1

EN BANC Jr.,Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja,
[G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011.] Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two complaints
in the Order of Business, 10 which was complied with by their inclusion in the
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,
Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m.,during its plenary session, the House
JR.,SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
(BAYAN);MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF
respondent. 11
PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP);ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1,
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS 2010,found both complaints sufficient in form,which complaints it considered to
(NUPL);FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
have been referred to it at exactly the same time.
(COURAGE);and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
STUDENTS (LFS), respondents.
15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,respondent-intervenor
. On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the
DECISION September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to
CARPIO MORALES, J p: accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await
the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner),challenges via copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent. cEaSHC
petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7,
of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public 2010,found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of
respondent). HDITCS the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance.The
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on
or onJuly 22, 2010,private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon.
and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an
complaint 1against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives answer to the complaints within 10 days. 13
Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello. 2 Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for
Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En
transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order 14 and to
Jr. 3 who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the Committee on Rules require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court
to include it in the Order of Business. 4 subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition.
On August 3, 2010,private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr.,Mother Mary
John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which
Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint 5 against petitioner filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and private
with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives Neri Javier counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.
Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4,
and Emerenciana de Jesus. 6 On even date, the House of 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Representatives provisionally adopted theRules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date, 7 the Secretary Under an Advisory 15 issued by the Court, oral arguments were
General transmitted the Reyes group's complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioner's filing of a
Memorandum of August 9, 2010, 8 also directed the Committee on Rules to Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda
include it in the Order of Business. within the given 15-day period.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall
chairperson of the Committee on Rules, 9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, first resolve.
 2

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, 16 and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. 17 committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v.
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
Representatives.18 The argument that impeachment proceedings are beyond the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise: raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
power of judicial review is onlyimpliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
the Constitution,is not just a power but also a duty,and it was given congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation
instrumentality. IcHEaA in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. InDaza v.
the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives in
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of subject to judicial review. InTañada v. Cuenco, it held that although
Representatives without limitation, ourConstitution,though vesting in under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of
XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
and the same official. the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly. AIcaDC
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.Thus, they call upon exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
judicial willfulness and pride." system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the the Constitution. 19(citations omitted; italics in the original;
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows underscoring supplied)
that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as
for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. the expanded certiorari jurisdiction 20 of this Court reflects, includes the power to
Carr,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." 21
xxx xxx xxx
In the present case, petitioner invokes the Court's
expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and
 3

prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to The Court finds petitioner's allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft
determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does
gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that not suffice. 26
could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective
measures from the Court. The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of
the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.27 teaches:
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature
in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a
repository of the sovereign will. 22 majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to
validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote
Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming
not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order,
Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition 23 on resolution or decision.
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency
of form and substance of the two complaints. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body ....28
ripeness. 24 The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct,
adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct. 25 In the present In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in
petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia,the validity of the fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the
simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. 29
of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for Even petitioner's counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there
immediate interpretation. are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two JUSTICE CUEVAS:
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed.In
cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another
be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness
and in accordance with law under that matter, he is only human
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue — whether we grant him that benefit.
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or JUSTICE MORALES:
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically Is he a one-man committee?
anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec. JUSTICE CUEVAS:
1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec. 3, par. 5) of the Constitution. He is not a one-man committee,Your Honor, but he decides.
JUSTICE MORALES:
Due process of law
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
Petitioner alleges that public respondent's chairperson, Representative JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then
while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her (interrupted)
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the JUSTICE MORALES:
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and
and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in such a Corrupt Practices Act, does that mean that your client will
way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of be deprived of due process of law?
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her. TcEAIH JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No,what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes
with the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due
process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.
 4

