Property Reviewer by Roxanne Jurial
Property Reviewer by Roxanne Jurial
Property Reviewer by Roxanne Jurial
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
The concept of property extends only to those things which are already
possessed and found in the possession of man. The Civil Code does not define
the term property but simply implies that the concept refers to things which are
susceptible of appropriation. Things which cannot, therefore, be subjected to
human control by reason of sheer physical impossibility are NOT considered as
property. Examples: stars, moon, ocean.
Most authors in the subject provide for two additional requisites before
considering a thing as property, aside from the more general “susceptibility
to appropriation”: (1) utility, or that it can serve as a means to satisfy
human needs; and (2) substantivity or individuality, or that the thing
must have an autonomous and separate existence.
Classification of Property
1. As to nature
a. Res nullius (Belonging to no one) -wild animals
b. Res communes (Belonging to everyone) -wind, sunlight, air
c. Res alicujus (Belonging to someone) - shares of stock
2. As to mobility
a. Movable/ personal -television set
b. Immovable/ real -land
3. As to ownership
a. Public -sea
b. Private -car
4. As to alienability
a. Within the commerce of men -residential building
b. Outside the commerce of men -public plaza
5. As to existence
a. present
b. future
6. As to materiality
a. Tangible/ corporeal -Paper
b. Intangible/ incorporeal -Rights or credit
7. As to dependence
a. Principal
b. Accessory
8. As to substitution
a. Fungible -Capable of substitution of same kind and quantity
b. Non-fungible -Incapable of substitution; Identical thing must be given
or returned
9. As to nature or definiteness
a. Generic -Referring to a group or class
b. Specific -Referring to single, unique object
Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are
considered either:
The law does not define what properties are immovable; they are merely
enumerated. While it is true that the dictionary defines immovable property
as that which is firmly fixed, settled, or fastened, and while in general,
immovable property is that which is fixed in a definite place, still there are
many exceptions to this general criterion. The etymological meaning should,
therefore, yield to the legal or juridical significance attached to the term by
the law. (See 3 Manresa 18). As a matter of fact, the enumeration given in
Art. 415 does not give an absolute criterion as to which properties are real,
and which are personal. (See Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaranillo, 44
Phil. 630).
(a) If the property is capable of being carried from place to place (test by
description);
(b) If such change in location can be made without injuring the real property
to which it may in the meantime be attached (test by description); and
(c) If fi nally, the object is not one of those enumerated or included in Art.
415 (test by exclusion). Then the inevitable conclusion is that the property is
personal property. (3 Manresa 46-47). [
CHAPTER I
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the
land or form an integral part of an immovable;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms
part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
1.) Land as well as buildings and other forms of construction attached to the soil
2.) Trees and plants, if they weren't planted by anybody
3.) Mines, quarries and slag dumps (slag dumps form part of the bed and water)
1.) Trees and plants that were planted (the fruit hanging on the trees is
considered part of real property until harvested or removed)
2.) Things attached to the real property in such a way that they can't be
removed without damaging the real property.
3.) Statues, paintings, reliefs that have been put there by the owner with the
intention that they form part of the property permanently.
1.) Fertilizer that was actually used on the land (if it's not used, it's
considered personal property
3.) In case of lakes, rivers or coasts, docks and other structures which are
intended by their nature or object to remain at a fixed place (even if floating)
4.) Animal houses, pigeon houses, fishponds, breeding places, beehives and
even the animals in these places; in case the owner put all these (buildings,
animals, etc.) there, intending to have them permanently part of the land
1.) Public works contracts as well as servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property
Note: Timber cut down on timberland is considered real property until it's
taken out of the land.
Paragraph 1: Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds
adhered to the soil.
N.B. The Supreme Court explained: “A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its
adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil Code). This classification holds
true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different
owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its
character as an immovable likewise ceases. It should be noted that the complaint here is for
recovery of damages.” (Biscerra v. Teneza, 6 SCRA 649 (1962) “buildings are always immovable
under the Code.” The Court further ruled that “the prevalent doctrine is that an action for the
annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and
prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.”
(Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. De Lacsamana, 121 SCRA 331 (1983)
N.B. Possessory rights over said property before title is vested on the grantee may be validly
transmitted or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage. (Prudential Bank v. Panis, 153 SCRA 390
(1987)
Publication in a newspaper of general circulation was indispensable (to the subject building as
real property). Being admitted that no such publication was ever made, the execution sale was
void. (Ladera v. C.N. Hodges, et al. (CA), 48 Off. Gaz. 5374 (1952)
Non-acquisition of a preferential lien through the preliminary writ of attachment is futile. The
Court of Appeals erred when it opined that the house should have been levied pursuant to the
rules governing the levy of personal property. In reversing the decision of the CA, the Supreme
Court reiterated the ruling in (Ladera v. Hodges. Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc., 103
Phil. 401 (1958)
N.B. The trial court upheld the validity of the chattel mortgage. In sustaining the decision of the
trial court, the Supreme Court applied the principle of estoppel because the house in question
was treated as personal or movable property by the parties to the contract themselves. (Navarro
v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963)
The Supreme Court, the said Court again applied the principle of estoppel since the parties
treated the subject house as personalty. The Court explained that “although there is no specific
statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage (Vicencio and Simeon) could only have meant
to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they
should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.” (Tumalad v.
Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143 (1971)
The duties of a register of deeds in respect to the registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely
ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or
quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a
chattel mortgage. (Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, G.R. No. L-20329, March 16, 1923)
Paragraph 2: Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached
to the land or form an integral part of an immovable.
(a) No matter what their size may be, trees and plants are considered
real property.
- By nature - Spontaneous products of the soil
- By incorporation - Planted through labor
(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personal property;
JURISPRUDENCE: The sugar cane, although considered as “growing fruits” and therefore
ordinarily real property under Par. 2 of Art. 415 of the Civil Code, must be regarded as
PERSONAL PROPERTY for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and also for
purposes of attachment, because as ruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the right to
the growing crops mobilizes (makes personal, as contradistinguished from
immobilization) the crops by ANTICIPATION. More specifi cally, it said that the existence
of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were, in
advance, rendering the crop movable. (Sibal v. Valdez 50 Phil. 512)
EXCEPTION: The moment they are detached or uprooted from the land,
they become PERSONAL PROPERTY.
The important thing is for them to be still attached to the land. On the other
hand, once they have been severed, they become personal property, even if left
still scattered or lying about the land.
N.B “Growing crops’’ are sometimes referred to as “standing crops’’ or “ungathered fruits’’ or
“growing fruits.’’
(a) The New Civil Code nowhere requires that the attachment or incorporation
be made by the owner of the land or immovable himself.
(b) If the parties treat the machinery as chattels, they are bound by their
agreement under the principle of estoppel notwithstanding the fact that the
machinery may have been attached to an immovable in a fixed manner and may
not be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the
object to which it is attached.
REQUISITES:
1. They must be placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the
immovable or by his agent; and
2. The attachment must be intended to be permanent.
PARAGRAPH 3 PARAGRAPH 4
CANNOT be separated from immovable CAN BE SEPARATED from immovable
without breaking or deterioration without breaking or deterioration
Need not be placed by the owner Must be placed by the owner, or by his
(Ladera vs Hodges, CA, 48 O.G 5374) agent, express of implied
Real property by incorporation Real property by incorporation and
destination
REQUISITES:
(1) They must be machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements;
(2) They must be placed by the owner of the tenement or by his agent;
(3) There must be an industry or work carried in such building or on the piece of
land; and
(4) They must tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.
(c) Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when
placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed
by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. (Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, G.R.
No. L- 40411, August 7, 1935)
Paragraph 6: Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or
breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them
or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently
attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in
these places are included.
