TPL 069 Abb Yn1m 301 542 Zab P0
TPL 069 Abb Yn1m 301 542 Zab P0
TPL 069 Abb Yn1m 301 542 Zab P0
10 FIRST ISSUE RK DD
REV. / ISSUE DATE DESCRIPTION PREP APPD
REVISION
PROJECT TITLE
TPL’S CONSULTANT
TENDER
FOR
Table of Contents:
1 Introduction......................…………………………………………………………………....3
2 Technical data................................................................................................................3
3 Description of one and half breaker………………………………………………………..3
4 Master List of Document…………………………………………………………………….6
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1 Introduction
The 400kV Switchyard provided for evacuation of power generated at Krishnapatnam plant, is of
conventional one and half circuit breaker switching scheme, comprising 2 Nos. of Station transformers, 2
sets of Generator transformers, 2 Nos. of Bus Reactors and 6 Nos. of lines evacuating power to
APTransco grid.
2 Technical Data
Control supply voltages envisaged for different Equipments
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The protection are segregated into Group-A and Group-B electrically and physically. Dedicated CT and
CVT cores along with independent DC (from battery/chargers) for each of Group-A and Group-B
protections are provided to achieve redundancy (refer Figure-2)
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2 Nos. Relay panels with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
a) Main-1 Distance protection IED – REL670 (Non switched 5 zone with Quadrilateral characteristic)
b) Main-2 Distance protection IED – REL670 (Non switched 5 zone With Mho characteristic)
Control for Bay level equipment (Circuit breaker, Isolators and Earth switch)
Synchronising/energising Check
Auto-reclosure
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a) Trip matrix
b) Auto-reclose logic
c) Direct Trip Send logic,
The distance protection has selectable communication schemes for permissive carrier intertrip/blocking.
The main 1 & 2 protections are on separate DC (i.e battery/chargers) along with respective 1 & 3 phase
trip units and trip coils 1 & 2.
For faults on line, protection trip commands are issued via trip units to main and tie breakers faulted
phase.
Auto-reclosure facility (either 1 or 3 phase selectable) is available in the bay controller for reclosure under
line faults. Auto reclosure is started for Zone -1 (or) carrier aided trip for faults within the line section. The
main and tie breakers tripped under this event has to be reclosed sequentially. For this purpose “Priority
circuit” feature is available which allows closing of one breaker first ( preferably main breaker) and upon
successful closing of main breaker the tie breaker is allowed to close subsequently.
Besides “Memory” feature is built in the bay controller which prevents auto-reclosing of the breaker which
was open prior to fault occurrence.(Refer Figure-3)
Auto recloser is blocked for definite trips like LBB operation, back-up protection trip, busbar trip, over
voltage trip, zone 2/3 faults, carrier fail, direct trip receive, breaker problems.
In the event of DC fail to the bay controller (having reclosing function), any single phase faults is
converted to three phase trip, due to non availability of auto reclosure.
Protection operated from over voltage, directional earth fault, stub protection, intertrip receive are definite
trips energizing 3 phase lockout relays, which in turn trip the main & tie breaker.
Direct inter trip send is initiated to remote end for local breaker stuck to isolate faulted line section. Direct
trip can also be initiated for manual trip, busbar trip when lines are long.
Necessary contacts are provided from protections for alarm annunciations in backup control panel and
Scada. (Refer Alarm List Annexure-E)
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2 Nos. Relay panels with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
c) Bay control unit REC 670 with binary input/output cards, mA modules
Control for Bay level equipment (Circuit breaker, Isolators and Earth switch)
Synchronising/energising Check
Transformer tap raise/lower
d) Latch relay with Trip circuit supervision for 3Ph trip GR-A (86A & 95A)
e) Latch relay with Trip circuit supervision for 3Ph trip GR-B (86B & 95B)
f) High Speed Inter-trip relay 1No.for each LV (86LV1 & 86LV2)
g) Trip circuit supervision relays (3 Nos.) for supervision of Breaker Trip coil-1 (95-1 R/Y/B)
h) Trip circuit supervision relays (3 Nos.) for supervision of Breaker Trip coil-2 (95-2 R/Y/B)
i) DC supervision relay (2 Nos.) for monitoring of protection DC. (80A/B)
j) Auxiliary relay with flag indication for Transformer protection like Buchholz, WTI, OTI, LOL, Cooler
trouble, DC fail, OLTC trouble, Fire protection etc required as per ST drg.
a) Trip matrix
b) HV/LV inter trip logic
c) Voltage selection logic.
The ST protections are grouped and put on seperate DC (i.e battery/chargers) along with respective 3
phase trip units and trip coils 1 & 2.
For faults in transformer, protection trip commands are issued via trip units to main and tie breakers.