JUSTICE MORALES: one but five state prosecutors. 32 (italics in the original;
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee? emphasis and underscoring supplied)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor. DacASC Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination
JUSTICE MORALES: of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality? theImpeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioner's
JUSTICE CUEVAS: counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of an
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding answer.
officer of the committee as in this case there were JUSTICE MORALES:
objections relative to the existence of the implementing Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is
rules not heard, there was objection made by Congressman sufficiency in form and substance before she is asked to
Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional file her answer (interrupted)
crisis. JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE MORALES: That is correct,Your Honor.
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you JUSTICE MORALES:
can cite which makes it mandatory for the chair of the During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the
committee to inhibit given that he had previously been regularity of the proceedings and related irregularities?
found liable for violation of a law[?] JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS: Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that
There is nothing, Your Honor.In our jurisprudence which deals with statement, Your Honor,because it is only after a
the situation whereby with that background as the material determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and
or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor,
the right of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect without that but it may be asked, how is not your action
of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from an premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the
impartial adjudicator. 30 (emphasis and underscoring other violations involved and that is
supplied) (interrupted).33 (emphasis and underscoring
Petitioner contends that the "indecent and precipitate haste" of public supplied) HEAcDC
respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear Rule III (A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the
indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5 34 which
to arrive thereat. denotes that petitioner's initial participation in the impeachment proceedings — the
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an opportunity to file an Answer — starts after the Committee on Justice finds the
indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice 31 holds: complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept
petitioner's motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
performance of functions. For one's prompt dispatch may be Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the
another's undue haste.The orderly administration of justice sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards
remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. 35
particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case. The claim fails.
The presumption of regularity includes the public officer's official The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an
actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-
presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such
contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in
numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel's to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations
initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively
discounting the presumably regular performance of not just
 5

carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the
constitutional guidelines. publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation." 42
Contrary to petitioner's position that the Impeachment Rules do not
provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional Officers and Investigations 43 which held that the Constitution categorically
requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public
resolution," 36 and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely enable
facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3 (8),Art. XI of
committee." 37 Constitution.
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as:
a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important
is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as
or obligatory. The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court.
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely requires a
"hearing." 38 In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or
regulation to become known or obligatory. 44 (emphasis supplied)
finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital
"to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a
such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. statutory difference in their usage.
Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. 45 A
the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and
complaints. issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as
This the Court cannot do. well as other constitutional offices.

Francisco instructs that this issue would "require the Court to make a To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating
is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the
Commission. . . . Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable publication of these rules for their effectivity.As far as promulgation of judgments
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.]" 39 Worse, is concerned, however, promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the
petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds clerk of court for filing and publication." 46 acCETD
raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision
involve matters of defense. cADaIH directing Congress to "promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates"
In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress
questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May 25,
the Impeachment Rules. 2010, 47 it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather,
Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on
August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment In the case of administrative agencies, "promulgation" and "publication"
Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in
its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, 48 the publication of implementing rules
Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. 40 occurs after their promulgation or adoption.

Citing Tañada v. Tuvera,41 petitioner contends that she was deprived of Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is
due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, generally understood — that is, to make known.Generalia verba sunt
2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the generaliter inteligencia.What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3 (8), Article XI of Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must
the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. 49
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
 6

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section
"publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention
sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any
its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to citizen alleging ultimate facts constituting a ground or
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a
of court for filing and publication. provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that this
procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by
It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to a citizen to avoid harassment or crank complaints, could
promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as
promulgation.The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation
follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS
beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY
Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation OUT THE PURPOSES THEREOF. I think all these
is but one avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence other procedural requirements could be taken care of by
emphatically teaches that: the Rules of Congress.52 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
...in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions
legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of are not self-executing. Section 3 (8) does not, in any circumstance,operate to
respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the took pains in designing even its details.
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.In the words
of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
that where no specific, operable norms and standards are generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and
implement them,before the courts may intervene. 50 (italics in the the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the provisions of the constitution are self-executing.If the
rules of procedurein legislative inquiries,per Neri.Other than "promulgate," there is constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to an of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
issuance without need of it being published. EcTCAD practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic.That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been,
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of that —
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in
theConstitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of ...in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
rules of procedure.Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of executing rather than non-self-executing . . . Unless the
publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution's directive, contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of
without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Tañada v. the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
Tuvera.51 Tañadanaturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution's intentions as expressed when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would
through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
known the issuances. make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.53 (emphasis and underscoring
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then
supplied)
Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section
3 (8),Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not
process. nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment
MR. REGALADO. Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of
 7

the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No
the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of once within a period of one year." TcEaDS
the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules.
In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
requirement. DAEIHT opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year
from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules referred to public respondent.
on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of
impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and
House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the
14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee,
following Francisco,but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation ends
with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment
provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal
Congress' Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Baraquel group,
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose. meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the
parties' interpretation, its impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of scrutiny.
the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
Contrary to petitioner's asseveration, Francisco 58 states that the term
impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive
"initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it. 59 The initiation
application to pending actions. "It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint. The initial
laws." 54 In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the
rights. Committee on Justice.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily that "no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the
for the protection of the people as a body politic,and not for the punishment of Committee on Justice for action" 60 which contemplates a situation where a first
the offender. 55 impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and Regalado, who
both acted asamici curiae in Francisco,affirmed that the act of
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
...[o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action
witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of of said complaint.
the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are
considered valid and effective.56 (emphasis and underscoring Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing
supplied) and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the
House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper third 61 of the members of the House of Representatives with the
procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions 57 of Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no violation initiated,another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
of the due process clause. same official within a one year period. 62 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The one-year bar rule
 8

