The Origins of Democracy: Theoretical Reflections On The Chilean Case

STUDY
THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY: THEORETICAL

REFLECTIONS ON THE CHILEAN CASE*
Arturo Valenzuela and

Samuel Valenzuela
Chile was one of the most democratic countries in the world, not
only in the 1960s but also during the last century and a half. Political
institutions in Chile evolved in a similar way to comparable
institutions in Europe and the United States, in conditions generally
considered to be unfavorable for the development of representative
processes and procedures. Based on the Chilean case, this article
seeks to help explain the origin and consolidation of democratic
regimes. In the author’s opinion, the Chilean case calls into question
the general validity of the most accepted theories of the gestation of
democratic regimes. The article provides an historical interpretation
of the evolution of Chile’s institutional structures compared to other
western democracies; it then points out the shortcomings in cultural
and economic theories of the origin of democracy; and lastly, it
stresses the value that a historical and political approach can
provide to the gestation of democratic institutions, as can be
inferred from the Chilean case in the 19th century.
ARTURO V ALENZUELA. Duke University.

SAMUEL V ALENZUELA. Harvard University.
* This study presents an overview of some of the main arguments of a book by
the same title to be published by Cambridge University Press.
Estudios Públicos, 12 (autumn 1983).

2 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS
A fter World War II there was a fundamental shift in the analysis

of democratic regimes. Guided in part by the pessimism of authors such as
Michels, Mosca and Pareto, who became skeptical of the ability of
European societies to practice democratic ideals, the theorists of politics
moved away from a preoccupation with constitutionalism and the normative
implications of regime types, to a concern for understanding the actual
operation of democracy in complex contemporary nation-states. A few
scholars, notably Robert Dahl, made major contributions to democratic
theory by articulating the principal features of functioning democracies, or
polyarchies, as he preferred to call them, since most fail to meet fully the
democratic ideal.1 Other scholars made use of new techniques, such as
survey research, which tended to reinforce a sober view of the actual
commitment of mass publics in democratic societies to the norms of
participation and political tolerance.2 And, more recently, authors interested
in “empirical democratic theory” have turned to cross-national quantitative
techniques in an attempt to specify the incidence of democracy in the
contemporary world. They have also sought to explain why some countries
develop democratic systems and others do not by examining a wide range
of socio-economic determinants which are associated (in greater or lesser
degree) with democratic politics.3
1 See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1956); Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Polyarchy:
Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
2 Studies questioning commitment to the “democratic creed” as a basis for
democracy include the classic study by Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and
Civil Liberties (New York: 1955). See also the influential articles by James W. Prothro
and Charles M. Grigg, “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and
Disagreement”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, N° 2 (May, 1960), pp. 276-94; and Herbert
McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in American Politics”, American Political Science
Review, Vol. 58, N° 2 (June, 1964), pp. 361-82. For a discussion of these issues,
emphasizing the importance of leadership, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs?, Chapter 28.
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In their path-breaking cross national study, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic
Culture (Boston: Little Brown, 1965)) concluded that democratic regimes require not
only “participant” attitudes but also “subject” ones —i.e. a measure of traditionalism and
deference to authority such as that found in England. On deference, see also Harry
Eckstein, “A Theory of Stable Democracy”, Center for International Affairs, Princeton
University, Research Monograph N° 10, 1961; Robert T. Mackenzie and Allan Silver,
Angels in Marble; Working Class Conservatives in Urban England (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1968); and Eric Nordlinger, The Working Class Tories, Authority,
Deference and Stable Democracy (Berkeley, 1967).
3 Seymour Martin Lipset began these studies with his influential “Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American

Political Science Review, Vol. 53, N° 1 (March, 1959), pp. 69-105. Other studies include
Phillips Cutright, “National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis,” American
Sociological Review, Vol. 28 (April, 1963), pp. 253-64; Donald J. McCrone and Charles F.
Cnudde, “Toward a Communication Theory of Political Development: A Causal Model”,
ARTURO VALENZUELA AND SAMUEL VALENZUELA 3
Almond notes that these cross-national studies are one of the best
examples of cummulative efforts in the field, as different authors have
attempted to redefine their indices and improve their explanatory models.4
However, these studies provide little insight into the reasons why some
countries become democratic and others not, beyond a rather general
statement of association beween democracy and certain socio-economic
variables. Furthermore, the examination of a large number of cases
repeatedly comes up with several deviant cases which would have to be
explained if causal inferences are to be made between economic and social
determinants and regime type. Indeed, because of the existence of these
deviant cases some scholars, like Juan Linz, questioned the validity and
reliability of the associations uncovered in this literature.5
Among the most prominent of these deviant cases are two Latin
American ones: Argentina, in which the absence of democracy belies the
high degree of societal modernization; and Chile, which appeared in most
studies as one of the most democratic countries in the World, despite its
status as a relatively “underdeveloped” country. In one of the most recent
articles on the subject, utilizing the largest sample of countries, Chile
ranked among the 15% most democratic countries of the world with a score
in 1965 higher than that of the United States, France, Italy and West
Germany. For 1960 the score was higher than that of Great Britain.6
American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, N° 1 (March, 1967), pp. 72-79; Deane E.
Neubauer, “Some Conditions of Democracy”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 61,
N° 4 (December, 1967), pp. 1002-09; Arthur K. Smith, Jr., “Socio-Economic
Development and Political Democracy: A Causal Analysis”, Midwest Journal of Political
Science, Vol. 13 (1969), pp. 95-125; Robert W. Jackman, “On the Relation of Economic
Development to Democratic Performance”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
17, N° 3 (August, 1973), pp. 611-21; Robert W. Jackman, “Political Democracy and Social
Equality: A Comparative Analysis”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 39, N° 1
(February, 1974), pp. 29-44; Kenneth A. Bollen, “Comparative Measurement of Political
Democracy”, American Sociological Review, Vo1. 45, N° 3 (June, 1980), pp. 370-90. For
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reprints of some of these and other articles see J. V. Gillespie and B. A. Nesvold (eds.),
Macro-quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development and Democratization (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1971); and Charles Cnudde and Deane Neubauer, Empirical Democratic
Theory (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969). For an excellent review of some
of this literature see Leonardo Morlino, “Misure di Democrazia e di Liberta: Discusione di
Alcune Analisi Empiriche”, Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, Vol. 5. N° 1 (April, 1975).
pp. 131-166.
4 Gabriel Almond, Approach to Development Causation”, in Gabriel Almond,
Scott Flanigan, and Robert Mundt, Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of
Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1973), p. 11.
5 Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes”, in Fred I. Greenstein and
Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science Volume 3 (Reading, Mass.:

Addison Wesley, 1975), p. 182.
6 See Bolen. It shoold be noted that the author cautions against concluding that
closely ranked countries are any different in level of development.

The Chilean case is the most intriguing of the two, because it so

clearly departed from the standard of Latin America and the Third World as
a whole. This “surprising” finding led Phillips Cutright to suggest that Chile
would be one of the best cases to examine in detail “to see the institutional
mechanisms or other national characteristics that allow a nation to wander
far from the regression line for many years.”7 For this reason, Chile figured
prominently in Dahl’s Study focusing on the development of
“polyarchies.”8
It is obvious that if those those studies had considered Chile after the
military coup of 1973, the country would have ranked not among the
highest, but among the lowest on all indices of democratic performance.9
Chilean exceptionality, however, was not merely a statistical fluke. What
the synchronic associational studies were not able to show is that Chile had
a democracy that would have persistently ranked with the most democratic
countries in the World not only in the 1960s, but for the last century and a
half. Chile’s political institutions evolved, in a strikingly similar manner to
the evolution of comparable institutions in Europe and the United States
under circumstances which have generally been viewed as deleterious to the
development of representative processes and procedures.
This paper is a preliminary statement of a larger study which
attempts to discern from the Chilean experience certain patterns which can
then help us assess the value of various competing theories which seek to
explain the origin and consolidation of democratic regimes. Naturally,
whatever propositions can be derived from the Chilean case can only
remain tentative until subjected to comparative examination with other
cases carefully chosen to test these propositions. Without carefully
structured comparative evidence it would be difficult to identify those
factors from the Chilean case which are generalizable to the phenomena in
question, and those which are fundamentally, if inadvertantly, wrong in
explaining the Chilean case itself. Much of the effort to systematize
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propositions from the Chilean case and the effort to examine them in the
light of other cases remains to be done. The reader, however, should get a
feel for the direction of the project in these pages.
The task of explaining the Chilean case is not an easy one, for there
are no systematic studies which address these questions for Chile, nor is
7 See Cutright, “National Political Development”, reprinted in Cnudde and
Neubauer, p. 205.
8 Dahl, Polyarchy.
9 For an analysis of the breakdown of Chilean democracy see Arturo Valenzuela,
The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1978).
Chile considered, with the exception of Dahl’s work, in the general literature
on the origins and evolution of democratic institutions.10
The principal contention of this project is that the available
theoretical contributions are not adequate to explain the Chilean case,
thereby casting doubt on even the more general validity of these theories.
The paper will briefly review them to note their shortcomings in accounting
for the Chilean pattern of political development. It will also provide a
synopsis of the main features of the evolution of Chilean democracy,
suggesting how these features can provide a basis for the development of
an alternative theoretical conceptualization. However, before turning to
those themes, it is necessary to provide a sketch of the evolution of Chilean
political institutions aimed at documenting the assertion that Chile
succeeded early in the 19th century in developing representative
institutions similar to those being developed in Europe.11
Elements of Chilean Exceptionality
Robert Dahl has noted that the principal requirements for democracy
to exist among a large number of people can be summarized in two
different theoretical dimensions. The first refers to the degree of
“liberalization” or “contestation” in a political system, or the extent to
which opposing elements can peacefully challenge the regime through
mechanisms such as suffrage and institutions such as representative
assemblies or parliaments. As Dahl notes, the existence of an opposition
party is “very nearly the most distinctive characteristic of democracy itself;
and we take the absence of an opposition party as evidence, if not always
conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy.” 12 The second
10 Not only has Chile not been given much consideration in the literature; Latin
America in general has been left out. The volumes of the Committee on Comparative
Politics of the Social Science Research Council had only a few studies dealing with Latin
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America, and Latin America did not figure prominently in the theoretical efforts of the
1960s. In part, this was due to the fact that Latin America did not fit as neatly into the
modernization schema as did countries in Africa or Asia. In his excellent study of parties in
Western Democracies, Epstein acknowldeges that a few Latin American countries meet his
criteria for inclusion in his study, but leaves them out “mainly because the whole of Latin
America is customarily treated along with developing nations.” (Emphasis added). See Leon
Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 4.
11 Because the empirical material on the Chilean case in this colloquium paper
draws from a 1arger work, involving considerable primary research, references will not
be provided for the material presented that deals directly with Chile.
12 See his introduction to the volume he edited on Political Oppositions in Western
Democracies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), p. xviii. For a development of
the framework see Polyarchy Chapter 1. Juan Linz defines democracy stressing similar
elements, as does Barrington Moore. See Linz, Handbook, p. 183 and Barrington Moore,
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) p. 429.
characteristic, “participation” or “inclusiveness”, refers to the degree of

