-French cooperation in
expelling pro–de Gaulle French civil servants and military officers from Syria.
Thus in the spring of 1941, Germany was prepared to pursue some new
military and intelligence initiatives in the Middle East, independent of the
Italians, designed to bolster German and Axis military efforts against the British
in the region. However, these initiatives were not meant to substantially
enhance Germany’s political role in the area, nor were they meant to secure
in any way the future independence of the Arab states. It remained to be seen
how the military significance of Rommel’s Afrika-Korps for the Axis war effort
in North Africa would affect Axis political strategy and policy toward the
79
Ibid. Just a week before the circulation of this report, the German ambassador in Paris, Otto
Abetz, had warned his colleagues in Berlin that any German declaration of support for an
independent Greater Arab Empire would only help the strong pro–de Gaulle movement in Syria.
He also warned that such a declaration would at the same time alienate the Vichy government,
which would view it as a violation of the cease-fire agreement that recognized continued French
authority in its colonies and mandates. See PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, DB/Paris
an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 684, für Unterstaatssekretär Woermann, 28. Februar 1941.
Arabs. Moreover, military and other preparations for the massive assault on
the Soviet Union tended to preclude much more in terms of Germany’s military
commitment beyond Rommel’s current campaign in North Africa, plans for
greater military intelligence in the region, and the shipment of some weapons to
the Iraqi government and transfer of money to the Mufti’s organization in
Baghdad. Woermann, vonWeizsäcker, and von Ribbentrop recognized this
reality in their discussions on the Middle East in March, one that von Weiz-
säcker summed up with the statement: “How best to use the Arab movement
against England depends on the greater problem of Germany-Russia.”80
The German Foreign Office and German military intelligence did indeed
come together in the spring of 1941 to plan for an expanded and cooperative
intelligence effort in the Middle East. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris outlined the
specific components of this joint effort in late March, which included the
following: expanded intelligence gathering in the region, especially in Turkey,
Syria, Iraq, and Egypt; sabotage in Palestine against power plants, pump
stations for oil pipelines, factories, and electricity and water installations, as
well as against English supply lines; the incitement of unrest in Palestine and
Transjordan through the provision of weapons and money; and the search for
ways to get weapons into Iraq.81 Of course, such operations were not intended
for Syria where Vichy France still exercised control.82 Moreover, this
heightened German intelligence agenda was to be carried out while providing
the Italians with only the most general information, but not necessarily the
details, of each specific activity. Nevertheless, these actions alone were deemed
insufficient to break the British hold on the lands of the Fertile Crescent, Egypt,
and the Arabian Peninsula. Again, as von Weizsäcker observed in his March 12
communication with von Ribbentrop, the only threat to Britain’s position in
the Arab world would be the breakthrough of an enemy great power.83
The implication here, of course, was that Germany’s military capabilities alone,
and certainly not an Arab revolt, remained in the end the only hope for
defeating Great Britain in the Middle East.
In early 1941, one significant indicator of a more or less continuing “busi-
ness as usual” political approach from Berlin toward the Arab world involved
something that would not have cost the German government much of anything
in terms of military resources. For the second time in less than a year, in part in
deference to the political and strategic interests of Italy and the Vichy
80
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, Weizsäcker an den Herrn Reichsaußenminister, 12.
März 1941.
81
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, OKW, Amt Ausland/Abw., Nr. 526/41, g.Kdos.
Abw.II/Ch., „Geplante Maßnahmen des Amts Ausland/Abwehr im vord. Orient, 25. März 1941.
82
See for instance Woermann’s memo to von Weizsäcker and von Ribbentrop of in PA: R29539,
Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, U.St.S. Pol.Nr.238, 26. März 1941.
83
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, Weizsäcker an den Herrn Reichsaußenminister, 12.
März 1941.
government in France, Hitler’s regime virtually ignored the renewed request

from the Mufti for a formal, unequivocal public declaration of Axis support for
Arab national self-determination and independence. In fact, although the
German Foreign Office had come to recognize the increasing importance of
German political activity among the Arabs and the importance of the Mufti and
his associates in that activity, it concluded that the Mufti was not the only Arab
force through which it would work. Woermann noted in a memo to von
Weizsäcker and others that: “It has been agreed that the main political route
to the Arab world should be through the Mufti and his secretary, but that
exclusivity should not be attached to this way.”84 The continued unwillingness
of the Italians to sign on to such a declaration, of course, reflected the continu-
ing incompatibility of Arab independence with Mussolini’s imperial aims in the
Mediterranean. In a sense, it also reflected Germany’s commitment to respect
those aims and to allow Italy to take the lead in policy matters in the region.
Moreover, a declaration in support for complete Arab independence would
also violate Germany’s cease-fire obligations of June 1940 to Vichy France.
These obligations included maintaining the integrity of the overseas French
empire, and thereby denying support to Free French elements in Syria. How-
ever, rapidly changing events in the Middle East beginning in April of 1941
would increase pressure on the German government to alter its position, and to
make some sort of formal commitment to Arab independence. For example,
following the successful invasion of Syria and Lebanon by British and Free
French forces in June 1941, the larger context of which is considered later in the
chapter, Germany began to move in the direction of a clearer endorsement of
Arab independence, albeit without ultimately following through.
Two events in the spring of 1941 stand out as key political defeats for the
Axis powers in the Middle East, notwithstanding the initial military successes
that German forces under Rommel would have in North Africa for the remain-
der of 1941 and much of 1942. These events were interconnected, with one
coming on the heels of the other; together, they played a significant role in the
ultimate defeat of the Axis powers in the Middle East and North Africa.
The first was the collapse of the short-lived pro-Axis coup d’etat in Iraq in
April and May of 1941, followed by the successful British invasion of Vichy-
controlled Syria and Lebanon in June.
In the fall of 1940 and winter of 1941, Britain was alarmed at what it viewed
as the pro-Axis sympathies of important members of the Iraqi government,
including Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani.85 Besides putting pressure on
the Iraqi government to sever relations with Italy, the British government also
84
PA: R29539, Büro des St.S., Arabien, Bd.1, U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 240, Woermann an St.S., Botsch.
Ritter, Ges. Von Rintelen, LR Kramarz, LR Schlobies, 26. März 1941.
85
See Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq, 1932–1958: A Study in Iraqi Politics (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), 159–205; and Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 105–
111.
tried to dissuade the Iraqi government from reestablishing diplomatic relations

with Germany and purchasing German weapons. The British were also uncom-
fortable with the relationship between some members of al-Gaylani’s govern-
ment and the Mufti of Jerusalem who had been living in exile in Baghdad since
October 1939. While some important Iraqi officials, such as General Nuri Said,
were pro-British, and in fact wanted Iraq to end its neutrality by declaring war
on the Axis powers, al-Gaylani and some others at that time appear to have
favored maintaining Iraqi neutrality in the war and friendly relations with both
Germany and Italy. In brief, there appears to have been a contentious mix of
opinion within the Iraqi government toward the two sides in the war. In any
case, the combination of political in-fighting and instability within the Iraqi
bureaucracy, coupled with the wartime presence of the British in Iraq and its
role in this domestic political uncertainty, and the diplomatic activities of the
Mufti from Baghdad, ultimately led to Rashid Ali al-Gaylani’s successful but
short-lived coup on April 1 and April 2, 1941.
An Iraqi request for arms from the Axis had been conveyed through the
Italian embassy in Baghdad in December 1940.86 It asked mainly for captured
English weapons and ammunition that would be more compatible with the
British arms already used by the Iraqi military. The al-Gaylani government also
made inquiries to Japanese diplomats in Teheran about possible arms pur-
chases. When these December initiatives received little if any response from
Rome or Berlin, al-Gaylani and his supporters in the Iraqi government attached
their request for arms assistance to the Mufti’s initiative with Hitler in January
1941. To reiterate, the Mufti’s January 20 letter to Hitler, delivered in Berlin by
his private secretary Kemal Haddad, stressed among other things the readiness
of the Arabs to take up arms against the “common enemy,” Great Britain. By
late January and early February 1941, things had changed dramatically for the
worse for the Axis powers since the fall of 1940. The magnitude of Britain’s
military victory over the Italian army in Egypt and Libya in the winter of 1940–
1941, coupled with Italy’s simultaneously humiliating defeat in Greece, and the
commitment of significant German military forces to North Africa in order to
avoid a total Axis collapse in the region, placed the Iraqi request for arms
support in a new context. More importantly, Germany could no longer avoid
playing a greater role in the formulation of Axis policy toward the Arabs.
The rather meaningless Axis references to Arab national self-determination,
contained in the joint German-Italian declaration of October 23, 1940 and in
Axis propaganda, along with an earlier reluctance to supply weapons to Arab
nationalists, specifically to the Mufti and to the Iraqi government, would have
to be reexamined in Berlin.
In wartime Berlin, Fritz Grobba still had considerable influence in the
German Foreign Office with regard to Iraq and the Arab world. Long an
86
Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 108–109.
advocate for a greater German role in the Middle East, Grobba tended to
support the idea that the Mufti was respected and influential throughout
the Arab world, particularly in Iraq. In his mid-February 1941 report on
discussions with Kemal Haddad, the Mufti’s private secretary, Grobba
attached the following observation, the author of which is unknown, on al-
Husayni’s influence: “Through his superior intelligence and his multiple per-
sonal activities, he has achieved in the northern Arab countries (Iraq, Syria,
Palestine and Transjordan) such a significant position that he is recognized
today as their spokesman.”87 With the war in North Africa hanging in the
balance in the first half of 1941, Germany had few options in the Middle East,
beyond the Palestinian Mufti of Jerusalem living in exile in Baghdad since 1939,
and some of the pro-Axis members of the Iraqi government, among them
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. Britain, however, was increasing its military strength
in and around Iraq, and appeared to be relatively strong in Palestine and
Transjordan. In Egypt, British reinforcements were moving into the country
to resist Rommel’s threat from Libya, and the Egyptian government seemed
generally supportive of the British war effort. In Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea
there appeared to be no threat to the British position, while the continued rule
of Vichy France in Syria and Lebanon precluded any Axis support for Arab
nationalism there. Thus, with the presence of the Mufti and al-Gaylani, along
with their supporters and organizations in Baghdad, the only Arab state that
appeared to be open in 1941 for Axis political and military inroads was Iraq.
Because of its geography, Iraq’s future role in German plans for the Fertile
Crescent was inextricably linked to the situation in Syria. The only feasible
route in wartime for the shipment of weapons from Germany or Italy to Iraq,
by air or by sea, was through neighboring Syria. Turkey wished to preserve its
neutrality, the Soviet Union would soon be at war with Germany, and Iran
would be partially occupied by British and Soviet troops beginning on August
25, 1941. In any case, Germany started to receive specific requests in late
January 1941 from some Iraqi military commanders and from Rashid Ali
al-Gaylani via Italian diplomats in Baghdad and the Italian Foreign Ministry
in Rome. The Italian ambassador in Berlin handed one such request to Under
State Secretary Woermann on January 27.88 At that time, the Iraqis assumed
that the shipments could reach Iraq via the Soviet Union, provided Turkey and
Iran remained out of the war. The request called for light machine guns with
ammunition, tanks, anti-aircraft batteries, anti-tank weapons, mines, and gas
masks. While the Iraqis preferred captured British arms that would match their
own British-provided weapons, they indicated that they could adapt their needs
87
PA: Büro des RAM, Aufzeichnung (Geheim), (no date). It is likely that Grobba himself authored
this comment, and that this view was generally shared in Abteilung VII, the Near East depart-
ment in the German Foreign Office.
88
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung Woermanns, U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 12, 27.
Januar 1941.
to German and Italian weapons if need be. By early March, however, the
Foreign Office in Berlin realized that it would be difficult to substantially arm
the Iraqis. Abteilung VII was informed by the OKW that it possessed only small
amounts of captured British weapons and that what it did have had been put
aside for possible future operations in Ireland.89 The OKW also stated that the
requirements of the German military made the new production of arms for
other countries very difficult, but that nevertheless weapons of German caliber
could be found for shipment to Iraq. The main problem, however, was finding a
possible transport route over which to send the weapons that Iraq wished to
purchase. The Soviet Union would not permit such transports through its
territory, while the German embassy in Ankara reported that Turkey would
not permit the transport of weapons bound for Iraq through its territory.
The Turks would permit the transit of goods officially declared as destined
for Iran or Afghanistan, but this would in the opinion of Abteilung VII prove to
be too complicated.90
In April, there were several new developments that had a significant impact
on Germany’s strategic position in the region. Perhaps most importantly,
another military coup d’etat occurred in Baghdad in which the Axis-leaning
former Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and his nationalist supporters
seized power.91 At that time, Iraq was the only Arab state besides Libya in
which Germany and Italy had any chance of retaining or gaining a foothold
from which to militarily threaten Britain’s position in the Middle East. A few
days later, on April 6, the Germans launched their invasion of the Balkans
through Yugoslavia toward Greece. Finally, on April 9, the German Foreign
Office in Berlin began to push Hitler for the shipment of arms to al-Gaylani’s
new pro-Axis government. Woermann sent a memorandum to von Ribbentrop
and von Weizsäcker expressing his impatience with Italian timidity and indeci-
sion in the matter of supplying arms to the new Iraqi government. He recom-
mended that the Italian government inform Prime Minister al-Gaylani that
Germany and Italy were following his actions with the greatest sympathy,
that they advised the prime minister to begin armed resistance against England
as soon as circumstances permitted and success seemed assured, and that
Germany and Italy intended to begin supplying Iraq with arms as soon as the
problem of finding suitable transport routes to Iraq was overcome.92
89
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung Ripkens “Prüfung der Möglichkeiten und
Wege für Waffenlieferungen nach dem Irak,” HaPol 100/41, 6 März 1941.
90
91
For good overviews of Iraqi domestic political issues, institutions, and personalities involved in
the April 1941 Baghdad coup, see Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism, (complete); and Hirszowicz,
The Third Reich and the Arab East, chap. 8.
92
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Woermann an von Ribbentrop und von Weizsäcker,
U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 289, 9. April 1941.
Woermann further stipulated that Germany and Italy should be ready to

provide any financial support that the new Iraqi regime might need.
However, two weeks later, on April 25, the German embassy in Rome
conveyed to Berlin the contents of a note from the Italian ambassador in
Baghdad to the Italian Foreign Ministry. The Italian ambassador described a
meeting he recently had with al-Gaylani and the Mufti in Baghdad.93 Al-Gaylani
described the influx of British troops from India into Iraq, and Britain’s intention
to topple his government. He expressed his frustration with the apparent Axis
reluctance to heed his calls for immediate arms assistance before the outbreak of
fighting between British and Iraqi forces. Furthermore, al-Gaylani asked that a
German general staff officer be sent secretly to Baghdad, and that German and
Italian Arabic-language radio broadcasts to the Middle East be intensified to
counter British radio broadcasts. He asked that Germany vigorously promote
the message about Iraqi determination to resist Britain’s reoccupation of Iraq
and that the Axis powers were determined to provide full support for Iraqi
resistance. The following day, however, Woermann reported that a representa-
tive of the OKW told him that Hitler had determined it was too late to assist the
government in Baghdad in view of the arrival in Iraq of substantial numbers of
British troops, including two divisions of Indian troops. Woermann, however,
contested that assessment, arguing that in fact far fewer British troops than was
previously reported had landed in Iraq and that: “The situation today,
according to the most recent reports of the Italian ambassador in Baghdad, is
such that German weapons assistance for the Iraqi government and army is fully
welcome.”94 It is difficult to ascertain whether the problem was Italian indiffer-
ence, German uncertainty, the lack of a German presence, diplomatic or other-
wise, in the Iraqi capital, or some combination of all three.
By the end of April, the German Foreign Office expressed frustration that, in
the absence of diplomatic relations, it had been difficult to communicate
directly with Iraqi officials. What communication there was came and went
mostly through the Italian embassy in Baghdad via Rome, or somewhat more
directly through the German embassy in Ankara. With this in mind, von
Ribbentrop jumped into the fray on April 27 to try to sort things out through
communications with the German embassies in Ankara and Rome. He
instructed the embassy in Ankara to ask the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey to
either take it upon himself to engage in discussions about German arms
assistance for Iraq, or to have the government in Baghdad send someone to
Ankara to do so.95 He further stipulated that the Foreign Ministry intended
93
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 907, Streng
geheim, 25. April 1941.
94
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung Woermanns, U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 350, Über
Büro RAM für Sonnleithner, 26. April 1941.
95
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Ribbentrop/Sonderzug an DB/Ankara, Telegramm Nr.
345, 27. April 1941.
to send Fritz Grobba, the former German ambassador to Iraq, to Ankara

to discuss the situation with the appropriate Iraqi representatives. Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop advised that the Italian government should only be
told that Berlin was attempting to establish separate contacts with the Iraqi
regime, but that it should not be given details. His instructions to the German
embassy in Rome were twofold: to convey to the Iraqi government through the
Italian embassy in Baghdad Germany’s assurances of full sympathy for the
current Iraqi government, the Iraqi army, and the Iraqi people in their struggle
against England, and that the Baghdad government could expect further com-
munications shortly; and to inform the Italian government that Germany was
ready to provide financial assistance to the government in Baghdad, and that it
would consider the matter of providing weapons and munitions.96 In other
words, Germany could not yet formally commit itself to provide arms assist-
ance to the al-Gaylani government in Iraq without first securing Hitler’s
approval. Of course, none of this activity included suggestions for an official
public commitment by Germany and Italy to support complete Arab independ-
ence after the war.
On the same day that von Ribbentrop contacted the embassies in Ankara
and Rome, he also sent a detailed message to Hitler requesting permission to
begin the process of supplying arms and money to the al-Gaylani government in
Baghdad. He informed Hitler that the Iraqis were especially interested in
German air support should hostilities break out between the Iraqi army and
British forces already in and near Iraq. He also said the weapons were available,
largely from stocks that had been reserved for Iran and Afghanistan, as well as
French weapons available in Syria through the Italian Control Commission
there. He also informed Hitler that plans for German air support for Iraq were
being prepared and coordinated with the Luftwaffe. Further military interven-
tion on the part of the Axis would likely have to take place via Syria, something
that would depend on future German-French relations. But von Ribbentrop
also mentioned the caution with which Germany should proceed in Iraq before
any outbreak of violence between the Iraqis and the British: “Under no circum-
stances should the Iraqi government be induced into an open conflict against
England unless it is certain that, with the help of the Axis, Iraq is strong enough
to be able to hold its own against the English.”97 On May 3, von Ribbentrop
received the approval of General Wilhelm Keitel, chief of the OKW, as well as
the full support of Hitler for military assistance to the Iraq government.98
That same day, he suggested to Hitler that Fritz Grobba be secretly sent to
96
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Ribbentrop/Sonderzug an DB/Rom, Telegramm Nr.
346, 27. April 1941.
97
PA: R28865, Büro des RAM, Irak, Bd.-, Notiz für den Führer Betr. Vorgänge im Irak, Ribben-
trop/Wien, 27. April 1941.
98
PA: R28865, Büro des RAM, Irak, Bd.-, Der Chef der OKW (Keitel) an RAM, F.H.Qu., 3. Mai
1941; and Notiz für den Herrn Reichsaussenminister, 3. Mai 1941.
Baghdad with a small staff to establish contact with the Iraqi regime and to help
instigate an Arab revolt against the British in the Fertile Crescent that would
assist the efforts of Rommel’s forces in North Africa. To avoid the kind of
publicity that would surround his return to Baghdad, Grobba was to travel
under the name of Franz Gehrcke. Hitler approved, and Grobba with several
assistants left Berlin on May 7. Along with several fighter aircraft, Grobba and
his staff arrived in Baghdad on May 11.99
Hitler’s Directive No. 30 (Weisung Nr. 30) on the Middle East of May 23,
1941 is instructive both for its timing as well as for its content.100 By that date,
the battle between British and Iraqi forces had been underway for almost three
weeks, and the complete defeat of the Iraqis and overthrow of al-Gaylani’s
regime was about a week away. Yet the content of Hitler’s directive might lead
one to conclude that Germany’s intervention in Iraq was meant to be both
timely and decisive. After a long statement about the natural alliance between
the Arab liberation movement and the German Reich against England, and the
strategic importance of Iraq to an Axis victory, Hitler announced: “I have
therefore decided to move developments in the Middle East forward through
support of Iraq.”101 In the firm belief that the forthcoming Operation
Barbarossa would be brief and successful, Hitler suggested that after its victory
in Russia, Germany would then be in a position, if needed, to eliminate the
British from the areas west of the Suez Canal. The directive goes on to describe
the military and civilian agencies responsible for Germany’s forthcoming pres-
ence in Iraq, the role of the German Luftwaffe, the delivery of weapons from
and through Syria, continued cooperation with Italian military officials in Iraq,
and a somewhat revised statement for German propaganda purposes in the
Arab world.
A special military mission, with the code name “Sonderstab-F” and a staff
of more than forty, was set up in Sunion near Athens. Under the command of
General Helmuth Felmy, the task of Sonderstab-F was to oversee German
military support for Iraq against the British, and to establish contact with and
support for Arab organizations, and to use them in support of later German
military operations in the Middle East.102 Hitler reiterated the necessity for
cooperation between the Foreign Office in Berlin and the OKW in crafting
German propaganda in the region, and suggested: “The basic idea for propa-
ganda: The victory of the Axis will bring to the lands of the Middle East
liberation from the English yoke and with it the right to self-determination.
99
100
BA-MA: RW4–535, Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, OKW/WFSt/Abt.
L (Iop) Nr. 44772/41 gK Chefs., Weisung Nr. 30: Mittlerer Orient, 23. Mai 1941. This
Directive, No. 30, is also printed in Domarus, Reden, Bd. IV, 1719–1720.
101
Ibid.
102
See NARA: MS/P-207 (Felmy), complete. See also Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und
Hakenkreuz, 91–93.
Whoever loves freedom will join the front against England.”103 Aside
from the fact that it was already too late for the sort of significant German
military and political intervention that might tip the balance against the
British in Iraq, Hitler’s statement about winning the right to “self-
determination” for the Arabs did not necessarily commit Germany to real
Arab independence after the war. In fact, the only reality that it did reflect was
Hitler’s apparent acceptance, in late May 1941, of possible military advan-
tages for the Axis in a widespread Arab uprising against the British in the
Fertile Crescent.
On May 2, the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara notified the German embassy
there that fighting had broken out that day between Iraqi and British troops,
and that the government in Baghdad had broken off diplomatic relations with
London.104 He also asked the German embassy to request the immediate
sending of Fritz Grobba with assistants to Baghdad, and the reestablishment
of German-Iraqi relations. In terms of needed military assistance, the Iraqi
government asked specifically for air support to prevent further landing of
British reinforcements in Basra in southern Iraq, not far from the northern tip
of the Persian Gulf. German air support was also needed to clear the British
from Iraqi airfields. The same urgent requests for immediate German diplo-
matic, financial, and military assistance were made by Iraqi officials via the
German embassy in Teheran.105 Perhaps the most realistic and sobering
assessment of the situation in Iraq and the possible repercussions for the
German war effort came from the German embassy in Ankara during those
early days in May 1941.106 Hans Kroll, the First Counselor in the German
embassy in Ankara, held meetings attended by the Iraqi ambassador and
Turkish officials to discuss the situation in Iraq. Kroll noted the pessimism
of the Iraqi ambassador who expressed fears that for military and domestic
political reasons, and because German assistance had not yet arrived in the
needed quantities, Iraq would not be able to hold out against the British.
Kroll observed that the Iraqis underestimated the organizational and trans-
port difficulties of providing the necessary assistance. He also reported that
Turkey was uneasy about the conflict in Iraq, expressed its preference for an
end to hostilities, and offered to mediate a diplomatic solution. Kroll
also pointed to the importance of prestige in the eyes of the Arab people in
the context of the conflict in Iraq.
103
Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 91–93.
104
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Ankara an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 487, Ganz
besonders dringend, 2. Mai 1941.
105
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DG/Teheran an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 328, 4. Mai
1941; and Telegramm Nr. 336, 5. Mai 1941.
106
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Ankara an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 504, 6. Mai
1941.
From Rome as well, the German embassy sent similarly worrisome reports
based on information sent by the Italian embassy in Baghdad to the Italian
Foreign Ministry.107 Iraqi morale was reported as low due to falling confidence
in the Iraqi military in the face of growing British military power in Iraq, and
little if any visible support from the Axis powers. Indeed, on May 1, at the start
of the fighting between British and Iraqi forces, the German High Command
(OKH) had issued a very negative report on the military strength and prepared-
ness of the Iraqi army, even with the modest military support it had already
received from Italy and Germany, and warned: “However, without foreign
support, primarily weapons and munitions as well as financial means, Iraqi
resistance will soon suffer defeat.”108
It was clear even before the middle of May that Vichy-controlled Syria
would have to be the primary route for German military assistance to reach
Iraq. The Foreign Office in Berlin also pressured the Vichy government to allow
the immediate transfer to Iraq of French military equipment stored in Syria.109
On May 8, German Ambassador Abetz informed the Iraqi ambassador to
Vichy France that, in spite of technical difficulties, the first German air trans-
ports would likely begin their journey to Iraq the following day, and that the
delivery of weapons would soon follow.110 On May 9, several German fighter
aircraft accompanying Grobba on his way to Baghdad did indeed land in
Aleppo, Syria. Abetz mentioned in his note that he did not tell the Iraqi
ambassador about the recent agreement, known as the Paris Protocols, which
had just been concluded between Germany and Vichy France regarding, among
other things, the shipment of German arms to Iraq via Syria. By May 5, the
Vichy government had agreed in principle to turn over to Iraq French arms
stored in Syria since the cease-fire agreement in June of the previous year, and to
permit German aircraft to use Syrian airfields on their way from Europe to Iraq.
On May 6, orders from Vichy went out to the French High Commissioner in
Syria, General Dentz, to permit German aircraft to land in Syria. These oper-
ations were to be kept secret from the British which, of course, would prove to
be an impossible task. Further discussions took place at a meeting between
Vichy Vice-Premier Admiral Darlan, Hitler, and von Ribbentrop at
Berchtesgaden on May 11 and 12, which led to the Paris Protocols of May 23.
The Paris Protocols considered a number of areas for broadening French-
German collaboration, in part within the context of the situation in Iraq.
107
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1059, 9. Mai
1941.
108
BA-MA: R2–1767, Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Nr. 1714/41 geh.,
“Vorläufige kurze Orientierung über den Irak,” 1. Mai 1941.
109
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 366, Woermann an RAM, St.S.,
Botschafter Ritter, 3. Mai 1941.
110
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1430, 9. Mai
1941.
The Protocols reiterated Vichy France’s agreement to send to Iraq war materials
stored in Syria, and to allow the landing and refueling of German and Italian
aircraft in Syria and Axis use of Syrian ports, roads, and railways for shipments
to Iraq. The agreement also provided for the training in Syria of Iraqi soldiers
with French arms, the sharing of French intelligence with the OKW, and the
joint defense of Syria and Lebanon in the event of a British attack. In return, the
Axis agreed to the rearming of French forces in Syria beyond the limits imposed
by the cease-fire agreement.111 The British, of course, very quickly learned of
Germany’s use of Syria as a transit route to Iraq for Axis officials and arms
assistance. This set the stage the following month for the British and Free
French invasion and occupation of Syria and Lebanon, the same month that
the German invasion of the Soviet Union commenced.
It would appear to be self-defeating for the Vichy government to do anything
that might help an independent Arab nationalist regime in neighboring Iraq,
especially one that was playing host in Baghdad to the more pan-Arab nation-
alism of the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem. Vichy France was determined to main-
tain the French empire; a victorious and truly independent Iraq, along with a
strengthened pan-Arab movement under the Mufti operating out of Iraq, would
be an obvious threat to continued French control over Syria and Lebanon.
Nevertheless, nothing in Axis policy in Iraq in 1940 and 1941 indicated any
degree of support for a greater Arab union or state in the Fertile Crescent.
As indicated earlier, both the Italians and the Germans had refused to formally
and unequivocally commit to Arab independence and unity anywhere in the
Middle East by June 1941. Moreover, Germany had clearly recognized its
own interest in supporting the continuation of French colonial rule in Syria,
Lebanon, and North Africa, and remained the only great power supporter of
the Vichy regime and its determination to retain the French overseas empire
more or less intact. Finally, German support for Vichy rule in Syria and
Lebanon was clear in late 1940 and through the first half of 1941 when Berlin
began to assert a somewhat stronger voice in the formulation of Axis policy in
the Fertile Crescent, specifically in Iraq and Syria. Any apparent contradictions
between that support and German recognition of Italian imperial ambitions in
the Mediterranean region, and more frequent but consistently vague and non-
committal statements about the common interests of Germany, the Axis, and
the Arab people in the Middle East, could be overlooked so long as the war
continued and Britain remained undefeated.
At the end of 1940, as part of a somewhat more assertive role in Axis policy
in the Middle East following Italy’s recent collapse in Egypt and Libya, the
German Foreign Office sought a greater role in the International Armistice
Commission in Syria that was dominated by thirty-eight Italian military officers
111
See Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 159–161; and Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria
and Lebanon, 99–100.
and a support staff of twenty civilians. In the fall of 1940, Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop instructed Werner-Otto von Hentig, the former head of its Near
East Department (Abteilung VII), to travel to Syria with a stop in Turkey.
His function would be to assess the situation in Syria and Lebanon, including
the threats posed by the British and the Gaullists to continued Vichy control.
In conveying the foreign minister’s instructions to von Hentig, State Secretary
von Weizsäcker cautioned him that he was expected “. . .to learn about the
situation in Turkey and in Syria, without becoming actively involved.”112
In January and February 1941, von Hentig visited Syria where he met with
leaders and other individuals from Arab and pan-Arab nationalist groups,
activities that were not appreciated by the Vichy authorities. Much of the
ground work in establishing contacts with Syrian and Lebanese Arab leaders
had been done by Rudolf Roser, a member of the Abwehr who had been sent to
Beirut in the late summer of 1940 as a German member of the Armistice
Commission.113 Needless to say, German activities in Syria and Lebanon only
heightened French concerns, particularly as von Hentig pushed French High
Commissioner General Dentz to restore some of the self-governing authority
that the Arabs had possessed before the war. In late February, and again in
early April 1941, after he had returned to Berlin, von Hentig wrote reports
summarizing the strategy he pursued during his mission in Lebanon and Syria.
He noted that he had tried to rally Syrian and Lebanese Arabs to support the
Vichy administration as the best defense against the British and Gaullist threat,
and as the best guarantee for their future independence.114 He also suggested
the creation of a formal German representation in Syria and Lebanon, and
concluded that General Dentz had come to accept his approach toward the
Arabs. In a follow-up note in early April, von Hentig further observed that
while French authorities in Syria had come to see the wisdom of some of his
suggestions, the Italians firmly opposed any degree of autonomy for the Arabs:
“This is natural, for an independent Syria is incompatible with their firmly-held
hopes to establish themselves in the country.”115 Although von Hentig argued
112
See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/26, Weizsäcker/Berlin an von Hentig (im
Amt), Pers. H 14307, 23. Oktober 1940. See also Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon,
95–98.
113
Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 92.
114
See NARA: T-120, Roll 735/351282, “Syrische Reise,” Berlin, 2. April 1941. It is not clear for
whom Hentig’s early April report was intended. See also IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig,
ED 113/26 & 34, “Groß-Arabien und die Lage in Syrien,” 26. Februar 1941; Von Hentig, Mein
Leben, 337 ff; and Nordbruch. Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 98.
115
NARA: T-120, Roll 735/351280-281, “Syrische Reise,” Berlin, 4. April 1941. For yet another
report on von Hentig’s trip to Syria, see IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, “Reise durch
Syrien Januar 1941,” Persönliches zum Sachlichen des amtlichen Berichts. Autofahrt mit George
Malouf, Kawas Schoffoer und Herrn Roser von der Waffenstillstandskommission, n.d. In this
undated report, von Hentig informs his superiors in Berlin that there are significant opportunities
for the Axis in Syria and Lebanon, and that Italian colonial ambitions must be rejected.
that the German position must be made clear to the Italians, Under State
Secretary Woermann was reluctant to confront the Italians on this issue so
soon after their defeats in North Africa. In other words, the Foreign Office in
Berlin was not ready to accept von Hentig’s suggestion that Germany make
a less ambiguous public commitment to Arab independence in Syria and
Lebanon, and perhaps beyond, in exchange for short-term Arab support for
the Vichy regime and the Axis powers for the duration of the war.
This by no means put to rest the matter of Syria and Lebanon in Germany’s
wartime Middle East policy, for von Hentig’s early April report on Syria
coincided with al-Gaylani’s coup in Iraq. If Berlin’s attention shifted somewhat
eastward to Iraq beginning in early April, Syria and Germany’s complex
relationships with Vichy France, Italy, and Syrian Arab nationalists remained
central to the deliberations of German policy makers due primarily to Syria’s
geography. Britain’s growing military strength in and near Iraq to the east and
in Palestine to the south, particularly in light of Axis hopes in North Africa with
the arrival of Rommel and the Afrika-Korps, cast Iraq and its new regime in a
considerably more important light in Axis military and political calculations.
Again, Syria would have to play a pivotal role since Syria was the only feasible
route through which significant Axis military support might reach Iraq.
Although desirous of remaining neutral in the war, the government in Vichy
nevertheless submitted to German pressure to allow passage of German equip-
ment and personnel through Syria to Iraq. From the German embassy in
France, Rudolf Rahn and several colleagues arrived in Syria on May 10,
1941 with the task of overseeing the movement of aid through Syria to Iraq.
Not surprisingly, it was not possible to keep the movement of German
aircraft and supplies to Iraq via Syria a secret from the British. Indeed, the
British government quickly learned about the very first flights of German
aircraft through Syria on May 10, and immediately confronted the Vichy
government with the possibility of a conflict with British forces to the south
and west. From Beirut, Rahn reported to Berlin on May 12 that the British
Consul-General inquired with General Dentz about the landing of several
German aircraft in Syria, to which Dentz responded with an evasive answer.116
Rahn also reached an agreement with Dentz for the transfer of significant stores
of French weapons and munitions in Syria to al-Gaylani’s forces in Iraq for use
against the British.117 Moreover, Rahn reported that Dentz put Syria on a state
of alert and concentrated troops on the southern border with British-controlled
Palestine. He also observed that while he thought French forces would resist
any British attack, he doubted that they would cooperate with the German
Luftwaffe. In an earlier telegram that same day, Rahn had described the
misgivings expressed by French authorities in Damascus over the arrival of
116
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Rahn an AA/Berlin, Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.) ohne
Nummer, (Ankunft 17.20 Uhr), 12. Mai 1941.
117
See Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 154–157.
photo 5.5. Rudolph Rahn (no date).

Courtesy Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts Berlin.
German aircraft and their tendency to linger on the ground pending further
instructions for their continuation to Iraq.118 Rahn reported that, fearing an
English attack, Dentz protested the situation to the Germans, complained that
the fuel consumption of the German planes was excessive, and threatened to
withhold fuel in the future. Indeed, the situation only seemed to become more
problematic as the days passed. A few days later, he reported that during a trip
to Iraq he was able to arrange for the shipment of needed Iraqi food and fuel
supplies for Syria, but that relations between Dentz and Rahn’s staff and
German officers in Syria remained tense. Rahn noted: “His concern above all
was directed against connections between German army personnel and Arab
agitation.”119
118
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Rahn an AA/Berlin, Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.) ohne
Nummer, (Ankunft 16.40 Uhr), 12. Mai 1941.
119
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Rahn an AA/Berlin, Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.) Nr. 16,
15. Mai 1941. That same day from Baghdad, Grobba expressed concern after having met Rahn
that needed and expected arms were not arriving from Syria, and that friction between German
military representatives and French officials in Syria continued to exist. See PA: R29619, Büro
des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Gehrcke/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Telegramm (Geh.Ch.V.) Nr. 22, 15. Mai
1941.
On May 16, with minimal German assistance having entered Iraq via Syria
in the less than a week since it started, the Foreign Office in Berlin drew up a
summary of Germany’s current and future military support for Iraq.120
The memorandum cited a series of discussions that had taken place between
the German Foreign Office and the OKW with the purpose of introducing
a skeptical military establishment to the political necessities and possibilities
of operations in Iraq. This effort apparently had involved communications
between von Ribbentrop and Hermann Göring. The report stressed the
burden born by the Luftwaffe to date in transporting materials to Iraq via
Syria, in the absence of a more desirable land route through Turkey. It pointed
mainly to Luftwaffe actions in Iraq, as well as plans to bring in German
weapons specialists to help train Iraqi troops and some general staff officers.
Finally, the report mentioned plans to move a German merchant ship currently
docked in Iran into the Shatt al-Arab, the waterway from the northern tip of the
Persian Gulf to the southern Iraqi port city of Basrah, and to sink it
there in hopes of disrupting Britain’s ability to supply its troops in Iraq.
In sum, the volume of military assistance was not particularly significant, due
in part to the limits of air transport via Syria, and reflecting the German
assumption that the Iraqi army would have to bear the brunt of the fighting.
With Operation Barbarossa set to begin in a month and efforts to strengthen
Rommel’s Afrika-Korps under way, it is not surprising that Hitler had relatively
few human and material resources to spare for Iraq.
Between May 20 and 24, discussions took place in the German embassy in
Paris between German and Vichy French officials, among them the German
General Walter Warlimont. At issue was Germany’s request to the Vichy
government for support for Germany’s efforts against Britain in Iraq, North
Africa and, in the long term, in West and Equatorial Africa. Agreements were
reached regarding Iraq/Syria and North Africa, while the third area was put off
until the following week. In reporting the results of the Paris meetings to Berlin,
German Ambassador Abetz referred to preliminary agreements with Admiral
Darlan that had set the stage for the final agreement of May 24.121 The May 24
agreement came one day after Hitler’s Directive No. 30 formally authorizing
Germany’s military commitment to an anticipated Iraqi defeat of Great Britain.
With regard to Iraq and Syria, the Vichy government agreed to: sell to Iraq
three-quarters of the stocks of French war materials still in Syria; allow German
and Italian aircraft landing rights in Syria as well as refueling capabilities, and
the German Luftwaffe use of an airport north of Aleppo; allow German use of
Syrian harbors, roads, and rail lines for the transfer of war materials to Iraq;
train Iraqi soldiers on Syrian soil in the use of French weapons; transfer to
120
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung LR Kramarz Betr.: Stand der militär-
ischen Unterstützung für den Irak, Pol. I: 1352, 16. Mai 1941.
121
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1577 (vom
23.5.), 24. Mai 1941.
Germany French intelligence information regarding British forces and military