(a) For animals temporarily outside, still considered REAL PROPERTY as long
as the INTENT TO RETURN is present. Ex. Homing pigeon
(a) Fertilizers still in the barn but wrapped are still considered PERSONAL
PROPERTY, since not yet actually used.
Paragraph 10: Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other
real rights over immovable property.
(a) The piece of paper on which the contract for public has been written is
necessarily PERSONAL PROPERTY, but the contract itself / right of the
contract is REAL PROPERTY.
CHAPTER II
MOVABLE PROPERTY
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place
without impairment of the real property to which they are
fixed. (335a)
Paragraph 2 — growing crops for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law
(Sibal v. Valdez, 50 Phil. 512); machinery placed on a tenement by a tenant who
did not act as the agent of the tenement owner. (Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61
Phil. 709).
The sugar cane, although considered as “growing fruits” and therefore ordinarily real
property under Par. 2 of Art. 415 of the Civil Code, must be regarded as PERSONAL
PROPERTY for purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and also for purposes of
attachment, because as ruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the right to the growing
crops mobilizes (makes personal, as contradistinguished from immobilization) the crops
by ANTICIPATION. More specifi cally, it said that the existence of a right on the growing
crop is a mobilization by anticipation, a gathering as it were, in advance, rendering the
crop movable. (See Lumber Co. v. Sheriff, 106 La. 418). Sibal v. Valdez 50 Phil. 512
Paragraph 3 — electricity, gas, light, nitrogen. (See U.S. v. Carlos, 21 Phil. 543).
While electric current is not a fluid, still its manifestations and effects like those of gas
may be seen and felt. The true test of what may be stolen is not whether it is corporeal
or incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner,
may appropriate the same. Electricity, like gas, is a valuable merchandise, and may thus
be stolen. (See also U.S. v. Tambunting, 41 Phil. 364). U.S. v. Carlos 21 Phil. 543
Paragraph 4 — machinery not attached to land nor needed for the carrying on of
an industry conducted therein; portable radio; a laptop computer; a diploma
hanging on the wall.
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or
demandable sums; and
(b) Since the ownership of public dominion belong to the public in general
and not to the state, the latter may not make them object of commerce
unless they are properly converted into patrimonial property.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and
are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
(a) PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE STATE are those owned by the state
NOT devoted to public use, public service or the development of national
wealth. It is the property owned by the state in its private or proprietary
capacity. It may be acquired by private individuals or corporations thru
prescription and it may be an object of ordinary contract
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible of
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the state or any of its subdivisions
not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
CHAPTER I
OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
Kinds of Ownership
Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor
of the thing in order to recover it. (348a)
1. General limitations imposed by the State for its benefit such as the power
of eminent domain, the police power, and the power of taxation;
2. Specific limitations imposed by law, such as legal servitudes;
3. Limitations imposed by the party transmitting the property either by
contract or will;
4. Limitations imposed by the owner himself, such as voluntary servitudes,
mortgages, pledges, and lease rights; and
5. Inherent limitations arising from conflict with other rights, such as those
caused by contiguity of property. (2 Tolentino, Civil Code, p.50)
6. The Constitutional prohibitions regarding acquisition of private land by
aliens.
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this
purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to
repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. (n) - DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP
Requisites:
Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon. (388)
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner
as to injure the rights of a third person. (n)
The continued occupation by petitioners of the two lots belonging to private
respondents, despite the expiration of the lease contracts over the same,
petitioners had become “undesirable lessees.” However, it was improper for
private respondents to resort to fencing their properties in order to remove
petitioners from the premises in the light of the clear provision of Article 536 of
the Civil Code on the matter. Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134239,
May 26, 2005
Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference
of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an
imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the
damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater.
The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the
damage to him. (n) - DOCTRINE OF STATE OF NECESSITY or “Doctrine
of Incomplete Privilege”
Requisites:
1. Interference is necessary; and
2. Damage to another is much greater than damage to property
3. Imposed by the owner (e. g. lease)
4. Imposed by the grantor (e.g. prohibition to the donees from partitioning the
property not exceeding 20 years.