popular involvement in the system of public contestation. These dimensions
vary somewhat independently with a democratic regime being characterized
by high degrees both of contestation and participation. Most democracies
evolved slowly toward full participation after first developing systems of
public contestation in which a progressively larger portion of the citizenry
was allowed to participate.13 As Dahl notes, in the 19th century most of the
European democracies and the United States were “oligarchical
democracies”, with relatively high degrees of political liberalization and
tolerance for opposition and relatively low levels of political
participation.14
Chile, by contrast with other Latin American countries, developed a
relatively high level of competitive politics early in the 19th Century, ahead
of the development of similar institutions in many European countries. The
Chilean Congress was an important center of public authority from the very
beninning, and between 1830 and 1970 virtually all presidents and
congressmen were elected to office following the electoral practices of the
time, which did of course change. The short lived political crisis of 1851,
1859, 1891, 1924-5, and 1931-2, did not alter what can be seen in the long
run as an essentially linear development towards more competitiveness and
participation.
The establishment of an “oligarchical democracy” in Chile was not a
simple process. Particularly in the early part of the century constitutional
procedures were severely challenged on a number of occasions. At the
same time, executive authority was paramount in the early years, and
effective participation was limited both by suffrage restrictions and by
intervention in the electoral process. The Chilean executive, until his
powers were eroded by the third quarter of the 19th century, served a five
year term which could be renewed once.
The president had the power to appoint and remove ministers, and
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name all judges, public employees and clergy. He could call extra-ordinary
13 This dimension is close to Rokkan's argument that “incorporation and
representation” are the two most significant dimensions in the development of European
democracies. For a compendium of his writings which have made a major contribution to
the field see Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: David McKay Co, Inc. 1970),
especially Chapters 3 and 7. The literature on “crisis and development” points to similar
dimensions. However, because the concern is with overall political development, and not
simply with democratization, the concept of “authority” usually carries very different
connotations from the notion of representation or contestation. For work in this vein see
Leonard Binder et al. Crises and Sequences in Political Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1971.). Some of these studies will be noted again later in the paper.
14 See Dahl, Polyarchy.
sessions of the legislature to consider initiatives of his choosing and had

an absolute veto over ordinary legislation. The control that the executive
had over the electoral process meant that from 1830 to 1870, presidents
Prieto, Bulnes, Montt and Perez served two terms each, and it was not until
1860 that the president failed to impose his succesor.
Though the president was clearly the dominant figure in Chilean
politics for much of the 19th Century, the bi-cameral congress had final
authority over the approval of periodic laws prescribed in the Constitution,
including budget and taxation measures, legislation creating public
employment and the deployment of the armed forces. In addition, it was
charged with reviewing the performance of executive agencies. Legislators
could raise questions about governmental performance which cabinet
officers had to answer in the chamber, and could censor ministers over
policy disagreements. The executive, however, could not dissolve
parliament and call for new elections. Thus, Chile had some of the features
of parliamentary systems which weakened its executive authority.
In the early years the executive was able to ensure relatively docile
legislatures both because of its prominence and the control which ministries
exercised over the electoral process. However, as early as 1839, 12
opposition deputies were elected to the Chamber, and executives soon
faced the reality that they could not ensure the undivided loyalty of
legislators elected under ministry sponsorship. The absence of well
structured parties, and the increased saliency of key issues, such as the
conflict between church and state, forced the executive to become more
sensitive to shifting parliamentary majorities. In 1841, the Congress held up
the budget resolution in order to force the executive to add to the agenda of
an extra-ordinary legislative session a couple of measures that had initiated
in the legislature. In 1849, a cabinet was censored, and by the 1850s the
legislature resorted to delaying tactics on key measures to force the
executive to change policies and ministries.
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The gradual development of parliamentary accountability of the

executive led in the 1870s to a series of constitutional reforms ratifying the
increased importance of the legislature and the declining power of the
executive. The president was restricted to one five year term, the Senate
was elected by popular vote (40 years before the XVII Amendment in the
United States), the executive’s veto power was limited, and various
measures were enacted as part of electoral reform legislation in an attempt
to deprive the executive of its continued influence in the electoral process.
The struggle between the executive and the legislature finally led to civil
war in 1891 when President Balmaceda, unlike his predecessors, refused to
acknowledge the congressional prerogative of delaying budgetary
legislation in order to force policy changes. After the victory of

congressional forces, Chile virtually became a parliamentary system, rather
than a presidential one, as ministries were structured solely to reflect the
shifting coalitions in both chambers of the legislature. Not until the
Constitutional revisions of 1925 did the executive regain the position of
primary actor in the political system.
While Chile’s executive dominated the political process during most
of the nineteenth century, it must be emphasized that he was an elected
leader for a fixed term. In Europe, with rare exceptions, executive authority
rested with unelected monarchs. As Epstein notes, “political power was
often not effectively transferred from hereditary rulers to representative
assemblies no matter how narrow their electorates until late in the
nineteenth century.”15 Some countries, including Britain and Norway,
developed political contestation with parliamentary responsibility before
Chile. Other countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, began to
develop parliamentary influence around the same time as Chile did. The
Sweedish king and the German Kaiser were able to choose ministers
without regard to parliamentary majorities up until 1917, though the
parliament’s views were taken into consideration earlier. Italy was not
finally unified until 1870 and did not establish a system of parliamentary rule
until the 1880s. Republican and democratic rule in France consolidates only
with the Third Republic beginning in 1871-1876, and many observers noting
the importance of the Napoleonic bureaucracy question the degree of
authority wielded by the French parliament.16 Chile in fact has greater
similarity with the United States than with Europe in the nineteenth century.
As in most of Europe with the notable exception of France, the
second dimension of democracy, political inclusiveness, expanded only
gradually in Chile during the 19th Century. Until 1874, the suffrage was
restricted to males with property or a trade or profession which was
equivalent to the property requirement. Voter participation remained very
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limited. In 1846, approximately 2% of the population voted, a figure which

was nevertheless comparable to the voting population in Britain in 1830,
Luxembourg in 1848, the Netherlands in 1851, and Italy in 1871.17 After that
date voting remained at the same level, or actually declined, as registries
15 Epstein, Political Parties, p. 1924.

