EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127580. August 22, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. ZHENG BAI HUI @ CARLOS TAN
TY and NELSON HONG TY @ SAO
YU, accused-appellants.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For the sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu, Zheng Bai
Hui alias Carlos Tan Ty and Nelson Hong
Ty alias Sao Yu were sentenced by the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court to suffer the death penalty. Their
case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellants were charged in an information stating:
That on or about the 24th day of October 1994 at
Kalookan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, conspiring
together and mutually helping with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell
and deliver to SPOI GILBERT G. SANTOS who
posed as buyer, One (1) blue plastic bag labelled
SM Shoemart containing one (1) piece of newsprint
with one (1) transparent plastic bag containing
yellowish crystalline substance
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCLORIDE (Shabu)
and having a weight of 992.30 grams, a regulated
drugs, knowing the same to be such.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Arraigned on November 4, 1994, appellants
pleaded not guilty to the above charges.Trial ensued
thereafter.
The prosecutions version, as pieced together from
the testimonies of witnesses SPO3 Gilbert
Santos,[2] SPO1 Gerico Bacani,[3] PO2 Elleonito
Apduhan[4] and PO3 Noel Castaeto,[5] is as follows:
In the morning of October 24, 1994, a police
informant code-named Stardust arrived at the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo
Papa, Bicutan, Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp.
Franklin Moises Mabanag of two Chinese nationals
who were supposedly big time drug pushers. She
claimed to have regular contact with one of the
alleged drug pushers, a certain Carlos Tan
Ty. Stardust, the informant, was a woman who had
previously provided the police with information that
led to the confiscation of one (1) kilo of shabu.
 Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the
NARCOM agents organized a buy-bust operation to
apprehend the reputed drug pushers. Stardust called
up Carlos Tan Ty that same morning and introduced
SPO3 Gilbert Santos over the cellular
phone.Pretending to be a pusher-buyer in Paraaque,
SPO3 Santos told Carlos that he was willing to
buy shabu if Carlos had any stock. Carlos replied that
they had stock that was yellow in color. SPO3 Santos
and Carlos subsequently reached an agreement for
the former to buy from the latter one (1) kilo
of shabu for P500,000 and to meet at the Mercury
Drug Store in Monumento later that afternoon. Carlos
would bring the shabu and SPO3 Santos the
money. Carlos informed SPO3 Santos that he would
be wearing a striped T-shirt and that he would be
bringing with him a companion. Per Carlos
instructions, SPO3 Santos would come alone.
SPO3 Santos and Police Sr. Insp. Mabanag then
prepared the boodle money consisting of seven (7)
bundles of newspaper cuttings[6] that was supposed
to represent the P500,000 purchase money. A
genuine P500 bill[7] was placed on top of one of the
bundles and another P500 bill[8] at the bottom of the
same bundle. SPO3 Santos initialed the red portion
of the Philippine flag in each of the bills.[9] Between
the bills were the newspaper cuttings. The bundles,
each about three (3) inches thick, were wrapped with
straps from the United Coconut Planters Bank and
tied with a rubber band. The boodle money was then
placed in plastic[10] and sealed with scotch
tape.[11] SPO3 Santos rehearsed how he would show
the drug pushers the boodle money.
The police held a briefing and formed a team led by
Inspector Rolando Ibaez. The members of the team
included SPO3 Santos, SPO1 Gerico Bacani, PO3
Elleonito Apduhan, PO1 Noel Castaeto, and a certain
SPO1 Juspid. SPO3 Santos was designated poseur-
buyer and SPO1 Apduhan, his backup. The team
then proceeded to the meeting area for
reconnaissance.
SPO3 Santos and the rest of the buy-bust team,
dressed in civilian attire, arrived at the Mercury Drug
Store at the corner of Edsa, Monumento, Caloocan
City later that afternoon. SPO3 Santos and Stardust
waited inside the Mercury Drug Store while the other
agents strategically positioned themselves several
meters from the store, where the suspects could not
spot them.
The suspects arrived at around 6:00 in the
evening. Stardust pointed to SPO3 Santos two (2)
Chinese nationals, later identified as the accused,
alighting from a tax. SPO3 Santos stepped out of the
store and introduced himself to the two (2) Chinese
nationals as the person whom they talked with over
the phone that morning. He told the suspects that he
brought the money with him, and showed the accused
the boodle money by opening the wrapper and
showing half of the bundle with the P500 bill on
top. He then gave the money to one of the Chinese
nationals, later identified as the accused Carlos Tan
Ty. The latters companion, later identified as accused
Nelson Hong Ty, in turn handed SPO3 Santos a blue
plastic bag[12] with the marking of SM or
Shoemart. The two looked at the money while SPO3
Santos opened the bag handed to him by Nelson
Hong Ty. SPO3 Santos found a yellowish
substance[13] sealed in transparent plastic and
wrapped in newspapers. The accused identified the
substance as shabu. Thereupon, SPO3 Santos held
Carlos by the hand as the other members of the team
came to help him effect the arrest of the two suspects,
who were later brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City.
After the buy-bust operation, SPO3 Santos, PO3
Bacani and PO3 Apduhan placed their respective
signatures[14] on the SM plastic bag, the newspaper
wrappings and the transparent plastic containing the
substance. The yellowish substance, together with its
wrappings, was then delivered by SP01 Noel
Castaeto to the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine
National Police (PNP). The boodle money was
handed over to the property custodian.
Leslie Maala,[15] a forensic chemist from the PNP,
received a letter-request[16] from Police Sr. Insp.
Franklin Moises Mabanag to conduct a laboratory
examination on the substance taken from the
accused. Ms. Maala took random samples of about
one (1) gram from different parts of the substance
and, per their standard operation procedure,
performed physical, chemical and confirmatory
examinations thereon. The physical examination
consisted of weighing the entire substance. The
chemical examination, in turn, consisted of the
Simons test and the Marquis test. Thence, a thin layer
chromatography test was performed. The
examinations were supervised by the Chief of the
Chemistry Division.
From the examinations thus conducted, Ms. Maala
concluded that the sample was positive for
methamphethamine hydrochloride. The results of Ms.
Maalas examination were reflected in her initial
(Chemistry Report No. 0-793-94 dated October 25,
1994),[17]as well as in her final (Physical Sciences
Report D-793-94 of even date)[18] report. The final
report states that the entire substance weighed 992.3
grams.
 The accused, in their defense, countered that no
buy-bust operation took place. They denied selling
any shabu and accused the police of extortion.
Accused Carlos Tan Ty,[19] 38, described himself
as married and engaged in the business of buying
and selling lumber and furniture. At the time of his
testimony, he had been staying in the Philippines for
more than ten years, although sometimes he would
go home to Mainland China. Previously, he owned a
sawmill business in Malanday but shifted to the
furniture business in 1987, with Peter Chua and
Nestor Lim as his partners.Their office is located in
Karuhatan near a gasoline station along the
MacArthur Highway. Their customers include Arenas
Furniture and Unicorn Furniture. The business is not
registered in Carlos name, however, since he is a
Chinese citizen.
Accused Nelson Hong Ty,[20] 24, and originally
from Fuchu, China, had been residing in the
Philippines for around seven (7) years before his
arrest. Though not licensed or authorized to work in
the country, Nelson was employed as a factory
worker and electrician in Everwood Furniture, a
business owned by one Jessie Cua and located in
Lincoln Street, Malinta, Valenzuela.
 Testifying with the aid of an interpreter,[21] they
narrated their account of the events that transpired on
October 24, 1994.
That afternoon, Carlos was in Everwood Furniture
in Lincoln Street, Malinta conducting some business
with the shop owner when Nelson, an employee
there, entered the office. Nelson had just come from
the factory and had gone to the Everwood office in
Malinta to report to his boss. Nelson asked how
Carlos business was going.Carlos replied that it was
okay. Seeing it was almost 5:00 p.m., Carlos asked
Nelson if he was done working. Nelson replied, Yes,
my work is finished, and that he was in fact on his way
home. Carlos told him that he was supposed to meet
a customer, a certain Chua Ping, in Monumento to
take some orders. Carlos offered to bring Nelson
home to the latters house in Navotas if Nelson was
willing to wait.
Earlier that afternoon, Chua Ping called up Carlos
and said he needed lumber and plywood for his new
house. He wanted to meet with Carlos in Monumento
so Chua Pings carpenter could give Carlos a list of
the lumber he needed. He told Carlos to meet him
between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. at a restaurant located at
the ground floor of No. 316, Monumento, along Edsa.
Nelson took Carlos offer to take him home and rode
with Carlos to Monumento in Carlos car, a red
Toyota. Upon arriving in Monumento at around 6:00
p.m., Carlos parked his car in front of the Prudential
Bank. A boy even offered to clean the car.
The two walked along EDSA to meet Chua
Ping. They were about 15 arms-length from the car
when they were suddenly accosted by eight
men. Carlos and Nelson asked what was
happening. The men, who were in civilian attire,
shoved Carlos and Nelson into a red Nissan
Sentra. The two were not able to shout for help.
Inside the car, Carlos was blindfolded.
Carlos and Nelson were then taken to the Anito
Hotel in Monumento and brought to separate rooms.
Once inside the hotel room, Carlos was ordered to
face the wall. His blindfold was removed but he was
boxed every time he looked at the men. The men
frisked him, seized his wallet and took therefrom cash
amounting to P78,000. His license, cellular phone,
pager and watch were also taken from him.
Carlos captors sat him on the bed and one of them
(a policeman, according to Carlos) asked him
questions like what business he was engaged
in. Carlos tried to answer the mans questions but they
could not understand him. They got mad and boxed
him.
 An hour later, a Chinese-speaking man armed with
a gun entered the room. Carlos pleaded with the man
to help him since he did not know why he was
arrested. The man asked him if he had any
money. He said Carlos must have money since he
had a business. The man offered to help him in
exchange for P500,000. If Carlos would not give the
money, the man warned, he would not arrange with
the police for a settlement; Carlos might [even] be
thrown in Marikina. Carlos told the man that he did not
have that kind of money. He said that with the help of
his friends he could raise only P50,000. The
interpreter told Carlos to wait for him and he will talk
to the policemen.
Nelson was also brought to one of the hotel rooms
and instructed to sit on the bed.Two men were in the
room with him. After an hour, a person who knew how
to speak Chinese entered the room. The man, who
did not identify himself, carried a firearm. He
demanded P50,000 from Nelson, otherwise, the man
warned, something bad will happen to
him. Papatungan ako ng kaso, Nelson said in
court. Nelson told the man, I am just working. Where
can I get such a big amount?
Carlos and Nelson were then brought to their
captors vehicles. Carlos was handed his cellular
phone so he could call up friends or relatives who
could help him produce the sum of P200,000. Carlos
attempted to call them up but there was no reply.