moves; and finally to agree to further German requests for support for the war
effort in Iraq. Similar kinds of French logistical support for Axis operations in
North Africa were also part of the agreement. In return, Germany committed
itself, pending the agreement of Italy, to revise the military provisions of the
armistice agreements of the summer of 1940 in ways that would strengthen
France militarily. Details of any such revisions were not included in the report.
Finally, Abetz indicated that the subject of open French support for the Axis,
which would likely entail formal French entry into the war against Britain and
possibly America, was not part of the discussion.
Notwithstanding this apparent agreement between the Axis powers and
Vichy France for “secret” cooperation against Britain in the Fertile Crescent
and North Africa, it was merely a matter of days before military realities on the
ground made it, along with Hitler’s Directive No. 30, irrelevant. On May 29,
Grobba sent a desperate telegram from Baghdad describing Britain’s military
assault on the Iraqi capital.122 He described the rapid departure of Germans
from Baghdad and of German military officials on planes from Mosul in
northern Iraq. He also relayed al-Gaylani’s desperate appeals, albeit in vain,
for massive German Luftwaffe support in the defense of Baghdad, and argued
that at a minimum the city of Mosul must be defended if there was to be any
hope for the Axis in the Fertile Crescent. That same day, Rahn reported from
Syria that General Dentz refused to agree to allow German military officials in
Syria to appear in uniform in public. Dentz feared that the public exposure of
Franco-German military cooperation would be a further inducement for the
British to attack Syria and Lebanon.123 Pleading for instructions from Berlin,
Rahn warned that the situation in Syria was beginning to unravel:
“I fear. . .serious danger for our only resupply line and weakening of position
and loyalty of the High Commissioner.”124
From Rome, the German embassy conveyed to Berlin information from the
Italian embassy in Baghdad via the Rome Foreign Ministry that painted an
even bleaker picture for the Germans and their belated and inadequate efforts
in Syria and Iraq in 1941. The Italian ambassador reported on May 28 that al-
Gaylani was extremely bitter toward the Axis powers as Britain stood poised
to take complete control of Iraq. The Iraqi prime minister pointed to the
failure of Germany and Italy to deliver anything close to the level of assistance
122
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Gehrcke/Bagdad an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 151
(Verschlußsache), 29. Mai 1941.
123
Ribbentrop supported Dentz’s instructions two days later with an order to Rahn in Syria that
Luftwaffe aircraft in Syria were to initiate no military action against the British, and that
German officers in Syria and Lebanon were not to be seen in uniform in public. See PA:
R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, Ribbentrop an Rahn, Auf Nr. 91, 31. Mai 1941.
124
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, Rahn an Ribbentrop, Telegramm Nr. 71, 31. Mai
1941.
they had promised, and that what they did deliver was too late and too little to
make a difference. The Italian ambassador described his conversation with al-
Gaylani as follows: “Gaylani appeared to be very bitter. . .In his view German
help has been rushed and sparing, and he is beginning to fear that Iraq may be
viewed as Germany’s unassuming toy that it does not want to seriously play.
He also told me that he had expected much more from Italy.”125 Prime
Minister al-Gaylani also stated that the French weapons from Syria had not
been terribly useful and they had arrived too late. In general, he complained
that Iraqi troops essentially had to fight a defensive war against the British due
to a lack of suitable weapons, a defensive effort that British forces easily
overcame.
On May 31, al-Gaylani’s forces surrendered and his coup in Iraq was
finished.126 From Paris the following day, the German embassy reported that
the Vichy government was already bracing for a likely British attack on Syria
and Lebanon, and requesting that German planes and personnel fleeing Iraq via
Syria not linger in the French Mandates.127 Moreover, both the Vichy and
German governments went to great lengths to deny the presence of significant
numbers of German troops and other personnel in Syria.128 In any case, British
troops and the Free French forces invaded Syria and Lebanon on June 8 and
ultimately defeated General Dentz and his forces after several weeks of fighting.
As French forces in Syria initially tried to resist the British attack, the Vichy
regime let Berlin know that they would appreciate logistical support from the
Germans, and even recommended German air attacks against Haifa in Pales-
tine, but that they did not want German troops to enter Syria to resist the
British invasion.129 When Germany offered to mount air attacks on British
ships in Syrian coastal waters, the French responded that while such attacks
might be needed in the future, such German intervention at that time could be
counterproductive by provoking automatic British attacks against Morocco
125
PA: R29619, Büro des St.S., Irak, Bd. 1, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1260 (Im
Anschluss an Nr. 1227 vom 27.5.), 31. Mai 1941. In his May 31 diary entry, Joseph Goebbels
seemed to confirm Germany’s less than total commitment in Iraq when he wrote: “In Iraq the
situation is not very good. . .Yet, we are not responding to it at the moment.” See Frölich, Die
Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, Teil I, Bd. 9, 31. Mai 1941.
126
The collapse of al-Gaylani’s government and his flight from Baghdad prompted elements of the
population and al-Gaylani’s security forces to take revenge on the city’s Jewish community.
Known as the Farhud, almost 200 Baghdad Jews were murdered, and there was considerable
looting and destruction of Jewish property in Baghdad. After two days, British and Iraqi forces
intervened to stop the violence. See Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 103–106.
127
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1690, 1. Juni
1941.
128
See for example von Ribbentrop’s note to the German embassy in Ankara in PA: R29764, Büro
des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, Ribbentrop an DB/Ankara, Telegramm Nr. 535, 11. Juni 1941.
129
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, für Reichsaussenminister,
Telegramm Nr. 1761, 11. Juni 1941.
and French northwest Africa.130 As the situation was rapidly deteriorating for
French forces in Syria, Rudolf Rahn advised Berlin on June 20 to suggest to the
Vichy government that collaboration with Arab nationalist groups, Palestin-
ians, Kurds, and Druse might improve chances of holding out against the
British.131 However, in view of Vichy’s clear determination to hold on to the
French colonial empire, this was not likely to happen.
On July 11, von Ribbentrop informed Woermann that the Vichy govern-
ment had accepted a British offer to General Dentz in Syria, through the
American Consulate-General in Beirut, for a cease-fire in Syria and Lebanon.132
He also noted that while the Reich had advised Vichy not to accept the offer, it
was up to the French to decide how they wanted to proceed. The Vichy
government accepted the British offer nevertheless, and terms of the cease-fire
amounted to a French surrender of control over Syria and Lebanon.
British troops were to occupy Syria and Lebanon, and all ports, airports, and
aircraft, communications installations, etc. would come under British con-
trol.133 Thus, German and Italian efforts in Syria and Iraq in the spring and
early summer of 1941 were crushed. They had amounted to too little, too late,
as Axis strategy and aims in the Arab states west of the Suez Canal, never clear
to begin with, collapsed. In Paris in early May, as the al-Gaylani government in
Iraq was about to fall, German Ambassador Abetz told Rahn: “The situation
looks bad. We encouraged the Arabs to resist the English invasion, without
understanding that such a resistance was only feasible with our help.”134
Italy ceased to be a factor in the Mediterranean region as a whole, and
specifically in the Arab lands along the eastern and even the southern
Mediterranean rim, in spite of Rommel’s temporary victories in Libya and
Egypt in late 1941 and 1942. Moreover, already on May 16, Italian forces
had been forced to surrender in Ethiopia. All that was left of the Axis position
in Africa and in the Arabic-speaking world was Rommel’s military campaign in
Libya and Egypt. Germany alone, and not Italy, would from June 1941 on be
the determining factor in Axis policy; and June 1941 was the month that
Hitler launched the invasion of the Soviet Union.
Following the British victories in Iraq and Syria in May and June 1941,
German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, in a July 20 telegram to various
130
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, für Botschafter Ritter,
131
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, DB/Paris an AA/Berlin, für Botschafter Ritter,
132
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, Ribbentrop an Woermann, Telegramm Nr. 643, 11.
Juli 1941.
133
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, Welck/Wiesbaden an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr.
211, 14. Juli 1941. This telegram from the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden
amounts to a comprehensive list of the provisions in the armistice agreement regarding Syria
and Lebanon.
134
Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 152.
state and party agencies, suggested a slight adjustment in German policy

toward the Arabs. He observed that Germany had previously been prevented
from unequivocally supporting Arab independence due to Vichy determination
to maintain France’s control over all of its colonies, and Hitler’s decision to
curry favor with the French by avoiding the imposition of harsh peace terms.135
He further stated that with the recent British occupation of Syria, that argument
had been significantly weakened, and he advised the recipients of his telegram
as follows: “I request, therefore, that in future propaganda matters with regard
to the Arab question, we support the wish of the Arabs to achieve unlimited
freedom.”136 He also called for Italian cooperation in this effort. Of course,
general public statements in German propaganda broadcasts in support of
“unlimited freedom” (uneingeschränkte Freiheit) did not necessarily mean that
Germany in fact had committed itself to real Arab sovereignty and independ-
ence from foreign rule. Nor were Rahn’s suggestions in a meeting with Syrian
nationalist leaders in Beirut in early May that the French Mandates in Syria and
Lebanon would end after the war necessarily meaningful.137 It is possible that
given the significance of the inherent contradictions between Arab independ-
ence and Italian ambitions in the region, von Ribbentrop’s suggestion on July
20 implied a possible change in the Reich’s approach to Axis cooperation and
policy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, German support for al-Gaylani in Iraq
did not constitute support for the idea that all Arab states deserved independ-
ence, especially given the fact that al-Gaylani’s government never sought more
than the independence of Iraq alone. Moreover, German support for Vichy
France in Syria and Lebanon, as such purely out of wartime military necessity,
was in opposition to obvious Arab nationalist interests and independence in
any form. The true test of Nazi Germany’s stance on the national self-
determination and independence of all Arabs would come in its relationship
with the Mufti of Jerusalem and his followers, as well as with al-Gaylani, after
they fled from Iraq during the latter’s defeat by the British in May 1941, and
eventually made their way to Berlin by the fall of that year.
135
PA: Büro des St.S., R29539, Arabien, Bd.1, Ribbentrop Telegramm Nr. 684, 20. Juli 1941.
136 137
Ibid. See Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 160.
6
The Axis and Arab Independence, 1941–1942
arab leaders in wartime berlin

In some of the recent literature on the Third Reich and the Arab world, the
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Amin al-Husayni is portrayed as an Arab equivalent
to Hitler or to other top Nazi party officials. He sometimes appears as the
spokesperson for a singular Arab world in North Africa and the Middle East
during the Second World War, a role he in fact never tired of claiming for
himself. Some of the recent literature also implies that al-Husayni’s hatred of
Jews was a reflection of a historically and deeply rooted, cultural and political
anti-Semitism among the Islamic-Arab population. Of course, his embrace of
Nazi Germany, its leadership and policies, in particular with regard to the Jews
before and during the Second World War, is certainly well documented and
undeniable.1 That he did come to understand, accept, and support the Nazi
genocide against the Jews in Europe is clear, even if in reality he did not speak
for all Arabs. His own particular views and aims were not necessarily a reflec-
tion of a uniform, monolithic Arab nationalism, which given its many vari-
ations and movements then and now, did not exist.2 It should also be
remembered that al-Husayni was one of the relatively few primary contacts
that Hitler’s government was able to establish with Arab notables and leaders
1
See most recently Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists.
2
Again, see the growing body of scholarly literature from the past decade or so by scholars in the
field of modern Middle Eastern history on the topic of the Arabs and National Socialism, referred
to in the Introduction, among them: Stefan Wild (ed.), Die Welt des Islams, Special Theme Issue:
“Islamofascism”? 52 (2012); Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust; Litvak and Webman, From
Empathy to Denial; Gershoni and Nordbruch, Sympathie und Schrecken; Nordbruch, Nazism in
Syria and Lebanon; and Höpp, Wien, and Wildangel (eds.), Blind für die Geschichte?. See also the
essays in the special edition of Geschichte und Gesellschaft 37 (2011). See also most recently
Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, 175ff.
180
The Axis and Arab Independence, 1941–1942 181
and with Arab nationalism in general during the war years. This was possible,
moreover, because the Mufti and a few other Arab leaders were able to escape
the Middle East and to live in Berlin as exiles for much of the war, while most
of the Arab world remained outside of Axis control and influence. For the
purposes of this study, the Mufti and other Arab exiles in Berlin together
constitute a useful lens into the vicissitudes and ultimate intent of German
Middle East policy during the Second World War. However, they are perhaps
somewhat less so in any effort to fully understand the larger complexities
of Arab attitudes toward Hitler, National Socialism, and the Holocaust.
As stated in the Introduction, this study does not attempt to offer an analysis
of, and general conclusions about, the reception of National Socialism and its
policies among the Arab populations of the Middle East and North Africa
before and during the Second World War. It does, however, consider the
attitudes and activities of Amin al-Husayni and the few other Arabs during
their exile in Berlin and Rome in some detail, particularly between the fall of
1941 and the end of the war. Because of their exile in Berlin and in Rome
during the war years, from late 1941 to 1945, there exists a substantial
documentary record in German and other European languages that provides
insight, particularly into the Mufti’s views and activities. More important for
this study, the relationship between those Arab exiles and their host govern-
ments in Berlin and Rome sheds considerable light on the real intent and
policies of the German government during those years. Therefore, this chapter
will address the wartime relationship of the two most important Arab person-
alities living in exile in Berlin and Rome, Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem, and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, the Iraqi nationalist and leader of
the short-lived coup in Baghdad in April 1941, with Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy. This relationship will be examined within the important context
of al-Husayni and al-Gaylani’s activities in Berlin and Rome beginning in
November 1941. From the perspective of specifically German interests and
aims in the Middle East from January1933, through their arrival in Rome
and Berlin in the fall of 1941, to their increasing isolation and eventual irrele-
vance in Nazi policy following the collapse of the Axis in North Africa in 1943,
al-Husayni and al-Gaylani remained figures whose usefulness and role in
German Middle East policy was strictly controlled, limited, usually uncertain,
and relatively brief.3 Moreover, among the relatively small group of Arab exiles
living and operating in Berlin and Rome during the war, Nazi authorities would
quickly learn that political and cultural outlooks and goals even among this
relative handful of Arabs were varied, and anything but homogenous.
The German Foreign Office in Berlin was the state agency in charge of
overseeing al-Husayni, al-Gaylani, and other Arabs in exile in wartime Berlin.
3
See for example Peter Wien, “Arabs and Fascism: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives,” in Die
Welt des Islams (Special Theme Issue on ‘Islamofascism’), 52 (2012): 332–333.
The records of the Foreign Office in Berlin clearly demonstrate its operational
assumption that the exiled Arab community was at a minimum divided
into two distinct political groups, each under the control of its own leader. In
April 1942, for example, the diplomat Erich von Granow, at the time stationed
at the German embassy in Rome, sent to the Foreign Office in Berlin a list with
brief biographical sketches that he had composed of individual Arabs living in
both Berlin and Rome who were working with either the Mufti or with al-
Gaylani. He described the two groups as living and working separately from
eachother: “The clearly visible division of the Arabs in Berlin into two camps,
the one around the Grand Mufti and the other around Rashid Ali, is even more
pronounced in Rome. . .”4 Von Granow also describes important professional,
generational, ideological, and cultural differences between the two groups,
differences that reflected not only those between the two leaders themselves,
but also the considerable diversity of the larger Arab world. Most of all, he
contrasted the more secular and western inclinations of al-Gaylani and
the generally older people around him with the more Islamic and pan-Arab
tendencies of the Mufti and a somewhat younger group of people in his camp.
Indeed, the German embassy in Rome had responded a week before to com-
plaints from the Mufti about Arab comments in Berlin that were critical of the
Mufti and his positions, criticism that was allegedly supported by Fritz Grobba
in the German Foreign Office. Von Granow’s response from Rome reflects
some of the frustrations among German officials with the differences in Arab
opinion and objectives that were prevalent just in Berlin and Rome: “I didn’t
let these remarks go unanswered, and replied right away that ambassador
Dr. Grobba along with all German civil servants involved in this matter were
driven by purely objective motives to achieve a fair balance between the often
conflicting views and wishes of the Arabs.”5
Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was clearly
the more well-known and infamous of the two main Arab leaders living in exile
in Berlin and Rome during the war. He was born into an influential and
wealthy land-owning family from Jerusalem in 1895. By the nineteenth century,
members of the al-Husayni family had become prominent religious leaders,
jurists, and educators active in Ottoman and local Palestinian government.
Following the First World War, al-Husayni championed pan-Arab nationalism
and independence, and was an ardent opponent of the two central elements of
the postwar settlement in the Middle East, namely, the Anglo-French Mandates
in the Fertile Crescent and the Jewish National Home in the Palestine Mandate.
Indeed, he had spoken out against Jewish immigration and settlement in
4
Zentrum Moderner Orient/Berlin (hereafter ZMO): Nachlaß Höpp, 1.27, Gesandtschaftsrat
Dr. Granow (Rom) an das AA/Berlin, “Arabische Mitarbeiter Raschid Ali el-Gailanis und des
Grossmuftis,” 14. April 1942.
5
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.27, Gesandtschaftsrat Dr. Granow (ROM) an das AA/Berlin, “Besch-
werde des Grossmuftis über des arabischen Rundfunksprecher Yunis Bahri,” 8. April 1942.
Palestine even before 1914. A devout Muslim who did not separate
religion from politics, al-Husayni initially favored an Arab state that would
join Palestine and Syria upon the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918; but
postwar Anglo-French determination to control the Fertile Crescent, as well as
the implementation of the 1917 Balfour Declaration’s promise of a Jewish
National Home in Palestine, frustrated his hopes. Mindful of British power,
he chose initially to focus his political activities on opposing Zionist efforts in
Palestine rather than on immediate resistance to British rule.6 He helped organ-
ize demonstrations in early 1920 throughout the Palestine Mandate against the
Jewish National Home. When these demonstrations turned violent and the
British sought to arrest him, he fled first to Damascus and then to Transjordan.
Herbert Samuel, the first British High Commissioner in the new Palestine
Mandate, and a determined advocate of an accommodation between Jews
and Arabs there, granted al-Husayni a pardon and allowed him to return to
Palestine. In April 1921, al-Husayni succeeded to the position of Grand Mufti
of Jerusalem.
Disputes over the control of religious sites in Jerusalem led to Arab violence
that soon engulfed Palestine in 1928–1929. This violence was soon followed
by the Arab revolt and general strike that broke out in April 1936 and lasted
until the summer of 1939. Between his elevation to the office of Mufti in 1921
and the outbreak of the Arab revolt in 1936, al-Husayni had actually discour-
aged violence and sought cooperation with British authorities in hopes of
derailing Zionist efforts to build up the Jewish National Home. He also tried
to use his religious authority to promote the Palestinian national cause and, in
particular, his own political position in the larger Arab world. Although he was
not directly involved in the outbreak of the Arab general strike and revolt in
Palestine in April 1936, the Mufti soon came to support violence against Britain
and, particularly, against the Jews in the wake of Britain’s efforts to suppress
the revolt. He denounced the Royal (Peel) Commission’s July 1937 plan to
partition Palestine into nominally independent Arab and Jewish states. As the
violence in Palestine intensified after publication of the partition plan,
and fearing arrest by the British authorities, al-Husayni fled to Lebanon in
October 1937, from which he tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to continue leading
the revolt. Like the Zionist movement, but obviously for very different reasons,
he rejected Britain’s May 1939 White Paper that would have guaranteed a
permanent two-thirds Arab majority in a future, independent Palestinian state.
The outbreak of war in Europe in September forced him to leave Lebanon for
Iraq, which had gained nominal independence in 1930 when Britain formally
ended its Iraq Mandate and direct control. Rapid German victories in Europe
in 1939 and 1940 led al-Husayni to conclude that an Axis victory over Britain
and France was imminent and the likely key to finally ending both British
6
See Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 33–49.
domination of much of the Arab world and the Jewish National Home in
Palestine. From Baghdad he continued to seek Axis diplomatic and material
support in 1940 and 1941 for a regional Arab revolt against Britain, as outlined
in the previous chapter. He encouraged the Germans to send armed forces to
Iraq after al-Gaylani’s pro-Axis seizure of power in a Baghdad coup in
April 1941. However, al-Gaylani’s short-lived coup, crushed by British forces
a month later, forced the Mufti to flee to Iran, from which he eventually made
his way via Turkey to Italy, and then to Germany, in the fall of that year.
As observed in earlier chapters, the Mufti had established contact with
German consular officials in Palestine not long after Hitler’s assumption of
power in 1933. His sporadic contact with German Consul-Generals Heinrich
Wolff and Walter Döhle in Jerusalem between 1933 and his move to Lebanon
in 1937 did not yield the public endorsement and material support from
Germany that he had hoped to obtain for the Arab cause in Palestine and in
the larger Arab world. With regard to Palestine, Nazi policy before the war was
based on maintaining the geopolitical status quo in the region and, particularly,
on promoting the emigration of Jews from Germany to Palestine. As concluded
in the previous chapters, the small amount of German financial support for the
Arab revolt that reached Palestine via other Arab states beginning in mid 1938
was meant merely to distract Britain from the crises in central Europe rather
than to actually promote Arab independence in Palestine. That support never
approached the level he had hoped to receive from Berlin. As previously noted,
this support was something about which British officials in Palestine and the
Fertile Crescent were aware, but that did not seem particularly worrisome to
the British government. Beyond recognizing a recent upswing in German inter-
est and activity in Palestine, the British government, responding to questions
in Parliament about German activities in Palestine in December 1938, had
concluded: “. . .we have no direct proof of financial assistance being given to
the Arabs from German sources, in the same way as there is no evidence of
the supply of arms. . .”7 This response in Parliament seemed to recognize
German activity in Palestine as part of a general increase in German propa-
ganda throughout the Arab world, as part of Berlin’s effort to distract Britain
and France from the situation in central Europe. It is difficult to know what role
if any al-Husayni played in those German activities in Palestine in 1938 and
1939 from his exile in Beirut, especially since he was living in an area that
was still under direct French mandatory rule. But it is certainly clear that prior
to the outbreak of war in 1939, the Nazi regime remained firmly committed to
the continuation of Jewish emigration from central Europe to Palestine,
and had not yet committed itself to altering or otherwise compromising the
imperial positions of Britain and France in the Middle East.
7
NAL: FO371/21871-E7394, HMG answer to question from MP Mander, December 14, 1938.
It has already been observed that the British Colonial Office had concluded
in September 1939, shortly after the outbreak of war, that the Mufti was
interested in reaching some sort of compromise agreement with Britain over
Palestine. One source in the Colonial Office reported on September 30 that,
“The Mufti was anxious to reach a settlement with the British government on
the basis of Anglo-Arab peace in Palestine. . .”8 That same report also noted
that the Mufti was not yet tied to Germany, and that, “The Mufti had emphat-
ically explained that he would not support Nazi aggression against the democ-
racies and that he was prepared to make an immediate declaration of loyalty to
and support for Great Britain in order to stop the Nazi allegation that the
Arabs were sympathetic to Hitler.”9 Almost two months later, British officials
in the Colonial Office reported that the Mufti had recently expressed his
suspicion that German interest in Palestine was based more on creating diffi-
culties for the British in the region than on consideration and support for the
interests of the Arab people. Citing what it termed as “reliable” intelligence, a
November 14, 1939 report by the Eastern Department described a November 7
meeting in Baghdad involving al-Husayni and other Palestinian Arabs at which
they further discussed a possible joint Arab appeal to the British for an end to
hostilities in Palestine.10 The report referred to the Mufti’s disillusionment with
the Germans, particularly with the realization that German interests in Palestine
had been based more on creating difficulties for the British than on any
sympathy or support for Arab interests. Regarding al-Husayni, the report
noted: “He admitted that until Germany had made an unprovoked attack on
Czecho-Slovakia he had believed that German interest in Palestine was genuine;
but he had been misled and he regretted it. He now knew that all European
Powers were imperialist and he warned his followers against the danger of
falling between two stools if they continued to trust Germany.”11
Al-Husayni’s influence on events in Palestine and among Arab leaders after
the outbreak of war in September 1939 and his move from Beirut to Baghdad
the following month was apparently on the wane, according to the Colonial
Office in London. In November 1939, it described his loss of prestige among
Arab leaders as a result of his failure to reach an agreement with the British over
Palestine, his lack of funds, and his new and dependent status in exile in Iraq.12
He was in an Iraq that was at least nominally independent, a member of the
League of Nations, and governed by Iraqi leaders, many of whom shared in
varying degrees his aims to end European domination of the region and the
Jewish National Home in Palestine. Indeed, the Colonial Office concluded
that “. . .the Mufti, it appeared, was less concerned with carrying on the
rebellion than with regaining his lost prestige; it was for that reason that shortly
8 9
NAL: KV2–2084, Colonial Office, CX/88500, September 30, 1939. Ibid.
10
NAL: KV2–2084, Colonial Office, Eastern Department, No. 167, November 14, 1939.
11
Ibid.
12
NAL: KV2–2084, Colonial Office, Eastern Department, No. 161, November 6, 1939
before coming to Iraq he had expressed his anxiety to receive a visit from some
highly placed British official, with whom he could discuss the basis of an
agreement with the British government.”13
Once the war in Europe spread to the Mediterranean and the Arab lands of
North Africa and the Middle East following Italy’s entry into the war in
June 1940, Germany naturally became more directly involved in the politics
of Axis-Arab relations. This was inevitable, despite Hitler’s ideological and
geopolitical focus on Europe and an invasion of the Soviet Union, his convic-
tion that the Mediterranean and the Arab world constituted Italy’s natural
sphere of interest, and that Berlin should therefore defer to Rome in all Axis
policy decisions. Following his apparent failure to make a deal with the British
regarding Palestine in the fall of 1939, al-Husayni’s efforts to forge a formal
alliance of sorts between Nazi Germany and an ill-defined, idealized pan-Arab
nationalist movement under his leadership were strictly limited by his depend-
ent status as an exile living in and working from an Iraq that was still very
much under British influence. In the end, therefore, his efforts were ineffective.
His main ambition with regard to Germany and Italy between the fall of 1939
and his arrival in Rome and Berlin two years later was to secure from Hitler
and Mussolini formal public declarations of support for the sovereignty and
independence of the Arab people. He failed to achieve this goal, and would
continue for the most part to come up empty-handed in this endeavor from his
exile in Berlin for the rest of the war. The other point that the Mufti vigorously
pursued with the German government between 1940 and the end of 1941 was
to convince the Nazi regime that he spoke for all Arabs, and that he alone could
mobilize the full weight and power of the Arab world in support of the Axis
war effort in North Africa and the Middle East. In the few examples of his
written correspondence with German officials from his Baghdad exile in 1940
and 1941, but especially in his considerable correspondence with the German
and other European governments after his arrival in Berlin, al-Husayni
never tired of reiterating his central leadership role in the Arab world. As he
would do so often in his Berlin exile, his New Year’s greetings to Reich Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop on January 1, 1942 claimed that he spoke for the all
Arabs: “The entire Arab people share my wishes and enter into the struggle
on the side of the Axis powers, as therein it sees the guarantee for its freedom
and its future.”14
Living in exile in Baghdad for the first two years of the war, it is difficult to
know the extent of al-Husayni’s influence in, or direct communication with, the
rest of the Arab world. Britain and France exercised direct control over
the mandates in Palestine/Transjordan and Syria/Lebanon respectively, while
Britain still retained considerable influence in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq,
albeit in different ways, with relatively little difficulty. As for the rest of North
13 14
Ibid. Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 32.
Africa, Germany’s real and would-be allies, Italy, Vichy France, and Spain,
were governing powers obviously opposed to the Mufti’s ambitions of Arab
sovereignty and independence. Moreover, as observed in the previous chapter,
the Mufti’s main links to the Axis powers since the beginning of the war had
been through Italy and its embassy in Baghdad or through the Iraqi embassy in
Ankara. Iraq had severed relations with Germany when the war in Europe
began. This was so even as late as January 1941 when, for example, al-Husayni
organized the second trip of his private secretary, Kemal Haddad, to Italy and
Germany in search of aid for, and recognition of, Arab independence. Under
State Secretary Ernst Woermann described a conversation with Giuseppi
Cosmelli of the Italian embassy in Berlin about Italian relations with the Mufti
in Baghdad and past and future Italian financial support for al-Husayni in the
Iraqi capital and in Palestine. On January 24, Cosmelli reiterated to Woermann
his government’s opposition to Arab unity and independence in the Fertile
Crescent. He also described the Mufti’s determination to become the supreme
leader of a unified Arab nationalist movement. Cosmelli told Woermann that
the Mufti had warned Italian officials in Baghdad not to accept requests for
cooperation and support from other Arab sources in the Middle East, or in exile
in Europe: “He asked that all such attempts should be rejected and that all
communications with the Arab world should be exclusively through him or his
secretary Teffik al-Shakir [Kemal Haddad].”15
Between May and November 1941, al-Husayni was on the run again, and
therefore not in a position to play much of a role in Arab politics and efforts
to solicit support from Germany and Italy.16 On May 29, as the al-Gaylani
coup in Baghdad was crushed by the British, al-Husayni was forced to flee
Baghdad without his family to Iran where Riza Shah granted him political
asylum. However, his position there was by no means secure, especially after
the start of Operation Barbarossa on June 22. With the presence of a large
number of German technicians and officials in Iran, and the possibility that
Iran might have to serve as a conduit for the shipment of supplies from the
west to the Soviet Union, the Shah rejected Anglo-Soviet demands that he
expel the Germans. British and Soviet forces then crossed into Iran and
occupied much of the country on August 25, encountering little if any resist-
ance. The Shah abdicated in favor of his son, Muhammad Riza, who was
more inclined to cooperate with the British who were seeking al-Husayni’s
arrest. Therefore, the Mufti was once again forced into hiding and had to find
a way out of the country. Although not welcome in Turkey, he managed to
escape across the Iranian-Turkish border in late September with the assistance
15
PA: R29764, Büro des St.S., Syrien, Bd. 1, Aufzeichnung Woermanns, U.St.S. Pol.Nr. 5, 24.
Januar 1941. For instance, Cosmelli also told Woermann of the Mufti’s request to block a
planned trip by Mousa al-Alami from Beirut to Europe in the quest for Axis support for the
Palestinian Arabs.
16
See Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem, 96–98.
of a Japanese diplomat, but without a Turkish visa or permission. It was clear

that the only safe place for him would be Italy or Germany, so he immediately
traveled to Istanbul with the help of Italian diplomats in Turkey. From there
he made his way to Italy via Bulgaria in October.17 After meeting with
Mussolini in Rome on October 27, he traveled to Berlin, where he arrived
on November 6, 1941.18 Three weeks later, on November 28, al- Husayni had
his infamous meeting with Hitler at the Reich Chancellory, at which he
renewed his efforts to secure the full support of Hitler’s Germany and its
Italian ally for a postwar settlement based on the end of European colonial
rule in any form in the Arab lands, and on the elimination of the Jewish
National Home in Palestine.
Similarly, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani had fled from Baghdad to Teheran with the
collapse of his short-lived regime and, like the Mufti, faced an uncertain and
increasingly difficult situation in Iran as the British attempted to apprehend him
as well. With Turkish and then German assistance, he made his way to Turkey,
and from there he was flown to Germany on November 21, 1941.19 Al-Gaylani
would become part of the small group of Arab exiles in Berlin that would seek
to mobilize Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa in support of the Axis
war effort, and at the same time to secure the full commitment of Hitler’s
government to Arab independence once Great Britain and the United States
were defeated. In Berlin, however, al-Husayni and al-Gaylani had a relation-
ship that was beset with conflicts over questions of leadership and ultimate
Arab goals in the Middle East. Most importantly, while the Mufti would
always see himself as the leader of a large, new postwar pan-Arab and Islamic
state with borders that were as yet undefined, al-Gaylani seemed content to
pursue the much less ambitious goal of regaining his position as leader of a
more secular, independent Iraq.
the elusive axis declaration

Hitler was still committed to winning the war in the Middle East and North
Africa in the fall of 1941, despite the recent Axis losses in Iraq and Syria.
Convinced that victory in eastern Europe was certain by the end of the year, he
wrote to Mussolini on October 29 that because the campaign in the Soviet
Union had been virtually won, Germany was now in a position to begin
17
See Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem, 54–55, 74 ff; and Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond
und Hakenkreuz, 105. See also Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 249.
18
For details on the eventual size of the Mufti’s circle in Berlin between November 1941 and the
end of the war, as well as its costs to the Nazi government, see Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis,
Islamists, 177.
19
See Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 208–209. For more on the role of the
German Abwehr in al-Gaylani’s escape, see Paul Leverkühn, Der geheime Nachrichtendienst der
deutschen Wehrmacht im Kriege (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe, 1957), 167 ff.
transferring some German military units to North Africa.20 A month later,

Ciano wrote about meetings in Berlin with Hitler, von Ribbentrop, and Göring
at which Hitler talked about the “immediate objectives” in the war in the Soviet
Union, one of which involved an “attack on the Caucasus” that would enable
German troops to cross into Iran, Iraq, Syria and Palestine, and: “. . .lead to
the conquest of one of the key positions of the British Empire: Egypt.”21
On November 6, 1941, the same day that the Mufti arrived in Berlin, the
Under State Secretary’s office in the German Foreign Office issued a compre-
hensive assessment of the situation in the Middle East following the recent
Axis setbacks in Iraq and Syria.22 It is likely that the impetus for this assessment
was the recent losses in Iraq and Syria, combined with the rapid successes of the
German military assault on the eastern front and, possibly, the Mufti’s arrival
in Berlin. The report described the losses in Iraq and Syria the previous June and
July, along with the Anglo-Soviet occupation of significant parts of Iran that
summer, as serious setbacks for Germany. With the exception of Turkey and
Afghanistan, it described the region as having become: “. . .militarily and polit-
ically a closed area of English power. . .,”23 a negative reality because the area
would soon become a major battleground in the war. The thinking here was, no
doubt, centered on what the Germans had come to believe would be the
inevitable success of their campaign against the Soviet Union. This would entail
the movement of victorious German forces from the Ukraine south through the
Caucasus and into Iran and then the Arab Fertile Crescent from the north and
the northeast. This thrust would then meet up with Rommel’s Afrika-Korps
moving into the region from the southwest following an anticipated German
victory in Egypt.24 The assessment concluded: “The main goal will be the
permanent exclusion of England from the Near Eastern area, and the perman-
ent securing of German influence over the oil resources there.”25
With this in mind, the assessment went on to make specific recommenda-
tions that were placed under the heading of what it termed “the Arab
Question” (die arabische Frage). Arab nationalism would finally have to be
harnessed in such a way that the Arab population would rise up as one, and
join in the approaching Axis military assault on British hegemony in the Middle
20
Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 103. After a meeting with Hitler at the
Führer’s main headquarters on October 25, Count Ciano conveyed to Mussolini this same
positive assessment that Hitler had given him, albeit with a somewhat more balanced or nuanced
description of the difficulties still facing German troops on the Russian front. See Muggeridge,
Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 454–460.
21
Muggeridge, Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, 463. In these papers, Ciano places the meetings
between November 24 and 27, 1941.
22
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.26, Aufzeichnung über Fragen des Vorderen Orients, Politische Abtei-
lung, U.St.S. Pol. Nr. 959, 6. November 1941.
23 24
Ibid. Ibid. See also Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 89–90.
25
East. Without naming individuals, it referred to remarks by Arab leaders calling

first and foremost for: “. . .a new political declaration from Germany regarding
the independence of the Arab lands. . .”26 It cited Arab dissatisfaction with the
weak Axis statement of October 1940 and with the somewhat stronger,
but unofficial, private, and strictly verbal statements from the Foreign Office
in Berlin to the Mufti in Baghdad and to others in the spring of 1941.27
The assessment then stipulated that: “A new political declaration from Ger-
many and Italy on the independence of the Arab lands now seems unavoidable,
as failure to do so is an obstacle to cooperation with the Arabs based on
trust. . .”28 Finally, it warned that a stronger declaration on Arab independence
was all the more urgent because Britain appeared to be on the verge of
making new promises to the Arabs, implying that those promises would likely
include Allied support for full Arab independence after the war. Indeed, with
the backing of the British government on the eve of the British-led invasion of
Syria and Lebanon in June 1941, General Georges Catroux of the Free
French Forces had already declared the end of the Syrian and Lebanese
Mandates and the independence of Syria and Lebanon.29 That Germany and
Italy had refused to that point to issue such a public declaration, and the reality
that Germany’s erstwhile Vichy ally no longer governed Syria and Lebanon,
were likely on the minds of German Foreign Office officials when the Mufti
arrived in Berlin in November. Nevertheless, despite the fact that Vichy France
was for all intents and purposes no longer relevant, at least in the eastern
Mediterranean area, Italian interests and ambitions remained a factor, even if
somewhat diminished, in German strategic considerations.
26
Ibid.
27
These few examples of German and Axis intent even included somewhat clearer verbal support
for Arab independence, but still refrained from formal, official, and public declarations. See for
example the April 30, 1941 telegram from von Ribbentrop to the German embassy in Teheran,
authorizing it to inform the Egyptian ambassador there of the following: “Especially with regard
to Egypt, the Führer has already declared that Germany has no territorial aspirations in the Arab
lands, but in fact – and here he is in agreement with the Duce – he wishes for the independence of
Egypt and the entire Arab world.” See PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeit-
sexemplar, Bd.-, RAM an DB/Teheran, Telegramm Nr. 197, 30. April 1941.
28
29
See Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 103–104; and Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and
the Arab East, 187–188. Both Nordbruch and Hirscowicz caution that this propaganda did not
necessarily reflect the intended imperial policy of de Gaulle’s government in exile, nor for that
matter the policy of the British government. For instance, in May 1941 the British air force had
dropped leaflets over Damascus with an appeal not to the Arab population of Syria but
apparently to the French population in the Syrian Mandate. The message in the leaflet was:
“Frenchmen of the Levant, for four days German aircraft have violated Syrian airspace and have
occupied its airports. The armistice that has placed you in chains is broken. The hour has come
to liberate you from servitude to the enemy. Take up your weapons and liberate the land that
France has entrusted to you with honor. General Catreux.” See PA: R29764, Büro des St.S.,
Syrien, Bd. 1, Rahn an AA/Berlin, Telegramm ohne Nr., 15. Mai 1941.
Nor had an otherwise active wartime radio propaganda campaign aimed at