16 For discussion of the rise of political opposition in Europe see the excellent
collection of studies in Dahl, Political Oppositions, with essays on most European
countries by leading authorities.)
17 See J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratización a través de reformas: Los
conservadores y la expansión del sufragio en el siglo diecinueve chileno (Buenos Aires:

IDEP, 1983), Appendix, for 19th century Chilean electoral data. European data can be
found in Rokkan, Citizens, pp. 83-84.
were renewed every three years and executives sought to limit participation
to supporters, including public employees and members of the civil guard.
In 1874, the legislature, over the objections of the executive enacted a
fundamental reform of the electoral system which extended the suffrage to
all literate adult males. As a result, the number of registered voters
increased from 49,000 in 1873 to 149,000 in 1879.18 Norway, with a
comparable adult male population to Chile’s, had 84,000 registered voters
in 1876.19 Chile would later lag behind European nations both in the rate of
increase of male voters as well as in granting women the right to vote (with
the exception of Switzerland) and would not abolish the literacy
requirement until 1970. For all intents and purposes, however, the
development of institutions of contestation and participation compare
favorably in Chile to the development of comparable institutions in Europe
and in the United States.
Cultural and Economic Interpretations of the Origins of Democracy:

Problems with the Chilean case
The emergence of institutions of participation and contestation is a

relatively recent phenomenon which is roughly contemporaneous with the
rise of modern industrial societes. Consequently, there is a strong
assumption in much of the literature on the subject that democracy was the
end point in a general process of modernization. In addition, since
democracy had less difficulty in the North than in the South of Europe, the
analysts have linked its successful establishment with Protestant rather
than Catholic values.
Authors vary considerably on whether they give greater emphasis
to the value or ideological dimensions of the origins of democracy, or to the
economic or structural dimensions, and many combine both elements in a
more or less systematic fashion. Most authors, however, view either cultural
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or economic determinants as the major explanatory variables in accounting

for the rise or failure of democracy. We will focus on each approach, noting
their relevance for understanding the Chilean case.
A. Value Explanations
Value explanations have figured prominently in efforts to explain the

failure of democracy in Latin America and the success of democracy in the
18 J. S. Valenzuela, idem.
19 For Norway see the essay by Stein Rokkan,“Norway: Numerical Democracy
and Corporate Pluralism,” in Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. 76.
North American colonies. In his highly influential interpretation of United

States development, Louis Hartz has argued that democracy too root in the
United States because the American colonies were populated by settlers
who brought with them a highly individualistic protestant culture.
“Whatever the Americans thought,” he wrote, “their republican virtue was
insured by a cultural heritage of the past, ultimately out of the first of the
seventeenth century migrations. It was a heritage which had given them a
Tempered Enlightment, a traditionalistic revolution, ultimately a successful
republican constitution.”20
While the North American fragment of Europe brought the values of
the Enlightenment to the New World, their Latin American counterparts
brought aristocratic and feudal values which made it difficult for
representative institutions to flourish. Thus, Hartz notes that the “tradition
of popular assemblies” which ensured a continuity of government in the
British colonies not only did not exist in the Spanish colonies, they would
not have been possible because of the absence of an appropriate value
structure to sustain participatory politics. The exclusion of the creole from
participation in colonial administration “did to be sure, produce an
alienated class which turned toward French Thought. But the Creole was an
aristocrat, and even if he had been taken into the Spanish system as the
Canadian Seigneur was taken into the French, there would still have been
the passivity of the mass of the people as there was in Canada.”21
Underlying the difference between the North and South American
value structures was the difference between a protestant and a catholic
fragment. Pierre Trudeau has argued that “Catholic nations have not always
been ardent supporters of democracy. They are authoritarian in spiritual
matters; and since the dividing line between the spiritual and the temporal
may be very fine and even confused, they are often disinclined to seek
solutions in temporal affairs through the mere counting of heads.”22 As
David Martin has argued in his A General Theory of Secularization, “the
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incidence of pluralism and democracy is related to the incidence of those

religious bodies which are themselves inherently pluralistic and
democratic... Such bodies... are much more prevalent in the Anglo-
20 See Louis Hartz ,“United States History in a New Perspective”, in Hartz (ed.),
The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 80.
Hartz’ classic study on the United States is The Liberal Tradition in America (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955).
21 Hartz, 75.
22 Cited by Seymour Martin Lipset in his “Values, Education and
Entrepreneurship”, in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.), p. 12.
American situation than elsewhere... In Russia and Latin America

democratic and individualistic Protestantism arrived late in the process and
could not have an important effect...”23
Richard Morse has stressed the cultural adn ideological features of
Latin America and related them to the evolution of society and politics.
Morse argues that the “cultural determinants for society and personality in
Latin America” stem from the creole’s “medieval Catholic concern with
hierarchy, with honor and personal loyalty, with rhetoric, with casuistry,
with expressiveness, with the wholeness of things; their creole
ambivalences, sensibilities, self denigration and braggadocio habits of
command and deference; and their stack of half-absorbed ideas from the
arsenals of Anglo-French ‘enlightenment’ thought.”24 More recently, the
negative implications for Anglo-American style democracy of a cultural
heritage derived from Catholic Spain have been extremely well articulated by
Howard Wiarda who has underscored the organicist, patrimonialist and
corporatist implications of the Iberic-Latin American tradition for Latin
American political development.25
According to Morse and most Latin American historians, the Wars
of Independence, which were often Civil Wars with a 1arge portion of the
population seeking to maintain royal authority or to impose a new form of
monarchical rule, had devastating consequences for Latin America’s newly
independent states. With the demise of the authority of the crown in the
wake of the Napoleonic invasions, and in the absence of both a tradition of
representative government and a value system consonant with the “liberal
23 David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (New York: Harper and
Row, 1978.), p. 25. Martin explicitly notes that the Latin pattern of Catholicism is
associated with unstable democracy. See p. 59.
24 Richard Morse, “The Heritage of Latin America”, in Hartz, The Founding of
New Societies, p. 137. The personality characteristics which presumably have impeded
democracy in Latin America and which stem from traditional catholic antecedents have
been stressed by many authors including several anthropologists. See for example some of
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the essays reprinted in D.B. Heath and R.N. Adams (eds.) Contemporay Cultures and
Societies in Latin America (New York: 1965). These personality characteristics are noted
by Robert Dix as being at the root of the difficulties found in Latin America for the
acceptance of opposition. Dix adds that Latin Americans suffer from some of the same
qualities of “amoral familism” which Banfield attributes to Southern Italy. See Robert H.
Dix, “Latin America: Oppositions and Development”, in Robert A. Dahl, Regimes and
Oppositions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 261-305. It is also part of
James Payne's explanation which features the search for status as the underlying
motivation for politics in Latin American cultures. See James Payne, Patterns of Conflict
in Colombia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
25 See his “Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin
Tradition: The Corporative Model”, World Politics, XXV (January, 1973) and his
“Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: Toward a New Conceptualization”, in
Howard Wiarda (ed.), Human Rights and U.S. Human Rights Policy (Washington: American
Enterprise Institute, 1982.
constitutions” adopted at the time, most of Spanish America fell into

anarchy punctuated by caudillo rule. As Morse says “decapitated, the
government could not function, for the patrimonial regime had developed
neither: 1.) the underpinning of contractural vassal relationships that
capacitate component parts of a feudal regime for autonomous life; nor 2.) a
rationalized legal order not dependent for its operation and claims to assent
upon persona1istic intervention of the highest order.26 Jacques Lambert
adds, “in the void created by the disappearance of (royal) authority, all of
Spanish America went through a period when centrifugal forces threatened
to provoke an endless parceling of territories into small sovereignties...
Caudillismo results from the po1itical immaturity of Spanish American
societies in the nineteenth century.27
But if the absence of democracy in Latin America is explained by
cultural antecedents, how then do we account for the Chilean case? There
are two possible approaches which can be followed to account for Chilean
exceptionality in light of cu1tural theories. The first involves the elaboration
of an argument that somehow Chile did not conform to the Spanish
American fragment —that it had come closer in some respect to the “liberal”
fragment of North America. In attempting to account for puzzle of the
Chilean case, Robert Dahl comes close to this approach by suggesting that
the Chilean case can be explained by “considerable equality in distribution
of land and instruments of coercion, reinforced by norms favoring social
and political equality.”28
The historical record, however, does not bear out this assertion, nor
does it bear out Francisco Encina’s suggestions that Chilean politics took
the direction they did because of the greater enlightenment of a Basque
upper class.29 Chile was among the most traditional colonies. Royalist
sentiment in Chile was stronger than it was in many other colonies, with
Spanish forces recruiting most of their troops internally for the fight against
the rebels. At the same time, the Chilean social structure was characterized
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26 Morse, in Hartz, p. 161.

