MOY YA LIM YAO VS.

COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

July 07, 2013GR No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in

connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,

Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to

come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would

actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his

discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized
stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino
name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila
denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien
who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our
country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to
prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no
proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25
January 1962.
AZNAR vs COMELEC

JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmeña

G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 –Political Law-Citizenship

FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Governor of Cebu.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation
Commission that Osmeña is an American Citizen. According to the evidence presented, Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he
is a legitimate son of Emilio Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmeña Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private
respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmeña was proclaim of winning candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be presumed.

HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;

2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and

3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.

The evidence clearly shows that Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3) mentioned hereinaboved or any other
modes of losing Philippine citizenship.

The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states “Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law” has no retroactive effect.

The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his
naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his nationalityas Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988
referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner
filed a Motion for Clarification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen
resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as
such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship
is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law
in adversaryproceedings, this has become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and
satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections [GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Tecson vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 151434, 3 March 2004]

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9
January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the
decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR
161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,
only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue:

Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of the Philippines

Held:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for
at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of
birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to
being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of
his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of
FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been
submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the
ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The
petitions were dismissed.
Lee vs. Director of Lands

G.R. No. 128195October 3, 2001

FACTS:

Sometime in March 1936, the Dinglasans sold toLee Liong (Chinese citizen) a parcel of land situatedat the corner of Roxas Avenue and
Pavia Street,Roxas City. In 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita YuLee filed with the RTC of Roxas City a petition forreconstitution of
title of the lot. (Alleging that thetransfer certificate of title issued to Lee Liong waslost or destroyed during World War II.) Petitioners
Elizabeth and Pacita alleged thatthey were the widows of the deceased Lee BingHoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of
LeeLiong, the owner of the lot. The RTC approved reconstitution of the lost ordestroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liongon the
basis of an approved plan and technicaldescription. Solicitor General filed with the Court ofAppeals a petition for
annulment of the RTCdecision alleging that the RTC had no jurisdictionover the case. The Solicitor General contended that
thepetitioners were not the proper parties in thereconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not
acquire title to the lotbecause he was a Chinese citizen and wasconstitutionally not qualified to own the subject land. CA declared
the reconstitution void. Hence thispetition. Elizabeth and Pacita emphasized that theownership of the land had been settled in
twoprevious cases of the Supreme Court, where theCourt ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest,Lee Liong. They also
pointed out that they acquiredownership of the land through actual possession ofthe lot and their consistent payment of taxes overthe
land for more than sixty years. On the other hand, the Solicitor Generalsubmitted that the decision in the reconstitutioncase
was void; otherwise, it would amount tocircumventing the constitutional proscription againstaliens acquiring ownership of private
or publicagricultural lands

ISSUES:

1. WON Lee Liong has the qualification to ownland in the Philippines.

2. WON the reconstitution was valid. NO

HELD:

1. Lee Liong was not qualified but theownership of the lot was already acquired byFilipino citizens Lee Liong was
disqualified toacquire the land under the 1935 Constitution. Thesale of the land in question was consummatedsometime in March
1936, during the effectivity ofthe 1935 Constitution.Under the 1935 Constitution aliens could not acquireprivate agricultural lands, save in
cases of hereditarysuccession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, wasdisqualified to acquire the land in question. The fact that the Court did not
annul the sale of theland to an alien did not validate the transaction. Itwas still contrary to the constitutional proscriptionagainst aliens
acquiring lands of the public or privatedomain. The proper party to assail the sale is the SolicitorGeneral.This was what was done in this
case when theSolicitor General initiated an action for annulmentof judgment of reconstitution of title. While it tookthe Republic more
than sixty years to assert itself, itis not barred from initiating such action. Prescriptionnever lies against the State.The land is now in the hands
of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died andthe land has been inherited by his heirs andsubsequently their heirs,
petitioners herein.Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the SolicitorGeneral does not dispute.The constitutional proscription on alien
ownership oflands of the public or private domain was intended toprotect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case,
however, there would be nomore public policy violated since the land is in thehands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own suchland. “If land
is invalidly transferred to an alien whosubsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to acitizen, the flaw in the original transaction
isconsidered cured and the title of the transferee isrendered valid.”Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property toqualified
Filipinos may no longer be impugned on thebasis of the invalidity of the initial transfer. Theobjective of the constitutional provision to
keep ourlands in Filipino hands has been achieved.Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitutionof the original certificate of title must
be based on anowner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, orother valid sources of the title to be reconstituted.2. Reconstitution
was void for lack of factualsupportIn this case, reconstitution was based on the planand technical description approved by the
Land

Registration Authority. This renders the order ofreconstitution void for lack of factual support. Ajudgment with absolutely
nothing to support it is void.As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of title isthe re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost ordestroyed in
its original form and condition. It doesnot pass upon the ownership of the land covered bythe lost or destroyed title.Any change in the
ownership of the property must bethe subject of a separate suit. Thus, althoughpetitioners are in possession of the land, a
separateproceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue ofownership of the land.The SC Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE thedecision of
the CA.

