Open Source Competition
Open Source Competition
I. Introduction
O
r g a n i z at i o ns do not live in isolation; they are networked in nature. Many
firms, particularly in the high-tech industry, have increasingly engaged in
different kinds of cooperative interorganizational relationships (e.g., contractual
alliances, joint ventures, consortia, standards bodies and open-source communities)
to improve their resource endowment and manage strategic uncertainty (Chen and
Miller 2015; Eisenhardt 1989; Hoffmann 2007; Morgan et al. 2013). Consequently,
organizations are embedded in dynamic and cohesive networks where individual
and organizational actions are influenced by both their network and their network
position (Gomes-Casseres 1996; Granovetter 1973; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Uzzi
1996).
Scholars early recognized interorganizational relationships as an important
source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998; Hoffmann 2007; Zaheer
et al. 2000). While interorganizational interactions have become more complex,
they have also become more paradoxical (Lewis 2000). Paradox pervades daily
life, and how to manage paradox has long been the subject of philosophical and
[1]
As accepted for presentation at the 2016 International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS
2016), held in Dublin, Ireland, December 11-14, 2016. “IS in Organizations and Society” track. The offi-
cial conference proceedings are available at the AIS eLibrary (❤tt♣✿✴✴❛✐s❡❧✳❛✐s♥❡t✳♦r❣✴✐❝✐s✷✵✶✻✴).
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✷ ♦❢ ✸✽
WebKit Web browsing technologies Apple, Nokia, Google, Samsung, Intel and BlackBerry
Blink Web browsing technologies Google, Opera, Intel and Samsung
OpenStack Cloud computing infrastructure Rackspace, Canonical, IBM, HP, Vmware and Citrix
CloudStack Cloud computing infrastructure Citrix, SunGard AS and ShapeBlue
Xen Virtualization technologies University of Cambridge, Citrix, IBM, HP and Red Hat
Hadoop Distributed computing technologies Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Jive, Microsoft and Hortonworks
Open Handset Alliance Mobile devices platform Google, LG, Samsung, HTC, Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo and NEC
Tizen Mobile devices platform Fujitsu, Huawei, NEC, Casio, Panasonic and Samsung
GENIVI Alliance In-Vehicle Infotainment platform Volvo, BMW, Honda, Hyundai, Renault and PSA
Linux The Linux operating system Fujitsu, HP, IBM, Intel, Samsung, Hitachi and Red Hat
Yocto project Development tools for embedded Linux Broadcom, AMD, Texas Instruments and Intel
Linaro Development tools for embedded Linux ARM, Samsung, ST-Ericsson and Texas Instruments
Eclipse Software development environment Actuate, CA, IBM, Google, Oracle, SAP and Red Hat
OpenEMR Health records and medical practice software OEMR, EnSoftek, MI-Squared, ZH Healthcare and Visolve
Table 1 Known cases of cooperation among competitors in the open-source arena (i.e.
open-coopetition)
efficiency (Lado et al. 1997). Antitrust and regulatory policies prohibit many agree-
ments or practices that restrict free trading and competition between businesses
(European Commission 2001; Federal Trade Commission 2000).
In parallel, research on alliances within strategic management gives “important
insight into the advantages that can be obtained by cooperation and the prerequi-
sites needed for an alliance to work, but it is primarily the cooperative dimension
of the relationship that is emphasized” (Bengtsson and Kock 2000). More recently,
Gulati et al. (2012) claimed that important streams of research on alliances re-
main single-mindedly focused on the cooperation perspective. Summing up, from
the individual and firm perspective, competition is not necessarily socially desir-
able (Loury 1979). However, from a public and macroeconomics perspectives, the
existence of competition is essential for welfare (Pigou 2013).
Although competition and cooperation have individually received much consid-
eration, given limited attention to the fundamental issue of the interplay between
the two concepts (Chen 2008; Chen and Miller 2015). Even if strategic management
literature noted the importance of understanding open-source software from its
competitive-cooperative angles (see Bengtsson et al. 2010; Chen and Miller 2015;
McGaughey 2002), very few empirical cases exploring cooperation among com-
petitors in open-source arena exist. A few notable exceptions here are the studies
by Germonprez et al. (2013); Linåker et al. (2016); Teixeira and Lin (2014); Teixeira
et al. (2015).
practices over issues regarding the moral rightness and importance of granting
users the freedoms offered by both free and open-source software (von Hippel
and von Krogh 2003).