the Arab world included any sort of formal German commitment to Arab
independence. In May 1941, Gerhard Rühle of the Radio Political Department
(Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung) in the German Foreign Office submitted a
comprehensive review of Germany’s radio propaganda broadcasts in the
Arab lands of North Africa and the Middle East to Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop.30 Rühle reported that, according to reports received from German
diplomats, agents, as well as from Arabs with contacts in Germany, German
radio broadcasts from Berlin and Athens were well regarded in the Arab world.
He also described the contents of those broadcasts as including: readings from
the Koran; news from the region with a clear anti-British slant; an emphasis on
German military strength; discussion programs that dealt with Arab history
and literature, with emphasis on Arab heroes from the past; discussion pro-
grams with Islamic religious content and the role of Islam in resistance against
foreign domination; and recorded music as a means of promoting popular
interest in the radio broadcasts. Rühle also suggested that should Germany
formally call via radio for a full-scale Arab uprising, the radio programming
would require a heightened anti-English content to include a goal of ending
British control of the entire Middle East, Britain’s past broken promises to the
Arabs, Koran readings that emphasize struggle against oppressors, poetry
readings that stress freedom and independence and the struggle against foreign
powers, and the playing of nationalist music. It is interesting to note that
Rühle seemed to echo the causal relationship between an Arab revolt and a
real Axis commitment to Arab independence, reiterated time and again by the
Mufti and other nationalists, with the observation that: “A call for the struggle
for independence and freedom will undoubtedly be successful if German con-
sent can be given.”31 He seemed well aware that German policy in the Middle
East had not previously included unequivocal public support for Arab
independence.
Amin al-Husayni’s main goal in his meeting with Hitler on November 28
was to obtain from the German government the hitherto elusive goal of a clear
public declaration in support for the national self-determination and independ-
ence of the Arab people. He was certainly aware of Berlin’s renewed interest in
mobilizing the Arabs behind the Axis war effort in light of Hitler’s confidence
in victory in the Soviet Union, and following the setbacks in Iraq and Syria.
On November 12, the Mufti met with Fritz Grobba who was collecting infor-
mation on the Arab nationalist movements and organizations.32 He gave
30
PA: R67482, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Verbindungsmann RAM, usw., Bd. 1, Aufzeich-
nung betr. die Rundfunkpropaganda in dem arabischen Raum (Rühle), dem Herrn Reichsaus-
senminister weisungsgemäss vorgelegt, 5. Mai 1941.
31
Ibid.
32
PA: R27324, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, “Mitteilungen des Großmufti über die arabische
Nationalpartei,” Grobba an U.St.S., e.o. Pol. VII 7863 g/41, 12. November 1941.
Grobba information about the Arab National Party, of which the Mufti
had been elected president at the beginning of the Palestine revolt in 1936,
and on the leading personalities within the party from Iraq, Palestine,
Transjordan, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Al-Husayni emphasized
that while he had been recognized as the spiritual leader of the Arab struggles in
Iraq, Palestine, and Syria between 1936 and 1939, it was the party with himself
as its leader that was responsible for the unrest in those three Arab states.
He also reiterated to Grobba his intention to secure a clear and formal declar-
ation of support for Arab independence from the German government in return
for the full and active support of the Arab people for the Axis. Grobba
observed: “After an agreement with the German and Italian governments on
a declaration to the Arab lands, he is prepared to establish communications
with the Arab people that would be correctly understood and followed by these
and especially by all party members. He will naturally place the entire party
and its influence at the disposal of the joint German-Arab struggle against the
English.”33 Again, as he would so often do from Berlin, the Mufti presented
himself to Nazi authorities as the undisputed leader of, and spokesperson for,
all Arabs, and in that role, as an indispensable key to an Axis military victory in
the Middle East and North Africa.
At his meeting with Hitler on November 28, al-Husayni was unable to
secure the desired commitment and formal declaration of German support for
Arab independence.34 After expressing the Arab world’s admiration for Hitler
and Germany, and its gratitude for Hitler’s previous expressions of sympathy
for the struggle of the Arab people under the yoke of foreign domination and
against the Jews in Palestine, the Mufti once again requested a formal declar-
ation from Germany in support of Arab independence. Hitler responded to
the Mufti: “Germany is committed to an uncompromising struggle against the
Jews. Naturally, part of that is the struggle against the Jewish National
Home in Palestine, which is nothing more than a power base for the destructive
influence of Jewish interests.”35 After alluding briefly to the insufficiency of
Axis support in Iraq earlier that year, the only justification Hitler could
come up with for refusing to agree to a clear declaration was Vichy France
and Syria. Notwithstanding the fact that Vichy no longer controlled Syria and
Lebanon, Hitler reasoned that a declaration “. . .would strengthen those elem-
ents in France which were under the influence of de Gaulle. . .”36 He stated that
it would be interpreted as a call for the complete dissolution of the French
empire, and could move the Vichy government over to the English side in an
effort to save whatever parts of the empire that might still be saved. Hitler gave
al-Husayni yet another vague verbal commitment, namely that once German
troops arrived at the southern exit from the Caucasus, Germany would give the
33
Ibid. See also Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 251-256.
34
See Hirscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 214–221.
35 36
ADAP: Serie D, Bd. XIII/2, Nr. 515. Ibid.
photo 6.1. Hitler receives the Mufti Amin al-Husayni in Berlin (November 1941).
Arab world assurances that their liberation was at hand. At that meeting, Hitler
also appeared to have in mind the systematic extermination of the Jews in
Europe that was just getting under way, and the intention to expand the “final
solution” to the significant Jewish populations of the Middle East and North
Africa. Perhaps looking to the Mufti to possibly assist in organizing some form
of Arab participation in the anticipated mass murder of the Jews of the Middle
East, Hitler asserted: “The German goal would then be the destruction of the
Jews living in the Arab territories under British protection.”37 Hitler, in men-
tioning that al-Husayni would have to speak to the Arab world with the most
important voice, might have been hinting that the Mufti would be responsible
for calling on his fellow Arabs to assist the Germans in the destruction of the
Jews in the Arab world: “It would be his [the Mufti’s] duty to unleash his
secretly prepared Arab action.”38 There can be no doubt that the Mufti,
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid. See also Shlomo Aronson, Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2004), 41.
perhaps beginning with this meeting, would soon become aware and supportive
of the Nazi destruction of the Jews in Europe.39
After the meeting, Hitler claimed to understand the Arab wish for a formal,
public declaration of support, and tried to placate al-Husayni with suggestions
that it would eventually come in the not too distant future, perhaps when Axis
forces were on the verge of achieving military victory in the Middle East.
The Mufti’s alternative suggestion that a formal statement be made that would
be kept secret was also rejected by Hitler as unnecessary, with the assertion that
he had in fact just given al-Husayni such assurances. Following his meeting
with the Mufti, and against the advice of some in the German Foreign Office,
Hitler apparently ordered that the question of issuing a formal declaration
of support for Arab independence be dropped for the time being. Grobba
disagreed with Hitler’s decision because he believed that the Arabs could be a
valuable ally in the war against Britain in the Middle East and North Africa.40
Again, in his memoirs Grobba bemoaned the fact that the cost to Germany of
such a declaration would have been minimal, and the return potentially signifi-
cant, and he believed that without such a declaration, the Arabs would do
nothing to assist Germany’s war effort. Moreover, he also wrote that Hitler’s
obsession with the war in the Soviet Union had blinded him to the importance
of the war in the Arab lands and a potentially positive role that an Arab
uprising against Britain would play. Besides Operation Barbarossa, which
was entering a critical phase in Hitler’s timetable by late November, it is also
possible that his focus was on the commencement of genocide against the Jews
in Europe, and possibly its future application to the Jews of the Arab lands of
North Africa and the Middle East. Again, this might be understood from some
of his comments to the Mufti during their meeting. Of course, Hitler’s concerns
about the North African interests of his ally Mussolini and the Vichy regime in
France surely played a role in his thinking as well. Indeed, the British Foreign
Office’s observation of domestic German media coverage of the Middle East
from January 1941 through August 1942 demonstrate the durability of Hitler’s
belief in the continuation of the imperial positions of Italy and Vichy France in
the Arab world.41
In late January 1942, Erwin Rommel began his offensive from Libya east-
ward into Egypt, one that would bring German and Italian forces as far as
El-Alamein by early July. This initially successful Axis military thrust in North
39
See for example Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, 184–189.
40
According to Fritz Grobba, he and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, present at the meeting
between Hitler and the Mufti, both supported the latter’s request to Hitler for a public declar-
ation. See Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 256–257. In a follow-up meeting with von Ribbentrop
the next day, the German foreign minister, notwithstanding his own views on the issue, neverthe-
less reaffirmed Hitler refusal to issue the desired declaration. See also Gensicke, Der Mufti von
Jerusalem, 62.
41
See NAL: FO898–184, Summary of Comments on German Broadcasts in Germany, January
1941-August 1942 (entire file).
Africa during the first half of 1942 provided the backdrop for an intensification
of Arab efforts in Berlin and Rome to secure a firm commitment from the Axis
powers to support postwar Arab national self-determination and independence.
Yet, the activities and movements of al-Husayni, al-Gaylani, and the other Arab
notables in Berlin and Rome were strictly controlled and limited by the German
and Italian governments, leaving little room for independent initiative and
activity. Those activities were therefore limited for the most part to their own
internal rivalries, their necessary participation in Arabic language propaganda
broadcasts to the Arab world, the limited success and ultimate futility of
forming Islamic military units for the German war effort, and the ongoing
but ultimately futile campaign to secure a public commitment from Germany
and Italy for Arab independence.
In February 1942, Ciano wrote in his diary that Berlin rather than Rome was
taking the lead in resisting the Arab call for a public declaration of support for
Arab independence. Of course, this was a position that the Italian government
naturally supported. That von Ribbentrop had in fact recognized al-Gaylani as
the future prime minister of Iraq at a December 16, 1941 meeting in Berlin was
certainly not equivalent to a formal German declaration, public or private, of
German recognition of Arab or even Iraqi independence in the future.42
Following a meeting with al-Gaylani in Rome, Ciano wrote in his diary on
February 10: “The Germans are prudent and do not wish to sign any pact
with him [al-Gaylani] for the present.”43 A week later, following al-Gaylani’s
meeting with Mussolini, Ciano observed: “The Duce kept him guessing
because for some time the Germans have indicated their opposition to gestures
of this sort.”44 He also noted Mussolini’s rationale, one that mirrored Hitler’s
during the latter’s meeting with the Mufti in Berlin the previous November,
namely that a declaration should not be made in any case before Axis military
forces: “. . .are close enough to the Arab countries for the words to be immedi-
ately followed by deeds.”45 Of course, when Mussolini uttered these words to
al-Gaylani in February 1942, just as when Hitler said more or less the same
thing to al-Husayni three months earlier in Berlin, Axis forces and Vichy France
still controlled a significant part of the Arab world, namely the Arab states of
North Africa east of Egypt. Of course, this rationale would seem to contradict
42
See Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 260.
43
Gibson, The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943, 446. In this diary entry for February 10, 1942, Ciano
refers to al-Gaylani as “Prime Minister,” indicating that the German and Italian governments
were in agreement on his future title in an as yet undetermined form of Iraqi state.
44
Ibid., 450.
45
Ibid. On April 14, and again on May 3, Ciano referred in his diary to the Japanese proposal for a
tripartite declaration of support for the independence of India and Arabia. He also noted that
while Mussolini was favorably disposed to the Japanese idea, the Germans were not. See Ibid.,
473, 480. The Japanese proposal, which would surface again in 1942, will be considered in
detail later.
the aims of the Axis propaganda campaign to mobilize Arab opinion and a
popular uprising against the British position in the Middle East.
By 1942, it appeared that Hitler’s government had not yet determined
precisely what a postwar Arab world would look like in terms of satisfying
its own interests and the interests and ambitions of Italy, Vichy France, and
Spain. What does seem clear by early 1942, however, is the reality that both the
Axis powers on the one hand, and Arab exiles in Europe such as al-Gaylani
and al-Husayni on the other, were having a conversation about the future of
the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt,
one that for the most part tended to ignore Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and
Morocco at that time. Under State Secretary Woermann seemed to confirm
this scenario at least as far as the German government was concerned in a
December 26, 1941 memorandum to the Near East Department (Abteilung VII)
when he observed: “In our Arab policy, we have paid careful attention to
differentiate between the Arabs of the Middle East and the Arabs of North
Africa. Our Arab policy is not directed toward the territories west of Egypt.
In the interest of our policies toward Italy, France, and Spain, we have no
interest at the moment in promoting Arab nationalism in North Africa”46
Despite the loss of Syria and Lebanon to the British and the Gaullists in the
early summer of 1941, German refusal to publicly commit itself to Arab
independence through 1942 and 1943 was still conditioned by some of the
same perceptions of the previous year. The Nazi government continued to insist
on the need to support the Vichy French government in the hope of securing its
cooperation against the British and the Americans. Thus, despite Woermann’s
December 26, 1941 memorandum, Germany did have a policy of sorts toward
the North African Arabs west of Egypt. On February 23, 1942, Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop issued a directive on Arab policy and France, one
that was based on reports from German Ambassador Otto Abetz in Paris, from
Consul-General Auer in Casablanca, and from Consul-General Pfeiffer in
Algiers. Five days later, Under State Secretary Woermann issued a follow-up
memorandum on von Ribbentrop’s directive, emphasizing its conclusion that
Germany and Italy should not issue a declaration that dealt in any way with the
question of Arab independence at that time.47 Woermann does indicate that in
the matter of a public declaration and its timing, the German Foreign Office
was thinking specifically about British-occupied Syria and Lebanon, and not
French North Africa. In any case, the former mandates of Syria and Lebanon
were not necessarily more important than French North Africa to the Vichy
French government. Any policy on France and the Arabs of necessity had to be
about French North Africa as well.
46
ADAP: Serie E, Bd. I, Nr. 59.
47
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.26, “Aufzeichnung zur Weisung des Herrn Reichsaußenministers vom
23. Feb. 1942 über arabische Politik und Frankreich,” U.St.S., Pol. Nr. 154, 28. Februar 1942.
Woermann agreed with the advice of Abetz that it was not a good time to
issue a public declaration of support for Arab independence, even if Syria did
not revert back to French control after the war. Although not explicitly stated
by Abetz, Woermann writes that in order to avoid compromising German
wartime interests that were related to France, ‟. . .the Syrian question would
be settled as part of a comprehensive settlement of the outstanding issues
between France and the Axis powers, or at a time in close proximity to such
a settlement.”48 Woermann also mentions that the British, American, and
Egyptian governments had already declared their support for Syrian and Leba-
nese independence after the war. On the other hand, Woermann referred to
statements by Auer and Pfeiffer that even if the Axis issued a declaration on
Syria, it would not necessarily have an impact on French North Africa. In his
conclusion, Woermann accepted Abetz’s argument about the importance of
timing in any declaration, and that the time had not yet come: “Regarding
the timing, I agree with Ambassador Abetz that, in terms of German-French
relations, it is not at the moment advantageous. . .”49 Nevertheless, Woer-
mann’s comments also reveal increasing doubts that such a declaration would,
in the end, have an adverse effect on Germany’s conduct of the war: “The
assumption that the issuance of a declaration now could have a decisive influ-
ence on our relations with France or on our entire war effort would be an
exaggeration of its significance.”50
Another factor influencing Germany’s decision regarding a possible declar-
ation in support of Arab independence was Turkey. The Nazi regime scrupu-
lously supported Turkish neutrality during the war. It had been clearly aware of
Turkish sensitivity to the German invasion of the Balkans and Greece a year
earlier, in the spring of 1941, as demonstrated in Hitler’s March 1, 1941 note to
the Turkish president, Ismet Inönü. In that letter, Hitler sought to reassure
Inönü that the forthcoming German military push into southeastern Europe
was in no way intended to compromise the territorial and political integrity of
the Turkish Republic, and that Germany possessed no territorial ambitions or
interests in the region. He further assured the Turkish president that German
troops would leave the area once the British threat was removed. Hitler con-
cluded by expressing his confidence that: “. . .the territorial adjustments after
this war will never result in contradicting the aims of Turkish policy, but just
the opposite, in a closer understanding of the two states.”51 This was also an
indication that Berlin recognized Turkey’s strategic interest in any final settle-
ment of the “Arab Question” in general, certainly with regard to the states just
across its southern border in the Fertile Crescent. Indeed, the possible postwar
territorial changes that Hitler alluded to in his letter to Inönü likely included the
Arab states just south of Turkey, particularly parts of Syria that Turkey had
48 49 50
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.
51
PA: R29935, Büro des USt.S., Türkei, Bd.-, Auswärtiges Amt, Chiffrierbüro Nr. 128, 1. März
1941.
claimed since the end of the last war. Some mention of this was made in the
previous chapter with regard to the events in Iraq and Syria in the spring and
early summer of 1941. On June 18, 1941, the German and Turkish govern-
ments signed a Treaty of Friendship in which each country pledged to respect
the other’s borders and territorial integrity and to resolve all questions in a
friendly manner.52
Franz von Papen, the German ambassador in Ankara, had always advised
his superiors in Berlin that any future reorganization of the Arab states should
take into account first and foremost the vital interests of neighboring Turkey.
With German hopes for victory in Egypt and in the Caucasus, and an eventual
meeting of victorious German armies somewhere in the Fertile Crescent, and
based on von Papen’s previous advice, Woermann further advised von Ribben-
trop on March 12, 1942 that: “In any promises now regarding the shaping of
the Arab space, we should not go any further than necessary in order to lend a
helping hand to our Arab friends and to find a population ready to cooperate
with us when we march in.”53 Woermann suggested that a possible secret note
to al-Gaylani alone promising him German support for his reinstatement as
head of a new Iraqi government would be acceptable because even that would
not happen until sometime in the future. He also suggested that a similarly
secret statement to the Mufti about an intended declaration on the independ-
ence of the Arab lands might also be appropriate. But he was clear in recom-
mending that: “The issuing of a public declaration about the independence of
the Arab lands is better left unsaid for now. . .,”54 especially given the potential
problems that a declaration might create for relations with both Turkey and
with France. Finally, Woermann noted that at the appropriate time the question
of the organization of the Arab area will be a part of the discussions that
Germany and Italy will have with Turkey, and that: “Before then, we must
also clearly determine if and perhaps which border adjustments can be offered
to the Turks.”55
In the spring of 1942, Germany and Italy received a suggestion from their
Japanese ally that the tripartite powers issue a joint declaration of support for
the independence of India and Arabia. In this initiative, Arabia was not specif-
ically defined, but it presumably included the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian
Peninsula, and perhaps Egypt. According to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Hitler agreed to a joint declaration only with regard to India; he also noted
that Hitler opposed making even the declaration for India public.56 Mussolini
52
PA: R29935, Büro des USt.S., Türkei, Bd.-, Deutsch-türkischer Freundschaftsvertrag, 18. Juni
1941.
53
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.26, “Aufzeichnung über die Türkei und die arabische Frage,”
Woermann an RAM, Pol. Nr. 176, 12. März 1942.
54 55
Ibid. Ibid.
56
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Ribbentrop, Notiz für den Führer, 16. April
1942. See also Gibson, The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943, 473, 480–482.
approved in principle a declaration about Indian independence, provided it

remained more of a propaganda piece than a substantive independence dec-
laration. The German Foreign Office had in fact been in contact with Subhas
Chandra Bose, a member of the Indian National Congress who had arrived in
Germany in April 1941 in search of German support for Indian independence
from British rule. Von Ribbentrop too was supportive of a statement on
Indian independence,57 but he argued that one was in fact not necessary for
the Arab lands at that time. He reasoned that while Japanese forces were close
to India’s borders, Axis forces were not yet close enough to the borders of the
Arab Middle East to justify such a declaration. In reality, of course, this was
not the case given the presence of Rommel’s troops in Libya, an Arab state,
and their close proximity to both Egypt and French North Africa in
April 1942. It also indicates that to the extent that the German government
considered giving its public support for the idea of Arab independence as an
option, the Arab states of North Africa were obviously not part of that
consideration.
Hitler, however, remained apprehensive, even about a joint declaration for
India alone, and notified von Ribbentrop on April 17 that he preferred to
postpone a final decision until he had a chance to discuss the matter in person
with Mussolini in their forthcoming meeting in Salzburg later that month.58
At that meeting, Hitler and Mussolini did agree in principle to such a declar-
ation for both India and Arabia, but again that “. . . both governments took the
position that the right time for such a declaration had not yet come.”59 Again,
the Germans and the Italians put off the decision about a formal declaration
for the Arab world by taking the position that the military situation in the
Middle East did not yet warrant such a step. They reasoned that such a
step would run the risk of failing to stir the local population to action against
the British without a clear indication that Axis armies were poised to defeat the
British war effort. There appeared to be no consensus in Berlin regarding
the Arab argument that such a declaration would fan the flames of Arab
revolution against the British, and thereby substantially assist the Axis military
effort. Hitler and Mussolini concluded in Salzburg:
Both governments would take the position that such a declaration should be issued when
the military position of the “Tripartite Pact” powers in the Indian Ocean and the Near
57
See ADAP: Serie E, Bd. I, Nr. 266, 289, and Bd. IV, Nr. 50.
58
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Notiz für Herrn Reichsaußenminister,
Führerhauptquartier (Hewel), 17. April 1942. In his memoirs, Walter Schellenberg, a personal
aide to Heinrich Himmler in the Reich Security Main Office Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA),
asserts that Hitler told Bose that he was not interested in India and that the question of Indian
independence should be left to Japan. See Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), 298. Bose left Germany for Japan in 1943.
59
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Ribbentrop an DB/Rom, Für Botschafter
Macksensen oder Geschäftsträger, 2. Mai 1942.
East is so strong that a general uprising in both lands can be expected, and that this can
be led by immediate and active military interventions of the Tripartite Pact powers under
all circumstances to a successful conclusion.60
The German and Italian governments informed Japan in early May that they
agreed in principle to a Tripartite Pact power declaration in support of Indian
and Arab independence, but that now was not the time.61
Meanwhile, both al-Husayni and al-Gaylani continued to pressure the
German and Italian governments to issue a clear, formal statement, public or
private, in support of Arab independence. While in Rome again for discussions
with the Italian government in April 1942, both Arab leaders wrote yet another
appeal to von Ribbentrop and Ciano to issue such a declaration. The letter,
dated April 28, was written to von Ribbentrop in German and to Ciano in
Italian. It referred once again to the trust the Arab people had placed in the Axis
powers to end the suffering of the Arabs under British oppression and the
willingness of the Arab people to participate in the struggle against the common
enemy, Great Britain, until final victory. In return for joining the Axis war
effort, al-Husayni and al-Gaylani made the following appeal:
We ask now the German government to declare its readiness to guarantee to the Arab
lands currently suffering under British oppression all possible support in their struggle
for liberation, to recognize the sovereignty and independence of the Arab lands of the
Near East currently suffering under English oppression and their unity if the participat-
ing states so desire, as well as to agree to the elimination of the Jewish National Home in
Palestine.62
The letter concluded with the expressed willingness of both al-Husayni and al-
Gaylani to accept a written statement that would for the time being remain
secret.
On May 5, Woermann responded to al-Husayni and al-Gaylani with two
separate telegrams, each with its own intent, regarding the position of Germany
on the question of Arab independence. In his message to al-Gaylani, Woermann
recalled May 2 as the anniversary of the Iraqi declaration of war against
England, recognized al-Gaylani’s renewed struggle against the British, and
implied that Germany supported an independent state of Iraq: “The Arabs
remain in each locale true to their obligation to struggle to the very end,
for the realization of their independence and complete freedom and to the
expulsion of the English from their land.”63 It is likely that Woermann was
referring only to Iraq in what appeared to be an endorsement of its “independ-
ence and complete freedom.” In his note to al-Husayni, however, sent on the
60
Ibid.
61
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Ribbentrop, Notiz für den Führer,
Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag des Duce zur Indien-Erklärung, 14. Mai 1942.
62
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 39–40. The Italian version of this letter can be found on pages 40–41.
63
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 10.21.026, Woermann an al-Gaylani, Nr. 1888, 5. Mai 1942.
photo 6.2. The Mufti Amin al-Husayni and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Berlin on the first
anniversary of the coup in Iraq (April 1942).
Courtesy Yad Vashem, Jerusalem.
same day and also in commemoration of the first anniversary of Iraq’s declar-
ation of war against Britain, there is no mention at all of Arab independence.
Instead, Woermann played on the Mufti’s own tendency to present himself as
the leader and spokesperson of all Arabs by referring to the respect and trust
that the Arabs had placed in him and for his struggle against the English and the
Zionists. Woermann wrote that the Arabs: “. . .renew their obligation of loyalty
to the death in the struggle against these two enemies of Arab unity, under the
correct leadership of your eminence.”64 It appeared, therefore, that the German
Foreign Office was, by May 1942, finally prepared to extend a confidential
promise of German support for at least Iraqi independence to al-Gaylani, while
continuing with general expressions of solidarity with the Mufti as the leader of
the Arab people, all without a clear commitment to independence for the rest of
the Arabic-speaking world. In the spring of 1942, with Rommel’s drive into
Egypt progressing and German forces on the eastern front not far from the
northern Caucasus, Iraq seemed to loom once again as a central factor in
Hitler’s strategic plans for the Middle East.
In an exchange of letters between al-Gaylani and von Ribbentrop on
May 14, 1942, the latter finally extended Germany’s clear but confidential
endorsement of Iraqi independence. In his letter, al-Gaylani reaffirmed the
solidarity of the Iraqi people with the Axis powers and their determination:
“. . .to free their own country from British domination and to secure their
independence.”65 Al-Gaylani assured von Ribbentrop that he understood for
the time being the necessity for a confidential statement, although he did
not state why he had accepted the necessity for secrecy. Von Ribbentrop wrote
to al-Gaylani on the same day that the German government had complete trust
in him and the Iraqi people to fully support the goals of the Axis powers and
that: “Germany, in full agreement with Italy, considered one of these goals to
be the complete independence and full sovereignty of Iraq. . .”66
Al-Gaylani had been trying privately to conclude some sort of special treaty
or agreement with the German and Italian governments since February 1942.
Since he knew Fritz Grobba well from Grobba’s years as the German
Ambassador in Baghdad during the 1930s, al-Gaylani proposed a preliminary
treaty between Germany and Iraq, one that would allow further agreements
regarding future military cooperation, a new Iraqi currency, German oil con-
cessions in Iraq, and German advisors in the new Iraqi government.67 He made
a similar suggestion to the Italian government during his visit to Rome in mid
64
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 10.21.026, Woermann an al-Husayni, Nr. 1888, 5. Mai 1942
65
PA: R27828, Handakten Ritter, Briefwechsel des RAM und des Grafen Ciano mit dem
Großmufti und Gailani, Bd.-, Raschid Ali El-Gailani an den Herrn Reichsminister des Auswärti-
gen Joachim von Ribbentrop, 14. Mai 1942.
66
PA: R27828, Handakten Ritter, Briefwechsel des RAM und des Grafen Ciano mit dem
Großmufti und Gailani, Bd.-, Ribbentrop an Seine Exzellenz Herrn Ministerpräsidenten Raschid
Ali El-Gailani, Berlin, 14. Mai 1942.
67
PA: R27332, Handakten Ettel, Kaukasus Länder, Länder des arab. Raumes im Nahen Osten,
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, Der Bevollmächtigte des Auswärtigen Amts für die arabischen
Ländern (Grobba), Abschluß eines Rahmenvertrages mit Raschid Ali el-Gailani, 10. Februar
1942. Grobba sent this report to von Ribbentrop, State Secretary von Weizsäcker, and Under
State Secretary Woermann from Rome.
February. Grobba, who was in Rome during the mid-February meetings of

al-Gaylani and the Mufti with the Italian government, was supportive in
principle of such a preliminary treaty, noting that it had not been possible
before because such treaties are normally concluded only between two or more
sovereign governments. However, both Berlin and Rome had already decided
that they would support some sort self-governing Iraqi state with al-Gaylani as
its prime minister after the war. Therefore, German Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop, along with the Italian government, joined Grobba in support of
such an agreement.
In a meeting in Rome on February 18, Mussolini told al-Gaylani that Italy
recognized him as Iraq’s prime minister and would support such a preliminary
treaty with Iraq.68 According to Grobba’s February 20 report from Rome, and
perhaps unexpectedly, al-Gaylani then asked Mussolini for Italian recognition,
publicly or in secret, of the independence of Iraq and all of the Arab lands.
Mussolini, of course, responded in generalities about his admiration for
al-Gaylani and Italian sympathy for the Arab people and their struggle against
the British, but he could not agree at that time to such a declaration, public or
secret. Mirroring the German position on a declaration of support for Arab
independence, Mussolini told al-Gaylani, according to Grobba: “An official
declaration would only come into question when the Axis powers are closer to
Iraq; but it may be possible to issue a letter.”69 Presumably, a “letter” would
contain some sort of general, unofficial, and secret statement on Arab inde-
pendence. However, Mussolini cautioned al-Gaylani that he would first have to
reach an agreement on this issue with his German ally. Of course, the Axis
powers would first have to make a final determination about the level of
influence and control that they ultimately would seek in the Arab world,
including specifically in Iraq, something that neither Italy nor Germany had
as yet defined. Moreover, another complicating factor was al-Gaylani’s asser-
tions that the future Iraq would take possession of Kuwait, as well as control
over the waters of the Shatt al-Arab,70 claims that would likely complicate
future Axis relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
68
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, Der Bevollmächtigte des Auswärtigen Amts für die arabischen
Ländern (Grobba), Empfänge Gailanis durch Graf Ciano, den König, und den Duce, Nr. 4, 20.
Februar 1942.
69
Ibid. For Ciano’s conversations with al-Gaylani in Rome, see again his diary entries for February
10 and 18, 1942 in Gibson, The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943, 446, 450.
70
The Shatt al-Arab is the river in southern Iraq, formed at the confluence of the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers, which then flows for about 200 kilometers into the northern Persian Gulf. The
southern half of the Shatt al-Arab was, and remains today, the international border between Iraq
and Iran.
anticipation of victory: fall 1942

When it became clear in Berlin that the German army would not achieve final
victory in the Soviet Union by the end of 1941, plans for victory in the East had
to be moved forward to 1942. German military planners placed particular
emphasis on the southern front where Army Group South had been able to
hold on to a coherent defensive line by the winter of 1941–1942, where the
weather conditions would be conducive to earlier military operations in 1942,
and where the important and highly coveted oil resources in the Caucasus could
become available to Axis forces.71 In 1942, therefore, the Germans still envi-
sioned a victorious German army in the Caucasus, poised to enter the Arab
Fertile Crescent from the northeast before ultimately meeting up with Rom-
mel’s victorious troops moving into the region from Egypt. This, they believed,
would end Britain’s dominant position in the Middle East.
Rommel’s offensive against Egypt was well under way by the end of
May 1942. The Foreign Office in Berlin began to make the necessary political
plans for the Arab states that would parallel the military campaigns and the
anticipated victories both in Egypt and in the Soviet Union. On May 14,
Grobba, who had been appointed Plenipotentiary in the Foreign Office for
the Arab Lands, along with German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and
the commander of Sonderstab F in Greece, General Helmuth Felmy, met to
begin the political planning for the eventual German military advance into the
Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent.72 The meeting reiterated the general hostility
among Arabs toward Great Britain and Arab sympathy and support for
Germany. The reason for this positive situation, they believed, was the effect-
iveness of German propaganda, controlled by the Foreign Office with the
positive participation of the Mufti and al-Gaylani, in cultivating these attitudes
among the general Arab population. They fully expected German propaganda
and additional planned public statements from the Mufti and al-Gaylani to
stimulate Arab unrest and revolts against the British when German troops
arrived in the vicinity of the Fertile Crescent. This condition had been largely
absent throughout the Arab states since the beginning of the war. In this
context, it seems clear that the participants at the meeting were talking only
71
Weinberg, A World at Arms, 408–410. Weinberg provides the most complete assessment of the
merging of German military strategies in the southern sector of the Eastern Front and in North
Africa and the Middle East. For more specifically on German interest in the oil resources of the
Caucasus, see for example PA: R27651, Handakten Luther, Vortragsnotizen, Bd. 30, Der
Vertreter des Auswärtigen Amts beim AOK, Nr. 66, “Das Erdöl von Maikop und die Raffinerie
von Krasnodar,” Wirtschaftsbericht, 16. August 1942, and Bericht Nr. 27, Betr. Erdöllage im
Kaukasus, 5. September 1942.
72
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, Gesandter Dr. F. Grobba, Inhalt der Besprechung des Herrn RAM
mit dem Gesandten Grobba und dem General d. Fl. Felmy am 14. Mai 1942, “Die politische
Vorbereitung des deutschen Vormarschs nach den arabischen Ländern.”
about the Arab states of the Fertile Crescent. They also talked about the
incorporation of about 130 Arab volunteers, mostly prisoners of war,
who were training under Sonderstab F near Athens, along with another fifty
Arab students in Germany and a number of Arabs from French North
Africa who would be added to this special German-Arab Lehrabteilung
(training unit). The main task of this Lehrabteilung would be to form and train
a new Iraqi-Arab army, one in which volunteers from Syria and Palestine would
also eagerly enlist. Moreover, von Ribbentrop, Grobba, and Felmy discussed
an agreement with Italy that an additional Arab Legion would be formed in
Italy, starting with some 250 Arab prisoners of war and an already existing
Arab training unit that consisted of about twenty men. The purpose of this
Arab unit, they agreed, was: “. . .to serve less as a fighting unit than for use as a
propaganda mechanism to persuade more Arabs to come over to the Axis
side.”73 However, the meeting closed with the realization that while there
was agreement regarding the establishment of an Iraqi government under
al-Gaylani, there remained the need for Germany, Italy, the Mufti and
al-Gaylani, and other Arab leaders to determine just how the reorganization
of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan should proceed. There was no
mention at all of Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, or the rest of Arab North Africa
as this planning process was getting under way.
On May 31, von Ribbentrop put together an outline of the tasks that the
German Foreign Office would oversee as part of this combined effort.74 He first
defined the Arab states involved as those in the Fertile Crescent, all of which
were under British control at that time, and where the two victorious Axis
armies were supposed to meet. These included Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine,
Syria, and Lebanon. There was no mention of the territories in the Arabian
Peninsula or North Africa. Von Ribbentrop stated in his plan: “The task of
German foreign policy is to support the cause of Arab liberation through the
utilization of all anti-English elements and to bring about the establishment of
national Arab governments in close cooperation with our Axis partner Italy.”75
He continued that there was agreement that a new government in Iraq would be
formed by al-Gaylani, but that some sort of an agreement would have to
be reached among the German and Italian governments, al-Gaylani and
al-Husayni, and other recognized Arab leaders with regard to the other states
in the Fertile Crescent. To oversee these anticipated issues, a special office
(Dienststelle) was to be set up in the German Foreign Office under the direction
of Grobba, with other specialists in Middle Eastern affairs. The tasks of
Grobba’s office included organizing German propaganda in the region to
73
Ibid. See also NARA: MS/P-207, Felmy, 11–13. Felmy also expressed his concerns regarding
religious, regional, and tribal differences and conflicts among the Arab recruits.
74
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Ribbentrop, Die Länder des arabischen
Raumes, 31. Mai 1942.
75
Ibid.
stimulate an Arab revolt against the British, and working closely with the Mufti
and al-Gaylani in Berlin. It also took on the task of coordinating efforts with
General Felmy’s Sonderstab F in Sunion near Athens, in consultation with the
Mufti and al-Gaylani in Berlin, to recruit Arab volunteers for the previously
mentioned German-Arab Lehrabteilung. This unit would in turn raise and train
a new Iraqi-Arab army, under the supervision of the military’s Sonderstab
F. Clearly, the new Dienststelle under Grobba, and generally the attention of
von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office in Berlin in the summer of 1942, were
focused on the conquest of the Fertile Crescent, and specifically the return to
power of al-Gaylani in Iraq. The fate of the rest of the Fertile Crescent, of the
relative roles of Mufti and al-Gaylani in that region, the role of Italy, and
indeed the fate of the rest of the Arabic-speaking world were left unresolved
in von Ribbentrop’s May 31, 1942 memorandum.
Some of the omissions of the May 14 meeting and of von Ribbentrop’s
May 31 memorandum were at least partially addressed shortly thereafter in
the summer of 1942 in an undated and unsigned German Foreign Office
memorandum titled “Germany’s Advance toward the Arab world” (Vormarsch
Deutschlands nach dem arabischen Raum).76 After the usual preliminaries
about Arab popular enthusiasm for Germany, the memorandum, somewhat
naively and simplistically, asserted that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been
friendly toward the British in the past only out of necessity, and that they
would support German troops as they entered the Fertile Crescent. It also
pointed to Germany’s many friends in non-Arab Iran who were looking for-
ward to Germany’s arrival in the region. The document further outlines
plans to establish an Iraqi government under al-Gaylani and a Greater Syrian
government under al-Husayni, as well as a new Iranian government, once
German troops occupied the city of Tiflis and the rest of Georgia in the
Caucasus. These new governments in exile, having relocated along with
Grobba’s Dienststelle to the city of Tiflis, would issue calls to their people to
rise up in support of the incoming German army. As was discussed at the
May 14 meeting, plans were confirmed for the “formation of a new
Iraqi-Arab army,” (Neuaufstellung der irakisch-arabischen Armee) with three
Iraqi divisions and an additional division composed of volunteers from Syria,
Palestine, and Transjordan, under the command of Felmy’s Sonderstab F and
accompanied by German troops. Incredibly, the memorandum fantasized that
the new German-Arab force would advance southwest toward the Suez Canal
and south to the Persian Gulf, with the goal: “From Basra to establish contact
with the Japanese heading toward Ceylon.”77
76
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, “Vormarsch Deutschlands nach dem arabischen Raum,” (no date).
It seems likely that the author was, again, Fritz Grobba, in his capacity as Plenipotentiary in the
Foreign Office for the Arab Lands.
77
Ibid.
The document also goes into some detail about a planned “New Order in the
Arab Space” (Die Neuordnung des arabischen Raumes). It stipulates that:
“. . .Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt would remain independent states,”
and that “Syria, Lebanon, Palestine und Transjordan would be united in a
Greater Syrian state.” While the term “independent” is used to describe Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, states that had enjoyed varying degrees of
self-government before the war, it is omitted from the statement about Syria,
Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Moreover, Iraq would annex Kuwait,
while Saudi Arabia would take Aqaba to its northwest, as well as Bahrain,
Oman, and much of the southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula that had been
under British control since the middle of the nineteenth century. Al-Gaylani
would become prime minister and possibly chief-of-state in Iraq, with influence
as well in Greater Syria, while the Mufti would, pending the support of other
Syrian leaders, become the “Speaker” and possibly the head of state in a
Greater Syria. The memorandum cautions that Germany and Italy would have
to take great care to neutralize any rivalries between al-Gaylani and al-Husayni
in this Arab “New Order.” It reaffirms that Italy would retain its political
preferences, that Germany would retain all military preferences, and that in
political matters Italy would obtain Germany’s agreement before undertaking
any actions. In other words, the Axis powers might retain certain privileges and
prerogatives in the Fertile Crescent not unlike those retained by Great Britain in
Iraq and Egypt in 1930 and 1936, respectively.
Finally, the second part of this document reviews the specific responsibilities
of Grobba’s position as Plenipotentiary for the Arab lands. The staff under
Grobba consisted of Foreign Office civil servants with knowledge of the
Middle East and its languages. Its task was defined as the political preparations
for the German advance into the Arab lands and the implementation of German
policy in the region according to the directives of the Foreign Office. Its
previous tasks had included political and economic oversight of the Mufti
and al-Gaylani in Germany, discussions with them related to the political,
economic, and military issues between Germany and the Arab lands, and the
preparation of terms for an eventual takeover of the internationally owned and
London-based Iraq Petroleum Company. The document further defines the
immediate tasks of Grobba’s office as: “Preparation for the establishment of
Arab governments, participation in the preparations for the establishment
of the Iranian government.”78 It also refers to the need for negotiations
regarding cooperation with the Saudi and Egyptian governments, and in par-
ticular: “Advising the Arab governments in the building of their new adminis-
trations and in the economic development of their lands, as well as efforts to
exploit the riches of the Arab lands for the Axis powers’ conduct of the war.”79
78 79
Ibid. Ibid.
On July 2, German Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome notified Berlin

that Mussolini had approved the release of an Axis declaration of support for
the independence of Egypt, and had requested German approval of the
following public declaration. Translated in Rome from Italian into German,
the proposed declaration read: “In the moment in which their armed forces are
victoriously advancing in Egyptian territory, the Axis powers are joyously
strengthening their firm commitment to recognize and secure the independence
and sovereignty of Egypt. . .The policy of the Axis powers is guided by the
principle ‘Egypt for the Egyptians.’”80 However, less than half an hour later,
von Mackensen again telegraphed to Berlin, this time including the general
outlines of Italy’s preliminary plans for an Axis-occuppied Egypt. These plans
suggested the need for an Axis reorganization of the Egyptian government in
such a way that: “. . .in view of its impact on the rest of the Arab world, the
independent Egypt must be created to serve as a model regime.”81 The “model”
here likely reflected the Italian desire to establish a self-governing structure in
Egypt not unlike the one established by the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936,
one that would allow the Italians and the Germans to retain a political and
military presence and authority in a postwar Egypt and throughout the Middle
East. In any case, on the following day, July 3, two Arabic-language broadcasts
from Berlin, one of which was from the Mufti himself, declared full Axis
support for Egyptian independence and sovereignty.82 Three days later,
von Ribbentrop authorized the German ambassador in Rome to convey to
Mussolini the German government’s approval of Italy’s political plans in Egypt,
plans that von Ribbentrop noted reflected Germany’s position: “. . .that Italy
has political primacy in Egypt.”83
At the end of August, al-Husayni requested a change in German plans to
relocate Felmy’s operations at Sonderstab F, with its Lehrabteilung of trained
80
PA: R27772, Handakten Ritter, Ägypten, Afghanistan, Albanien, Alexandrien, Bd.-, Von Mack-
ensen/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 2455, 2. Juli 1942.
81
PA: R27772, Handakten Ritter, Ägypten, Afghanistan, Albanien, Alexandrien, Bd.-, Von Mack-
ensen/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 2456, 2. Juli 1942. See also von Ribbentrop’s May 29,
1942 eight-point strategy for German radio propaganda to Egypt in anticipation of a victory by
Rommel’s forces in ADAP: Serie E, Bd. II, Nr. 250. Von Ribbentrop’s points contain all of the
usual attacks on past British imperial rule in Egypt, its alleged economic exploitation of Egyptian
resources, and Rommel’s pending liberation of the Egyptian people. It avoids the question of
future Egyptian independence.
82
For the texts of these radio broadcasts, see Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 123.
83
PA: R27772, Handakten Ritter, Ägypten, Afghanistan, Albanien, Alexandrien, Bd.-, Von Rib-
bentrop/Berlin an Von Mackensen/Rom, Telegramm Nr. 674, 6. Juli 1942. Ciano more or less
confirms this Italian approach to Egypt in his diaries. See Gibson, The Ciano Diaries 1939–1943,
502–505. Communications between the German embassy in Rome and the Foreign Office in
Berlin in 1942 indicate that there was lingering Italian distrust of Germany’s intentions in Egypt.
See for example BArch: R901-68760, DB/Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 3213, 28. August
1942. See also BArch: R901-68688, Neurath/Akrikakorps an AA/Berlin, Telegramm ohne
Nummer, 24. Februar 1942.
Arab volunteers, from Greece to Tiflis in the Caucasus. He suggested moving

the entire operation to Egypt instead. In his memorandum to Field Marshal
Keitel of August 29, the Mufti had enthusiastically endorsed the plan to move
Felmy’s operation out of Greece, but objected to the idea of moving Arab
volunteers, former prisoners of war, to Russia and the Caucasus. He wrote:
“I have given these volunteers, who were former prisoners of war, assurances
that they will serve in an Arab organization and be placed in Arab lands, and
that the rumor that has been spread about sending them to Russia and the
Caucasus is false enemy propaganda. . .”84 Al-Husayni further argued that
most of the volunteers were from Syria and Palestine, with only three from
Iraq, and that: “Their move to Egypt would allow them to return almost
immediately to their homes and to be among their own people. . .,” and “. . .I
am convinced that many Syrian and Palestinian Arabs, refugees and those living
in Egypt, as well as many Egyptians, will gather in unity and join the
struggle.”85 In an attached statement, also dated August 29, 1942 and clearly
anticipating an Axis victory in Egypt, the Mufti reiterated his position that he
wanted: “The establishment on Egyptian territory of an Arab central authority,
the leadership of which would assume authority over all matters relating to
cooperation. . .,” and “The creation of regular Arab military units that would
cooperate shoulder to shoulder with Axis troops.”86 Of course, he, the Mufti,
would be in command of this new authority. Finally, as if the establishment of
an Arab authority in Egypt under his direction was not enough to affirm his
own position and his determination to secure Arab independence, the Mufti
then suggested that weapons and munitions should be sent to Egypt, behind
enemy lines, and then to Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, in preparation for a general
Arab uprising against the enemy.
By the end of the summer of 1942, the Mufti’s dissatisfaction with the
planned move of Sonderstab F to the Caucasus rather than to North Africa
reflected the continuing uncertainties in German policy in the Middle East, as
well as the rivalry between al-Husayni and al-Gaylani for influence in Berlin
and Rome. These uncertainties were echoed by General Felmy himself, who
composed an unusually frank and highly critical position paper sometime in
mid or late August that amounted to a fairly sharp critique of the German-Arab
Lehrabteilung and its planned mission in the Caucasus and the Middle East.87
He observed that the number of Arab recruits was small, with 24 Iraqis,
112 Syrians and Palestinians, and 127 Arabs from French northwest Africa.
He also asserted that any new recruits would likely be Arabs from North Africa
84
PA: R27325, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, Amin El-Husseini, Großmufti, an Herrn
Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, Chef des OKW, “Denkschrift über die Verlegung des Lagers Sunion
vom 29.8.1942,” 30. August 1942. Al-Husayni wrote this memorandum in Rome on August 29.
85 86
Ibid. Ibid.
87
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.27, Stellungnahme zum Schreiben des Auswärtigen Amts vom 5.8.42,
Pol. VII 1034 g.Rs., Felmy, (no date).
rather than from the Fertile Crescent, the region his unit was supposed to enter
at some point from the Caucasus. Felmy also expressed skepticism about
exactly how much influence the Mufti and al-Gaylani had among the Arab
populations in the Fertile Crescent, where they were supposed to rouse the
population to revolt against the British. He decried the lack of clarity over
future German vs. Italian leadership in the Middle East, once Axis armies
entered the region from the Caucasus and from Egypt, and insisted that the
command of any new Arab military units should rest primarily with Germany,
and not with Italy. He also reiterated that the German-Arab Lehrabteilung was
under the authority of the German army; it in no way constituted a separate
“Arab legion.” Once again, he joined others in concluding that Germany’s
alliance with Italy: “. . .on the one hand strengthens the distrust of the Arabs
while on the other is effectively used in English propaganda.”88 Felmy also
makes an apparent reference to Germany’s unwillingness to formally declare its
unequivocal support for Arab independence. He warns that Arab enthusiasm
for the Axis is weakened because: “No one knows what kind of future the Axis
powers are willing to guarantee for the Arab world,” and that the question
many Arab leaders were asking themselves was: “How far will the Arab lands,
or a part of them, be subject to Italian influence or Italian domination?”89
Felmy closed with a call for a resolution of the leadership battle between
al-Husayni and al-Gaylani, a clarification of German and Italian political
responsibilities in the planning for the Arab world, and a greater contribution
from the Arabs themselves in the common struggle.
The Mufti’s earlier attempt to change the eventual destination of Felmy’s
Sonderstab F was in vain, as the German-Arab Lehrabteilung was already on its
way to the Caucasus by the end of August.90 In any case, Admiral Canaris and
the Abwehr objected to any involvement of the Mufti in the activities at Sunion
in Greece, and in the formation and use of the German-Arab Lehrabteilung.91
88 89
Ibid. Ibid.
90
By the time of its departure from Sunion in Greece for the southern front in the Soviet Union in
late August 1942, the Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung actually consisted of 6,000 men with
special weapons and training for eventual deployment in the Middle East, by way of the
Caucasus. German soldiers made up 5,200 of its members, and some 800 were Arabs organized
into four companies. One company consisted of Arabs from Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, and three
consisted of Arabs from French North Africa. The four Arab companies were kept in a camp
several hundred kilometers behind the lines on the southern front in the Soviet Union, where they
remained in training without being deployed, while the German soldiers in the Lehrabteilung
suffered heavy casualties in the northern Caucasus. In December 1942, with the tide of battle
turning against the Axis in North Africa, the German Foreign Office and the OKW agreed to
send the four Arab companies to North Africa, as the Mufti had originally demanded, where
they were to be merged with a new Arab volunteer battalion that Germany and Italy considered
forming in Tunis. However, the rapid Axis collapse in North Africa in 1943 precluded this
formation. See PA: R27827, Handakten Ritter, Tunis, Ukraine, USA, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung
betreffend deutsch-arabische Lehrabteilung. U.St.S. Po1, 20. November 1942; and Botschafter
Ritter 25, 14. December 1942.
Walter Hewel, a Foreign Office liaison in Hitler’s main headquarters, reiterated