27 Jacques Lambert, Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967), pp. 150, 56.
28 Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 140.
29 The great Chilean historian, Francisco Encina in all of his writings tends to
suggest that the Chilean elites somehow had superior stock. See his Historia de Chile 20
Volumes (Santiago: Editorial Nascimiento, 1941-42.) Explanations drawing on the
wisdom of the upper class are also common in Julio Heise Gonzalez, otherwise excellent
Historia de Chile (Santiago: Editorial Andres Bello, 1974.) For example, Heise observes
that “public life in the final analysis depends on culture, on the habits and characteristics
of all of the social group. For any form of political community to express itself with
success... certain spiritual predispositions are requiered in all the people...” Heise, p. 273.
by large landed estates with semi-feudal class relations. The wars of

independence brought about fewer changes than in the other colonies. In his
excellent analysis of political independence in various colonies, Jorge
Domínguez notes that “Chile lagged behind the other colonies, although it
had experienced economic growth and mobilization. Its society had been
transformed the least. The social bonds within it remained strong.
Centralization had not been advanced nor had society been pluralized.
Traditional elites remained strong, and traditional orientations prevailed.”30
Furthermore, during the first twenty years or so of the country’s political
life, Chile, like its neighbors, was racked by civil conflicts and dissention as
regional, family and personalistic rivalries held sway.31
The second and standard approach is to argue that while Chile did
indeed develop stable institutions, these were not liberal. Morse writes that
“Chile was an example perhaps unparalleled of a Spanish American country
which managed, after a twelve-year transitional period, to avoid the
extremes of tyranny and anarchy with a political system unencumbered by
the mechanisms and party rhetoric of an exotic liberalism... Thus, the
structure of the Spanish patrimonial state was recreated with only those
minimum concessions to Anglo-French constitutionalism that were
necessary for a nineteenth-century republic which had just rejected
monarchical rule.”32 Hartz characterizes the regime more directly as a
dictatorship and notes that the emergence of a “liberalism within Congress
bent on controlling the clergy and extending suffrage” contributed to
anarchy which “lead to the emergence of a new dictatorship.” He concludes
that this “reminds us merely that participative responsibility in the
Jacksonian sense involves sobriety as well as ‘rationality’ -The Temperate
Enlightment of the Revolutionary era again... the progressives in Chile were
perpetually frustrated because they could not count on a 1iberal society to
back them up.”33
This view of Chilean political development, echoing many of the
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standard accounts in Chilean historiography, holds more specifically that

Diego Portales, as “dictator” (in Hartz’terms), imposed an absolutist
authority which restored harmony by not experimenting with liberal ideals
30 See Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1979) p. 141. For discussion of Chilean support for the royalist cause see p. 201. The
literature on Colonial Chile is voluminous. In particular see the works of Jaime Eyzaguirre and
Sergio Villalobos. A marxist perspective is provided by Hernán Ramirez Necochea.
31 See for example, Mary Lowenthal Felstinger, “Kinship Politics in the Chilean
Independence Movement”, Hahr, Volume 56, # 1 (February 1976).

32 Morse, in Hartz, pp. 163-4.
33 Hartz, in Hartz, p. 88.
from the new United States or from European progressive circles. John
Johnson articulates this thesis forcefully when he says that “Portales used
demotions and executions to remove liberal oriented officers and other
‘undesirables’ from the military and brought the institution under control...
Barracks revolts or coup d’etats practically standard practice elsewhere in
Latin America ended.”34
There are serious reasons to question the thesis that Portales was the
forger of Chilean institutions. He was never president, served as minister
for less than three years, and lived most of the Prieto presidency in
Valparaiso. He had little to do with the 1833 Constitution, and was
assassinated in 1837 by disgruntled former supporters (military men)
unhappy with his policies.35
But, whether or not the Portales account is plausible, the main
difficulty with this interpretation has already been anticipated in the
discussion outlining the features of the Chilean political regime in the 19th
Century. By comparison with the European experience at the time, and even
by comparison with the United States, the Chilean regime was hardly
characterized by “minimal concessions” to republican rule, nor were the
liberals “perpetually frustrated.”
Even though the early Nineteenth Century regime in Chile was
hardly by current standards a full-blown democracy, it is seriously mistaken
to equate it with the colonial period. Chilean presidents owed their
authority to a fundamentally different legitimacy base than the Spanish
monarchs or even most Constitutional monarchs of the period. They were
selected for fixed terms in competitive elections to a constitutionally defined
post with several important limitations and checks by other branches of
government. With independence Chile moved, in Weberian terms, to a
“rational legal” style of authority and did not reproduce the traditional
authority of the past. Indeed, its republican political system was much more
similar to that of the United States than it was to most regimes of
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contemporary Europe, let alone the patrimonial regime of 18th Century
34 See John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Cal.:
Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 24. See also the excellent history by Fredrick Pike,
Chile and the United States, 1880-1962 (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1963), p. 11. Perhaps the most extreme version of this thesis is Francisco Jose
Moreno’s, who argues that the strong man Chilean regime was succesful because it led to a
regime which coincided with the “authoritistic” tendencies in the Chilean national
character. See his Legitimacy and Stability in Latin America (New York: New Yor
University Press, 1969).
35 For an elaboration of this argument see Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers in
Chile: Local Government in Centralized Polity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1977.)
Spain.36 President Joaquin Prieto left office in 1840 after two terms to make
way for Manuel Bulnes who in turn was succeeded by Manuel Montt.
When Montt tried to impose his successor, the outcry was such that his
choice to succeed him withdrew from the race leading to the election of
President Perez, who incorporated the leading opponents of Manuel Montt
into his cabinet. This transition to opponents occurred earlier than in many
European countries, and much earlier than in France, the leading European
republic.
Martz, Morse, and others, characterizing the Chilean regime and
interpreting Chilean events, have been misled by an excessive reliance on
the writings of leading Chilean essayists and historians such as Diego
Barros Arana, Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna and José Victorino Lastarria,
who were actively involved in Chilean politics and were strong advocates
of most advanced liberal policies. In fact, Hartz cites Francisco Bilbao’s
account of “Chilean feudalism” in arguing that Chile was undistinguishable
from other Latin countries where creoles united with the “church hierarchy
and the new military corps to resist a leftward trend.”37 Bilbao, however,
was hardly an objective source having been the leader of the Chilean
socialist movement in mid-century, strongly influenced by the Paris
commune which he witnessed in person. Undoubtedly, his ideas would
have been as “foreign” in the United States in 1849 as they were in Chile.
Bilbao’s “dictator”, President Montt, was the same chief executive who
gave assylum and protection to Sarmiento in his exile from the Rozas regime
in Argentina, and sent Sarmiento to the United States to develop an
educational policy for Chile based on the North American example. He is
also a president who went against the interests of the Church, leading
ultramontane catholics to set up Chile’s first coherent opposition party to
battle the securalizing of the State. Though there is little question that the
leading liberals of the period were “frustrated”, they made as much, if not
more headway in Chile than they did in most of Europe, including
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Protestant Europe. Lastarria, one of the key critics of the period and a
champion of liberal causes, was elected to Congress in 1849 (20 years
before the start of the Third Republic) and served until 1882, occupying
Ministerial positions in 1862 and 1876.
36 For Weber’s discussion of authority see H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.)
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp.
78ff, 216ff, 295ff. The fundamentally different character of republican rule is stressed by
Lipset when he notes the pressures which existed in the United States toward granting
Washington some kind of monarchical legitimacy. See his The First New Nation (New
York: Basic Books, 1963).
37 Hartz, p. 29.
The failure of cultural explanations to account for the Chilean case

raises serious questions about the underlying assumption that there is a
direct fit between societal values and political institutions. Though the
evidence historically is hard to come by, it is extremely unlikely that Chile
had societal values comparable to Norway, Britain or the United States,
even though the political outcomes may have been similar. Indeed, several
students of democracy have argued that “stable” democracy is the product
not only of liberal and participatory values, but of a mix of participatory
and deferential values, and that the crucial element is not so much the
content of those values but the congruence between values and authority
patterns in society and in the political sphere.38 The problem, however, is
that in the absence of a clearly defined set of values which relate to
democracy, it is difficult to ascertain which mix of values is appropriate.
As a resu1t there is a real temptation to engage in circular reasoning: if
a particular regime was stable or had the requisite democratic
characteristics, then its value structures or authority structures were ipso
facto appropriate.
In concluding this section, it should be noted that some authors
have pointed to the corporatist or organic statist features of Latin American
politics, without attributing them to an underlying set of values or attitudes
within the population. For Alfred Stepan and Phillippe Schmitter, for
example, the prevalence of political institutions of an authoritarian or
corporate variety are more closely related to the evolution of political
institutions themselves which stem in some measure from the colonial
experience, but are also related to conscious choices on the part of relevant
political elites. While these authors have made an important contribution to
our understanding of Latin America, their focus on a more “voluntaristic”
explanation for the corporate or authoritarian phenomena provides us with
no systematic explanations for why another path may have been chosen in
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the Latin American context. Stepan, for instance, presents a typology of

“organic-statist” regimes which allows no room for alternative paths such
as the Chilean one before 1973.39
38 See Eckstein, “A Theory of Stable Democracy” for the argument that the
political system must be congruent with authority patterns in society.

