Security For Cloud Computing: 10 Steps To Ensure Success Version 3.0
Security For Cloud Computing: 10 Steps To Ensure Success Version 3.0
Security For Cloud Computing: 10 Steps To Ensure Success Version 3.0
December, 2017
Contents
Acknowledgements 3
Revisions 3
Introduction 4
Cloud Security Landscape 5
Cloud Security Guidance 7
Step 1: Ensure effective governance, risk and compliance processes exist 8
Step 2: Audit operational and business processes 11
Step 3: Manage people, roles and identities 14
Step 4: Ensure proper protection of data 17
Step 5: Enforce privacy policies 20
Step 6: Assess the security provisions for cloud applications 22
Step 7: Ensure cloud networks and connections are secure 25
Step 8: Evaluate security controls on physical infrastructure and facilities 31
Step 9: Manage security terms in the cloud service agreement 32
Step 10: Understand the security requirements of the exit process 34
Cloud Security Assessment 35
Works Cited 38
Additional References 41
Appendix A: Distinctions Between Security and Privacy 42
Appendix B: Worldwide Privacy Regulations 43
Appendix C: Acronyms & Abbreviations 47
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Council Security for Cloud Computing: Ten Steps to Ensure Success Version 3.0 (2017).
Acknowledgements
The major contributors to this whitepaper and successive version updates are: Claude Baudoin (cébé IT
& Knowledge Management), Eric Cohen (PricewaterhouseCoopers), Chris Dotson (IBM), Mike Edwards
(IBM), Jonathan Gershater (Trend Micro), David Harris (Boeing), Sreekanth Iyer (IBM), Reddy Karri
(Schlumberger), Ryan Kean (The Kroger Co.), Elizabeth Koumpan (IBM), Taiye Lambo (eFortresses), Yves
Le Roux (CA Technologies), Shamun Mahmud (GRC Research Associates), Madhava Meduri (Cisco), John
Meegan (IBM), Nya Murray (Trac-Car), Barry Pardee (Tailwind Associates), Steven Pogue (IBM), Matt
Rutkowski (IBM), Karl Scott (Satori Consulting), Annie Sokol (NIST), Pamela Wise-Martinez (Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation).
Revisions
Much has changed in the realm of cloud security since the Security for Cloud Computing: Ten Steps to
Ensure Success, Version 2.0 whitepaper was published in March, 2015. Version 3.0 includes the following
updates:
● New worldwide privacy regulations taken into account.
● New and updated standards focused on different aspects of cloud computing security have been
added.
● More emphasis given to security logging and monitoring particularly with respect to data activity
monitoring.
● The importance of a formal information governance framework highlighted more prominently.
● The standard practice of leveraging key management services to safeguard cryptographic keys
has been added.
● The importance of including security in a continuous delivery and deployment approach is
explained.
● Managing the identity and access of services in a microservices environment is emphasized.
● References to additional CSCC whitepapers related to cloud security and data residency have
been added.
The aim of this guide is to provide a practical reference to help enterprise information technology (IT)
and business decision makers analyze the information security and privacy implications of cloud
computing on their business. The paper includes a list of steps, along with guidance and strategies,
designed to help decision makers evaluate and compare the security and privacy elements of cloud
service offerings from different cloud providers in key areas.
When considering a move to cloud computing, customers must have a clear understanding of potential
security benefits and risks associated with cloud computing, and set realistic expectations with their
cloud service providers. Consideration must be given to the different service categories - Infrastructure
as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS) - as each model brings
different security requirements and responsibilities. Additionally, this paper highlights the role that
standards play to improve cloud security and privacy and it also identifies areas where future
standardization could be effective.
The section titled “Cloud Security Landscape” provides an overview of the security and privacy
challenges relevant to cloud computing and points out considerations that organizations should weigh
when migrating data, applications, and infrastructure to a cloud computing environment.
The section titled “Cloud Security Guidance” is the heart of the guide and includes the steps that can be
used as a basis for evaluating cloud provider security and privacy. It discusses the threats, technology
risks, and safeguards for cloud computing environments, and provides the insight needed to make
informed IT decisions on their treatment. Although guidance is provided, each organization must
perform its own analysis of its needs and assess, select, engage, and oversee the cloud services that can
best fulfill those needs.
The section titled “Cloud Security Assessment” provides customers with an efficient method of assessing
the security and privacy capabilities of cloud providers and assessing their individual risks. A
questionnaire for customers to conduct their own assessment across each of the critical security and
privacy domains is provided.
A related CSCC document, Practical Guide to Cloud Service Agreements [1], provides additional guidance
on evaluating security and privacy criteria from prospective cloud providers. The CSCC guide, Cloud
Security Standards: What to Expect and What to Negotiate [2], highlights the security standards and
certifications that are currently available on the market as well as the cloud-specific security standards
that are currently being developed. The CSCC Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on
Cloud Services [34] provides more in-depth advice offered for each of the ten steps covered in this
guide.
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Cloud Security Landscape
While security and privacy concerns, as outlined in Appendix A, are similar across cloud services and
traditional non-cloud services, those concerns are amplified for cloud computing by the existence of
external control over organizational assets and the potential for mismanagement of those assets.
Transitioning to public cloud computing involves a transfer of responsibility and control to the cloud
service provider over information as well as system components that were previously under the
customer’s direct control.
Despite this inherent loss of control, the cloud service customer still needs to take responsibility for its
use of cloud services in order to maintain situational awareness, weigh alternatives, set priorities, and
effect changes in security and privacy that are in the best interest of the organization. The customer
achieves this by ensuring that the cloud service agreement for each cloud service has appropriate
provisions for security and privacy. In particular, the agreement must help maintain legal protections for
the privacy of data stored and processed on the provider's systems. The customer must also ensure
appropriate integration of cloud services with their own systems for managing security and privacy.
There is a number of security and privacy risks associated with cloud computing that must be
adequately addressed 1:
● Loss of governance ownership. In a public cloud deployment, customers cede control to the
cloud service provider over a number of issues that may affect security and privacy. Yet cloud
service agreements may not offer a commitment to resolve such issues on the part of the cloud
service provider, thus leaving gaps in security defenses.