Riding in separate vehicles, Carlos and Nelson
were brought to the latters house in Navotas between
9:00 and 9:30 p.m. Nelson and some of the
policemen went inside the house while Carlos
remained in the car. The men took Nelsons clothes,
an electric fan, a gas stove, and a round plastic table
from the house, and loaded them into the car.
The Chinese-speaking man asked Carlos if he was
married. Carlos told him he was.The man informed
him that they would next go to Carlos house. He
instructed Carlos to tell his wife to borrow from her
friends the money they demanded.
Carlos and his captors arrived at his house at
around 11:00 p.m. Carlos wife answered the
door. Four (4) of the men accompanied Carlos into
the house, one of them holding him by the
shirt. Carlos told his wife that his companions were
policemen who arrested him because of the lumber,
and were now demanding P200,000 from him.Carlos
added that he had left his car in Monumento. Carlos
captors then brought him back to their car. From the
car, Carlos saw his wife ride in one of the policemens
vehicles.Carlos was told that his wife was going to
see her friends.
 The vehicle Carlos was riding proceeded to
Karuhatan when one of the policemen received a
message from a pager, and the group transferred to
the BB gasoline station.They stayed there for 15 to 20
minutes until the policeman received another
message from his pager. They drove to Monumento
when a hand from another vehicle signaled them to
stop. They proceeded to Camp Crame thereafter.
At Camp Crame, Carlos and Nelson were placed in
handcuffs. Later in the evening of October 25, 1994,
they were provided with a piece of paper with some
writings. The two were made to sign the paper and
place their thumb marks thereon. They told Carlos
that he would be released lunchtime the next day,
October 26, when his wife brought the money they
demanded. Nelson was given the same assurance of
release.
Carlos and Nelson were not released the following
day, however. At around 11:00 a.m., October 26,
Carlos and Nelson were presented to the media.
Carlos common-law wife, May Ann Ty, testified to
corroborate the accuseds testimony. Mary Ann and
Carlos have been living together since 1989, and
have three children. According to Mary Ann, appellant
has been engaged in the furniture business since
1989.
 Mary Ann testified that between 11 in the evening
of October 24, 1994 and 12 midnight the next day,
Carlos, along with a group of about six (6) men in
civilian attire arrived at the couples residence. They
asked her if she knew Carlos. Yes, Mary Ann replied,
and inquired what they needed from him. She also
asked the men who they were but they did not say
anything. (In court, Mary Ann identified one of them
as Abduhan, apparently referring to PO3 Elleonito
Apduhan, one of the agents who testified against the
accused.) The group informed her that Carlos was
arrested in connection with the woods. It occurred to
Mary Ann that appellant was arrested perhaps
[because] he was able to buy woods without receipts.
The men demanded that Mary Ann produce the sum
of P200,000, or else something bad will happen to
[Carlos]. They told her that they would return at 2:30
in the morning. Before they left, the men searched the
house and took her babys thermos and the batteries
of a cellular phone.
After the men left, Mary Ann changed her clothes
and woke up her brother so that he could accompany
her to borrow the money. One of her friends, a certain
John Ang, subsequently promised to lend her
P130,000 through his secretary who would bring the
money to Karuhatan. Mary Ann returned home at
past one in the morning and waited.
 Two of the men returned at about 5:00 that same
morning. Two minutes later, Carlos entered the room,
pushed by one of the men. What will you do to
me? Carlos asked in broken Tagalog. The man
replied by ordering him, Bumalik ka na sa kotse.
The men then told Mary Ann to go with them so
they could get the money from John Angs
secretary. Mary Ann thus rode with the men in a white
vehicle. She decided to go with them alone since her
relatives were busy. The vehicle first proceeded to
Maysilo, Bulacan and then to Karuhatan, Valenzuela
where Mary Ann received $4,000 and P30,000 in
cash from John Angs secretary. Back in the car with
the money, Mary Ann asked the men where her
husband was. They told her she would see her
husband when she went home before sunset.
Mary Ann then asked to whom should she give the
money. They replied, Of course for us, and the man
to her left immediately grabbed it from her. They kept
on uttering words to the effect that something bad will
happen to [her] husband. They said they planned to
bring her husband to the doctor for a check-up so in
case the couple filed a complaint, there would be no
proof that anything happened to him. The men
dropped Mary Ann off along Karuhatan in MacArthur
Highway. Mary Ann jotted down the plate number of
the mens white car then went home to Valenzuela.
 The men did not return Carlos home despite their
assurances. Mary Anns father managed to trace the
whereabouts of her husband through the vehicles
plate number.When Mary Ann went to Camp Crame
in the afternoon of October 25, 1994 to inquire about
her husband, she saw the same white car parked in
front of one of the offices. The vehicle bore the same
plate number as the one the men brought with them.
The night the men came, Mary Ann learned from
Carlos that he left his car in front of the Prudential
Bank at the Monumento Circle. Mary Ann was able to
retrieve the car, a Toyota, two days after Carlos
arrest, or on October 26, 1994, at past eight in the
morning.When she went to recover the car, a
teenaged boy approached her and asked her if she
owned the car. Yes, she replied.[22]
Norlito Dotimas, 18, and a resident of Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City was the teenaged boy from the
parking lot. Presented as a witness for the defense,
Norlito testified that since April 1994 he had been
earning a living guarding and washing cars parked in
the Prudential Bank. The bank is beside the Mercury
Drug Store in front of the Monumento in
Caloocan. Norlito works in the parking lot from eight
in the morning to seven in the evening.
Norlito narrated that at about 5:30 in the afternoon
of October 24, 1994, a red car arrived at the
Prudential Bank parking lot. Two men, who later
turned out to be the accused, alighted from the
car. Norlito offered the tall guy, referring to accused
Carlos Tan Ty, to watch and wash the latters
car. Carlos agreed and walked on. Norlito stared at
the two men as they left, wondering whether they
were Chinese or Japanese. Norlito said that the men
were not carrying anything with them.
Norlito had just started washing the back of Carlos
car when he saw that the two men, then about ten
(10) meters away, were "pinagkakaguluhan. The
taller man (Carlos) was held by the collar and then
pushed into the car. The smaller one (Nelson) was
poked with a gun on his right temple, handcuffed and
also forced into the car.
At around 8:00 a.m. the next day, October 25,
1994, someone took Carlos car from the Prudential
Bank parking lot. Norlito was not able to charge for
watching and washing that car, however, since he
was busy washing another.
Norlito admitted that he was requested by Maryann
Ty, whom he first met on December 9, 1994 in the
Prudential Bank parking lot, to testify regarding her
husbands disappearance. Norlito agreed to testify,
and Mary Ann promised to pay him P200, the
equivalent of his daily earnings.[23]
 The defense also offered the testimony of Sr. Insp.
Franklin Moises Mabanag, who was presented as a
hostile witness. Sr. Insp. Mabanag was the chief of
the Second Operation Group-Special Operation Unit
of the NARCOM when the accused were arrested. He
testified to certain aspects of the buy-bust operation
that led to the arrest of the accused.
(1) At the time he testified, Sr. Insp. Mabanag had
known Stardust for more than two (2) years, having
first met her in the place where she worked
nightly. He eventually convinced her to work with
them, and gave her the code-name Stardust. Sr. Insp.
Mabanag declined to divulge Stardusts real name in
court for security reasons. He revealed, however, that
Stardust was neither a drug pusher nor a drug user;
she did not have any arrest record. She was usually
given cash as incentive for the information she
provided; Sr. Insp. Mabanag, though, could not
remember how much he gave her in this case. He
described Stardusts participation in the operation as
indispensable.
(2) The first time Sr. Insp. Mabanag first heard
about Carlos Tan Ty was when Stardust reported on
October 24, 1994 that the accused was actively
engaged in the business of selling shabu. They
conducted a backgrounder on the accused, and their
investigation yielded several persons with the same
name as Carlos Tan. They could not verify, however,
if any one of these persons was actually the accused
Zheng Bai Hui.
(3) The accused were immediately brought to
Camp Crame after their arrest. Sr. Insp. Mabanag
prepared a spot report, which he submitted to Supt.
Charles Galinan, chief of the NARCOM Special
Operation Unit. The buy-bust operation was not only
reflected in said spot report but also in a pre-operation
report prepared by Sr. Insp. Mabanag before the
operation, and in a logbook containing the details
thereof. Not all the entries in the pre-operation report,
such as the denominations of the bills used as boodle
money, were entered in the logbook, however. Sr.
Insp. Mabanag claimed they did not maintain a police
blotter since they were a special operation unit.
(4) Sr. Insp. Mabanag denied that his operatives
demanded money from the accused in exchange for
the latters release.[24]
The defense also presented, as hostile witnesses,
SPO3 Gilbert Santos, PO3 Elleonito Apduhan and
PNP forensic chemist Leslie Maala, all of whom
previously testified for the prosecution.
The testimony of SPO3 Santos yielded the
following additional information:
 (1) The serial numbers and the denominations of
the genuine money used in the buy-bust operation
were not recorded in their police logbook, since their
Commanding Officer said it was no longer
necessary. They did not place any fluorescent
powder on the boodle money.
(2) He had never met either of the accused before
their arrest nor did he have any record or any A-1
information regarding them.
(3) They did not conduct a test-buy or a
surveillance of the activities of the accused to
determine the veracity of the information Stardust had
provided.
(4) They were not armed with a warrant when they
effected the arrest of the accused.[25]
PO3 Elleonito Apduhan also testified that he did not
know any of the accused before their arrest. He
confirmed that no test buy was conducted by their
office. He denied having gone to the house of
accused Carlos Tan Ty and demanding money from
the latters wife.[26]
Leslie Maala, for her part, expounded on the
examinations she conducted on the subject
substance. Quite pertinently, she testified that the
tests she performed, namely, the Simons test, the
Marquis test and the thin layer chromatography, are
qualitative, not quantitative tests. They are not
designed to determine the purity of the specimen. Ms.
Maala admitted she never conducted any quantitative
test on the substance since there was no request for
such an examination.[27]
The trial concluded, Judge Adoracion Angeles of
the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 121,
rendered a decision convicting both accused thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused
ZHENG BAI HUI a.k.a. CARLOS TAN TY and
NELSON HONG TY a.k.a. SAO YU are hereby
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Violation of Section 15, Article III, RA
6425 in relation to Section 21-B of the same Act and
each is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH and to pay a fine of TEN MILLION
PESOS (P10,000,000.00). With costs.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The case is now before this Court for automatic
review.
Appellants, in the brief filed by Atty. Nestor Ifurung,
contends:
I. That the trial court erred in depriving the
accused of the prized ideal of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge as part of
 procedural process. It assumed the role of the
prosecutor and judge in the case, and further
unduly and arbitrarily curtailed the right of the
accused on the cross examination of the
witnesses against them.
