Ng Meng Tam et.

al vs Chinabank

Rule 25 (in relation to JAR)

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking Corporation against Ever
Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go
(sureties) and petitioner Ng Meng Tam sometime in December 2008. China Bank alleged that it
granted Ever a loan amounting to P5,532,331.63. When Ever defaulted in its payment, China
Bank sent demand letters collectively addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner. The
demands were unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for collection.

In his Answer, petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and void since these
were executed before the loan was granted in 2004. Petitioner posited that the surety
agreements were contracts of adhesion to be construed against the entity which drafted the
same. Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive any demand letter.

On March 2011, petitioner served interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections 1 and 6, Rule
25 of the Rules of Court to China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of the
Account Management Group, to answer. On June 22, 2011, George Yap executed his answers to
interrogatories to parties.

On April 2014, when the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China
Bank objected citing Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to
testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George Yap’s judicial affidavit.

Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it specifically excludes
adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its application. RTC denied for lack of merit
petitioner’s motion to examine Yap without executing a judicial affidavit. MR by petitioner also
denied. Hence.

ISSUE:

W/NOT RTC COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DISREGARDED THE

YES. In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered
interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore complied
with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC
had already issued subpoenas for Yap to testify and produce documents. He was called to the
witness stand when China Bank interposed its objection for non-compliance with Section 5 of
the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse party witness, is not within Section 5 of the
JAR’s scope, the rules in presentation of adverse party witnesses as provided for under the
Rules of Court shall apply. In keeping with this Court’s decision in Afulugencia case, there is no
reason for the RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness.

In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile
witnesses. For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of
Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of
deposition and discovery rules shall apply.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 28, 2014 and August 27, 2014 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 139, Makati City are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
 Spouses VILLUGA vs Kelly Hardware

(Rule 26)

FACTS: On March 3, 1995, herein respondent filed with the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite a Complaint
for a Sum of Money and Damages against herein petitioners. In their Answer to
Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases from respondent, but alleged that they
do not remember the exact amount thereof as no copy of the documents evidencing the
purchases were attached to the complaint. Petitioners, nonetheless, claimed that they have
made payments to the respondent on March 4, 1994 and August 9, 1994 in the amounts of
P110,301.80 and P20,000.00, respectively, and they are willing to pay the balance of their
indebtedness after deducting the payments made and after verification of their account.

On January 30, 1996, respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of court, alleging that
between October 1992 until January 5, 1993, petitioners purchased from it (respondent)
various construction materials and supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50; that
only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.

In their Answer to Amended Complaint, petitioners reiterated their allegations in their Answer
to Complaint.

On March 8, 1996, respondent filed a Request for Admission asking that petitioners admit the
genuineness of various documents, such as statements of accounts, delivery receipts, invoices
and demand letter attached thereto as well as the truth of the allegations set forth therein.

Respondent basically asked petitioners to admit that the latter's principal obligation is
P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid.

On June 3, 1996, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC praying that
since petitioners failed to timely file their comment to the Request for Admission, they be
considered to have admitted the genuineness of the documents described in and exhibited with
the said Request as well as the truth of the matters of fact set forth therein, in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

On June 6, 1996, petitioners filed their Comments on the Request for Admission stating their
objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.

On January 24, 1997, respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of
court. The amendment modified the period covered by the complaint. Instead of October 1992
to January 5, 1993, it was changed to July 29, 1992 until August 10, 1994. The amendment also
confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the sum of P110,301.80 but alleged that this payment
was applied to other obligations which petitioners owe respondent. Respondent reiterated its
allegation that, despite petitioners' partial payment, the principal amount which petitioners
owe remains P259,809.50.

Petitioners filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint denying the allegations
therein and insisting that they have made partial payments.

On September 4, 1997, respondent filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary
Judgment claiming that petitioners' Comments on respondent's Request for Admission is a
mere scrap of paper as it was signed by petitioners' counsel and not by petitioners themselves
and that it was filed beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. Respondent goes on to
assert that petitioners, in effect, were deemed to have impliedly admitted the matters subject
of the said request. Respondent also contended that it is already entitled to the issuance of a
summary judgment in its favor as petitioners not only failed to tender a genuine issue as to any
material fact but also did not raise any special defenses, which could possibly relate to any
factual issue.