General Felmy’s complaints about the lack of clarity for the mission of Sonder-
stab F in the Caucasus, made even more problematic in Hewel’s view because:
“. . .above all, one can never expect from the Arab side any meaningful partici-
pation.”92 Hewel also reiterated Felmy’s concerns regarding Arab distrust of
the Italians and their imperial ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean, and
Arab fears that German loyalty to Italy would mean a betrayal of Arab hopes
for independence. He warned again that the absence of clear Axis intentions
regarding Arab independence and the reality that Arab distrust of Italy had
made British promises of Arab independence a danger to the extent that:
“They have given the Arabs, even if only out of pure opportunism, clear
guarantees similar to Lawrence in the past.”93 He also argued that German
propaganda about the struggle against the Jews only went so far with the
Arabs, and that: “These words are of course attractive, but not enough politic-
ally to motivate the Arabs to complete and fanatical action.”94 He also repeated
his fears that the rivalry between the Mufti and al-Gaylani would hinder the
work of Sonderstab F, and that the Mufti would: “. . . as soon as possible go off
into the desert, and from there implement his plans, namely to organize his
resistance movement from Egypt.”95
German expectations of imminent victory in Egypt and the Soviet Union in
the second half of 1942 produced some activity that was in part an attempt to
address these questions. However, the Foreign Office in Berlin remained at a
loss over what to do about the increasing rivalry between al-Husayni and
al-Gaylani for German and Italian attention, and their respective future roles
in a postwar Arab world. Since the spring of 1941, both Germany and Italy had
agreed that, at a minimum, the Mufti was the Arab leader above all others,
including Arab elements in Palestine and Syria who opposed the Mufti,
on whom Axis policy in the Arab world should rely.96 On July 13, 1942,
Woermann reported that each Arab leader had informed him of his views on
the important issues and where each differed from the other. The Mufti claimed
to have long been the leader of the Arab nationalist movement against
the British and to have been the one primarily responsible even for the Iraqi
coup of April 1941 that had briefly placed al-Gaylani in power in Baghdad.
Woermann observed: “At that time, and then during their brief stay in Iran and
91
PA: 61124, Politische Abteilung-Geheime Reichssache, Politische Lage in Arabien, Bd. 2, DB/
Rom an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 3524, 17. September 1942.
92
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Oriend, Bd.-, (Hewel), Notiz für Herrn Gesandten v.
Rintelen, 31. August 1942.
93 94 95
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.
96
See for instance Grobba’s telegram from Baghdad, just before the final demise of al-Gaylani’s
coup at the hands of the British army, in which he reassured the Italian ambassador there that,
despite his (Grobba’s) close ties to al-Gaylani and his difficulties with the Mufti, the two Axis
countries were in accord with regard to the Mufti. PA: R29884, Büro des U.St.S., Irak III, Bd.-,
Gehrcke [Grobba] an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 93, 23. Mai 1941.
at the beginning in Germany and Italy, there had never been any doubt that
al-Gaylani was subordinate to him.”97 Woermann also noted that the conflict
was also about al-Gaylani’s claim to be chief of state rather than prime minister
in a new Iraq, a claim that the Mufti could not accept because he supported
Iraq’s autonomy within, but not independence from, a larger unified Arab state
in the Fertile Crescent. Woermann also observed that although the German and
Italian governments recognized both al-Husayni and al-Gaylani as the two
most important Arab leaders, in the end, they would turn to the Mufti as the
primary Arab leader with whom they had to deal, assuming the two
were unable to come to some sort of agreement between themselves. Finally,
Woermann remarked that the Mufti favored a future greater Arab state that
included Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, while al-Gaylani
seemed to favor a loose federation of presumably independent states,
with himself as head of an independent Iraq. Woermann concluded that these
decisions need not be settled right away, but that the Axis powers would
eventually have to come to some sort of agreement, especially since Mussolini
did not like the idea of a large, unified Arab state. Woermann was of course
referring to Italy’s claims of special Italian interests in all the Arab lands that
bordered on the Mediterranean.
Al-Gaylani met with Hitler for the first time in July 1942 after complaining
for months that he had not been granted such a meeting since his arrival in
Germany the previous year. Woermann prepared some reference points in
preparation for al-Gaylani’s first meeting with Hitler, which was also attended
by von Ribbentrop. Al-Gaylani warned Hitler and von Ribbentrop about his
difficult relationship with the Mufti, and that the latter believed that Hitler had
already chosen him as the man “. . .who will ignite the movement in the Arab
lands.”98 Woermann then cautioned that since Italy’s views still had to be
considered in the matter of Arab leadership, it would be wise for Hitler to
avoid this question altogether for the time being. He urged both Hitler and von
Ribbentrop to impress upon al-Gaylani that close cooperation between the two
Arab leaders was in the interest of the Axis powers. Woermann also urged
Hitler to avoid the question, if possible, of al-Gaylani’s office in the future Iraq,
and that if it did come up in their discussions, that Germany could only
recognize him as prime minister at that time. Any attempt by al-Gaylani to
make secret agreements with Germany alone, without Italian involvement or
knowledge, should be rejected, while his claims that Kuwait and parts of Iran
must be annexed by Iraq should be politely heard, but remain undecided.
Finally, Woermann suggested that al-Gaylani’s view that Iraq does not belong
to Italy’s sphere of interest because it is not a Mediterranean land cannot be
accepted. In other words, and notwithstanding von Ribbentrop’s promise of
97
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Woermann, 13. Juli 1942.
98
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Woermann, 14. Juli 1942.
photo 6.3. Erwin Ettel (no date).

Iraqi independence two months earlier, the Foreign Office was once again
proposing that no firm official commitments should be made to the Arab
leadership in Berlin, and that polite, general, but noncommittal conversation
should be the rule in official German contacts with those Arab leaders.
With regard to al-Gaylani in the summer of 1942, Woermann suggested that
the only formal initiative that Hitler should take toward the Iraqi leader was
to express the following sentiment: “Gailani deserves an especially warm
recognition for his struggle against England.”99
The competition between the Mufti and al-Gaylani was enmeshed within
apparently conflicting points of view at the German Foreign Office as well;
some favored the positions of the former, while others supported the latter.
Erwin Ettel, the German ambassador in Teheran until August 1941, was one
of several key German bureaucrats with expertise and experience in the
Middle East.100 He was assigned to oversee the Mufti in Berlin in 1942 and
to work with him in policy matters. As mentioned earlier, Fritz Grobba, in
charge of the special office (Dienststelle) for the Middle East, had already
developed a relationship with al-Gaylani in Iraq prior to the collapse of
al-Gaylani’s government in May 1941. At the end of August 1942, Ettel
composed a report, the recipient of which is unknown, in which he disputed
99
Ibid.
100
Ettel, like many bureaucrats recruited into the German Foreign Office during the 1930s, had
been an official in the Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP. He was Landesgruppenleiter in Italy
before he joined the Foreign Office. See Conze et.al., Das Amt und die Vergangenheit, 118.
Grobba’s view that al-Gaylani was indispensable to Axis plans for the Middle
East. Ettel argued that al-Gaylani, contrary to Grobba’s claim, had been unable
to unite all Iraqis, especially the Shias, under his authority.101 Ettel’s simmering
dispute with Grobba also had the potential for disrupting German-Italian
relations, as indicated, for example, in al-Gaylani’s assertions to State Secretary
von Weizsäcker in September 1942 that the Italians were in part responsible for
the strained relations between himself and the Mufti.102
Sometime in early October, the Mufti sent a memorandum to Ettel com-
plaining about Grobba’s “negative role” in the cultivation of good relations
between Germany and the Arabs since the 1930s. The undated memorandum,
written in English, seems to be a litany of complaints based on Grobba’s past
contacts and relationships with other Arab leaders, particularly with Iraqis, and
blames Grobba for the Mufti’s poor relations with al-Gaylani.103 On October
17, Ettel submitted a lengthy report to von Ribbentrop in which he was quite
open and direct in his criticism of Grobba.104 The Mufti’s idea to recruit North
African Arabs for a new legion of volunteer fighters, with the recruitment
beginning in Italian-ruled Libya and then expanding into French North Africa,
had been politely turned down by the Foreign Office in Berlin that fall. Grobba
states in his memoirs that al-Husayni blamed him for this, and generally for
trying to scuttle all of al-Husayni’s efforts in the Arab world, even asserting that
Grobba had been the primary cause of the conflicts among Arab leaders,
particularly between himself and al-Gaylani.105 Ettel referred to continuing
Arab distrust toward Italy. He also referred to Arab discomfort with the
German policy of recognizing Italy as dominant in the Middle East, and to
the comments of unnamed Arab leaders that they would even prefer British
rule over Italian rule. Ettel then praised the Mufti and his preference for
Germany over Italy, as well as his realistic acknowledgement of the necessity
for close German-Italian cooperation in Arab affairs. Ettel devoted the second
half of his report to criticizing Grobba for everything, from damaging German-
Italian cooperation in the Middle East to jeopardizing German relations with the
Mufti by accusing al-Husayni of conspiring with Italy against German interests
in the Arab world. Through Grobba’s alleged hostility to the Mufti and to Italy,
101
PA: R27325, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung (Ettel), 26. August 1942. Ettel
admits in the memorandum that Grobba favored recognizing the Mufti as the primary Arab
advisor to the Axis powers, along with recognition that al-Gaylani would serve as the main
connection with Iraq.
102
PA: R27324, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung von Weizsäcker, St.S. No. 533,
15. September 1942. Weizsäcker assured al-Gaylani that there were no political differences
between Germany and Italy, and that both powers were cooperating on the Arab question in the
closest possible way.
103
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 80–85.
104
PA: R27324, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, Ettel an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister, 17.
Oktober 1942.
105
Grobba, Männer und Mächte, 301–302.
and his singular support for al-Gaylani, Ettel charged: “The national unity front
of the Arabs living in the areas controlled by the Axis is being destroyed by the
conduct of Dr. Grobba. . .,” and that: “The result of all of this is that today on
German soil internal political struggles are being settled.”106 Ettel, with the
support of German Ambassador von Mackensen in Rome, recommended that
von Ribbentrop replace Grobba with Curt Prüfer as head of the special Dienst-
stelle in the Foreign Office, which von Ribbentrop did in October.107
Personal animosities and rivalries notwithstanding, Hitler’s government
remained committed to al-Husayni as its natural and most effective Arab link
to the Middle East and North Africa during the fateful months of the fall and
winter of 1942–1943. In turn, and in recognition of his personal ambition to be
the supreme leader in a new, postwar pan-Arab state, al-Husayni did all that
he could, in spite of his virtual isolation from the Arab Middle East, to act as
the bridge between the Axis powers and the other Arab states during these
critical months of late summer and fall 1942 when Rommel appeared to be
close to victory in Egypt. This was a function that the Foreign Office in Berlin
had assigned to him in the early summer of 1942, one that al-Gaylani was
neither able nor willing to perform. The Foreign Office in Berlin clearly viewed
the Mufti as the better known and, therefore, the best qualified Arab spokes-
person for Germany’s political efforts in the region during the summer and fall
of 1942. The inevitable political implications of his role and office as an Islamic
leader, coupled with his own personal political ambitions, meant that
al-Husayni always looked beyond the relatively small confines of his native
Palestine, and could only conceive of a unified Islamic-Arab state in most if
not all of the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa. For instance,
the Mufti did not limit his appeals in Axis propaganda efforts to the states
of the Fertile Crescent, and often made appeals to the leading political and
military circles in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to support the Axis war effort against
a Great Britain that he portrayed as the friend of the Jews and the enemy
of the Arab people.108 Moreover, the combination of Rommel’s successful
but short-lived military campaign in Libya and Egypt, combined with the
106
PA: R27324, Handakten Ettel, Großmufti, Bd.-, Ettel an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister, 17.
Oktober 1942.
107
See Donald McKale, Curt Prüfer: German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler (Kent, OH and
London: Kent State University Press, 1987), 169–170. Like Grobba, Prüfer also opposed support-
ing the sort of pan-Arab nationalism and state that the Mufti had begun advocating, fearing that
such an approach would harm Germany’s relations with neutral Turkey. For Prüfer, and for the
German Foreign Office in general, maintaining Turkey’s neutrality in the war was a very high
priority. See PA: 61124, Politische Abteilung-Geheime Reichssache, Politische Lage in Arabien,
Bd. 2, Aufzeichnung Prüfers, über Woermann an Weizsäcker, 3. Dezember 1942. Grobba never-
theless continued to serve as the Foreign Office’s liaison with Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Berlin.
108
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 45–46, 55. See also PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM,
Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Ettel an RAM, 29. Juni 1942; and Telegram Nr. 182,
Rintelen an Ettel, 12. August 1942.
Anglo-American landings in northwest Africa in the fall of 1942, only served to

intensify al-Husayni’s political rhetoric to, and developing ambitions in, the
Arab states of North Africa. While the Mufti saw himself by the fall of 1942 as
the future supreme leader of a large, pan-Arab and Islamic state with as yet
undefined borders, al-Gaylani was interested first and foremost in being the
supreme leader of a postwar, independent Iraq.
the mufti and north africa

Communications between the Foreign Office in Berlin and the SS in October
reveal that by the middle of the fall of 1942, the Mufti had put himself on
record as seeking the creation of an even larger pan-Arab state, one that,
according to Walter Schellenberg of the SS foreign intelligence (Amt VI) in
October 1942: “. . .should encompass the entire Arab area to its furthest extent,
i.e. from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic coast of Morocco. . .”109 Schellenberg
indicated that the Mufti was in Rome negotiating with Italian officials, trying to
overcome the inevitable Italian resistance that these ambitions would generate.
His October 20 report states that the Italians had naturally viewed with
misgivings the Mufti’s earlier stated goal of a much smaller independent Arab
state in the Fertile Crescent, fearing that such a state would complicate Italy’s
relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, its interests in the Red Sea, and that it
would be an obstacle to Italy’s natural expansion in the Mediterranean area.
Schellenberg observed quite realistically: “In Italy it appears they have not yet
achieved final clarity about how one should deal with the entire pan-Arab
problem.”110 He also cited Italian fears of possible future German interests
and ambitions in the Middle East.
Schellenberg’s observations accurately reflected the uncertainty that still
existed in German and even Italian plans for the Arab world as they seemed
109
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD an AA/Berlin, z.Hd.v.
Herrn Unterstaatssekretär Luther, VI C 13 B. Nr.- 42g, 20. Oktober 1942. During the establish-
ment of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) in the summer of 1939, Amt-III of the SD Main
Office was renamed Amt-VI in the new RSHA. For more on SS foreign intelligence, the new
Amt-VI, and the role of Walter Schellenberg, see Katrin Paehler, “Foreign Intelligence in a New
Paradigm: Amt VI and the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA),” in Secret Intelligence and the
Holocaust, ed. David Bankier (New York: Enigma Books, 2006), 273–300; and “Creating an
Alternative Foreign Office: A Re-assessment of Office VI of the Reich Main Security Office,”
Journal of Intelligence History, 8 (2008): 25–42. See also Reinhard Doerries, Hitler’s Intelli-
gence Chief: Walter Schellenberg (New York: Enigma Books, 2009).
110
Ägypten, Sudan, Tunis, Bd.-, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD an AA/Berlin, z.Hd.v.
Herrn Unterstaatssekretär Luther, VI C 13 B. Nr.- 42g, 20. Oktober 1942. On October 10, Al-
Husayni had asked Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop to send him to North Africa so that he
might help organize and lead Arabs in support of Axis forces in the region. See Höpp, Mufti-
Papiere, 91–92.
photo 6.4. Walter Schellenberg (September 1943).

poised to achieve victory in North Africa and, via the Caucasus, eventually in
the Fertile Crescent. However, aside from the obvious goal of military victory in
North Africa and the Middle East and the establishment of several German air
and naval bases in French northwest Africa,111 the only clear political object-
ives in the Arab world that Hitler’s regime had articulated through October
1942 was that Italian and French interests, in consultation with Germany,
would take precedence over the general Arab goal of independence in some
form in any postwar settlement. This was quite clear, of course, with regard to
North Africa. The content of Schellenberg’s October 20 memorandum to
Martin Luther in Abteilung Deutschland, the Nazi party section in the German
Foreign Office, was not forwarded to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and
State Secretary von Weizsäcker until a month later. Luther commented on the
content of Schellenberg’s memorandum, and stressed the rather sudden expan-
sion of the Mufti’s ambitions into North Africa on the expectation that Axis
forces under Rommel would soon achieve victory. Luther observed
that “[Schellenberg’s] communication talks a lot about the position of Italy,
which is following the Grand Mufti’s efforts with suspicion and mistrust,
111
See Goda, Tomorrow the World, 16 ff.
including the Grand Mufti’s hopes for German assistance for his plan to build a
volunteer Arab Legion in North Africa. . .”112
Al-Husayni was tireless in his efforts to influence Axis planning and policy in
North Africa in the critical months of November and December 1942. In a
November communication with Karl Kapp of the Information Department
(Informationsabteilung) in the German Foreign Office, he sought to shape
the content of German and Italian propaganda directed specifically at North
African Arabs, one that had targeted the Jews and America as the enemies of
the Arabs and of all Muslims. The Mufti suggested a shift in emphasis in Axis
propaganda to a primary goal of achieving independence for the Arabs of
North Africa.113 In another November memorandum to Kapp, the Mufti
bemoaned past German policy toward the Arabs of North Africa, particularly
with regard to its avoidance of formally endorsing their independence.
In Tunisia, for example, he asserted that sympathy for Germany, although still
widespread, was nevertheless declining because of Germany’s deference to
Vichy French interests.114 He reported the same development in Algeria, while
noting British propaganda efforts against Vichy France that included Allied
promises of independence after the war. This similarly undated memorandum
to Kapp and the German Foreign Office concluded with a warning that the
Free French were already in the majority among French citizens in North
Africa, and that they would become even more dominant should the British
counter-offensive against Rommel in Egypt succeed, and should British forces
turn the tide of battle and approach Tripoli in western Libya. The Mufti made
the following general conclusion: “Disappointment with Germany is great.
In many areas, unrest and fear of the Italians and of the Spaniards rules. These
are all factors that British propaganda knows how to exploit for its own
purposes.”115
On November 18, 1942, al-Husayni appealed to German Ambassador von
Mackensen in Rome in his persistent effort to elicit a formal Axis declaration of
support for Arab independence in North Africa. The memorandum, in English,
once again tried to paint a negative picture of Germany’s standing among
North African Arabs due to its deference to French interests. He reasoned:
“I have always appreciated the Axis point of view which aimed at preventing
France from taking sides with the Allies; but the information I was receiving,
had always made very doubtful the intentions of France to resist the
Allies seriously. It was felt, also, that the Axis was gradually losing the sym-
pathy of the Arabs in the Maghreb, (North Africa) owing to its policy of
cooperation with France.”116 The Mufti further called for a new Axis policy
in North Africa, one that included the formation of a “Maghrebi Liberation
112
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Berichte und Meldungen zur Lage im und über den Nahen Osten, Bd.-,
Vortragsnotiz, Luther, 17. November 1942.
113 114 115
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 93–97. This document is undated. Ibid., 99. Ibid. 102.
116
Ibid., 108.
Army” composed of North African Arab prisoners of war and workers in

France, as well as North African Arab troops currently in the French army
there. He reminded von Mackensen that North Africa west of Libya was not yet
under Axis military control, and that it therefore posed a potentially serious
problem for the Axis war effort. Nevertheless, he also suggested: “But the Axis
can reverse this situation and obtain the above mentioned military advantages if
it reveals its good intentions toward Maghreb by publicly promising the
Maghrebis freedom and independence, and to assure them about that, by
concluding with them a convenient treaty on a basis similar to those of the
Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iraqi treaties.”117 The Mufti concluded his commu-
nication to von Mackensen with the unrealistic promise that if the Axis powers
did what he was calling for: “. . .they will readily have an army of no less than
half a million soldiers. . .” on their side, and that this would have the most
positive effect on the Axis campaign in Egypt.118
Although Rommel’s offensive in Egypt came to within sixty miles of
Alexandria by the end of June 1942, it had been unable to advance any further
in the second half of the year. While Britain and the United States were able to
rush significant reinforcements to Egypt, Germany and Italy were limited in
their ability to resupply the Egyptian front due to enormous demands of the
war in the Soviet Union.119 Nevertheless, haphazard and often contradictory
planning for the political reorganization of the Middle East and North Africa
continued in Berlin and Rome through the fall of 1942. The three significant,
interconnected, and outstanding issues facing the Nazi regime included: the
ongoing and intense political rivalry between the Mufti and al-Gaylani
regarding current and future Arab leadership; the future political geography
of the Arab world; and the satisfaction of German, Italian, and French strategic
and imperial interests in the region. In none of these areas was the Nazi
leadership entirely certain about the directions it would take as it approached
the decisive winter of 1942–1943 and Germany’s disastrous military defeats in
Egypt and at Stalingrad. It tried to focus simultaneously on Europe, the military
campaign and the political and racial reorganization of Eastern Europe, the
extermination of the European Jews, as well as its mostly military effort in
North Africa. Those defeats, of course, would render all notions of a “pincer”
117
Ibid., 108–109. With the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930,
Britain had granted the two Arab states a nominal independence that included alliances of the
two Arab states with Great Britain, and continuing British military presence and prerogatives in
those two countries.
118
Ibid. These ideas and suggestions were apparently repeated in a document that the Mufti put
together that same day, and then had translated into German. See PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.
S., Nord-Afrika I, Bd.-, Abw, I H West/3, Nr. 5214/42 g. Kdos. Betr. Übersetzung einer
Denkschrift des Grossmufti von Jerusalem am 18.11.42, 27. November 1942. It appears that
the Mufti was prepared to accept a nominal independence, at least to start with, when he stated
his readiness to live with an arrangement similar to the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian models.
119
Weinberg, A World at Arms, 350–352.
victory in the Fertile Crescent, the heart of the Arab Middle East, impossible.
They would preclude the necessity of reaching any final decisions on the basic
political questions in the Arab world.
Amin al-Husayni’s suggestion in the fall of 1942 that the states in the Fertile
Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa be consolidated into one
reasonably unified federation of Arab states was something new in his wartime
political thinking. It likely reflected his expectation of imminent Axis victories in
North Africa and in the Caucasus in the fall of 1942, expectations that only
fueled his ambitions to become the creator and leader of a somewhat unified,
Islamic, and pan-Arab state. The Mufti was aware of the likely opposition to his
plans from the Axis powers, from France and Spain, as well as from other Arab
leaders in the region, including al-Gaylani in Berlin. He had to contend with a
continuing lack of clarity and, most of all, immediacy in German thinking with
regard to the postwar political reorganization of the Arab world following
an imagined Axis victory. With the two military campaigns, upon which any
political reorganization of the Middle East and North Africa ultimately
depended, coming to a head in the fall and winter of 1942–1943, the German
government seemed content to avoid the sort of definitive political decisions
that the Mufti and al-Gaylani were seeking, notwithstanding von Ribbentrop’s
May 14 secret letter to al-Gaylani promising German and Italian support at least
for Iraqi independence. This reality, moreover, suited the Fascist government in
Rome. However, with the Anglo-American landing in northwest Africa on
November 8, 1942, and the simultaneous inability of Rommel’s forces to sustain
the German offensive in Egypt, the immediate military situation on the ground
was uppermost on the minds of the civilian and military authorities in Berlin as
their confidence in an imminent military victory began to erode.
The fall of 1942 proved to be pivotal in Germany’s uneven wartime political
strategy in the Arab world. It was a particularly tentative strategy in the Nazi
regime’s dealings with the exiled Arab leaders in Berlin. Of course, any German
interests in the Middle East were dependent on an Axis military victory;
however, Germany’s primary focus on the Soviet Union meant that the
resources necessary for a military victory in North Africa and the Middle East
would be severely limited. Moreover, Berlin’s continuing deference to the
ambitions of its Italian ally, coupled with the perceived strategic requirements
of its relationship with Vichy France and Spain, and constant pressure from
al-Husayni and other Arabs in Berlin for an unequivocal Axis commitment to
Arab independence and unity resulted in a dysfunctional policy that produced
no political or strategic advantages for the Axis war effort in the region. Nazi
propaganda was not nearly enough to compensate for this level of political
uncertainty and confusion, let alone Berlin’s continuing reluctance to openly
support complete Arab independence. The mobilization of Arab nationalist
opinion and political action in the form of uprisings behind Allied lines,
presented to Hitler and Mussolini by the Mufti and others as both essential
to an Axis victory and possible only with a clear, forceful, and public
commitment by the Axis to Arab independence, never materialized. It is also

highly questionable whether an Arab revolt would have occurred even if
Hitler and Mussolini had made such declarations in 1941 and 1942. With
the possible exception of the Iraq coup in April and May 1941, the Arab world
remained relatively quiet during the war years, in stark contrast to the years
prior to 1939.
By the end of 1942, the tide of battle turned decidedly against the Germans,
making Germany’s often murky policy toward the Arabs and the Middle East
increasingly inconsistent, a development that will be considered in the
next chapter. Rommel’s forces were stopped in Egypt in late October, and
Anglo-American forces landed in Morocco and Algeria on November 8,
1942. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s counteroffensive on the Volga in late
November of that year ended any German hopes for entering the Middle East
through the Caucasus, and set the stage for the massive German defeat at
Stalingrad three months later. The New Year 1943 would begin on a very
different note than the start of the previous year, which had followed the
Mufti’s recent arrival in Berlin and his meeting with Hitler in November
1941. In less than six months, Axis troops would be defeated in Tunis and
expelled from North Africa in May 1943. The final end to any Axis presence in
the Arab world relegated it even more than previously to the periphery of
Germany’s strategic interests and policies for the remainder of the war. It also
produced a new and very different environment in which the Mufti and
al-Gaylani had to function, one with altered priorities that would relegate them
to increasing irrelevance.
7
Collapse and Irrelevance, 1943–1944
north africa, continuity, and collapse

Through the fall of 1942, even with the Anglo-American landings in Algeria
and Morocco in early November, Hitler maintained his opposition to the
dismantling of the French colonial empire in North Africa and elsewhere.
His opposition, while taking into account the imperial ambitions of his Italian
ally, included a willingness to accommodate some adjustments in colonial
boundaries after a victorious war. In his very long letter to Marshal Pétain
of November 26, Hitler emphasized the common interests of France and the
Axis powers in defeating Great Britain and the United States. With reference to
France’s colonial position in North Africa, Hitler reassured Pétain that the Axis
powers would restore French colonial rule in North Africa:
Furthermore it is my unalterable decision to help France win back the colonial territories
that, in spite all of their assertions to the contrary, were stolen by the Anglo-Saxons,
and to do so with all of the means available to the Reich. It was neither the German nor
the Italian intention to destroy the French colonial empire.1
On that same day, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop sent a telegram to French
Premier Pierre Laval in which he stated that one of Germany’s main aims
in North Africa was to win back for France its colonial empire, much of
which had fallen under the control of Anglo-American forces by the end
of November.2 Indeed, at the end of 1942, as Axis forces were retreating
in North Africa in the face of Anglo-American victories in both eastern and
1
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika I, Bd.-, Hitler/Führerhauptquartier an Marschall
Pétain, Telegramm an die DB/Paris, 26. November 1942.
2
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika I, Bd.-, Ribbentrop/Berlin an Laval/Vichy,
Telegramm an DB/Paris, Nr. 1652, 26. November 1942.
222
Collapse and Irrelevance, 1943–1944 223
western North Africa, the constant stream of public statements emanating

from the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB) was meant to bolster French
forces in North Africa in the hope that they would join the battle against the
Allies. France, now certainly as much as Italy, was viewed by Hitler’s
government as a necessary source of support in the region by the end of
1942. These statements were based on the notion of defending France and
the French empire against the Allies and the Jews, and the assertion that the
German government had never demanded anything from France and never
intended any harm to French interests. Rather, according to the oft-repeated
line in these DNB reports, Germany always sought “The protection of the
French borders and the African possessions of the European peoples.”3 Yet,
on November 20, the German Foreign Office issued propaganda guidelines
for broadcasts from Tunis in which “Everything that might lead to specula-
tion about the territorial future is to be avoided.” 4 In brief, nothing was to
be done that might compromise German-Italian relations, or relations
between France and Italy. The authority of the Vichy government in North
Africa would be strengthened, and Axis troops in Tunisia were to be
portrayed as friends of France and defenders of the French empire. At the
same time, the propaganda would avoid direct references to Arab independ-
ence, and stress instead in very general terms, as in the past, an Axis
commitment to friendship and cooperation with all Muslims in the common
struggle against Anglo-American imperial ambitions and the Jews in North
Africa.
Nevertheless, the German military did favor the Mufti Amin al-Husayni’s
November 18 suggestions in Berlin to organize and arm an Arab military unit
in Tunisia and to incite an Arab insurgency behind enemy lines. This was
intended as a means of support for the increasingly difficult military situation
facing the Axis in North Africa at the end of 1942. On December 3, the OKW
advised the Foreign Office in Berlin that it viewed with favor “. . .the mobiliza-
tion of the Arab inhabitants of North Africa for the struggle against the
English-American forces that landed in French North Africa, and from Tunisia
to incite an extensive revolutionary movement among them and to activate
Arab units to fight alongside the Axis powers.”5 The OKW referred to the
3
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika I, Bd.-, Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro Berlin, Nr. 315,
11. November 1942. The reference to “African possessions of the European peoples” likely
reflects Hitler’s inclination at that time to eventually accommodate French, Italian, Spanish,
German, and perhaps even British imperial interests on the African continent after the war. There
was certainly no room in this scenario for the Arabs or any other indigenous population in Africa
to achieve real independence.
4
PA: R29867, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika II, Bd.-, Fuschl Nr. 1621, Telco Nr. 1453, 20.
November 1942.
5
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika-I, Bd.-, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Amt
Ausland/Abwehr, Nr. 1945/42, geh.Kds.Aus1.11 A 2, an das Auswärtige Amt. 3. Dezember
1942.
Mufti’s assurances that North African Arabs could be depended on to fight at

the side of the Axis powers, but only “. . .if they receive assurances from the
Axis regarding their freedom and independence.”6
With its focus naturally on the problematic military situation, the OKW
requested that the Foreign Office address this political issue, especially the
matter of a promise to the Arabs, given what the OKW considered to be the
potential importance of Arab cooperation. Just a few days later, on December
8, several officials from OKW intelligence met with al-Husayni in his apartment
in Berlin.7 At the meeting, the Mufti offered his services in any effort to rouse
the people of Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco in support of the Axis war
effort against the British and the Americans. He emphasized once again that his
efforts would only bear fruit “. . . if the German government and the Axis issue
a public declaration that French North Africa. . .is offered its freedom. . .”8
The Mufti was again specific in his offer that, at a minimum, an independent
North Africa could accommodate Axis military bases and generally an arrange-
ment along the lines of Egypt after the Anglo–Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
He suggested that if a public declaration was not possible at that time, a secret
letter to the Bey of Tunis promising Tunisian independence would suffice for
the time being. He offered to travel to Tunis immediately, which the Germans
had occupied on November 10, in the company of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris,
to join with the Bey and with other Arab officials there in an effort to organize
uprisings in Algeria and French Morocco. The Abwehr officials at the meeting
seemed to agree with the Mufti’s assessment and recommended that he be
included in future efforts from Tunisia to organize North African Arabs in
support of the Axis military campaign. They also suggested using the same
strategy, in agreement with the Spanish government, to organize from Spanish
Morocco a revolt in French Morocco, also with the Mufti’s assistance.
In the German Foreign Office, there were mixed views about the Mufti’s
recent suggestions to military intelligence, and the latter’s initially supportive
recommendations. Under State Secretary Ernst Woermann first reported on
December 8 that Colonel Erwin von Lahousen, one of the Abwehr officers
who took part in the meeting in the Mufti’s apartment the previous day,
had been informed by State Secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker that: “It is not
possible to promise the Arabs of North Africa ‘freedom and independence.’
It would contradict the Führer’s letter to Pétain, and it would also not be
6
Ibid.
7
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika-I, Bd.-, Vortragsnotiz von Chef Amt Ausl/Abw. Für
Chef OKW, Betr. Mufti / Französ.Nord-Afrika, 9. Dezember 1942.
8
Ibid. For more on the Mufti’s persistent requests for Axis recognition of independence for North
African Arabs, and his repeated offers to go to North Africa and personally organize the Arabs
there, see his notes to German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and to Admiral Canaris of
German military intelligence in December 1942 in Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 120–122.
possible given our relations with Spain.”9 After noting the significant efforts
already undertaken by the Foreign Office in Berlin to arouse the North African
Arabs, Woermann did state that the idea of sending the Mufti to Tunis and
using him in this capacity was in fact acceptable to Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop as well as to the Italian Foreign Ministry. The timing for sending
the Mufti to Tunis would, of course, depend on the needs of the military, and
that the OKW would have to make the final decision. Finally, Woermann noted
that the German Foreign Office had already advised the OKW that “. . .we are
ready to support in every possible way the wishes of the OKW with regard to
the Arab uprising.”10 However, two days later von Weizsäcker pointed out
that, among many of those involved in policy making for North Africa, there
was growing reluctance to grant the Mufti his wish to come to North Africa to
organize an Arab revolt. He mentioned the opposition of France and Spain, and
Italy’s reluctance, as well as the reluctance of Admiral Canaris, Field Marshal
Keitel, and even Hitler himself to bringing the Mufti to Tunis during the waning
days of 1942.11
Nevertheless, al-Husayni began the New Year 1943 with several new,
formal attempts to convince the German Foreign Office in Berlin of the urgent
necessity to publicly declare Axis support for the independence of the Arabs in
northwest Africa. By the end of 1942, Germany and Italy had managed
to formally endorse some measure of independence for Egypt and Iraq, albeit
not officially or publicly. It mirrored Great Britain’s arrangements in those
two Arab states in the 1930s, with special considerations for the interests of
the two Axis powers. On January 16, in an obvious reference to the Arab
states of French North Africa, the Mufti sent a memorandum to the Foreign
Office in Berlin that warned of potential Arab support for the American forces
in their midst, and suggested that the indigenous Arabs would prefer to join
forces with the Axis “. . .if the inhabitants of North Africa are given assur-
ances about their future and their freedom.”12 He dismissed previous assump-
tions that the Axis needed French cooperation by making the argument that
France had always fought against Germany in the past, and would continue
to do so in the future. He warned the German Foreign Office that the French
in North Africa had in fact been helping American forces there, that neither
the Gaullists nor Vichy would give up the French colonial empire, and that
9
PA: R29866, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika-I, Bd.-, U.St.S Pol.Nr. 802 q Rs, Woermann,
8. Dezember 1942.
10
Ibid.
11
PA: 61124, Politische Abteilung-Geheime Reichssache, Politische Lage in Arabien, Bd. 2,
Von Weizsäcker an Von Ribbentrop, St.S. Nr. 719, 10. Dezember 1942. See also Hirszowicz,
The Third Reich and the Arab East, 288–289.
12
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 137–141. See also the Amin al-Husayni’s personal letter to Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop, written almost two weeks later on January 28, on pages 144–146. It
contains more or less the same reasoning and appeal for an official German declaration of
support for Arab independence.
only “. . .through recognition of the Maghreb can the Axis accelerate the
disruption of Allied plans, for only then will it be possible to attract Islamic-
Arab forces away from the ranks of the Allies over to the Axis. . .”13 Finally,
he suggested that while the Arabs of the Maghereb had been distressed by
Axis reluctance to guarantee their independence in the past, they still retained
sympathy for the Germany because it had defeated France, and because it
continued to fight against the Jews and their Anglo-Saxon protectors who
were their enemies and the enemies of their fellow Arabs and Muslims in the
East. He stressed, however, that the Arabs of the Maghreb needed weapons
and other war materials from the Axis and, most of all, political support for
their national goals.
In late April 1943, an internal SS memorandum from SS-Gruppenführer
Gottlob Berger to Heinrich Himmler included a copy of an April 20, 1943
statement from the Mufti to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop. It is not clear
exactly why the Mufti had given Berger a copy of his earlier, rather lengthy
letter to von Ribbentrop, or what precisely the SS leadership’s interest in
its contents might have been. Berger was Himmler’s liaison to Alfred Rosen-
berg’s Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsminister-
ium für die besetzten Ostgebiete), and was also assigned as the SS liaison to
the Mufti. In his brief note to Himmler that accompanied the copy of the
Mufti’s long letter to von Ribbentrop, Berger called attention to the central
point of the enclosed al-Husayni letter, namely that the question of a public
declaration in support of Arab independence was more important than ever.
Berger repeated the Mufti’s main argument that not only had Winston
Churchill and the British government, the United States government, and
the French government in exile made repeated and public declarations of
support for Arab independence, but that Japan too had made a similar
public statement endorsing the independence of India as well as all of the
Islamic-Arab lands.14 Berger emphasized the Mufti’s view that these public
declarations had made a deep impression on Arabs and on all Muslims, and
that al-Husayni considered “. . . a similar declaration by the Axis powers
under the present circumstances to be useful and necessary.”15
In his actual letter to von Ribbentrop, the Mufti had outlined the main
propaganda line of the Allies in North Africa, namely that while they, the
Allies, had declared their full support for Arab independence, “. . .the Axis,
after three and a half years of war, refuse to issue either a declaration or an
official word with regard to the Arab lands of the Middle East and their future.
In their [the Allies’] view, this situation reveals the true but not exactly positive
13
Ibid., 139.
14
ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.26, SS-Gruppenführer G. Berger an den Reichsführer-SS und Chef der
Deutschan Polizei, Cd/HA/Be/Ra./VS-Tgb.Nr. 2674/43g., Betr. Schreiben des Groß-Mufti vom
20.4., 29. April 1943.
15
Ibid.
intentions of the Axis toward these lands.”16 Al-Husayni also admitted that in a
May 5, 1942 exchange of confidential letters with von Ribbentrop, the German
foreign minister had indeed mentioned German support for the independence
of the Arab lands of the Middle East, along with the elimination of the Jewish
National Home in Palestine. Nevertheless, he asserted that only an official,
public declaration that reflected the contents of those letters, in support of Arab
independence, would be enough to make the necessary impression on the
Arab people in the military struggle with the Allies. He once again insisted
that the past rationale of respecting French interests in Syria and Lebanon was
no longer relevant, as both states were firmly under the control of Great Britain
and the Gaullists, with their assurances of Syrian and Lebanese independence
after the war. He concluded with a warning that the Allies, particularly the
United States, were gaining support among the Arab population, and that
this unfortunate trend had to be reversed. In an obvious reference to the
collapsing Axis position in North Africa and, therefore, in the Arab world as
a whole, something about which Gotthold Berger had reminded Himmler in his
accompanying note, the Mufti warned: “Moreover, the collapsing front in
the Arab lands should not lead to the postponement of a declaration, on the
contrary, it should give the Axis cause to greater political action. . .Therefore
I ask you to take advantage of this opportunity and immediately issue such
a declaration.”17
From the Middle East, German military intelligence reported from time to
time on the intense British propaganda campaign that had called for a unified
and independent Arab state after the war, albeit with little if any comment on
Arab reactions to this message.18 Moreover, it is difficult to know exactly what
al-Husayni actually knew or believed he knew about public opinion in the Arab
lands of North Africa or elsewhere in the Middle East. He had, indeed,
promoted himself in Berlin since his arrival there in November 1941 as the
most important Arab leader with the most knowledge and understanding of
Arab attitudes toward both sides in the war; it was obviously in his political
interest to cultivate his image as the most important spokesperson for,
and leader of, all Arabs. German military intelligence reports from the region
in 1941 and 1942 suggest that while there was always a broad-based antipathy
toward the British and the Italians for obvious reasons, and friendly attitudes
toward Germany, there was little inclination among Arabs to organize a unified
revolt in conjunction with the Axis campaign against the Anglo-Americans and
the Jews. There were reports of periodic outbursts of unrest and violence in
Syria and Palestine related to food shortages, a growing communist movement
in Syria with ties to the Soviet Union, friction between British and Gaullist
troops in Syria, continued Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1941 and 1942,
16
Ibid. The Mufti’s April 20 letter to von Ribbentrop, with his attached suggestion for a declar-
ation, is published in Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 156–159.
17
Ibid. 18
See BA-MA: R2-1768, complete file.
and dissatisfaction over various Gaulist measures in Syria and Lebanon.19