39 See Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 59, where he argues against the notion
that corporatism is a cultural legacy and is more a response on the part of elites to
various political crises.
B. Economic Explanations
While there is a broad variation in studies emphasizing the economic

determinants of democracy, for simplicity’s sake they can be divided into
two categories: those drawing on broad economic factors related to
modernization, and those which point to certain particular class or group
formations which result from the development process.
Drawing on the classic distinction between “traditional” and
“modern” societies suggested by several leading 19th century thinkers
seeking to explain those factors contributing to the development of modern
industrial societies, several social scientists writing in the post-war period
have argued that democracy is a logical result of economic development.
With the shift towards industrialization from traditional agriculture,
societies became more complex, differentiated and secularized, opening the
way for the rise of new groups and institutions capable of challenging
traditional authority structures. One of the best known studies to make this
relationship explicit is Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society,
in which Lerner argued that urbanization resulting from economic
transformations directly led to societal complexity, widespread literacy and
a growing ability of people to work with others, resulting in turn in
democratic politics.40 Though the literature on political development,
particularly after the prompting of Samuel Huntington moved away from
this linear tie-in between economic development and political development,
there remained a widespread assumption that whether or not political
development was democratic development, democracy would best succeed
in economically developed contexts.41
40 See Daniel Lerner. The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: The Free
Press, 1958) .
41 Political scientists attempting to develop a theory of political development were
concerned by the charge that the effort was basically ethnocentric, and thus deliberately
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turned from a preoccupation with democracy to a consideration of the more universal

features of the development experience. Thus, most of the volumes of the SSRC Committee
on Comparative Politics deal with development at a more abstract level, looking at concepts
such as legitimacy, authority and participation which could apply equally to democratic and
non-democratic regimes. It is instructive that in most of the volumes in the series published
by Princeton University Press, democracy is not included in the index. Under the influence
particularly of Huntington’s critique of the “political development” literature, scholars turned
away from a preoccupation with development, to a preoccupation with political order. See
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968). Even in the studies focusing on “crises” and sequences in development, the main
concern is not with the development of democracy, but with the development of stable
regimes. See Binder, Crises and Sequences. For an excellent volume of historical essays
applying the framework, see Raymond Grew, (ed.) Crises of Political Development in Europe
and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.).
Thus, most of the studies in the literature on “empirical democratic”

theory noted in the introduction to this paper have sought, by examining a
cross-section of countries at one point in time, to determine the economic
and social correlates of democracy. In summarizing much of this work,
Cnudde and Neubauer echo Lerner when they note that “in general
democracy is most successful in what we have come to call modernizing
societies. In those societies, the major social and economic conflicts have
been solved or papered-over by the ameliorative effects of economic
growth. Democracy seems too fragile to survive the conflicts of poorer, less
developed social environments.” Elsewhere they note that “democracy
is the result of a developmental sequence from historic events to
industrialization to urbanization to education to literacy to mass
communications to democracy.”42
But, the main problem is not the lack of certainty about the causal
relationships or the presence of significant deviant cases. The problem is
that the literature is a-historical, ignoring the fact that several countries
could only be characterized as democratic (scoring highly on all of the
indices of democratization used in the various studies with the partial
exception of the participation index) at a time when their societies were
clearly rural and economically underdeveloped. Dahl, for one, points to the
United States as a case in point which in the early 19th century would not
have met any of the development criteria and yet clearly met the political
criteria.43 It is also clear that if the Chilean case was a deviant case in mid-
twentieth century, it was much more of a deviant case in the nineteenth
century when it was an overwhelmingly rural society with an export enclave
in the mining field. As Linz notes, explanations which draw on the overall
level of economic growth and development do not contribute much to
understanding the origins and evolution of democratic politics.44
Economic explanations, however, are not limited to those that focus
on overall indices of development or modernization. Several authors, both
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Marxist and non-Marxist, have argued that the key factor is not economic
development per se, but how that development affects the social structure,
and, in turn, how the social structure affects the evolution of political
regimes. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, specifically argues fo this
42 Cnudde and Neubauer Empirical Democratic Theory, pp. 516 and 518. And yet,
while these studies show an association between the incidence of democracy and levels of
developments, any causal linkages have not been established and, as noted earlier, several
deviant cases including the Chilean one appeared which require explanation.
43 However, as will be noted below, Dahl does not associate the U.S. in the 19th
Century with current underdeveloped countries. See Dahl Polyarchy, p. 72.

44 Linz, “Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism”, in Handbook, p. 182.
“social structural” as opposed to “cultural” explanation. He notes that the

“clue to understanding economic backwardness and political instability of
Brazil and much of Spanish America lies in their structural similarities with
the American South, rather than in those values which stem from Iberian o
Catholic origins.”45 Likewise, William Chambers, in disagreeing with Hartz
exclusive emphasis on cultural values notes that “the absence of a feudal
past and the pecu1iar nature of the American Revolution do not constitute a
sufficient explanation... American society even in the colonial years of the
enlightenment century was not so sharply graded into ranks or classes,
much less orders or estates, as European society...”46 Robert Dahl, while
objecting to the correlation between democracy and overall levels of
economic development, points to a multitude of cultural and structural
variables in emphasizing the differences between the United States in the
19th century and contemporary third world countries with “widespread
illiteracy, a tradition bound pre-literate, pre scientific culture, weak or
fragmented systems of communication, severe inequalities in wealth status
and power— a tiny or non-existent independent middle class and frequently
a tradition of autocratic or authoritarian rulership.”47
Marxist scholars have written little about the relationship between
social structure and democratic regimes or their origins. Though they have
in recent years qualified the simplistic notion of the state as merely the
executive committee of the bourgeosie, as Goran Thernborn notes, most of
their work has either consisted of a highly abstract treatment of the
capitalist state in general or on non democratic forms or absolutist forms of
the state.48
Thernborn in fact is one of the few Marxists to concern himself
explicitly with the origins and evolutions of democratic, as opposed to
45 Lipset, “Values Education and Entrepreneurship”, in Lipset and Solari, p. 11. It
should be noted, however, that in this article Lipset is rarely systematic, attributing much of
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Latin American underdevelopment to inappropriate values which can only be overcome

with education.
46 William Nisbet Chambers, “Partys Development and the American
Mainstream”, in William Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, (eds. ) The American Party
System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 25.
47 See Dahl 72. While Dahl’s book is a fundamental contribution to the debate on
origins of democracy, it is frustrating because of the lack of systematic attention to causal

factors. Thus, at another point he argues that competitive politics in Chile was aided by a
free farmer agrarian structure, p. 53. He also says that the “continental proportions and the
enormous length ...reduced the prospects for a successful monopoly of violence by any one
stratum of the population.” The irony is that occasionally the smallness of Chile, not its
vastness have been advanced to interpret the Chilean case. See Dahl p. 140.
48 Goran Therborn, “The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”, New Left
Review Nº 103 (May-June, 1977), pp. 3-41. For examples of the former see the work
of Nicos Poulantzas, and of the latter see that of Perry Anderson.
authoritarian state structures. His analysis, however, is flawed by an overly

rigid definition of democracy as focusing almost exclusively on the
participation dimension, to the exclusion of the contestation one. He thus
argues that the United States and Switzerland did not become democratic
until 1970 and 1971, respectively, because electoral restrictions were
maintained. Despite this problem, Therborn attempts to systematize some
of the structural variables which presumably relate to the development of
democratic regimes. Though he notes that contingent factors, such as war in
Europe was an important variable in bringing about a sense of national
purpose leading to bourgeois democracy, his primary emphasis is on the
emergence of certain bourgeois groups, including “an agrarian petty
bourgeosie and a small and medium agrarian bourgeoisie (those using hired
labor). The strength of these agrarian classes and the degree of their
independence from the landowning aristocracy and urban big capital were
crucial factors in the development of democracy.49 Therborn adds that the
rareness of bourgeois democracy in capitalist third world countries is due to
the vulnerability of commodity oriented economies giving the “indigenous
bourgeoisie little room for manoevre vis-a-vis the exploited classes”, a lack
of differentiation of a capitalist class dependent on the center and the
“intertwining of capitalist with feudal, slave or other pre-capitalist modes of
exploitation, as well as the combination of enclave capitalism with
subsistence farming (which) has impeded the development of the
impersonal rule of capital and free labour market, thereby seriously limiting
the growth of both the labour movement and of an agrarian small and petty
bourgeoisie.”50
Barrington Moore goes much further presenting a more complex and
sophisticated argument in attempting to explain the “democratic path” to
the modern world. Moore stresses that democracy in Britain and France
came about not only with the emergence of a bourgeois element, although
the bourgeois element was clearly central.51 For Moore, the crucial issue,
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however, is the way in which agriculture is commercialized, whether it

becomes ”labor repressive”, or “market commercial.” In the latter case,
49 Therborn, p. 24.
50 Therborn 1,32. Though he is not dealing with the development of democracy
per se, Immanuel Wallerstein argues that peripheral states in the world system were much
weaker in part because the social structure of export economies did not permit the
development of bourgeois sectors. See Wallerstein, Modern World System (New York:
Academic Press, 1974).
51 See for example his statement that “it is the development of a group in society
with an independent economic base, which attacks obstacles to a democratic version of

capitalism that have been inherited from the past.” Moore, Social Origins, p. xv.
characteristic of the English, French and U. S. cases, revolutions or the civi1

war contributed decidedly to a market agriculture, which produced allies for
more powerful and democratically inclined bourgeois sectors. However,
where “bourgeois revolutions” did not take place, and agriculture was
commercialized in a “labor repressive” fashion, as in Germany or Japan, the
stronger agrarian sectors ally with a weaker urban bourgeosie to impose a
fascist model based on exploitation of the peasantry with the use of
traditional relations of servitude. As Moore notes, for democracy to emerge
successfully “the political hegemony of the landed upper class had to be
broken or transformed. The peasant had to be turned into a farmer
producing for the market instead of for his own consumption and that of the
overlord. In this process the landed upper classes either became an
important part of the capitalist and democratic tide, as in England, or, if
they came to oppose it, they were swept aside in the convulsions of
revolution (France) or civil war (U.S.) In a word the landed upper classes
either helped to make the bourgeois revolution or were destroyed by it.”52.
As with value explanations, it is difficult to see how most available
economic explanations apply to the Chilean case. Dahl, in attempting to
account for Chilean exceptionality, argues that Chile was, like Australia and
the United States, basically a free farmer society and not a peasant society
with “a very high propensity for inequality, hierarchy, and political
hegemony.”53 However, Dahl cites no sources for this assertion, and no one
even superficially familiar with Chile would argue that its land tenure
system was one of free farmers. The fact is that Chilean agriculture well
into the twentieth century was characterized by a high concentration of
ownership and the prevalence of highly traditional serf-like relationships
between lord and peasant through the institution of the inquilinaje. While,
as Dominguez notes, Chilean agriculture was geared by the 18th century to
the export of wheat, wheat production was never commercialized like in
North America. As in czarist Russia, it was expanded with only minimal
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modifications in the traditional manorial system.54