From an innovation studies perspective, Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) and
von Hippel (2005) suggested that open-source software development shows that
users program to solve their own as well as shared technical problems and freely
reveal their innovations without appropriating private returns from selling the
software. Such “free” user-to-user assistance has turned open-source into a re-
markable example of user-innovation (von Hippel 2009). It was also reported
that the open-source trend has been so strong that previous, rather monolithic,
organizations (e.g., SAP, Intel, Apple, Philips, Xerox, and IBM among others) de-
centralized research labs, open up proprietary technology, and increased their
absorptive capacity for outside-in innovation processes within open-source ecosys-
tems (Chesbrough et al. 2006; Enkel et al. 2009; Gassmann et al. 2010).
The open-source software phenomenon keeps evolving from the earliest purist
views focusing on freedom (Stallman 1985) to newer perspectives considering
open-source as an alternative and viable way of doing business (Ågerfalk and
Fitzgerald 2008; Feller and Fitzgerald 2002; Fitzgerald 2006). Moreover, the phe-
nomenon has expanded from open-source software to open-data (Gurstein 2011;
Janssen et al. 2012), open-hardware (Maharaj et al. 2008; Söderberg 2013), open-
knowledge (Awazu and Desouza 2004), open-access (Antelman 2004; Davis et al.
2008; Swan 2007), and open-medicine (Bradner 2011; Open Medicine Institute
2015), among other manifestations of increasing openness in the way of doing
things. Even if the open-source phenomenon started to attract early scholarly at-
tention in computer science and software engineering, the phenomenon is more
recently capturing the largest interest from business and management scholars
(Raasch et al. 2013). Therefore, as pointed out by Carillo and Bernard (2015); von
Krogh and Spaeth (2007), information systems as a discipline is well positioned to
be at the center of trans-disciplinary research addressing the phenomenon.
IV. Method
Our case relied on naturally occurring data which emerged per se on the Internet.
Such data are not a consequence of researchers’ own actions, but rather are created
and maintained by the OpenStack community in their own pursuits of developing
an open-source infrastructure for big data. In order to make sense of coopera-
tive and competitive behaviors within OpenStack, we have combined qualitative
analysis of archival data (QA), mining software repositories (MSR), and Social
Network Analysis (SNA) on publicly-available and naturally-occurring data from
the OpenStack Nova repository to reconstruct and visualize the evolution of co-
operation in a sequence of networks. Table 2 presents the set of multidisciplinary
methodological notes that guided our mixed methods research design.
We began our research in a qualitative way by screening publicly available data
such as company announcements, financial reports and specialized press reports,
which allowed us to review an immense amount of online information pertain-
ing to the competitive cloud computing industry. While taking into consideration
established methodological notes that legitimate the use of archival data when
[2] From a legal perspective, the OpenStack Foundation is a nonprofit, non-stock “foundation” within
the meaning of Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, “Delaware Corporate Law”.
[3] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✹✺✶r❡s❡❛r❝❤✳❝♦♠✴r❡♣♦rt✲s❤♦rt❄❡♥t✐t②■❞❂✽✷✺✾✸
[4] ❤tt♣✿✴✴♦♣❡♥s♦✉r❝❡✳❝♦♠✴❜✉s✐♥❡ss✴✶✹✴✻✴♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲♥✉♠❜❡rs
[5] For a relational map of competition among OpenStack firms (see Teixeira et al. 2015).
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✾ ♦❢ ✸✽
Eisenhardt (1989)
Case studya rooted on archival data Multidisciplinary Yin (2011)
Dubé and Paré (2003)
Kagdi et al. (2007)
Mining software repositories Software-Engineering Martinez-Romo et al. (2008)
Teixeira et al. (2015)
Freeman (2005)
Social network analysis Multidisciplinary Wasserman and Faust (1994)
Kane et al. (2014)
Hahn et al. (2008)
Information-Systems
Network analysis of digital trace data Howison et al. (2012)
Software-Engineering
Trier (2008)
Biomedicine Lundvall (1992)
Network analysis with emphasis on the
Bibliometrics Cambrosio et al. (2004)
visualization of cooperative activities
Innovation-Studies Teixeira et al. (2015)
aWe see case study as an umbrella term covering a group of research methods which focus on a particular
instance (see Adelman et al. 1976). Our case study depended on the use of – and ability to integrate
in converging fashion (some would say “triangulate”) – information from multiple sources of evidence.
The evidence included announcements, financial reports, specialized press reports and actual information
systems artifacts. To built around the consistency of complex data, we were forced to encapsulate different
qualitative, quantitative and social network analysis methods (see Ibarra et al. 2005; Yin 1997). After all,
“Using mixed methods within the confines of a single study can simultaneously broaden and strengthen
the study. ... The stronger the "mix" of methods throughout these procedures the more that researchers
can derive the benefits from using mixed approaches.” (Yin 2006).