CABILING V COMMISSIONER FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma
(Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in the country for almost sixty (60) years. They spent their whole lives, studied and
received their primary and secondary education in the country. They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in
Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father. They have not even traveled abroad and they have already raised their respective families
in the Philippines. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs).
Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625

(An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect

Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen)

It was only on July 27, 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that they did so.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are considered Filipino citizens or foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens

RULING: The petitioners are Filipino citizens. According to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625

(An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect

Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen)

the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: 1) a statement of election under oath, 2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and Government of the Philippines and 3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. In the case at
bar, though the petitioners failed to register their election of Philippine citizenship in the civil registry, the court held that it should not defeat
the election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. They are considered to be Filipino citizens upon their election of
such citizenship as registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. It is just a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. The
court further held that the lacking requirement may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties.

LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]

FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and
discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is
that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the
election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at
the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification based on citizenship.

RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473.
Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may
question in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding.

2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially
assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume
the jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscore the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.

3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications
for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure.

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v ERMITA

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is
not a natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand,
contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for the
determination of the issue regarding Ong’s citizenship. Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen, following a series of
changes in nationalities and whatnot with respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has no standing to file the said
petition.

HELD:

First, on the issue of standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of utmost importance—the citizenship of a person to be
appointed as a member of the Supreme Court.
Second, on the principal issue of the case, the Court took judicial notice of Ong’s petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to
be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that
he became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino citizen. As
part of his evidence, he submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father.
It was on basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a
lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court, Ong is a naturalized Filipinocitizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no substantial change in an entry in the
civil register can be made without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a substantial change. The long string of events that Ong
alleged leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceedings.
NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks other acts that
will complete the appointment.
The last act in an appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the appointee—he must accept the appointment, take an oath
of office, assume office, etc. It doesn’t end here. The CSC can either reject or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesn’t pursue
all the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be held liable. The law doesn’t provide really that there is a period to accept
or reject an appointment.

Held: No.R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens whohave lost their Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Natural-born citizensof the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retaintheir Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil andpolitical rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain
conditions imposed in Section 5,viz: Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquirePhilippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and besubject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
thePhilippines and the following conditions:xxx (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualificationfor holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, atthe time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized toadminister an oath;xxxUnder the
provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired herFilipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines onDecember 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.In Jacot v. Dal, the Court
held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship underR.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if
they wish to run for elective posts inthe Philippines, thus: The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retainedtheir Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before a public officer authorized toadminister an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.Hence, Section 5(2)
of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural- born Filipinos, whohave been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired
orretained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in thePhilippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and allforeign citizenship before an
authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filingof their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.[T]he
intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining theirPhilippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their
oath of allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if theywish to run for elective posts
in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippineelections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.The
foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officerauthorized to administer oath.

It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement Section 18, Article XIof the Constitution on public officers’
primary accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which provides: Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at alltimes and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the statusof an immigrant of another
country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. The solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures
truthfulness to theprospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance andloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to saythat it is only for ceremonial purposes; it would also
accommodate a mere qualified or temporaryallegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand
otherwise.The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effectiverenunciation of her Australian citizenship.
While this Court has previously declared that thefiling by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already considered
arenunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged superseded by theenactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29,
2003 which provides for the additional condition of apersonal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.In fine, R.A. No. 9225
categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire theircitizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and allforeign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing oftheir certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.The rule applies toall those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like
petitioner, without regard as towhether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of theright to run for
public office. Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipinocitizens who re-acquire their citizenship
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative actthat restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply
therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes a sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines .Petition was DISMISSED
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. x x x The renunciation of foreign
citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual
renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship. Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by
the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire
dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce
their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to
no other. We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of
Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public
office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. 3. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified candidates. With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he
obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded,
the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and
total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be
respected. With Amado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It
could not have produced any other legal effect except that Amado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections
because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner. Arnado
being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
 GRACE POE vs. COMELEC

The Case
· Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody
over her was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling
with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
· 1991 – Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein
· 2001 – She became a naturalized US citizen
· First quarter of 2005 – she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside herein
· February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings
· July 18, 2006 – she re-acquired Filipino citizenship
· According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6
months (reckoned from year 2006 when she re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225).
· Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May, 2013, she has been a resident in the Philippines
for 9 years and 6 months only)
· However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the day before election would be 10
years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005(when she returned from the US to the Philippines for good).