● Responsibility ambiguity. Responsibilities over aspects of security and privacy may be shared
between the cloud service provider and the customer, with the potential for vital parts of the
defenses to be left unguarded if there is a failure to allocate and delineate responsibilities
clearly. The split of responsibilities is likely to vary depending on the cloud service model used
(e.g., IaaS vs. SaaS).
● Authentication and Authorization. The fact that sensitive cloud resources are accessed from
anywhere in cyberspace heightens the need to establish with certainty the identity of a user –
especially if users now include employees, contractors, partners, and customers. Strong
authentication and authorization becomes a critical concern.
● Isolation failure. Multi-tenancy and shared resources are defining characteristics of public cloud
deployment. This risk category covers the failure of mechanisms separating the usage of
storage, memory, routing and even reputation between tenants.
● Compliance and legal risks. The cloud customer’s investment in achieving certification (e.g., to
demonstrate compliance with industry standards or regulatory requirements) may be lost if the
cloud service provider cannot provide evidence of their own compliance with the relevant
1
Credit to European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). Visit http://www.enisa.europa.eu/ for
more information.
Another factor in the security and privacy landscape for cloud computing that has emerged more
recently is the creation of standards. For example, ISO/IEC 27017 [4] deals with security for public cloud
services while the complementary ISO/IEC 27018 standard [5] deals with personal data protection for
public cloud services. In addition, the ISO/IEC 19086 series of standards [30] addresses cloud service
agreements and SLAs. ISO/IEC 19086 Part 4 [31] deals with security and privacy components of cloud
service level agreements. ISO/IEC 27036-4 [43] specifically provides guidance on information security
risks associated with the use of cloud services and managing those risks effectively, and responding to
risks specific to the acquisition or provision of cloud services. Use of these standards can help customers
and providers. There is a growing list of cloud services that have are certified to 27017 and 27018. There
is also a growing number of standards that address specific industries, for example, Fast Healthcare
Interoperability Resources (FHIR) [36] in the healthcare sector.
This section provides a prescriptive series of steps for cloud service customers to evaluate and manage
the security and privacy of their use of cloud services, with the goal of mitigating risk and delivering an
appropriate level of support. The following steps will be discussed in detail below:
Requirements and best practices are highlighted for each step. In addition, each step takes into account
the realities of today’s cloud computing landscape and postulates how this space is likely to evolve in
the future, including the important role that standards will play.
Good information governance requires specificity and transparency on the legal and regulatory
obligations and business value of information. This relates to the people tasked with managing
information and establishes measurement, policy, and control mechanisms to enable people to carry
out their roles and responsibilities. The ISO/IEC 38500 standard [37] describes guiding principles for
governing IT in an organization.
● the sharing of responsibilities between the cloud service customer and the cloud service
provider,
● the fact that technical design and operational control of the cloud service is in the hands of the
cloud service provider,
● the interface(s) that exist between the cloud service customer and one or more cloud service
providers,
● data ownership and data access rights, including intellectual property issues and the access
rights that regulators and legal authorities have with regard to data held in cloud services.
It is essential to update security requirements developed for enterprise data centers to produce
requirements suitable for the use of cloud services. As part of the transition to cloud computing, it is
critical that cloud service customers understand the risks associated with using cloud services and their
own level of risk tolerance, and then focus on mitigating the risks that the organization cannot tolerate.
The primary means cloud service customers have to ensure their applications and data hosted in cloud
services are secured in accordance with their security and compliance policies is to verify that the cloud
service agreement between the customer and the provider, along with associated documents such as
the service level agreement (SLA), contain all their requirements. It is vital for the customer to
understand all the terms related to security and privacy and to ensure that those terms meet their
needs. If a suitable cloud service agreement and SLA are not available, then it is inadvisable for an
organization to proceed with the use of those cloud services. Refer to the CSCC Practical Guide to Cloud
Service Agreements [1] for details.
The category of cloud service offered by the provider (IaaS, PaaS or SaaS) has a significant impact on the
sharing of responsibilities between the customer and the provider to manage security and associated
risks. For IaaS, the provider is supplying (and responsible for securing) basic IT resources such as
machines, disks, and networks.
The customer is typically responsible for the operating system and the entire software stack necessary
to run applications, and is also responsible for the customer data placed into the cloud computing
environment. As a result, most of the responsibility for securing the applications and the customer data
falls onto the customer. For a PaaS offering, it is likely that much of the software stack is under the
control of the cloud service provider, with the application code being the responsibility of the cloud
service customer. For SaaS, the infrastructure, software, and data are primarily the responsibility of the
provider, since the customer has little control over any of these features. These aspects need
appropriate coverage in the contract and the SLA.
It is necessary to be aware that the divisions between these cloud service categories are not always
hard, but can be blurred. An example is a PaaS offering that provides the capability for the customer to
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run their own software in a container, alongside other software made available by the provider. The
container is more like an IaaS offering, placing much of the responsibility for security and privacy on the
customer.
From a general governance perspective, cloud service providers should notify cloud service customers
about the occurrence of any security incident in their system, regardless of the parties or data directly
impacted. The provider should include specific pertinent information in the notification, resolve the
incident as quickly as possible, restore secure access to the service as soon as possible, apply best
practice forensics in investigating the circumstances and causes of the incident, and make long-term
changes to correct the root causes of the incident to ensure that it does not recur. Due to the high
financial and reputation costs resulting from an incident, customers may want the provider to indemnify
them if the incident was the provider’s fault. Again, the service level agreement (SLA) and associated
documents for use of the cloud service should include details of specific pertinent information and the
process.
A fundamental design premise in cloud computing is that, as a customer, your data may be stored in,
processed on, and transmitted to any of the servers or devices the cloud service provider operates. In
some instances, servers hosting customer data may be located in multiple data centers within different
jurisdictions, either because the service provider has multi-jurisdictional operations or has
subcontracted services to providers that operate in other jurisdictions. This means that it may be
difficult at any particular point in time to know where the customer data actually resides, which
regulators have jurisdiction, and what regulations apply. This matters since some regulations, such as
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) [39], restrict the allowable locations
for data (data residency). However, it is increasingly the case that cloud service providers provide
information about the location(s) of their data centers and provide some degree of control to the
customers to choose which of them they use - or don’t use - for any given cloud service.