German intelligence even reported that periodic Syrian unrest was due to
fears that an Axis victory might mean Italian control, that some of the unrest
in Iraq was a result of rumors that Britain intended to create an autonomous
Kurdish state, and that sabotage attempts against oil installations in Iraq
were aimed at shutting off the flow of Iraqi oil to the Allied war effort.20
Reports also described the various Bedouin tribes of Iraq as loyal to neither
the current Iraqi government, nor to the Allies, nor to the Axis, while the
Kurds in Iraq seemed somewhat favorably disposed toward the Iraqi govern-
ment and the British for their support for Kurdish autonomy.21 These reports
may or may not reflect the realities of the situation on the ground at that
particular time, but they do reveal how the Germans viewed those realities in
1942 and 1943. None of this suggests in any way that German intelligence
believed that pro-Axis unrest or revolts were possible or even feasible. There-
fore, the Mufti’s assertions that an official public declaration of Axis support
for Arab independence, something he had long sought from the German and
Italian governments, was Germany’s last and best hope for victory in the
Middle East were probably unrealistic and, more importantly, never very
convincing for Nazi leaders in Berlin.
German military intelligence in the Middle East in the fall and winter of
1942–1943 was clearly focused on military rather than political questions as
the Axis fronts in Egypt and the southern Soviet Union began to collapse almost
simultaneously. Germany had been determined to take the Caucasus in 1942,
after failing to do so in 1941. Again, after securing control over that region’s
oil resources, and denying those resources to the Soviets, victorious German
forces would pass through Turkey or Iran into the Arab Middle East, where
they were supposed to meet up with Rommel’s victorious army. However,
the British 8th army began its successful offensive against Rommel’s forces at
El-Alamein in Egypt in late October 1942, and Anglo-American forces landed
on the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of French northwest Africa on
November 8. These events forced the Axis to fight yet another two-front war,
this one in North Africa, one that would rapidly culminate in the final defeat
and expulsion of German and Italian troops from Tunis in May 1943. More
significantly, the German southern offensive in the Ukraine had encountered
stiffening Soviet resistance in September and October and was soon reversed
by the Soviet counteroffensive that began in November 1942, ultimately
leading to the crushing defeat and surrender of the Germans at Stalingrad in
19
See for example BA-MA: RH2-1790, Auswärtiges Amt Nr. Pol. VII 959, Deutsches Vizekonsulat
Iskenderun Nr. 539/42 v. 5.7.42, 24. Juli 1942. See also entire file.
20
See for example BA-MA: R2-1768, Abwehrstelle Frankreich Nr. 5524/42 g.IH, 31. Juli 1942;
and Abwehrstelle Belgrad, Tgb. Nr. 6358/10.42, 23. Oktober 1942.
21
See for example BA-MA: R2-1769, Abschrift Istanbul, 25. Juli 1941; and Niederschrift des
Abbas Hilmi vom 1. Dezember 1941, “The Leaders of the [Bedouin] Tribes.”
early February 1943.22 Of course, the enormous logistical demands of the

German campaign in the Soviet Union would have a decisively negative impact
on Axis military efforts in North Africa. In all of this, the issue of a public
declaration of support for Arab independence, along with the idea to recruit
and train Arab military units in North Africa, were unable to gain traction in
Germany’s increasingly precarious military situation as 1942 came to a close.
Much of the German military intelligence in 1941, and particularly in the
summer and fall of 1942 and early 1943, related to British military activities
and installations in the Fertile Crescent. It seemed to focus on the locations,
capacity, and functioning of oil pumping stations, pipelines, and refineries,
the electricity grid and installations, and other types of infrastructure, as well
as questions about weather and climate. Much of the information was provided
by unnamed Arab sources, and there seemed to be a particular German
focus on oil facilities.23 Various acts of sabotage against oil pipelines and
other installations were reported as carried out by “unknown perpetrators”
(unbekannte Täter), and the effectiveness of sporadic Italian and German air
attacks on oil refineries and pipelines, along with British and American damage
repairs and new facilities construction, were assessed. For example, through
much of 1942, one agent identified as Agent A3181 was reporting on the
construction of new British air bases in Syria; on American plans to build a
naval base in the Persian Gulf from which to supply Soviet forces; on the
changing strength of British military units in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and British
plans for a joint British-Arab brigade in Transjordan; on significant British and
American road-building projects; and on Britain’s natural preference for using
Hindu rather than Muslim Indian troops in the Arab countries.24 Another
report from Agent D-89 in Iraq in August 1942 provided details on military
fortifications, workshops, bomb and munitions dumps, camps for soldiers,
harbor construction, airports, concentration camps for men and women, food
shortages, demolition of houses for military purposes, and “terror groups.”25
Those “terror groups” were described as pro-German groups in Baghdad that
engaged mainly in the printing and posting of presumably anti-British leaflets.
In North Africa through the fall of 1942, therefore, German intelligence
exhibited relatively little interest in the political issues of Arab independence
and unity, as intelligence reports seemed to focus mostly on the military
situation. To the extent that these reports did take up political matters, specif-
ically the position of the Axis with regard to Arab independence, they indicate
very clearly that not much had changed in German thinking on that question.
In the late summer and fall of 1942, they continued to emphasize the views of
22
See Weinberg, A World at Arms, 420–425, 447–455.
23
See the many reports in BA-MA: RH2-1773 and 1779.
24
See the relevant files in BA-MA: RW49-593.
25
BA-MA: R2-1767, Nr. 5573/42 geh. I os/3, V-Mann D 89 von I Wi., Bericht eines vor kurzem
angekommenen Freundes des V-Mannes aus Bagdad, 18. August 1942.
many that the destruction of British power in Egypt would mean the end of
Britain’s political dominion over the entire Middle East, along with expressions
of disappointment that a weak and poorly armed Egyptian army could hardly
be counted on to revolt against the British.26 Moreover, given the relative speed
with which Axis forces in North Africa collapsed in 1943, the reports were
naturally focused on acute shortages of troops, equipment, and other supplies,
as well as the ever-present need for local labor. By early 1943, the Germans
were trying to meet severe labor shortages in North Africa and free up German
troops for the front by organizing French and Arab workers, and Jewish forced
labor. The Germans and Italians requested assistance from French officials in
Tunis, and they called for the “formation of purely Arab gangs of workers”27
(die Aufstellung von rein arabischen Arbeiterkolonnen) to engage in hauling
equipment, maintaining roads, and other kinds of heavy labor. The Germans
were also looking for Arabs to serve as “supplementary assistants” (zusätzliche
Hilfskräfte) as truck drivers, cooks, and in other similar support functions.28
The landing of American and British troops in Morocco on November 8,
1942 was followed by the landing of German troops in Tunisia two days later.
This forced the Axis to begin negotiations immediately with the Vichy
government and French officials in Tunis for the deployment of Axis troops
in Tunisia. Rudolf Rahn, appointed by von Ribbentrop as the German Foreign
Office representative in Tunis, arrived there on November 15, and initiated
talks in the Tunisian capital that centered on the problems of competing
French, Italian, and Arab interests in the days immediately following the
Anglo-American invasion in northwest Africa.29 Rahn’s initial concern was
to prevent Vichy forces in Tunisia from turning against the Axis, and he
reported that the talks between French and German officers were proving to
be very difficult. French forces in Tunisia initially promised the Germans
their full cooperation, and expressed a willingness to turn over to the Germans,
but not to the Italians, the garrisons of Tunis and Bizerta. But on November 10,
as twenty-three Italian fighter planes landed at El Aouina without permission,
the French protested to the Germans and refused to provide the Italians with
maintenance and supplies. According to Rahn, the Germans suspected that
some of the French troops in Tunisia were inclined to go over to the American
side in any case. Rahn also reported that “. . .I was told by the German military
26
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 245, Feindnachrichtenblatt: Stand 22. August 1942; and “Aufgaben der
Marine bei der Besetzung Aegyptens,”August 1942.
27
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 356, Sitzung, General von Arnim, mit Rahn, Heigl, Pomtow, Aschoff,
Burandt, Fiedler, Rauff, Protokoll: Arbeiterfrage, 6. Januar 1943.
28
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 359, Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Afrika, Abt. Ia/Id, Nr. 5724/43
geh., 18. April 1943.
29
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 358, Rahn, Aufzeichnung für General Nehring über die militärpolitische
Vorgänge in Tunis vom 9. – 21. November 1942, Tunis, 21. November 1942. See also PA:
R27767, Handakten Rahn, Ein- u. Ausgehende Telegramme 1942 and 1943, entire file; and
Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 197–198.
that the available German forces were not nearly enough to disarm the French
division that controlled the key strategic positions [passes, bridges, etc.] or to
force them to accept our will. . .”30 In a separate report on the same day, Rahn
also indicated that the Germans were trying to prevent Arab actions against
the Jewish population and against the French civilian and military authorities,
activities that might compromise the calm and order they believed was
necessary for an effective defense against Allied forces.31
With these factors in mind, the German delegation in Tunis saw little
alternative to further negotiations with French authorities there, along with
appeals for support from the government in Vichy. On November 19, after
German surveillance planes were shot at by French fighters, the Germans
protested to the Vichy government, after which Marshal Pétain ordered the
commander in Tunis to cease any hostile acts against the Axis. Apparently
acknowledging that some in the French military in Tunis were indeed sympa-
thetic to the Allies, Pétain issued the following radio broadcast to French forces
in Tunis: “Generals in the service of foreign powers have refused to obey my
orders. Generals, officers, junior officers and soldiers of the African army, do
not obey these unworthy leaders. Once again, I command you to resist the
Anglo-Saxon attack.”32 Therefore, the Germans saw little alternative to more
or less maintaining the status quo in their rapidly diminishing areas of control
in North Africa.33 In the city of Tunis, which Axis troops formally occupied in
November 1942, German troops were ordered to cooperate with French
authorities. By the middle of December, according to Admiral Canaris and
German intelligence, Hitler had ordered German officials in Tunis to support
Italy’s political leadership with regard to the question of building a movement
for an Arab uprising in Tunisia. Moreover, Canaris stipulated that the Mufti’s
demand that he be sent to Tunis would be approved, if at all, by German
officials only if the Italians approved. However, Canaris also recognized that,
“Any political promises or declarations from the Italian side to Tunisian
nationalists will not be made.”34 He further told the Foreign Office in Berlin
that attempts by some to bring the Mufti to Tunis had been cancelled in any
30
Vorgänge in Tunis vom 9. – 21. November 1942, Tunis, 21. November 1942. See also
31
PA: R27766, Handakten Rahn, Ausgehende Telegramme, Bd.-, Rahn/Tunis an AA/Berlin,
Telegramm ohne Nummer, 21. November 1942. Rahn indicated that this strategy was working,
and that there was relative calm in Tunis in spite of Allied bombing raids.
32
Vorgänge in Tunis vom 9. – 21. November 1942, Tunis, 21. November 1942.
33
Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 201.
34
PA: R27827, Handakten Ritter, Tunis, Ukraine, USA, Bd.-, Abschrift Pol. I M 3423 gRs,
Canaris, Aktenvermerk über die Maßnahmen des Amtes Ausl-Abwehr, die auf dem Abw.
II-Gebiet in Franz.Nordafrika getroffen, bzw. Vorbereitet worden, 14. Dezember 1942.
case by the chief of the OKW, and that this decision had put an end to any
German notions of starting an Arab uprising in Tunisia.35
Among the Germans, confusion prevailed over whether it would be worth
bringing the Mufti to Tunis and materially backing the organization of an Arab
uprising. From Rome, German Ambassador von Mackensen asked the Foreign
Office in Berlin for the authority to formally request information from the
Italian government regarding its Arab policies in order to better coordinate
Germany’s response in support of those policies.36 Just after the new year 1943,
von Macksensen was instructed by von Weizsäcker to defer to the Italians on
all issues of a political nature, that for the time being there was a consensus
in Berlin that the Mufti should not be sent to Tunis, and that the Bey of
Tunis should be told that Germany fully supports the Italian position “. . .that
the political and civilian sector should to a significant extent come under
German and Italian authority.”37 In other words, by the beginning of 1943,
Germany’s position on the political issues of Arab independence and Italian
political preeminence in North Africa had not fundamentally changed, even as
the military position of the Axis powers was rapidly deteriorating. This was
reaffirmed in a joint conference in Rome on January 2, 1943 at which
the German representatives were instructed by Berlin to obtain agreement
from the Italians to retain the French administration of Tunisia, under Axis
supervision and control, at least for the time being.38
In a March 7, 1943 order to his troops in Tunisia, just two days before he
succeeded Rommel as commander-in-chief of Axis forces in North Africa,
General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim stipulated that security, order, and quiet must
be maintained in the Axis-controlled territories of North Africa. He asserted
that this would be possible only if the troops followed the orders of the military
and political leadership, which stipulated that: “An involvement of troop
commanders and their troops in the politics of the country is forbidden.”39
This approach by Berlin had already been summarized by Rudolf Rahn in his
lengthy report of February 10, 1943 on the political situation in Tunisia.40
While the report is replete with assurances of the friendly disposition of
the Arab population toward Germany, it is also quite clear in presenting the
Foreign Office’s view that nothing should be done overtly that could comprom-
ise the political status quo. It argues that, to the extent that any sort of political
35
Ibid.
36
PA: R27827, Handakten Ritter, Tunis, Ukraine, USA, Bd.-, Telegramm Nr. 5197, Von Mack-
ensen an den Herrn Reichsminister, 23. Dezember 1942.
37
PA: R27827, Handakten Ritter, Tunis, Ukraine, USA, Bd.-, von Weizsäcker/Berlin an von
Mackensen/Rom, Nr. 5240, Betrefft Deutsch-italienischer Meinungsaustausch betr. Tunis, 2.
Januar 1943. See also Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 204–205.
38
39
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 359, Oberkommande der Herresgruppe Afrika, Abt. AIa./Ic Nr. 471/43
geheim, 7. März 1943.
40
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 358, Aufzeichnung Gesandter Rahn, Tunis, 10. Februar 1943.
action was even possible under the current military circumstances, Germany’s
goals should include the following: maintenance of the French administration
in the service of the Axis cause; the elimination of French officials suspected of
Gaullist sympathies; the limiting of steps that might compromise French
authority in any way, especially “. . .since France played the role of place holder
for Italian interests in Tunisia;” the maintenance of the friendly attitude of the
local population in the interest of labor needs for airports, harbors, streets, as
well as for news outlets and barracks security, and the possible later recruit-
ment of Arab volunteer units; the exercise of a calming influence on Muslim
youth groups in the face of disappointments in the realization of their national-
ist goals; and the involvement of Italian authorities in all internal political
matters in a way that avoids any overt demonstration of Italian imperial claims
in Tunisia, claims “. . .that could ignite a dangerous backlash on the Arab and
French sides to the detriment of our war effort.”41
Rahn’s report is quite clear in its summary of Germany’s wartime policy
toward the issue of Arab independence, as well as its prognosis for the future.
In his section labeled the “Arab Sector” (Arabischer Sektor), Rahn recognizes
that generally positive Arab attitudes toward Germany were based not merely
on feelings nurtured by anti-Semitic and anti-capitalist ideas, but also in the
hope that they would soon achieve their national goals with German assistance.
He also suggests that given the weakness in Germany’s initial position in
Tunisia, these Arab sympathies for Germany ought to be strengthened as much
as possible and utilized in the Axis war effort. For instance, a recent French
release of communist prisoners could be a positive model for the release of
other Arab political prisoners, provided they and their popular following
could be mobilized against the British and the Americans. In any case, Rahn
warned, it would be necessary first to counter the enemy propaganda line
“. . .that German troops have come to Tunisia only to deliver the country to
their Italian allies.”42 For the Arabs, Rahn’s memorandum recommended the
following strategy: “In order to prevent a dangerous slippage in the mood,
certain safety valves in the nationalist activities of the Arab Tunisians would
have to be opened, without this leading to a damaging compromise of the
existing protectorate system and the future position of Italy.”43 In other words,
something would have to be done to mollify Arab nationalist hopes without
actually doing anything to bring those hopes any closer to fruition.
In his section labeled the “Italian Sector” (Italienischer Sektor), Rahn reiter-
ates the political problems in Tunisia and indeed in North Africa in general
caused by Arab and French rejection of Italian imperial ambitions. In their
efforts to maintain the wartime status quo in Tunisia, the Germans at times
found it necessary to side with the French in their disputes with both the Italians
41
Ibid. See also Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 206–207.
42
43
Ibid.
and the Arabs.44 After detailing some of the points of conflict among the
Italians, the French, and the Arabs in Tunisia, Rahn nevertheless concludes
that the only significant policy difference between the two Axis powers in
Tunisia concerned the recruitment and use of volunteer Arab military units.
He writes of the Italians “. . .that in their opinion this would be dangerous and
could promote a revolutionary movement in North Africa that would be
directed temporarily against our enemies, but also later could fight against the
Axis powers. . .”45 Rahn further asserts that the Germans believed a political
formula could be worked out that, after the defeat of the enemy, would still
safeguard Italian interests. In his conclusions, Rahn states that internal political
problems could be avoided if the Italians were restrained. He further argues
that French influence in the administration, within certain limits, had to be
maintained, and that Arab demands might be accommodated within the con-
text of a continuing “protectorate” model. But he warns that the serious
shortages of food and other necessities of life posed a real danger of unrest,
revolts, and epidemics, problems that political measures would do little to
remedy. Rahn concludes: “In the economic, political, and military areas,
the securing of supplies and supply lines will in the end be decisive.”46
In a March 19 report to General von Arnim, Rahn described his recent
conversations with Italian officials in Tunis in which it was agreed that,
“The French administration necessary for the Axis war effort will be maintained
and supported.”47 Rahn also reported that he and the Italians had agreed
to avoid the issue of future Arab or Tunisian independence. Falling considerably
short of the Mufti’s persistent demands for a clear public declaration of
support for Arab independence and unity, Rahn reported to von Arnim:
However, the Arabs should know that they will be supported in their struggle to free
themselves from French control, and that Italy does not intend a diminution of the
Tunisian state or the colonization of the land, but rather will seek a friendly arrangement
that will assure equally Italian military and economic interests and the legitimate
national demands of the Tunisian government and the Muslim population.48
Rahn also alluded to the now largely irrelevant German-Arab Lehrabteiling

that had been transferred to Tunisia in January. Still technically a part of
Felmy’s Sonderstab F in the southern Soviet Union, it was sent to Tunisia as
part of plans for use in a possible general Arab uprising against the British, the
Americans, and the Gaullists in North Africa. Perhaps in disbelief, von Arnim
underlined the words “Arab uprising” (arabische Aufstandsbewegung) and
44
45
46
Ibid.
47
BA-MA: RH19-VIII, 358, Gesandter Rahn, Notiz für Herrn Generaloberst von Arnim, 19. März
1943.
48
Ibid.
noted in the margin: “What is this supposed to be?!”49 (Was soll das?!) In any
case, the North African territories under Axis control were rapidly shrinking in
the winter and spring of 1943, as British forces raced through Libya from
the east, and Anglo-American forces through Morocco and Algeria from the
west, with both campaigns rapidly converging on Tunisia. By the middle of
January, Allied troops were already established inside Tunisia. For Berlin,
therefore, its continued reluctance to make a public endorsement of complete
Arab independence and unity, along with a continuing if at times diminishing
deference to Italian interests in North Africa, remained essentially unchanged
in the winter and spring of 1943, even with the growing likelihood of military
defeat in North Africa.
Berlin’s essentially “business as usual” approach in North Africa in 1943
included continuing efforts to accommodate French interests within a rapidly
shrinking area of Axis control. With British forces in Tripoli by the end of
January 1943, there was virtually nothing left of Italy’s prewar African empire
in Libya, Ethiopia, and Somaliland. In all of this, Italian, French, and Spanish
interests in North Africa would be rendered irrelevant to German policy by the
end of the summer with the Axis surrender in Tunis on May 13, Allied landings
in Sicily on July 10, followed by the overthrow of Mussolini two weeks later,
and then the surrender of Italy on September 8. In this context, it is noteworthy
that in December 1942 the German Foreign Ministry had decided to direct
French propaganda from occupied France toward the French populations in
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.50 Conveyed via radio from France and leaflets
dropped from airplanes, the message included allegations of sexual assaults
by American and English soldiers against French women, as well as Allied
plundering of resources, particularly food, and the shipment of these resources
to England. Other allegations included statements that the Allies planned to
settle two million Eastern European Jews in North Africa, and to absorb
North Africa, Madagascar, and Syria into their respective empires. Moreover,
the propaganda from occupied France appealed to anti-Jewish sentiments
among the non-Arab French populations in North Africa as well, especially
condemnation of the lifting of Vichy’s anti-Jewish measures in North Africa by
the Allies. Indeed, much has been written about how much of the propaganda
emanating from Germany and directed toward the Arab populations of
North Africa and the Middle East in the second half of 1942 and in 1943
49
Ibid. Arab soldiers in the German-Arab Lehrabteilung, after more than a year of languishing in
the Caucasus and the southern front in the Soviet Union, were moved to Sicily in November 1942,
and then to Tunisia in January 1943. Joined by some additional Arab volunteers from North
Africa and the Middle East, they engaged in limited military action for the first time in March,
as the Axis position in Tunisia was nearing collapse. See NARA: MS/P-207 (Felmy), 25–32.
50
PA: R102974, Pol.Abt. II, Richtlinien Monaco, Nordafrika, Niederlande, Bd.-, Notiz für den
Herrn RAM, Vorschläge für franzsösische Propaganda nach Nordafrika auf Grund der
Anregung Lavals, 21. Dezember 1942.
was about the Jews and Zionism, and the usual anti-Semitic claims that the
Jews were seeking to take over all of the Arab lands.51 Finally, in January 1943,
Hitler ordered that any French soldiers who surrendered to, or were captured
by, Axis forces in the fighting in North Africa were not to be treated as
prisoners of war, but that, “According to their wishes or based on their descent,
these members of the armed forces can be sent home to France or can remain
free in Tunisia.”52 In all of this, little attention if any was paid to the questions
of fomenting an Arab revolt, and Arab sovereignty and independence.
In the spring of 1943, as the military situation in North Africa continued to
deteriorate, the Germans increasingly turned to futile propaganda efforts
toward the French population and French and Spanish authorities in northwest
Africa. In March, for example, the Foreign Office in Berlin directed the German
embassy in Paris to mobilize the French government for the Axis propaganda
campaign against the Allies in North Africa. Berlin reasoned that, “Over time it
is not possible from the German side in North Africa to maintain and
strengthen the position of the French government without it engaging itself
fully in the matter.”53 At about this time, Rahn put together a comprehensive
propaganda plan for the German Foreign Office. His undated document with
the title “Propaganda in North Africa” (Propaganda in Nordafrika) pitches
Axis propaganda toward multiple targets, including Free French military forces
with accompanying Arab units, the relatively large French and Spanish popu-
lations in northwest Africa, and their civilian and military authorities.54
The message to French troops was mainly about nationalism, loyalty, and
military honor. It stressed allegations of America’s betrayal of its promises to
the French of North Africa, it’s purely selfish capitalist motives, and the need
for European solidarity against Bolshevism and the Jews. To the Arabs, there
were religious messages about preserving Islam, fighting against the Jews and
Bolshevism, and defending the Arabs against alleged Anglo-American efforts to
steal their resources and food. In particular, Rahn stressed the propaganda
line of protecting Muslim women from predatory American and British sol-
diers. He also identified Spanish Morocco, as yet unoccupied by Allied troops,
as an important place from which Axis propaganda materials might be
smuggled into French Morocco and Algeria, and generally the need to convince
51
See Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, chaps. 5 and 6.
52
PA: R102974, Pol.Abt. II, Richtlinien Monaco, Nordafrika, Niederlande, Bd.-, Flugblatt
„Offiziere, Unteroffiziere, Soldaten des Heeres in Französisch-Nordafrika,“ (no date). This
leaflet was also printed in French, Italian, and Arabic. See also PA: R27827, Handakten Ritter,
Tunis, Ukraine, USA, Bd.-, Telegramm ohne Nummer, an Nachr. Ausw.Amt., z.Hd. Botschafter
Ritter, 8. Januar 1943. This telegram contained Hitler’s original order about treatment of
captured French troops, and copies were also sent to the OKW and other state agencies.
53
PA: R102974, Pol.Abt. II, Richtlinien Monaco, Nordafrika, Niederlande, Bd.-, AA/Berlin an
DB/Paris, Telegramm, 17. März 1943.
54
PA: R102974, Pol.Abt. II, Richtlinien Monaco, Nordafrika, Niederlande, Bd.-, Gesandter Rahn,
Propaganda in Nordafrika, (no date).
Spanish officials in Tangiers that the Allies were a threat to Spain’s position
there. Finally, Rahn emphasized measures to exacerbate tensions between
Arab soldiers and their Free French officers. Again, these and other efforts
in German propaganda tended to assume the continuation of prewar
French-Spanish colonial control, and posited nothing about the independence
of Arab North Africa.
The final Allied push in Tunisia began on April 22. On May 11, Rahn was
able to escape from Tunisia, just two days before the final surrender of Axis
troops.55 In the end, it appears that there was little if any acceptance by Hitler,
his immediate advisers, the higher echelons of the German Foreign Office, the
military, or military intelligence of the rationale of the Mufti and other
Arab leaders that the absence of a formal and unambiguous German commit-
ment to the independence of all Arabs was a significant factor in the final defeat
of the Axis in North Africa in 1943. Indeed, one cannot know whether an
aggressive public campaign by the Germans for Arab independence and unity
would have produced an Arab uprising that would then have had an impact
on the military balance in the region. In retrospect, what analysis there was
in Berlin of the defeat in North Africa was predominantly, although not
exclusively, military in substance. It included admissions that the Reich’s
Italian allies were poorly trained, equipped, and led, and that they did not
always perform well.56 There was also grudging praise for the performance
of the English and American forces, as well as regrets over the difficulties of
resupplying and reinforcing German troops in North Africa.
Some insight into Hitler’s assessment of the defeat was provided by Walter
Hewel, the German Foreign Office’s liaison in Hitler’s main headquarters,
in late June 1943. In a note to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Hewel referred
to ongoing discussions among Hitler and his staff about possibly putting
together an official report on the defeat in North Africa, as well as a response
to Britain’s propaganda campaign depicting the Wehrmacht in the worst terms
in the recently concluded North African campaigns. Von Ribbentrop was in
favor of a response to Anglo-American propaganda against the German army.
Hitler, however, told Hewel that he preferred no official response to the
British and Americans, particularly in the interest of avoiding any mention of
Germany’s dissatisfaction with its Italian ally. According to Hewel, Hitler also
rejected using the excuse of resupply and reinforcement difficulties. He para-
phrased Hitler in the following way: “We encountered difficulties with the
Italians. Nevertheless, one must be particularly careful in this area, for on our
55
Rahn would briefly be appointed Reich Plenipotentiary to the Fascist National Government in
Italy in September 1943. See Conze et.al., Das Amt und die Vergengenheit, 269.
56
See BA-MA: RH2-600, entire file. For Italy in particular, see for example Rommel’s generally
balanced views on the Italian military in the war in North Africa in Liddell-Hart (ed.),
The Rommel Papers, 91–101, 126–134, 147, 373.
side as well there were inexcusable failures and sins of omission. It is therefore
better not to touch this topic at all.”57
In this postmortem, there was no mention of the Arabs, or speculation over
what might have happened had Germany officially and publicly committed
itself, in spite of perceived Italian and French interests, to a fully sovereign and
independent Arab world, and to an all-out armed Arab uprising in support of
Axis forces. If there was one point on which most everyone in the Foreign
Office, the OKW, and the Abwehr could agree, perhaps with the exception of
Hitler and von Ribbentrop, it was the decidedly negative overall impact
of Germany’s alliance with Italy on its pursuit of a sound political strategy in
the Arab world. Of course, it is difficult to imagine that the desired result for the
Axis would have materialized in any case, given the ultimate military imbalance
between Axis and Allied military forces beginning in 1942. Rommel, of course,
was quick to cite both the political and military factors as causes for his defeat
in North Africa, and the consequent loss of the entire Arab world. He criticized
the German High Command for refusing to understand the importance of the
war in the Mediterranean, and both the military and civilian leadership
in general, and by implication Hitler himself, for failing to understand the
enormous strategic importance of the Middle East for Germany’s future:
The blame for this – apart from the scant attention given to the African theatre of war
by the German High Command, who failed to recognize its immense importance – lay
with the half-hearted conduct of the war at sea by the Italians. . .It was obvious that
the High Command’s opinion had not changed from that which they had expressed in
1941, namely, that Africa was a ‘lost cause’ and that any large-scale investment
of materials and troops in that theatre would pay no dividends. A sadly short-sighted
and misguided view!58
Rommel reiterated his criticism of Hitler’s generally deferential approach to

Mussolini and the Italians on both the military and political fronts with the
observation that, “Our Government’s weak policy towards Italy seriously
prejudiced the German-Italian cause in North Africa.”59 Finally, in his section
of the 1957 report to the U.S. Army on German Middle East policy during
the war, former General Walter Warlimont wrote that Arab sympathy for
Germany or the exploitation of Arab nationalism were never major factors
for the OKW or for Rommel in the war in North Africa.60 Nor does it appear
that they were for much of the leadership in the German Foreign Office in
Berlin, or even for Hitler himself.
57
PA: R27797, Handakten Ritter, Montenegro, Nordafrika, Norwegen, Bd.-, Botschafter Hewel,
Notiz für den Reichsaussenminister, Betr. Englische Propaganda bezüglich Tunesienfeldzug, 25.
Juni 1943.
58
Liddell-Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, 191. Alfred Rosenberg was quick to blame Italy for the
disasters in North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy, and Stalingrad in the summer of 1943. See:
USHMM: The Alfred Rosenberg Diary, 26. Juli 1943, 717.
59 60
Ibid., 192. NARA: MS/P-207 (Warlimont), 154.
the jewish question, the middle east, and palestine

To reiterate, this study will not speculate about how the Arab populations of the
Middle East and North Africa, their governments, movements, leaders, and
organizations would have reacted to Nazi persecution and mass murder of the
Jewish communities in the Middle East and North Africa had the Axis been
victorious in the war. With Germany’s final defeat in North Africa and ultimately
in Europe, we will never have a definitive answer to this question. Indeed,
Germany’s physical presence in the Arab world ended completely in May 1943,
just a little more than a year and a half after the start of the “final solution” in
Europe. We do know with reasonable certainty that Hitler’s regime planned
to extend the final solution from Europe to the Jews of North Africa and the
Middle East. This was likely despite the absence of significant German colonial
ambitions in the Mediterranean region, and despite its deferential policies toward
Italian, French, and Spanish colonial interests in the region. There are, of course,
the indirect references at the January 20, 1942 Wannsee Conference to the
relatively large number of Jews in French northwest Africa, as well as the forma-
tion of an SS-Einsatzkommando that was slated for attachment to Rommel’s
army in North Africa later that year.61 Given the region’s close geographical
proximity to the Nazi genocide in Europe, it would seem self-evident that, flush
with total victory in the Soviet Union, North Africa, and the Fertile Crescent, and
committed to the destruction of the Jewish people, Hitler would have extended
the final solution to the almost three-quarters of a million Jews of North Africa
and the Middle East. Undoubtedly, some friction regarding Nazi Jewish policy
would have emerged with the Italians, the French, and the Spaniards, as had
occurred from time to time in Europe between Germany and its allies and friends.
As the new dominant power in the region, however, Germany likely would have
found a way to carry out its program of mass murder of the Jews in the Arab
world. Moreover, as was certainly the case in Europe, this possibly would have
involved the participation of some of the local non-Jewish population.
In his memoir, Rudolf Rahn briefly alludes to the arrival in Tunis of an
SD-Sonderkommando at the same time as his own arrival in November 1942.62
According to Rahn, its general task was to take control of police functions in the
city, and its first specific order from Berlin was to arrest the leadership of
the Jewish community and to organize Jewish men from the community for
forced labor (Zwangsarbeit). Rahn claims he intervened with the local, but
unnamed SD leader63 to have the Jewish community leadership released, and
that he obtained the SD’s approval of his suggestion to have the community
61
For the background and plans for the formation of this particular SS-Einsatzkommando begin-
ning in the summer of 1942, in anticipation of an Axis victory in the Middle East, see Mallmann
and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 137–147.
62
Rahn, Ruheloses Leben, 203–204.
63
The official was SS Colonel Walter Rauff. See Robert Satloff, Among the Righteous: Lost Stories
from the Holocaust’s Long Reach into Arab Lands (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 45.
photo 7.1. Jews rounded up by the Germans in Tunis for forced labor, marching
to the port of Bizaret (December 1942).
Courtesy Bundesarchiv, Berlin and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem.
leadership rather than the police be responsible for organizing Jewish labor
services. Rahn also claims that Jewish workers would receive medical and other
support services, and that generally they would receive the same treatment as the
volunteer Arab workers. In the end, however, the Germans mobilized some 5,000
Tunisian Jews for forced labor, with some living in work camps and others living
outside of the camps. Unlike Arabs who were conscripted for labor, Jewish forced
laborers in Tunisia were fed and equipped by their own Jewish community, and
did not receive payment for their labor; for Jews, the only exceptions were the
approximately 5,000 Italian Jews who were excused from forced labor in early
September 1942 at the request of the Italian government.64 The conditions, of
course, were terrible, and the Jewish population in Tunisia was generally sub-
jected to the same sort of violence and intimidation that the Jews in Libya had
experienced at the hands of the Germans and the Italians during the Axis retreat
from Egypt after El-Alamein, westward through Libya.65
64
The Italians also feared that losses suffered by Italian Jews in Tunisia damaged overall Italian
economic interests in Tunisia, and thus Italy’s ambitions there. See ADAP: Serie E, Bd. III, Nr.
259 (Anlage). See also Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, 277.
65
For more on anti-Jewish regulations and general Axis persecution of the Jews in French and
Italian North Africa during the war, see Maurice Roumani, The Jews of Libya: Coexistence,
The final, genocidal stage of Nazi Jewish policy in Europe that began in late
1941 contains aspects that are particularly relevant to Germany’s relationship
with Arab nationalism and some of its leaders living in exile in Berlin after
1941. It arises from a little known Nazi policy beginning in 1942 of generally
exempting some Jews living in German-occupied Europe from the wartime
genocide. This policy was referred to indirectly in an unsigned July 12, 1943
internal German Foreign Office memorandum that its authors felt was neces-
sary because “. . .the solution of the Jewish question in the German-controlled
areas had made so much progress that in many places there were only the
Jews living in mixed marriages and a small number of foreign Jews left.”66
The document suggested that the policy of allowing allied and neutral states to
repatriate their Jewish citizens from German-occupied areas of Europe was
being extended one last time in order to give those states a final opportunity
to do so before “. . .the general Jewish measures are also applied to all foreign
Jews in areas controlled by Germany.”67 This policy would have implications
for Germany’s fading interest in the Arab world, particularly for the Mufti and
other Arab leaders in Berlin in 1943 and 1944. It would allow the movement
of some Jews from Europe, either directly from, or indirectly through, states
in western and southeastern Europe and Turkey to the Jewish National Home
in Palestine.
Earlier chapters consider Nazi Jewish policy and its connection to
Germany’s relationship with the Arabs and the Middle East before the war.
In part, this is done within the context of a Jewish policy that used Zionism
and the Zionist movement and institutions in Germany, London, and Palestine
for the promotion of Jewish emigration from central Europe to Palestine before
the adoption of the “final solution to the Jewish question in Europe” in 1941.
All of this had occurred in spite of growing Arab complaints about
Nazi Jewish policy by September 1939. It only ceased with the formal end of
Jewish emigration from Europe as part of a policy of systematic mass murder
of the Jews in German-occupied Europe. Beginning in 1941, and given the
intent of the final solution, all Jewish emigration from Germany and German-
occupied Europe to all destinations, including Palestine, was prohibited.
However, German willingness to send Jews from Europe to Palestine and
elsewhere in fact did not end entirely, despite the Nazi state’s closer and more
pragmatic wartime relationship with Arab nationalism, Amin al-Husayni,
Persecution, and Resettlement (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009), 33 ff; Daniel Carpi,
Between Mussolini and Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia
(Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1994), 205 ff; and Satloff, Among the Righteous, 45–56.
66
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, Vortragsnotiz zu Inl.II 1947 g,
12. Juli 1943.
67
Ibid. See also Nicosia and Browning, “Ambivalenz und Paradox bei der Durchsetzung der NS-
Judenpolitik,” 216–219. The list of allied, friendly, and neutral states to which this applied
included Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey.
Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, and other Arabs in Berlin beginning in 1941. This was in
part the result of the inevitable “friction” between Germany and allied or
friendly states in Europe, alluded to earlier. Berlin was not always able to
persuade allied or friendly states such as Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary, Rumania,
and Bulgaria to comply with its plans, beginning in late 1941, to deport their
Jewish populations.68 Indeed, the regime could not even secure the cooperation
of its main ally, Fascist Italy, in the deportation of Jews from Italy and Italian-
occupied areas of southern and southeastern Europe.69
Further complicating matters was the question of Jews from neutral states
such as Turkey and Spain, and the problem of determining their countries of
origin. For instance, there existed the possibility of exemptions from the
deportations for those Jews in German-occupied Europe who claimed Turkish
or Spanish citizenship.70 These disruptions in Germany’s implementation of the
final solution in Europe might shed some light on its ultimate intentions
toward the Jewish communities in the Arab world. A willingness to permit
some Jews to leave occupied Europe during the final solution might have
reflected the intention to murder those same Jews at a later time and in another
place. In any case, and for the purposes of this study, the implications of these
exemptions for some Jews for Germany’s already problematic relationship with
Arab nationalism beginning in 1943 are instructive. On both a racial and
geopolitical level, they are another indicator of the general indifference of
Hitler’s government toward the Arabs in its approach to the issue of Arab
nationalism and independence in a postwar Middle East.
At the height of the systematic annihilation of the Jews in Nazi-occupied
Europe in 1943 and 1944, the German Foreign Office and the Sicherheitsdienst
(SD) in the SS dealt with the attempts of Jewish organizations and several
governments to secure the transfer of some Jews from German-occupied
Europe to Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Palestine, or the Americas. The German
Foreign Office had some difficulty getting the governments of Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria to comply with German requests for the deportation
68
See Christopher Browning, The Final Solution and the German Foreign Office (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1978), 102–108.
69
Ibid., 134–141, 164–170. See also Dalia Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust: Illegal Immigration to
the Land of Israel, 1939–1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 189–198.
70
Many who claimed Spanish or Turkish citizenship, and who might be permitted to enter Spain or
Turkey, had never resided in those two countries. Some might have been descendants of Jews
who had fled Spain during the Inquisition or had emigrated from the Ottoman Empire before the
establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. For details on the complex history and identities
of Turkish Jews in Europe, as well as Turkish laws that provided for the denaturalization of
Turkish citizens who resided abroad for more than five years, and the situation of Turkish Jews
residing in Germany, see Corry Guttstadt, Die Türkei, die Juden und der Holocaust (Berlin:
Assoziation A, 2008), 109–153, 271–282, 481–483; Nicosia and Browning, “Ambivalenz und
Paradox bei der Durchsetzung der NS-Judenpolitik,” 218–219. Only about 900 Turkish Jews
were returned to Turkey during the war.
of their Jewish populations to Poland from the fall of 1942 through much of
1943. All three countries were involved in various ways in alternative efforts to
send some of their Jewish populations to Palestine. An early indication of this
came in December 1942 when the Rumanian government was involved in
schemes to organize the movement of up to 80,000 Jews from Rumania to
Palestine as part of a process in which Jews would pay a substantial fee to the
Rumanian government.71 The German embassy in Bucharest was instructed to
strongly oppose the Rumanian effort. It was told to inform the Rumanian
government that the Germany could never accept a plan that might end up
sending military-age Jewish males to a British-ruled territory, one that involved
a German ally concluding an agreement with the enemy, Great Britain, and that
would be unacceptable to Arab leaders in the Axis capitals and to Arab opinion
in general. Of course, in December 1942, the outcome of the war in North
Africa was not yet settled, although the military tide had begun to turn against
the Axis by the end of that year. Some Jews from Rumania were able to reach
Palestine in January and February 1943, although the Germans were able to
stop the process by the end of February through diplomatic intervention with
Rumania.
However, the Rumanian example was just part of a larger process that
would continue through 1943 and into 1944, much to the consternation of
the Mufti and his fellow Arabs in Berlin. Even in January 1943, Martin Luther
in the German Foreign Office hinted indirectly in a message to the German
embassy in Bucharest that in the end, Germany was determined to remove the
Jews from Europe one way or another. He noted “. . .that the Führer is deter-
mined in the end to remove all Jews from Europe during the war,” and that
“the evacuation of Jews out of Europe is a compelling necessity for the internal
security of the continent.”72 Was this an indication that in certain situations
Germany would accept the transfer of some Jews out of German-occupied
Europe as an alternative to their deportation to ghettos and extermination
camps in Poland? It is likely that this was indeed the case. However, Luther
did instruct the German embassy in Bucharest that sending Jews from Rumania
to Palestine was generally not in Germany’s interest at the time. Nevertheless,
efforts by a few governments and by Jewish organizations to move relatively
small groups of Jews out of occupied Europe to Palestine and elsewhere
continued in 1943 and 1944. At the same time, German objections to these
efforts gradually dissipated, more or less concurrently with the Axis demise and
surrender in North Africa in May and the defeat and overthrow of Mussolini in
the summer and fall of 1943.
71
ADAP: Serie E, Bd. IV, Nr. 279, and Bd. V, Nr. 28. See also Browning, The Final Solution and the
German Foreign Office, 171; Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, 189–190; and Richard Breitman and
Allan Lichtman, FDR and the Jews (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 223 ff.
72
ADAP: Serie E, Bd. V, Nr. 70.
In early February 1943, the German embassy in Sofia reported to Berlin

that Britain, via the government of Switzerland, had notified the Bulgarian
government that it would allow almost 5,000 Jewish children from Bulgaria
to enter Palestine.73 After receiving initial assurances from the Bulgarian
government that the British offer was nonbinding, the German ambassador
in Sofia, Adolf Beckerle, responded that Germany’s experience with Jewish
emigrants in the past had been negative because they contributed to the anti-
German propaganda of Germany’s enemies. In fact, according to British radio
transmissions, negotiations had been ongoing and steps were being taken to
organize the movement of 4,500 Jewish children with 500 accompanying
adults from Bulgaria to Palestine. British Colonial Minister Oliver Stanley
had informed Parliament of the negotiations and the logistical difficulties
associated with the idea, and that earlier agreements had already resulted
in the removal of 270 Jewish children from Hungary and Rumania to
Palestine.74 Stanley made his statement to Parliament within the context
of Britain’s May 1939 White Paper on Palestine that allowed the immigration
of an additional 75,000 Jews to Palestine over a five-year period, to the end of
March 1944; by the autumn of 1943, some 44,000 immigration certificates
had been used, leaving about 31,000 certificates still available for the
remaining year. With the support of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA),
the German Foreign Office instructed Beckerle in Sofia to firmly oppose the
British offer to the Bulgarians, with the assertion: “Our experiences support
the fear that these 5,000 Jews under English influence will become 5,000
propagandists against our anti-Semitic measures.”75 The instructions also
included the assertion that the movement of Jews from Bulgaria to Palestine
would contradict German policy toward the Arab world: “Also, such a
measure would not be in harmony with our policy toward the Arab
people.”76 To remain consistent with its current propaganda campaign in
the Arab world, and given the fact that the war was still raging in North
Africa, the German Foreign Office continued to use the argument that support
for removing Jews from Bulgaria, or from anywhere in Europe, to Palestine
would contradict its official support for the Arab people and their opposition
to Zionism and Jewish immigration to Palestine.
Although Germany’s opposition to the movement of Jews from Bulgaria
to Palestine was clear, the Bulgarian government was not entirely inclined to
73
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, DG/Sofia an AA/Berlin, Tele-
gramm Nr. 176, 4. Februar 1943.
74
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin an DG/Sofia, D III 141
g, 13. Februar 1943. See also Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, 189; and Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 3 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 1123.
75
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin (von Hahn) an RSHA/
Berlin (Eichmann), D III 149 g, 8. Februar 1943.
76
Ibid.
accept the German position. To appease the Germans, the government in

