Borges and The Ontology of Tropes: Ivan Almeida & Cristina Parodi
Borges and The Ontology of Tropes: Ivan Almeida & Cristina Parodi
Borges and The Ontology of Tropes: Ivan Almeida & Cristina Parodi
S
uch is the closing tercet of the double sonnet “El Ajedrez”, by J.
L. Borges. .And this question represents, perhaps, the quintes-
sence of what can be called “Borges’ rhetorical ontology”2.
Rhetoric is, no doubt, one of the central points in the Borgesian Welt-
anschauung. Not only rhetoric as subject, but also rhetoric considered as
an intellectual or, moreover, an ontological position, and even, like in
this sonnet, as a way to deal with the problem of God.
For the occidental tradition, the idea of God is intimately related to the
idea of causality. That means that for any chain of facts it is reasonable
to postulate an absolute beginning, which can be called “God”. Never-
theless, if instead of explaining the universe through the principle of
causality we decide to refer to the pure idea of a “form” -as one can
speak of “rhetorical (or mathematical) forms”-, the chain ceases to be
factual and becomes structural and iterative, like a grammar, and there
is no longer any way to avoid the possibility of denying a “real” begin-
ning. The entities in the world become figures in a diagram, the onto-
logical “history” becomes a rhetorical “texture” (trama), and God (writ-
ten with upper initial) may always “be moved” by some other “god”
1 God moves the player, who moves the pawn. /And behind God, which god opens
the run /of dust and time and dream and agonies? (El Hacedor, OC 2: 191).
2 The present essay is a re-elaboration of some themes dealt about in the Permanent
Seminar of the “J. L. Borges Centre for Studies & Documentation”, in 1994 and 1995,
as well as in the Ph.D. Seminar of the Faculty of Arts, University of Aarhus during
the Fall Semester 1995. We owe many of the following ideas to the participants in
the Permanent Seminar.
(with lower initial), and so on, following a never ending texture “of
dust, and time, and dream and agonies”.
The purpose of the following pages is to illustrate this Borges intellec-
tual position with some of his most relevant texts. Considering the on-
tological option of Borges’ rhetoric (or the rhetoric option of his ontol-
ogy, which, in this case, is the same) can also help us to discover the
amazing degree with which the boundaries of rhetoric have been
changing steadily throughout the centuries.
volving here the deliberative activities before the laws, the forensic dis-
courses before the courts, and the epideictic speeches before occasional
assemblies.
Aristotle was the first who systematically tried to turn rhetoric from a
simple strategy of persuasion into a real theoretical endeavour to eluci-
date the conditions of persuasion. And thus, he placed rhetoric in some
tense relationship with dialectic, which, as for it, only aims to ‘expose’,
without any perlocutionary intention. Even if Aristotle attempted to
make rhetoric meet somewhere the question of truth, mainly by includ-
ing the syllogism as a figure of speech, he and his disciples continued
to consider it as a purely pragmatic discipline. Gradually rhetoric re-
ceived its standard division into inventio (subjects, arguments, com-
monplaces), dispositio (arrangement of large units of discourse, such as
narration, peroration, etc.), and elocutio (management of terms and
phrases). To this last component belongs the well-known division into
tropes and figures. In this long first period, they are considered mostly
as ornamental means belonging to the complex art of persuasion. Quin-
tilian described the tropes as “the artificial alteration of a word or
phrase from its proper meaning to another”, and the figures as “a
change in meaning or language from the ordinary and simple form”.
3 Tesauro (25-26) said that while theologians search to confirm their theses by the
means of litteral arguments, God, through the Inspired Writers, often has recourse
to the “concetti predicabili” based on metaphors.
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4 “…e dove quelle vestono i concetti di parole, questa veste le parole medesime di
concetti”. (67)
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on a historical deed: the fact that the Chinese emperor Shih Huang Ti
was the one who paradoxically ordered both the construction of the
wall of China and the destruction of all books in his empire. What dis-
turbs Borges in his analysis is that both actions, construction and de-
struction in such an enormous scale, have their origins in the same per-
son. He considers a few of the many possible conjectures -historical,
ethical, magical, etc.- that could help to interpret this paradox, but since
none of them alone provides a satisfactory interpretation, each is ulti-
mately discarded.