The jurisdictional issue directly influences the protection of personally identifiable information (PII) and
also legal and jurisdictional authority access to this data. 2 There is divergence across countries in the
laws on investigation and enforcement, including access to encrypted data and investigation of
extraterritorial offences. A court can only hear a matter if it has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of the action, while governmental agencies can only exercise their powers within their
authorized jurisdictions.
2
The Business Software Alliance (BSA) Global Cloud Computing Scorecard provides an assessment of security and
privacy policies that countries are implementing for cloud computing. Refer to http://cloudscorecard.bsa.org/2016
One useful approach to the security challenges of cloud computing is for customers to verify that cloud
providers are compliant with an established set of security controls. Certification of the provider gives
prospective customers more confidence in that provider, and the ability to show “due diligence” in
provider selection. Which certification is most appropriate depends to some extent on the category of
the cloud service and on the customer’s regional and industry requirements.
Some organizations provide non industry-specific frameworks for evaluating security controls which can
be applied to cloud service providers, including the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA), Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), and Holistic Information Security
Practitioner Institute (HISPI) which respectively provide the SSAE 16 [6], CoBIT 5 [7] and CAAP [33]
frameworks. Other organizations provide frameworks for specific services or industries such as the
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (DSS) [8].
Groups such as the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) provide guidance which includes a Cloud Controls
Matrix (CCM), a provider self-assessment program, Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire
(CAIQ), a certification of cloud security knowledge for personnel, Certificate of Cloud Security
Knowledge (CCSK), and a registry for cloud service providers to publish the self-assessment results
(STAR) [9]. There are also codes of conduct relating to the handling of personal data in cloud services - a
particular example is the EU Cloud Code of Conduct [33].
As a baseline, customers should expect to see a report of the cloud service provider's operations by
independent auditors. The level of access to essential audit information is a key consideration of
contracts and SLA terms with any cloud service provider. As part of any terms, cloud service providers
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should offer timely access to audit events, log, and report information relevant to a customer's specific
data or applications.
Security tends to be a significant element of any compliance framework. Privacy is commanding much
attention in recent years. There are three significant areas where the consideration of security and
privacy for cloud computing are of particular interest to cloud service customers and auditors:
1. Understanding the internal control environment of a cloud service provider, including risks,
controls, and other governance issues when that environment touches the provision of cloud
services.
2. Access to the corporate audit trail, including workflow and authorization, when the audit trail
spans cloud services.
3. Assurance of the facilities for management and control of cloud services and how such facilities
are secured.
● Providing protection of customer assets from unauthorized access by the provider's staff,
● Providing protection of customer assets from the accidental or intentional access by the
customer’s employees and partners.
Auditors may be employed by the customer or by the provider, but the key element is that they should
be independent. Auditors require access to the policies and procedures of a cloud service provider
which relate to security controls. Auditors also require access to logs and records that show whether the
policies and procedures are being followed correctly – and, in some cases, the auditors may require
specific testing to demonstrate compliance with the prescribed policies and procedures.
Security and authentication technologies, allied to event logging, in the cloud computing environment
can help auditors as they deal with issues related to workflow. Were those who entered, approved,
For complete insight into security controls as they relate to the customer's applications and data,
mechanisms for the routine flow of audit information from the provider to the customer are
recommended. This flow may include secure logs and reports sent on an agreed-upon schedule. There
should be more timely notification of any exceptional security alerts, events or incidents, and incident
management processes should be documented and audited. Any audit data should have the necessary
associated information to enable forensic analysis to understand how any particular incident occurred,
what assets were compromised, and what policies, procedures, and technologies need to be changed to
prevent recurrence, along with any additional security controls that need to be established. 3
Ideally, there should be automated, standards-based access (through APIs or Web services) to all of
these audit facilities, to ensure timely availability of required data and to remove the costs associated
with human processing of requests for information. Through these interfaces, customers should be able
to track and record all the cloud API calls by their users and applications to the cloud environment. This
is essential not only for audit, but also for implementing secure monitoring and intelligence. The audit
data itself should be encrypted to avoid the chance of eavesdropping.
These facilities are often more sensitive in security terms than the services and applications to which
they apply, since the potential for abuse and damage may be higher. A security audit must extend to
these facilities as well as to the main services of the provider.
3
The DMTF Cloud Audit Data Federation (CADF) Workgroup [10] has developed an audit event data model and a
compatible interaction model that describes interactions between IT resources suitable for cloud deployment
models.
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Auditing is essential
The security audit of cloud service providers is an essential aspect of the security considerations for
cloud service customers, typically as part of a certification process. Audits should be carried out by
appropriately skilled staff typically belonging to an independent auditing organization. Security audits
should be carried out on the basis of one of the established standards for security controls. Customers
need to check that the sets of controls in place meet their security requirements.
There is also a need to ensure proper integration of the cloud service provider's reporting and logging
facilities with the customer's systems, so that appropriate operational and business data flows on a
timely basis to enable customers to manage their use of cloud services.
Customers must ensure that the cloud service provider has processes and functionality that govern who
has access to the customer's data and applications. Conversely, cloud service providers must allow the
customer to assign and manage the roles and associated levels of authorization for each of their users in
accordance with their security policies, and apply the principle of least privilege. These roles and
authorization rights are applied on a per-resource, service or application basis. For example, a cloud
service customer, in accordance with its security policies, may have an employee whose role allows the
generation of purchase requests, but a different role and authorization rights is granted to another
employee responsible for approving the request.
The cloud service provider must have a secure system for provisioning and managing unique identities
for their users and services. This Identity and Access Management (IdAM) functionality must support
simple resource access and robust customer application and service workflows. Any user access to the
provider's management platform, regardless of role or entitlement, should be monitored and logged to
provide auditing of all access to customer data and applications.
Identity Management serves to secure access privileges not only for end users of applications, but also
for privileged access by administrators, developers, and testers. All major public cloud service providers
have the same concepts for Identity Management, however, the security implementation details differ
from provider to provider. Best practice is to use a Key Management Service to safeguard cryptographic
keys, passwords, and secrets used by cloud IdAM services. Multi Factor Authentication (MFA), such as a
security token assigned to the user’s device (hardware or virtual), authenticator applications, or SMS
text message is now standard practice. SMS text message-based should be avoided due to vulnerabilities
in the public telephone network Signaling System 7 protocol.