Sofia decided to inform the Swiss intermediaries in February that although
they were in fact not opposed to the idea of Jewish emigration from Bulgaria
to Palestine, the logistical problems involved in moving a large group of
people in wartime from Bulgaria to Palestine rendered the current plan
unworkable.77 Nevertheless, in March 1943, the communications in Berlin
between the Foreign Office and the SS increased as rumors spread of other
initiatives, including those involving Palestinian Jewish officials in Turkey
and even Rumania, to move Jews from the Balkans via Turkey to Palestine.
In early March, for example, Adolf Eichmann notified the German Foreign
Office that Jewish officials working out of Istanbul were trying to arrange
transit visas for 1,000 Jewish children and 100 accompanying adults overland
from Rumania through Bulgaria to Turkey, and then on to Palestine.
Eichmann demanded that this planned emigration be prevented, if possible.78
The German embassy in Bucharest followed up on this effort a week later
by informing Berlin that Turkey was indeed willing to provide the 1,000
Jewish children and accompanying adults from Rumania with the necessary
transit visas for their journey to Palestine, and that 150 children were about
to leave Rumania for Palestine, via Bulgaria and Turkey, in the next few
days.79 The German Foreign Office and the SS joined forces to do what
they could to prevent Jews from leaving Rumania and Bulgaria for Palestine,
although their options were limited.80 At the same time, communications
from the German embassy in Budapest arrived in Berlin reporting that
Britain had issued entry permits to Palestine for up to eighty Jewish
children from Hungary, although the emigration of these children had not
yet taken place.81
The role of Turkey in this developing process was very important. By 1943,
Istanbul had replaced Switzerland as the central location for officials from the
Jewish Agency for Palestine and other Zionist organizations from Palestine
involved in efforts to rescue Jews from German-occupied Europe.82
77
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, DG/Sofia an AA/Berlin,
Telegramm Nr. 321, 27. Februar 1943. See also Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews,
220 ff.
78
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei
und des SD (Eichmann) an das Auswärtige Amt-Berlin, IV B 4 b-3 – 89/43g, 3. März 1943.
79
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, DG/Bukarest an AA/Berlin,
Telegramm Nr. 1283, 10. März 1943.
80
und des SD an das Auswärtige Amt/Berlin, IV B 4 3349 / 42g (1425), 10. März 1943; and
AA/Berlin (LR Rademacher) an DG/Bukarest, Telegramm ohne Nummer, März 1943.
81
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, DG/Budapest an AA/Berlin,
G Nr. 66, Abtransport jüdischer Flüchtlinge nach Palästina, 11. März 1943.
82
Stanford Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey’s Role in Rescuing Turkish and European
Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933–1945 (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 256–
258, 268 ff. For the most complete and detailed account of the efforts of Zionist and other
photo 7.2. Simon Brod, Jewish Agency for Palestine representative in Istanbul,
and Jewish refugees from Transnistria (May 1944).
Courtesy United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington D.C.
Its geographical proximity to both Palestine and eastern Europe, and the fact
that, unlike Switzerland, Turkey was not surrounded by Germany, Italy, and
German-occupied France, made it a natural gateway to Palestine for Jews able
to escape from German-occupied Eastern Europe. So too did the apparent
willingness of the Turkish government to help in the rescue process. For
instance, since implementation of its “Special Transit Law No. 2/15132”
on February 12, 1941, Turkey had permitted Jewish refugees with valid
Palestinian immigration certificates to receive Turkish transit visas for passage
through Turkey on their way to Palestine.83 In all, more than 4,000 Jews passed
through Turkey in route to Palestine in 1941 alone, a number that grew
Jewish organizations to organize rescue operations in German-occupied Europe beginning in

1942, see Aronson, Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews, Chaps. 18–30. For the significance of
Istanbul in those operations, see Tuvia Friling, “Istanbul 1942–1945: The Kollek-Avriel and
Berman-Ofner Networks,” in Secret Intelligence and the Holocaust, David Bankier (ed.)
(New York: Enigma Books, 2006), 105–156.
83
Shaw, Turkey and the Holocaust, 261–264. See also Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, 164; and
Guttstadt, Die Türkei, 236–238. Those without entry permits for Palestine who arrived in
Turkey were usually permitted to stay until they could be smuggled into Palestine “illegally.”
significantly between 1942 and 1945.84 This increase can be explained at least
in part by the eventual German decision to participate in, rather than resist,
various “exchange plans” with Great Britain, negotiated through the offices
of the International Red Cross in Geneva and Ankara. These plans involved
the exchange of Jews from German-occupied Europe for detained German
nationals held in various parts of the British Empire since the beginning
of the war. Most of the Jews involved in these exchanges, from countries
such as Greece, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary, ended up in
Palestine in 1943 and 1944.
In the end, German Foreign Office efforts to completely stop the movement
of Jews from the Balkans to Palestine in the winter and spring of 1943 were not
successful. German diplomatic missions in Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia
acknowledged their inability to stop the process entirely. As the German
embassy in Sofia admitted on March 13, nothing could be done to accommo-
date an RSHA request to stop the passage through Bulgaria of a transport of
150 Jews from Rumania, and the German ambassador indicated that he
would not petition the Bulgarian government about it because “. . .there
does not exist any chance for success, that only the distrust of the Bulgarian
government would be aroused, and its relationship with Rumania would be
damaged.”85 There seemed to be some resignation on the part of the German
Foreign Office and its representatives in the Balkans that, regardless of
German entreaties to the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian governments
to stop the transports, there was little that could be done to stop them
completely. In a brief note to Eichmann in the RSHA in late March, the German
Foreign Office admitted that in spite of the assurances of the Bulgarian and
Rumanian governments that they would take steps to comply with Germany’s
requests: “It is however still questionable, whether and to what extent these
steps can be successful.”86
By April 1943, the movement of Jewish refugees from Rumania to Palestine
via Bulgaria and Turkey had apparently reached a point at which the ability of
the German government to effectively influence the actions of the Rumanian
and Bulgarian governments almost disappeared. The Foreign Office in Berlin
telegraphed its embassy in Sofia asking for clarification about a recent transport
of Jewish children from Rumania to Palestine via Bulgaria. The telegram
reported that Germany’s “Bucharest embassy reports that transport of Jewish
children numbering seventy-seven persons from Rumania to Palestine left
84
Dalia Ofer and others conclude that more than 13,000 Jewish refugees managed to escape
German-occupied eastern and southeastern Europe, and were able to reach Palestine mostly
via Turkey between 1940 and 1944. See Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, 320.
85
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, DG/Sofia an AA/Berlin, Tele-
gramm Nr. 390, 13. März 1943.
86
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin an das Reichssicher-
heitshauptamt, D III 403 g, 26. März 1943.
Bucharest on March14 and has already passed through Bulgaria. On instruc-

tion from Sofia, a Bulgarian transit visa was given [to the transport] by the
Bulgarian embassy in Bucharest.”87 At about the same time, in early April,
the German embassy in Bucharest reported to Berlin that the Rumanian travel
agency “Romania” intended to transport seventy-four Jewish children from
Rumania through Bulgaria and Turkey to Palestine.88 The travel agency even
requested the approval of the German embassy, but was informed “. . .that it is
not in the political interest of the Reich that emigration should take place not
only from Rumania but from Europe in general in view of the desired solution
to the Jewish question in Europe.”89 The German embassy in Bucharest
suggested that should this particular transport leave Rumania, something
should be done to stop it as it makes its way through Bulgaria. On April 14,
the Foreign Office in Berlin, after admitting that German officials in Bucharest
and Sofia had been unable to prevent the transport of Balkan Jews to Palestine,
asked the German embassy in Ankara whether it might be able to persuade the
Turkish government to cease issuing transit visas for Jews on their way to
Palestine.90 It was unlikely that German pressure on a neutral Turkey would
be effective when it was not on Germany’s allies and friends in Budapest,
Bucharest, and Sofia. In any case, Turkish assistance in preventing the move-
ment of Jews from Europe to Palestine would prove to be unnecessary
beginning in May as the Nazi regime, in an apparent change of policy, began
to accept the reality that relatively small groups of Jews from southeastern
and even from western Europe would be permitted to leave Europe and go to
Palestine.91
In mid April 1943, Marshal Antonescu, the leader of Rumania, met with
Hitler near Salzburg. A brief telegram from the German embassy in Bucharest
to the Foreign Office in Berlin of April 30 reported that the Rumanian
government was in possession of 70,000 immigration certificates for the
87
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin (LR Wagner) an DG/
Sofia, Telegramm ohne Nummer, April 1943.
88
Telegramm Nr. 1816, 4. April 1943.
89
Ibid.
90
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin an DB/Ankara, e.o.
Inl.II A 918 g, 14. April 1943. In her essay, Tuvia Friling refers to Abwehr and Gestapo
awareness of Yishuv rescue networks in the Balkans. For instance, she writes that German and
Rumanian officials accepted bribes in return for allowing the purchase and preparation of the
Struma, a rescue ship, for the transport Jews to Palestine. The Struma sank off the coast of
Turkey in February 1942. See Friling, “Istanbul 1942–1945,” 155–156.
91
In the summer and autumn of 1943 and through the first half of 1944, the SS also approved the
transfer of at least several hundred Jews from transit camps in Holland, Belgium, and possibly
France, to Palestine. Some were transferred by train via Bergen-Belsen and Vienna to Istanbul
and from there through Syria and Lebanon to Palestine. See Bernard Wasserstein, The Ambiguity
of Virtue: Gertrude van Tijn and the Fate of the Dutch Jews (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2014), 156-166, 198-212.
immigration of Jewish children from Rumania to Palestine. The telegram

also revealed that the Rumanian government had informed the embassy that
at his recent meeting with Hitler near Salzburg, Antonescu had obtained the
German government’s agreement to allow Jews to leave Rumania for
Palestine.92 In what appeared to be a significant policy change, the embassy
requested instructions from Berlin on this issue for its future dealings with the
Rumanian government. Eichmann’s office, on the other hand, continued to
operate on the assumption that no Jewish emigration was to be permitted
from the Balkans or from any other part of Europe. Yet it did at least entertain
a suggestion from the Bulgarian government that it might be possible to
send 8,000 Bulgarian Jews to Palestine in exchange for the repatriation of
8,000 Bulgarian nationals living at the time in South America.93 In any case,
there was some confusion within the German Foreign Office and the RSHA
over what Hitler or someone else in the German leadership had actually said
to Antonescu when they met in April. It is likely that von Ribbentrop
rather than Hitler had promised something to Antonescu at those mid-April
meetings, something that related to the alleged existence of immigration
certificates for Palestine for some 70,000 Jewish children in Rumania, and
that von Ribbentrop had merely promised to consider Antonescu’s request,
but that he had not yet approved it.94
None of this appears to have been entirely secret in Berlin. Amin al-Husayni,
perhaps because he had begun to sense a change in German policy on this issue,
entered the fray in early May 1943. He began to express his strong opposition
to any policy that allowed Jews to leave Nazi-occupied Europe for Palestine.95
Moreover, he did so at precisely the same time that the German military
presence in the Arab world was ending entirely with the Axis surrender in
Tunisia on May 13, 1943. On May 6, the Mufti appealed to the Bulgarian
government to do everything in its power to halt the movement of Jews from
the Balkan states to Palestine.96 Most of the letter reiterates the old anti-Semitic
notions about an international Jewish conspiracy to dominate the world,
and its intention to use Palestine as the base for this conspiracy. The Mufti
then pleaded: “Beyond that, the emigration of the Jews to the Arab lands, and
92
Telegramm Nr. 2370, 30. April 1943. See also Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, 192.
93
und des SD (Eichmann) an das Auswärtige Amt, IV B 4, 3349/42g (1425), 3. Mai 1943, and 4.
Mai 1943.
94
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin (Ribbentrop) an
DG/Bukarest, Telegramm ohne Nummer, Mai 1943. The exact day in May is not specified,
but it was likely in the first week of the month. See also Vortragsnotiz über Herrn U.St.S., Herrn
St.S., zur Vorlage bei dem Herrn Reichsaussenminister, 7. Mai 1943.
95
For the Mufti’s efforts to block the movement of Jews from Bialystok and Hungary, see Aronson,
Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews, 330 ff.
96
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 163–164.
especially to Palestine, violates the most important existential interests of the

Arab people, who in every way stand at the side of the Axis and their allies.”
He closed with the request that the Bulgarian government prevent any Jewish
emigration from Bulgaria, and to send the Jews instead “. . .where they will be
under strong control, e.g. to Poland.”97 On May 13, the day of the Axis
surrender in Tunis, al-Husayni appealed to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop
with the same arguments about Jewish conspiratorial intentions: “The Arabs
see in the emigration of the Jews to their lands a threat to their interests, which
compels me to draw your Excellency’s attention this question and its damaging
consequences for the Arabs.”98 The Mufti’s appeal to von Ribbentrop reflected
his awareness of the ongoing issue of the movement of relatively small numbers
of Jews from southeastern Europe to Palestine since the beginning of 1943.
His relatively late intervention in the matter might be explained by the realities
of Germany’s final defeat in North Africa in April and May and its disastrous
implications for his plans to lead the movement for Arab unity and independ-
ence in alliance with the Axis powers.
Notwithstanding his failure to obtain an official, blanket Axis endorsement
of the unity and independence of the Arab world, the final defeat and surrender
of German and Italian forces in North Africa in the spring of 1943 reduced the
Mufti’s chances of obtaining meaningful German help to zero. Moreover,
whatever relevance the Arabs and Arab nationalism had had for Hitler’s
geopolitical strategy and aims in the war all but disappeared, as an increasingly
isolated Reich was forced to put all of its resources into defensive and ultimately
futile military campaigns in eastern, southern, and western Europe. By the
summer of 1943, with almost two years of war still ahead of them, al-Husayni,
al-Gaylani, and other Arab officials in Berlin found it virtually impossible to
look to an Axis victory and the end of British domination in North Africa and
the Middle East. On the other hand, it also meant that the German government
was bound even less to maintain at least some modicum of sensitivity to the
political rhetoric of sympathy for and collaboration with the Arab people,
and with all Muslims in general, that nevertheless remained the basis of its
propaganda campaign toward the Arab world for the rest of the war.
On June 10, almost a month after his previous note to von Ribbentrop,
the Mufti wrote once again to the German foreign minister, and to the former
Italian foreign minister, Count Ciano. He expressed his disappointment that
Jews from Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria had been arriving in Palestine,
in spite of assurances from Berlin that the process would cease. An English
version of the letter, sent to von Ribbentrop in French, was also sent to Ciano.
97
Ibid., 164. It seems likely that by the middle of 1942, the Mufti was generally aware of the fate of
the Jews who were being deported to Poland since the fall of 1941. See Gensicke, Der Mufti von
Jerusalem, 104.
98
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 165. See also ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.27, AA/Berlin (Wagner) an
DB/Sofia, Akt.z. 1294, Inl. II, Mai 1943.
Directing his anger to the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian allies of

the Axis, the Mufti wrote: “I deem it fitting to inform Your Excellency
that the loyal Arab friends of the Axis powers are deeply offended that their
friends, partners of the Axis powers, are furthering Jewish-English objectives by
permitting the transfer of Jews, agents of the British and Communism and
enemies of the Arabs and Europe, to Arab Palestine.”99 The Mufti pleaded
with von Ribbentrop and Ciano to give their attention to the matter and to do
everything in their power to stop it. Similarly, the Mufti sent letters to the
Rumanian and Hungarian foreign ministers with the request that they too take
steps to prevent the further transfer of Jews from their countries to Palestine.100
The Foreign Office in Berlin, in a note to the German embassy in Rome on
June 19, dismissed al-Husayni’s concerns as exaggerated. It contrasted the
larger number of immigration permits issued by the British through Swiss
diplomatic officials in the Balkans to the relatively small number of Jews who
had actually arrived in Palestine through these channels since the end of 1942,
numbers that the Mufti cited in his June 10 letter to von Ribbentrop and
Ciano.101 After insisting that the German government had vigorously inter-
vened with Balkan governments in an effort to stop the movement of Jews to
Palestine, Berlin instructed the embassy in Rome to inform the Mufti that the
success of this intervention was reflected in the fact that only seventy-five Jews
had reached Palestine via Turkey. It also insisted that British announcements of
large numbers of immigration certificates and the impending arrival in Palestine
of large numbers of Jews from Europe was pure propaganda. However,
the June 19 German Foreign Office memorandum did qualify its argument by
admitting that even with the “positive intentions” of Germany’s friends and
allies in the Balkans, it was not possible to prevent a limited “illegal” immigra-
tion process into Palestine. While it is difficult to know precisely how many
Jews were able to reach Palestine from the Balkans in 1942 and 1943, it seems
clear that the numbers, although still relatively modest, were nevertheless much
higher than just seventy-five.102
By the middle of the summer of 1943, and despite its previous assurances
to the Mufti, the German Foreign Office had already indicated its intention to
allow some Jews to leave Europe for Palestine in exchange for German or other
Axis nationals who were in British custody. Once again using the Swiss
99 100
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 168. Ibid., 179–181.
101
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin (Wagner) an
DB/Rom, Inl.II 1682g, Betr. Juden-Auswanderung nach Palästina, 19. Juni 1943; and LR von
Thadden sofort zunächst Herrn LR Melchers Pol. VII, 15. Juni 1943. The German Foreign
Office was likely referring to the small group of Palestinian Jews, with passports from the
Palestine Mandate, who were exchanged in late 1942 for German nationals in British custody.
These sixty-nine Palestinian Jews arrived in Palestine in November 1942. See Dina Porat, The
Blue and the Yellow Stars of David: The Zionist Leadership in Palestine and the Holocaust
1939–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 36–37.
102
See Ofer, Escaping the Holocaust, Appendices A and D.
government as intermediary with Germany and its allies, Britain asked the
German government to issue exit visas for 5,000 Jewish children from
the occupied eastern territories for transfer to Palestine.103 German interest in
this particular initiative was based on the idea that the Jewish children would
be exchanged for German nationals who had been detained in various parts
of the British Empire since the beginning of the war. Discussions ensued
between the German Foreign Office and the RSHA about how to respond to
the British initiative. An unsigned July 13 letter from the Foreign Office in
Berlin to Heinrich Müller of the RSHA referred to an earlier meeting between
von Ribbentrop and Himmler, and their agreement that the Foreign Office
would formulate the official German response to the British offer, based on
the following points:
Basic agreement of the Reich government for negotiations; distribution of exit permits,
if the occasion arises in exchange for interned [Germans], but rejection of the emigration
to Palestine; basic condition: transfer of the children to England and approval of this
action by resolution of the English lower house.104
The author of the letter to Müller further commented on the very real possibil-
ity that, should England accept Germany’s conditions, there would be an
exchange of Jewish children for interned Germans and that the RSHA would
have to play an important role. Of course, the German insistence that the
Jewish children ostensibly sent to England should not be permitted to go to
Palestine was meaningless, as there would be no way that such a condition
could be enforced once the children left German-controlled territory.
The German Foreign Office and the RSHA were now both willing to permit
the movement of some Jews from Europe to Palestine, in spite of the objections
of the Mufti in Berlin. The Nazi policy of allowing some Jews from friendly or
neutral states who were caught in Germany or German-occupied territories to
return to their home countries, mentioned earlier in this chapter, was not easy
for some due to the difficulties involved in determining their countries of origin.
This was particularly true for Jews considered by the Spanish government to be
citizens, but who had never lived in Spain.105 In late 1943 and early 1944,
the German Foreign Office and the RSHA approved the transfer of Jews with
103
Ibid., 192–193.
104
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenausreise nach Palästina 1943, Bd.-, AA/Berlin an SS-Gruppenführer
Müller, Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 13. Juli 1943.
105
For the negotiations between the German and Spanish governments regarding these problems,
see the entire file in PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenfrage in Spanien, Bd.-. After initial indifference
on the part of the Spanish government regarding Jews “of Spanish descent” in German-
occupied Europe during the war, Franco’s government began to press the Nazi regime to permit
the repatriation of Jews to Spain by the summer of 1943. Hitler’s government resisted these
efforts at first. The Germans believed that the Spanish government began to seek repatriation
because of American pressure on Spain to seek the transfer of those Jews considered Spanish
back to Spain for further transfer to Portugal and then to the United States and elsewhere in the
Turkish citizenship from German-occupied Greece to Turkey via Bulgaria,

as well as Jews with other national identities for transfer out of Europe via
Germany.106 In any case, it is difficult to determine the final destinations of
these Jewish refugees, although it is certainly possible that some ultimately
ended up in Palestine. Such an outcome could not have been a surprise to
German authorities.
In any case, the willingness of the German government to permit the transfer
of some Jews from Europe to Palestine in exchange for German nationals still
interned in Egypt and elsewhere by the British reflects the final stages of an
ongoing process of diminishing interest in, and engagement with, Arab nation-
alism as a factor in German foreign policy. Sometime in the spring of 1944,
al-Husayni once again registered his concerns about alleged German govern-
ment complicity in planning the transfer of Jews from occupied Europe to
Palestine. In a May 27, 1944 internal note from Eberhard von Thadden,
the official in charge of Jewish affairs in the German Foreign Office since
April 1943, reference was made to the Mufti’s recent complaint to Himmler
that an Anglo-German exchange agreement was in preparation that would
send Jews to Palestine. Von Thadden was seeking information about the details
of the agreement, specifically how large the exchange would be, and most
importantly, “. . .whether the negotiations for the exchange were authorized
by the Reich Foreign Minister and whether he had explicitly approved of
including Jews in the exchange.”107 Several days later, after discussions in
Berlin with an unnamed representative of the Mufti, von Thadden noted that
discussions with the British regarding the exchange were indeed taking place,
that at least one exchange had already taken place, that the next one had to be
postponed temporarily, and that the Mufti’s opposition to including Jews in
the exchange would be considered, but that it would not in any way prejudice
Germany’s position on the issue.108 Perhaps this was a hint that at least when
it involved an exchange for German nationals held by the British, the Nazi
regime was not at all opposed to sending Jews to Palestine, regardless of the
objections of the Mufti and Arab nationalist circles in Rome and Berlin.
western hemisphere. See for example PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenfrage in Spanien, Bd.-,
DB/Madrid an AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 7326, Inland.II 3361 g., 29. Dezember 1943.
106
PA: Inland II A/B, Juden in der Türkei, Bd. 1, Ref. LR von Thadden, Aktennotiz, hiermit über
Herrn U.St.S. Pol., Herrn VLR Melchers mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme vorgelegt, 22.
September 1943; AA-Berlin an das Reichssicherheitshauptamt, z.Hd. von Eichmann, Nr. Inl.
II A 8561, 15. November 1943; and Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD an AA-Berlin,
IV B 4 b Nr. 2314-43 g (82), 29. Februar 1944.
107
PA: Inland II A/B, Juden in Palästina, Bd.-, Ref. LR.I.Kl. von Thadden, Hiermit R XIII – Herrn
LS. Dr. Theiß vorgelegt, 27. Mai 1944.
108
PA: Inland II A/B, Juden in Palästina, Bd.-, Ref. LR.I.Kl. von Thadden, Hiermit R XIII – Herrn
LS. Dr. Theiß mit der Bitte um beschleunigte Erledigung der Notiz vom 27. Mai vorgelegt, 3.
Juni 1944.
photo 7.3. Eberhard von Thadden (no date).

The Mufti also tried to convince the German Foreign Office to exchange
non-Jewish British citizens in its custody for German nationals rather than
Jews who would be resettled in Palestine. But his interventions had little if any
impact on German officials who were engaged in negotiations for the planned
exchanges. In a second internal German Foreign Office memorandum of
June 3, 1944, von Thadden stated that the delays in carrying out some
exchanges were not the result of al-Husayni’s interventions, but rather of
Britain’s inability to meet some of the deadlines suggested by Germany.109
In that second memorandum, von Thadden confirmed “. . .that the German-
Palestinian civilian exchange is being carried out with the clear approval of
the Reich Foreign Minister. . .”110 He also observed that there were few if any
non-Jewish Palestinians under German control, and that the few non-Jewish
Britons in German custody were being held back for possibly more important
exchanges. Indeed, in 1944 Britain was willing to exchange German nationals
for Jews and to allow them to settle in Palestine. Germany, in the process of
ending Jewish life in Europe one way or another, no longer saw itself in
109
PA: Inland II A/B, Juden in Palästina, Bd.-, Ref. LR.I.Kl. von Thadden, Hiermit Herrn
Gruppenleiter Inl.II mit der Bitte um Kenntnisnahme vorgelegt, 3. Juni 1944.
110
Ibid.
need of support from Arabs in general or from any of their spokespersons in

particular. In 1944, moreover, it was unlikely that people other than Jews in
occupied Europe would be suitable and willing candidates for settlement
in Palestine or that the British government would be inclined to permit
non-Jewish Germans (Palästinadeutsche) who had lived in Palestine before
the war to return.
A few days later, on June 8, von Thadden reiterated that Reich Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop, and therefore, presumably, Hitler himself, formally
approved of what he termed the “Palestine-Exchange” (Palästina-Austausch),
the exchange of Jews from occupied Europe who would be resettled in Palestine
for German nationals in British custody. With a direct reference to the Mufti’s
opposition to any exchanges that would enable more Jews to come to Palestine,
von Thadden, as the person in charge of Jewish affairs in the German Foreign
Office, was explicit in his instructions regarding an upcoming third exchange:
“In this regard, I believe that it would be pointless to allow the intervention
of the Grand Mufti to hinder the upcoming third exchange, scheduled for
5 July.”111 Von Thadden also stipulated that should the Mufti try to intervene
again in the matter, “. . .one would probably have to say to him that the
exchange has been in progress for some time, and could not have been stopped
in any case.”112 While it is difficult to know just how many Jews and German
nationals were involved in the exchanges, it is clear that by the middle of 1944,
as was the case during the years before the war, the Nazi regime once again
saw little relevance if any of Arab nationalist claims to the immediate policy
needs of the Reich.
The exchange with Palestine was not accepted by everyone in the Nazi
hierarchy. Himmler had doubts about it, although the basis for those doubts
is still not clear.113 What is clear is that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had a
decisive input into this particular matter, and that he approved the removal of
some Jews to Palestine at a time when the SS was fully in charge of the
implementation of the “final solution” in Europe. That Himmler had a friendly
working relationship with the Mufti is certainly true, as will be demonstrated in
the section that follows on the formation of a Muslim Waffen–SS division in
Bosnia in 1943. However, it is not likely that this was a factor in his reticence
about the exchange with Palestine. His task was clear, namely the destruction
of all the Jews in Europe. If he still thought in terms of one day extending the
final solution to the Jewish communities of the Arab world, despite the fact that
Germany had ceased to be physically present in any part of the Middle East or
North Africa, moving a small group of Jews to Palestine in 1944 would not
111
PA: Inland II A/B, Juden in Palästina, Bd.-, Ref. LR.I.Kl. von Thadden, hiermit Gruppenleiter
Inland II vorgelegt, 8. Juni 1944.
112
Ibid.
113
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenfrage: Allgemein, Umsiedlungsaktion (Warburgplan) u.a., Bd.-,
Leiter Inl. II, Herrn LR.I.Kl.v.Thadden, 12. Juni 1944.
have made much of a difference. On the other hand, if he believed by the

summer of 1944 that that would never happen, he might very well have wanted
to prevent any Jews from escaping annihilation in Europe. In any case, von
Thadden reported on June 13 that further delays in the exchange were no
longer acceptable, especially since a group of non-Jewish German nationals
who had been held in South Africa had already been sent to Palestine the
previous October and were awaiting their repatriation to Germany.114
They were mostly elderly people who were not in good health. Moreover, an
agreement had also been reached for the repatriation of German nationals held
in Egypt, who were to be exchanged for Jews who would be sent to Palestine.
Von Thadden reported on June 19 that in the coming weeks, some 282 Jews
would be exchanged for 282 German nationals who had been held by the
British in South Africa and in Egypt, and that a further exchange involving
112 Germans held in Egypt was also planned.115 It is not clear if these
exchanges were ever carried out.
Some of the German nationals transferred from British custody to Germany
in exchange for Jews from occupied Europe were the remnant of the former
German-Christian communities in Palestine. Most were members of the
Temple Society (Tempel-Gesellschaft), a breakaway Lutheran sect from
Württemberg that had begun to settle in Palestine in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, and that numbered some 2,500 members by the 1930s.116
The outbreak of war in September 1939 led the British to dissolve the Palestin-
ian German community. Some 400 Palästinadeutsche had left for Germany in
August 1939, just before the outbreak of war, while the British sent about
700 to Australia. The remaining Palestinian Germans were interned in Palestine
or Egypt during the war, and some 440 of them, mostly women and children,
were exchanged for Jews who were able to leave Europe for Palestine
between the end of 1941 and 1944. For instance, there are references in
the files of the Overseas Organization of the NSDAP (Auslandsorganisation
der NSDAP) to an exchange involving sixty-three Palästinadeutsche that was
planned for as early as December 1941,117 although it is not known whether
this initial and quite modest exchange ever occurred.
The Mufti referred to an exchange in 1944 that involved Palästinadeutsche
who had been interned in Egypt since the beginning of the war. In a note to
von Ribbentrop on July 25, 1944, al-Husayni complained that his request
114
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenfrage: Allgemein, Umsiedlungsaktion (Warburgplan) u.a., Bd.-,
Ref.Lr I.Kl.v.Thadden, hiermit Herrn Gruppenleiter Inland II wieder vorgelegt, 13. Juni 1944.
115
PA: Inland II-Geheim, Judenfrage: Allgemein, Umsiedlungsaktion (Warburgplan) u.a., Bd.-, LR
1.Kl.v.Thadden, 19. Juni 1944.
116
See Francis R. Nicosia, “National Socialism and the Demise of the German-Christian Commu-
nities in Palestine during the 1930s,” Canadian Journal of History XIV (1979): 254.
117
PA: R27192, Büro des Chefs der Auslandsorganisation, Ägypten, Bd. 71, LR Grossmann,
hiermit der ZAF vorgelegt, 8. Dezember 1941.
of June 5 that Germans in Egypt be exchanged for Egyptians living in

Germany was ignored, and that instead the most recent exchange had involved
Jews who left for Palestine on July 2.118 He also wrote that he feared more
exchanges involving the Palästinadeutsche were being planned that would
send Jews from Germany and France to Palestine. He concluded with the
observation: “Furthermore, after the declaration of Your Excellency of
2 November 1943 that ‘the destruction of the so-called Jewish National
Home in Palestine is an unchangeable component of the policy of the Greater
German Reich,’ this step is unfathomable for the Arabs and Muslims and
would arouse in them a feeling of disappointment.”119 Again, in futility,
the Mufti requested the prohibition of any movement of Jews from Europe to
Palestine. He made a similar appeal to Himmler two days later, which
also remained unanswered.120 Al-Husayni and the Arabs no longer seemed to
matter in the discussions regarding the exchange of Jews from German-
occupied Europe for German nationals in British custody abroad. Indeed, by
the end of the summer of 1944, it is difficult to discern a tangible German
Middle East policy behind the largely meaningless content of Nazi propaganda
aimed at the Arab world.
postscript: handschar
There was never a consensus among German civilian and military authorities
regarding the much-talked-about idea of forming Arab military units to support
the Axis war effort in the Fertile Crescent and North Africa. The initial decision
in January 1943 to transfer Arab members of the German-Arab Lehrabteilung
from the southern Soviet front to Tunisia to recruit and train Arabs, referred
to earlier, was unsuccessful. The Italians were never happy with the idea,
and relatively few Tunisian Arabs volunteered to join the Axis war effort.
The unit was withdrawn from North Africa not long after it arrived.121 Nor
did the Mufti’s idea of establishing some sort of Arab center in Egypt or Tunis
under his authority, with the transfer there of Arab military units such as they
existed, ever materialize. It was an idea that had gained little traction in Berlin
and Rome in any case. All of this reflects the fundamental unwillingness of the
German government to seriously commit to the goal of Arab self-determination
and independence following a victorious war. German policy remained
committed instead to reconciling the basic imperial interests and ambitions of
Italy, Vichy France, and Spain in the Mediterranean area, as well as to Turkish
interests with regard to the Arab Fertile Crescent.
However, the Nazi regime did take it upon itself to form a number of
mostly non-Arab, mostly European Muslim military units for service in
118 119 120

Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 215. Ibid. Ibid., 216.
121
Europe, in support Germany’s European war effort. In view of its constant

manpower shortages after the first stages of Operation Barbarossa, the
regime needed to recruit manpower for support roles from a variety of non-
German sources for much of the war. This would also include manpower
from the diverse Muslim populations that came under its control in south-
eastern Europe and the southern Soviet Union beginning in 1941. Already
in early 1942, a military unit composed of Muslims from the Caucasus
was formed for service in the General Government in Poland; later that year,
a unit made up of Muslims from the northern Caucasus and Tartars from the
Volga area and the Crimea was formed.122 These and other Muslim units
were used by both the army and, in particular, the SS in the regions of the
northern Caucasus and the Crimea. In central and western Europe, some
Arabs, mainly prisoners of war, were also used.123 All performed largely
police and other support functions behind the lines in the areas occupied by
the German army.
In the spring of 1943, during the final weeks of the Axis collapse in North
Africa, the Mufti found an outlet for his frustrations over his increasing
isolation and irrelevance in German policy calculations. An additional frus-
tration was his largely unsuccessful effort to organize some sort of significant
Arab-Islamic military force that would fight in conjunction with the German
war effort in the Arab world. Moreover, since his arrival in Europe in
November 1941, and his closer proximity to the significant non-Arab Muslim
populations in the Balkans and the southern Soviet Union, the Mufti tended
increasingly to see himself as a leader of all Muslims.124 For instance, begin-
ning in 1942, he tried to secure German support for a tour of Bosnia, but
failed due to German deference to Italian objections to such a trip.125
He eventually did become directly involved in the German plan to form a
new Muslim SS division in heavily Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring
of 1943, at about the same time that the Axis military campaign and presence
in North Africa was in the process of total collapse. In early February 1943,
Hitler ordered the formation of an SS division to be composed mainly of
Muslims from Croatian-controlled Bosnia, to be used in the struggle against
both Josip Broz Tito’s communist partisans and the Serbian nationalists loyal
to the former king of Yugoslavia.
Despite the misgivings of the Fascist regimes in both Croatia and Italy
regarding the formation of a Bosnian Muslim SS division, plans for the
new SS Muslim division nevertheless went forward. Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop authorized Erwin Ettel, the Foreign Office official who had been
assigned as its liaison with the Mufti the previous year, to enlist al-Husayni’s
122
Mallmann and Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz, 221–222. See also Rubin and Schwanitz,
Nazis, Islamists, 145 ff.
123 124
Ibid., 223–226. Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, 151.
125
See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/6, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, 27. April 1943.
support for the idea.126 Ettel met with al-Husayni on March 19, 1943, and
reported that the Mufti was eager to help in any way he could. The new Muslim
unit was to be a Waffen-SS division, an idea that Himmler and the SS enthu-
siastically endorsed.127 On the following day, the Mufti met with the chief of
the SS-Hauptamt, SS-Brigadeführer Gottlob Berger, who had been stationed in
Croatia for part of the war and had been appointed by Himmler to oversee the
formation of a Bosnian division that would be solely under the authority of
the SS. Berger and the Mufti agreed that the Bosnian division would consist
only of Bosnian-Muslim troops who would serve only in the Balkans. Its tasks
would be limited to protecting the Muslim population against various partisan
bands, to fighting against internal unrest, as well as against enemy troops that
might at some point land in the Balkans. Finally, they also agreed that the Mufti
would undertake a secret trip to Croatia where he would meet with members of
the Croatian government, and then to Bosnia where he would meet with
Muslim leaders. Al-Husayni told Berger and other SS officials before his trip
that he did not want to involve himself in any political discussions relating to
a future reconfiguration of the former Yugoslavia. This was perhaps his way of
asserting that his focus was and remained the Arab world, and not Europe.
On his visit to Croatia and Bosnia between March 30 and April 11, the
Mufti was accompanied by the chief of the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei),
Kurt Dalueges, Berger, and other SS officials. The visit marked the beginning of
his involvement in the formation and activities of the new Muslim SS unit for
most of the remainder of the war in Europe.128 Even before the Mufti’s arrival,
SS officers and the Croatian government concluded an agreement that the new
division would be composed predominantly, but not exclusively, of
Muslims.129 They decided that both Muslims and Catholics from Croatia,
including Bosnia-Herzegovina, could enlist in the new division, and that they
would serve under mainly German officers. SS officers in Croatia were quite
positive about involving the Mufti in the project. SS-Gruppenführer and
Lt. General of the Waffen-SS Artur Phleps believed that al-Husayni was greatly
admired by Muslims in Croatia and asserted that at least 20,000 Muslim
volunteers would join the proposed division.130 Not terribly enthusiastic about
this German plan to begin with, the Croatian government tried unsuccessfully
126
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung Gesand-
ter Ettel, Betr. Aufstellung einer bosnischen Division, 22. März 1943.
127
See Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem, 114–115. See also Georg Lepre, Himmler’s Bosnian
Division: The Waffen-SS Handschar Division, 1943–1945 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing,
1997).
128
For a concise description of al-Husayni’s itinerary in Croatia, see Gensicke, Der Mufti von
Jerusalem, 117–119.
129
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, DG/Agram an
AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1272, 23. März 1943.
130
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, Gesandter Ettel,
Aufzeichnung, 25. März 1943.
to have the Mufti’s visit postponed for a month, and he arrived in Croatia on
March 31, 1943. To reaffirm the importance of this project, a memorandum
from Under State Secretary Woermann confirming that the Mufti had arrived in
Croatia also reiterated “. . .that a decision by the Führer in this matter is
available and that the Reich Foreign Minister has been instructed accord-
ingly.”131 During the Mufti’s visit to Croatia and Bosnia, he spoke with
Croatian officials and with Muslim leaders. He complained to the Croatians
and the Germans about the poor protection afforded the Muslim population,
especially in the Italian-occupied parts of Croatia.132 He demanded greater
protection for Muslim Croatians and Bosnians, while at the same time pledging
the loyalty of the Muslim population to the Croatian state and to the Axis
cause. Otherwise, according to the German embassy in Zagreb, the Mufti was
generally kept out of sight of the diplomatic corps and the local population.
After his return to Berlin, in a April 30 communication with Wilhelm
Melchers of the Near East Department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign
Office, the Mufti reported in detail about his recent trip to Croatia and Bosnia,
and generally on the progress in forming the new Muslim division in the
Waffen-SS.133 He complained of atrocities committed against Muslims in
Bosnia in which he alleged that Serbian partisans, armed by England and
Russia, murdered over 100,000 Muslims and left over 200,000 homeless.
Perhaps reflecting on his frustrations to date with German and Axis policies
toward the Arab world since 1933, he insisted that Muslims had once again
demonstrated their loyalty to Germany, and implied that they had received little
if anything in return. He asserted that the very fact that more than 12,000
Muslim volunteers had already signed up for the new Muslim Waffen-SS
division was a clear reflection of that loyalty.
A clearer indication of the Mufti’s mood is evident in his assessment of his
activities since arriving in Germany in November 1941. This assessment appears
in his April 16, 1943 conversation with Erwin Ettel, shortly after his return from
the trip to Croatia and Bosnia.134 This was a time when the formation of the
Muslim SS division in Croatia coincided with the imminent Axis collapse and
defeat in North Africa. Ettel refers to al-Husayni’s bitter complaints that the
131
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, Aufzeichnung
(Woermann), 31. März 1943. In keeping with their desire to maintain total secrecy, neither
the German Foreign Office nor the Italian embassy in Berlin had been initially apprised of the
impending visit by the Mufti to Croatia.
132
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, DG/Agram an
AA/Berlin, Telegramm Nr. 1526, 12. April 1943.
133
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 160–162. Melchers was appointed head of Abteilung VII in December
1939, after serving as German Consul in Haifa from 1937 to 1939. For more on Melcher’s role
in Haifa, see Nicosia and Browning, “Ambivalenz und Paradox bei der Durchsetzung der
NS-Judenpolitik,” 212–213.
134
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, Gesandter Ettel,
Aufzeichnung, 16. April 1943.
Italians allegedly tried to prevent him from traveling from Croatia to Bosnia.
The Mufti also repeated the charge that little had been done, especially by the
Italians, to protect Muslims in Croatia and Bosnia from Serbian atrocities.
Moreover, his demands that the new Muslim division be confined exclusively
to protecting the Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that its officer
corps include as many Muslims as possible, were not meeting with much
success. Ettel also refers to al-Husayni’s description of his three-day stopover
in Vienna, as guest of Reichsstatthalter Baldur von Schirach, on his way back to
Berlin from Zagreb. According to Ettel, the Mufti, in his conversations with von
Schirach, spoke little about his recent trip, and instead focused on his role in,
and views of, German policy toward the Arab world. The Mufti was aware that
von Schirach was about to meet with Hitler at the Obersalzberg. He expressed
to von Schirach his great disappointment with his working relationship with the
German Foreign Office, and the fact that the responsible people in the Foreign
Office were no longer engaged in Arab policy and the Middle East. Perhaps
sensing the decreasing relevance of the Arab world in general in German policy,
the Mufti told Ettel he intended to ask Woermann and the German Foreign
Office to schedule meeting for him with Hitler. The Mufti’s desired meeting with
Hitler did not take place. His first meeting with Hitler in Berlin on November
28, 1941, an unsuccessful meeting in terms of the Mufti’s wartime goals in any
case, would remain his only meeting with the German dictator.
The Mufti seemed to fade from the scene by the new year of 1944, as issues
such as Arab independence and the destruction of the Jewish National Home in
Palestine ceased to be of immediate concern to Hitler and Nazi policy makers.
As in the past, al-Husayni’s correspondence with German officials and various
Arab exiles in Europe continued to offer significant insight into the relative
consistency of German attitudes and policy toward the Arabs. Through late
1943 and 1944, the Mufti’s comments seem to reflect his realization that
Germany would not be the main instrument for securing independence for the
Arabs, and that indeed Germany had never intended to undertake that particu-
lar mission in any case. He wrote to an anonymous recipient in late October
1943 that, notwithstanding Italy’s recent surrender, Germany still had not made
the long sought-after formal commitment to support full Arab independence,
and that German propaganda to Arabs and Muslims had been inadequate and
largely ineffective.135 A year later, in October 1944, al-Husayni issued yet
135
Höpp, Mufti-Papiere, 189. Moreover, in his April 27, 1943 meeting with von Hentig in Berlin,
following his return from Bosnia and Croatia, al-Husayni complained bitterly about the general
indifference and opposition among the leadership in the German Foreign Office to a formal,
public German commit to complete Arab independence. See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von
Hentig, ED 113/6, Aufzeichnung von Hentig, 27. April 1943. And, in a written statement
twelve years after the end of the war, von Hentig seemed to confirm the Mufti’s assessment of
the relative disinterest of the Foreign Office leadership of von Ribbentrop, von Weizsäcker, and
Woermann in the Middle East in general. See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/2,
Abschrift Hamburg, 20. Juni 1957.
photo 7.4. Grand Mufti with Bosnian volunteers for Muslim Waffen-SS Division
(November 1943).
another call for the formation of an Arab military unit, presumably for duty in
Europe and later in the Arab world. It was greeted positively by Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop. The Mufti then wrote back to von Ribbentrop
expressing his doubts that the German government was serious about acting
on this suggestion.136
By the end of 1943, al-Husayni had come to realize that his quest for
unequivocal German support for a unified and independent Arab world in
some form would never be realized. Moreover, his support for, and cooper-
ation in, the formation of a Muslim Waffen-SS division in Bosnia and Croatia
in 1943, somewhat of a diversion from his own focus on Arab issues and the
Arab world in any case, was also a failure. Along with the SS, the Mufti
invested considerable effort in the organization, military training, and political
education of this Muslim Waffen-SS division in Bosnia.137 However by the fall
136
See Ibid., 218, 226–228
137
Approximately 12,000 volunteers were eventually recruited for the division. For a detailed
account of the organization of the division, its problems, and its ultimate failures, see Gensicke,
Der Mufti von Jerusalem, 120–134. See also Rubin and Schwanitz, Nazis, Islamists, 151–152.
of 1944, with the Foreign Office in Berlin reporting on significant desertions