Selection of bus CVT is done through main &/or tie breaker of corresponding diameter, and caters to
metering/ protections
Protection operated from differential, REF, Teed, directional over current & earth fault, over fluxing,
standby earth fault (HV & LV) protection, transformer trouble trips energize 3 phase lockout relays, which
in turn trips the HV and Tie breaker. Besides above protection trip is also routed to inter trip the LV
breakers.
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Closing of LV breakers is feasible only when HV side is closed, and LV breakers are tripped in event of
HV side trips.
Necessary contacts are provided from protections for alarm annunciations in backup control panel and
Scada. (Refer Alarm List Annexure-E)
6.3 400kV Bus-Reactor Protection & Relay panel (in APPDCL scope)
Following item is supplied loose, to be mounted in the Protection & Relay panel being supplied by
APPDCL.
Control for Bay level equipment (Circuit breaker, Isolators and Earth switch)
Synchronising/energising Check
1 No. Relay panel with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
b) Bay control unit REC 670 with binary input/output cards, mA modules
Control for Bay level equipment (Circuit breaker, Isolators and Earth switch)
Synchronising/energising Check
Transformer tap raise/lower
c) Trip circuit supervision relays (3 Nos.) for supervision of Breaker Trip coil-1 (95-1 R/Y/B)
d) Trip circuit supervision relays (3 Nos.) for supervision of Breaker Trip coil-2 (95-2 R/Y/B)
e) DC supervision relay (2 Nos.) for monitoring of protection DC (80A/B)
f) Auxiliary relay with flag indication for each phase of Transformer protection like Buchholz, WTI,
OTI, LOL, Cooler trouble, DC fail, OCTC trouble, Fire protection etc required as per GT drg.
a) Trip matrix
b) Voltage selection logic.
All the GT and generator protection panels are in MELCO scope of supply in Main control room. The
protection trips (Class A,B,C ) is routed to the Switchyard GT relay panel and tie relay panel. The trip
circuit supervision relays are interfaced with the trip contacts received from MELCO panel and routed
to the main breaker & tie breaker.
3 Nos.self reset contacts of 87OH protection operated will be provided to MELCO for their class A trip
logics. GT trouble relays in SCR are provided mainly for alarm contacts to backup control panel and
Scada. No trip logics envisaged in SCR for 87OH and transformer trouble relays.(2 sets of transformer
trouble alarm and trip contacts to be made available from GT to MELCO panel & SCR)
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Necessary contacts are provided from MELCO protections for alarm annunciations in backup control
panel and Scada. (Refer Alarm List Annexure-E)
1No. Relay panel with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
Control for Bay level equipment (Circuit breaker, Isolators and Earth switch)
Synchronising/energising Check
Auto-reclosure
Breaker failure protection
The 1 & 3 phase tie trip units and trip coils 1 & 2. are on seperate DC (i.e battery/chargers).
Initiation for tie trip units is from diameter bay protections. The protections in the bays are as listed below.
I. Lines – Distance, Over voltage, directional earth fault, stub protection, negative sequence, inter
trip receive
II. Station transformer - Differential, REF, Teed, directional over current & earth fault, over fluxing,
standby earth fault (HV & LV) protection, transformer trouble trips
III. Generator transformer - The protection trips (Class A,B,C ) from MELCO panels, including 87OH
trip sent from SCR.
IV. Bus Reactor (APPDCL scope) - Differential, REF, Teed, backup impedance, over current & earth
fault, reactor trouble trips
The trip unit in tie issues trip command to tie breakers (single phase trip to faulted phase in case of Line/
all 3 phases in case of ST, GT, BR and definite trips of lines)
Auto-reclosure facility (either 1 or 3 phase selectable) is available in the bay controller for reclosure under
line faults. Auto reclosure is started for Zone -1 (or) carrier aided trip for faults within the line section. The
main and tie breakers tripped under this event has to be reclosed sequentially. For this purpose “Priority
circuit” feature is available which allows closing of one breaker first ( preferably main breaker) and upon
successful closing of main breaker the tie breaker is allowed to close subsequently.
Besides “Memory” feature is built in the bay controller which prevents auto-reclosing of the breaker which
was open prior to fault occurrence.(Refer Figure-3)
Auto recloser is blocked for definite trips like LBB operation, back-up protection trip, busbar trip, over
voltage trip, zone 2/3 faults, carrier fail, direct trip receive, breaker problems.
In the event of DC fail to the bay controller (having reclosing function), any single phase faults is
converted to three phase trip, due to non availability of auto reclosure.
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Breaker fail of Tie breaker initiates trip of both main breakers in the diameter and remote end breakers..
In case of lines direct inter trip send is initiated to remote end for local breaker stuck to isolate faulted line
section. Direct trip can also be initiated for manual trip, busbar trip when lines are long.