Table 1. Cloud service provider support for people, roles and identities
This is not only more efficient, it is also more secure because some
functions, such as removing users from the cloud service when users
leave the organization, happen automatically.
Identity Provisioning and Customer organizations need to administer their own users. The cloud
Delegation provider should support delegated administration.
Single Sign-On (SSO), Customer organizations may wish to federate identity across
Single Sign-Off applications to provide single sign-on (SSO) along with single sign-off
to assure user sessions get terminated properly. For example, an
organization using separate SaaS applications for CRM and ERP may
require single sign-on, sign-off, and authorization across these
applications (using standards such as SAML 2.0 [11], WS-Federation
[12] and OAuth [13]).
Robust Authentication For access to high value assets hosted in cloud services, customers
may require that their provider support strong, multi-factor, mutual
and/or biometric authentication.
Role, Entitlement and Cloud service customers need to be able to describe and enforce their
Policy Management security policies, user roles, groups, and entitlements to their business
and operational applications and assets with due consideration for any
industry, regional, or corporate requirements.
Service ID and API Keys With the cloud native microservices approach, cloud service
customers also need to manage the identity and access of services.
This is typically done through use of the service ID which is an identity
that can be used by an application or service. The developer can also
create and associate API keys with the service ID which is used to
authenticate and access other services based on the policy and
permissions set.
Essentially, the questions relating to data for cloud computing are about various forms of risk: risk of
theft or unauthorized disclosure of data, risk of tampering or unauthorized modification of data, risk of
loss or of unavailability of data, risk of keeping data longer than it is needed. In the cloud, “data assets"
may also include application programs or machine images, which can present the same risks as the
contents of databases or data files.
The general approaches to the security of data are described in specifications, such as the ISO/IEC 27002
[44] standard, and these control-oriented approaches apply to the use of cloud services with some
additional cloud-specific considerations as described in the ISO/IEC 27017 standard. Security controls
described in ISO/IEC 27002 highlight the general features that need to be addressed and to which
specific techniques can then be applied.
The category of the cloud service is very likely to affect who is responsible for handling particular
security controls.
● For IaaS, more responsibility is likely to be with the customer (e.g., for encrypting data stored on
a cloud storage device).
● For SaaS, more responsibility is likely to be with the provider, since neither the stored data nor
the application code is directly visible or controllable by the customer.
● PaaS cloud services present unique challenges in that responsibility is likely shared between the
customer and provider. It is important to understand how each service being utilized within the
PaaS environment handles data security, including encryption as well as log file handling and
administrative access. The customer needs to know what obligations it retains and the available
features and configuration of the PaaS service that can facilitate data security.
Table 2 highlights the key steps customers should take to ensure that data involved in cloud computing
activities is properly secure.
Controls Description
Create a data ● Identify all data assets, classifying them in terms of criticality to the business
asset catalog (which can involve financial and legal considerations, including compliance
requirements), specifying ownership and responsibility for the data, and
describing the location(s) and acceptable use of the assets.
● Relationships between data assets also need to be cataloged.
● A strong understanding of sensitive data flow is needed. This includes
identification of permanent (e.g., database) and temporary (e.g., cache -
Content Delivery Network) storage of sensitive data.
● An associated aspect is the description of responsible parties and roles, which
in the case of cloud computing must span the cloud service customer
organization and the cloud service provider organization.
Consider all ● Organizations are increasing the amount of unstructured data held in IT
forms of data systems, which can include items such as images of scanned documents,
pictures and multimedia files.
● Unstructured data can be sensitive and require specific treatment - for
example, redaction or masking of personal information such as signatures,
addresses, or license plates.
● For structured data, in a multi-tenant cloud environment, data held in
databases needs consideration. Database segmentation can be offered in a
couple of varieties: shared or isolated data schema.
o In a shared data schema, each customer’s data is intermixed within
the same database. This means that customer A's data may reside in
row 1 while customer B's data resides in row 2.
o In an isolated architecture, the customer's' data is segregated into its
own database instance. While this may provide additional isolation, it
also impacts the providers' economies of scale and could, potentially,
increase the cost to the customer.
o In either scenario, database encryption should be employed to
protect all data at rest.
Most of the security techniques involved are not new, though cloud computing can create new
considerations. Cloud provider implementation and maintenance of effective security controls becomes
a critical consideration when ensuring the protection of data in cloud services. Data isolation,
encryption, and access control is needed to maintain confidentiality. Robust back-up services and
resiliency capability is needed to maintain availability. Customers must understand their responsibility to
protect data in cloud services and plan accordingly.
The CSCC Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on Cloud Services [34] provides additional
guidance on the protection of data at rest and data in motion in a cloud environment.
If the customer has interoperability requirements between on premise to cloud or multiple cloud
systems, review the standard ISO/IEC 19941 Cloud Computing - Interoperability and Portability [38].
Typically, data protection requires imposing limitations on the use and accessibility of PII, based on
policies that are written by non-IT personnel, especially the Legal and Risk Management departments,
which are consistent with applicable regulations and laws, and are approved at the highest levels of the
organization. Enforcement of such limitations implies requirements to tag the data appropriately, store
it securely, and permit access only by authorized users. This requires appropriate controls, which can be
more challenging when the data is stored in cloud services. The ISO/IEC 27018 standard addresses the
controls required for the protection of PII.
When data is placed in or transferred to a cloud computing environment, the ultimate responsibility for
protecting and securing the data typically remains with the customer (the data controller in EU
terminology 4), even if in some circumstances this responsibility may be shared with others. When an
organization relies on a third party to host or process its data (the data processor), the data controller
may remain liable for any loss, damage, or misuse of the data, while the data processor may need to
appoint a Data Protection Officer if certain criteria are met. The rules for data processors are stricter in
the European Union under the GDPR [39]. It is prudent, and may be legally required, that the data
controller and the cloud service provider enter into a written (legal) agreement that clearly defines the
roles and expectations of the parties, allocates between them the many responsibilities that are
attached to the data at stake, and specifies under which circumstances the cloud customer indemnifies
the provider for any losses or damages sustained, or vice versa.
It is critical that privacy requirements be adequately addressed in the cloud service agreement. If not,
the cloud service customer should consider seeking a different provider or not placing sensitive data in
the cloud service. For example, customers that wish to place health information subject to the United
States HIPAA regulation [14] into a cloud service must find a cloud service provider that will sign a HIPAA
business associate agreement.