from the Muslim Waffen-SS division in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its general demise
seemed imminent.138 Regardless of its success or failure, the Muslim Waffen-SS
division, later named the Handschar Division, was a German idea, a European
creation, meant for the support of Germany’s war in Europe, and made up
largely of European, not Arab, Muslims. In the effort to attract volunteers
mostly from among the Bosnian-Muslim population in the Balkans for support
duties in the war in Europe, the German government enlisted the services of
al-Husayni, the well-known Arab Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was appar-
ently well-known to many in Muslim Bosnia. However, this division, regardless
of its success or failure, had nothing whatever to do with the Nazi regime’s
policies toward the Arab world in the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula,
and North Africa.
138
See for example ZMO: Nachlaß Höpp, 1.27, Vortragsnotiz betr. Reise Großmufti nach
Budapest, Inland II 2124g, 5. Oktober 1944.
Conclusions
This study has devoted relatively little space to an analysis of German and Axis
propaganda toward the Arab world. Recent scholarship, alluded to in previous
chapters, offers the reader a comprehensive account of the content of Nazi
Germany’s Arabic-language propaganda, particularly during the war years.
Thanks to their important work, this book is able to focus on the content and
the actual intent of German policy with regard to the Arab lands of the Middle
East and North Africa, beyond the largely temporary, tactical imperatives of
Nazi wartime propaganda in those regions. German policy was, according to
the German diplomat and Foreign Office official, Werner-Otto von Hentig, one
that consistently refrained from revealing Berlin’s real intent in the Arab world,
in large part due to the Reich’s deference to the imperial interests and aims of its
Italian ally in the Fertile Crescent and North Africa.1
Nevertheless, it is useful to begin this conclusion by considering some of the
tactics employed in Nazi propaganda toward the Arab world during the Second
World War, tactics that were meant to conceal Germany’s intentions in the
region. It can provide a useful mechanism with which to identify, define, and
summarize the actual intent of Nazi Germany’s policy toward the Arab world
before and particularly during the Second World War. In drawing a distinction
between propaganda and actual policy, this study will hopefully contribute to a
clearer understanding of the actual intentions of the Third Reich toward the
1
See IfZ: Nachlaß Werner-Otto von Hentig, ED 113/6, von Hentig/Berlin an Habich/Berlin, 20.
Juni 1940. Von Hentig, head of the Near East Department (Abteilung VII) in the German Foreign
Office from 1937 to 1939, also complained in this note that it was time for Germany to develop
its own coherent and viable policy toward the Arab world rather than continuing to simply follow
the lead of an Italy for which most Arabs had a deep distrust and antipathy. He would again
suggest such a course, albeit in vain, in his comprehensive analysis of the Arab world on July 1,
1940, referred to in chapter 5.
265
Arabic-speaking lands of the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, and

North Africa. In turn, this may contribute to developing a useful context for
scholars who consider the varied responses in the Arab world to National
Socialism and Hitler’s Third Reich.
Germany’s wartime propaganda campaign in the Arab world was intense
and extensive. This was particularly the case after its victory over France in the
summer of 1940 and its somewhat more direct political role in Axis policy in
the region that followed. The arrival of Rommel and his Afrika-Korps in Libya
in February 1941, following British victories over the Italians in Egypt and
Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) in late 1940 and early 1941, of necessity signaled
the start of more intense Arabic-language propaganda radio broadcasts from
Germany to the Arab world. Although aimed at the Arab world in general,
initially there seemed to be a particular focus on Egypt given the uncertain and
precarious situation that Rommel’s forces faced in early 1941. However, as
extensive as the German propaganda campaign eventually became, its methods
still tended to reflect a continuing deference to Italian, French, and even Spanish
colonial interests in the Fertile Crescent and North Africa. That entailed, of
course, a non-committal and generally indifferent position on long-standing
Arab demands for independence. The German ambassador in Rome, Hans von
Mackensen, reported on an Italian complaint in April 1942 that even when
German propaganda did allude in the most general terms to the Arab people
and their rights, it tended to provoke the Arabs in a negative way in the French
and Italian colonies. He wrote: “. . .from the Italian point of view, it is objec-
tionable to even speak of the ‘Arab people,’ and thereby bring up the difficult
problem of the Arabs living in the Italian and French colonies.”2 In that report,
von Mackensen conveyed to Berlin Mussolini’s frequent reminder, one that was
shared by most in the Foreign Office in Berlin, namely that Axis propaganda
statements were and should remain propaganda, and therefore should not
reflect the actual intent of German foreign policy.
In April 1941, just two months after Erwin Rommel’s arrival in Libya,
the Radio-Political Department (Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung) in the German
Foreign Office issued preliminary guidelines for German Arabic-language radio
broadcasts in light of the situation in Libya and Egypt.3 It directed the use of
“undisguised broadcasts” (ungetarnte Sendungen) with an emphasis on Egypt
that would contain news with a definite anti-British slant. There were also to be
special discussion programs about current events in Egypt, Britain’s dominant
political and economic influence in Egypt, British propaganda and “lies” about
Germany, the relationship between democracy, England, and Islam, British
power, and about the attitudes of well-known Egyptian politicians and freedom
2
PA: R28876, Büro des RAM, Vorderer Orient, 1941–1942, Bd. -, Telegramm, DB/Rom an
AA/Berlin, Nr. 1204, 14. April 1942, and Telegramm Nr. 1219, 15. April 1942.
3
PA: R67482, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Verbindungsmann RAM, usw., Bd. 7,
Aufzeichnung, Betrifft: Sondersendungen in hocharabischer Sprache für Ägypten, 18. April 1941.
Conclusions 267
fighters toward England. The guidelines also established a “secret broadcast”

(Schwarzsender) that would aim the message “Egypt for the Egyptians”
(Ägypten den Ägyptern) at younger Egyptian revolutionaries and their nation-
alist movements, generally at ordinary Egyptian civil servants, the poor masses,
and at the lower levels of the officer corps of the Egyptian army. Yet, beyond
the slogan “Egypt for the Egyptians,” no specific or concrete calls for Egyptian
sovereignty and independence were made at that time. The only specific themes
that the guidelines did suggest for the Schwarzsender were Britain’s responsi-
bility for Egypt’s poor economy, the ability of British authorities to take
advantage of the internal conflicts within Egypt’s population, the cooperation
of certain Egyptian politicians with British authorities, and the need to break
British power in Egypt once and for all. It concluded that the message must
demonstrate above all “. . .that the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Friendship
Treaty of 1936 has only damaged Egypt, since as a result all of Egypt’s political
and economic goals cannot be realized.”4 It would not be until 1942 that
references to some form of Egyptian independence would appear in German
propaganda.
In the end, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of Nazi Germany’s
wartime propaganda campaign on the Arab populations of the Middle East and
North Africa. Although this study does not draw conclusions on any overall
Arab response to German propaganda in the region, it does consider the role of
the Mufti and other Arab exiles in Berlin in Nazi Germany’s propaganda
campaign during the war. For those Arabs and German officials who desired
Arab unrest and rebellion against Britain and later the United States during
the war, their hopes remained unfulfilled. In Berlin, all seemed to agree that the
Arabs in general were sympathetic toward Hitler and the Third Reich from
the outset. Yet, with the exception of Iraq briefly in April 1941, there were no
serious Arab attempts to take advantage of the war by rebelling against
Britain’s position in the region; even during the Iraqi coup of 1941, no popular
uprising in support of the coup against the British position in Iraq occurred.
Unlike the more turbulent decades of the 1920s and 1930s, there was relatively
little wartime popular unrest and violence against the British, the French, the
Italians, or the Spaniards in Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa.
The hopes of some in Berlin and Rome that Axis wartime propaganda might
stimulate popular uprisings against the British throughout the Arab world,
and thereby significantly assist Axis troops on the ground, never materialized.
One possible explanation for this relative quiet might be that the wartime
military power on the ground of both Allied and Axis armies precluded any
inclination on the part of a largely unarmed Arab population to rise up in
revolt. Another factor was the likelihood that the Mufti, al-Gaylani, and other
Arabs in the Middle East and in exile feared that, given the reluctance of
4
Ibid.
Berlin and Rome to clearly and unequivocally endorse complete Arab inde-
pendence, the Axis intended to maintain some form of European control of the
Arab world. If nothing else, this was evident in Arab fears of Italian ambitions
in the Arab world and Hitler’s fairly consistent support for his Italian ally.
The substance of Axis propaganda to the Arab world, although filled with
many positive, pro-Arab generalities and virulent attacks on Britain, the United
States, and especially the Jews, did not reflect an actual intention to fight for the
independence of the Arab lands of the Middle East and North Africa. A few
examples of this apparent disconnect between propaganda and actual intent at
this point might be helpful in summarizing some this book’s main arguments
regarding Nazi Germany’s intentions and policy toward the Arab world. One
of the more blatant examples of this disconnect occurred in the fall of 1940,
just a few months after Germany’s victories in western Europe. The German
Consulate in Tetuán in Spanish-controlled northern Morocco reported on
Spain’s recent appointment of a Spanish governor in the neighboring
and hitherto autonomous city of Tangiers. The German Consul expressed
misgivings about the apparently positive manner in which Germany’s Arabic-
language radio broadcast from Berlin had reported the appointment.5 The
Consul’s report began by reminding Berlin that Spain was not loved in
Morocco, and that Germany’s popularity in the Arab world was diminished
when Berlin portrayed any expansion of Spanish power in Morocco in a positive
light. He further reported that the Arabs in the Spanish-controlled portion of
Morocco opposed the new order in Tangiers. He also suggested that future
broadcasts should avoid if possible any reference to Spanish and Italian relations
with the “Arab-Islamic world” because Germany’s “. . .friendship with both
powers is such that it does not win friendship for us in the Islamic world, and
we therefore have no reason to advertise our relationships with them in our
propaganda to the East.”6 The report closed with the observation that while
Spain had been viewed in Morocco as an enemy for many years, “Italy enjoys
even less sympathy as a result of its ruthless colonial wars in North Africa.”7
The German Consulate did not recommend that German radio broadcasts
should even mention in passing the Arab desire for independence; rather it
simply sent a veiled warning that German propaganda should not overtly
advertise Germany’s real policy interests and intentions in the Arab world.
Four months later, in a similar report to the Foreign Office in Berlin from the
German Consulate-General in Casablanca in French Morocco, the contradic-
tion between German policy and its general support for continuing European
imperial interests in the Arab world, and Nazi propaganda and the question
of Arab independence was likewise apparent. Theodor Auer, the German
5
PA: R67490, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Referat B.Allg., Propaganda, Bd. 15, DK/Tetuán
(Richter) an AA/Berlin, J.Nr. 1497/40, “Deutsche Propaganda in der arabischen Welt, insbeson-
dere arabische Radiosendung aus Berlin zur Neuordnung in Tanger,” 13. November 1940.
6 7
Ibid. Ibid.
Conclusions 269
Consul-General in Casablanca, again described the popularity of Hitler and the

new Germany in French Morocco and throughout the Arab world, and
observed that Germany’s Arabic-language radio broadcasts were trying to take
advantage of that popularity in many ways. Auer also observed with some
confidence that the working relationship between Germany and France since
the summer of 1940 had not to that point had an adverse effect on Germany’s
generally positive image. Nevertheless, he warned that public pronouncements
about close Franco-German cooperation in North Africa could have a very
negative impact on an Arab opinion that already embodied a degree of skepti-
cism: “Too strong an emphasis on German-French cooperation may conform
to certain necessities in German-French political affairs, but it also has the
potential to raise doubts among native-born listeners about Germany’s future
position on the Moroccan and Arab question. As seen from here. . .the
Montoire policy should be left out of the Arabic broadcasts.”8 Auer was
referring, of course, to Hitler’s meeting with Marshal Phillipe Pétain in
Montoire on October 24, 1940, when Hitler assured the French leader that
Germany would do everything necessary to preserve France’s overseas
empire in any future peace settlement. Auer recommended that German propa-
ganda in Morocco place emphasis on German military power and its recent
military victory over France (i.e., on those elements for which he argued the
population of Morocco held Germany in high esteem). In other words,
German propaganda should serve as an instrument to distract the Arab popu-
lace from the contradictions between Arab ambitions for sovereignty and
independence and those of an otherwise much-admired National Socialist
Germany that aimed to preserve the French colonial rule in some form in North
Africa. Auer also suggested the intensification of another element in German
propaganda that would distract Arabs from Germany’s interest in the perpetu-
ation of European colonial rule in much of the Arab world. He recommended
periodic references to the “Jewish question” and the need for the local popula-
tion to keep in mind the German example of how “. . .one country under one
leader, for the benefit of the country and its people, can free itself from
Jewish control.”9
In May 1941, Gerhard Rühle of the Radio Political Department (Rundfunk-
politische Abteilung) in the German Foreign Office submitted a comprehensive
review of Germany’s radio propaganda broadcasts in the Arab lands of
North Africa and the Middle East to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.10 Rühle
8
PA: R67490, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Referat B.Allg., Propaganda, Bd. 15, DGK/Casa-
blanca an AA/Berlin, P 57/41, “Die deutsche Radiosendungen in arabischer Sprache –
Marokko,” 12. März 1941.
9
Ibid.
10
PA: R67482, Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, Verbindungsmann RAM, usw., Bd. 1, Aufzeich-
nung betr. die Rundfunkpropaganda in dem arabischen Raum (Rühle), dem Herrn Reichsaus-
senminister weisungsgemäss vorgelegt, 5. Mai 1941.
reported that according to reports received from German diplomats and agents,
as well as from Arabs with contacts in Germany, German radio broadcasts
from Berlin and Athens were generally well regarded in the Arab world.
He described the contents of those broadcasts to include the following: readings
from the Koran; news from the region with a clear anti-British slant; an
emphasis on German military strength; discussion programs that dealt with
Arab history and literature and with an emphasis on Arab heroes from the past;
discussion programs with Islamic religious content and about the role of
Islam in resistance against foreign domination; and recorded music as a means
of promoting popular interest in the broadcasts. In other words, there was
nothing in the current content of Nazi propaganda to the Arab world that even
the most ardent Arab nationalist might reject.
However, the pro-Axis al-Gaylani coup in Iraq in April was followed a
month later by Britain’s reassertion of its former position in Iraq and the
removal of the short-lived al-Gaylani regime. Besides the situation in Iraq, there
was Britain’s anticipated invasion of Vichy-controlled Syria and Lebanon.
Rühle was clearly aware of these realities and their additional pressure on the
content of German propaganda toward the Arabs. He suggested that should
Germany decide to formally call, via radio broadcasts, for a full-scale Arab
uprising in the Fertile Crescent against the British, its radio programming
would require much more anti-English content. This would have to include
the goal of ending British domination in the Near East, Britain’s past broken
promises to the Arabs, Koran readings that emphasized struggle against
oppressors, and poetry readings that stressed freedom and independence and
the struggle against foreign powers. Here, Rühle seemed to echo the causal
relationship between a firm commitment to Arab independence and an Arab
insurgency, in support of German military operations in the region reiterated
time and again by the Mufti and other Arab nationalists. Rühle observed that,
“A call for the struggle for independence and freedom will undoubtedly be
successful if German consent can be given.”11 Although nothing in his report
suggests that Germany should in fact issue a formal and unequivocal commit-
ment to Arab independence, Rühle does suggest that Germany at least raise the
question in its propaganda broadcasts, something that German propaganda did
in fact do. He was surely aware that actual German policy in the Arab world to
that point had included no such commitment to the idea and achievement of
Arab independence; it is also possible that he had concluded there could be a
price to pay for that omission.
Germany’s commitment more or less to the status quo in North Africa
continued throughout 1942 and beyond. In February 1942, Under State
Secretary Woermann informed the German embassy in Rome that German
propaganda should avoid any references to political issues involving the Arab
11
Ibid.
Conclusions 271
population of North Africa: “In the Arab territories west of Egypt, no national-
Arab or other political propaganda should be made. Our propaganda in these
territories should be limited to placing the political significance of Germany
and its struggle in the proper light.”12 Karl Megerle, von Ribbentrop’s assistant
for propaganda matters in the German Foreign Office, issued specific guidelines
for German propaganda for Tunisia on November 20, almost two weeks
following the Anglo-American invasion of French northwest Africa.13 In an
effort to appeal to French residents of Tunisia and northwest Africa, all specu-
lation about the territorial future of Tunisia and presumably all of French
North Africa was to be avoided. The primacy of the German-Italian relation-
ship was to be reaffirmed, Italian-French conflicts were to be downplayed
and resolved, the authority of the motherland (France) was to be reaffirmed
and strengthened, and the French local government and population were to be
treated as friends. German propaganda should advertise that the Axis forces
“. . .together with France want to defend French North Africa, and with it,
the French Empire, against the Anglo-American assault that also seeks to divide
up the rest of the French Empire.”14
Megerle also encouraged everyone to publicize Hitler’s past assurances
to Pétain of Germany’s full support for the integrity of the French empire.
Anglo-American promises to the Arab population of independence were to be
described as a cover for delivering the Arab people of Morocco and the entire
region to Anglo-American and Jewish exploitation. Finally, as far as the Arab
population was concerned, only the most general themes were to be pursued
with statements such as: “The Axis powers respect the religion, customs,
property, and treasures of the Muslim peoples and struggle on their side against
Anglo-American oppressors and against a Jewry that expels Muslims from
Palestine and the holy places and that seeks to make itself the ruler over the
entire Arab world. . .”15 Here, Megerle seems to have rejected those earlier
recommendations that Germany downplay or avoid entirely references to
common German-French interests in North Africa. Indeed, as far as North
Africa was concerned, Berlin had to appeal to two different constituencies with
very different and mutually exclusive interests and goals. It appears that
Megerle favored focusing German propaganda on an appeal to the French
citizens rather than to the Arab majority of French North Africa.
These and other reports and directives pertaining to the substance of
German propaganda in the Arab world reflect several realities in the wartime
strategic and foreign policies of Hitler’s Reich toward the Arab world.
Few would argue that the Third Reich did not enjoy a general popularity and
12
ADAP: Serie E, Bd. I, Nr. 231.
13
PA: R29867, Büro des U.St.S., Nord-Afrika II, Bd. -, Karl Megerle/Salzburg, Vorläufige Spra-
chregelung für Propagandazug und Sender Tunis, Fuschl Nr. 1621, Telko Nr. 1453, 20.
November 1942.
14 15
Ibid. Ibid.
good will within the Arabic-speaking lands of the Middle East and North
Africa. Indeed, Germany had also enjoyed a high degree of acceptance in the
Arab world, in comparison to the other European great powers, before Hitler’s
assumption of power in 1933. Moreover, Nazi propaganda in the region,
both before and particularly during the war, sought to capitalize on that
sympathy and good will in a variety of ways, as mentioned by Rühle in his
report. Nevertheless, it also seems clear that German policy toward the Arab
world was predicated on a fundamental support for the continuation of
European imperial rule in some as yet undefined reconfiguration of colonial
boundaries. It is also clear that there existed some concern among Arab exiles in
Berlin and Rome, and perhaps even inside the Arab world as a whole, over
ultimate German and Axis intentions, both before and during the war.
That concern recognized that while German propaganda in the region certainly
did express kind words for the Arabs, their history and culture, and for Islam,
it did not reflect the actual intent of a Germany foreign policy that sought to
maintain a dominant European position in the Arab world. That Germany’s
very active wartime radio propaganda broadcasts to the Arab world were
not driven by a clear and unequivocal commitment to future Arab independ-
ence seems quite clear in the many futile initiatives of the Mufti and other
Arabs throughout the war to secure just such a formal, public commitment
from Berlin.
Finally, to reiterate, Arab unrest and rebellion in conjunction with, and in
support of, Italian and German military campaigns in North Africa between the
fall of 1940 and the early summer of 1943, and with Axis failures in Iraq and
Syria in May and June 1941, never materialized. Of course, its potential
military value to the Axis war effort will never be known. Nor can one
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not materialize entirely or
in part because of a general Arab realization that there was no clear, formal
German or Axis commitment to Arab independence; it is equally impossible to
demonstrate that such a clear and determined commitment would indeed have
produced significant Arab unrest and rebellion.
On June 19, 1943, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop issued a
directive to all state and party agencies engaged in the Nazi regime’s overall
wartime propaganda effort. This occurred more than two years after the
Tetuán, Casablanca, Megerle, and Rühle reports and directives, and just one
month following the final defeat of Axis troops in Tunisia and their expulsion
from their only remaining foothold in the Arab world. There is no mention of
North Africa or the Middle East in von Ribbentrop’s directive, so it is not clear
whether this was part of some sort of assessment of Germany’s propaganda
efforts by the German Foreign Office following the recent Axis defeat in North
Africa, or for that matter the German collapse following the Wehrmacht’s
surrender at Stalingrad in early February. However, von Ribbentrop’s
June 1943 directive is instructive in part because it failed to mention specifically
the Axis disasters in North Africa and in the Soviet Union, their possible
Conclusions 273
relationship to the propaganda campaign in support of the German war effort,

and possible improvements from that point on that might help in reversing
German military fortunes. The title of the directive is “Basic Instructions for
all offices working in the Foreign-Information-Service” (Grundsätzliche
Weisungen für alle Stellungen, die im Auslands-Informations-Dienst tätig
sind).16 After reiterating his earlier substitution of the term “foreign informa-
tion service” (Auslands-Informations-Dienst) for “foreign propaganda”
(Auslands-Propaganda), von Ribbentrop asserts that the change amounted to
much more than merely a change of words. He attempts to demonstrate just
how such a change would better help the German war effort in the following
way: “One should not want to directly and frontally force opinions, judgments,
and conclusions on people abroad, rather one should give them information on
the basis of which they will themselves build their opinions, judgments,
and conclusions.”17 Yet, von Ribbentrop does not stipulate whether the “infor-
mation” provided by several years of German wartime propaganda had
enabled its recipients in the Arab world to form the judgments and conclusions
that he, the German Foreign Office, and the Nazi regime had desired. Again,
without specific references to the events of the past six months in North Africa
or the Soviet Union, he suggests three approaches that were likely to produce
success: the obvious necessity of communicating information favorable
to Germany and unfavorable to the enemy; the reinterpretation of enemy
information and evidence in a way that is favorable to Germany; and the
creation of stories of unrest or disturbances that had only a grain of truth or
possibility and that could be made to be believable abroad. He does not define
what that success would look like or entail.
German propaganda in the Arab world had, in fact, followed von Ribben-
trop’s first two rules between 1940 and 1943, obviously with mixed success. It
is clear that for much of the interwar period there existed a general sympathy
for Germany in the Arab world, albeit along with very real and continuing
suspicions of German motives based on policies such as Berlin’s pre-1941
support for Jewish immigration to Palestine, and of course its adherence to
the alliance with Italy between 1938 and the Axis surrender in Tunis in May
1943. The third rule was difficult to follow with regard to the Arab world, try
as they might, since the very basis for creating stories of unrest or disturbances
based on a “grain of truth or possibility” was generally lacking. He then
recommend the right “packaging” of this information for each country in such
a way that it could be adapted to Germany’s basic intentions toward a particu-
lar country or region and its particular circumstances. Information,
he concludes, must be communicated in such a way that “. . .it takes into
16
PA: R27322, Handakten Ettel, Erlaß des RAM, Arbeitsexemplar, Bd.-, “Grundsätzliche
Weisungen für alle Stellen, die im Auslands-Informations-Dienst tätig sind” (Ribbentrop) Streng
Vertraulich!, 19. Juni 1943.
17
Ibid.
account the mentality and the racial characteristics of a particular country,

and that it achieves the desired resonance through the kindliness of its form.”18
Whatever it was supposed to mean, von Ribbentrop’s supposedly new or
preferred approach to propaganda did not appear to differ significantly from
the Nazi propaganda approach in the Arab world to that point. Particularly as
it related to German policy in the Arab lands of the Middle East and North
Africa between 1933 and 1944, Nazi propaganda reflected the usual discon-
nect, especially in time of war, between the intent of propaganda and that of
actual policy. Part of the intent of German foreign policy in the Arab world,
as this study has sought to demonstrate, was predicated generally on the
continuation of a European presence and European control throughout
the Arab world in some as yet undefined political configuration following an
Axis victory in the war. On the one hand, one wartime component of the Nazi
regime’s efforts to achieve its intended goals, admittedly a subject of debate and
disagreement in German military and foreign policy circles, was the mobiliza-
tion of Arab insurgencies as a means of assisting Axis armies on the ground in
North Africa and the Fertile Crescent. Germany’s “Auslands-Propaganda,”
or as von Ribbentrop labeled it, “Auslands-Information,” was supposed to be
a useful mechanism to achieve this particular goal. As stipulated in his June 19
directive, that propaganda should contain information that would enable its
receivers to form on their own the conclusions desired by the Axis powers.
However, this assumption seemed to preclude the existence of at least one
significant conclusion that the Arab targets of Nazi propaganda had in fact
already reached several decades before, namely their demands for an end to
European imperial domination in whatever form, and the establishment of fully
independent Arab states.
Nazi wartime propaganda in the Arab world did stress a particular conclu-
sion that most Arabs had in fact reached simultaneously since the end of the
First World War. That issue was the end of the Jewish National Home in
Palestine and the vehement opposition to the establishment of an independent
Jewish state.19 Unlike the question of Arab independence, this propaganda
point and Nazi Jewish policy in general actually did reflect real intent in the
foreign policy of Hitler’s Germany during the Second World War. It was a
message that demonized all Jews, including the Jewish communities in the Arab
world. Many Arabs no doubt accepted this message. Opposition to a Jewish
state and the demonization of the Jews everywhere had been part of the
propaganda that served Nazi foreign policy since 1933, while opposition
specifically to the Jewish National Home had been part of Nazi policy only
since the early years of the war and the beginning of the “final solution”
in Europe. Indifference and opposition to Arab independence had been an
18
Ibid.
19
See Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust, 5–20. See also Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab
World, chaps. 5–7.
Conclusions 275
axiom of German foreign policy that Nazi propaganda had consistently

sought to sidestep, as its virulent attacks on Zionism and the Jews continued
unabated, even after the final defeat of Axis forces in North Africa in
May 1943.20 Although the question of the political future of the Arab world
had become largely irrelevant for Hitler’s government and its foreign policy by
the summer of 1943, the so-called Jewish question would remain a central
element in German policy until the end of the war. Therefore, Nazi propaganda
in the Arab world, often with a focus on the Jews and calls for Arab attacks on
Jews in Arab lands, continued as before until the end of the war, more or less
in harmony with the intent of German policy as it was being carried out
in Europe. While consistently refusing to publicly embrace a policy of sover-
eignty and independence for the Arab populations of the Middle East
and North Africa, Hitler’s government consistently pursued a policy aimed
at the destruction of the Jewish people in Europe as well as the Arab world
and beyond.
Hitler’s policy toward the Arab world reflected a significant degree of
continuity that stretched from the Wilhelminian period through the Weimar
years and the Third Reich. Imperial Germany had generally accommodated
itself to a status quo that included shared control among the Ottoman,
British, French, Italian, and Spanish Empires over the Arabic-speaking lands
of the Middle East and North Africa. The Kaiser’s government remained
fairly content with its expanding economic and cultural presence within the
existing political structures, and pursued its imperial ambitions in areas of the
world beyond the Middle East and North Africa. Its alliance with the Ottomans
in the First World War and its subsequent defeat precluded any German role in
the establishment of a postwar order in the Arab world, one that witnessed the
expansion of primarily British and French imperial influence and control,
in one form or another, over most of the remaining Ottoman-Arab territories
of the Fertile Crescent and Arabia. Moreover, the successful efforts of the
World Zionist Organization to include within the final peace settlement
the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was also in line with
Imperial Germany’s somewhat belated wartime support for the Zionist cause.
The end of the First World War more or less completed a process begun almost
a century earlier, namely the gradual expansion of European imperial control
over the Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, and North
Africa. Moreover, it also resulted in a substantial achievement for the
Zionist movement in its hopes of one day creating an independent state
for the Jewish people. In general, the prewar status quo in the Arab world
was retained, albeit without the Ottoman Empire, and with an even greater
Anglo-French presence, and with the new Jewish National Home under British
authority as mandated by the new League of Nations.
20
Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, 194.
The primary foreign policy focus of the new German republic beginning in
1919 was the peaceful revision of most of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty
in Europe. As such, and given its military and political weakness and diplomatic
isolation, Weimar Germany was in no position to contest the new postwar
order in the Arab world, even if it had wanted to. In fact, the governments of
the Weimar Republic did not inherit any compelling reasons to challenge the
final settlement for the Middle East. Therefore, Weimar Germany quietly
pursued its rather modest interests in the Arab world, interests that in some
respects mirrored those of its Wilhelminian predecessor. It too defined
Germany’s interests in the Arab world and the larger Middle East as primarily
economic and cultural; as was the case before 1914, the government in Berlin
set out to promote those interests within the context of adhering to the political
status quo in the region. With its primary focus on Europe, Weimar Germany
accepted Anglo-French-Italian imperial domination of the region, and the
establishment and development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.
Within this context, Weimar governments sought to expand Germany’s mainly
economic and cultural presence in the otherwise European-dominated
Arab states. In doing so, however, Berlin also claimed that it was not respon-
sible for the unrest and violence that it viewed as the result of the new status
quo in the Arab world, a status quo that it repeatedly insisted it had no role in
establishing. Moreover, in its acceptance of the postwar settlement in the
region, Weimar Germany’s response to Arab efforts to reverse the settlement
and to achieve Arab national self-determination and independence and an
end to the Jewish National Home in Palestine were met with indifference
or outright rejection.
Much like the governments of Imperial and Weimar Germany, Nazi
attitudes and policy toward Arab demands for independence after 1933 also
ranged from indifference to rejection. Nazi racial ideology and geopolitical
ambitions in Europe necessitated more or less the continuation of the
status quo in the Middle East and North Africa. Hitler’s quest for German
Lebensraum in Europe and his racial world view presumed the maintenance
of European colonial rule, especially British colonial rule, over much of Africa
and Asia as part of a natural world order in which there was no place for
Arabs and other “colonial peoples” to achieve their full political sovereignty
and independence. Moreover, the end of Jewish life in Germany would initially
require the dispossession and rapid emigration of the Jewish population
from Germany, preferably to destinations outside of Europe, including the
Jewish National Home in Palestine. The reliance of Nazi Jewish policy on
the continued existence of the Jewish National Home, albeit under British
control, necessitated the rejection of Arab requests for German diplomatic
and material support in their quest to end British colonial rule in Palestine
and the larger Arab world, to dismantle the Jewish National Home, and
to end Jewish immigration to Palestine. Therefore, Hitler’s Germany during
the prewar years, as was the case with previous German governments since
Conclusions 277
the late nineteenth century, generally accepted the post–World War I status
quo in the Middle East. This strategy would be modified somewhat in 1938 and
1939 as the situation in Europe changed with Hitler’s pursuit of the annexation
of Austria and the breakup of the Czechoslovak state. However, Hitler soon
realized that the unrest and quest for independence in the British and French
empires around the world was not enough to persuade London and Paris
to accept his plans for central and eastern Europe, and that he would have to
achieve his goals in Europe in the face of Anglo-French opposition. Germany’s
policy of restrained encouragement of, and support for, Arab unrest in Palestine
and elsewhere in 1938 and 1939, meant primarily to distract Anglo-French
attention from central Europe rather than to actually threaten the existence of
the British and French empires, was ultimately unsuccessful.
Germany’s victory over France in June 1940, coupled with Italy’s entry into
the war on Germany’s side followed by its unsuccessful invasions of Greece and
Egypt in the fall, directly extended Germany’s political and military involve-
ment into the Arab world. It also brought Hitler face to face with the conflicting
French, Italian, and Spanish imperial interests in the Arab world, and intensify-
ing Arab demands that a seemingly invincible and victorious Germany
unequivocally commit to support Arab independence. From the start, Hitler
took the very clear position that Italian interests and ambitions in the entire
Mediterranean were paramount in Axis relations and policy, but that France’s
colonial position in the region must be more or less preserved as well in the
interest of enlisting French support against Great Britain. Arab hopes that
the Axis would explicitly commit to their independence in some form were
in the end fundamentally unacceptable to Hitler, and obviously to Mussolini,
to the French government in Vichy, and to Franco’s government in Spain.
Yet, Axis propaganda broadcasts continued to preach Axis solidarity with
Arabs and Muslims everywhere against their “common” Anglo-American
and Jewish enemies. Even as British forces easily ousted the brief pro-Axis
government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Iraq and, with the assistance of
Gaullist troops, seized control of Syria and Lebanon from the Vichy French
in May and June 1941, an explicit German commitment to Arab independence
was not forthcoming. Repeated attempts by the Mufti of Jerusalem from his
prewar and wartime exiles in Lebanon, Iraq, and Berlin respectively to secure
a clear and unequivocal commitment from Germany to support Arab independ-
ence remained unfulfilled. Indeed, the only firm commitment for change in
the Arab world that Hitler would undertake was Germany’s determination
to destroy the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and ultimately the Jewish
communities in the Middle East and North Africa.
North Africa and the Middle East represented a large region in very close
geographical proximity to German-occupied Europe, one in which German
troops were militarily engaged and, however briefly, appeared to be on the
verge of a military victory in 1942. Therefore, Germany was for a time in a
position to possibly apply National Socialist racial principles to the populations
living in the region, a significant minority of whom were Jews, and a large
majority of whom were Arabs. Had the Axis won the war, there can be little
doubt that this ultimately would have included the ancient Jewish communities
of the region in the “final solution,” the mass murder of the European Jews
that had become a central element of Germany’s war in Europe. Of course,
it is not likely that the same fate would have befallen the Arab population,
despite the Nazi racial view of the world, and its general disdain for Arabs as
for all “colonial peoples.” Notwithstanding the absence of significant German
colonial ambitions in the Arab world, the reality of Italian, French, Spanish,
and continuing British imperial interests in the Arabic-speaking world, and
Nazi views about the racial inferiority of the Arabs, made it unlikely that
Hitler’s government could ever have supported Arab independence and the
end of European colonial rule in some form in the region.
Germany’s primary focus on Europe, and its military campaign in the Soviet
Union, meant that the resources necessary for a military victory in North Africa
and the Middle East would be limited. This problem was only compounded by
the infusion of massive American resources into the war, and by the landing of
Anglo-American forces in northwest Africa on November 8, 1942. Moreover,
Germany’s continuing deference to the interests and ambitions of its Italian ally,
coupled with the perceived strategic requirements of protecting the basic
positions of Vichy France and Franco’s Spain in North Africa, generally pre-
cluded any Axis commitment to Arab independence and unity. In the end, this
policy produced no political or strategic advantages for the Axis war effort in
the region. The arguments of the Mufti and other Arabs to Hitler and Mussolini
that an Axis military victory in the Arab world was possible only with a
clear and public Axis commitment to Arab independence fell on deaf ears.
As observed earlier, it is not at all certain that an Arab revolt would have
occurred even if Hitler had made such an open and clear commitment in 1941
and 1942. Again, it must be emphasized that with the possible exception of
al-Gaylani’s short-lived coup in Iraq in April and May of 1941, the Arab world
remained relatively quiet during the war years. By the end of 1942, the
tide of battle was turning decidedly against the Germans, in North Africa
and especially in the Soviet Union, making Germany’s rather murky policy
toward the Arabs increasingly irrelevant. The New Year 1943 would see the
massive defeat of German forces at Stalingrad in February, followed by the final
Axis defeat in Tunis and expulsion from North Africa in May 1943. This final,
total termination of an Axis presence anywhere in the Arab world relegated
the Middle East and North Africa even more than previously to the periphery
of Germany’s strategic interest and policy for the remainder of the war.
This in turn produced a new and very different imperative for Hitler’s
government. It included the obvious, namely an immediate need to defend
against Allied offensives from the Soviet Union in the east, from Italy in the
south, and from an anticipated allied invasion of France in the west. It also
relegated the Arabs, their exiled leaders in Europe, and the Middle East as a
Conclusions 279
whole to a much diminished level of immediacy and importance for German

policy makers in Berlin. By the end of 1943, especially following Italy’s
surrender in September, Italian, French, and Spanish imperial interests, along
with Arab nationalism and independence and the elimination of the Jewish
National Home in Palestine, had for the most part ceased to have any relevance
to the immediate needs of Hitler and Nazi policy makers. Through late 1943
and 1944, the Mufti concluded that Germany had never been in a position to
help secure Arab independence after all and that it had in fact never really
intended to do so. Indeed, he even found himself unable to stop Germany’s
decision to, once again, send Jewish refugees, albeit in relatively small numbers,
from German-occupied Europe to Palestine in exchange for German nationals
in British custody since the beginning of the war. Moreover, the Mufti’s role in
the formation of the Muslim Waffen-SS (Handschar) division in Bosnia in
1943 had little if anything to do with Arab independence and the Arab world.
The project was a German idea, a European creation, and meant to support
Germany’s war effort in Europe. It was made up mostly of European, not Arab,
Muslims, and had little if anything to do with remaining interests that the Nazi
regime might have had in the Arab world. Indeed, Croatian officials expressed
their anger to the Germans in the summer of 1944 that the existence of the
Handschar division threatened the territorial integrity of a Greater Croatia, and
that it was “. . .sickening, that in the offices of the division there were every-
where pictures of the Grand Mufti, but not of the Croatian Chief of State.”21 In
the end, the Handschar division in Europe was al-Husayni’s only tangible
“accomplishment,” if one can call it that, from his wartime exile in Germany
during the Second World War. Indeed, it was one that gave him a position of
some importance in Bosnia for a time following the Axis surrender in Tunis, but
that had nothing to do with the Arab lands of the Middle East and North
Africa.
21
ADAP: Serie E, Bd. VIII, Nr. 95.
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Index
Abdullah, Amir, 85 Arnim, Hans-Jürgen von, 232, 234