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.

1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:

a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international law

Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high probability
that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the
total number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis,
there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate more than ample probability that
Poe’s parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe’s parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume
that Poe’s parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.

Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
Ø The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Ø Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Ø Recent legislation all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

Generally accepted principles of international law

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Convent on
Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in
the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found)
bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
 Poe’s evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as
its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.

2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired
her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poe’s repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after
repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day of the election.

[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently abandon her US residence and reside in
the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad, email correspondences with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school
records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the
date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency
from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was
advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it
was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.

--------------------------------------end-----------------------------------------------

NOTE: The Supreme Court is the highest court in the Philippines. It is the court of last resort, which means that it gives the final disposition to a
case which cannot be overturned by any other court but itself. In short, it resolves controversies once and for all. Whatever it says, forms part
of the law of the land; whatever it says, binds us all Filipinos, even our children yet to be born unless it has decided differently in another
subsequent case.

Classic display of power and personal interests, well-executed but of course, highly doubted. This is a shameless disregard of the most
fundamental law, a revolutionary turn-around from the rule of law, slavery to the should-be infallible, thief to lawyers and aspirants, the
downfall of a highly respected profession, an evidence of the evils of corruption. What else could happen in this country?

As a law student, I am deeply frustrated but this is more reason for me to be one of the lawyers who stand for and by the law, inviolable as it is,
sacred in its letters and spirit. Never shall I play blind, never shall I be blinded.

As it ever was and should always be--dura lex sed lex.

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the
pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two
or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore,
be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and
thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has
not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and
solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough
sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the
court sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar
sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a
renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy
FACTS:

Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City held on October 29,
2007, who eventually emerged as the winner. On October 25, 2007, respondent Villanueva filed a petition before the Provincial Election
Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of Lopez (American citizen), hence, ineligible from running for any public
office. Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.He said, he possessed
all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should
have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Lopez
resorted to petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for disqualifying him from running and
assuming the office of Barangay Chairman

RULING:

SC dismissed the petition. The COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the
Barangay elections of 2007Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He
later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-
acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:(2) Those seeking elective public
office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)Lopez was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law
when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is
not enough to allow him to run for a public office.Lopez's failure to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.

Under the law, for the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to
administer an oath. The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not
cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity

Jacot vs. Dal

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He
was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

ISSUE:

Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?

HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.
VALLES vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

FACTS:

In 1992, private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the COMELEC en bancdismissed the petition. When Lopez ran for re-election in 1995 elections, her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed
a petition for disqualification, contesting herFilipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May
11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipinocitizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because
(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987
Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there
are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining that the Lopez is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on
the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was
issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

ISSUE:

1. Whether respondent is a Filipino

2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160

HELD:

1. Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on
the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipinocitizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also
known as the Jones Law.

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided
therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5,
1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at
the time of her birth, Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The
fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at
most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or
more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not
amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate
of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian
citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and
a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a
ground for losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim
that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing
any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained
that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:

“xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual
allegiance’. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one
declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the
Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in
Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of
repatriation holds no water.

4. Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision
thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same, citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration. He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case
that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or
simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54
which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same
evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such
prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

REPUBLIC VS. SAGUN CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8,
1959 in Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said document was notarized but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.

In 2005, Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation
on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine
citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a registered voter in Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as
shown in the Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact
should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine passport.

After hearing, the trial court granted the petition and declaring Sagun a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed a petition for review on certiorari, pointing out that while Sagun executed an oath of allegiance
before a notary public, there was no affidavit of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance which was not
registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.

Issues:

1. Is an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible?

2. Has Norma complied with the procedural requirements in the election of Philippine citizenship

Held:

1. No. There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, it was erroneous for
the trial court to make a specific declaration of respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the courts competence.

2. When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines
those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Being a legitimate
child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine
citizenship. For respondent to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Case Digest: Republic v. Lao Ong

G.R. No. 175430 : June 18, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong alleged in his petition that he has been a "businessman/business
manager" since 1989, earning an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he has been a businessman
since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did not specify or describe the nature of his business.