II. That the trial court erred in giving credence to
the so-called buy-bust story of the prosecution
despite the unmistakable hallmarks of
fabrication thereof, and corollarily, in
concluding that both accused were caught
in flagrante delicto in the act of selling
methamphetamine hydrochloride to a police
poseur buyer.
III. That the trial court erred in refusing
disclosure of the identity of and putting on the
witness stand the alleged confidential
informant who supposedly arranged the buy-
bust that led to the arrest of both accused, and
thereby, infringed upon the fundamental right
of the accused to confront and cross-examine
a material witness against them.
IV. That the trial court erred in convicting both
accused on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution showing they were the victims of
police instigation, which entitles them to
acquittal.
 V. That the trial court erred in imposing upon the
accused the capital penalty of death despite
the absence of expert evidence on the
percentage of the pure quantity of the alleged
shabu sued upon called for in Resolution No.
3, dated March 8, 1979 of the Dangerous
Drugs Board, and of Sec. 16, Art. III, of RA
6425.[29]
Appellant Nelson Hong Ty, in whose behalf Atty.
Leven Puno filed another brief, assigns similar errors
on the part of the trial court:
I THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR WHEN IT KNOWINGLY DEPRIVED
THE ACCUSED OF THE COLD NEUTRALITY
OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AS A PART OF
THEIR RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL PROCESS.
II THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT TO THE BUY-BUST STORY OF THE
POLICE OFFICERS.
III THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT BOTH ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTOIN THE ACT OF
SELLING METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE TO A POSEUR BUYER.
 IV THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR IN REFUSING DISCLOSURE OF
THE IDENTITY AND REFUSING TO PUT ON
THE WITNESS STAND THE ALLEGED
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT WHO
ALLEGEDLY ARRANGED THE BUY-BUST
DRAMA THAT LED TO THE ARREST OF
BOTH ACCUSED. THERE WAS DENIAL BY
THE TRIAL COURT THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-
EXAMINE A WITNESS AGAINST THEM.
V THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED
AND SENTENCING THEM TO THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT OF DEATH DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THEIR GUILT HAS NOT BEEN
PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. UNDER THE LAW THEY ARE
ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL ON THE
GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[30]
In his supplemental brief, appellant Nelson Hong
Ty adds that:
1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION
BASED PARTLY ON THE TESTIMONY OF A
 WITNESS WHO THROUGH INADVERTENCE
WAS NOT SWORN, BEFORE TESTIFYING
FOR THE PROSECUTION.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[31]
The arguments raised by appellants may be
reduced to the following issues:
(1) Whether the failure of a prosecution witness to
take his oath invalidates the proceedings before the
trial court.
(2) Whether appellants were denied their right to an
impartial and disinterested tribunal.
(3) Whether the refusal of the trial judge to allow
disclosure of the identity of the informer deprived
appellants of their right to confront and cross-examine
said witness.
(4) Whether the prosecution proved appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(5) Whether the death penalty should be imposed
upon appellants.
I
Appellant Nelson Hong Ty argues that the failure of
SPO1 Jerico Bacani to take an oath before he
testified deprived the accused of their right to due
process. It is contended that they are entitled to a new
trial.
That SPO1 Bacani, a witness for the prosecution,
did not take an oath before his testimony is
undisputed. The omission appears to have been
brought about by circumstances starting from the
hearing of November 14, 1994. SPO3 Gilbert Santos
was testifying on cross-examination when Atty. Leven
Puno, counsel for the defense, moved for a
continuance.[32] The trial court granted counsels
motion.[33] At the start of the next hearing, on
November 17, 1994, the prosecutor called on SPO1
Jerico Bacani as a witness[34]notwithstanding SPO3
Santos unfinished testimony. Atty. Puno objected and
reminded the court that he was still cross-examining
SPO3 Santos.[35] In response, the prosecutor
informed the court that SPO3 Santos was not present
in the courtroom[36]despite notice.[37] After some
discussion between the court and counsel for the
respective parties,[38] Atty. Puno acceded to continue
the cross-examination of SPO3 Santos at a
subsequent date.[39] The court even dictated an order
to that effect.[40] The prosecutor then offered the
testimony of SPO1 Bacani,[41] and conducted the
direct examination, without the witness having first
taken an oath. Neither did SPO1 Bacani take an oath
at the continuation of his testimony on November 23,
1994.
The failure of a witness to take an oath prior to his
testimony is a defect that may be waived by the
parties.[42] Appellant Nelson Hong Ty concedes to this
rule.[43] He asserts, however, that he did not waive his
right to object to the lack of oath, since the
inadvertence was discovered only after the judgment
of conviction by the trial court when counsel was
preparing the brief for automatic review by this
Court. As authority for this argument, appellant
cites Langford v. United States,[44] where the Court of
Appeals of the Indian Territory declared that:
x x x it would seem that knowledge or want of
knowledge [of the lack of oath] is the true test in this
class of cases. In a note to section 264b of
Wigmores Edtion (16th) of Greenleaf on Evidence
the following appears: Whether he may [have a new
trial] if a witness on the other side, testified without
having been sworn at all qure? If the omission of the
oath was known at the time, it seems he cannot; but,
if it was not discovered until after trial, he may. Mr.
Thompson, in his work on Trials (volume 1, 365)
says: It is the duty of the party calling the witness to
see that he is sworn, though, if the oath is
inadvertently omitted, the objection will not be good
after verdict; but at once adds, The objection must
be made as soon as it is discovered, or it will be
deemed waived. x x x.
Langford makes reference to the following excerpt
in Hawks v. Baker,[45] also cited by appellant:
It is the duty of the counsel offering a witness to
move that he may be sworn, and thus be qualified to
testify. * * * Thus far the counsel for the opposite
party has no concern with the transaction. He has a
right to presume that the person taking the stand in
the character of a witness has been duly sworn. Of
course, his omission to inquire and ascertain the fact
cannot be considered as any waiver of his right to
object to the incorrectness of the proceeding if the
person supposed to be sworn was in fact never
sworn. No man can be considered waiving a right
which he is unconscious of possessing.* * * The
defendant has not had a trial of his cause on legal
evidence, but partly on that which is illegal.
Langford states that knowledge or want of
knowledge is the true test in determining whether
there was a waiver of the lack of oath. We find,
however, that this test would open the door to fraud
since any party can claim want of knowledge of the
defect before verdict is rendered. Such a claim would
be exceedingly difficult to verify. We believe that the
better test would be not whether a party
had knowledge of the lack of oath but whether he
had the opportunity to know of the lack of oath. If a
party ought to have known of the lack of oath but did
not object thereto, he cannot later be heard raising
such an objection. Thus, in State v. Embrey,[46] the
Supreme Court of New Mexico held:
The testimony or declarations of any unsworn
person, given or made in the presence of the trial
judge and of the parties and their attorneys, under
such circumstances that they knew or should have
known what the unsworn individual was doing and
saying, may be considered by the jury as that of any
sworn witness. Where no objection is promptly made
to such a proceeding, it is too late to urge the
objection on motion for new trial.(Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, defendant and his counsel were
present at the hearing of November 17, 1994 when
SPO1 Bacani was presented as a witness. They did
not, however, object to the lack of oath. Nor did they
pose any objection when SPO1 Bacani continued his
testimony on November 23, 1994; Atty. Puno even
cross-examined the witness. In State v. Doud,[47] the
Supreme Court of Oregon had occasion to rule that:
If the defendant had wished that the x x x witness
should have been sworn, he should have been
observant and should have mentioned the matter in
the trial court. We are certain that had the matter
then been mentioned an appropriate oath would
have been administered. In all likelihood, it would
have produced no different effect, for all thought that
an oath had been administered. It is now too late to
present the objection. This assignment of error is
dismissed as lacking in merit.
So we hold in this case.
In any event, the granting of a new trial because of
said omission would be pointless because even if
testimony of SPO1 Bacani were excluded, it would
not materially affect the totality of the evidence for the
prosecution. His testimony is merely corroborative of
those of SPO3 Gilbert Santos, PO2 Elleonito
Apduhan and PO3 Noel Castaeto and could therefore
be dispensed with, without affecting the prosecutions
case or prejudicing that of the defense.
II
Appellants also contend that they were deprived of
their right to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,
and attempt to establish a pattern of partiality on the
part of RTC Judge Adoracion Angeles.
First, they assert that the judge actively assumed
the role of the prosecutor[48] in the examination of
Norlito Dotimas. Norlito, the watch-your-car boy,
testified that appellants did not arrive in a taxi but in a
car driven by appellant Carlos Tan Ty. In resolving
this argument, it would be helpful to examine the
entire transcript of Norlitos cross-examination and the
circumstances surrounding the questioning
appellants find so objectionable.
The prosecutor began the cross-examination by
asking the witness who requested him to
testify. Norlito answered that it was Mary Ann Ty, the
wife of appellant Carlos Ty.Asked when he was
requested to testify, Norlito replied he could not
remember. The prosecutor continued:
Q But you are sure that when you came to this Court
this morning, she accompanied you, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you neither received a subpoena coming
from the Court to testify today, is that correct?
A None, sir.
Q And where did she pick you up before you came
to this Court?
A From Arte Subdivision, sir.
Q Where is that Arte Subdivision?
A In BBB, sir.
COURT:
 Q Valenzuela?
A Yes, your Honor.[49]
A couple more questions were asked by the
prosecutor when the judge interrupted
him. Apparently, the judge wanted to clarify where
Mary Ann picked up Norlito because when he recited
his personal circumstances, he said that he resided
in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan. The clarification led to
several more questions involving when and where
Norlito and Mary Ann agreed to meet in Arte
Subdivision. Thereafter, she ordered the prosecutor
to continue with the cross-examination.
Before the prosecutor could continue, however, the
judge again asked a series of questions, all pertaining
to when Norlito and Mary Ann first met. These
questions, the defense claims, were aimed to
discredit[50] the witness:
FISCAL MANANQUIL:
Q After the incident, Mr. Witness, you did not
even(interrupted).
COURT: (Butts in for clarificatory questions)
Q What was the date on Friday?
A December 9, 1994, your Honor.
Q In other words, is it your testimony now that it was
only on December 9, 1994 that you came to know
that you will become a witness in this case?
A I was told by a woman by the name of Mary Ann,
your Honor.
COURT:
Q Going back to the question of the Court. Is it your
testimony now that it was only on Friday
afternoon of December 9, 1994 that you came to
know that you will be a witness in this case?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Tell to the Court how did Mary Ann Ty came to
know your residence?
A I accompanied her in our house, your Honor.
COURT:
Q So, prior to December 9, 1994, Mary Ann Ty had
already talked with your relative to this case?
A No, your Honor.