52 Moore pp. 429-30. Moore’s analysis, though brilliant in scope, leaves much to
be desired in terms of clarity. For an extremely valuable interpretation and critique see
Theda Skocpol, “A Critical Review of Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy”, Politics and Society, Vol. 4, N° 1 (Fall, 1973), pp. 1-34. See also Ronald
Dore, “Making Sense of History”, Archive Europeenes de Sociology, Vol. X (1969), pp.
295-305. Several reviewers have questioned many of Moore’s conclusions on various cases,
and in particular the extent to which an agricultural peasant class was destroyed in England.
For instance, see Joseph V. Femia, “Barrington Moore and the Preconditions for
Democracy” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 N° 1 (January, 1972), pp. 21-46.
53 See Dahl, Polyarchy, p. 53. He repeats this in Greenstein and Polsby,
Handbook, p. 139.
54 Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty, p. 131.
By the same token, and despite some interpretations of Chilean

history that stress the rise of an urban bourgeoisie as the key liberalizing
force, Chile did not develop a strong and independent urban based
bourgeosie, which is central to Moore and other scholars.55 Throughout the
nineteenth century Chile remained a fundamentally rural economy. Chile
did depend on a mining enclave (copper and later nitrates) for much of the
its foreign exchange and for government budget reveneus. However, the
close ties of mining elements with landed elites, and the absence of a
separate industrial base, left Chile at best. in Moore’s terms, with a weak
bourgeoisie. Indeed, most of the prominent political leaders of the liberal
party depended on the state, and not on commerce or industry for their
livelihoods.
However, it is not only the absence of a large middle class and a
commercially oriented agricultural sector of free farmers and the presence
of a significant and traditional landed aristocracy which leads one to
question the applicability of the economic determinants of democracy
literature to the Chilean case. A careful examination of Chilean history
reveals that the sectors which pushed for many of the most important
reforms associated with the rise of democracy in Chile, such as limitations
on presidential authority and the concomitant expansion of legislative
prerogatives, as well as the critical expansion of suffrage, were not “liberal”
elements but “conservative” elites closely tied to the traditional landed
interests, often in alliance with a small group of ideological liberals with
whom they disagreed on most other issues. We will return to this theme in
examining more closely the key elements of the Chilean case.
Historical and Political Interpretations of the Origins of Democracy:

Lessons from the Chilean Case
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As the previous examination of cultural and economic perspectives

on the origins of democracy makes clear, both approaches are excessively
deterministic. Once the modernization process, depending on the particular
perspective, introduces either the requisite norms or values or creates the
necessary groups or social actors, then democratic alternatives are likely.
But these approaches neglect the fact that the development of democratic
institutions is highly problematic and contingent. Our examination of the
Chilean case suggests that the study of democracy must take into account
55 For interpretations attempting to fit Chilean developments into a Marxist
framework see the excellent studies of Luis Vitale and Ramirez Necochea.
certain fortuitous events as well as the role of political leadership and of

conscious choice on the part of elites. Democratic institutions owe their
development or consolidation to critical historical moments in which the
balance of political forces tilts in favor of elites and social forces often of
very different ideologies, who press for the consolidation of democratic
institutions in the expectation that they will be advantageous for
consolidating or increasing their power, safeguarding their interests, and or
resolving in the least costly manner a political crisis.56
This stress on discrete political phenomena, on the role of leadership
and on historical accidents should not be taken as a rejection of the
importance of other factors of either a normative or economic dimension.
They should not imply that the existence of a “liberal tradition” or of free
farmers, is not conducive to the development of institutions of political
contestation and participation. Nor do they mean that the existence of
traditional values, or the lack of experience in institutions of self rule, or
the existence of highly inegalitarian land tenure systems are not severe
obstacles to the establishment of representative institutions. These factors
are undoubtedly important in providing the climate, or the context, for the
development of certain kinds of political structures and practices. However,
the Chilean case, and that of other Latin American countries such as
Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Colombia, which also experienced long periods of
democratic rule at a later date, suggests that the absence of certain factors
which may be conducive to the development of democracy, and the
presense of others which may be negative, do not in themselves preclude
the emergence of institutions comparable to those that developed in the
most progressive European countries. Economic and cultural conditions
may be contributory factors; they are not sufficient ones.
A stress on historical and political variables should not be taken to
imply that we are advocating a kind of historicism —where each case can
be understood only on its own merits by delving into the past. To the
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contrary, research on the process of development of democratic institutions

should specify the major structural and ideological parameters which
constitute the context for political and contingent events. Furthermore,
while there is much which is apparently historically accidental in the
process of building democratic institutions, general patterns can be
identified in an effort to explain the conditions which lead certain political
56 Our perspective comes closest to that developed by Almond, Flanigan and
Mundt in their Crisis, Choice, and Change. Our emphasis on choice leads us to incline
more towards a rationalist view that emphasizes individual and group choice. See Ronald
Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
forces to advocate or support democratic rather than other solutions at

critical moments, and the circumstances that will help them prevail. A
perspective which holds that political factors can and should be
understood as independent variables need not eschew the economic and
cultural constants nor shy away from developing generalizations that relate
socio-economic variables to political variables or that seek to establish
uniformities in political phenomena..
In this task we are aided by considerable progress in the literature of
comparative politics which has moved away from a generalized
modernization focus and a belief in a unilinear process of political change.
In particular the most recent work of the SSRC Committee in Comparative
Politics on “crisis and development”, and studies which have focused on
the question of timing and sequence of various developmental problems,
offer much promise in helping to account for variations in patterns of regime
formation.57 As Eric Nordlinger has suggested, this literature permitted
specialists to move away from an effort to “identify a general pattern
according to which political systems develop...” to one which entails
looking “at the various developmental patterns and ask questions about
their different consequences.”58
According to the “crisis” literature, every political system faces
certain severe problems or challenges which need to be successfully
resolved in order to contribute to regime stability (implicitly or explicitly)
understood as democratic stability. Though the “crises” vary in kind and
number, most authors view the problem of national identity (creating
national over parochial loyalty), authority (the development of viable state
structures) and participation (the incorporation of the masses into the
political system) as the crucial problems. In turn, the sequence and the
timing of the appearance of these problems on the historical scene are
judged crucial to the eventual political outcome. Thus, Nordlinger argues
that the “probabilities of a political system developing in a nonviolent, non
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authoritaran, and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized

when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization
57 See Binder, et al., Crises and Sequences. For application of the framework to
various countries see Grew, Crises of Political Development. See also Dankwart Rustow, A
World of Nations (Washington: The Brooking Institution, 1967). An extremely important
contribution to the literature which attempts to relate crises to societal cleavages is
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter
Alignments: An Introduction”, in Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments
(New York: The Free Press, 1967).
58 Eric Nordlinger, “Political Development, Time Sequences and Rates of Change”,
in Jason L. Finkle and Robert W. Gable (eds.), Political Development and Social Change,
2nd Edition (New York: John Wiley, 1971).
of the central government, and then by the emergence of mass parties and a
mass electorate. With respect to rates of change, it is argued that a national
identity cannot be created in a rapid fashion and if the attempt is made, it
will lead to authoritarian abuses and widespread violence.” And, when
“mass parties are rapidly formed, and when mass electoral participation is
ushered in practically overnight, the outcome is likely to be widespread
violence and repressive rule, which make if far more difficult to establish a
democratic system and, further, assure that if such a system is established,
its stability, representativeness and decisional effectiveness will suffer.”59
The problem, however, is that these kinds of propositions remain at
too high level of abstraction to be useful in applying to a case which was
not considered in the original conceptualization, such as the Chilean case.
Indeed, the crisis literature succeeds only to a point in explaining why Chile
differed from other Latin American countries. Like other theoretical
explanations reviewed earlier, this literature treats Latin America as a
failure of democracy without coming to grips with the problem of deviant
cases in the Latin American context. Thus, Chile did not develop a strong
sense of national identity over centuries as Britain or Norway did, and was
plagued in its early years by factional, regional and family rivalries. If
national identity came about, it developed much more quickly than the
theorists imply that it can, and developed simultaneously with the
development of central authority structures- a risky process for long term
political stability.
The second half of the proposition applies much more clearly to the
Chilean case. Chile, like Britain, and unlike France, or for that matter,
Argentina or Colombia, extended suffrage slowly allowing a measured
incorporation of citizens over a long period of time. Paradoxically,
however, and contrary to the implications in the literature in question, the
slow development of the electorate in Chile, clearly sponsored by the
traditional parliamentary elites, did not contribute to a “consensual” party
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system. Though the evolution of Chile’s political institutions, the strength