In case of station transformer, closing of LV breakers is feasible only when HV side is closed, and LV
breakers are tripped in event HV side trips.
Necessary contacts are provided for alarm annunciations in backup control panel and Scada. (Refer
Alarm List Annexure-E)
.
6.6 400kV Bus bar protection panel:
2 Nos. Relay panels with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
a) Bus-bar Protection IED, REB670 for Main Bus-1 & 2 catering to 6 bays on each bus (87B)
b) Bus-bar Protection IED, REB670 for Main Bus-1 & 2 catering to 6 bays on each bus (87CH)
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3 Nos. Control panel with dead front and rear access. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 1000 x 2250 x 1000mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) AV pad 15mm(Tk)
The panel shall have sealing facility.
a) 12Nos. Tariff Meter, with ABT feature & meeting the CEA regulations (2 Nos each for 6 Line
bays for Main & Check Metering)
Accuracy class of 0.2S
Import/Export MWH and MVARH
4 Quadrant
3 phase, 3 element, 4 wire
Optical port
Shall have suitable port preferably RS485 for interfacing with Scada/DCS
Retransmitting contacts
b) 4Nos. Tariff Meter, with ABT feature & meeting the CEA regulations (2 Nos each for 2 GT bays
for Main & Standby Metering)
Accuracy class of 0.2S
Import/Export MWH and MVARH
4 Quadrant
3 phase, 3 element, 4 wire
Optical port
Shall have suitable port preferably RS485 for interfacing with Scada/DCS
Retransmitting contacts
c) 4Nos. Tariff Meter, with ABT feature & meeting the CEA regulations (2 Nos each for 2 ST bays
for Main & Standby Metering)
Accuracy class of 0.2S
Import/Export MWH and MVARH
4 Quadrant
3 phase, 3 element, 4 wire
Optical port
Shall have suitable port preferably RS485 for interfacing with Scada/DCS
Retransmitting contacts
d) 1No. Meter reading instrument(MRI) for down loading the data from tariff meter.
e) 20Nos. 3Phase, 3 element, 4 wire, Test terminal block link type for above meters
The Tariff metering data is made available on Scada & also communicate with remote SLDC/RLDC
through COM500 gateway using IEC 60870-5-101 (slave) protocol.
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Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 750 x 900 x 1050mm (WxHxD)
1No. Relay panel with front transparent perspex door. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 800 x 2250 x 800mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Tk)
1 No. Control panel with dead front and rear access. Degree of protection -- IP54
Paint shade Exterior -- Semi glossy RAL 7032, Interior – Glossy White
Dimension: 1000 x 2250 x 1000mm (WxHxD) with Base Frame 47mm (H) & AV pad 15mm(Thk)
j) Metering consisting of
2Nos. Digital ammeter (direct reading)
2Nos. Digital Voltmeter (direct reading)
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Note:- Bus Metering under (i) is provided in only one Back-up Control panel
The back-up control panel has switches for open/close of switchyard breakers, isolators and status
indication. Earth switches are locally controlled (Control level 0) and only status indicated. Besides
bay metering, alarm annunciations, synchronizing of breakers are available on control panel.
Synchronising/Energising check is performed via Synchronising Trolley plugged to synchronizing
socket.
With switchyard equipment Local/Remote switch selected to “Remote” the control authority will be
transferred to respective back-up control panel. Further hierarchy control can be selected from
lockable control switch CP-OFF-BCU-SCADA.
Hard wired interlocks are built in bay marshalling kiosk (BMK) and command issued from back-up
control panel (Control level 1). All control cables from SCR to equipment are made through BMK.
Control of generator transformer breaker as well as synchronizing is only from main control room in
TG building. Necessary VT supplies will be extended from switchyard to Main Unit control room for
synchronizing purposes.Similar philosophy is applicable for the Tie breaker (GT-Tie-Line diameter)
when exclusively functioning as generator breaker (i.e Not as normal tie). Hard wired signal from
GCP identifying tie breaker being used as generator breaker to provided, to block tie breaker
operation from switchyard.
The following logics in Annexure-D & E provided guidelines for Scheme functioning
a) Breaker closing logic
b) Breaker synchronising logic
c) Isolator & earth switch interlocking logic
d) Alarm annunciation list
The SAS provides facility to monitor the complete 400kV Switchyard Protections, Control &
Synchronization of the Bay equipments from Switchyard control room as well as from Main control
room. However a simultaneous control from both the control rooms is not possible.
The SAS is based on ABB make MicroSCADA Pro software running on a redundant hot standby
mode on two industrial PCs with Microsoft Windows 2003 server Operating System. In addition the
SAS system, integrated Gateways are also provided on IEC 60870-5-101 (Slave) protocol and OPC
(SAS as Server) connectivity for interfacing to Main plant DCS.