COURT:
Q When did you accompany Mary Ann Ty to your
house then?
A When I was washing cars, your Honor.
 COURT:
Q When was that?
A I cannot remember, sir/your Honor.
COURT:
Q How many days prior to December 9, 1994?
A I cannot remember, sir/your Honor.
COURT:
Q Could it be two (2) weeks or two (2) days prior to
December 9, 1994?
A I cannot remember, your Honor.
Continue fiscal.[51]
After several questions by the prosecutor, the
judge made this telling observation:
Make it on record that the Court has observed that
from the very start of the testimony of the witness,
he was looking in only one direction, outside. He
never look to the persons profounding [sic] the
questions, whether the Court, Whether to the
prosecutor, or to the interpreter or even to the
counsel for the accused.[52]
Another question was then posed by the
prosecutor. The witness answered, but the judge
promptly noted
Likewise, make it on record that after the Court has
observed, that he started to look at the persons
profounding [sic] the questions.[53]
The prosecutor continued with the cross-
examination, delving on the scene before and during
appellants arrest. This was followed by another series
of questions from the judge which, according to
appellants, make it appear that [the witness] gave
testimony for the defense because he was
bribed[54] by Mary Ann Ty.
COURT:
Q Tell to the Court how many cars did you wash and
watched on that particular day when the two
accused were allegedly arrested?
A Four (4) cars, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Is it your testimony now that you watched only
four (4) cars from morning up to the evening?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What are the colors of the car of the three other
cars which you washed and watched on that day,
together with the car owned by the accused
driven by Carlos Ty?
A White, light green and blue, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Do you also know the owners?
A No, your Honor.
FISCAL MANANQUIL:
Q You said that you cannot remember the time.
(interrupted)
COURT: (Clarificatory questions )
Q By the way, how much were you paid for the car
which you washed and watched?
A It depends upon the amount given by the
customer.
COURT:
Q On that day, how much was given to you by the
owners of the cars you washed, the four (4) cars.
A P20.00
COURT:
Q For four (4) cars?
A Only one, per car, your Honor.
COURT:
Q P20.00 for each car?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Is it your testimony now that you are paid for
P20.00 for each car you washed?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q In other words, you received P80.00 on that
particular day?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q So today you will earn anything?
A None, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Did she (referring to Mary Ann Ty) promise you to
give something?
A No, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Is it your testimony now that you come to the
Court without receiving a subpoena and yet you
abandon your work as a car-wash boy and you
will not receive any single cent?
A There was, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How much were you paid today?
A None, yet, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How much did she promise to give you?
ATTY. PUNO:
May I request your Honor to specify the person, he
might not know .
COURT:
Q According to him, it was Mary Ann Ty, who
fetched you at Arte Subdivision. Is it your
testimony now that it was Mary Ann Ty who
brought you to this Court now?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q You testified a while ago that .......Was she the
one who promised to give you?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How much? How much did Mary Ann Ty promise
to give you today?
A The amount I will earn for this day, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How much?
ATTY. PUNO:
 Kikitain.. His earning this day, your Honor is what he
said.
COURT:
Q Precisely, how much?
A I cannot estimate, your Honor.
FISCAL MANANQUIL:
Q More or less?
A P200.00, sir.[55]
The judge then returned to the subject of Mary Ann
and Norlitos initial meeting.
COURT: (clarificatory questions from the Court).
Q You testified that you met Mary Ann Ty in the
parking lot on December 9, 1994, was it right?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q And also, on that day, that you agreed with Mary
Ann Ty that she will fetch you at the Arte
Subdivision at BBB, Valenzuela, Metro Manila?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Tell to this Court why do you still accompany her
to your house and show your house to her at
 Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City on December 9,
1994?
A So, that, I can relate to her the incident, your
Honor.
COURT:
Q Why? Could you tell to the Court today? You
cannot tell to her the place where you were
working, and that you still have to accompany her
to your house?
A No, sir.
COURT:
Continue, Fiscal.[56]
The cross-examination by the prosecutor
proceeded until the judge again propounded
questions, picking up where she left off. The defense
construes this line of questioning as badgering[57] on
the part of the judge:
COURT:
Q Why did you abandon your work on December 9,
1994 and you accompanied Mary Ann Ty to your
house and showed to her your house?
A I left my work, because I narrated to her the
incident, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Did she give you something on that day on
December 9?
A No, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Are you sure?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What time did you leave at the parking area?
A In the afternoon, sir/your Honor.
COURT:
Q About what time?
A 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What time do you usually leave the parking area,
your regular time for leaving?
A 6:00 oclock in the evening, your Honor.
COURT:
Q So, in other words, you did not earn for two (2)
hours anymore?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
 Q And yet, you claimed that you were not paid by
Mary Ann Ty?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Anymore, Fiscal?[58]
The cross-examination ended with a question from
the prosecutor. The judge also propounded a few
more questions again relating to the alleged meeting
between Norlito and Maryann.
Thereafter, Atty. Puno proceeded with the witness
re-direct examination. After several questions by Atty.
Puno pertaining to the conversation Norlito had with
Mary Ann at the witness house, the judge interjected
with her own questions on the subject. At this point,
Atty. Puno tried to protest since the witness was
getting confused. The judge, according to appellants,
only exhibited greater vehemence and further tried to
push him to the wall,[59] thus:
ATTY. PUNO:
Q In fairness to the witness, he is getting confused,
your Honor.
COURT:
The question is one by one. I am trying to find out
the truthfullness of his testimony, counsel
COURT:
Q Is that what happened? She just glanced at
you? Who started introducing ones self, yourself
or herself?
A The person by the name of Mary Ann Ty, your
Honor.
COURT:
Q Who described each of you? Was she or were
you the one?
A She told me and I volunteered lakas-loob. She
told me to testify in this case, your Honor.
COURT:
Q And you agreed?
A And I readily agreed, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Where did it happen when she said you will testify
and you agreed?
A In our house, sir/your Honor.
COURT:
Q In the parking lot Did she tell you in the parking
lot?
A No, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How did you bring her to your house?
 A She went with me, because I told her to go with
me, your Honor.
COURT:
Q The first time that you and Mary Ann met each
other at the parking lot, where you were working
as a car-wash boy, what transpired between you
and Mary Ann Ty in the afternoon of October 24,
1994?
A I was the person whom she asked or inquired to,
your Honor.[60]
It is also claimed that the judge then exploit[ed] the
confusion of the witness by a maze of baffling trivials
[sic]:[61]
COURT:
Q So, at the parking lot, she already asked you to
testify in this case.
A Not yet, your Honor..
COURT:
Q What REALLY transpired between you and Mary
Ann at the parking lot?
A She asked me, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Is it your testimony that she immediately
approached you at the parking lot?
A She asked me, your Honor.
COURT
Q In other words, she approached you at the
parking lot?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What then were you doing at that time?
A I was washing car, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How did she introduced herself?
A She introduced herself to me, your Honor.
COURT:
Q How did she introduced herself to you?
A She told me that she is the wife of Carlos Ty.
COURT:
Q What did you talked about at the parking lot
before you accompanied her to your house?
A No more, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Tell to the Court what precipitated you to
accompany her to your house?
A So that she will know my house, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Why do you want her to know your house?
A So that we can talk, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Why, when you can already talk at the parking
lot?
A Because I was busy then, your Honor.
COURT:
Q The more you will lose your job, if you go home?
A I was busy and I accompanied her to our place,
your Honor.
COURT:
Q Why did she want to go to your house, if you
know?
A So that I can narrate to her the whole incident,
your Honor.
COURT:
Q Why? What did you tell her exactly before going
to your house?
A About the whole incident, your Honor.
COURT:
Q In other words, you already narrated to her
everything before you went to your house?
 A No, your Honor.
COURT:
Q What did you tell her exactly?
A She introduced herself to me, your Honor.
COURT:
Q Did you volunteer to accompany her to your
house or she volunteered to you to go to your
house? What is which?
A She was the one who volunteered, your Honor.
COURT:
Q So, it was not true that she went there in order
that you can tell her the whole incident, because
she was the one who volunteered herself to go to
your house?
A She volunteered to go with me to our house, so
that we can talk, your Honor.
COURT:
Q For how long did you talk with each other at the
parking lot?
A Only few seconds, your Honor.[62]
Atty. Puno manifested that the judge herself was
actually conducting the cross-examination, and a
spirited discussion between counsel and the judge
ensued:
ATTY. PUNO:
I do not know how to tell this to the Court, Your
Honor, but I will not be true to my duty to my client
if I will not express this to the Courtthat the
Presiding Judge actually was doing the cross-
examination.
COURT:
No, counsel, thats for clarification of the Court. I
would like to find out also some matters.
ATTY. PUNO:
This is very honest, that is no longer clarificatory
questions, but that is actually cross-examination
for the prosecution I am very sorry to say this,
Your Honor. I am telling this with all honesty and
I felt your Honor, I will not be true to my duty to
my client if I will not express this. And I want that
to be placed/put on record
COURT:
Those questions were asked by the Presiding
Judge for clarification for clarificatory questions,
because there are matters which are very vague
to the Court.
ATTY. PUNO:
That is my manifestation, your Honor.
COURT:
And that is also the observation of the Court on the
matter.
ATTY. PUNO:
Do not know if this will be all that (interrupted).
FISCAL MANANQUIL:
Besides, it was the witness himself who testified that
she was requested by Mary Ann Ty to testify,
thats precisely why we are going deeper
(interrupted)
COURT:
No. The observation is not only in the particular
point. The prosecution and the defense is entitled
to their own observation in the same way that the
Court is entitled to its own observation. Because,
the trial court has to observe the demeanor of the
witness while testifying. As a matter of fact, even
on appeal, the findings of the trial court with
respect to findings of fact will be given much
weight, because we, Judges in the trial court has
the capacity to observe the demeanor of the
parties to witnesses being presented in
Court.Therefore, I have to make it on record the
demeanor of the witness or the witnesses, so
that, when I make the proper evaluation and
assessment by the time a decision will be
rendered in this case, everything will have to
 appear on record, for the guidance of the Court. It
is the prerogative of the Presiding Judge to ask
clarificatory questions on matters which are still
very vague to Him or to Her, in order that He or
She will not be misguided in the proper evaluation
and assessment of the facts of the case.. Thats it
ATTY. PUNO:
Your Honor, please, I agree that clarificatory
questions were to be asked by the Presiding
Judge, as the latter is entitled to it. The only thing,
if your Honor please, is that, this witness is not an
intelligent witness and because of this cross-
examination conducted by the Presiding Judge of
this Court---and I am very sorry to say this---. May
I place it on record that this witness actually got
confused
COURT:
That is your assessment, simply because the Court
was able to find out, in the conduct of its
clarificatory questions, some matters which were
not taken up by the Prosecuting Fiscal, like for
example, the testimony of the witness that she
was paid by such Mary Ann Ty, and probably
thats the reason why you did not like the Court to
ask that question. Thats your observation and
this is the observation of the Court.