N.B. The right to enclose or fence in Article 430 is also subject to the limitation that it should not
work detriment to the servitudes constituted therein. Must be legitimately exercised and must not
be attended with bad faith. Thus, if the lot owner fenced his property for the purpose of evicting
its occupant whose lease contract had already expired, the lot owner is liable to said occupant for
damage. The existence of this kind of servitude works as a limitation upon the right of the owner
of the lower tenement to enclose his property with walls or other means if the same will prevent
the passage of the water which naturally falls from the higher tenement.
Thus, a tenant, who admits his tenancy, cannot be presumed to be the owner.
Moreover, just because a person works on a parcel of land does not necessarily
mean that he is the owner thereof, particularly if he has not expressed the
concept in which the land was being worked upon by him. (Alano, et al. v.
Ignacio, et al., L-16434, Feb. 28, 1962).
If the claims of both plaintiff and defendant are weak, judgment must be for the
defendant, for the latter, being in possession, is presumed to be the owner, and
cannot be obliged to show or prove a better title. (Santos v. Espinosa, 26 Phil.
398).
N.B. These pieces of evidence, though admissible, do not necessarily mean that they are
conclusive proof of ownership. They may therefore still be defeated or rebutted.
N.B. It has been held that in the absence of evidence of ownership, the mere fact that a map in
the city’s possession showed that the property involved was a portion of a street does NOT prove
dominium by the State. (Acuña v. City of Manila, 9 Phil. 225).
N.B. If land is registered under the Land Registration Law in the name of “M.R. married to R.L.,”
it is evident that prima facie the land belongs to “M.R.” (the wife), alone as her paraphernal
property, for if it were conjugal, the title should have been issued in the name of both. The
words “married to R.L.,” written after the name of M.R., are merely descriptive of the civil status
of M.R., the registered owner of the property covered by the title. (Litam, et al. v. Espiritu, et al.,
L-7644-45, Nov. 27, 1956; Florentina Mata de Stuart v. Hon. Nicasio Yatco, et al., L-16467, Apr.
27, 1962).
Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by
competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of
just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall
protect and, in a proper case, restore the owner in his
possession. (349a)
Eminent Domain. The superior right of the State to own certain properties
under certain conditions, and is a limitation on the right of ownership, with
payment of just compensation.
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and
of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or
make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper,
without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and
ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of
aerial navigation. (350a) – SURFACE RIGHT
Limitations:
1. Servitudes;
2. Special laws and ordinances;
3. Reasonable requirements of aerial navigation; and
4. Rights of third persons (Art. 431, NCC)
Rights over the land are indivisible, and the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The owner of the land is the owner of its surface and
subsurface. Thus a party cannot claim ownership by acquisitive prescription of
mineral land by showing he was in possession of the land or the surface thereof
in the concept of agricultural land. (Republic v. CA)
Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or
other property on which it is found.
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and
unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the
lawful ownership of which does not appear. (352)
EXCEPTION: If finder is not the owner of the land, finder is entitled to ½ of the
treasure if:
1. Made in the property of another, or of the state or any of its subdivisions;
2. Made by chance;
3. Finder is not a trespasser/agent of the landowner;
4. Finder is not a co-owner of the property where it is found; and
5. Finder is not married under the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership system (otherwise his share belongs to the community).
N.B. If the ownership of the treasure is known, but the owner is already dead, the same will not
be considered “hidden treasure” and must therefore go to the owner’s rightful heirs .
CHAPTER III
RIGHT OF ACCESSION
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and
the young and other products of animals.
Civil fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and
other property and the amount of perpetual or life annuities or other
similar income.(355a)
Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the
expenses made by a third person in their production, gathering, and
preservation. (356)
Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural or
industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the
mother, although unborn. (357)