Goitia vs.
Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married
on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed
together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home. Goitia filed a complaint
against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused
to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation.
Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and
stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.
Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal
home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband
to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal
home.
ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ de ARROYO
GR No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
FACTS:Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo were married in 1910 and have lived
together as manand wife until July 4, 1920 when the wife went away from their common home
with the intention of living
separate from her husband. Mariano’s efforts to induce
her to resume marital relations were all in vain.Thereafter, Mariano initiated an action to compel
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with himas a dutiful wife. Dolores averred by way
of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled toleave because of the cruel
treatment of her husband. She in turn prayed that a decree of separation bedeclared and the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership as well as permanent separate maintenance.The trial
judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the
husbandwas more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justificationfor her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off
of marital relations with him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can compel one of the spouses to cohabit with each other
HELD: NO.
It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
tocohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of
one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclinedto sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be
entered to compelthe restitution of the purely personal rights of
consortium . At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of
justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of marriedpeople shows that the policy of the
practice is extremely questionable.We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in
this case is entitled to the unconditionaland absolute order for the return of the wife to the
marital domicile, which is sought in the petitorypart of the complaint; though he is, without doubt,
entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife haspresented herself without sufficient cause and
that it is her duty to return.Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to
the original complaint and thecross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has
absented herself from the marital homewithout sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is
her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolvedfrom the cross-complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs of either instance.
Agapay vs. Palang
GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The
trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a house
in Pozzorubio Pangasinan.
The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise
agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their
child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed
the complaint but CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of
Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However,
their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the properties
acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual contribution. If
actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
shares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20
years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal
partnership property of the deceased and Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in
favor of Herminia. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take
place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation
in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from the compromise was not specifically
for separation of property and should not be so inferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who prepared the deed of
conveyance for the property revealed the falshood of Erlinda’s claim that she bought such
property for P20,000 when she was 22 years old. The lawyer testified that Miguel provided the
money for the purchase price and directed Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly a donation and which was clearly void
and inexistent by express provision of the law because it was made between persons guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code,
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
Harding vs Commercial Union Assurance
38 Phil. 464 – Mercantile Law – Insurance Law – Representation – Warranty
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as
a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell, and Co. which was the duly
authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in
the Philippines. The car’s value was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic
(Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The
mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This
estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell, and Co. She also
disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an
agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as
to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union
also stated that the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her
husband] is void under the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
HELD: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made
by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the
cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00
and then thereafter, Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to
P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was
effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this
valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of
necessity, to a large extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the
validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated
value.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael
GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him
after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house as well as the store
inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the master’s bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for
her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila
who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower.
The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided with food
and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos” where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house
to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor
was valid.
HELD:The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain
documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand
her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.
BA Finance Corp vs. CA
GR 61464, May 28 1988
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by
a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries.
Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who
managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered, purportedly
authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. 2months prior the
procurement of the loan, Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the
same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were
guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A. Soriano
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented with the
order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the
properties attached by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction of any judgment
which was likewise granted by the court.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband.
HELD:
A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said
proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the
same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the
property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. The obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family
and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife
in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the
requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto
against his conjugal properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment cannot be issued
against the said properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages
amouting to P660,000.00.
Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6
children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in
various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband for the separation of their
properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged
their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the
conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he
was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the
conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits
in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband
had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for
the fear that her husband might squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the
concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the
family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully
and with intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has
been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant
or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business
constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter
disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.