ATTY. PUNO:
May I take exception to the observation of the Court
with regards to payment .. I believe your Honor,
that he was paid for the amount of his gana ..
COURT:
Everything were placed on records. Never mind,
you and I cannot change the testimony of the
witness at this point in time. So, let us not make
any alteration in the testimony of this witness. At
this point in time, the Court is not yet in a position
to evaluate the evidence, as the Court is still in
the process of receiving the evidence for the
defense. But, the Court should not be divested of
its prerogative to conduct clarificatory questions
on the matter which are still very vague .
ATTY. PUNO:
This is my manifestation, your Honor.
COURT:
Everything is on record.
COURT:
After all, it is the duty of the member of the Bench to
always aid the Court in the proper administration
of Justice, so that the Court should not be
divested of its right to conduct clarificatory
questions. And, neither the lawyer should be a
 bar if the Court asks clarificatory questions on
matters which are vague, so much so, that the
Court is not interested in this case. If at all, the
Court asks clarificatory questions, it is for the
purpose of finding out the truth and for the
purpose of aiding the Court in the proper
evaluation and assessment of facts and evidence
on records, in order, further, that the law may be
acquired properly.[63]
On that note, the hearing of December 12, 1994
ended.
A week later, the accused filed a Motion to
Inhibit/Disqualify Presiding Judge,[64]contending that
the judge exhibited bias against the accused in her
questioning. The judge denied the motion in an
Order[65] ated December 20, 1994, prompting the
accused to file a petition for certiorari[66]before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals initially
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Angeles from hearing the case.[67]The appellate court,
however, eventually dismissed the petition for lack of
merit and lifted the restraining order,[68] thereby
allowing trial to continue.
Like the Court of Appeals, we find no prejudice in
the judges questioning.
 From the outset, Her Honor had observed that the
witness Norlito Dotimas never looked at any of the
persons propounding the questionsthat is, until the
judge made her observations of
record. Understandably, appellants did not care to
mention this fact in their pleadings. It is in the context
of the judges observations, however, that her
questioning must be construed.
The averted gaze, in our culture, is a telltale sign of
prevarication, and Norlitos reticent demeanor no
doubt raised suspicions in the judges mind that his
testimony may be a fabrication. The judge also noted
in her Order denying the motion to disqualify her that
the witness was evasive.[69] Of course, the witness
behavior could be attributed to shyness, or even
nervousness, since the witness was testifying in court
for the first time.[70] In any case, it was incumbent
upon the trial judge to confirm or dispel her
suspicions.It was, after all, her duty to ascertain the
credibility of the witness to enable her to arrive at a
just verdict. In the fulfillment of this duty, the judge
dwelt at length on how Norlito and Mary Ann first met
and whether Norlito was paid in exchange for his
testimony. It would be to curtail or limit unduly the
discretion of a trial judge to impute with a sinister
significance such minute and searching queries from
the bench,[71] especially in light of the witness
suspicious behavior.
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge
of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to
develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords
no justification for a charge that he has assisted the
prosecution with an evident desire to secure a
conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses
for the defense.[72] The trial judge must be accorded
a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to
witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts
to make the record speak the truth.[73] Trial judges in
this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the
facts, and they would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice
as a result of a failure to propound a proper question
to a witness which might develop some material
bearing upon the outcome.[74] In the exercise of sound
discretion, he may put such question to the witness
as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to
the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the
truth.[75] A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness.[76] He may propound clarificatory questions
to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the
truth.[77] He may seek to draw out relevant and
material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
party.[78] It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one
party.[79]
To prop up their theory of bias, the defense claims
that the judge in asking questions to prosecution
witnesses SPO3 Gilbert Santos,[80] SPO1 Gerico
Bacani,[81] SPO3 Noel Castaeto,[82] and Leslie
Maala[83] Actually helped the prosecution.[84] We do
not agree.As we held in People vs. Angcap:[85]
x x x. At the most, there was the effort of the trial
judge to arrive at the truth and do justice to the
parties. It would be a distorted concept of due
process if in pursuance of such a valid objective the
trial judge is to be stigmatized as being guilty of an
act of unfairness. x x x. There is nothing on record to
show that anyone of the judges of the trial court
attempted to help the prosecution. The questions
propounded by the judge, subject of appellants
complaint, appeared to have been intended to elicit
the truth from the witnesses. The inquisitiveness
complained of by appellants counsel did not have
the purpose of unduly harming the substantial rights
of the accused. It was only to be expected from the
judges who, with full consciousness of their
responsibilities, could not easily be satisfied with
incompleteness and obscurities in the
testimonies. This assignment of error is therefore
unfounded.[86]
Next, it is claimed that the judge prevented the
defense from pursuing intensive inquiries of
witnesses.[87] Instances are cited where the judge
allegedly blocked off[88]questions by defense counsel
even when the prosecutor failed to object. Thus,
when SPO3 Santos was testifying for the defense as
a hostile witness, Atty. Ifurung, the counsel for the
defense, asked him:
Q I ask you Mr. Santos, are you a forensic chemist?
A No, sir.
Q. Have you ever been trained in the detection and
identification of drugs?
A Yes, sir.
Q. You would be able to determine a drug without
use of a laboratory examination?
A Yes, because that is similar with the one brought
to the laboratory, sir.
Q Would you be able to differentiate from other
crystalline like tawas without conducting
laboratory examination?
A The appearance of tawas is . (interrupted)
COURT:
The witness is not testifying as an expert witness
ATTY. IFURUNG:
But he effected the arrest, your Honor.
COURT:
But you are practically asking him of the opinion on
shabu
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
The witness is incompetent. He is not a chemist who
can determine whether the substance was shabu
or not
ATTY. IFURUNG:
The determination of whether the substance is
shabu or not is important for the purpose of
effecting the arrest.
COURT:
While it may be true that the determination of the
substance is shabu or not by the witness is .The
witness is not testifying here as an expert witness
and you are asking for an opinion, counsel.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
May we move for consideration because he said he
effected the arrest and the reason is he said he
was selling the shabu. And now, I am testing his
credibility.
COURT:
Motion for reconsideration, DENIED.
xxx
Q. Where did you undergo any training in the
determination of regulated and prohibited drugs,
or did you not?
A Camp Crame, Quezon City, sir.
Q Will you tell us who was your instructor on that
particular training?
A Inspector Reyes, sir.
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court the full name of
Inspector Reyes?
A Romeo Reyes, sir.
Q Will you tell us the degree of this Inspector
Reyes?
A Class 83, sir.
Q I am asking for his academic degree.
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
Incompetent and immaterial
COURT:
Sustained.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
He claims that he is an expert by reason of his
training. I am asking him who was his instructor. It
is very material, because the witness testified that
he was very sure that what he bought is
methamphetamine hydrochloride and I am
testing his credibility.
COURT:
While it may be true that this witness testified that
he bought shabu, he is not testifying here as
forensic chemist with expertise on chemical
analysis. He is testifying as a poseur buyer and
therefore, further questions on the witness would
be out of order. Hence, the Court grants the
motion of the prosecuting fiscal.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
Q I asked you, Mr. Witness, as an agent, how long
have been an agent of NARCOM?
A Six (6) years, sir.
Q Have you written any book on the identification
and analysis on drugs?
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
Objection, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
 ATTY. IFURUNG:
May we ask for reconsideration
COURT:
Denied.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
He has opened the gate on this line of
questionings. We wanted to test his credibility.
COURT:
Third motion for reconsideration, denied.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
In fairness to the accused. The accused here is
charged with capital offense.
COURT:
The Court is aware of that.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
We are only asking that we will be allowed to test
the credibility of the witness on material points,
but not on expertism and special knowledge.
COURT:
On this particular case, you are asking the witness
on particular knowledge or qualification.[89]
The questions by counsel in court regarding the
ability of the arresting officer to distinguish
between shabu and tawas without a laboratory
examination, the academic degree of his training
instructor, and the officers authorship of books on
drug identity and analysis are irrelevant, improper and
impertinent. In drug cases, an arrest made in
flagrante delicto does not require that the arresting
officer possess expert knowledge of the substance
seized, or that he perform precise scientific tests to
determine its exact nature. That would be impractical,
and obstructive to effective law enforcement. The
judge was therefore correct in disallowing these
questions.
The judge need not have waited for an objection
from opposing counsel to bar immaterial questions. A
judge has the duty to see to the expeditious
administration of justice.[90] If the opposing counsel
does not object to such questions, the judge cannot
stand idly by and allow the examining counsel to
propound endlessly questions that are clearly
irrelevant, immaterial, improper or tend to be
repetitious. The action by the judge in this case,
therefore, cannot be deemed prejudicial; indeed, it is
entirely proper. In Ventura et al. vs. Judge
Yatco,[91] we said:
About the active part that the judge took in the trial,
the court finds that said active part was for the
purpose of expediting the trial and directing the
course thereof in accordance with the issues. While
judges should as much as possibly refrain from
showing partiality to one party, it does not mean that
a trial judge should keep mum throughout the trial
and allow parties that they desire, on issues which
they think are the important issues, when the former
are improper and the latter, immaterial. If trials are to
be expedited, judges must take a leading part
therein, by directing counsel to submit the evidence
on the facts in dispute, by asking clarifying questions
and by showing an interest in a fast and fair
trial.Judges are not mere referees like those of a
boxing bout, only to watch and decide the results of
the game; they have as much interest as counsel in
the orderly and expeditious presentation of
evidence, calling attention of counsel to points at
issues that are overlooked, directing them to ask
questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarifying ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, etc. Unless they take an active part in
trials in the above form and manner, and allow
counsel to ask questions, whether pertinent or
impertinent, material or immaterial, the speedy
administration of justice which is the aim of the
Government and of the people cannot be
attained. Counsel should, therefore, not resent any
interest that the judge takes in the conduct of the
trial, they should be glad that a trial judge takes such
interest and help in the determination of the truth.
It is also argued that the judge showed her uneven
hand[92] when she overruled objections interposed by
the defense when it was the prosecutions turn to
examine SPO3 Santos. This was supposedly in
contrast to the above actuation exhibited by the judge
when the defense was examining the same witness.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
Q Mr. witness, you have a Commanding Officer in
your unit?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you will agree with me that your commanding
officer is the one who determines whether the
operation is a buy-bust or a raid?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
This was not taken on direct-examination. He said
he was the one who arranged with Stardust, so
we object with the line of questionings.
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
I am on cross-examination.
COURT:
Overruled, witness may answer.
A Our commanding Officer, sir.