RTC granted. MR denied. CA affimed. Hence, to SC.

ISSUE: W/NOT THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DENIED DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS' (PETITIONERS) COMMENT AND RULED THAT THERE WAS IMPLIED ADMISSION
CONTAINED IN THE REQUEST.

HELD: In their first assigned error, petitioners insist in arguing that respondent waived its
Request for Admission when it filed its Second Amended Complaint; that all motions or
requests based on the complaint, which was amended, should no longer be considered.
Petitioners also contend that the Request for Admission was not in the form specified by the
Rules of Court as it did not specify a period within which to reply as required by Section 1, Rule
26 of the same Rules.

The petition lacks merit.

The Court agrees with the CA in holding that respondent's Second Amended Complaint
supersedes only its Amended Complaint and nothing more.

Pursuant to the above-quoted Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the party to whom the
request is directed must respond to the request within a period of not less than ten (10) days
after the service thereof, or upon such further time the Court may allow on motion. In the
instant case, the plaintiff-appellee's herein respondent's "Request" failed to designate any
period for the filing of the defendants-appellants' herein petitioners' response. Neither did the
trial court fix the period for the same upon motion of the parties. However, such failure to
designate does not automatically mean that the filing or the service of an answer or comment
to the "Request" would be left to the whims and caprices of defendants-appellants. It must be
reiterated that one of the main objectives of Rule 26 is to expedite the trial of the case.
Nonetheless, the Court takes exception to the ruling of the CA that by reason of the belated
filing of petitioners' Comments on the Request for Admission, they are deemed to have
impliedly admitted that they are indebted to respondent in the amount of P259,809.50.

A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is
inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which as a mode of discovery, contemplates
of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already
been alleged in the pleadings. Nonetheless, consistent with the abovementioned Rule, the party
being requested should file an objection to the effect that the request for admission is
improper and that there is no longer any need to deny anew the allegations contained therein
considering that these matters have already been previously denied.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that the CA was correct in sustaining the
summary judgment rendered by the RTC.
 EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs CAMERON

(RULE 27)

FACTS: For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc.’s motion for
reconsideration of our April 10, 2013 decision, which reversed and set aside the Court of
Appeals' resolutions and ordered respondent to produce the Loan Sale and Purchase
Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006, including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in
order that petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.

One of the questions raised was the motion for production was filed out of time.

Respondent asserts that there was no "insistent refusal" on its part to present the LSPA, but
that petitioners filed their motion for production way out of time, even beyond the protracted
pre-trial period from September 2005 to 2011. Hence, petitioners had no one to blame but
themselves when the trial court denied their motion as it was filed only during the trial proper.

For their part, petitioners counter that their motion for production was not filed out of time,
and there is no proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of Court, from filing
motions for production, beyond the pre-trial.

ISSUE: W/NOT petitioners’ was filed out of time.

HELD: NO. We deny the motion for reconsideration. Discovery mode of production/inspection
of document may be availed of even beyond pre-trial upon a showing of good cause.

The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes of discovery, is not limited to
the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery
mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of
court "upon due application and a showing of due cause." Rule 27, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, states:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order — Upon motion of any party showing
good cause therefor the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control

The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal treatment." The evident purpose of
discovery procedures is "to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain
the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials" and, thus, facilitating an
amicable settlement or expediting the trial of the case. WHEREFORE, the motion for
reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
 Vda. De Manguerra vs Risos
Rule 28 (in relation to Rule 119 section 15)

Facts: Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before
the RTC as Criminal Case that arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of
the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the
document.

Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly
confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised
to stay in Manila for further treatment.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the need
to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which
limited her freedom of mobility.

The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondent’s petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution
witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the
appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule
119, Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the
case is pending and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the
assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.

The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the
same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The
appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the
situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

Issues:
Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of the petitioner?

Held:
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of
the judge. This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the
credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses
demeanor.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules
are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In
criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.

In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play.
FULLTEXT LINKS:

Rule 25 http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015augustdecisions.php?id=631

Rule 26 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/jul2012/gr_176570_2012.html

Rule 27 http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/gr_204700_2014.html

Rule 28 http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2008/august2008/152643.htm