❚❛❜❧❡ ✷ ❊♠♣❧♦②❡❞ ♠✉❧t✐❞✐s❝✐♣❧✐♥❛r② ♠❡t❤♦❞♦❧♦❣✐❝❛❧ ❣✉✐❞❡❧✐♥❡s
studying a case (Dubé and Paré 2003; Eisenhardt 1989; Flynn et al. 1990; Gibbert
et al. 2008; Shanks 2002; Yin 2011), we gained valuable insights from the industrial
context surrounding the OpenStack community. After attaining a better under-
standing of the industrial cooperative and competitive dynamics, we extracted
and analyzed the social network of the OpenStack Nova project by leveraging
SNA (Brandes et al. 2013; Scott 2012; Wasserman and Faust 1994).
As in Teixeira et al. (2015), we took advantage of naturally occurring digital
trace data (i.e., the OpenStack Nova project repository and its changelog) and built
cooperative social networks that were explored using a variety of tools: Gephi
(v0.8.2) (Bastian et al. 2009), Visone(v2.7.3) (Brandes and Wagner 2004), and the
sna (v2.3-2) and statnet (v2014.2.0) statistical modules (Butts 2010; Handcock et al.
2003) for R (v3.0.2) (R Core Team 2014). To better explore cooperation at the ecosys-
tems level, we also modeled cooperative relationships in the tri-dimensional (3D)
space using Blender (2.72). By mining digital traces of code cooperation, and by
uncovering the social structure of the OpenStack Nova project, the computerized
SNA also revealed key preliminary understandings of coopetition in the Open-
Stack ecosystem that were later re-investigated with complementary qualitative
data. The combination of methods was not only fundamental for the retrieval of
social structures, but also for explaining and them.
As in prior multi-disciplinary studies (Cambrosio et al. 2004; Glänzel and Schu-
bert 2005; Lundvall 1992; Porter et al. 2005; Teixeira et al. 2015), our analysis
emphasizes the visualization of the cooperation network, which evolves over time,
to reveal the dynamics among the OpenStack software developers. We then at-
tempted to understand the visualized networks with our acquired understanding
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✵ ♦❢ ✸✽
V. Results
We present our results in a narrative format complemented with “pictures” of the
evolving social structure of OpenStack. Such narrative, concerned with how ac-
tors simultaneously cooperate and compete in the development of an open-source
socio-technical ecosystems, aggregates theoretical issues that are later addressed
in the discussion section. Such narrative, built on both quantitative and qualita-
tive evidence, contributes to the understanding of a rather new and unexplored
phenomenon and its embedded paradoxes (i.e., open-coopetition).
We start by quoting the words of Jim Curry in one of the first announcements
of the OpenStack project. The founding leader of the OpenStack community starts
by advocating the freedom of open-source software before stating the mission of
the the OpenStack project. It is important to notice that Jim Curry emphasizes the
roles of NASA and Rackspace as initial contributors to the project – that is, the
project did not start from “ground zero”.
“What is OpenStack? Well, our mission statement says this: To produce the
ubiquitous Open Source Cloud Computing platform that will meet the needs of public
and private clouds regardless of size, by being simple to implement and massively
scalable. That is a big ambition. The good news is that OpenStack is starting
with code contributions from two organizations that know how to build
and run massively scalable clouds – Rackspace and NASA. — Jim Curry,
OpenStack Lead, 19 July 2010[6]
[6] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✳♦r❣✴❜❧♦❣✴✷✵✶✵✴✵✼✴✐♥tr♦❞✉❝✐♥❣✲♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✴
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✶ ♦❢ ✸✽
citrix
rackspace
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
Figure 2 captures the cooperation in the OpenStack Nova project from the ❆✉st✐♥
to the ❇❡①❛r release, from October 21st 2010 to February 3rd 2011. From it, we can
derive the cooperation between software developers affiliated with companies;
for example, Citrix had three developers working on the project together with
Rackspace.
Citrix who had worked before with Rackspace, wanted to make sure that their
XenServer platforms would be conveniently integrated with Rackspace’s plans for
OpenStack.
“The project is exhibiting the key benefits that the industry derives from suc-
cessful open-source cooperation: rapid development, faster testing, feedback
and project turn around, broader industry adoption and learning through
implementation and de-facto standardization whilst avoiding the prospect
of commoditization.