The most immediate interpretation is also the most trivial: “Burning
books and erecting fortifications is a common task of princes” (221)8.
But doing that in such a scale should not be a simple question of degree:
Walling in an orchard or a garden is ordinary, but not walling in an
empire. Nor is it banal to pretend that the most traditional of races
renounce the memory of its past, mythical or real. (221)9
A possible historical interpretation is that by burning the books, the
emperor attempted to eradicate the memory of the whole past in order
to abolish one single memory: that his own mother had to be banished
for being a libertine. “The conjecture is worthy of attention, but tell us
nothing about the wall” (222)10.
Borges also briefly offers a magical interpretation without further
elaboration: maybe “the wall in space and the fire in time were magic
barriers designed to halt death”(222)11.
There are also two possible psychological interpretations: a) “a king
who began by destroying and then resigned himself to preserving”12,
and b) “a disillusioned king who destroyed what he had previously
defended”13. The problem here is that these interpretations presuppose
that both acts were separated by an amount of time adequate to foster a
radical change in emotional state, but history tells that they were al-
8 “Quemar libros y erigir fortificaciones es tarea común de los príncipes” (Otras in-
quisiciones. OC 2: 11).
9 “Cercar un huerto o un jardín es común; no, cercar un imperio. Tampoco es baladí
phenomena, but go also beyond the pure artistic domain, so that they
become the secret formal root (as the ontological reason) of historical
events. Finally, it seems that for Borges the rhetorical-formal interpreta-
tion of this fact somehow depends on the circumstance that the two
events were, if not simultaneous, at least occurred close together in
time. We will see that the rhetorical interpretation of the universe im-
plies its fundamental untemporality. Narrative structures seem to be
the human way of approaching the timeless ontological structure, con-
stituted by rhetorical forms.
17 “En la figura que se llama oximoron, se aplica a una palabra un epíteto que parece
contradecirla; así los gnósticos hablaron de luz oscura; los alquimistas, de un sol
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negro. Salir de mi última visita a Teodelina Villar y tomar una caña en un almacén
era una especie de oximoron; su grosería y su facilidad me tentaron. (La circunstan-
cia de que se jugara a los naipes aumentaba el contraste.)” (El Aleph. OC 1: 590)
18 “La historia era increíble, en efecto, pero se impuso a todos, porque sustancial-
mente era cierta. Verdadero era el tono de Emma Zunz, verdadero el pudor, verda-
dero el odio. Verdadero también era el ultraje que había padecido; sólo eran falsas
las circunstancias, la hora y uno o dos nombres propios.” (El Aleph. OC 1: 568)
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19 “(…) la historia es un círculo y que nada es que no haya sido y que no será.” (OC
1: 550)
20 “(…) para curarse del rencor que éste le infundía” (551).
21 “El final de la historia sólo es referible en metáforas, ya que pasa en el reino de los
cielos, donde no hay tiempo.” (556)
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22“Tal vez cabría decir que Aureliano conversó con Dios y que Éste se interesa tan
poco en diferencias religiosas que lo tomó por Juan de Panonia. Ello, sin embargo,
insinuaría una confusión de la mente divina. Más correcto es decir que en el paraí-
so, Aureliano supo que para la insondable divinidad, él y Juan de Panonia (el orto-
doxo y el hereje, el aborrecedor y el aborrecido, el acusador y la víctima) formaban
una sola persona.” (556)
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ian hexameter: “Ibant oscuri sola sub nocte per umbras”, in which the hu-
man solitude and the nocturne shadows exchange their attributes.