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing
12th Congress' Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings — Sections that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or
16 63 and 1764 of Rule V thereof — "clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such
since they g[a]ve the term 'initiate' a meaning different from filing and referral." 65 overturning will not amount to a refiling which is prohibited
under Section 3 (4).
Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the Another point, Madam President. ...68 (emphasis and underscoring
relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner supplied)
Maambong's statements 66 that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
An apparent effort to clarify the term "initiate" was made by Commissioner Teodulo
Petitioner fails to consider the verb "starts" as the operative word. Natividad:
Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the complaint
indeedstarts the initiation and that the House's action on the committee MR. NATIVIDAD.
report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. HEDaTA How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. BENGZON.
Commissioner Maambong saw the need "to be very technical about One-third.
this," 67 for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations MR. NATIVIDAD.
loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges. To initiate is different from to impeach;to impeach is different
from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before
MR. DAVIDE.
the Senate. HTAEIS
That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment
MR. REGALADO.
proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the
When we speak of "initiative," we refer here to the Articles of
membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.
Impeachment.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. NATIVIDAD.
A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to
So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach,
initiate proceedings.
we are charging him with the Articles of
MR. DAVIDE.
Impeachment.That is my understanding. 69 (emphasis
No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings,only one-fifth vote of
and underscoring supplied)
the membership of the House is required; for conviction,
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner
a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.
Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DAVIDE. [I]
However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to
overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 MR. MAAMBONG.
(4) which reads: Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner
official more than once within a period of one year. Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
disallow one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier,
to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.
ordinary Member. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee
MR. ROMULO. resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the approved by the body.
possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
where we are faced with just a verified complaint rather than the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the
the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted
the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint, are some Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
of the questions we would like to be discussed. approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it.
MR. DAVIDE. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that
 9

score, probably the Committee on Style could help in Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
rearranging the words because we have to be very the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
technical about this. I have been bringing with me Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 70 (italics in the original; emphasis In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by
and underscoring supplied) former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
[II] Jr.,along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
MR. MAAMBONG. 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of 2003,the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Section 3 (3).My reconsideration will not at all affect the Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the United States regarding impeachment. the same impeachable officer within a one-year
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any period. 72 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3),from lines 17
to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the
impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco.She submits that referral
on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH THE could not be the reckoning point of initiation because "something prior to that had
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in already been done," 73 apparently citing Bernas' discussion.
"impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third
of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the House's
to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of action on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not
impeachment OF the committee or to override its contrary state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded." done. Following petitioner's line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the endorsement by a member of the House — steps done prior to the filing —
the House of Representatives of the United States is would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified Contrary to petitioner's emphasis on impeachment complaint, what
complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries the Constitution mentions is impeachment "proceedings." Her reliance on the
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the singular tense of the word "complaint" 74 to denote the limit prescribed by
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a
in the case of the direct filing of a verified complaint of one- word covers its enlarged and plural sense.75
third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again,
Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the
States Congress. IESTcD lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up
Thank you, Madam President. 71 (emphasis and underscoring the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle
supplied) wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment
proceeding.With asimultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time..
Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the
complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both
is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in illusive and illusory. EHSTcC
pointing out the material dates.
 10

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioner's stance suggests explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It
that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention of is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power
Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to
government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, regardless of ill otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by
motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
by the expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be
the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective complainants Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those
who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made
subject to the five-minute rule. 79 Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice
days or even hours later from filing an impeachment complaint.
that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon,
Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. 80 With
proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer
be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official
process is precisely intended to effectively weed out "worms" in high offices which records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the
could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the
season. one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a
constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the
actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment which to make the proper referral. IDATCE
complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the
impeachment process. As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an
impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that "[a]
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second session days,and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a thereafter."
second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed
impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion
knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not readily on the allegedly "belated" referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by the
ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was
committing their endorsement. yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on July 26, 2010
that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started
The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the
impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that administers Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was well
the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner within the said 10-day session period. 81
Bernas' disquisition 76 in Francisco, a proceeding which "takes place not in the
Senate but in the House" 77 precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an
Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is
is within the sole and absolute control of the House of primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to
Representatives. 78 Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and frustrates the collective
taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable
impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an
by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.
or any private individual, should own up to its processes.
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents' alternative
The Constitution did not place the power of the "final say" on the lips of contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into
the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on
forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should refer
the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the
 11