[7] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳r❛❝❦s♣❛❝❡✳❝♦♠✴❜❧♦❣✴♥❡✇s❛rt✐❝❧❡s✴r❛❝❦s♣❛❝❡✲♦♣❡♥✲s♦✉r❝❡s✲❝❧♦✉❞✲♣❧❛t❢♦r♠
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✷ ♦❢ ✸✽
It has been rewarding to work with the OpenStack crew, and to have ex-
perienced first hand the dedication to an open, code-rules, community-first
approach taken by the project leaders.” — Simon Crosby, CTO, Citrix 21
October 2010 [8]
citrix
cloudscale
rackspace
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
“Earlier this week, one of our clients, a Tier 1 ISP, launched an object storage
cloud based on OpenStack, an open-source compute and storage framework
created by Rackspace and NASA. The new storage cloud is the first commer-
cial OpenStack-based storage offering in the market after Rackspace itself,
which is based on the same technology.” – Joe Arnold, Director of engineer-
ing, Cloudscaling, 31 of January 2011[9]
Our visualization in Figure 4 captures cooperation from the ❈❛❝t✉s to the ❉✐❛❜❧♦
release (from April 15th 2011 to September 22nd 2011). HP (a well-known IT multi-
national company), Mirantis (an OpenStack startup), and Red Hat (the company
behind the Red Hat Enterprise Linux and sponsor of the Fedora Linux distribu-
tions) joined the coopetitive software development efforts.
[8] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❜❧♦❣s✳❝✐tr✐①✳❝♦♠✴✷✵✶✵✴✶✵✴✷✶✴✐❢✲②♦✉✈❡✲s❡❡♥✲♦♥❡✲r❡❞✇♦♦❞✲②♦✉✈❡✲s❡❡♥✲t❤❡♠
✲❛❧❧✴
[9] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❝❧♦✉❞s❝❛❧✐♥❣✳❝♦♠✴❜❧♦❣✴❝❧♦✉❞✲❝♦♠♣✉t✐♥❣✴♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲♦❜❥❡❝t✲st♦r❛❣❡✲♠♦✈❡s
✲❜❡②♦♥❞✲r❛❝❦s♣❛❝❡✴
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✸ ♦❢ ✸✽
cannonical
citrix
cloudscale
hp
ibm
mirantis
nebula
rackspace
redhat
developer
vmware & a�liation
collaboration
Mirantis was founded in January of 2011 by Boris Renski Jr. and Alex Freedland.
Also born in Northern California, this startup marketed itself as a “pure-play”
OpenStack company and started working early with Red Hat. Besides cooperating
in the development of OpenStack, both firms partnered in implementation and
integration services at common customers[10]
In the meantime, HP started marketing their cloud computing services based
on OpenStack. HP markets itself as the leading corporation behind the project,
emphasizing that OpenStack is the only cloud computing solution without a single-
vendor lock-in but with an extensive ecosystem behind it[11] .
cannonical
citrix
cloudscale
hp
ibm
mirantis
rackspace
redhat
intel
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
Figure 5 depicts the cooperation from the ❉✐❛❜❧♦ to the ❊ss❡① release (from
September 22nd 2011 to April 5th 2012). Although the graph becomes more dense,
we can visualize new nodes representing early contributions of Intel (investing on
the compatibility of OpenStack with Intel microprocessors) and IBM. The later had
[10] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳r❡❞❤❛t✳❝♦♠✴❡♥✴❛❜♦✉t✴♣r❡ss✲r❡❧❡❛s❡s✴r❡❞✲❤❛t✲❛♥❞✲♠✐r❛♥t✐s✲♣❛rt♥❡r
✲❛❝r♦ss✲♣r♦❞✉❝ts✲❛♥❞✲s❡r✈✐❝❡s
[11] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✽✳❤♣✳❝♦♠✴❤✷✵✻✷✶✴✈✐❞❡♦✲❣❛❧❧❡r②✴✉s✴❡♥✴❡✈❡♥ts✴❡♥t❡r♣r✐s❡✴❤♣✲❞✐s❝♦✈❡r
✲✷✵✶✶✴✷✼✾✸✼✾✾✶✹✶✵✵✶✴
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✹ ♦❢ ✸✽
a long history of working with open standards and open-source initiatives, such
as in the Apache and Eclipse projects, and has been able to sell complementary
solutions (i.e., hardware, software, and services) from open-source projects. It
expected the same business model to work well with OpenStack[12] .
cannonical
citrix
cloudscale
hp
ibm
mirantis
nebula
rackspace
redhat
vmware
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
Figure 6 shows the cooperation between the ❊ss❡① and the ❋♦❧s♦♠ release (from
April 5th 2012 to September 27th 2012). We can observe that the network becomes
more dense, as there are more developers working with each other. Even though
some of their developers continued contributing to the project, Citrix had by then
abandoned its OpenStack distribution in order to focus instead on the compet-
ing CloudStack cloud computing open-source ecosystem. Citrix decided to con-
tribute to the competing CloudStack software ecosystem under the umbrella of the
Apache Software Foundation, with a codebase resulting from the acquisition of
Cloud.com of July 2011. This turn of strategy from Citrix was related with Open-
Stack’s lack of integration with the Amazon’s APIs (Application Programming
Interfaces). Amazon is currently the leader of cloud services, and the migration
costs to another cloud computing infrastructure are very high, specially if the APIs
do not resemble each other.