Anyway, the consequence of such inversion is, in this case, not so dras-
tic. Its only effect is a total doubt installed about the relevance of any
kind of distinction: if the ‘reverent heretic’, condemned, “dies at the
stake”, the ‘irreverent orthodox’, “died just as John had”. By the way,
let us remark that, after all, both theologians meet in Paradise…
The role of flames is capital in this story. They constitute the element of
neutralisation of all varieties of distinction. Four different stakes struc-
ture the transition between opposite values. The first one is the burning
by the Huns of the sacred books in a monastery. The second one is the
punishment of the Monotones’ leader Euphorbus. The third one is the
punishment of John of Pannonia, and the last the forest “stake” that
burned Aurelian. The result of the first fire determines the way of all
subsequent transitions: the fire consumes a part of Saint Augustin’s
Civitas Dei, that refutes the platonic theory of eternal repetition, but the
burned piece concerned only the augustinian refutation, leaving intact
the stated platonic quotation as if it were a part of augustinian doctrine:
The text pardoned by the flames enjoyed special veneration and those
who read and reread it in that remote province came to forget that the
author had only stated this doctrine in order better to refute it. (150)23
Thus the first and the constant effect of the flames is to pervert any sys-
tem of doctrinal distinction: fire is blind, as Borges was. It can be said
that each character in the story is constructed following this first
schema of ‘released quotations’. Each character literally encloses, as a
refutation does, the opposite character into his own ‘script’, and then,
due to some literal or metaphorical fire, the negation and quotation
marks disappear and the contraries become a single, perverted, entity.
Yet, perverting doesn’t mean inducing in some chaotic confusion. What
time distinguishes, ‘flames’ integrate -but following different figures
that correspond to rhetorical forms. Such is the God’s ‘ars rhetorica’
Borges introduces in the coda of his story.
The final scene cannot be described but metaphorically, not -as we
would expect it- because it is impossible to describe the transcendence,
but because in the kingdom of heaven, “there is no time.” Thus the
metaphor is the timeless counterpart of narrative oppositions in a tem-
23 “El texto que las llamas perdonaron gozó de una veneración especial y quienes lo
leyeron y releyeron en esa remota provincia dieron en olvidar que el autor sólo de-
claró esa doctrina para poder mejor confutarla.” (550)
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porally affected situation. The human vision considers the universe and
the history as constituted partes extra partes, but for the eternal present
of God, the oppositions are simultaneous elements of a complex figure.
What there is struggle, here is oximoron. The history is only a temporal
degradation of the eternal timeless rhetoric.
In fact, Borges doesn’t believe in the reality of time. Not in the sense
Kant does not, but rather he professes the temporally disconnection of
things and events. He has published an essay paradoxically titled “A
New Refutation of Time”(Other Inquisitions), in which he says:
I deny the existence of one single time, in which all things are linked
as in a chain. The denial of coexistence is no less arduous than the
denial of succession.
I deny, in an elevated number of instances, the successive; I deny, in
an elevated number of instances, the contemporary as well. The lover
who thinks While I was so happy, thinking of the fidelity of my love, she
was deceiving me deceives himself: if every state we experience is ab-
solute, such happiness was not contemporary to betrayal; the discov-
ery of that betrayal is another state, which cannot modify the “previ-
ous” ones, though it can modify their recollection. The misfortune of
today is no more real than the happiness of the past. (257)24
Finally, we can observe that the rhetorical ‘spatialisation’ of temporal
oppositions leads Borges not to a new kind of platonic dogmatism, as if
there were some rhetorical archetypes to which this reality should be
conformed, but to a sort of aesthetic scepticism. The aesthetic view of
reality allows the gratuitous treatment of the oppositions as if they
were as many figures we can contemplate, without any necessity of de-
ciding about their truth-possibilities.
In this connection we can remember that each time Borges himself has
to evaluate the different interpretations of a historical or fictional event,
he prefers to savour each of them. This is the meaning of his frequent
‘perhaps’ we have found in “The Theologians”, but also in “The Wall
and the Books”. In front of the impressive array of possible interpreta-
tions that can be provided to the paradoxical action of Shih Huang Ti,
the rhetorical position of Borges does not produce a new interpretation,
25 “La muralla tenaz que en este momento, y en todos, proyecta sobre tierras que no
veré, su sistema de sombras, es la sombra de un César que ordenó que la más reve-
rente de las naciones quemara su pasado; es verosímil que la idea nos toque de por
sí, fuera de las conjeturas que permite. (Su virtud puede estar en la oposición de
construir y destruir, en enorme escala.) (OC 2: 12-13)
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Borges’ story ends: “beside the deserter Martín Fierro” and this name is
a disclosure to the reader: just now the reader notices that what he has
read was not a ‘real’ biography but the trans-fictional reconstruction of
a fictional person: Cruz, the friend of Fierro, the main character in El
gaucho Martín Fierro, a long poem written by José Hernández in 1869.
