UNITED CLAIMANTS G.R. No.

187107
ASSOCIATION OF NEA (UNICAN),
represented by its representative
BIENVENIDO R. LEAL, in his Present:
official capacity as its President and in
his own individual capacity,
EDUARDO R. LACSON, ORENCIO CORONA, C.J.,
F. VENIDA, JR., THELMA V. CARPIO,
OGENA, BOBBY M. CARANTO, VELASCO, JR.,
MARILOU B. DE JESUS, EDNA G. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
RAA, and ZENAIDA P. OLIQUINO, BRION,
in their own capacities and in behalf PERALTA,
of all those similarly situated officials BERSAMIN,
and employees of the National DEL CASTILLO,
Electrification Administration, ABAD,*
Petitioners, VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,**
- versus - SERENO,*
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION (NEA), NEA
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS
(NEA BOARD), ANGELO T. REYES
as Chairman of the NEA Board of
Administrators, EDITHA S. BUENO,
Ex-Officio Member and NEA
Administrator, and WILFRED L.
BILLENA, JOSPEPH D.
KHONGHUN, and FR. JOSE
Promulgated:
VICTOR E. LOBRIGO, Members,
January 31, 2012
NEA Board,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

 The Case

This is an original action for Injunction to restrain and/or prevent the

implementation of Resolution Nos. 46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September
3, 2003, respectively, otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) Termination Pay Plan, issued by respondent NEA Board of
Administrators (NEA Board).

The Facts

Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their
employment with the implementation of the assailed resolutions.

Respondent NEA is a government-owned and/or controlled corporation

created in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued on August 6,
1973. Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or
reorganize NEAs staffing structure, as follows:

Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of

Administrators; Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree,

there is hereby established a public corporation to be known as the
National Electrification Administration. All of the powers of the
corporation shall be vested in and exercised by a Board of Administrators,
which shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members, one of
whom shall be the Administrator as ex-officio member. The Chairman and
the three other members shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines to serve for a term of six years. x x x

xxxx

The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

have the following specific powers and duties.

1. To implement the provisions and purposes of this Decree;

xxxx
 5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis
of merit, technical competence and moral character, and, upon the
recommendation of the Administrator to organize or reorganize NEAs
staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their
powers and duties. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thereafter, in order to enhance and accelerate the electrification of the whole

country, including the privatization of the National Power Corporation, Republic
Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of
2001 (EPIRA Law), was enacted, taking effect on June 26, 2001. The law imposed
upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of the role of rural
electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Correlatively, Sec. 3 of the
law provides:

Section 3. Scope. - This Act shall provide a framework for

the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the
privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired competitive
structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various
government agencies and private entities. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 77 of RA 9136 also provides:

Section 77. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The DOE shall,

in consultation with the electric power industry participants and end-users,
promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, subject to the
approval by the Power Commission.

Thus, the Rules and Regulations to implement RA 9136 were issued on

February 27, 2002. Under Sec. 3(b)(ii), Rule 33 of the Rules and Regulations, all the
NEA employees and officers are considered terminated and the 965 plantilla
positions of NEA vacant, to wit:

Section 3. Separation and Other Benefits.

(a) x x x
 (b) The following shall govern the application of Section 3(a) of
this Rule:

xxxx

(ii) With respect to NEA officials and employees, they

shall be considered legally terminated and shall be entitled to
the benefits or separation pay provided in Section 3(a) herein
when a restructuring of NEA is implemented pursuant to a law
enacted by Congress or pursuant to Section 5(a)(5) of
Presidential Decree No. 269. (Emphasis supplied.)

Meanwhile, on August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo

issued Executive Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization
plan. Thus, the NEA Board issued the assailed resolutions.

On September 17, 2003, the Department of Budget and Management

approved the NEA Termination Pay Plan.

Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated

as the Early Leavers Program, giving incentives to those who availed of it and left
NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The other employees of NEA
were terminated effective December 31, 2003.

Hence, We have this petition.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to
terminate all NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
 On the other hand, respondents argue in their Comment dated August 20, 2009
that:

1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;

2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions
of the NEA Board have long been implemented; and
3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith.

The Courts Ruling

This petition must be dismissed.

The procedural issues raised by respondents shall first be discussed.

This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Case

Respondents essentially argue that petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of

courts, pursuant to which the instant petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court first rather than with this Court directly.

We explained the principle of hierarchy of courts in Mendoza v. Villas,[1] stating:

In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.

(CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, a petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 65 was dismissed for having been filed directly with the Court,
violating the principle of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the

Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the
following pronouncements:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
 concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to
issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an
exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside
for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving as
it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees all
told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to
the mind of the Court entails its attention.

Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation
(NPC).[2] In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly
with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, both
dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of the NPC on
January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of
courts, the petition was given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to treat
the instant case differently.
 The Remedy of Injunction Is still Available

Respondents allege that the remedy of injunction is no longer available to petitioners

inasmuch as the assailed NEA Board resolutions have long been implemented.