“Amazon has in many ways invented and created this market, and with what
is projected to be $1 billion in ecosystem and customer revenue attached to
Amazon cloud, we believe the winning cloud platform will have to have a
high degree of interoperability with Amazon” – Sameer Dholakia, GM Cloud
Platforms Group, Citrix, 3 of April 2012[13]
“CloudStack has firmly aligned itself with the Amazon ecosystem. But Open-
Stack is an interesting case of an organization caught in the middle. Its ser-
vice provider supporters are fundamentally interested in competing against
[12] ❤tt♣✿✴✴t❤♦✉❣❤ts♦♥❝❧♦✉❞✳❝♦♠✴✷✵✶✷✴✵✾✴♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲♣♦✐s❡❞✲t♦✲❧❡❛❞✲t❤❡✲✇❛②✲t♦✲♦♣❡♥
✲❝❧♦✉❞✲❝♦♠♣✉t✐♥❣✴
[13] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳♥❡t✇♦r❦❝♦♠♣✉t✐♥❣✳❝♦♠✴❝❧♦✉❞✲✐♥❢r❛str✉❝t✉r❡✴❛♠❛③♦♥✲❛♣✐s✲❛r❡✲❢✐♥❡✲✲❢♦r
✲❛♠❛③♦♥✴
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✺ ♦❢ ✸✽
AWS[14] ... they’re afraid of a world in which AWS becomes the primary way
that businesses buy infrastructure. It is to their advantage to have at least
one additional successful widely-adopted cloud management platform in the
market, and at least one service provider successfully competing strongly
against AWS. Yet AWS has established itself as a de facto standard for cloud
APIs and for the way that a service “should” be designed.” – Lydia Leong,
VP Distinguished Analyst, Gartner, 6 of April 2012[15]
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
Figure 7 shows the cooperation in the OpenStack Nova project from the ❋♦❧s♦♠
to the ●r✐③③❧② release (from September 27 th 2012 to April 4th 2013). As expected,
Citrix reduced its commitment to OpenStack, as we observe reduced cooperative
activity from Citrix developers. Canonical continued investing increasingly in the
development of OpenStack, interested in keeping its Linux Distribution Ubuntu as
the leading Linux distribution for OpenStack clouds [16] .
VMware, a Northern Californian firm with expertise in virtualization technolo-
gies, made substantial contributions (evidenced by the source-code commits) dur-
ing this between-releases period [17] . The acquisition of the networking virtualiza-
tion startup Nicira in July of 2012 reshaped the VMware cloud computing strategy.
As a sign of commitment to OpenStack, VMware and Canonical issued a joint
statement on their intentions to work together to improve the integration VMware
technologies with Canonical’s OpenStack distribution[18] .
Figure 8 captures the cooperation in the project in a more recent phase, from
the ●r✐③③❧② to the ❍❛✈❛♥❛ release (from April 4th 2013 to October 17th 2013). We
can see that VMware took its commitment to OpenStack seriously, as six new
developers engaged in developing with other OpenStack developers. Mirantis, in
yellow on the right of Figure 8, invested heavily in cooperative activities with
[14] AWS stands for Amazon Web Services. See ❤tt♣✿✴✴❛✇s✳❛♠❛③♦♥✳❝♦♠✴ for more details.
[15] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❜❧♦❣s✳❣❛rt♥❡r✳❝♦♠✴❧②❞✐❛❴❧❡♦♥❣✴✷✵✶✷✴✵✹✴✵✻✴❡❝♦s②st❡♠s✲✐♥✲❝♦♥❢❧✐❝t✲❛♠❛③♦♥✲✈s
✲✈♠✇❛r❡✲❛♥❞✲♦♣❡♥st❛❦✴
[16] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳♠❛r❦s❤✉tt❧❡✇♦rt❤✳❝♦♠✴❛r❝❤✐✈❡s✴✶✸✼✸
[17] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❜✐t❡r❣✐❛✳❝♦♠✴♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲r❡❧❡❛s❡s✲r❡♣♦rts
[18] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✐r✳✈♠✇❛r❡✳❝♦♠✴r❡❧❡❛s❡❞❡t❛✐❧✳❝❢♠❄❘❡❧❡❛s❡■❉❂✼✺✻✼✷✾
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✻ ♦❢ ✸✽
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
IBM, Rackspace, and Red Hat. Mirantis counted on financial support from Dell
Ventures and Intel Capital (representing the interests of hardware manufacturers
betting on OpenStack[19] and additional investment by Ericsson, Red Hat, and SAP
Ventures[20] , turning it into one of the biggest code contributors to the OpenStack
software ecosystem in just a few months[17] .
developer
& a�liation
collaboration
Figure 9 captures the cooperation in the latest period studied, from the ❍❛✈❛♥❛
to the ■❝❡❤♦✉s❡ release (from October 17th 2013 to April 17th 2014).