of its governmental processes, and its pattern of suffrage expansion paralell
that of Britain or Norway; its partisan cleavages, which include a militant
and not a reformist working class and the development of one of the
strongest communist parties in the west, was much closer to that of France
and Italy.60
59 Nordlinger, “Political Development”, p. 458. See also Rustow, A World of
Nations.
60 For the suggestion that gradual suffrage expansion, coming on the heels of the
prior establishment of strong government authority leads to a less alienated and conflicted
party system see Nordlinger 465. See also Lipset and Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures.” J.
Toward a Revisionary Interpretation of Chilean Development
As noted earlier, Chile did not deviate substantially from the norm of
Latin American colonies. Its colonial institutions were comparable to those
of the rest of Hispanic America, and the role of a conservative church was
as strong, or stronger than in other colonies. As elsewhere, the wars of
independence were actually civil wars in which a large portion of the
politically relevant population supported the royalist cause. Indeed after the
Spanish reconquest with primarily local forces, independence came about
only when the external army of General San Martin, supported by Chilean
rebel forces, finally subdued the royalists.
And, despite the myth that Chilean elites behaved differently after
independence, Chile was characterized by fierce personal, factional, family
and regional fighting. The forces of O’Higgins clashed bitterly with those of
the Carrera brothers —a conflict which extended into mid century when
Carrera’s son was one of the leaders of the abortive civil war of 1859. And
regional interests in Copiapo and particularly Concepcion, challenged
central government authority in various civil conflicts before 1830 and in
1851 and 1859. Portales and his political allies were able to establish national
authority after the Battle of Lircay in 1830, but the establishment of such
authority, including the republican constitution of 1833, was highly teneous
and should not be taken to mean that national institutions had been
consolidated. They were clearly fragile institutions, which might have
crumbled at several key points. Indeed Portales himself was assassinated in
one of several mutinies which threatened to bring the Prieto government
down.
Four key factors, however, contributed to the success of the
authorities of the incipient state structures in warding off challenges which
would have merely reified a pattern of caudillo politics such as that found
in most neighboring countries. In the first place, Chile fought a war with
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perennial commercial rivals Peru and Bolivia in 1837 and won. The war
effort brought together in the face of a common enemy various personalities
and factions which had been on opposing sides in the War against Spain
and in the numerous skirmishes which followed. Defeat, as Encina notes,
would have brought the government down and only aggravated the latent
centrifugal forces in Chilean society. Victory, however, brought about an at
Samuel Valenzuela in his “The Chilean and French Labor Movements: A Comparative
Analyis”, Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1979, explains the non consensual
character of Chilean politics in relation to elites and cleavages.
least ternporary sense of unity among elite elements and a degree of pride
in an emerging (though clearly not fully forged) national identity.61
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the War produced a hero
who became president, leading to the first successful peaceful transition in
Chilean history, a transition aided by the fact that outgoing President Prieto
was a relative of incoming President Bulnes. What is important, however, is
not that Bulnes became president, but the fact that he deliberately
eschewed the role of charismatic leader, one which he could have easily
played in the wake of one of the few decisive military victories in Spanish
America. Instead of projecting himself as a Rosas, Santa Ana or Paez, he
followed more closely in the steps of a Washington, observing the main
features of constitutional procedures and inaugurating many elements of
Chilean institutionalization, including the use of cabinet government and
the acceptance (at times reluctant) of an expanding role for the legislature.
His willingness to step down at the end of his term, and turn over the
government to a civilian and a career civil servant, underscored his
commitment to constitutional practice.
The third factor was a sharp control of the military on the part of
government authorities. Bulnes, deliberately dismantled much of the
victorious expeditionary force to Peru, and following a pattern prevalent in
the United States, favored the growth of a national guard closely controlled
by political patronage.62 It is instructive that the Civil War of 1851 was led
by disgruntled army officers, and was put down by Bulnes himself who
turned against his former military colleagues (mostly from his native
Concepcion, the key regional challenger to the hegemony of Santiago) to
ensure the survival of government continuity.
The fourth factor is that the government in its early years did not
challenge the interests of the dominant economic groups, the landowning
aristocracy, but work effectively at ensuring the growth of the export
economy by placing the international economic and diplomatic relations of
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the nation in good order, and ensuring the development of port and shipping
facilities. National government was still very weak, and impinged little on
the autonomy of the manorial estates.
It should be emphasized, however, that these factors peculiar to the
Chilean case only helped to preclude challenges to state authority, and
61See Encina, Historia, Vol. XI, p. 483.
62For the role of the National Guard in the U.S. and the anti-military ideology,
which had strong parallels in Chile, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
(New York: Vintage Books, 1964). On the control of the military in Chile see Arturo
Valenzuela “The Chilean Political System and the Armed Forces, 1830-1920”
Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1967.
allowed state elites to weather challenges when they occurred. They do not
in themselves explain the consolidation of representative procedures and
institutions. As in other countries, powerful elites had a natural fear of any
encroachment on their interests and autonomy by the state, a feeling shared
by the catholic ultramontane Church.
Much to the chagrin of those very sectors, government elites,
drawing on their early success in surviving attempts to oust them by force,
soon began to expand their authority. It is crucial to note that government
officials, contrary to the implications in much of the Chilean historical
literature, were not tools of the landed elites, or for that matter of any elite
groups. They represented a new social formation in Chilean politics, one of
career civil servants who depended primarily on state employment for their
livelihood, and developed their own interests and their own agenda. In
essence this involved the expansion and consolidation of a secular and
autonomous state —one able to assert control over local and regional
interests and curb the privileged position of the church in temporal matters
(a position which provided much of the ideological rational for a
maintenance of the traditional inegalitarian social order).63
By the time the traditional elites realized the ramifications of state
power, it was too late for them to directly challenge it. The revolution of
1859, backed by a coalition of liberal and pro-church conservative critics of
the government, failed in its attempt to break the power of the state. The
absence of a viable military force which could have served as an ally of the
oppositions, was a crucial element in their lack of success in imposing by
force a new direction to state policies.64
The oppositions, including the Conservatives, then realized that
they had no choice but to push for an expanded and freer suffrage if they
were ever to succeed in preventing state elites from simply designating their
successors by ensuring through electoral intervention the victory of the
official state of candidates. The fact that even the conservatives had to
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resort to “liberal” practices explains one of the most extraordinary

paradoxes of Chilean histrory -the alliance in the legislature as opposition
forces of ultra-montane catholics and radical, even anticlerical liberals, both
63 For the concept of state autonomy, in relation to democratic regimes see the path-
breaking theoretical treatment by Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic

State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981). State expansion in Chile is
discussed in Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers, Chapter 8.
64 This lack of a military option is stressed strongly by Allan Silver when he argues
that the British upper class opted for suffrage reform in a similar fashion to the Chilean
Conservatives. See Silver, “Social and Ideological Bases of British Elite Reactions to
Domestic Crisis in 1829-1832”, Politics and Society, Vol. 1, N° 2 (1970-71), pp. 179-201.
seeking, for different reasons, the fulfillment of enlightenment ideals. Clearly

the Conservatives did not become democrats simply because of an
ideological conversion. They correctly perceived that representative
institutions were in their best interests and the only alternative they had
once the military solution was pecluded. They were forced to make the
liberal creed their own, because they had lost ground to a new political
class which had succeeded in gaining strength by occupying key
administrative roles in an expanding state apparatus. In turn, the Chilean
“moderate liberals” who controlled the state apparatus were not acting
irrationally when they resisted attempts to expand suffrage and maintain the
intervention of the Minister of the Interior in the electoral process. Though
many were committed to liberal ideals, they also held power and did not
wish to allow the uncertainty of results stemming from fully free elections,
especially given the misgivings over whether a government by their
opponents would not apply the same electoral intervention techniques to
preclude them from eventually returning to power. Conservatives and
opposition Radicals and Liberals thus became the champions of electoral
reforms in 1874, and Manuel Jose Irarrazabal, the leader of the Conservative
party, became the principal exponent of the Law of Municipal autonomy of
1891, which ensured landlord control of the electoral process and guaranteed
local autonomy.65 Local autonomy and electoral reform were crucial elements
in the continuing struggle of the various oppositions against the expanding
state which culminated in the Revolution of 1891 and the advent of
parliamentarianism, in which the Conservative Party, for the first time in over
half a century, became the dominant force in national politics.
Is the support of the Conservatives in Chile of liberal rules merely a
minor footnote in history? In fact it has central theoretical importance. It led
to the creation in Chile of a conservative party committed to representative
institutions with no exact paralell in Latin America or in Latin Europe. Like
Britain and Norway, but unlike Latin Europe, Chile extended suffrage
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65 The role of the Conservatives in the passage of the 1874 electoral law is
documented in J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratización. It was, in fact, Zorobabel Rodríguez