Certain technologies may be used to reduce the risk of disclosing PII to unauthorized parties while
allowing the customer to gain the benefits of a cloud solution. For example, data may be anonymized
before being stored in the cloud service, while the small amount of critical information required to
match the anonymous records with the real people they represent is held in a separate database kept
on premises.
4
The European Union provides a Glossary of terms associated with Data Protection here:
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/EDPS/Dataprotection/Glossary
Enterprises are responsible for defining policies to address privacy concerns and raise awareness of data
protection within their organization. They are also responsible for ensuring that their cloud service
providers adhere to the defined privacy policies. Thus, customers have an ongoing obligation to monitor
their provider’s compliance with customer policies. This includes an audit program covering all aspects
of the privacy policies, including methods of ensuring that corrective actions will take place.
Application security poses specific challenges to both the cloud service provider and the customer.
Organizations must apply the same diligence to application security as they do to physical and
infrastructure security. If an application is compromised, it can create financial liability and reputation
damage to both the provider and the customer, especially if the ultimate end users of the application
are customers of the customer rather than its employees.
In order to protect an application from various types of breaches it is important to understand the
application security policy considerations based on the different cloud deployment models. Table 3
highlights the impact of cloud deployment on application security. All of these considerations are in
addition to the others outlined in this whitepaper (facilities, network, data, etc.).
It should be noted that there is a cost to the customer to ensure that these considerations are applied.
The costs are typically built into technology, resources, interventions, and audits. However, these costs
will likely pale in comparison with the potential liability and loss of reputation from an application
security breach.
When developing and deploying applications in a cloud environment, it is critical that customers realize
that they may forfeit some control and should design their cloud applications with these considerations
in mind. Additionally, it is critical that customers and providers developing application software use a
structured methodology to engineer security into their cloud applications from the ground up. Secure
engineering for applications is dealt with at length by the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) [41] and by the ISO/IEC 27034 series of standards [42].
For cloud services, development and operations teams come together as Dev-Ops. Cloud infrastructures,
cloud platforms, and cloud applications should be engineered to address the threats found within the
operational environment. Security must be incorporated into this continuous delivery and deployment
approach as Sec-Dev-Ops or Dev-Sec-Ops to ensure the application runs on a safe platform, the code is
free from vulnerabilities, and the operational risks are clearly understood.
● Secure engineering to ensure the products and services are developed and built with
appropriate security and privacy controls and operate in compliance with accepted
international, national, governmental, industry, and regional security standards.
● Secure deployment and operations to ensure that cloud platform, runtimes, and applications
are deployed securely, checked regularly for security configuration and hygiene, tested for
security vulnerabilities, and updated with software patches and security fixes.
● Separation of duties to ensure that users only have the access that is required to perform their
jobs according to the principle of least privilege.
● Availability and business continuity management to ensure that infrastructure, runtime
components, and management components are highly available.
● Security evaluation and learning to ensure that the security functions and properties in the
delivered code and services are maintained as threats evolve and new vulnerabilities arise.
Automating most of the above security steps as part of the Dev-Ops process is key to enabling
continuous development and deployment of services and offerings on the cloud. However, an
automated static code analysis tool is no substitute for appropriate security engineering analysis and
practice, and a strong developer peer review process should also be documented and published.
There are general secure coding practices guidelines available to help educate developers including the
OWASP Secure Coding Practices [41].
To use the analogy of a hotel, we expect the hotel to provide some limited amount of perimeter security
- not allowing anyone into the building without a key card during certain times of night, for example, or
challenging obviously dangerous persons - even though we should not expect the hotel to deny access
to every potentially dangerous person. We also expect the hotel to provide door locks that are effective
if the customers use them.
With this in mind, it is recommended that customers evaluate the external network controls of a cloud
service provider based on the areas highlighted in Table 4.
Traffic screening ● Certain traffic is almost never legitimate – for example, traffic to known
malware ports. If the cloud provider does not automatically screen traffic, the
cloud customer should do so.
● Screening is generally performed by firewall devices or software. Some
considerations:
o Does the provider publish a standard perimeter block list that aligns
with the terms of service for the offering? If so, customers should
request a copy of the block list; a reasonable block list can provide a
customer with both assurance of a network protection plan as well as
some functional guidelines on what is allowed. There may be some
cause for concern if the block list is not in line with the terms of
service.
o Does the provider's firewall control IPv6 access, or protect against both
IPv4 and IPv6 attacks? More and more devices are IPv6 capable, and
some providers forget to limit IPv6 access, which can allow an attacker
an easy way around the IPv4 firewall.
o Does the provider offer any geographic restrictions? Traffic from some
geographic areas may be prohibited by local laws or may be more
likely to be fraudulent.
Denial-of-service ● Is the provider able to withstand and adapt to high-traffic attacks, such as
protection Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks? DDOS attacks are commonly used for
extortion purposes, and the ability of a cloud service provider and its Internet
service provider to assist in blocking the unwanted traffic can be crucial to
withstanding an attack.
● If the solution deployed in the cloud is accessed by the customer’s customers,
a DDOS attack against the cloud service provider may result in loss of business
for the customer.
Intrusion ● Some traffic may initially look legitimate, but deeper inspection indicates that
detection and it is carrying malicious payload such as spam, viruses, or known attacks. The
prevention customer must understand whether the provider will block or notify the
customer about this traffic.
● Intrusion detection and/or prevention systems (IDS/IPS) may be virtual or real
devices. While a firewall usually only makes decisions based on
source/destination, ports, and existing connections, an IDS/IPS looks at overall
traffic patterns as well as the actual contents of the messages. Many firewalls
now include IDS/IPS capabilities.
● Although technically not IDS/IPS devices, application-level proxies (such as
email gateways) will often perform similar functions for certain types of
network traffic.
● An IDS will typically only flag potential problems for human review; an IPS will
take action to block the offending traffic automatically. Some IDS/IPS
considerations:
o IDS/IPS content matching can detect or block known malware attacks,
virus signatures, and spam signatures, but are also subject to false
positives. If the cloud service provider provides IDS/IPS services, is
there a documented exception process for allowing legitimate traffic
that has content similar to malware attacks or spam?
o Similarly, IDS/IPS traffic pattern analysis can often detect or block
attacks such as a denial-of-service attack or a network scan. However,
in some cases this is legitimate traffic (such as using cloud
infrastructure for load testing or security testing). Does the cloud
service provider have a documented exception process for allowing
legitimate traffic that the IDS/IPS flags as an attack pattern?