By this time the role of NASA on OpenStack had diminished. The first develop-
ments of OpenStack were in the service of science, supporting NASA’s research
activities. NASA’s participation has been a selling point for advocates of Open-
Stack technologies. NASA lost much of its IT staff working on its Nebula cloud
computing project. Software developers and IT architects headed to startups and
high-tech giants within the OpenStack ecosystem. Moreover, a cost-driven IT re-
form led to disinvestment in OpenStack by NASA. Today, scientists at NASA
[19] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳♠✐r❛♥t✐s✳❝♦♠✴❝♦♠♣❛♥②✴♣r❡ss✲❝❡♥t❡r✴❝♦♠♣❛♥②✲♥❡✇s✴♠✐r❛♥t✐s✲r❡❝❡✐✈❡s✲✶✵
✲♠✐❧❧✐♦♥
[20] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳♠✐r❛♥t✐s✳❝♦♠✴❝♦♠♣❛♥②✴♣r❡ss✲❝❡♥t❡r✴❝♦♠♣❛♥②✲♥❡✇s✴♠✐r❛♥t✐s✲✇✐t❤
✲✐♥✈❡st♠❡♥t✴
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✼ ♦❢ ✸✽
depend on the Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure cloud computing infrastruc-
tures[21] . Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the European Organization
for Nuclear Research (CERN) decided on an OpenStack based strategy in 2012. In
January of 2014, OpenStack was already running collision reconstructions at the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC)[22] .
By pure serendipity, we also explored the cooperation among competing ecosys-
tems (i.e., OpenStack vs. CloudStack). As pointed out before, Citrix, in a surprise
move, and citing the lack of OpenStack interoperability with Amazon cloud sys-
tems, acquired Cloud.com in July of 2011 and donated the overall code-base to
the Apache Foundation (a reputed non-profit corporation supporting open-source
software). “CloudStack’s application programming interface (API) provides com-
patibility with Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), the world’s
most popular public cloud” ... “(Citrix) hopes that EC2 customers will use their
CloudStack for their private clouds while using the EC2 APIs to integrate with
Amazon’s public cloud”[23] . This move raised conflict in the OpenStack commu-
nity. Citrix claimed to make peace with OpenStack on 21 April 2015 by announcing
that it had become a Corporate Sponsor of the OpenStack Foundation[24] .
From a research point of view, it was unclear during this period of conflict,
whether Citrix developers were contributing to OpenStack, CloudStack or both.
By mining both OpenStack and CloudStack repositories with SNA, we found out
that 10 developers contributed both to OpenStack and CloudStack. Six of these
developers were affiliated with Citrix. While Citrix’s contributions were recurrent,
the contributions of the other four were sporadic.
In the following Figure 10, we capture the role of Citrix in cooperation among
competing ecosystems, from the first open-source release of CloudStack to Citrix’s
official return to OpenStack (from November 6th 2012 to April 21th 2015). We rep-
resent the ecosystems as wireframe spheres, OpenStack on the left and CloudStack
on the right. Inside each ecosystem, we modeled the cooperative networks of de-
velopers that contribute to both ecosystems. As open-source ecosystems are not
black boxes, we were able to identify such developers. Citrix, as a firm, is repre-
sented as a cuboid. The ultra-thin cylinder connecting firms with developers maps
an “affiliation” relationship. Such visualization highlight that Citrix’s developers
were contributing to both OpenStack and CloudStack – in the open-source arena,
developers and firms can take part in competing ecosystems.