System Architecture
For safety and availability reasons the SAS is based on a decentralized architecture and on a concept
of bay-oriented, distributed intelligence. Functions are decentralized, object-oriented and located as
close to the process as possible.
Station Level
The hardware of the station level system provided for the 400kV Switchyard control room consists of
the following:
The SAS conforms to IEC 61850 standards and has a decentralized architecture consisting of the
following main functional parts:
A redundant PC based HMI (Main/standby controller / Operator work station) enables local station
control through the software package MicroSCADA Pro, which contains an extensive range of SCADA
functions. The operator workstation HMI depicts the complete 400kV switchyard real time graphic
mimic diagram. Within the SAS it is possible to work from both Operator workstations at any point of
time and with the failure of Main controller the operations can be monitored from the Standby
Controller.
The SCADA system is having special user functions such as station single line diagram, overviews,
control of circuit breakers and isolators, alarm lists and event lists, logging of historical data for trends
and reports.
Within the SAS, inter bay bus provides independent station-to-bay and bay-to-bay data exchange.
Disturbance evaluation software and MicroSCADA application is provided in the Main Control Room.
The application server automatically downloads the DR data from the IEDs in the pre-defined time
intervals. The downloading of DR data can also be done manually on operator’s request.
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An authorization mechanism prevents system access to unauthorized users and allows assignment of
a number of authorization levels. This makes certain functions accessible only to those users who
have the required level of authorization.
The control hierarchy and control levels of the SAS shall be based on the logical structure of the SAS,
shown below
Local/Remote switch is provided in the Switchyard equipment. When the switch is set to Remote, the
control authority will be transferred to the respective back-up control panel
For all bays Local-CP-OFF-BCU-SCADA switch is provided on the backup control panel. When the
switch is set to BCU, the control authority will be transferred to the respective BCU. Synchronizing/
Energising check is performed in the BCU.
Local-CP-OFF-BCU-SCADA switch is provided on backup control panel. When the switch is set to
SCADA, the control authority will be transferred to SCADA HMI.
Bay Level
A bay comprises of one circuit breaker and associated disconnectors, earth switches and instrument
transformers. At bay level, the IEDs provide all bay level functions like control (command outputs),
monitoring (status indications, measured values) and protection. The IEDs are directly connected to
the primary equipment without any need for additional interposing devices or transducers.
Each bay control IED is independent of the others and its functioning is not affected by any fault
occurring in any of the other bay control units of the station.
Ethernet switches are provided for Bay level connection in the SAS System. The connection from
each IED to the switch is by a single fibre optic link. The switches are connected in a fault tolerant ring
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topology. At the station level, to provide communication redundancy, two Ethernet switches are used
to connect the redundant HMI and other station level equipment.
The data exchange among bay level IEDs and between bay level and station level take place via the
fibre-optic inter bay bus according to IEC 61850-8-1 standard. The use of fibre-optic LAN guarantees
disturbance-free communication.
Though, at station level, the entire station is controlled and supervised from the station HMI, it is
possible to control and monitor the bay from the bay level, when the control authority is set
appropriately. The decentralized architecture ensures that station wide interlocking is available even
when the station computer fails.
Clear control priorities prevent the initiation of simultaneous operation of a single equipment from
more than one of the various control levels, i.e. MCR, SCADA, BCU, CP or Equipment level. The
priority is on the lowest enabled control level. The operation also depends on the status of other
functions like interlocking, synchrocheck, etc., as applicable.
a. Uninterruptible power supply system will cater to critical AC loads like SCADA operator stations
in switchyard control room.
b. UPS will be of “parallel redundant with static bypass to regulated supply” with 2x100% SMF
battery, 2x100% battery charger, inverter, static bypass switch, and regulated AC sinusoidal
supply.
c. UPS battery will be Lead acid type and will be rated for 1 hour backup.
d. The supply required for the computers in Main control room shall be taken from UPS supply
available in main control room.
e. UPS will be single phase and rated for connected loads and with a loading factor of 1.25.
f. Output voltage waveform will be sinusoidal (<1% accuracy over entire load) with AC harmonic
content 230V+/-5% total & +/-3% for any single harmonic. Frequency regulation will be +/-0.5%
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ANNEXURE - A
LINE BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - A
LINE BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - B
ST BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - B
ST BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - C
GT BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
LINE BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
ST BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
GT BAY
INDIA
ANNEXURE - D
INDIA
ST BAY
INDIA
GT BAY
INDIA
KEYS
INITIATING SIGNAL -COMMUNICATION
INITIATING SIGNAL -HARDWIRED/COMMUNICATION
RECEIVING SIGNAL -HARDWIRED/COMMUNICATION
RECEIVING SIGNAL -COMMUNICATION
TRIP SIGNAL
INDIA