Logging and ● For assurance purposes and troubleshooting, it's important that customers
notification have some visibility into network health.
● Incident reporting and incident handling procedures must be clear and the
customer should look for visibility into the handling process. Note that if any
Personally Identifiable Information is stored in the cloud computing
environment, there may be legal requirements associated with logging data
(limiting what can be stored in logs, for example).
● Some network logging information is of a sensitive nature and may reveal
information about other clients, so a cloud provider may not allow direct
access to this information. However, it is recommended that customers ask
certain questions about logging and notification policies:
o What is the network logging and retention policy? In the event of a
successful attack, the customer may want to perform forensic analysis, and
the network logs can be very helpful.
o What are the notification policies? As a cloud customer, you should be
notified in timely manner if your machines are attacked or if they are
compromised and are attacking someone else.
o Are historical statistics available on the number of attacks detected and
blocked? These statistics can help a customer understand how effective
the provider's detection and blocking capabilities actually are.
A cloud environment includes a number of resources that are not shared in a traditional data center.
One of these resources is the cloud service provider's internal network infrastructure, such as the access
switches and routers used to connect cloud virtual machines to the provider's backbone network.
Internal network security differs from external network security in that we assume that any attackers
have already made it through the external defenses, either via an attack or, more commonly, because
the attackers are legitimately authorized for a different part of the network. After a user is allowed
access to a portion of the cloud service provider's network, the provider has a number of additional
responsibilities with respect to internal network security. To extend the hotel analogy, the room locks
and walls must also be sufficient to protect the customers.
The primary categories of internal network attacks that customers should be concerned with include:
1. Confidentiality breaches (disclosure of confidential data)
2. Integrity breaches (unauthorized modification of data)
3. Availability breaches (denial of service, either intentional or unintentional)
Provide tools Cloud service providers are responsible for providing ways for customers to separate
to protect themselves from other customers and from the Internet. Most cloud service
customers providers will provide one or more of the following technologies for this purpose:
from one
1. Virtual LANs, or VLANs, are a technology that places systems on separate virtual
another
Ethernet switches. In theory, network traffic on one VLAN cannot be seen on a
different VLAN any more than network traffic on one physical Ethernet switch
can be seen on a different, non-connected Ethernet switch.
VLAN separation technology is often a primary control for cloud providers and is
generally very effective. However, there are documented “VLAN hopping”
attacks that allow unauthorized traffic between VLANs, such as “double-tagging”
and “switch spoofing.”
Most VLAN technologies allow all systems on the same VLAN to talk with no
restrictions, and only prevent communication between systems on different
VLANs. Advanced VLAN and firewall technologies may be able to prevent
communications on a more granular level, from system to system.
Many cloud service providers offer private VLANs for customers that no other
customers should be able to access. These VLANs may be implemented on
physical switches, hypervisors, or a combination of both. When implemented on
hypervisors, this technology is often called “Virtual Private Cloud.” It is
recommended that customers verify that the provider's VLAN controls address
known VLAN hopping attacks.
2. Virtual Private Networks (VPNs, and also sometimes referred to simply as
“tunnels”) can be used to connect a customer's dedicated cloud VLAN back to the
customer's network; this configuration is commonly known as a “site-to-site”
VPN.
VPNs can also be used to allow roaming users anywhere on the Internet to
securely access the customer's VLAN; this configuration is commonly called
“client-to-site”.
In both cases, there are multiple technologies (such as SSL and IPSec) with
If using a cloud provider's images, customers should ensure that the images
contain proper software firewall capabilities and that the rules are simple to
deploy and modify. Per-instance firewalls are particularly important if sharing a
network segment with other customers.
4. Hypervisor based filters, such as ebtables on Linux, are functionally similar to
VLANs and firewalls in that they can prohibit or allow communications at the
“virtual switch” level. However, these can also be used to prevent attacks such as
IP and MAC address spoofing. If dedicated VLANs are not used, it is
recommended that the customer ask what protections are in place to prevent
another customer's instance from masquerading as one of your instances.
Provide tools ● The provider should allow customers to create multiple layers of network security
to allow within the deployment, such as the creation of a “demilitarized zone” or DMZ, and
customers to multiple back-end network zones for different types of systems. For example, a
implement customer may want to create:
network ○ two different DMZ network segments for production and test
segmentation ○ separate back end segments for production and test
○ a separate administration segment
Protect the ● The client separation strategies above are worthless if the provider's control
provider's network is not properly protected. An attacker who gains access to the provider's
network control network may be able to perform attacks on other customers from the
control network.
● Customers should ask what security controls are in place for the cloud
infrastructure itself. While many cloud providers will not give out in-depth details
of their security measures due to valid security concerns, there should be a stated
security policy and some assurance (e.g., via audit and certification) that it is
followed.
Monitor for ● Activity auditing and logging are an important part of preventive security
intrusion measures as well as incident response and forensics. Audit information and logs
attempts should be subject to appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized access,
destruction, or tampering.
● Customers should ask what types of internal network security incidents have been
reported and if there are any published statistics or metrics.
● Customers should also ask for the provider's processes for alerting customers
about both successful and unsuccessful internal network attacks.
Assurance may be provided by means of audit and assessment reports, demonstrating compliance to
such security standards as ISO/IEC 27002. The security controls include:
● Physical Infrastructure and facilities should be held in secure areas. A physical security
perimeter should be in place to prevent unauthorized access, allied to physical entry controls to
ensure that only authorized personnel have access to areas containing sensitive infrastructure.
Appropriate physical security should be in place for all offices, rooms, and facilities that contain
physical infrastructure relevant to the provision of cloud services.
● Protection against external and environmental threats. Protection should be provided against
fire, floods, lightning, earthquakes, civil unrest or other potential threats that could disrupt
cloud services.
● Equipment security controls. Controls should be in place to prevent loss, theft, damage or
compromise of assets.