VI. Discussion
This research was conducted with the purpose of exploring cooperation among
competitors in the open-source arena. Our case revealed certain peculiarities
that call for the adaptation and expansion of the selected theory. Among other
[21] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❜❧♦❣s✳♥❛s❛✳❣♦✈✴◆❆❙❆✲❈■❖✲❇❧♦❣✴✷✵✶✷✴✵✻✴✵✾✴♣♦st❴✶✸✸✾✷✵✺✻✺✻✻✶✶✴
[22] ❤tt♣✿✴✴❤♦♠❡✳✇❡❜✳❝❡r♥✳❝❤✴❛❜♦✉t✴✉♣❞❛t❡s✴✷✵✶✹✴✵✶✴✐♠♣♦rt❛♥❝❡✲♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲❝❡r♥
[23] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳③❞♥❡t✳❝♦♠✴❛rt✐❝❧❡✴♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦✲✈s✲❝❧♦✉❞st❛❝❦✲t❤❡✲❜❡❣✐♥♥✐♥❣✲♦❢✲t❤❡✲♦♣❡♥
✲s♦✉r❝❡✲❝❧♦✉❞✲✇❛rs✴
[24] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❝✐tr✐①✳❝♦♠✴♥❡✇s✴❝✐tr✐①✲✐♥✲t❤❡✲♥❡✇s✴❛♣r✲✷✵✶✺✴❝✐tr✐①✲♠❛❦❡s✲♣❡❛❝❡✲✇✐t❤
✲♦♣❡♥st❛❝❦
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✶✾ ♦❢ ✸✽
which codebase was open-sourced with its acquisition of Cloud.com (see Figures 5
to 8 for the progressively decreasing presence of developers affiliated with Citrix).
Citrix claimed later to make peace with OpenStack on 21 April 2015 by official
becoming a Corporate Sponsor of the OpenStack. By mining both OpenStack and
CloudStack repositories, we found out that six developers affiliated with Citrix
were actually recurrently contributing to both competing ecosystems during the
conflict period (see Figure 10 ).
From the perspective of a dyad of socio-technical ecosystems, we add to lit-
erature on portfolio of alliances (Anand and Khanna 2000; Duysters et al. 2012;
Hoffmann 2007; Lavie 2007; Lavie and Miller 2008; Lavie and Singh 2012; Wassmer
2010). As highlighted in Figure 10, we remarked that developers affiliated with
Citrix contributed concurrently to two competing open-source ecosystems (i.e.,
OpenStack and CloudStack). In fact, Citrix recurrently engaged in cooperation
with many other IT giants (e.g., with Amazon in setting cloud computing inter-
operability standards[25] , with Microsoft in ’PC’ virtualization technologies[26]
and with Google by joint-developing software powering the ’Chromebook lap-
top family’[27] among others). Such netting cooperative behavior of Citrix was
not exceptional, HP also contributed to both OpenStack and Eucalyptus (another
open-source cloud computing ecosystem). The observed mesh of alliances adds
relevance to research on how to manage a portfolio of alliances (Hoffmann 2005,0).
Anand and Khanna (2000) argued that firms should build an alliance manage-
ment capability while Hoffmann (2005) reported on the institutionalisation of
multi-alliance management.
Research on multi-alliance management addressed the effects of alliance portfo-
lio diversity. However, results on a diversity-performance relationship are rather
inconclusive with mixed results (Duysters et al. 2012). It is generally accepted that
redundant alliances can increase the reliability of the information and resources
that a focal company has access to and also reduce the dependence on a single
partner (Hoffmann 2005). However, the advantage of a portfolio of alliances is
not so much a matter of the portfolio’s size (i.e. number of alliances), but a mat-
ter of characteristics of the firms that a focal organization is connected to (Stuart
2000). Also, that the performance of a focal firm improves with the intensity of
competition among partners in its alliance portfolio (Lavie 2007). The evolution of
alliance portfolios is contingent on external constraints and opportunities (changes
in exogenous uncertainty), internal resources available, and strategic choices that
interact and drive the pace, pattern, and direction of the evolution of a firm’s
alliance portfolio (Hoffmann 2007). Inertial pressures tend to fixate the current
configuration of the alliance portfolio, whereas external stimuli in the form of
technological changes and shifts in strategy set new courses for alliances (Lavie
and Singh 2012).
[25] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❝✐tr✐①✳❝♦♠✴❣❧♦❜❛❧✲♣❛rt♥❡rs✴❛♠❛③♦♥✲✇❡❜✲s❡r✈✐❝❡s✴♦✈❡r✈✐❡✇✳❤t♠❧
[26] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❝✐tr✐①✳❝♦♠✴❣❧♦❜❛❧✲♣❛rt♥❡rs✴♠✐❝r♦s♦❢t✴♦✈❡r✈✐❡✇✳❤t♠❧
[27] ❤tt♣✿✴✴✇✇✇✳❝✐tr✐①✳❝♦♠✴♥❡✇s✴❛♥♥♦✉♥❝❡♠❡♥ts✴❛✉❣✲✷✵✶✹✴❝✐tr✐①✲❝♦❧❧❛❜♦r❛t✐♦♥✲✇✐t❤
✲❣♦♦❣❧❡
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✷✶ ♦❢ ✸✽
At first sight, and while providing insight into why firms cooperate with com-
petitors in an open-source way, the advanced proposition makes a virtue of open-
coopetition (i.e., because it enables a focal firm to transfer information and re-
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✷✷ ♦❢ ✸✽
sources more easily between multiple alliances). However, living with paradox
implies that we shift expectations for rationality and linearity to accept paradoxes
as persistent and unsolvable puzzles (Smith and Lewis 2011). Consequently, we
caution against seeing the ”ease of transfer“ as a pure virtue. If in one hand, the
focal firm can benefit from an easier transfer of information and resources between
alliances, on the other hand, its competitors can also benefit from transparency
and weak intellectual rights (either entering in the same alliances or not). Even
within the context of multiple alliances, open-coopetition remains paradoxical
and difficult to explain. From one side, organizations can simultaneously bene-
fit from both coopetition (see Bengtsson and Kock 2000; Chen and Miller 2015;
Gulati et al. 2012) and open-source innovation (see Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald 2008;
Fitzgerald 2006; von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). But from the other side, there is
an increased risk of opportunistic behavior and unintended spillover effects (see
Nooteboom et al. 1997; Park and Russo 1996; Trott and Hartmann 2009).