Abetz, Otto, (fig.5.2), 141n.22, 152, 153 Arslan, Amir Schekib, 75
(fig. 5.2), 153n.63, 159, 160n.79, 170, Auer, Theodor, 196–197, 268–269
175–176, 178, 196–197 Austria,23, 28, 66–69, 82, 99, 101–103, 105,
Abwehr (German intelligence), 108–110, 108, 117, 277
109n.25, 172, 188n.19, 210, 224, 238,
244n.90 Bahrain, 207
Aden, 25, 116, 122 Balfour Declaration, 23, 26, 33, 37, 38n.39, 72,
Afghanistan, 2, 113, 113n.41, 128, 165, 80, 183
167, 189 Baranowski, Shelley, 10n.17
Afrika-Korps. See Erwin Rommel Bari. See Italy; propaganda (German and Axis)
Alami, Musa al-, 97, 109, 187n.15 Beckerle, Adolf, 244
Albania, 124, 133 Bedri, Abdul Ghaffur el-, 77n.55
Algeria, 21, 25, 50, 75, 116, 118, 135, 140, Belgium, 32, 49, 107, 248n.91
141n.23, 142–144, 196, 218, 221–222, Ben Gurion, David, 5n.10
224, 235–236 Berger, Gottlob, 226–227, 259
Anatolian Railway, 22 Berk, Schwarz van, 108
Anglo-American landings in northwest Africa Berliner Tageblatt, 80n.62
(1942), 216, 220, 222, 230, 278 Bey of Tunis, 224, 232
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 1936, 129, 135, 219, Bismarck, Otto von, 19, 19n.3, 21
219n.117, 219n.118 Bizaret. See Jews, forced labor in North
Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935), 64, 82 Africa
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty 1930, 219, 219n.117, ‟Blood and Soil” (Blut und Boden) 62
219n.118 Bohle, Ernst, 78
Anglo-Italian Agreement (1938), 120–123, Bolshevism, 49, 63, 70, 236
128, 130 Börsen Zeitung, 80n.62
Angola, 32 Bose, Subhas Chandra. See India
anti-Semitism, 2, 6, 10–13, 33, 72, 115, 180 Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Handschar Division
Antonescu, Ion, 248–249 Brauchitsch, Walther von, 108n.23
Arab labor for Axis, North Africa, 240–241 Brit Shalom, 5n.10
Arabian Peninsula, 1–3, 16, 21, 24–25, 43, 47, British White Paper (1939), 110, 112, 131, 136,
66, 112, 127, 140, 144, 146–147, 136n.4, 183, 244
160–161, 205, 207, 220, 263, 266, 275 Brod, Simon, 246 (fig. 7.2)
Arlossoroff, Chaim, 74 Browning, Christopher, 10–11
Armistice (France with Germany and Italy Bulgaria, 113, 188, 242, 244–245, 247–251,
1940), 144n.35, 152–153, 171–172, 176, 253
190n.29 Bullock, Alan, 9
Armistice Commission (German) in Wiesbaden, Bülow, Bernhard von, 37, 82n.69
178n.133 Bülow-Schwante, Vicco von, 90
Armistice Commission (Italian) for Syria, 152 Burckhardt, Carl, 107n.21
293
294 Index
Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, Djibuti, 122, 141

London, 103 Döhle, Walter, 79, 79n.60, 85, 85n.82, 97, 115,
Canaris, Wilhelm, 108–110, 161, 210, 117, 184
224–225, 224n.8, 231 Dresdner Bank, 87
Catroux, Georges, 190 Drummond, Eric, 85, 85n.83
Caucasus, 98n.121, 189, 192, 198, 202, 204,
204n.71, 206, 209–211, 210n.90, 217, “Eastern Question,” 19–21, 44
220–221, 228, 235n.49, 258 Eden, Anthony, 64, 80n.63
Cavallero, Ugo, 122, 122n.75 Egypt, 4, 25, 31, 39, 85, 135, 150, 155, 161,
Central Association of German Citizens of the 163–164, 171, 178, 186, 189, 194–195,
Jewish Faith (Centralverein deutscher 197–199, 202, 204, 218–221, 228–230,
Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens), 33–34 240, 253, 256–257, 266, 277
Central Powers, 22, 44 and “independence” from England., 21,
Central Relief Committee, 85 24–25, 55, 75–76, 79, 81, 87, 116, 135,
Christian Arabs, 7 140, 146
Churchill, Winston, 7, 27, 69n.31, 105, 226 Axis and independence of, 87–88, 105, 114,
Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 17, 69, 85–86, 85n.83, 128–131, 147, 157, 160, 190n.27, 196,
86n.86, 116, 118, 120–123, 121n.66, 128, 205–211, 208n.81, 208n.83, 215, 219,
141–142, 141n.23, 147–149, 151, 224–225, 267, 271
151n.59, 189, 189n.20, 189n.21, 195, Italian aims in, 116, 119, 122, 124, 126, 144,
195n.43, 195n.45, 200, 203n.69, 208n.83, 149, 152, 155, 216
250–251 Eichmann, Adolf, 95n.115, 245, 247, 249
Claß, Heinrich, 48 Einsatzkommando in North Africa, 239,
Clodius, Carl, 99 239n.61
Colonial Office, London, 85, 136, 185 El-Alamein, 194, 228, 240
“colonial peoples,” 1, 54–56, 59, 61, 63, El Aouina, 230
276, 278 Epp, Ritter von, 62, 65
Colonial Policy Office of the NSDAP Ethiopia, 66, 67n.22, 68, 85, 101, 118–120,
(Kolonialpolitisches Amt der 123, 144, 178, 235
NSDAP), 65 Ettel, Erwin, 213 (fig. 6.3), 213–214, 213n.100,
Colvin, Ian, 108n.23 214n.101, 258–261
Corsica, 50, 118, 122–123, 141, 141n.23, 144 Europapolitik. See Kontinentalpolitik
Cosmelli, Giuseppe, 187, 187n.15
Craig, Gordon, 45n.61 Farhud, 177n.126
Croatia, 242, 258–262, 259n.128, 260n.131, Faysal I (King), 41–42
261n.135, 279 Felmy, Helmuth, 114n.43, 140n.17, 168,
Cüppers, Martin, 3–4, 5n.10, 11, 13, 14n.14, 204–211, 205n.73, 234
70–71 Fertile Crescent, 1, 3, 7, 16, 21, 23–26, 26
Czechoslovakia, 68–69, 82, 101–103, 105–106, (fig. 1.4), 29, 31, 33, 44, 47, 50,
108, 128 98n.121, 137, 140, 144, 149, 152–153,
157, 159–161, 164, 168–171, 176,
Dalueges, Kurt, 259 182–184, 187, 189, 196–198, 204–207,
Darlan, François, 170, 175 210, 212, 215–217, 220, 229, 239, 257,
Darré, Walter, 62 263, 265–266, 270, 274–275
Das Schwarze Korps, 94 “final solution,” 3, 10–12, 61, 193, 239,
Dentz, Henri, 154, 170, 172–174, 176–178, 241–243, 255, 274, 278
176n.123 Fischer, Fritz, 19
Der Angriff, 80n.62, 108 Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP
Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische (Aussenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP), 65,
Korrespondenz, 80n.62 95, 99, 110, 111n.30, 127n.88, 130
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB), 110, 223 Foreign Trade Office of the Overseas
Dirksen, Herbert von, 106 Organization of the NSDAP
Index 295
(Aussenhandelsamt der Germany,

Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP), 99 and al-Gaylani coup (1941), 162–181, 184,
Fourteen Points (Woodrow Wilson), 29 187, 201 (fig. 6.2), 221, 267, 278
France, 15, 22, 24, 28, 30, 32, 36, 38, 41, 44, and the Jewish National Home in Palestine, 12,
48–51, 57, 63, 68, 69, 71, 74, 101, 105, 16, 23, 26, 28–45, 71, 74, 80, 89–100, 188,
126, 134, 135, 139, 162, 176, 184, 186, 192, 200, 227, 257, 261, 275–277, 279
195–196, 225–226, 246, 248n.91, and a Jewish state, 80, 89–100
257, 277 economic and cultural interests in Arab
Vichy and the French empire, 140–143, states, 28–45, 70–89, 127–134
152–153, 171, 179, 190, 190n.29 and return of former colonies in Africa, 19,
and the Syrian and Lebanese mandates, 25, 28, 31–32, 49, 62, 64–65, 68–69, 102n.2,
38–39, 75, 79, 110, 118, 135, 159, 161, 143, 151, 153
164, 173, 179, 192, 197 arms exports to Arab states, 79–89, 127–134
and French North Africa, 21, 146, 194, and Palestinian Germans (see Palestinian
218–220, 222, 225, 233, 235–236, 271 Germans [Palästinadeutsche]),
and relations with Italy, 53–54, 63, 116, 118, and German nationals in British custody, 12,
121, 121n.66, 122, 122n.73, 123, 135, 247, 251n.101, 252–257, 279
126n.86, 144, 144n.35, 152, 223 and relations with Turkey, 1, 22, 128, 132,
Vichy anti-Jewish laws in North Africa, 235, 133, 136, 137, 140, 161, 164–166, 169,
240n.65 175, 189, 197–198, 215n.107, 228,
France and Nazi Germany, 15, 51–52, 241–257, 242n.70
57, 62–66, 78, 107, 114, 121, 133, German and Italian landing in Tunis (1942),
140–143, 141n.22, 151–153, 153n.63, 228–230
159, 170–171, 194, 196, 222–223, 257, collapse in the Soviet Union (1943), 60, 219,
269, 278 221, 228, 238n.58, 272, 278
Francis, Joseph, 77n.55 Axis collapse in North Africa (1943),
Franco, Francisco, 142, 143 (fig. 5.1), 155, 222–239
252n.105, 277–278 Gestapo. See SD; SS
Frank, Hans, 117 Gibraltar, 141, 143, 155
Free French. See Gaullists Goebbels, Joseph, 60, 61, 73, 108, 138,
Friedländer, Saul, 10 138n.12, 177n.125
Friedrich Krupp, 84 Göring, Hermann, 62, 86, 86n.86, 108, 114,
Friling, Tuvia, 248n.90 122, 175, 189
Granow, Erich von, 182
Gaullists, 153–154, 162, 171–172, 177, 190, Great Britain,
196, 218, 225, 227, 234, 236–237 imperial interests in the Arab world, 13,
Gaylani, Rashid Ali al-, 6, 8, 61, 162–184, 24–26, 30, 104–105, 108, 110, 111n.33,
177n.126, 187, 188n.19, 195–196, 113, 114, 116–120, 122, 135, 151, 157,
195n.43, 198, 200, 201–207, 201 161, 184, 190, 204, 230, 270
(fig. 6.2), 203n.69, 209–215, 211n.96, and intelligence in the Middle East, 185
214n.101, 215n.107, 219–221, 242, 250, and Egypt, 25, 39, 55, 87, 120, 122, 128,
267, 270, 277–278 163, 207, 215, 219, 219n.117, 266–267
Gehrcke, Franz see Fritz Grobba and Iraq, 40–42, 83–87, 124, 128–129,
Gensicke, Klaus, 4 128n.92, 150, 159, 162, 164, 166, 173,
“Gentlemen’s Agreement“ (1937), 119 175–176, 183, 186, 201, 207, 219n.117,
German-Arab Training Unit 228, 267, 270
(Deutsch-Arabische Lehrabteilung), and Palestine and Transjordan, 7, 25, 37, 42,
205–206, 208–211, 210n.90, 235n.49, 44, 91, 94, 98, 100, 115, 120, 136, 173,
257 183, 185, 186
German Pro-Palestine Committee (Deutsches and French mandates in Syria and
Pro-Palästina Komitee), 33, 33n.30, Lebanon, 30, 38, 162, 173, 176, 186,
34n.31, 37 227, 270
296 Index
Great Britain, (cont.) Hud, Khalid al-, 110–113, 115, 132

and Saudi Arabia, 128–132, 186, 215 Hungary, 241n.67, 242, 244, 245, 247,
and exchange of German nationals for 249n.95, 250
Jews, 244–245, 247, 252, 254 Husayn, Sharif, 16, 25, 43
and Hitler’s overtures 11, 14–17, 14n.24, 21, Husayni, Amin al-,
47–54, 57, 62–70, 78, 80–81, 81n.67, 101, and Nazi anti-Semitism, 193, 239, 278
103, 106–107, 138, 152n.60 and mass murder of the Jews in Europe, 193,
Greece, 154, 155, 163, 165, 197, 204, 209, 239, 278
210n.90, 211, 247, 253, 277 and Zionism and the Jewish National
Grobba, Fritz, 36, 38, 41–42, 76, 76n.51, 77, Home, 72, 79–100, 183–188, 192, 200,
77 (fig. 3.1), 77n.55, 81–87, 81n.66, 227, 257
81n.67, 84n.73, 85n.78, 85n.82, 98, 100, and Great Britain, chap. 6, 222–239
108–114, 114n.43, 115, 124–126, and support for the Axis, 72, 79–100, chap. 6,
126n.88, 127–129, 127n.90, 128n.92, 222–239
131, 132n.110, 139, 140, 151, 157, 163– among Arab exiles in Berlin, 8, 180–204, 201
164, 164n.87, 167–170, 174n.119, 176, (fig. 6.2), 241–242, 250
182, 191–192, 194, 194n.40, meeting with Hitler 1941, 191–194, 193
202–203, 202n.67, 204–207, 211n.96, (fig. 6.1)
213–215, 214n.101, 215n.107 and North Africa, 204–238
Groscurth, Helmuth, 109 and Bosnian Muslim Waffen-SS division,
see Handschar Division,
Ha’avara Transfer Agreement, 95, 95n.117, and wartime transfer of Jews from Europe to
96, 108 Palestine, 249–257
Haddad, Kemal, 147, 147n.46, 148n.48, 149,
157–159, 163–164, 187 Ibn-Saud, King, 88, 98, 110, 112, 125–126,
Hagen, Herbert, 110 126n.88, 127n.90, 130–132
Halder, Franz, 114, 114n.43 India, 15, 31, 55, 105, 166, 195n.45, 198–200,
Halifax, Earl Edward, 69, 102, 102n.2 199n.58, 226, 229
Hamza, Fuad, 130 Inönü, Ismet, 197
Handschar Division, 257–263, 262 (fig. 7.4), Iran, 1, 2, 83, 87, 98, 113, 113n.41, 116, 128,
279 138, 164–165, 167, 175, 184, 187–189,
Harley, H. Fitzgerald, 108n.23 203, 203n.70, 206, 207, 212, 228, 229
Hassell, Ulrich von 142 Iraq, 2, 25, 31, 41–42, 41n.50, 42n.54, 73, 77,
Hendaye, See Spain, ambitions in Morocco and 77n.55, 83–85, 84n.73, 85n.78, 86, 88,
northwest Africa; Gibraltar 98n.122, 100, 100n.133, 110, 114, 115,
Henderson, Neville, 103, 107, 119 126n.88, 127, 128, 128n.92, 129, 131,
Henke, Josef, 121 135, 140, 145, 159, 161, 163–166,
Hentig, Werner-Otto von, 97 (fig. 3.4), 97–98, 165n.91, 181, 185, 188, 189, 192, 200,
98n.121, 103n.5, 108, 110–111, 111n.33, 201 (fig. 6.2), 203n.70, 209, 210n.90, 214,
112, 112n.35, 113, 115, 130–131, 140, 153, 216, 228, 277–278
172–173, 172n.114, 172n.115, 261n.135, and “independence” from England in 1930,
265, 265n.1 40, 75, 79, 81, 129, 219, 219n.117,
Herf, Jeffrey, 3–4, 14 219n.118
Hewel, Walter, 211, 237 Axis and Iraqi independence, 6, 8, 61, 76,
Hijaz, 25, 43 76n.51, 86–88, 116, 124, 146–148, 150,
Hildebrand, Klaus, 9, 47, 68n.26 160, 163, 171, 179, 195, 195n.43, 198,
Hillgruber, Andreas, 9 200, 202–203, 205–207, 212–213,
Himmler, Heinrich, 108, 199n.58, 226, 227, 220, 225
252, 253, 255, 257, 259 collapse of al-Gaylani coup, 162, 166–180,
Hinrichs, Walther, 90, 115 177n.125, 177n.126
Hirszowicz, Lukasz, 11, 12 and an independent Arab federation,
House of Commons, 85 126n.86, 153, 171, 212
Index 297
and wartime relationship with Great forced labor in North Africa, 230, 239, 240,
Britain, 129, 148, 150, 154–180, 186, 240 (fig. 7.1)
187, 211, 228–229, 267, 270, 277 of Spanish and Turkish descent, 242n.70,
Iraq Petroleum Company, 129, 207 252–257, 252n.105
Istiqlal, 77n.55 Zionist rescue organizations, 245, 245n.82,
Italy, 15, 25, 39, 47–53, 57, 63–70, 67n.22, 75, 246, 246 (fig. 7.2), 248n.90
84n.73, 85–86, 86n.86, 114, 116–127, wartime exchange for German nationals,
134, 144n.35, 145–148, 158, 159, 239–257
164–167, 176, 203, 205–207, 210, Jewish Agency for Palestine, 245, 246 (fig. 7.2)
210n.90, 212, 214n.102, 219, 223, Jewish National Home, 5, 7, 8, 12, 16, 23,
258, 278 26–38, 38n.39, 42, 44–45, 71, 72, 74, 76,
imperial interests in the Mediterranean, 17, 50, 80, 89, 91, 93, 94, 104, 136n.5, 182–185,
53, 116–127, 130, 137, 141, 145, 149, 188, 192, 200, 227, 241, 257, 261,
150–151, 153, 155, 158–162, 178, 186, 274–277, 279
187, 190, 194, 196, 198, 212, 216, 257 Ottoman declaration in favor of, 23
entry into the war, 122, 122n.73, 122n.75, Austro-Hungarian declaration of, 23
137, 139, 186, 277 Imperial German declaration in favor of,
defeats in Egypt and Greece (1940), 154, 155, 23–24
163, 171 Jewish state, 38n.39, 76, 79–82, 81n.67,
Arab distrust of, 71, 85–86, 112, 123–126, 89–100, 98n.122, 120, 136n.4, 183, 274
130, 137, 140, 141, 150, 152, 152n.61,
165n.1, 211, 214, 268 Kapp, Karl, 218
and Libya, 21, 25, 123, 157, 235 Kaoukji, Fauzi, 81, 81n.65, 82, 85
and Egypt, 39, 119, 122, 144, 149, 208, Kastl, Ludwig, 31, 33n.30
225 Keitel, Wilhelm, 108, 167, 209, 225
and French North Africa, 118, 126n.86, 142, Kontinentalpolitik, 11, 51, 56
194, 223, 225, 231–234 Kroll, Hans, 169
and the Red Sea and Arabia, 118–120, 125, Kuhn, Axel, 9
144, 216 Kurds, 178, 228
and relations with Great Britain, 120–123, Kuwait, 24 (fig. 1.3), 25, 203, 207, 212
130, 144, 149, 150, 152
and anti-Jewish Race Laws (1938), 123–124, Lahousen, Erwin von, 224
241n.67, 242, 246 Law for the Export and Import of War
and Jews in Tunisia, 240n.64 Materials (Gesetz über Aus- und Einfuhr
final defeat of (1943), 60, 235, 237n.56, 238, von Kriegsgeräte), 82
238n.58, 279 Lawrence (of Arabia), 24, 211
International Red Cross, 247 League of Nations, 7, 15, 25, 26, 29, 41,
41n.50, 43, 44, 55, 89–90, 105, 107n.21,
Jabotinsky, Vladimir, 5n.10 121, 185, 275
Jäckel, Eberhard, 9 and German membership, 31–35, 33n.30,
Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, 9 37–38
Japan, 32, 47, 68, 70, 119, 159, 163, 188, Lebanon, 25, 26 (fig. 1.4), 31, 35, 38, 73, 75,
195n.45, 198–200, 199n.58, 226 79, 85, 118, 135–136, 146, 152, 160, 162,
Jews, 28–45, 46–61, 70–79, 89–100, 164, 171–173, 172n.115, 176–179,
239–257 176n.123, 178n.133,
emigration from Germany and Europe, 11–12, 183–184, 186, 190, 192, 196, 205, 207,
14n.24, 28–45, 82n.67, 89–100, 114–115, 212, 227–228, 248n.91, 270, 277
184, 239–257, 276 Libya, 21, 21 (fig. 1.2), 25, 40, 116, 120, 123,
immigration to Palestine, 5, 8, 24, 30–31, 34, 135, 140, 145, 149, 155–156, 163–165,
38n.39, 42, 71–72, 72n.41, 74, 79, 80, 89, 171, 178, 194, 196, 199, 214, 216,
90, 93–96, 100, 115, 115n.48, 136n.4, 218–219, 235, 240, 266
140, 182, 227, 239–257, 273, 276 Lichtheim, Richard, 26
298 Index
‟living space” (Lebensraum), 9–10, 9n.17, 11, Nord, Erich, 35, 38, 42
15, 46, 51–53, 56–57, 61–64, 68, 93, 101, Nordbruch, Götz, 190n.29
103, 105, 107, 128, 133, 134n.113,
155, 276 Ofer, Dalia, 247n.84
Locarno, 28, 31 OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres), 170
Luftwaffe, 167–168, 173, 175–176, 176n.123 OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), 111,
Luther, Martin, 217, 243 113, 116, 123, 131, 132n.110, 152, 159,
165–168, 171, 175, 210n.90, 223–225,
Mackensen, Hans Georg von, 118, 144, 232, 236n.52, 238
148–149, 208, 215, 218–219, 232, “Operation Barbarosa” (Fall Barbarosa), 155,
266 156, 168, 175, 187, 194, 258
Maghreb, See North Africa “Operation Green” (Fall Grün), 102, 105
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael, 3–4, 5n.10, 11, 13, “Operation Sunflower” (Fall Sonnenblume),
14n.14, 70–71 156
Mandates, 7, 25, 26 (fig. 1.4), 28–45, 79, 118, Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), 259
135, 147–148, 160n.79, 177, 179, 182, Ottoman Empire, 7, 16, 18–20, 20 (fig. 1.1), 21,
186, 190, 196 23–25, 40, 44, 125, 133, 182, 183,
Mauser-Werke, 83 242n.70, 275
McMahon, Sir Henry, 25 alliance with Germany in First World War,
Mecklenburg, Georg, 34 19, 22, 27, 33, 34, 133
Megerle, Karl, 271–272 German interests in, 22–23, 27, 44, 275
Melchers, Wilhelm, 260, 260n.133 Otto Wolff, 83–84, 129
Mommsen, Wolfgang, 19 overseas German communities
Montoire, See Philippe Pétain, (Auslandsdeutsche), 78
Morocco (French), 2, 21, 21 (fig. 1.2), 25, 75, Overseas Organization of the NSDAP
135, 140, 141n.23, 142, 143, 177, 196, (Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP), 78,
216, 221–222, 224, 230, 235, 236, 268, 91, 99, 213n.100, 256
269, 271
Morocco (Spanish), 21, 21 (fig. 1.2), 25, 75, Pact of Steel, 133, 134n.113
140, 142, 143, 196, 224, 236, 268, Palestine, 4, 5, 5n.10, 7, 8, 11–13, 14n.24,
271 16–17, 23, 25–40, 26 (fig. 1.4), 29n.21,
Mufti of Jerusalem, See Amin al-Husayni 38n.39, 42–45, 70–101, 72n.41, 77n.55,
Müller, Heinrich, 252 82n.67, 92n.106, 95n.117, 96 (fig. 3.3),
Munich Agreement and Conference, 103, 106 104–105, 108, 114–116, 118, 120, 130,
Mussolini, Benito, 13, 16, 50, 86, 116, 120, 132n.110, 183–184
123, 162, 188, 198–199, 203, 235, 243, Arab revolt in, (1936), 79–90, 80n.63,
277–278 81n.66, 93, 104, 108n.23, 109–110,
and relations with Great Britain, 85, 101, 109n.25, 112, 115, 119, 183, 184
118, 120–121 wartime situation in, 4, 12, 13, 16, 17, 136,
and relations with France, 116–118 136n.4, 136n.5, 140, 144, 146–148, 150,
and relations with Hitler and Germans 50, 152, 160–161, 164, 173, 177,
54, 63, 66, 69, 106, 114, 116, 117 186–189, 192, 200, 205–207, 209–212,
(fig. 4.3), 119, 122, 123, 128, 137n.8, 227, 239–257, 246n.83, 247n.84,
138–144, 148, 155–156, 186, 188, 248n.90, 248n.91, 252n.101, 261, 271,
189n.20, 194–195, 195n.45, 199, 208, 273, 274–279
212, 220, 238, 266 Palestinian Germans (Palästinadeutsche), 40,
95, 255–257
Nashashibi family, 136 pan-Arab nationalism, 76, 94, 153, 171–172,
Netherlands, 107 182, 186, 188, 215–216, 215n.107, 220
Neurath, Constantin von, 65, 66, 75, 91, 92, Papen, Franz von, 148n.48, 150, 198
92n.106, 116 Paris Protocols, 170
Nice, 118, 123, 141n.23, 144 Passfield White Paper, 38n.39
Index 299
Peel Commission (Royal Commission), 81–82, Near East Department (Abteilung III,
90–95, 97–100, 99n.126, 104, 120, Abteilung VII), 36, 75, 78, 97, 103n.5,
121, 183 108, 125, 164n.87, 172, 196, 260,
Peel Partition Plan (1937), 96 (fig. 3.3) 265n.1
Permanent Mandates Commission, 31–38, Germany Office (Referat Deutschland), 90,
33n.30 92, 115
Pétain, Philippe, 153–154, 153n.64, 154 Trade Department (Handelspolitische
(fig. 5.3), 222, 224, 231, 269, 271 Abteilung), 88, 99
Petroleum, 22, 41–42, 112, 126, 129, 131, 140, Economic Affairs Department
145–146, 148, 161, 189, 202, 204 (Sonderreferat-W), 113n.41
204n.71, 207, 228, 229 Radio Political Department
Pfeiffer, Peter, 196–197 (Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung), 191,
Phipps, Eric, 80, 80n.62, 80n.63 266, 269
Phleps, Artur, 259 Reich Industry Consortium: Export Group
Poland, 28, 46, 82, 93, 103, 107, 111, 122, for Armaments (Reichsgruppe
128, 132, 133, 137, 243, 247, 250, Industrie: Ausfuhrgemeinschaft für
250n.97, 258 Kriegsgerät), 83
Portugal, 241n.67, 242, 252n.105 Reich Kommissar for Export and Import
propaganda (German and Axis) to the Arab Allowance (Reichkommissar für
world, 2–5, 8, 12, 14, 16–17, 23, 25, 60, Aus- und Einfuhrbewilligung), 82
65, 70–76, 103, 104, 110, 114, Reich Ministry for the Enlightenment of the
119–120, 123–124, 136–138, 137n.10, People and Propaganda
138n.12, 145–146, 149, 158, 160, 163, (Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung
168, 179, 184, 190n.29, 191, 195–196, und Propaganda), 73, 77n.43, 138
199, 204–205, 208n.81, 209–211, 215, Reich Ministry for Economics
218, 220, 223, 233, 235–237, 244, 250, (Reichwirtschaftsministerium), 17, 84, 88,
261, 265–275 89, 91, 95, 99, 111, 129, 130,
Prüfer, Curt, 33n.30, 41n.50, 75, 215, 215n.107 132n.110
Reich Ministry of the Interior
racial ideology, Nazi, 1, 10–12, 10n.17, 23, (Reichministerium des Innern), 17, 89, 91,
46–47, 52, 54–61, 70, 79n.58, 93, 276 95, 96
Rahn, Rudolf, 142n.22, 173–174, 174 Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories
(fig. 5.5), 174n.119, 176, 176n.23, (Reichsministerium für die besetzten
178–179, 230–234, 231n.31, 236–237, Ostgebiete) 226
237n.55, 239, 240 Reich Security Main Office
Rauff Walter, 239n.63 (Reichssicherheitshauptamt), 199n.58,
Reich Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 8, 17, 216n.109, 244, 247, 249, 252
29, 30, 33n.30, 34–42, 66–67, 73, 75, Reichenau, Walter von, 50, 63
76, 76n.51, 78, 81, 83n.71, 84, 86, Reichert, Franz. See Deutsches
87–91, 95, 97, 98n.121, 99–100, Nachrichtenbüro
103n.5, 105, 108–113, 111n.30, 113n.41, Rheinmetall-Borsig, 83, 87, 129
120, 121, 124–130, 132n.110, 133, Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 60, 65, 65n.16, 68,
136, 138, 138n.12, 140, 144, 68n.26, 102 (fig. 4.1), 110, 111n.30, 112,
146–148, 150–152, 157–159, 161–163, 112n.35, 113, 118, 122, 123, 128,
164n.87, 165–168, 170–175, 181–182, 132–133, 133n.112, 142, 142n.26, 149,
189–191, 194, 196, 199, 202, 204–207, 151, 158–159, 161, 165–175, 176n.123,
208n.83, 210n.90, 211, 213, 213n.100, 177n.128, 178–179, 186, 189, 190n.27,
214–218, 215n.107, 223–225, 230–232, 194n.40, 195–200, 202–206, 202n.67,
236–238, 241–245, 247–249, 251, 208, 208n.81, 212–217, 216n.110, 220,
251n.101, 252–255, 258, 260–261, 222, 224n.8, 225n.12, 226–230, 237, 238,
260n.131, 261n.135, 263, 265, 265n.1, 249–252, 255, 256, 258, 261n.135, 262,
266, 268–273 269, 271–274
300 Index
Ritter, Karl, 113n.91 Soviet Union, 9–11, 15, 16, 46, 49, 52, 57, 61,
Riza, Muhammad, 187 63, 98n.121, 105, 107, 132, 133, 139,
Riza, Shah, 187 151, 155, 161, 164–165, 171, 178,
Rome-Berlin Axis, 67, 67n.22, 118 186–189, 191, 194, 204, 210n.90, 211,
Rommel, Erwin, 4, 156 (fig. 5.4), 157, 219–221, 227–229, 234, 235n.49, 239,
160–162, 164, 168, 173, 175, 178, 189, 258, 272, 273, 278
194, 199, 202, 208n.81, 215, 217–221, Spain, 21, 135, 142, 143–146, 187, 196, 220,
228, 232, 237n.56, 238, 239, 266 225, 241n.67, 242, 242n.70, 252,
Rosenberg, Alfred, 49, 60, 62, 63, 65, 80, 252n.105, 277
80n.63, 94, 95, 99, 111n.30, 152n.60, imperial aims in Morocco and northwest
226, 238n.58 Africa, 142, 142n.26, 151, 152, 196, 237,
Roser, Rudolf, 172 257, 268, 278
Rühle, Gerhard, 191, 269–270, 272 Spanish Civil War, 68, 101, 118
Ruhr Crisis, 52, 63 Speer, Albert, 67, 67n.22, 78n.58
Rumania, 93, 241–251, 241n.67, 248n.90 Stahmer, Friedrich, 27–28
Russia (Tsarist), 15, 21–23, 133 Stalingrad, See Germany, collapse in the Soviet
Union,
sabotage (Axis) in Arab lands, 160–161, Stanley, Oliver, See Great Britain, exchange of
228–229 German nationals for Jews
Said, Nuri, 163 Stohrer, Eberhard von, 39
Samuel, Herbert, 183 Straits (Turkey), 22, 133
Saudi Arabia, 26, 26 (fig. 1.4), 43, 75, 76n.51, Stresemann, Gustav, 28, 28n.17, 32, 36,
85, 88, 98, 109–114, 109n.25, 119, 120, 45n.61
124–128, 126n.88, 130–132, Stuckart, Wilhelm, 89
132n.110, 135, 136, 159, 164, 186, 192, Struma, 248n.90
203, 206–207, 215, 216 Sudan, 21, 21 (fig. 1.2), 25, 140, 144, 147, 160
Schacht, Hjalmar, 64, 82n.69 Sudetenland, 105–106
Scheiban, Sheik Rahhal, 73 Suez Canal, 118, 120, 122, 123, 141, 144, 155,
Schellenberg, Walter, 199n.58, 216, 216n.109, 168, 178, 206
217, 217 (fig. 6.4) Suleiman, Hikmet, 100
Schirach, Baldur von, 98, 261 Suñer, Serrano, 142
Schlobies, Hans, 130 Sunion, See Sonderstab F
Schmidt, Karl, 108n.23 Switzerland, 241n.67, 244–246
Schöllgen, Gregor, 19 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 16, 24 (fig. 1.3), 25
Schubert, Carl von, 32, 33n.30 Syria, 2, 25, 31, 34–35, 38–42, 50, 73–77, 79,
SD (Sicherheitsdienst): Security Service 81, 81n.66, 85, 86, 110, 118, 126, 131,
of the SS, 94, 96, 110, 216n.109, 239, 160n.79, 172n.115, 174n.119, 176n.123,
242 178n.133, 183, 186,
“secret treaties,” 16, 25 188–189, 192, 196–198, 205–207,
Seiler, Ferdinand, 76–77 209–212, 210n.90, 227–229, 235,
Shakir, Tawfik al-, See Kemal Haddad 248n.91
Shatt al-Arab, 175, 203, 203n.70 Italian ambitions in, 50, 126, 131, 144, 152,
Shaw Commission, 37 160, 173
Shawkat, Naji, 150 Vichy French defeat in, 135–179, 189–190,
Sillitti, Luigi, 125 190n.29, 196, 270, 272, 277
Simpson, John Hope, 38n.39
Simon, Sir John, 64 Tangiers, 237, 268
Slovakia, 242 Temple Society (Tempelgesellschaft),
Sobernheim, Moritz, 29–30, 29n.21, 35–36 See Palestinian Germans
Somaliland, 21 (fig. 1.2), 116, 141n.23, Thadden, Eberhard von, 253–256, 254
144, 235 (fig. 7.3)
Sonderstab F, 168, 204–206, 208–211, 234 Thies, Jochen, 9, 9n.14
Index 301
Tito Josip Broz, 258 Weinberg, Gerhard, 9, 14n.26, 52–53, 116,

Transjordan, 25, 26 (fig. 1.4), 31, 75, 79, 85, 204n.71
118, 127n.90, 146–147, 160, 161, 164, Weizmann, Chaim, 5n.10
183, 192, 205–207, 212, 229 Weizsäcker, Ernst von, 67, 91, 91n.104, 92
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 9 (fig. 3.2), 97, 98n.122, 99, 110, 121, 142,
Tripartite Declaration on India and Arabia, 144–147, 151, 161, 162, 165, 172,
195n.45, 198–200, 226 202n.67, 214, 214n.102, 217, 224–225,
Trumpener, Ulrich, 22 232, 261n.135
Tunisia, 21, 21 (fig. 1.2), 25, 50, 75, 116, 118, Weltpolitik, 11, 19, 21, 51, 52, 56, 57, 65
122, 135, 140, 141, 141n.23, 144, 196, Wiedemann, Fritz, 66
218, 223–224, 230–237, 235n.49, 240, Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 19, 21, 23, 27, 44, 53,
240n.64, 249, 257, 271, 272 275
Turkey, 1, 2, 128, 132, 133, 140, 161, 165, Wilson, Horace, 106
172, 175, 184, 187–189, 228, 241–242, Woermann, Ernst, 109 (fig. 4.2), 109–110, 112,
242n.70 126, 127, 130–131, 144–146, 149, 153,
and policy of neutrality, 1, 22, 136–137, 150, 159–162, 164–166, 173, 178, 187,
164 187n.15, 196–198, 200–203, 202n.67,
and interests in the Arab Fertile Crescent, 211–213, 224, 225, 260, 261, 261n.135,
169, 197, 215n.107 270
“Special Transit Law” (1941), 246 Wolff, Heinrich, 72, 74, 77, 77n.55, 78,
and transfer of Jews to Palestine, 241–248, 79n.60, 180
242n.70, 246 (fig. 7.2), 247n.84, 248n.90, World Zionist Organization, 23, 26, 275
251, 253 Wurst, Timotheus, 73–74
Terrorism, 2, 94, 229
Yassin, Sheik Yussuf, 98
United States, 14, 16, 19, 32, 33, 46–48, 52, Yemen, 83, 88, 119–120, 127–128, 130, 132,
57–59, 70, 89, 131, 136, 146, 176, 188, 132n.110, 144, 160, 192, 207
196, 197, 218–219, 222–229, 233–234, Yishuv, 26, 28–45, 89–100, 242–257
242, 252n.105, 267, 268, 271, 277–278
Zeesen, 104, 137
Versailles Treaty, 28, 31, 35, 36, 44, 49, 62, 276 Zionism, 5, 5n.10, 11, 16, 26, 29, 31–34, 80,
Vichy, See France 82n.67, 90, 93–94, 99, 120, 236, 241,
Völkischer Beobachter, 80, 94, 104n.9 244, 275
Zionist Federation for Germany
Waffen-SS, See Handschar Division (Zionistische Vereinigung für
Warlimont, Walter, 114n.43, 175, 238 Deutschland), 32

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Nazi Germany and the Arab World

francis r. nicosia is Professor of History and the Raul Hilberg

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

List of Illustrations page ix

Anticipation of Victory: Fall 1942 204

1.1 Map: Ottoman Empire 1914 page 20

6.1 Hitler receives the Mufti Amin al-Husayni in Berlin

AA Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ofﬁce)

I wish to express my appreciation for the support of the scholars, archivists,

I am indebted to my wife, Ellen Oxfeld, an anthropologist and scholar, who

This book is a reexamination of the foreign policy of Hitler’s Third Reich

scholarship tends to ignore or dismiss as a motivating force among Arabs at

Arabic-language sources that are necessary in such an endeavor. In recent years,

And Browning has exposed this tendency toward improvisation as circum-

geopolitics were in the end inextricably linked in a somewhat improvised Nazi

Continuity and Departure:

imperial germany and the first world war

map 1.1. Ottoman Empire 1914

map 1.2. North Africa 1914

penetration of what remained of the Ottoman Empire, speciﬁcally Anatolia and

map 1.3. The Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916

so-called Arab revolt. This public position in Allied wartime propaganda,

map 1.4. Anglo-French Mandates in the Fertile Crescent 1922

Anglo-Saxon powers.”13 Indeed, the very brief one-year German-Zionist

the weimar years

If the postwar settlement in the Middle East conﬁrmed an expanded

of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith (Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger

French in Syria and Lebanon. For instance, a representative of the Syrian

reaction was to categorically reject as premature and unfounded such allegations

members of the League of Nations. Germany greeted Britain’s decision to grant

of a German consulate in Jidda. Britain even approved the shipment of three

Hitler, Race, and the World Beyond Europe

race and the european great powers

Germany. Germany’s mortal enemy in any further development. . .is France,

race and “colonial peoples”

Hitler’s obvious focus on power-political relations among the European

of Jerusalem as I have. He considers him to be a descendant of the crusaders,

Germany and the Arab World, 1933–1937

without England, and indeed, in the face of British opposition, after

he considers, even today, to be an important factor in world equilibrium.”32

arab overtures, nazi responses

of its rule in Germany, Hitler’s regime viewed Arabs and Muslims as

The generally positive responses to the Nazi assumption of power in Germany

photo 3.1. Fritz Grobba (no date).

to these overtures in a similar manner two months later. For instance, in a

and organization as well as the military trappings of German National Socialism

the arab revolt and german arms

term due to Germany’s own considerable rearmament requirements. On the

in its own armaments program.73 The ﬁrm Friedrich Krupp reported in

changing. He explained that Baghdad’s recent weapons transactions with Italy,

the British ambassador in Rome, Lord Perth, reported to London that he

population. Nevertheless, events in the region, affected in part by increased

photo 3.2. Ernst von Weizsäcker (no date).

policy implications of the eventual destinations of emigrating Jews, was their

map 3.3. Peel Partition Plan 1937

revolt resumed with even greater intensity. In response, British authorities

photo 3.4. Werner-Otto von Hentig (no date).

work in Germany, and Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine, would

of a representative from the Mufti.121 On August 7, Abteilung VII issued a