who suggested the necessary formula, the “presunción de derecho” which permitted
granting the vote to literate males —regardless of the constitutionally mandated censitary
requirements— without having to reform the Constitution. See Boletín de Sesiones de la
Cámara de Diputados, sesión ordinaria del 16 de junio de 1872, p. 24. For a discussion of
the law of Municipal autonomy see Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers, part II. A stress on
the instrumental objectives of the conservatives in supporting suffrage expansion should
not be taken to mean that the leading proponents did not firmly believe in suffrage as an
ideological commitment. The key is that the ideological proponents were able to succeed
because their political objetives coincided with those of a majority of the Conservative
group —many of whom were skeptical of liberalizing trends.
gradually, less in response to pressures from below than as a consequence

of elite strategies to maximize electoral gain in the absence of alternative and
less peaceful strategies. And like Britain, but unlike Latin Europe, Chile
found in the elites of the Conservative party (the party of rural, clerical
defense) a driving force behind the first pivotal extension of suffrage in
1874. This took place a dozen years before the Third Republic teetered on
the brink with Boulangism and 25 years before the French right, still
resisting republicanism and democracy, was in the throes of the Dreyfus
affair. It took place 40 years before the Pope lifted the non-expedit barring
catholics from participating in Italian elections, and 42 years before the
Saenz Peña Law in Argentina forced reluctant conservatives to allow an
electoral system to bring Radicals into the political process. And, though
the Argentine conservatives left office in the wake of their electoral defeat,
they maintained a close alliance with the military which continued in the
twentieth century, as it was in the nineteenth, to be a dominant feature of
Argentine politics.
If the party of the traditional land owning class and of clerical
defense went the route of suffrage and supported the development of
democratic institutions, can it really be said that the contextual economic or
cultural factors explain the political differences between the United States,
Britain and Sweeden on the one hand and Latin Europe on the other? This
leads to a central proposition of this study: the evolution of democratic
institutions and procedures is determined more by the opportunities which
significant elites have to gain power, and the positions that afford power,
rather than cultural or economic factors. It is the result of the interplay of
certain choices which are arrived at given a variety of options and
constraints.
This study will document this alternative view of the evolution of
Chilean politics outlined above, carrying forward the implications of
Chilean developments for political trends in the twentieth century, including
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the rise of working class parties and eventually the breakdown of Chilean
democracy. As noted in the introduction, it is also the intention of this study
to elaborate from the Chilean case a series of propositions which can serve
as a guide for comparative analysis with other cases, both in Latin America
and in Europe without which it would be difficult to isolate those features
of this framework which speak to the generic problem of the origins and
evolution of democratic regimes.
In elaborating this guide we begin with the assumption that our
analysis is only applicable to historical cases where strong pre-democratic
regimes existed, and thus exclude cases like the United States or Australia
which as fragments of Europe left the anti-democratic forces behind. While

we would argue that even in these latter cases the path to democratization
needs to be explained in political as well as in cultural terms, the political
forces involved and the various cultural, structural and economic
constraints in the road to democracy are fundamentaly different from
democratization in contexts where preexisting anti-democratic elements
held away.
Focusing on regimes with strong pre-democratic forces there seem
to be two routes which 19th Century regimes took toward a democratic
outcome. In the first one there was a sharp political discontinuity as the
forces opposed to democracy resisted transformation and excluded new
social elements and classes from the political process, forcing the latter to
push their way onto the historical stage by destroying or attempting to
destroy old procedures and institutions. In the second route pre-democratic
or openly anti-democratic forces chose (or were forced) to become
supporters or even champions of democratic rules and procedures in order
to assure their continuing influence in the body politic. The first route is
dotted with breakdowns and new beginnings and was followed by most
major Latin European and American countries. The second route gives the
impression of a gradual and incremental evolution toward democracy and
contributed to the consolidation of long standing democratic institutions. It
was followed by Great Britain, and Chile. A major difference between the
two lies in the fact that the second route typically lead to strong
conservative parties, a result of traditional elite sponsorship of mass
mobilization and its ability to adapt to the requirements of electoral
competition.
Based on our examination of the Chilean case, the conditions
favoring the second route, which comparative research can help clarify,
modify and elaborate further, include the following: First, liberal or
democratic institutions, as they were in the 19th century must be perceived
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as sufficiently legitimate and prevalent so that different groups could adapt

them to their cause, a condition which may be problematic in the Twentieth
Century where alternative models such as the Communist one are viewed
not only as tenable, but perhaps desirable. Second, it is necessary that the
pre-democratic state develops to the point that the actions of its agents
have develops a decisive impact, either favorably or unfavorably on the
interests of elites throughout the national territory. This pressures the elites
to devise strategies to control the influence of state agents, which becomes
particularly important once a third condition develops, namely, the
emergence of sharp conflicts between different and clear cut factions
among the elites in which control of the state becomes decisive in

advancing or protecting different interests. A fourth condition is that
aggrieved sectors of the elites should be precluded from the possibility of
resorting to a secessionist movement or of capturing the state through the
use of force, forcing them to turn to democratic rules in procedures to gain
the upper hand. These conditions say nothing about the specific interests of
the various factions or of their basic progams, fo these can vary widely.
In sum, a deviant case in Latin America which fails to conform to
many of the generalizations found in the social science literature which
attempts to explain the origins and evolutions of democratic politics is in a
unique position to provide insights which can be used to formulate an
alternative perspective focusing on the interplay of contextual features of a
cultural and economic character and more discrete political phenomena.
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STUDY

THE ORIGINS OF DEMOCRACY: THEORETICAL

Arturo Valenzuela and

ARTURO V ALENZUELA. Duke University.

Estudios Públicos, 12 (autumn 1983).

A fter World War II there was a fundamental shift in the analysis

Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”, American

Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science Volume 3 (Reading, Mass.:

closely ranked countries are any different in level of development.

The Chilean case is the most intriguing of the two, because it so

The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

Elements of Chilean Exceptionality

characteristic, “participation” or “inclusiveness”, refers to the degree of

13 This dimension is close to Rokkan's argument that “incorporation and

sessions of the legislature to consider initiatives of his choosing and had

The gradual development of parliamentary accountability of the

legislation in order to force policy changes. After the victory of

limited. In 1846, approximately 2% of the population voted, a figure which

15 Epstein, Political Parties, p. 1924.

conservadores y la expansión del sufragio en el siglo diecinueve chileno (Buenos Aires:

Cultural and Economic Interpretations of the Origins of Democracy:

The emergence of institutions of participation and contestation is a

or economic determinants as the major explanatory variables in accounting

Value explanations have figured prominently in efforts to explain the

North American colonies. In his highly influential interpretation of United

incidence of pluralism and democracy is related to the incidence of those

American situation than elsewhere... In Russia and Latin America

constitutions” adopted at the time, most of Spanish America fell into

26 Morse, in Hartz, p. 161.

by large landed estates with semi-feudal class relations. The wars of

standard accounts in Chilean historiography, holds more specifically that

30 See Jorge I. Dominguez, Insurrection or Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University

Independence Movement”, Hahr, Volume 56, # 1 (February 1976).

contemporary Europe, let alone the patrimonial regime of 18th Century

The failure of cultural explanations to account for the Chilean case

the Latin American context. Stepan, for instance, presents a typology of

political system must be congruent with authority patterns in society.

While there is a broad variation in studies emphasizing the economic

turned from a preoccupation with democracy to a consideration of the more universal

Thus, most of the studies in the literature on “empirical democratic”

Century with current underdeveloped countries. See Dahl Polyarchy, p. 72.

“social structural” as opposed to “cultural” explanation. He notes that the

45 Lipset, “Values Education and Entrepreneurship”, in Lipset and Solari, p. 11. It

Latin American underdevelopment to inappropriate values which can only be overcome

origins of democracy, it is frustrating because of the lack of systematic attention to causal

authoritarian state structures. His analysis, however, is flawed by an overly

however, is the way in which agriculture is commercialized, whether it

with an independent economic base, which attacks obstacles to a democratic version of

characteristic of the English, French and U. S. cases, revolutions or the civi1

modifications in the traditional manorial system.54

By the same token, and despite some interpretations of Chilean

Historical and Political Interpretations of the Origins of Democracy:

As the previous examination of cultural and economic perspectives

certain fortuitous events as well as the role of political leadership and of

contrary, research on the process of development of democratic institutions

56 Our perspective comes closest to that developed by Almond, Flanigan and

forces to advocate or support democratic rather than other solutions at

authoritaran, and eventually democratically viable manner are maximized