Given the specific empirical background, where OpenStack challenges the domi-
nance of the cloud computing market by three large players (i.e., Amazon, Google,
and Microsoft), we add OpenStack as yet another paradoxical case of firms’ in-
vestment in open-source software to disrupt the leading positions of proprietary
software players (see West 2003; West and Gallagher 2006). However, as pointed
out in a recent review by Teixeira and Baiyere (2014), ”tables turned“, open-source
ecosystems should no longer be seen as the alternative to proprietary ecosystems
controlled by leading, and often monopolistic, players (e.g., Linux vs. Windows,
Mozilla vs. Internet Explorer, and R vs. SPSS among others). As outlined in Table 1,
several open-source ecosystems are now leading the market. For example, Google
Android and the Open Handset Alliance are leading the mobile platforms market
while traditional proprietary software players, such as Microsoft and Blackberry,
are currently struggling with residual sales (Teixeira and Baiyere 2014).
We remain far from a comprehensive understanding of ”why, how, and when
competitors cooperate in open-source ecosystems“. However, our research efforts
suggest that coopetition in an open-source way have its peculiarities - future
research is needed to assess the impact of the open-source movement to theory
addressing both cooperation and competition in inter-organizational settings.
VII. Conclusion
Managers deal with tensions in which opposing forces push or pull the organi-
zation in several ways at the same time (Lewis 2000; Nutt and Backoff 1993). In
industries characterized by high R&D costs and uncertainty (e.g., information tech-
nology sector), managers might have to deal with the competition versus cooperation
and open-source versus proprietary technology development paradoxes simultane-
ously. Both by visualizing the evolution of the social structure of OpenStack and
by scrutinizing complementary qualitative data, we propose that the development
transparency and weak intellectual property rights (i.e., characteristics of open-
❆♣♦❧✐♥❛r✐♦ ❚❡✐①❡✐r❛ ❡t ❛❧✳ P❛❣❡ ✷✸ ♦❢ ✸✽
source ecosystems) allow a focal firm to transfer information and resources more
easily between its multiple alliances.
Acknowledgments
Besides the three anonymous reviewers, we would like to thanks participants
from the 1st European Conference on Social Networks (INSNA EUSN 2014), the
10th International Symposium on Open Collaboration (ACM OpenSym 2014),
the 2nd IEEE International Conference Big Data (IEEE Big Data2014) and the
38th Information Systems Research Conference in Scandinavia (IRIS38) for early
feedback on our research efforts[28] . Special thanks to Gregorio Robles and Jesus
Gonzalez-Barahona that brought much expertise from the Mining Software Repos-
itories (MSR) field. Acknowledgments also for Lin Tingting, Devi Gnyawali, Rudy
Hirschheim, Natalia Levina, Sonali Shah and Annabelle Gawer for valuable ideas,
comments, and conversations. We thank also Arto Lanamäki for help revising the
manuscript. This research was partially funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e
a Tecnologia (grant SFRHBD615612009), Liikesivistysrahasto (grants 5-3076 and 8-
4499), Marcus Wallenberg Säätiö (grant “open-coopetition R&D management strat-
egy”), Academy of Finland (decision no. 295743) and the Turku Centre for Com-
puter Science (travel grant). We thank also the University of Turku, the EIT digital
and the University of Oulu for providing much of the needed research infrastruc-
ture. Finally, we would like to thank the R, Gource, Gephi, Tulip, Blender and
OpenStack open-source communities for developing cool and research-friendly
software.
Author details
1 Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Turun yliopisto, 20014 Turku,
Finland. 2 OASIS Research Group, University of Oulu, Oulun yliopisto, 90014
Oulu, Finland.
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