Taking respondents above posture as an argument on the untenability of the

petition on the ground of mootness, petitioners contend that the principle of
mootness is subject to exceptions, such as when the case is of transcendental
importance.

In Funa v. Executive Secretary,[3] the Court passed upon the seeming moot
issue of the appointment of Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) while concurrently serving as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications. There,
even though Bautista later on was appointed as Administrator of MARINA, the
Court ruled that the case was an exception to the principle of mootness and that the
remedy of injunction was still available, explaining thus:

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline
jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However,
as we held in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, supervening events,
whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering
a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in cases
where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts

already done. However, as an exception to the rule on mootness,
courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Similarly, in the instant case, while the assailed resolutions of the NEA Board
may have long been implemented, such acts of the NEA Board may well be repeated
by other government agencies in the reorganization of their offices. Petitioners have
not lost their remedy of injunction.

The Power to Reorganize Includes the Power to Terminate

The meat of the controversy in the instant case is the issue of whether the NEA Board
had the power to pass Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 terminating all of its employees.

This must be answered in the affirmative.

Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the
implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by
Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization
was carried out, viz:

Section 5. National Electrification Administration; Board of

Administrators; Administrator.

(a) For the purpose of administering the provisions of this Decree,

there is hereby established a public corporation to be known as the
National Electrification Administration. x x x

xxxx

The Board shall, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,

have the following specific powers and duties.

xxxx

5. To establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis

of merit, technical competence and moral character, and, upon the
recommendation of the Administrator to organize or reorganize NEAs
staffing structure, to fix the salaries of personnel and to define their powers
and duties. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Thus, petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to
organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate employees but only
to reduce NEAs manpower complement.

Such contention is erroneous.

In Betoy v. The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation,[4] the Court upheld
the dismissal of all the employees of the NPC pursuant to the EPIRA Law. In ruling
that the power of reorganization includes the power of removal, the Court explained:

[R]eorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation

of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of
functions. It could result in the loss of ones position through
removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the
purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be
valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA
Boards powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith.

Petitioners Failed to Prove that the NEA Board Acted in Bad Faith

Next, petitioners challenge the reorganization claiming bad faith on the part
of the NEA Board.

Congress itself laid down the indicators of bad faith in the reorganization of
government offices in Sec. 2 of RA 6656, an Act to Protect the Security of Tenure
of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization, to wit:

Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be

removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A valid
cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a
position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to
merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of
the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The
 existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result
of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of

positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency
concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing

substantially the same functions is created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less

qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the

department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same function as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation

provided in Section 3 hereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

It must be noted that the burden of proving bad faith rests on the one alleging it. As
the Court ruled in Culili v. Eastern Telecommunications, Inc.,[5] According to
jurisprudence, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Moreover, in Spouses Palada v. Solidbank
Corporation,[6] the Court stated, Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence.

Here, petitioners have failed to discharge such burden of proof.

In alleging bad faith, petitioners cite RA 6656, particularly its Sec. 2, subparagraphs
(b) and (c). Petitioners have the burden to show that: (1) the abolished offices were
replaced by substantially the same units performing the same functions; and (2)
incumbents are replaced by less qualified personnel.

Petitioners failed to prove such facts. Mere allegations without hard evidence cannot
be considered as clear and convincing proof.
Next, petitioners state that the NEA Board should not have abolished all the offices
of NEA and instead made a selective termination of its employees while retaining
the other employees.

Petitioners argue that for the reorganization to be valid, it is necessary to only

abolish the offices or terminate the employees that would not be retained and the
retention of the employees that were tasked to carry out the continuing mandate of
NEA. Petitioners argue in their Memorandum dated July 27, 2010:

A valid reorganization, pursued in good faith, would have resulted to: (1)
the abolition of old positions in the NEAs table of organization that pertain
to the granting of franchises and rate fixing functions as these were all
abolished by Congress (2) the creation of new positions that pertain to the
additional mandates of the EPIRA Law and (3) maintaining the old
positions that were not affected by the EPIRA Law.

The Court already had the occasion to pass upon the validity of the similar
reorganization in the NPC. In the aforecited case of Betoy,[7] the Court upheld the
policy of the Executive to terminate all the employees of the office before rehiring
those necessary for its operation. We ruled in Betoy that such policy is not tainted
with bad faith:

It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution

found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The
privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its
operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate
employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower
requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and
restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its
primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, the fact that the NEA Board resorted to terminating all the incumbent
employees of NPC and, later on, rehiring some of them, cannot, on that ground alone,
vitiate the bona fides of the reorganization.
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Resolution Nos.
46 and 59, dated July 10, 2003 and September 3, 2003, respectively, issued by the
NEA Board of Directors are hereby UPHELD.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.