One element of surprise in this text is that Cruz, an illiterate man, as he
is living his real life, guesses that, in a certain way, he has already lived
all those present events. And only the aware lector discovers that
Cruz’s life is, so to say, a pragmatic ‘quotation’ of a character in an exis-
tent literary book. But then, the decisions the man takes moved by this
special ‘memory’ determine a ‘real’ evolution of his character inside the
plot of the book in question. The effect here is similar to the situation
created by Woody Allen in The purple rose of Cairo. The hypothesis that
lies under those artistic works is that there is no priority of real life over
fiction.
Another surprising element is that in Borges’ rewriting of the classical
poem, Cruz not only rejoins his official adversary Fierro (that is the
case in Hernández’s poem), but also ‘becomes’ Fierro: fighting with
him is a temporal way of showing his untemporal identification whit
him. This is the way in which Borges describes the last encounter:
A notorious reason prevents me from telling the struggle. Be it
enough for me to recall that the deserter wounded or killed several
Cruz’s soldiers. As Cruz was fighting in the dark (as his body was
fighting in the dark), he begun to understand. He understood that no
destiny is better than another, but that each man must fulfil the des-
tiny he carries inside. He understood that the shoulder-knot and the
uniform begun to tease him. He understood his deep destiny of wolf,
not of gregarious dog; he understood that the other was him. (OC 1:,
563, our translation)26
In the original poem, Cruz just decides to rejoin the camp of his enemy.
For Borges, he really turns into his enemy, or better, he discovers they
are the same person, as the two theologians in Paradise. Borges stresses
this effect describing some scenes of Cruz’s life in the same way
Hernández describes Fierro’s.
26 “Un motivo notorio me veda referir la pelea. Básteme recordar que el desertor
malhirió o mató a varios de los hombres de Cruz. Éste, mientras combatía en la os-
curidad (mientras su cuerpo combatía en la oscuridad), empezó a comprender.
Comprendió que un destino no es mejor que otro, pero que todo hombre debe aca-
tar el que lleva adentro. Comprendió que las jinetas y el uniforme ya lo estorbaban.
Comprendió su íntimo destino de lobo, no de perro gregario; comprendió que el
otro era él.”
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But for our purpose, this text presents a huge novelty in the strange
parenthetical sentence by which Borges corrects the description of the
conversion: “As Cruz was fighting in the dark (as his body was fighting
in the dark)”. This correction is not a sign of hesitation but a warning.
That means that a human being, for the author, is composed by two
separate substances: the body, that is the superficial component, and
the Other. Normally we are supposed to fill in this Other with the soul.
In this case, however, the other, the deep component is the literary
identity of the person. The narration, conceived as the temporal way of
understanding the eternal rhetorical grounds of reality, is thus telling
the imaginary moment in which the real person who fights, is a void
carcass, since his true literary entity has already left the contradictions
of the real illusion, to precede the body in the realm of the figures…
Now we can understand why, as a conclusion of his conjectures about
the wall and the books, about political, historical and ethical things,
Borges offers one of the best definitions of… the aesthetic fact:
Music, states of happiness, mythology, faces belaboured by time, cer-
tain twilights and certain places try to tell us something, or have said
something we should never had missed, or are about to say some-
thing; this imminence of a revelation which does not occur is, per-
haps, the aesthetic phenomenon. (“The Wall and the Books” 223)27
He seems to say: “All real things are shadows: the rest is literature”.
Bibliography
27 “La música, los estados de felicidad, la mitología, las caras trabajadas por el tiem-
po, ciertos crepúsculos y ciertos lugares, quieren decirnos algo, o algo dijeron que
no hubiéramos debido perder, o están por decir algo; esta inminencia de una reve-
lación, que no se produce, es, quizá, el hecho estético.” (OC 2: 13)
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