● Supporting utilities such as electricity supply, gas supply, telecommunications, and water
supply should have controls in place. Controls are required to prevent disruption to cloud
services either by failure of a utility supply or by malfunction (e.g., water leakage). This may
require the use of multiple routes and multiple utility suppliers.
● Control security of cabling. In particular, controls are needed to protect power cabling and
telecommunications cabling to prevent accidental or malicious damage.
● Control of removal of assets. Controls are required on the removal of assets to avoid theft of
valuable and sensitive assets.
● Secure disposal or reuse of equipment. Controls are required for the disposal of any equipment
and particularly any devices which might contain data such as storage media.
● Human resources security. Appropriate controls need to be in place for the staff working at the
facilities of a cloud service provider, including any temporary or contract staff.
● Backup, Redundancy and Continuity Plans. The provider should have appropriate backup of
data, redundancy of equipment, and continuity plans for handling equipment failure situations.
Effective physical security requires a centralized management system that allows for correlation of
inputs from various sources, including property, employees, customers, the general public, and local and
regional weather. For more detail on the controls and considerations that apply to each of these items,
refer to the ISO/IEC 27002 standard.
The CSA should explicitly document that providers must notify customers in a timely manner of the
occurrence of any breach of their system, regardless of the parties or data directly impacted. The
provider should:
Due to the high financial and reputation costs resulting from a breach, customers may want the provider
to compensate them if the breach was their fault. An indemnification clause in the contract should not
protect the provider from liability in the case of negligence.
Metrics and standards for measuring performance and effectiveness of information security
management should be established in advance in the cloud service agreement. At a minimum,
customers should understand and document their current metrics, how they will change when
operations migrate to the cloud, and where a provider may use different (potentially incompatible)
metrics. Refer to the following resources for specific information on security metrics:
● ISO/IEC 19086, Cloud computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework [30]
● NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-55 Rev.1, Performance Measurement Guide for Information
Security [16]
Measuring and reporting a provider’s compliance with respect to data protection is a tangible metric of
the effectiveness of the overall enterprise security plan. Certification to a suitable standard such as
ISO/IEC 27018 is preferable. Otherwise, a data compliance report should be required from the cloud
provider, reflecting the strength or weakness of controls, services, and mechanisms supported by the
provider in all security domains. Alternatively, the provider should obtain an independent certification
of their cloud service against recognized data protection standards.
Copyright © 2017 Cloud Standards Customer Council Page 33
Finally, one must realize that each cloud service category has distinct responsibilities for the provider
and customer:
● In the IaaS model, the onus for securing of and reporting on the infrastructure falls on the
provider, but all responsibility for the software stack from the operating system to the
application is the responsibility of the customer. 5
● In the PaaS model, the provider is responsible for securing the infrastructure and platform, and
the responsibility of the application lies with the customer.
● In the SaaS model, the provider has responsibility for most aspects of security.
Even in an instance where the provider bears all responsibility, the customer should validate that the
provider has instituted the appropriate measures to secure the environment.
From a security perspective, it is important that once the customer has completed the termination
process, "reversibility" is achieved - i.e., customer data should not remain with the cloud service
provider. The provider must ensure that any copies of the data are permanently erased from their
environment, wherever the copies may have been stored (including backup locations as well as online
data stores). Note that cloud service derived data held by the provider may need "cleansing" of
information relating to the customer (e.g., logs and audit trails), although some jurisdictions may require
retention of records of this type for periods specified by law.
Clearly, there is the opposite problem during the exit process itself - the customer must be able to
ensure a smooth transition, without loss or breach of data. Thus the exit process must allow the
customer to retrieve their data in a suitably secure form, backups must be retained for agreed periods
before being eliminated and associated event logs and reporting data must also be retained until the
exit process is complete.
5
The cloud provider is responsible for logging and timely data retrieval and provision to the customer in an
incident response scenario.
1. Ensure effective ● What information security and privacy standards or regulations apply to the
governance, risk customer’s domain?
and compliance ● Does the customer have governance and compliance processes in place for
processes exist the use of cloud services?
● Does the provider have appropriate governance and incident notification
processes for their services, consistent with the customer’s requirements?
● Is it clear what legal and regulatory requirements apply to the provider's
services?
● What do the Master Services Agreement and Service Level Agreement say
about the sharing of security responsibilities between provider and
customer?
● Is there a risk related to data location?
2. Audit and ensure ● Is a report by an independent audit agency available for covering the
proper reporting of provider’s cloud services? Does the audit information conform to one of the
operational and accepted standards for security audit such as ISO 27001/27002?
business processes ● Does the provider have mechanisms to report to the customers both routine
and exceptional behavior related to its services? Are all appropriate events
and actions that have security implications logged?
● Do the security controls encompass not only the cloud services themselves,
but also the management interfaces offered to customers?
● Is there an Incident Reporting and Incident Handling process that meets the
needs of the customer?
3. Manage people, ● Do the provider services offer fine grained access control?
roles and identities ● Is multi-factor authentication supported for provider services?
● Can the provider give reports for monitoring user access?
● Is it possible to integrate or federate customer identity management
systems with the identity management facilities of the provider?
4. Ensure proper ● Is there a catalog of all data assets that will be used or stored in the cloud
protection of data environment?
and information ● Is there a description of responsible parties and roles?
● Has the handling of all forms of data been considered, in particular
unstructured data such as images?
● For structured data held in databases in a multi-tenant cloud environment,
is there proper separation of data belonging to different customers?
● Have appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and availability measures been
applied to data used or stored in the cloud?
Copyright © 2017 Cloud Standards Customer Council Page 35
Security Step Assessment Questions
10. Understand the ● Is there a documented exit process as part of the cloud service agreement?
security ● Is it clear that all cloud service customer data is deleted from the provider's
requirements of the environment at the end of the exit process?
exit process ● Is cloud service customer data protected against loss or breach during the
exit process?