Q In this particular case, you are telling this
Honorable Court that it was your Commanding
Officer who will determine whether the buy bust
operation shall be conducted against accused
Zheng Bai Hui, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Likewise, Mr. witness, it was your Commanding
Officer who determines whether or not the two
P500.00 paper bills which were used together
with the boodle money should be placed with
flourescent powder or not?
ATTY. IFURUNG:
I will object, I think the Commanding Officer would
be the best witness on this line of questionings.
COURT:
I would like to be clarified on this. You testified
during the direct-examination that you lied to the
accused when you said that you are a drug
pusher, who has run out of stock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Why do you say so? Why did you lie to the
accused and said that you are a drug pusher?
ATTY. IFURUNG:
With due respect to this Honorable Court, we will
object. Because in that case, the Honorable
Court would be now assuming. . . (interrupted)
COURT:
The Court, in the exercise of its duty and in order to
find out the truth, can ask clarificatory questions.
WITNESS:
In order that I could buy from him drugs, your Honor.
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
x x x.
Q And lastly, why did you effect the arrest of Mr. Tan
Ty?
A Because of the shabu which he was bringing, sir.
Q When was that?
A On October 24, 1994 between 6:00 oclock to 7:00
oclock in the evening, sir.
Q Was that after the fact that after you have handled
the boodle money to the accused?
ATTY. IFURUNG:
THE FACT in the last question, he stated negative
to the answer and I closed my examination. . . . It
 was answered contrary to the answer of the
accused. . . .
COURT:
Objection, overruled, witness may answer.
A Not yet. When he was able to bring it to me and
who hand it to me and I opened it, thats the time
I gave the boodle money, your Honor/sir.
xxx
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
Q Please tell to the Court what were the specific
instructions given by your Commanding Officer
before you effected the buy-bust operation?
ATTY. IFURUNG:
We object in the first place, there was no statement
by the eye witness as to any instruction given by
his Commanding Officer with respect to that buy-
bust operation.
COURT:
Overruled, witness may answer.
A We conducted surveillance on the area where we
are going to. And if we were already there, I will
approach him and I will pose as a buyer. And if I
 can see that there is shabu, then I will arrest him,
sir.[93]
We discern no bias in the foregoing
proceedings. The questions of the prosecutor were
proper, and the objections of defense counsel were
correctly overruled.
The prosecutors question as to whether the
Commanding Officer determines if the operation
should be a buy-bust or a raid was objected to for not
having been taken up on direct examination. The
question, however, was merely preliminary and was
posed to lay the foundation for the next question, that
is, whether it was the Commanding Officer who
determined if fluorescent powder should be placed on
the boodle money or not. The latter question, too, was
within the bounds of the rules of evidence[94] for
defense counsel had previously asked questions
whether fluorescent powder was used in the
operation.[95]The question was intended to blunt any
implication from defense counsels questions
thatSPO3 Santos was somehow responsible for the
non-use of fluorescent powder in the buy-bust
operation. In response, SPO3 Santos said that the
decision to use fluorescent powder rested in the
Commanding Officer. Contrary to defense counsels
objection, SPO3 Santos was equally competent to
answer this question. He was a subordinate of the
Commanding Officer and a member of that particular
command, and therefore knowledgeable of the
decision-making policies therein.
The judges query as to why SPO3 Santos
pretended to be a drug pusher was completely
relevant in determining the legality of the
entrapment. Moreover, the defense counsel had
asked during the direct examination if SPO3 Santos
lied when he allegedly told the accused that he was a
drug pusher. The judge merely asked why he
lied. The question was clearly clarificatory.
Neither do we find anything objectionable to the
prosecutors question on whether the accused were
arrested after SPO3 Santos handed over the money
to them. It is not clear from the transcript what exactly
was the ground for counsels objection.
Lastly, the judge did not err in overruling counsels
objection to the questions pertaining to the
Commanding Officers specific instructions to SPO3
Santos for, on re-direct examination, Atty. Ifurung,
counsel for the defense, asked:
Q What is the name of your Commanding Officer?
A Sr. Ins. Franklin Mabanag, sir.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
 Q So, you just follow instructions from your
Commanding Officer?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed by your Commanding
Officer to effect the arrest of Carlos Tan Ty?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed to effect his arrest under
any circumstances?
A Yes, sir.
FISCAL CAJIGAL:
Misleading, your Honor.
ATTY. IFURUNG:
That will be all, your Honor.[96]
Upon the conclusion of the re-direct examination, the
adverse party may re-cross-examine the witness on
matters stated in his re-direct examination.[97]
In sum, we find that the judge, in propounding
questions to the witnesses, in overruling ungrounded
objections and disallowing improper questions by the
defense, did not exhibit any bias against the
accused. On the contrary, the judge demonstrated
nothing more than an unwavering quest for the truth
and a rightful intolerance for impertinence, fully
cognizant of her duties and of the scope of her
discretion.
III
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in
sustaining the refusal by Sr. Insp. Mabanag to divulge
the identity of Stardust, the woman who informed the
police about the two accused. It is claimed that such
refusal violated the right of the accused to confront
and cross-examine said witness.[98]
As a rule, informers are not presented in court
because of the need to preserve their cover so they
can continue their invaluable service to the
police.[99] Equally strong reasons include the
maintenance of the informants health and safety and
the encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to
police authorities.[100] The rule against disclosure is
not absolute, however. In Roviaro v. United
States,[101] the United States Supreme Court
declared:
What is usually referred to as the informers privilege
is in reality the Governments privilege to withhold
from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged
with enforcement of that law. [Citations omitted.] The
purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and
protection of the public interest in effective law
enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation
of citizens to communicate their knowledge of the
commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials
and, by preserving their anonymity, encourages
them to perform that obligation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying
purpose. Thus, where the disclosure of the contents
of a communication will not tend to reveal the
identity of an informer, the contents are not
privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer
has been disclosed to those who would have cause
to resent the communication, the privilege is no
longer applicable.
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege
arises from the fundamental requirements of
fairness. Where the disclosure of an informers
identity, or of the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or
is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the
privilege must give way. In these situations the trial
court may require disclosure and, if the Government
withholds the information, dismiss the action.
xxx
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to
disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow
of information against the individuals right to prepare
his defense. Whether a proper balance renders
nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into
consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informers
testimony, and other relevant factors.
Before disclosure of the informers identity may be
allowed, however, the defense must, before or during
the trial, request the production of the confidential
informant or his identification.[102] (Thus,
in Roviaro the accused repeatedly demanded
disclosure.) In addition, the defendants must show
how the identity of the informer is essential to their
defense.[103]
In this case, counsel for appellant Carlos Tan Ty
indeed requested the trial court to compel Sr. Insp.
Mabanag, who was then testifying on direct
examination, to reveal the identity of Stardust:
Q: What is the real name of Stardust?
A: For security reason, we cannot give her name,
sir.
Q: Is it not a fact Mr. Mabanag, that this informant
was the one who arrange for the selling of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In other words this Stardust is known to the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So there is no reason for you to hide the identity
of the informant considering that according to you
she is known to the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact she was the one who allegedly arrange for
the buying of the alleged shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please give her name?
A: For security reason I cannot give her name,
because we are putting the very life of the
informant to danger, sir
Atty. Ifurung:
Your Honor please may we request the witness to
give the name of the alleged informant since
according to him she is known to the accused, so
there is no reason for the witness to keep the
identity of the informant, so may we request that
the Court directs the witness to divulge the
identity of the informant
Court:
 She might be known but the court will not compel
the witness to divulge the identity of the informant
for security reason as alleged by the witness.[104]
Appellants nevertheless failed to show at the time
of their request how the identity of the informer or her
production was essential to their defense. In State v.
Driscoll,[105] the defense, during the cross-
examination of the States final witness, asked the
witness the name of the informant. The prosecution
objected to the question for being outside the scope
of the direct examination. The court sustained the
objection, stating I will not compel him to answer that
question if he desires not to at this time. The state
rested and the defendant presented his evidence
without renewing his request for the disclosure of the
identity of the informer. The defendant was
subsequently convicted for burglary. On appeal, the
defendant assigned as error the trial courts refusal to
require disclosure of the identity of the informer. The
Supreme Court of Washington held that the trial court
did not commit error in ruling thus. It held:
In the instant case, the request came from the
defendant at the time and in the manner
hereinabove set out, and was not in any fashion
thereafter renewed. The defendant, at the time of
the request, did not advise the trial court of his
proposed defense of entrapment nor undertake, in
any way, to enlighten the trial court as to the
materiality of relevancy of the requested
disclosure. The ruling at that particular stage of the
proceedings was to the effect that disclosure would
not be required at that time. The door was thus open
to subsequent showing and request.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v.
Boles, 246 N.C. 83, 85, 97 S.E. 2nd 476, 477, in
considering a like claim of error under analogous
circumstances, stated
In passing on defendants assignments based on
exceptions Nos. 4 and 5, we must do so in the light
of the facts before Judge Johnston at the time he
made the ruling complained of. At that time there
was no conflict in the testimony. Nothing appeared
in the evidence concerning the informer except the
fact that he was present when the witness made the
purchase. We hold that the defendant did not make
a sufficient showing to require the disclosure. The
courts refusal to order it under the circumstances
was not error.
******
Had the defendant, in the light of this conflict [a
conflict in the evidence developed by defendants
testimony], requested the name of the confidential
informer as a possible defense witness, a more
serious question would have been presented. That
question, however, was not before Judge Johnston
and consequently is not before us. The propriety of
disclosing the identity of an informer must depend
on the circumstances of the case and at what stage
of the proceedings the request is made. Roviaro v.
United States, [decided 25 March, 1957, 353 U.S.
53, 1 L.Ed.2d 639] 77 S.Ct. 623.
Under the circumstances of the instant case, we
hold the trial court did not commit error in the ruling
complained of.
Like in Driscoll, the defense in this case did not
renew their request for the production of the informers
identity. Nor did they advise the trial court of their
defense or the relevancy of such disclosure when
they demanded the production of Stardusts
identity.When Sr. Insp. Mabanag was put on the
stand, there was no hint that the accused was going
to raise frame-up, extortion, and instigation as
defenses. The accused had not yet testified; neither
had appellant Carlos Tan Tys wife, Mary Ann. The
defense did not raise the question of the informers
identity again after these witnesses testified.
The burden of showing need for disclosure is upon
defendants.[106] The necessity for disclosure depends
upon the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informers testimony, and other relevant factors.
Appellants did not develop any such criteria with
reference to the merits of the case.[107] A mere
request during a witness examination indicates
speculation on the relevancy of his testimony; and
mere speculation an informer may be helpful is not
enough to carry the burden and overcome the public
interest in the protection of the informer.[108] Hence,
the trial court did not err in sustaining the refusal of
the witness to reveal the identity of Stardust.