members of the House. 82 To the Reyes group, initiation means the act of plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. 83 To respondent- intervenor).Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the
intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justice's recommendation to the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would
House plenary. 84 disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one
proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the Impeachment impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo
Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an impeachment Azcuna's separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling. 89 Justice
proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason for the Court to Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: "to prevent undue
deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment ortoo frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task
proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the reckoning point of [of] legislation," with main reference to the records of the Constitutional
initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations Commission, that reads:
of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
MR. ROMULO.
...We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect
movere.This doctrine, which is really "adherence to precedents," public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category
mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do
case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in its work which is lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings
the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the take a lot of time.And if we allow multiple impeachment
necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As charges on the same individual to take place, the legislature
the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise The will do nothing else but that. 90 (underscoring supplied)
Nature of the Judicial Process:DHETIS
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one element of time,and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should
set of litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be
of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly, Congress
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time
opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that
when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today initiation means filing and referral remains congruent to the rationale of the
if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of constitutional provision.
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to
material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the intervening
then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first
faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts. 85 impeachment complaint to the date of referral. ETIHCa
As pointed out in Francisco,the impeachment proceeding is not initiated As pointed out during the oral arguments 91 by the counsel for
"when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an
because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a
is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House member,
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance — all these must be met before
the Committee on Justice for action.This is the initiating step which triggers the bothering a respondent to answer — already weigh heavily in favor of an
series of steps that follow." 86 impeachable officer.
Allowing an expansive construction of the term "initiate" beyond the act Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of
of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre-agenda
own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the standard operating procedure),the number of complaints may still be filtered or
Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on the sufficiency of
one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioner's fear, a complaint will not
the overriding 87 of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent),or last the primary stage if it does not have the stated preliminary requisites.
the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes
group),88 or the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House
 12

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in
deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression. the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense,
and the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-
Petitioner's claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the
and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints filed. same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the
This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which issue
freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel
assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution,
complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information referred
theConstitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be
the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did in the name of the People of the Philippines.
not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition of an
impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions 92 outside the Rules
official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel and
the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply,
to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a petitioner's case falls under the exception since impeachment prescribes a single
vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is punishment — removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office —
the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule. even for various offenses. Both groups also observe that petitioner concededly and
admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.
Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner's claim deserves scant consideration.
On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused
its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules she Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of
earlier chastised. the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional
provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without
In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules "to effectively carry out" delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense per
the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the
theImpeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that "the Rules of Criminal House 93 which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner's
Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable,apply to invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to
impeachment proceedings before the House." state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment
Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in
additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying out its one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." 94 It, therefore, follows that an
mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices. impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.
First is on the "one offense, one complaint" rule. By way of reference to The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In
Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of Section rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows only one
13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that "[a] complaint impeachment complaint against her within one year.
or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to
single punishment for various offenses." To petitioner, the two impeachment consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on
complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both the Committee whether to consolidate[;c]onsolidation may come today or may
culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and
that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
rules. DaAETS consolidate[,a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate." 95 Petitioner's petition, in
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated." 96 DEcTIS
confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of the highly Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not
political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on
certain rules; impair her performance of official functions as well as that of the this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory. 97
House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the
deadline. Even if the Court assumes petitioner's change of stance that the two
impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated, 98 her claim that
 13

consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner's theory obviously springs from

her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.
WHEREFORE,the petition is DISMISSED.The assailed Resolutions of
September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on
September 14, 2010 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr. and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J.,Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta, JJ.,join the dissent of Mr. Justice
Brion.
Carpio, Abad and Sereno, JJ.,see concurring opinion.
Velasco, Jr.,J.,took no part.
Nachura, J.,see separate opinion.
Brion, J.,see dissent.
Bersamin, J.,I certify that Mr. Justice Bersamin sent in his vote joining the dissenting
opinion of Mr. J. Brion. — Corona, C.J.
Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.