[2] Cloud Standards Customer Council (2016). Cloud Security Standards: What to Expect and What to
Negotiate.
http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/cloud-security-standards-what-to-expect-and-what-to-
negotiate.htm
[4] ISO/IEC 27017 Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud
services
https://www.iso.org/standard/43757.html
[5] ISO/IEC 27018 Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public
clouds acting as PII processors
https://www.iso.org/standard/61498.html
[6] Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16, Reporting on Controls at a
Service Organization (SSAE 16)
http://ssae16.com/SSAE16_overview.html
[12] WS-Federation
https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/documents.php?wg_abbrev=wsfed
[13] OAuth
http://oauth.net
Copyright © 2017 Cloud Standards Customer Council Page 38
[14] HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996)
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/
[15] ISO/IEC 27004:2016, Information security management -- Monitoring, measurement, analysis and
evaluation.
https://www.iso.org/standard/64120.html
[16] NIST Special Publication 800-55 Rev.1, Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-55-Rev1/SP800-55-rev1.pdf
[18] OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html
[24] Law for the Protection of Personal Data (LPDP), Law No. 25.326 - see
http://www.protecciondedatos.com.ar/law25326.htm
[30] ISO/IEC 19086 Cloud computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework -- Part 1: Overview and
concepts
https://www.iso.org/standard/67545.html
[31] ISO/IEC 19086 Cloud computing -- Service level agreement (SLA) framework -- Part 4: Security and
privacy
https://www.iso.org/standard/68242.html
[34] Cloud Standards Customer Council (2017). Cloud Customer Architecture for Securing Workloads on
Cloud Services.
http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/cloud-customer-architecture-for-securing-workloads-on-
cloud-services.htm
[43] ISO/IEC 27036-4:2016: Information technology -- Security techniques -- Information security for
supplier relationship -- Part 4: Guidelines for security of cloud services
https://www.iso.org/standard/59689.html
[44] ISO/IEC 27002:2013: Information technology -- Security techniques -- Code of practice for
information security controls
https://www.iso.org/standard/54533.html
Additional References
Cloud Standards Customer Council (2017). Practical Guide to Cloud Computing.
http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/practical-guide-to-cloud-computing.htm
Cloud Standards Customer Council (2016). Public Cloud Service Agreements: What to Expect and What to
Negotiate.
http://www.cloud-council.org/deliverables/public-cloud-service-agreements-what-to-expect-and-what-
to-negotiate.htm
Cloud Security Alliance. Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Cloud Computing.
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/security-guidance/
Security Privacy
6
This list is derived from the Forrester Global Data Protection Heat Map. See
http://www.forrestertools.com/heatmap/
Copyright © 2017 Cloud Standards Customer Council Page 43
Region Regulation
Asia Pacific • Some countries have enacted data protection laws that require the data
region, Japan, controller to adopt reasonable technical, physical, and administrative measures
Australia, New in order to protect personal data from loss, misuse, or alteration, based on the
Zealand, and Privacy and Security Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
others and Development (OECD) [18], and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s
(APEC) Privacy Framework.
• China, Taiwan and Thailand have effectively no data protection regime.
• Malaysia and India have some limited protections.
• South Korea and Singapore have the most stringent privacy regulations of the
region. In Singapore, the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 is enforced by the
Personal Data Commission established in 2013.
Japan • In Japan, the Personal Information Protection Act [19] requires the private
sectors to protect personal information and data securely. In the healthcare
industry, profession-specific laws such as the Medical Practitioners' Law [20],
the Law on Public Health Nurses, Midwives and Nurses [21], and the Dentist
Law [22] require registered health professionals to protect the confidentiality
of patient information.
Europe • The European Union has adopted a stringent General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) that superseded the 1995 Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC and the 2002 ePrivacy Directive (as amended in 2009). These
regulations include a security component, and the obligation to provide
adequate security must be passed down to subcontractors.
• Even within the European Union, there are differences in local laws and
regulations. The Benelux countries, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia have the
strictest rules. France has had a data privacy law since 1978, enforced by a
special government commission (CNIL), with which any new database
containing PII must be registered.
Africa, Middle • Other countries that have close ties with the European Union, such as Morocco
East and Tunisia in Africa, or Israel and Dubai in the Middle East, have adopted
similar laws that follow the same principles as the EU GDPR. Turkey, by
contrast, has minimal restrictions, a situation that is likely to change if and
when the country is admitted into the EU.
Americas • Laws across the continent place on the data custodian the burden of ensuring
the protection and security of personal data wherever the data is located, and
especially when transferring to a third party.
• In addition to the data protection laws of Canada [23] and Argentina [24],
which have been in existence for several years, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay,
and Peru have recently passed data protection laws that are inspired mainly
from the European model and may also include references to the APEC Privacy
Framework.
• Argentina is the strictest of the hemisphere’s countries and the combination of
its constitutional protection and laws have earned it recognition by the
European Union that it provides equivalent protection.
• In Mexico, the “transparency laws” enacted in order to fight corruption can
work at cross-purposes with privacy. For example, any civil servant’s name and
professional e-mail address is exposed to the public because the law requires
the employee directories of all government agencies to be public. On the other
hand, data held by the private sector is protected under a series of laws
enacted in 2010-2014, and the situation is still changing. Data residency
restrictions are often invoked as an obstacle against moving to cloud solutions,
even though it is hard to pinpoint any text that explicitly imposes data
residency within Mexico.
• Paraguay is the exception in the continent, with essentially no restrictions.
United States • There is no single privacy law in the Unites States. A range of government
agency and industry sector laws impose privacy obligations in specific
circumstances. There are numerous gaps and overlaps in coverage. Current
industry sector privacy laws include:
o The Federal Trade Commission Act [25], which prohibits unfair or
deceptive practices - this requirement has been applied to
company privacy policies in several prominent cases.
o The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 [26], which
protects customers against interception of their electronic
communication (with numerous exceptions).
o The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
[27], which contains privacy rules applying to certain categories of
health and medical research data.
o The Fair Credit Reporting Act [28], which includes privacy rules for
credit reporting and customer reports.
o The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) [29], which governs the
collection, disclosure, and protection of customers’ nonpublic
personal information for financial institutions
These laws hold organizations responsible for the acts of their subcontractors. For
example, GLBA and HIPAA require that organizations compel their subcontractors,
in written contracts, to use reasonable security measures and comply with data
privacy provisions. U.S. Government agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) or the State Attorneys General, have consistently held
organizations liable for the activities of their subcontractors.
Worldwide • The Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standards (DSS) [8], which apply
to credit card data anywhere in the world, including data processed by
subcontractors, has similar requirements.
In addition to privacy-specific regulations, customers should review data residency laws and regulations
that may constrain the offshore storage and transfer of sovereign data (e.g., data about natural