IV
We come now to the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence.
The elements necessary in every prosecution for
the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.[109] The Court finds that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses adequately
establish these elements. The Court has no reason to
doubt the following assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of these witnesses:
An exhaustive scrutiny of the prosecutions evidence
shows that the accused were caught in flagrante
delicto through a buy-bust operation staged b police
operatives. Both accused were positively identified
by the poseur-buyer himself and by three (3) other
members of the buy-bust team. These eye
witnesses for the prosecution were also consistent in
their testimonies concerning the important details of
the sale, to wit: (1) that the informant was at the
scene and it was she who identified the two
accused, (2) that Gilbert Santos acted as poseur-
buyer, (3) that the said poseur-buyer handed the
boodle money to accused Carlos Tan Ty and the
latter called his co-accused Nelson Hong Ty who
handed to the poseur-buyer a blue plastic bag
containing the regulated drug, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu.[110]
Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the
assessment of witnesses credibility by the trial court,
because the latter was in a position to observe their
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.[111]
Appellants however attempt to poke holes in the
prosecutions case. They theorize that the buy-bust
operation was merely a contrivance as indicated by
the following so-called unmistakable hallmarks:
(a) a fictitious informant,
 (b) no pre-arrest test-buy,
(c ) absence of pre-arrest surveillance,
(d) use of bogus/boodle money,
(e) drug sale in public,
(f) no record of operation in the police blotter,
(g) money not dusted with fluorescent
powder.[112]
We are not swayed by this argument.
Appellants claim that the failure of the prosecution
to present the informer in court demonstrates that the
informer is fictitious and gives rise to the presumption
that her testimony would be adverse if produced.
The rule in determining whether the informer
should be presented for a successful prosecution in
cases involving buy-bust operations is best stated
in People vs. Doria:[113]
Except when the appellant vehemently denies
selling prohibited drugs and there are material
consistencies in the testimonies of the arresting
officers, or there are reasons to believe that the
arresting officers had motives to testify falsely
against the appellant, or that only the informant as
the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire
transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it will be merely corroborative of
the apprehending officers eyewitness
testimonies. There is no need to present the
informant in court where the sale was actually
witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution
witnesses.
None of the above circumstances obtains in this
case. While appellants do deny selling shabu, there
are no material inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the arresting officers.The arresting officers had no
motive to testify against appellants; the claims of
extortion against the arresting officers, as will be
shown later, were not firmly established. Finally, the
informer was not even the poseur-buyer in the
operation. The sale was actually witnessed and
adequately proved by the prosecution witnesses. The
presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, to wit: (e) [t]hat evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced, therefore,
does not apply since the testimony of the informer
would be merely corroborative.[114]
That no test buy was conducted before the arrest
is of no moment for there is no rigid or textbook
method of conducting buy-bust operations. For the
same reason, the absence of evidence of a prior
surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-
bust operation,[115] especially when, like in this case,
the buy-bust team members were accompanied to
the scene by their informant.[116] The Court will not
pretend to establish on a priori basis what detailed
acts police authorities might credibly undertake and
carry out in their entrapment operations.[117] The
selection of appropriate and effective means of
entrapping drug traffickers is best left to the discretion
of police authorities.[118]
Appellants describe as implausible the testimony
that they supposedly merely looked at the boodle
money without counting it. We find nothing dubious in
appellants behavior.Indeed, it is totally consistent with
human nature. Appellants were engaged in an illegal
activity and it was necessary that they act
inconspicuously. The sale was consummated in
public and appellants would invite unwanted attention
if they counted the money right in busy Monumento.
Appellants also fault the police officers for not
observing the purported proper procedure in the
marking and the blotter of the P500 bills used as part
of the boodle money. They failed to establish,
however, that such a procedure existed. Sr. Insp.
Mabanag, on the other hand, testified that they do not
even maintain a police blotter[119]since they were a
special operation unit.[120]
That the sale was in public does not diminish the
prosecution witnesses credibility or the
trustworthiness of their testimony. In People vs.
Zervoulakos,[121] we observed that the sale of
prohibited drugs to complete strangers, openly and in
public places, has become a common
occurrence. Indeed, it is sad to note the effrontery
and growing casualness of drug pushers in the
pursuit of their illicit trade, as if it were a perfectly
legitimate operation.
Appellants submit, however, that this ruling applies
only to small level drug trafficking, and not to cases
involving a substantial amount of drugs, such as the
one at bar. The distinction is illusory for it is not
improbable for large transactions involving drugs to
take place under the cover of commonplaceness. A
kilo of shabu can be transported and delivered with
facility in public and it does not tax credulity that such
transactions indeed occur. While the sale may have
been made to a stranger, the lure for easy profits can
easily outweigh the risk of arrest and
prosecution. Moreover, the risk was reduced by the
introduction by the informant, who had regular contact
with appellant Carlos Tan Ty,[122]of the poseur-buyer
to the latter.
Equally without merit is the argument that the buy-
bust was not recorded in the police blotter is proof of
a sham buy-bust. A prior blotter report is neither
indispensable nor required in buy-bust operations.[123]
 Lastly, the failure of the NARCOM agents to use
fluorescent powder on the boodle money is no
indication that the buy-bust operation did not take
place. Like a prior blotter report, the use of
fluorescent powder is not indispensable in such
operations. The use of initials to mark the money
used in the buy-bust operation has been accepted by
this Court.[124] The prosecution has the prerogative to
choose the manner of marking the money to be used
in the buy-bust operation.[125]
Appellants raise the defense of frame-up. Frame-
up is the usual defense of those accused in drug
related cases,[126] and it is viewed by the Court with
disfavor[127] since it is an allegation that can be made
with ease.[128] For this claim to prosper, the defense
must adduce clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that government officials
have performed their duties in a regular and proper
manner.[129]Appellants have failed to provide clear
and convincing evidence that they were framed by the
NARCOM agents. Appellants testimonies were
corroborated merely by Norlito Dotimas and Mary
Ann Ty. Norlito Dotimas credibility, however, remains
doubtful because of his suspicious behavior and
evasive answers while on the witness stand. Mary
Ann Ty, on the other hand, is the common-law wife of
appellant Carlos Tan Ty and the mother of his three
children.[130] She has a natural interest in favoring
appellants. Pitted against the presumption that
government officials have performed their duties in a
regular and proper manner, the evidence for the
defense simply cannot prevail.
The claim of extortion is similarly untenable. Like
an alleged frame-up, a supposed extortion by police
officers is a standard defense in drug cases[131]and
must also be proven by clear and convincing
evidence.[132] Again, appellants have failed to
discharge this burden. Such a claim is supported only
by the same unreliable evidence to support the claim
of frame-up.
Appellants submit in the alternative that the facts
as presented by the prosecution reveal that the law
enforcers instigated appellants to sell shabu to
them. We find no instigation in this case.
x x x the general rule is that it is no defense to the
perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or
that the criminal act was done at the decoy
solicitation of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the
act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of
cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by
the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or the
instigation of the detective.[133]
Here, the law enforcers received a report from their
informant that appellants were big time drug
pushers. Poseur-buyer SPO3 Santos then pretended
to be engaged in the drug trade himself and, with the
help of his fellow NARCOM agents, arrested
appellants in the act of delivering the shabu. Hence,
appellants were merely caught in the act of plying
their illegal trade.[134]
Contrary to appellants contentions, no tinge of
unconstitutionality attended the arrest of appellants.
What we said in People vs. Liquen[135]is sufficient to
dispose of this argument:
In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was
formed by the police officers precisely to test the
veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend the
perpetrator. Having caught the culprit red-handed as
a result of the buy-bust operation, Garcia and his
team-mates were not only authorized but were also
under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even
without a warrant of arrest. Section 5 (a) of Rule 113
of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, reads in
part as follows: Sec.5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawfulA peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; x x x.
Clearly, the situation in the case at bar is one where
a person commits a crime in the presence of a police
officer; hence, the latter may validly arrest the
offender even without first obtaining a warrant of
arrest.[136]
There can be no doubt, therefore, that appellants
are guilty of the sale of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug,[137] in violation of
Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act,[138] as
amended.
Conspiracy between the appellants was evident.
The transaction was successfully consummated
between the poseur-buyer and appellant Carlos Tan
Ty, together with his companion, appellant Nelson
Hong Ty, with one receiving the marked money and
the other delivering the contraband to the poseur
buyer. No other logical conclusion would follow from
the duos concerted action except that they had a
common purpose and community of interest, the
accepted indicia that could establish the existence of
conspiracy.[139] Conspiracy having been established,
the accused are answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation.[140]
Conspiracy,[141] as used herein, refers to the
manner of incurring criminal liability, and not a crime
in itself. Conspiracy is not punishable except when
the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor,[142] such as in conspiracies to commit
treason,[143] coup
detat,[144] rebellion,[145] sedition,[146] and the sale of
dangerous drugs. The last is punishable under
Section 21(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[147]
When the conspiracy relates to a crime actually
committed, the conspiracy is absorbed; it does not
constitute a separate crime, but is only a manner of
incurring criminal liability. The participants to the
crime are merely held equally liable since the act of
one is the act of all. It was thus error for the trial court
to convict appellants for Section 15, Article III, RA
6425 [punishing the sale of regulated drugs] in
relation to Section 21-B [penalizing the conspiracy
to sell regulated drugs] of the same Act.[148] In this
case, the crime (the sale of regulated drugs), and not
only the conspiracy (to sell the same) was actually
committed. To hold appellants liable for violation of
Section 15 alone, therefore, would be more precise
and more in accord with the principles of criminal
law.[149]
V
We arrive at the imposition of the proper penalty.
Section 15 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 states:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand persos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this
Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed.
In relation thereto, Section 20 of the same law, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or instruments of the
Crime.- The penalties for offenses under Sections 3,
4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15
and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following
quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams of more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil;
7. 40 grams of more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity
of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
From the foregoing provisions, the penalty for the
sale of regulated drugs is based, as a rule, on the
quantity thereof. The exception is where the victim is
a minor or where the regulated drug involved is the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. In such
cases, the maximum penalty prescribed in Section
15, i.e., death, shall be imposed, regardless of the
quantity of the prohibited drugs
involved.[150] Appellants, therefore, cannot be
sentenced to suffer the death penalty under this
exception, the conditions for its imposition not being
present. Their penalty ought to be determined by the
quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride involved
in the sale.
To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives
a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is
more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the
law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion
perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances,
the death penalty.[151] Appellants however foist the
probability that the substance sold could contain
additives or adulterants, and not just
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual
weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3
grams, thereby possibly reducing the imposable
penalty.