As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997. Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was
P60,000.00 for 1994; P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On November 23, 2001, the trial court granted
Ongs petition.

The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition despite his
failure to prove that he possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under Section 2, fourth paragraph of the
Revised Naturalization Law.

The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business
manager earning an average income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his income. Moreover, he failed to
present evidence on the nature of his profession or trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children (all
attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home,
his alleged income cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that respondent Ong is not qualified as
he does not possess a definite and existing business or trade.

The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization

The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest.Naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant to
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law.

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment,
sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands
of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."

It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her
spouses income should not be included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should
be the one to possess some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court
has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.

A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the
applicant's qualifications. In fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for consideration in an appeal
to this Court. Indeed, "[a] naturalization proceeding is so infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given special
treatment. x x x [U]nlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case
and giving the government another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship will not even constitute res
judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground
that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if not raised in the lower court may be entertained on
appeal. As the matters brought to the attention of this Court x x x involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower court and
admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness
or incorrectness of said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there is even no need to present new
evidence. A careful review of the extant records suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.

Republic won the case.

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed
with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines.

Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry.

Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of
election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an
alien. Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(now Bureau of Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship
and said Office will initially decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said election. Afterwards, the same is elevated
to the Ministry (now Department) of Justice for final determination and review.

It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of
entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine
citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election.
Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of
majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices,
its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil
registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election
of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere
exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship
cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the intervention of the court to
confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching, the prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
foregoing requirements, respondents petition before the trial court must be denied. (Republic vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012)

EDISON SO, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:
He was born on February 17, 1982, in Manila; he is a Chinese citizen who has lived in No. 528 Lavezares
St., Binondo, Manila, since birth; as an employee, he derives an average annual income
around P100,000.00 with free board and lodging and other benefits; he is single, able to speak and write
English, Chinese and Tagalog; he is exempt from the filing of Declaration of Intention to become a citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC issued an Order8 setting the petition for hearing at 8:30 a.m. of December
12 and 17, 2002 during which all persons concerned were enjoined to show cause, if any, why the
petition should not be granted. The entire petition and its annexes, including the order, were ordered
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and also in a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Manila. The RTC likewise ordered that copies of the petition and notice
be posted in public and conspicuous places in the Manila City Hall Building.9
During the hearing, petitioner presented Atty. Adasa, Jr. who testified that he came to know petitioner
in 1991 as the legal consultant and adviser of the So family’s business. He would usually attend parties
and other social functions hosted by petitioner’s family. He knew petitioner to be obedient,
hardworking, and possessed of good moral character, including all the qualifications mandated by law.
Another witness for petitioner, Mark Salcedo, testified that he has known petitioner for ten (10) years;
they first met at a birthday party in 1991. He and petitioner were classmates at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where they took up Pharmacy. Petitioner was a member of some school organizations and
mingled well with friends.
The RTC granted the petition on June 4, 2003.

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA on the following grounds:

Issue:
W/N Edison So did meet all the qualification needed to be a naturalized Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen.44 Under current and existing laws, there are three
ways by which an alien may become a citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c)
legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an
alien.

First. C.A. No. 473 and R.A. No. 9139 are separate and distinct laws – the former covers all aliens
regardless of class while the latter covers native-born aliens who lived here in the Philippines all their
lives, who never saw any other country and all along thought that they were Filipinos; who have
demonstrated love and loyalty to the Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions.52 To
reiterate, the intention of the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of acquiring
Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical and more encouraging which is administrative rather
than judicial in nature. Thus, although the legislature believes that there is a need to liberalize the
naturalization law of the Philippines, there is nothing from which it can be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was
intended to be amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139. What the legislature had in mind was merely to
prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may be availed of by native born
aliens. The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or
administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.
In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good moral
character but also the good moral character of his/her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.56 Within the purview of the naturalization law, a "credible person" is not only an individual
who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police
record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible. What must
be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it. This implies that such person must
have a good standing in the community; that he is known to be honest and upright; that he is reputed
to be trustworthy and reliable; and that his word may be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of
the applicant’s worthiness.
e do not agree with petitioner’s argument that respondent is precluded from questioning the RTC
decision because of its failure to oppose the petition. A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, and the decision rendered therein does not constitute res judicata. A certificate
of naturalization may be cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by
misleading the court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of
a certificate of naturalization upon grounds or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the
certificate.59 If the government can challenge a final grant of citizenship, with more reason can it
appeal the decision of the RTC within the reglementary period despite its failure to oppose the petition
before the lower court.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.