Special Second Division G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Supreme Court of the Philippines
371 Phil. 672
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON,
NQSR MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents' and
intervenors' separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, as well as their motions to refer this case to this Court en
banc.
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which
the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions
for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the
Court sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999,
wherein we noted without action the intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration
With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc" filed on December
3, 1998, on the following considerations, to wit:
"the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the Court
after their motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the April 24,
1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was also
denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides, their
aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The impropriety of
movants' December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more glaring considering
that all the respondents in this case did not anymore join them (movants) in
seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998 Resolution."[1]
Subsequently, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
their "Motion For Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17,
1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With
Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)" on December 3, 1998,
accompanied by a "Manifestation and Motion"[2] and a copy of the Registered
Mail Bill[3] evidencing filing of the said motion for reconsideration to this Court
by registered mail.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and

intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend
that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated
April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to
carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be
referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision:
"Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without
the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number
is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc."[4]
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand,
and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters,
which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must
refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the
rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the
above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the
Constitution where these words appear.[5]
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case,
the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted
Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If
there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the
case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has
already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for
reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie
in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which
must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the
necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,
the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered
and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
It is the movants' further contention in support of their plea for the referral of
this case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate motions
are of first impression. In the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Antonio M.
Martinez during the resolution of the motions for reconsideration on November
17, 1998, the following was expressed:
"Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the
issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify
lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been
decided by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs.
Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need not obtain
the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case
states:
`WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's
order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
`xxx xxx xxx' (Emphasis supplied)
"Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a

unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court.
Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised
by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court
en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants'
motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate."[6]
The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not
dispose of the earlier motions for reconsideration of the Decision dated April
24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present motions for reconsideration
necessarily partake of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which,
according to the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in
relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is
prohibited.
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second
motion for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive
reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration
must be filed with express leave of court first obtained.[7] In this case, not only
did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have
been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons for us to give due course
to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for
referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject of this
resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration
which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure,
the allegations contained therein have already been raised before and passed
upon by this Court in the said Resolution.
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had
already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This
ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the part of
respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of
the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-
reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation,
however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be
true that on its face the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded
on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for
reconsideration, the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the
substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, viz: "Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case."[8]
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly
vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the
people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by
the development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a
question of technicality but of substance and merit.[9]
Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule

once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors in this case. In their present
motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest inasmuch as they
have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, or CLOAs, and
that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been
identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. These
arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have already been raised in
intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our April 24, 1998 Decision.
Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are
admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own
the land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the
land.[10] Moreover, the "Win-Win" Resolution itself states that the qualified
beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the
Department of Agrarian Reform.[11] Absent any definitive finding of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested
with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this
case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the
requisite standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-Win" Resolution. No legal
rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors' "Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter
To The Court En Banc," dated December 3, 1998; respondents' "Motion For
Reconsideration Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For
Referral Of The Case To This Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer
For Issuance Of A Restraining Order)," dated December 2, 1998; and
intervenors' "Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme Court Sitting En Banc
To Annul The Second Division's Resolution Dated 27 January 1999 And
Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By
The Intervenors," dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY.
No further motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.

Special Second Division G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999: Ynares-Santiago, J.

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Special Second Division G.R. No. 131457, August 19, 1999: Ynares-Santiago, J.

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Supreme Court of the Philippines

371 Phil. 672

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION

In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and

"Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a

Before finally disposing of these pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule

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