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar
argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:[152]
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were
not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly
found inside the bags. It is suggested that since the
law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty
dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs
seized or take, then laboratory tests should be
undertaken for the entire amount or quantity of drugs
seized in order to determine the proper penalty to be
imposed.
The argument is quaint and even borders on being
ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that
the confirmatory tests were conducted on samples
taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages,
accused-appellants arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages
weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than
sufficient to justify imposing the penalty under Sec.
14 of Rep. Act. No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act
No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of the
packages is logically presumed to be representative
of the entire contents of the package unless proven
otherwise by accused-appellant. Therefore, a
positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative
that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic
package from which the sample was taken. If it is
then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, x x x that
accused appellant transported into the Philippines
the plastic packages from which samples were taken
for tests, and found positive as prohibited drugs,
then conviction for importing shabu is definitely in
order. (Italics in the original. Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can
be presumed that the entire substance seized
is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the
accused who must prove otherwise. Appellants in this
case have not presented any evidence to overcome
the presumption.
The sale of 200 or more grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug,[153] is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, and a fine ranging from P500,000 to
P10,000,000.00.[154] No aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime. Hence,
appellants can only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
The personal corporal punishment must be
complemented by the pecuniary penalty provided
therein. With respect to the latter, the courts may
determine the amount of the fine within the range
provided by law, subject to the rule on increasing or
reducing the same by degrees as provided by the
Revised Penal Code.[155]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Zheng Bai
Hui alias Carlos Tan Ty and Sao Yu alias Nelson
Hong Ty are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425 and
are hereby sentenced to each pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) and
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Records, p. 1.
[2]
TSN, November 9, 1994, pp. 2-22; TSN, November 14,
1994, pp. 1-20; TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 22-30.
[3]
TSN, November 17, 1994, pp. 10-40; TSN, November
23, 1994, pp. 31-47.
[4]
TSN, November 25, 1994, pp. 2-27; TSN, November 28,
1994, pp. 2-14.
[5]
TSN, December 2, 1994, pp. 2-47.
[6]
Exhibits C to C-6.
[7]
Exhibit A.
[8]
Exhibit B.
[9]
Exhibits A-1 and B-1.
[10]
Exhibit D.
[11]
Exhibits D-1 to D-3.
[12]
Exhibit J-4.
[13]
Exhibit J.
[14]
Exhibits J-1-A to J-1-C, J-3-A and J-3-B, and J-4-A
to J-4-C.
[15]
TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 2-30.
[16]
Exhibit G.
[17]
Exhibit H.
[18]
Exhibit I.
[19]
TSN, September 4, 1996, pp. 2-16.
[20]
TSN, September 25, 1996, pp. 2-24.
[21]
Both accused speak Mandarin, and have difficulty
speaking Filipino and English.
[22]
TSN, May 3, 1996, pp. 8-42.
[23]
December 12, 1994, TSN, pp. 5-30.
[24]
TSN, January 8, 1996, pp. 2-22; TSN, February 9, 1996,
pp. 1-18.
[25]
TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 5-22.
[26]
TSN, December 11, 1995, pp. 2-11.
[27]
TSN, May 5, 1996, pp. 2-16; TSN, June 11, 1996, pp.
2-20.
[28]
Rollo, p. 491.
[29]
Id., at 80-81
[30]
Id., at 281-282. Underscoring in the original.
[31]
Id., at 358-359.
[32]
TSN, November 14, 1994, p. 20.
[33]
Records, p. 55.
[34]
TSN, November 17, 1994, p. 2.
[35]
Ibid.
[36]
Ibid.
[37]
Id., at 3.
[38]
Id., at 3-8.
[39]
Id., at 8.
[40]
Id., at 9.
[41]
Ibid.
[42]
See Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Wilby, 69 N.E. 2d
429 (1946).
[43]
Rollo, p. 359.
[44]
76 S.W. 111 (1902).
[45]
6 Greenl. 72, 19 Am. Dec. 191.
[46]
305 P.2d 723 (1956).
[47]
225 P.2d 400 (1950).
[48]
Rollo, pp. 82 and 283.
[49]
TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 11-12.
[50]
Rollo, p. 83.
[51]
TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 13-14.
[52]
Id., at 15.
[53]
Ibid.
[54]
Rollo, p. 84.
[55]
TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 19-21.
[56]
Id., at 21-22.
[57]
Rollo, p. 86.
[58]
TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 24-25.
[59]
Rollo, p. 88.
[60]
Id., at 28-29.
[61]
Rollo, p. 89.
[62]
TSN, December 12, 1994, pp. 28-29.
[63]
Id., at 31-33.
[64]
Records, pp. 80-95.
[65]
Id., at 99-100.
[66]
Id., at 105-133.
[67]
Resolution dated January 26, 1995; Records, p. 175.
[68]
Decision dated June 22, 1995; Records, pp. 203-208.
[69]
Records, p. 99.
[70]
TSN, December 12, 1994, p. 26.
[71]
People vs. Ancheta, 64 SCRA 90 (1975).
[72]
United States vs. Lim Tiu, 31 Phil. 504 (1915).
[73]
People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 (1987).
[74]
United States vs. Hudieres and Sagun, 27 Phil. 44
(1914).
[75]
Id.
[76]
People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98 (1987).
[77]
People vs. Muit, 117 SCRA 696 (1982).
[78]
People vs. Manalo, supra.
[79]
People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 (1984).
[80]
TSN, November 14, 1994.
[81]
TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 43-44.
[82]
TSN, February 4, 1994, pp.42-44.
[83]
TSN, November 23, 1994, pp. 15-16; TSN, November
25, 1994, p. 4.
[84]
Rollo, pp. 296-301.
[85]
43 SCRA 437 (1972).
[86]
People vs. Angcap, supra, quoting People vs.
Manalo, supra.
[87]
Rollo, p. 93.
[88]
Id.
[89]
TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 15-18. Underscoring
supplied.
[90]
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, SECTION 3.05.
[91]
105 Phil. 287 (1959).
[92]
Rollo, p. 101.
[93]
TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 20-22. Underscoring
supplied.
[94]
Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that
Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness
may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any
matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest of
bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing
upon the issue.
[95]
TSN, November 27, 1995, pp. 13-14.
[96]
TSN, November 27, 1995, p. 22.
[97]
RULES OF COURT, RULE 132, Section 8.
[98]
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, Section 14 (2).
[99]
People vs. Collantes, 208 SCRA 853 (1992).
[100]
People vs. Bolasa, 209 SCRA 477 (1992).
[101]
353 US 53, 1 L ed 2d 639, 77 S Ct 623 (1957).
[102]
United States v. Lewis, 315 F.2d 228 (1963). See
also McCoy v. State, 140 A.2d 689 (1958).
[103]
People v. Dewson, 310 P.2d 1962 (1957).
[104]
TSN, January 8, 1996, pp. 7-8.
[105]
379 P.2d 209 (1963).
[106]
State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70 (1972).
[107]
Rugendorf v. United States, 376 US 528, 11 L ed 2d
887, 84 S Ct 825 (1964), citing Roviaro vs. United States,
supra.
[108]
State v, Battle, supra.
[109]
People vs. De Vera, 275 SCRA 87 (1997).
[110]
Rollo, p. 487.
[111]
People vs. Lacerna, 278 SCRA 561 (1997). See also
People vs. Atad, 266 SCRA 262 (1997); People vs. Juatan,
260 SCRA 532 (1996); People vs. Ang Chut Kit, 251
SCRA 660 (1995); People vs. Flores, 243 SCRA 374
(1995); People vs. Utinas, 239 SCRA 362 (1994);
People vs. Merabueno, 239 SCRA 197 (1994); People vs.
Manahan, 238 SCRA 141 (1994); People vs. Go, 237
SCRA 73 (1994); People vs. Garcia, 235 SCRA 371
(1994); People vs. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51 (1994).
[112]
Rollo, p. 104.
[113]
301 SCRA 668 (1999).
[114]
People vs. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733 (1995).
[115]
People vs. Manahan, supra.
[116]
People vs. Lacbanes, supra.
[117]
People vs. Go, supra, citing People vs. Roldan, 224
SCRA 536 (1993).
[118]
Id.
[119]
TSN, February 9, 1996, p. 15.
[120]
Id., at 8-9.
[121]
241 SCRA 625 (1995).
[122]
TSN, November 14, 1994, p. 9.
[123]
People vs. Ang Chut Kit, supra.
[124]
People vs. Rivera, supra, citing cases.
[125]
Id.
[126]
People vs. Enriquez, 281 SCRA 103 (1997); People vs.
Lising, 275 SCRA 807 (1997).
[127]
People vs. Lacbanes, supra. See also People vs.
Velasco, 252 SCRA 135 (1996); People vs. Nicolas, 241
SCRA 67 (1995); People vs. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 (1995).
[128]
People vs. Tranca, supra; People vs. Agustin, 215
SCRA 725 (1992).
[129]
People vs. Enriquez, supra; People vs. Lising, supra.
[130]
TSN, May 3, 1996, p.8.
[131]
People vs. Enriquez, supra. See also Manalili vs.
Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 400 (1997); People vs.
Doroja, 235 SCRA 238 (1994).
[132]
People vs. Bolasa, 209 SCRA 476 (1992).
[133]
People vs. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 56 Phil. 44
(1931), quoting 16 Corpus Juris, p.88, sec. 57.
[134]
People vs. Balidiata, 222 SCRA 409 (1993).
[135]
212 SCRA 288 (1992).
[136]
People vs. De Jesus, 205 SCRA 383 (1992).
[137]
People v. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 (1994).
[138]
Republic Act No. 6425.
[139]
People vs. Herrera, 247 SCRA 433 (1995).
[140]
People vs. Solon, 244 SCRA 554 (1995).
[141]
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. (REVISED PENAL CODE,
ARTICLE 8.)
[142]
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 8.
[143]
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 115.
[144]144
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 136.144
[145]
Id.
[146]
REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 141.
[147]
SEC. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy.- The same penalty
prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense
shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to
commit the same in the following cases:
(a) Importation of dangerous drugs;
(b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of dangerous drugs;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for prohibited drug
users;
(d) Manufacture of dangerous drugs; and
(e) (e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of
prohibited drugs.
[148]
Rollo, p. 491.
[149]
See People of the Philippines vs. Berly Fabro y
Azucena, G.R. No. 114261, February 10, 2000.
[150]
See People vs. Garcia, 235 SCRA 371 (1994).
[151]
See People vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703
(1998). Also People vs. Valdez, 304 SCRA 140 (1999);
and People vs. Medina, 292 SCRA 436 (1998).
[152]
276 SCRA 24 (1997).
[153]
People v. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 (1994).
[154]
Section 15 in relation to Section 20 (b), R.A. No. 6425,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
[155]
People vs. Medina, supra.